British Army Units under US Army Control: Interoperability Issues

A Monograph

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14. ABSTRACT

World War II laid the foundations for a ?special relationship? between the UK and US, with security being its primary purpose. Since the end of that war, the threat of Soviet expansion caused it to deepen. Time changed the balance of the relationship, with Britain firmly becoming the junior partner. A side effect of this was that British troops were placed under US control during both the Korean and Gulf Wars. This monograph initially looks at the relationship to see if this situation could reoccur. As it finds that it is likely to reoccur, the remainder of the paper is used to identify issues that could reduce the efficiency of such a combined force in the future. In order to do this the Korean War is used as a case study. This war was chosen as it was the first and arguably the most complex operation to have seen British forces under US control. This paper finds that although the Armies were of equal capability, friction developed between the formation headquarters. The monograph speculates that the primary cause of this friction was a lack of understanding of the implicit intent of either side, which in turn led to occasional misunderstandings and inefficiencies. The monograph then looks at the forces in 2001 to see if the issues of 1950 remain relevant. Before conducting that comparison, it reviews the intervening fifty years. The paper notes that the problems identified in Korea were not as prevalent during the Gulf War. It argues that this was primarily because of NATO experiences and the use of an integrated staff. This chapter concludes by comparing the forces of both eras and finds the forces of 2001 to be in a far better position than those of the 1950?s. However, it highlights that the bedrock of this position lies in the residual NATO experiences of its senior commanders, which is not being systematically replaced under the current education and training systems. The last chapter looks forward to the future and proposes that the reduction in the tactical intensity of NATO may well produce senior commanders who are not as well prepared for the complexities of multinational warfighting command as their predecessors. This, together with the increasing unilateral training focus of the US Army could create a situation that is similar to the one that US and UK forces found in 1950 on the Korean peninsular. The monograph argues that it could in fact be even worse. This is as a result of the emerging doctrinal desire for near simultaneous deployment and employment coupled with the observation that the political and public will of the future is unlikely to be as understanding of mistakes as that of the 1950?s. The paper concludes by proposing that a deeper exchange program combined with greater combined training, specifically at the formation level using simulation and video teleconferencing systems, is the most realistic method of mitigating the potential effect of this situation.

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ABSTRACT

BRITISH FORCES UNDER US CONTROL: INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES by MAJ Douglas M. Chalmers, R IRISH, 53 pages.

World War II laid the foundations for a 'special relationship' between the UK and US, with security being its primary purpose. Since the end of that war, the threat of Soviet expansion caused it to deepen. Time changed the balance of the relationship, with Britain firmly becoming the junior partner. A side effect of this was that British troops were placed *under* US control during both the Korean and Gulf Wars. This monograph initially looks at the relationship to see if this situation could reoccur. As it finds that it *is* likely to reoccur, the remainder of the paper is used to identify issues that could reduce the efficiency of such a combined force in the future.

In order to do this the Korean War is used as a case study. This war was chosen as it was the first and arguably the most complex operation to have seen British forces under US control. This paper finds that although the Armies were of equal capability, friction developed between the formation headquarters. The monograph speculates that the primary cause of this friction was a lack of understanding of the implicit intent of either side, which in turn led to occasional misunderstandings and inefficiencies.

The monograph then looks at the forces in 2001 to see if the issues of 1950 remain relevant. Before conducting that comparison, it reviews the intervening fifty years. The paper notes that the problems identified in Korea were not as prevalent during the Gulf War. It argues that this was primarily because of NATO experiences and the use of an integrated staff. This chapter concludes by comparing the forces of both eras and finds the forces of 2001 to be in a far better position than those of the 1950's. However, it highlights that the bedrock of this position lies in the residual NATO experiences of its senior commanders, which is not being systematically replaced under the current education and training systems.

The last chapter looks forward to the future and proposes that the reduction in the tactical intensity of NATO may well produce senior commanders who are not as well prepared for the complexities of multinational warfighting command as their predecessors. This, together with the increasing unilateral training focus of the US Army could create a situation that is similar to the one that US and UK forces found in 1950 on the Korean peninsular. The monograph argues that it could in fact be even worse. This is as a result of the emerging doctrinal desire for near simultaneous deployment and employment coupled with the observation that the political and public will of the future is unlikely to be as understanding of mistakes as that of the 1950's. The paper concludes by proposing that a deeper exchange program combined with greater combined training, specifically at the formation level using simulation and video teleconferencing systems, is the most realistic method of mitigating the potential effect of this situation.

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CHAPTER ONE

OVERVIEW

Introduction

On the 25th of June 1950, the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) initiating the Korean war. The US immediately committed combat forces to support the ROK government and four days later, on the 29th, Britain dispatched naval forces to operate under the US fleet.[1] Subsequently, the British government enhanced this commitment by endorsing the dispatch of a Brigade group to operate under a US commander. By the end of the war, three years later, Britain had contributed a total of 81,084 service men and women to the Korean theatre.[2] This military commitment was made quickly and efficiently, although many had initially regarded it as a distant obligation.[3]

At the center of the policy that led to this commitment was the shared vision that had been forged during World War II between the US and Britain. This translated itself into a working relationship that continued after 1945 as both nations identified the Soviet bloc as the primary threat to world stability and Europe as the primary theatre. However, following the Second World War the British Empire shrunk dramatically whilst the US,

[1] The fleets combined on the 1st of July with the first British airstrike being launched on the 3rd. Anthony Farrar Hockley. *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume One – A Distant Obligation* (London: HMSO, 1990), 64.

[2] The average standing commitment at any one time was 27,000. 1,078 were killed, 2,674 were wounded and 1,060 were taken as POWs (of which 82 died in captivity). Ibid., 491.

[3] To which Prime Minister Attlee replied ‘ Distant – yes, but nonetheless an obligation.’ Ibid., 33.

through her constantly increasing economic and military strength, rose steadily to a position of unparalleled power in the western world. In short, although Britain was still a world player she no longer had the military power of the 1940's, she was now very firmly a junior partner and no longer an equal.[4] The first test of this change in the balance of the relationship came in 1950 with the Korean War.

The Problem

Since the Korean War the UK's global responsibilities have continued to shrink. This shrinkage has been reflected in the armed forces, which have been reduced to a level of manning not seen since the days of Marlborough in the 18th century.[5] It is important to note that this drawdown has not occurred because of a decline in Britain's global interests but rather in that of her global responsibilities. The observation that the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has not drawn down is ample proof that these interests remain at the heart of the UK's foreign policy.

Against this decline of British military strength has been the rise of the US to its lone super power status. Despite this, as in the 1950's, these two nations continue to remain linked by what is a generally comparable foreign policy. In executing this policy, Britain's diplomatic tool (reliant in no small degree upon her seat on the United Nations Security Council) has enabled her to retain a diplomatically strong if not equal position to the US. However, militarily she has clearly become inferior due to the size of her forces, which in turn limits the scope of crises that can be dealt with unilaterally by her.

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[4] This junior partner position was dramatically underlined by the Suez Crisis, the result of which has done much to shape relations, at least from the UK's perspective, since. A good short summary of this crisis can be found in Sir Robin Renwick's book *Fighting With Allies* (London: Times Books, Random House, 1996), 216 to 221.

[5] Tim Butcher. *Red Line at its thinnest since days of Wellington.* Daily Telegraph, Saturday 12th August 2000, 14.

Consequently, she has firmly adopted the lead nation approach for large-scale multinational combat operations. Relevant, but not formally linked to this is the reality that the US is the only western nation that has the depth of resources to undertake the lead nation role for large-scale war fighting operations in 2001.[6]

Purpose of the Study

From the above paragraphs two basic assumptions can be drawn. First, that the similarity of the foreign policies of the two nations is likely to lead to future crises where the vital interests of both are affected. Second, that the US military capability is likely to ensure that if British forces are deployed to such a crisis they will be placed *under* US control. The Korean War was the first campaign to be conducted along these lines and arguably the most complex to date.[7] Therefore, a study of the British Army units placed under US control during that conflict might well reveal areas of friction that reduced the potential efficiency of the combined force. If these assumptions are accepted, a review of these areas has obvious utility in 2001. Therefore, the purpose of this monograph is to conduct that research by asking does a study of the British units under US control during the Korean War identify any interoperability issues that remain applicable today?

Outline and Scope of the Study

Four subordinate questions support and enable this question to be answered. These are (1) does the tactical scenario of British forces under US control remain relevant in

[6] For the purpose of this paper a large-scale operation is defined as one that involves more that one Division and utilizes a headquarters of at least Corps level.

[7] This complexity stems, particularly in reference with the UK/US relationship from a divergence of opinion at the grand strategic level. Firstly the UK had recognized China whilst the US had not, secondly the US (specifically MacArthur) saw a larger war whilst the UK wished to keep it limited. This led to direct disagreement over MacArthur, which was perceived to be one of the contributing factors in his removal. At the tactical level the uncertainty of UN success obviously added to its complexity.

2001? (2) What were the interoperability issues during the Korean War? (3) Do they remain applicable in 2001? (4) Will they remain applicable or change in the future? The paper will be structured to explore these questions by being divided into five chapters. In order to give the paper relevance, chapter 2 answers question one through a deeper review of the diplomatic and military relationships that exist between the US and UK. Chapter 3 reviews the War itself, identifying the main interoperability issues. Chapter 4 assesses the applicability of these issues in the year 2001 and lastly, chapter 5, looks into the future to identify any potential changes. It will conclude with a series of proposals/recommendations.

To enable focus on purely warfighting issues, this paper limits itself in two ways. First, it only studies the issues faced by the two Armies on conventional operations. Second, when looking forward this paper focuses on operations that might take place outside of the NATO alliance arena and therefore conducted by a coalition force rather than through an alliance structure. The alternative, NATO structures operating outside of its area of responsibility, is acknowledged but placed beyond the scope of this paper. It is also accepted that the European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI) intends to create a European capability in the future. However, the stated aim of this force is peacekeeping or enforcement and not war fighting, thus it falls outside the remit of this monograph.[8]

Doctrine Review

The criteria used to identify interoperability issues have been drawn from the guidance given in the various current doctrine publications of the United Kingdom,

[8] The Helsinki Summit defined the potential roles for the force – the so called Petersberg Tasks. A summary of these can be accessed on the web at http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/homeen.htm

United States and NATO concerning multinational operations. Specifically these publications are (1) *The United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations - JWP 0-10* (2) *The US Army in Multinational Operations - FM 100-8* and lastly (3) *The NATO Allied Joint Operations Doctrine – AJP-01*. All three of these publications use General Eisenhower's statement that 'mutual confidence is the one thing that makes an allied command work' to articulate that confidence is the key to multinational operations. They further specify that that this confidence stems from a series of intangibles. These are: (1) rapport, (2) respect, (3) knowledge of partners, (4) patience, with only FM 100-8 listing a fifth, appropriateness of missions. These intangibles are defined in a similar manner in all three publications, a summary of these is shown below.

Table 1: Definitions of Multinational Co-operation Criteria[9]

INTANGIBLE	DEFINITION
Rapport	Senior Officers must strive to effect a sympathetic rapport with each other. The personal relationships amongst military leaders will influence every aspect of multinational co-operation.
Respect	Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and values of participants will serve to strengthen relationships.
Knowledge of Partners	In multi national operations it is important to be as knowledgeable about friendly forces as the enemy. Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends during combined operations.
Patience	Effective co-operation may take time to develop. Differences of opinion and perspective will require patience to achieve a focused and unified approach.
Appropriateness of Missions	All participants must perceive missions as appropriate, achievable and equitable in terms of burden and risk sharing. Capabilities are an obvious factor but national honor and prestige may be as important to the partnership as battlefield capability. Partners should be included in the planning process and their opinions must be sought concerning mission assignment. The political impact of high casualties must be balanced against practical military choices.[10]

For the purpose of this paper the knowledge of partners is regarded as the primary

[9] Joint Warfare Publication 0-10. *United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations (Intrim Edition)*.

[10] US FM 100-8. *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Virginia: Fort Monroe, 1997).

criterion, as the others draw from it to some degree. In order that the substance of that one intangible, which by its very nature involves concrete aspects, can be studied objectively, this paper will use the framework provided by the British concept of fighting power. This concept breaks fighting power into three components: conceptual, physical and moral. The following table defines these components.

Table 2: Definitions for the Components of Fighting Power[11]

COMPONENT	DEFINITION
Conceptual	The thought process behind the ability to fight. Includes decision processes, doctrine and development
Physical	The means to fight. Equivalent to combat power. Includes manpower, equipment, logistics, training and readiness
Moral	The ability to get people to fight. Includes motivation, leadership and management.

Theory Review

Carol McCann and Ross Pigaeu, in their article "Redefining Command and Control," articulate a theory that explains and links many of the intangibles listed in Table 1.[12] The theory proposes that intent, the commanders vision, is made up of two parts. The first part is the explicit intent that is publicly communicated in written or verbal form. The other part is that of implicit intent, which is built up from the commanders personal expectations (based on his style and experiences), military expectations (based on training, doctrine, tradition and ethos) and lastly his cultural expectations (based on societal values, cultural morals and national pride). These terms, explicit and implicit, are used through out the paper to highlight the fact that a true common understanding is derived from both a conscious and subconscious knowledge of both parts.

[11] *Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine*. Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff. 4-3.

[12] Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. "Redefining Command and Control" in *The Human in Command* (New York: Kluwher Academic/ Plenum Publishers, 2000), 166.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Overview

The histories of the US and the UK have been intertwined since the Pilgrims first settled in New England. This set the base of a common language and a similar interpretation of key issues such as democracy, law and individual rights. Despite this common base the nations did not have a special relationship with each other until World War II. During this war exceptionally strong statesmen, who shared a common perspective, led both nations. This shared vision forged the two nations into a powerful alliance against common foes. Its success, coupled with the replacement of the German/Japanese threat with that of the rising Soviet bloc, led to its continuance after 1945. Throughout this period, European defense was the primary purpose of the special relationship. All associations are symbiotic in nature and this one was and is no different. The UK received the promised support of the US in Europe and maintained its self-identified role of being the bridge into the continent from the other side of the Atlantic. The US, on the other hand, gained basing rights and the generally reliable support of a major European power, through which she could leverage her own position.

Although Europe was the primary driver of the relationship it was not the only one, both nations continued to have global interests and these often overlapped. The UK, as the head of the Commonwealth and with numerous overseas territories maintained a

global perspective that was of use to the US. Examples of this extend from leased rights in Diego Garcia and the Ascension Islands, the use of facilities in Cyprus and Gibraltar to direct negotiation assistance on a variety of world wide issues.[13]

This relationship, both European and global, has often been over exaggerated by others, especially the French.[14] In reality its substance has been restricted to security issues only and has never had an economic aspect to it. Indeed the tariff issues between the two nations remain as great today as they ever have been.

The end of the Cold War obviously removed the corner stone of this special relationship as there was no longer a common, clearly defined threat with a European focus. This change was closely followed by the slow increase in the level of unity between the European states. In turn, this has caused the US to widen its relationships with the other European nations, particularly Germany, in order to continue to safeguard its own interests. Many political analysts argue that this has naturally weakened the relationship, particularly from the UK's perspective.[15] Has it really? Joseph Lepgold, in his article on the special relationship, argues that the relationship has always consisted of three elements, all of which remain as applicable in 2001 as during the height of the Cold War. These three elements are (1) the UK as a diplomatic confidant for the US, (2)

[13] A classic example being the Rhodesian crisis.

[14] The rumor of an Anglo-Saxon cabal masterminded in London and Washington was initially promulgated by President Charles de Gaulle but has continued since. The recent allegations of a US/UK intelligence network that has been used to further their economic advantage is one such current example. Dov S. Zakheim, *Wither The Special Relationship*, The Round Table, edition number 337, dated January 1996.

[15] An example would be John Baylis' book *Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939- 1980* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981).

similarity of outlook on several fundamental questions and lastly (3) a developed level of working collaboration in the fields of diplomacy, intelligence/surveillance and defense.[16]

The geostrategic similarity of the two nations meant that from the American perspective British leaders could act as a diplomatic confidants in a way that no other nation could. This was further assisted by the common language that enabled this interaction to be conducted by all levels of either administration without the complication of translation. These similarities enabled this interaction but its worth was derived from the different perspective that Britain would often supply. The level to which this aspect of the relationship has been utilized is extremely dependent on the personal relationships of the nations' leaders. The bond between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, Ronald Reagen and Margaret Thatcher and most recently between Bill Clinton and Tony Blair marking the high points of this element.

Despite the importance of a degree of rapport between the heads of both nations' executives, the main accelerator for the special relationship has always been the similarity of outlook on the solutions to several fundamental questions. Initially the question was the aggression by both Germany and Japan, subsequently during the Cold War it was the threat of Soviet expansion. Since the fall of the Berlin wall it has shifted to questions such as European integration, NATO, ESDI, Libya and of course Iraq to name but a few. Unlike the earlier questions, these no longer directly threaten the integrity of either nation. This has naturally led to a decrease in the intensity with which the relationship has been pursued by both parties.

[16] Joseph Lepgold. British-American Relations after the Cold War: the end of the Special Relationship? *Brassey's Defence Yearbook*, 1996.

The final element concerns the advanced working level of collaboration on security issues that exists between the two nations. This collaboration stems from the agreed positions articulated above and is probably strongest in the diplomatic and intelligence arenas. In these areas the Cold War networks, protocols and agreements have been retained, as they are still of use to both nations. The other area of collaboration, which naturally nests under these two, is in the sphere of defense.

The Military Special Relationship

The military relationship initiated by World War II and cemented by the cold war developed along four different strands. These were (1) the nuclear deterrent, (2) control of sea-lanes, (3) strategic air power and lastly (4) ground forces. In order to understand how these various strands deepened the level of defense collaboration between the two nations, they will be looked at seperately.

The Nuclear Deterrent

The involvement of British scientists in the Manhattan project set the foundation for the integrated nuclear weapons procurement program that exists today. Yet, the route between these two points in time has not always been smooth. The McMahon Act of 1946 excluded other nations from the US nuclear program and forced the UK to develop and produce her own air delivered weapons. President Eisenhower, who sought and gained an amendment to the act, changed this position in 1957, thus allowing US nuclear technology to be shared with the UK. Over time the sharing of technology expanded to joint procurement ventures the first of which, Skybolt, was an abject disaster for the relationship.[17] However, the political impact of its failure forced President Kennedy to

[17] Richard E. Neustadt. *Alliance Politics (*New York: Columbia University Press,1970), 30 to 55.

open the door wider and allow the UK to purchase Polaris. The natural upgrade of Polaris led to Trident, which is the only nuclear weapon system maintained by the UK in 2001. The procurement and testing of the launch vehicles remains an area of tight collaboration, the majority of which occurs physically in the US. During the height of the Cold War the integration of the two nuclear forces reached a high level as a result of combined planning. In short, from 1963 onwards the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff allocated the targets for the UK weapons.[18] This level of collaboration and interoperability is unique, as the US does not maintain a similar program with any other nation. This area of co-operation has also enabled the UK to purchase conventional Cruise missiles, which again are tested in the US.

Naval Forces

The two Navies have a history of combined operations dating back to the nineteenth century. The evidence of this can still be seen in the dress uniforms, customs and emblems of the two fleets.[19] The lessons from World War II and the emergence of the Soviet threat drove high levels of combined training and exchange to take place. Indeed, elements of the two fleets had just concluded such a period of training before the North Koreans invaded. This training ensured that the fleets combined quickly and efficiently.[20] This level of interoperability has been maintained by constant exercises, operational deployments (these have ranged from the blockade of Haiti to the Gulf War) and a large exchange and liaison program.[21] The announcement that the US Navy will

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[18] This organization was part of the US Airforces Strategic Air Command until its demise in 1992.

[19] The most obvious being the Marine Corps globes. The US Marine Corps globe depicts half of the world whilst the Royal Marine globe depicts the other half.

[20] Farrar Hockley. *The British Part in the Korean War: Volume One – A Distant Obligation*, 64.

[21] The Royal Navy currently has 150 personnel attached to the US Navy under this program. *British Defense Staff Washington, Latest News.* Web site available from http://www.bdsw.org; Internet: accessed 22 November 2000

allow the Royal Navy to participate in the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) Program will only deepen and enhance the interoperability of the two forces.[22]

Air Forces

World War II laid the historical bedrock for interoperability between the two nations' airforces. The current wearing of World War II RAF Eagle Squadron patches by US Air Force fighter Squadrons is but a symbol of that period.[23] Since 1949 regular NATO exercises and the resulting combined planning tools have led to a high level of effective interoperability between the two forces. A physical example of this is the inclusion of the RAF in the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTID) link, which ensures that the air picture is truly common. Operationally the two forces have worked together on the various air campaigns in both the Balkans and the Gulf and perhaps more importantly in the maintenance of the Iraqi no-fly zones, which remains a combined air operation today. Technologically there is, and always will be, a difference between the two forces, principally in the area of stealth aircraft. However, the procurement of Eurofighter and potentially the Joint Strike Fighter, alongside the steady improvement of the RAF's precision weaponry will ensure that it remains a relevant and capable airforce in the future. In addition to its combat capability the RAF retains a significant support capability in its tanker, transport (soon to be enhanced by the leasing of C17's from the US) and AWACS fleets. The analysis of the RAF's role in the Kosovo air campaign of 1999 often overlooks the important role these assets played, by

[22] *British Defense Staff Washington, Latest News.* Web site available from http://www.bdsw.org; Internet: accessed 22 November 2000

[23] The RAF Eagle Squadrons were manned by American pilots that fought in RAF uniforms during the Battle for Britain. Once the US entered the war they transferred across to the US Army Air Corps.

concentrating purely on bombs. On a day to day basis the link between the two airforces is maintained by the operations over Iraq, multinational exercises and a wide spread liaison and exchange program which has over 113 RAF personnel attached to the US Air Force.[24]

Land Forces

Again, the combined operations of World War II laid the foundations for the desire of future interoperability between the two nations Armies. However, the infighting between Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery on the UK side and Generals George Patton and Mark Clark on the US side initially left a bitter taste for many. Over time this feeling has been eroded by combined operations across the globe from Korea to Kosovo. The interoperability of the two Armies has been and continues to be developed along three main lines. Firstly, through the NATO system which involves the creation of allied doctrine and its subsequent practice during large-scale exercises. Secondly through the American, British and Australian Armies Organization (ABCA) which seeks to identify and develop solutions to ensure interoperability between these english speaking Armies. Lastly, through a widespread exchange and liaison program within the US, which involves over sixty two British Army personnel attached to various parts of the US Army.

Summary

In summary it has been shown that the UK maintains a full spectrum of military capability which can, and has, operated alongside its US counterpart. The impact of that statement is that the UK is one of the few potential allies that can contribute capable assets across the spectrum. Thus, although the UK's force in one component may not be

[24] The depth of this program is best articulated by fact that this program includes aircrew posts with an operational F-117 Squadron. *British Defense Staff Washington, Latest News.* Web site available

decisive, it is the total force that should be considered. If considered in that light the British contribution is often considerable, for example she was the third largest contributor of forces during both the Korean and Gulf wars.

Implications of the Special Relationship to this Paper

In the author's opinion the current lack of a clear and present danger will result in the relevance and intensity of the relationship being more issue specific and thus episodic in nature for the foreseeable future. Despite this, the UK's global interests coupled with her diplomatic and military capability is likely to ensure that in dealing with a large crisis that affects both nations, she will continue to desire to play an active role. This is clearly anticipated by the US Department of Defense, whose recently published strategy on transatlantic security states:

> Bilateral engagement with European Allies remains a necessary method to build consensus within NATO and address specific issues where NATO as a whole is not involved, or where other multilateral flora are found to be less effective. Certain Allies share broader interests with the United States in other regions-for example, in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Strong bilateral ties are indispensable in instances where the United States might join with one or more Ally to undertake military operations in a "coalition of the willing" outside of NATO.[25]

Therefore, when such a crisis requires a substantial military response, it is likely that British forces will be committed. Although the strategic political environment has changed the nature of the relationship from that of the 1950's, the tactical scenario of British forces under US control remains a strong possibility.

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from http://www.bdsw.org; Internet: accessed 22 November 2000.

[25] US Department of Defense. *Strengthening Transatlantic Security - A US Strategy for the 21st Century* (December 2000), 40.

CHAPTER THREE

THE BRITISH ARMY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR

Overview

This chapter reviews and analyzes the history of British units under US control in the Korean War with the purpose of identifying key issues that caused friction. In order to limit the size of the paper, only three areas are examined in detail. These are (1) the initial incorporation of both the 27th and 29th Brigades into the US Eighth Army and the subsequent creation of the Commonwealth Division, (2) a selection of combat operations involving these formations and finally (3) the command and control arrangements and processes that were used throughout. It will conclude with a summary of the issues identified, the majority of which concern misunderstandings between the various formation headquarters.

Initial Incorporation of British Units into the US Eighth Army

The British Army's plan to support the US forces was initially limited to one Brigade group.[26] The 29th Brigade was warned and a period of three to four months was set aside for it to train and receive reservists who would bring it up to full strength. Due to events in Korea this was going to be too late and a decision was made to send the 27th

[26]This plan was driven primarily by accepting the mean ground between the need to provide a force large enough to secure a diplomatic voice and the very real manning difficulties that existed within the British Army at that time. These difficulties were shaped by three factors: firstly, commitments to NATO; secondly the on going counter insurgency campaign in Malaya and lastly, the reduced level of regular recruiting. Jeffrey Grey. *The Commonwealth Armies and The Korean War* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1988),41.

Brigade headquarters and two battalions immediately from Hong Kong as an interim measure. This was done with the intent of withdrawing them once the 29th Brigade arrived. The 27th Brigade, which was trained for the British unilateral tropical environment of Hong Kong – the concept of operating as part of a US formation was not part of its training - arrived in theatre 11 days after being tasked. Almost immediately it became involved in the defense of the Pusan perimeter, having been placed under the 1st Cavalry Division.[27] Once the 29th Brigade arrived in theatre, the initial plan was adjusted and both Brigades were kept in theatre. Subsequently the commitment of a Canadian Brigade presented the option of pooling Commonwealth resources into one formation. This was done and the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed at the end of July 1951 (Britain was the framework nation for this headquarters).

The various British deployments to Korea provide clear examples of three ways that forces may join a lead nation. (1) Emergency move with minimal training time as conducted by the 27th Brigade, (2) planned move with training and preparation time as executed by the 29th Brigade and lastly (3) creation within the theatre using in-place assets as practiced by the 1st Commonwealth Division. A look at the manner in which these units were deployed may reveal areas of friction.

The 27th Brigade

The 27th Brigade, having rushed into Korea, was extremely light and apart from having no integral artillery or armor faced two major challenges.[28] Firstly as alluded to

[27] It was later enhanced by an Australian Battalion to bring it up to strength, thereafter it became known as the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. The change in the title of the Brigade was made by Brigadier Coad himself. Farrar-Hockley. *The British Part in the Korean War – Volume 1,* 180.

[28] A member of the Brigade staff described the formation as 'too light, we're in danger of floating to Korea like a bunch of balloons.' Ibid.,129.

earlier, it had never even thought about operating as part of a US formation let alone trained for it! Secondly the logistical deficiencies that resulted from the speed of deployment. The logistical aspects were covered by a simple arrangement in which the US provided transport (over one tonne - until the Brigades own vehicles arrived from Hong Kong), 3.5" rocket launchers and food. The UK would be responsible for ammunition (standard caliber in the Commonwealth was .303 compared to the .30 used by the US forces) and tea! General Walker, the US Eighth Army Commander, recognized both of these challenges and planned to allow the Brigade seven days to finish training and equipping with the 3.5" launchers. This time would also enable them to address the first challenge by allowing them to visit US units in order to observe and learn their procedures and processes, specifically those concerning artillery and air support.

The NKPA offensive prevented this plan from being executed and forced General Walker to deploy the Brigade after only a few days. Its incorporation into the line was generally trouble free and its lightness in supporting arms was compensated for by the attachment of artillery, Sherman tanks and a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) from the 1st Cavalry Division, under whom the Brigade was placed. Fortunately they were not immediately tested and thus able to conduct a limited amount of the interoperability training that would otherwise have been missed, although it should be noted that much of it failed to physicaly materialize. Subsequent events, which occurred during the breakout, were to prove that this training had been inadequate. They are discussed in detail later.

One organizational issue that immediately became apparent to Brigadier Basil Coad (Commander 27th Brigade) was that US staffs were larger and differently organized

than their British equivalents. He attempted to limit the friction of this issue by re-titling his staff branches along US lines. Although this was cosmetically effective it still did not address the central issue, which was that the scope of duties for each branch varied between the two systems. Consequently this re-titling did not last long and British titles were re-instigated, primarily because it was causing greater confusion for the national chain of command than it was mitigating with the US! A subsequent measure was the publication of a handbook that described the British Commonwealth system in comparison to the US system. This proved to be relatively successful.

The 29th Brigade

The 29th Brigade being fully manned and having conducted combined training on Salisbury plain was in a far better position to be effective on arrival. The extra time also enabled it to tackle the interoperability issue effectively by flying 'Battle Inoculation Teams' into Korea to observe US units in action. After several weeks in Korea they were then flown to Singapore where they rejoined their respective units on board the troop ships. This enabled the remaining part of the sea journey to be used as a training environment in which the lessons and procedures that they had observed were passed on before arrival in Korea. These efforts ensured that the 29th Brigade was combat ready on its arrival and able to move directly inland in time for the withdrawal. Its subsequent performance as I Corps rearguard proved the effectiveness of its preparation.

The First Commonwealth Division

The creation of the 1st Commonwealth Division was planned in advance with the plan being published in May and the Headquarters activated at the end of July 1951. This time period enabled numerous visits and advance coordination to be conducted. The end

result was a relatively trouble free assumption of command. A period of relative stability followed, enabling it to bed in thoroughly before conducting its first major offensive, which went well. Once again a longer period of time had allowed thorough planning and coordination to occur, thus enhancing the chance of success. The one problem with coordination too far in advance with US units was highlighted by the Division Commander. He found that although he had gotten to know and therefore build up a level of rapport with the various US commanders on his initial visit, they had nearly all changed by the time he arrived with his Headquarters.[29]

Summary of Deployment Issues

The primary issues raised under this heading concern force packaging, differences in staff sizes and organization and the need to learn the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP's) of the lead nation. Firstly regarding force packaging, the British Army accepted risk in sending the 27th Brigade without organic artillery, tanks, heavy transport or engineers on the understanding that it would be mitigated on the ground by task organized US assets. Generally, this worked to an acceptable level but the lack of organic artillery, which resulted in the need to rely on others, was to be a constant source of weakness until the New Zealand Battery arrived the following year. Secondly, the differences in the size and organization of either nations' headquarters led to much friction throughout the war. Work-arounds such as the re-titling by Coad and the publication of handbooks did mitigate its effect but the individual rotation policy of the US prevented it from being removed permanently. Lastly, TTP's. The lead nation naturally uses its own processes and procedures and this was correctly the case with the

[29] Lt Gen James Cassels. Lecture on 31st March 1953 published in *The Journal of the Royal Unites Service Institution* (Vol XCVIII, No 591, 1953).

US in Korea. The effect of the differences in processes and procedures is probably most obvious and arguably acute in the area of fire support. The lead nation controls the fire support assets that are not integral to organizations and therefore uses its own systems for applying them. To ensure efficiency, contributing nations must obviously learn and use these methods, this takes time and should ideally be done prior to entering the theatre. However, due to the unilateral focus of both Armies, this had not been done. The attempts by Coad to conduct this training in theatre or the use of battle inoculation teams by the 29th Brigade provide useful examples of how it can be done at short notice. The effectiveness of the 27th Brigade was reduced, at least initially, because of a lack of training in this area.

Review of a Selection of Combat Operations

The review of operations involving the 27th and 29th Brigades focuses on two incidents in which the results were not overwhelmingly successful. They have been selected as by having gone wrong they may well provide an easier window through which to identify areas of friction. The first incident concerns the 27th Brigade's attack on Point 282 during the break out of the Pusan perimeter; the second the actions of the 29th Brigade during the Battle on the Imjin river.

Point 282

During the breakout from Pusan, the 27th Brigade was tasked to clear the road to Songju after having been moved across to the 24th US Division. On the first day the First Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment cleared a defended hill site supported by US artillery. Their assault was delayed due to the inability to get the guns to lift but was

otherwise effective.[30] The following day the First Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders assaulted a feature called Point 282, but with minimal notice had their fire support withdrawn once the assault had commenced. After a protest from Coad they received several Close Air Support (CAS) sorties by Mustangs carrying napalm. Sadly the Argylls were targeted and hit by these strikes causing numerous casualties.[31] Tactically the commanders of the 27th Brigade could forgive the air strike as being a tragic accident but were angered by the no notice removal of artillery support whilst in the middle of a planned assault. This anger was to create in Coad a sense of distrust for the 24th Division in general and General John Church (24th Division Commander) specifically.[32]

An administrative issue that arose from the incident was that of casualty reporting. On the grounds of operational security the US military had refused to allow the opening of a national radio link between the Brigade and Hong Kong and had thus been forced to act as the conduit for casualty reporting. This, combined with the procedure of the time which called for a waiting period of 72 hours, inevitably caused a delay which resulted in a picture and article being published in the British national press before the next of kin had been informed. Coupled with the friendly fire aspect, this

[30] This problem was caused by these fires being directed by an airborne spotter who did not have communications with the ground forces and it was only by switching one of the Sherman tank radios to his frequency that the firing was adjusted. This event was regarded simply as teething problems and ensured that procedures were tightened for the future.

[31] According to Air Marshall Bouchier's account of General Partridge's investigation three factors were found to be responsible for this incident. Firstly the TACP had been unable to close up with the battalion due to a small river and thus had not confirmed the guidance criteria face to face. Secondly the spotter aircraft was using a different scale map to the TACP and finally that the TACP had identified the wrong hill. Furthermore, he then ignored advice from the spotter that the troops on that hill were showing the correct recognition signals with the simple rebuttal that the enemy often copied them

[32] Farrar-Hockley. *The British Part in the Korean War – Volume 1*, 179.

caused it to become a contentious issue with political overtones. Consequently the US reversed its policy on the national rear link and it was established shortly afterwards.[33]

The issues raised from this incident firstly validate the TTP issue raised under the previous heading and secondly highlight how inter-linked the various criteria for this paper are. For if one starts with the *appropriateness of mission*, Church did assign the 27th Brigade an appropriate mission and Coad accepted it because of the task organization allotted to him. When Church took the artillery away, he had altered the balance to a point where the mission was no longer *appropriate.* It may be assumed that he made this decision based on faulty *knowledge* concerning the actual combat power of the Brigade or lack of *patience* in preparing for another task. This decision directly affected the *respect* that Coad had for his higher headquarters and furthermore limited the chance of any *rapport* developing with Church. The combined effect was to temporarily weaken the confidence that the British troops had in their US higher headquarters, thus a sense of mutual confidence was not initially achieved and took longer than may have been necessary to build.

The Battle of Imjin

After five months of successful operations the 29th Brigade was deployed along the Imjin River in a defensive position. The main effort of the new Chinese offensive was focused on their sector and after several days of heavy fighting the Brigade withdrew leaving the First Battalion of The Glostershire Regiment to be over run. The loss of a battalion prompted much investigation and efforts to apportion blame. The investigations revealed differences in command styles and in the use of the English language. General

[33] Ibid., 178.

Robert Soule, the Division Commander, admitted to not knowing the Glosters' true situation and implied this was because it had not been reported in a manner that would have allowed him to gauge it accurately. Brigadier Thomas Brodie (29th Brigade Commander) accepted 50% of the responsibility for this but by doing so implied that he felt that a Division Commander should have displayed more initiative in searching for information. General Mathew Ridgeway eventually found fault with the various commanders, Brodie in particular, for not understanding the habitual understatement of events that Colonel James Carne (Glosters) was known for. He felt that this understanding would have initiated action earlier, thus preventing the loss of the battalion.[34] Another slant on the issue is provided by the Adjutant of the Glosters, who felt that their stand was a natural result of the constant directives by Ridgeway, which stated that positions should be held for as long as feasible. Eventually that feasibility line would be crossed and sadly, it was the Glosters that crossed it.[35]

The main issue raised by this incident concerns the use and interpretation of the English language, both written and spoken. The *use* of the English language is an interesting issue that is extremely subjective, however, from the various accounts it would appear that British reports were bland factual statements whilst US reports were more colorful. Naturally, a commander used to reading colorful reports would read all reports through that lens, hence the potential for adjusting a British bland report into something even blander. Conversely, US written directives would suffer precisely the

[34] The author does not fully agree with this, as without a major effort by the Division and possibly the Corps it is difficult to see how the 29th Brigade, heavily engaged along its front, could have done anything different, even if that anticipation had been present. This opinion was also voiced by Van Fleet in his enquiry.

[35] Farrar-Hockly. *The British Army in the Korean War Vol II,* 136.

opposite effect as alluded to by the Adjutant of the Glosters. British officers used to bland factual statements would read them literally and not through the colorful lens that the author had subconsciously anticipated. These subtle differences in interpretation and understanding obviously affected the knowledge of the other partner, and thus impacted upon the efficiency of the combined force.

Command and Control Arrangements and Processes

The review of issues concerning the command and control arrangements and processes will be done by looking at four areas. These are (1) the strategic context, (2) the command environment in Korea, (3) the physical methods and processes that were used to establish communication and control and lastly (4) differences in doctrine and staff reporting. It will conclude with a summary of the major issues raised.

Strategic Context

The command and control arrangements of the British forces were simple, the British Government gave the US operational control over them. This enabled the US to assign missions, move and deploy the units without being responsible for their administration or logistics. It is important to note that once this control was given there was little direct interference over the tactical use of the formations. For example Field Marshall Slim expressed severe misgivings over the crossing of the 38th parallel but never interfered with the 27th Brigades leading role in it. Also present was the right of appeal to a higher commander if the order was felt to be flawed by the British commander. The authors research did not reveal any examples of this right being applied during the Korean War.

The Command Environment in Korea

Once in theatre both Brigades were assigned to the Eighth Army but were regularly switched between formations. For example, the 27th Brigade was switched ten times in the first eleven months of its tour.[36] Although a compliment to the professionalism of the Brigade and proof of the respect with which it was regarded, it did prevent them from building a long-term relationship with one formation.[37] Thus, constant work was required to gain and pass on the knowledge that both the higher and lower headquarters needed to operate effectively. This was not efficient and could have been prevented by a more permanent relationship, at least with a single Corps. It also prevented rapport from building between the commanders and staffs, thus the language difficulties raised earlier remained a hidden issue. In addition, as no one had a permanent responsibility for them, they tended to be overused. This is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that Ridgeway, following a visit, found it necessary to order IX Corps to withdraw the 27th Brigade for a complete rest in February 1951.[38]

The issue raised by this is not one of constant switching (that is unpleasant as it prevents a reliable rhythm from being established but is understandable in extremis[39]) but of logistical tracking by the higher headquarters. The problem is that if the unit is not tracked it will not be given time to service its vehicles and rest, thus it could be driven to culmination by over use not enemy action. This was a particular challenge for the US formations as the British were using equipment that operated on a different schedule than

[36] Figure derived from the authors research. A chronological review of events is at Annex A.

[37] Interestingly the other national contingents, such as the French or Turks, tended to be left with US Regiments or Divisions. Jeffry Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War*. Page 28. The author feels that this was due primarily to the size of the other contingents as only the Turks were larger than Battalion size.

[38] Ibid., 73.

[39] Extremis is a term that could be used to describe Korea in 1950!

its own and were supplied and repaired through a Commonwealth rather than US chain. This area particularly worried Coad, who felt that the western military 'can do attitude' was further enhanced by national pride. This appears to have delayed requests for rest from being passed up to the US higher headquarters by his staff.

The situation caused by this was further exacerbated by a perception that the US staff did not make any effort to gain a feeling for ground truth and thus accepted all reports at face value. This is perhaps best articulated by Coad, who states that 'with very few exceptions the American staff officers never leave their HQ's, even to visit lower formation HQs, and never in our experience did any staff officer come to look at the ground'.[40] This perception obviously weakened the respect and rapport between the various staffs and was only effectively addressed by the Brigade commanders personally going back to advise the headquarters on their situation. This was contrary to the accepted British system of headquarters looking forward not rearwards.

The above paragraphs infer that US commanders and staff rarely visited the British Brigades. This presents a slight paradox in that many of the Commonwealth Commanders felt that their US counterparts tended to micromanage. The only explanation for this apparent mismatch, which was effectively either end of the command and control spectrum (micro management versus complete hands off), is that British Commanders would question orders if unclear and become irritated on being told precisely how to conduct specific tasks. Thus, it may be speculated that many US commanders simply took the path of least resistance and left them to it with little interference. Although pleasant for both sides, this level of minimal interference appears

[40] Farrar-Hockly. *The British Army in the Korean War Vol I*, 138.

to have occasionally become one of limited involvement. This approach was not effective as logistical tracking and ground truth often became lost within the higher headquarters. The vehicle readiness state in the 27th Brigade in the early part of 1951 or Battle of the Imjin being possible examples of the results that can arise from such breakdowns.

Command and Control Systems and Processes

During the Korean War control of formations and units was conducted by radio and line communications. British radios were not compatible with US radios. To get around this radios of both types were exchanged between headquarters. This system worked well but did not allow the US to speak directly to the sub units within the British formations. This flaw was actually seen by many as a strength, as it ensured that the headquarters could not be circumvented and therefore served to enforce the chain of command. Another benefit was that it actually enhanced the orders process of the day, as the US system was substantively different to the Commonwealth one.

Throughout the war the US Army promulgated orders on an overlay, where as the British utilized a system of verbal briefs supported by written orders and traces. The US system was understandable but relied heavily on a sufficiency of information and detail if verbal orders were not to be given. An example of this is provided in the following quotation which describes the lead up to an advance conducted by the 27th Commonwealth Brigade:

> On the 21st October, a staff officer from I Corps arrived at the headquarters early in the morning with an 'overlay' which instructed him (Coad) to advance with his Brigade as rapidly as possible to the Chongch'on river, to cross it and sieze the town of Chongju. The latter was 75 miles distant up the main highway. There were no details as to the whereabouts or plans of the 24th Division, under whose command he now came. Also on the trace a circle was drawn about Sukch'on,

> marked 187th Airborne Combat Team. Coad had no information of any airborne landing.[41]

Only later during a chance meeting with the Chief of Staff, I Corps, does Coad get a chance to ask about the 187th. The Chief informed him that the Brigade's first and primary task was to link up with them! This vignette does *not* necessarily prove that the graphics were flawed, they may well have been understood by a US officer, but rather that they were not interpreted correctly by the British officer who was charged with the mission.

The Brigades and subsequently the Division, overcame these differences in methods by actively trying to become involved in the planning or at least in the clarification of tasks. Within the formations themselves the British system of verbal orders, supported by maps and traces was still utilized. In short, communication incompatibility was not actually a crippling flaw but in many respects an advantage as it ensured that the responsibility for 'translating' the order remained with the chain of command.

Doctrine and Perception

The main sources of friction came from the areas of doctrine and what can be only termed as the national approach to war. British doctrine in the 1950's was substantially different to that of the US. During the war this was most easily observed in the different concepts and theories that lay beneath the structuring of a defensive position. The British preferred to physically control the high ground, thus dominating the low ground, whilst the US preferred a lower approach that placed more emphasis on a main defensive line with out posts. This difference created problems during reliefs, as it

[41] Ibid., 248.

caused the incoming unit to waste much time reorganizing the position until it fitted its own nations concept. Though a point of friction, it was not a source of serious disagreement as both were seen to be effective.

However, the differing approaches to the necessity or purpose of combat operations were. This difference was based on a British perception that the US conducted operations not only for clear objectives but also as a method of keeping units sharp. This perception was most prevalent during the stalemate and was the source of serious disagreement between Lieutenant General O'Daniel, Commander US I Corps, and Major General Cassels, Commander First Commonwealth Division. Cassels was more than ready to conduct combat operations but liked to know the purpose behind them and on several occasions he felt that the reason was not explained sufficiently or was simply not worthy of the effort or sacrifice. His personal perception is most succinctly captured in the following quote, in which he discusses one of I Corps directives.

> I am being harassed and ordered by Corps to produce a prisoner every third day, apparently regardless of cost. As we know quite well what enemy divisions are in front of us I cannot see the point in this and have said so…. Personally I believe the reason behind the order was to keep the US divisions 'sharp' regardless of casualties, and at least one of their divisions has taken considerable casualties – between 2,000 and 3,000.[42]

The final issue that was the source of much irritation, although arguably of little impact upon the efficiency of the combined force, was the differing way in which figures and statistics were perceived. The US reporting system demanded estimates of casualties and damage inflicted whereas the British system demanded only the reporting of confirmed facts and figures whilst allowing for estimates, but at the reporting officer's

[42] 1 Commonwealth Division Periodic Report, 15 October 1951 – 15 February 1952. *AD314/11/3 New Zealand Archives (NZA)*.

discretion. This led to friction between the staffs and the perception on the British side that these estimates often transformed into facts as they went up the chain, which they arguably did.[43]

Summary of Interoperability Issues Identified

This chapter has identified numerous issues that either actually reduced the efficiency of the combined force during the Korean War or had the potential to do so. In order to simplify their cognition, the components of fighting power, as defined in chapter one, are used as the framework upon which they are summarized.

Physical Component Issues

The Korean War validated several timeless truths concerning the physical component. Firstly, the importance of combined arms groupings for force packaging: the initial weakness of the 27th Brigade compared to the immediate strength of the 29th providing the clearest proof, if any was required. Secondly, the requirement to maintain equipment of at least equal capability to that of the lead nation. The British Army, with the exception of the 3.5" rocket launcher, was so equipped (indeed one could argue that the British Centurion tank was superior to the American Sherman). This allowed it to partake fully in any mission, which in turn enabled respect to develop. Having taken these truths into consideration the physical issues that arose from the Koreran War centered around a series of differences. First, although the equipment was of equal capability to its US counterpart, it tended to use different ammunition natures, this led to a separate Commonwealth logistic train that ran parallel to, but was not part of, the US one. Second, the different staff systems caused much friction as neither staff was well

[43] Grey. *The Commonwealth Armies and The Korean War,* 148.

acquainted with the other before the war. Lastly there was a difference in the quality and training of the soldiers involved, at least in 1950. The British government tried hard to send reservists rather than national servicemen and therefore the formations contained a much higher proportion of World War II veterans than an equivalent US unit. In addition, the British training system had not suffered the same neglect that the US system had before the war. Thus, the discipline of British formations in 1950 was generally regarded to be higher than that of US Army units.[44] Incompatible communications, although an irritant, have been shown to have had minimal impact on the effectiveness of the combined force.

Conceptual Component Issues

The conceptual issues center on differences in doctrine, TTP's and perception. These differences of concept, doctrine and definition exist because of the basic fact that there *is* a national way of war and they are not the same for both nations. The US, due to its power and resources, is generally far more direct whilst the UK's, due to her corresponding lack of resources, is more indirect.[45] However, these differences are not, by themselves, the issue that reduced effectiveness, as they could have been mitigated by previous knowledge and experience of the other system. Therefore the central issue in the Korean War was that neither Army was aware, in any detail, of the other's system before they were flung together on the peninsula. There had been no substantial effort to develop any standardization between the two Armies, as both forces were still unilaterally focused. As a result there had been little, if any, combined formation training that could have provided a source of experience for the various commanders to refer to.

[44] Mathew B. Ridegeway. *The Korean War* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1967), 87.
[45] Sir Robin Renwick. *Fighting with Allies*, 102.

Consequently, the commanders entered the war with no knowledge of the other force and although they quickly learnt to interpret the explicit messages, their implicit understanding of the other was often flawed to the point that misunderstandings occurred.

The first couple of months did not show any dramatic improvement in the level of implicit understanding. In the author's opinion this seems to have resulted from two factors, firstly the lack of a habitual arrangement with one formation and secondly the fact that a cursory glance found the two nations to be remarkably similar. This similarity appears to have often reduced the perceived need to develop an understanding of the other nation's 'way of war'. A contrasting example would be the Turkish Brigade. Here the differences were obvious, and the effort by the US to understand and develop rapport through habitual relationships was far more marked. The weakness in the assumption that similarity equals implicit interoperability allowed issues such as the differing use and interpretation of the English language to remain a hidden irritant. This lack of implicit understanding appears to have regularly led to differing interpretations of what was supposedly a common picture. The vignette involving Coads' potentially incorrect interpretation of a US overlay order vividly demonstrates this.

Moral Component Issues

Although both nations employed different methods to build unit cohesion, the British Regimental system as contrasted to the US individual posting system, only two issues in this component could be regarded as having had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the combined force.

The systems mentioned above led to different rotation policies. The British and Commonwealth units rotated whole units and headquarters whilst the US rotated

individuals. Although the US system was more logical from a mathematical perspective, it did have the effect of constantly weakening the institutional knowledge within the various headquarters. Perhaps more importantly, by its constant nature it was very difficult to identify when that knowledge had been eroded before events proved it. Conversely the British system, by keeping units together, gained in institutional knowledge as time passed. The down side was that they required a period of hand-over between units, which ideally took place out of major contact and needed to be planned by the higher headquarters. The argument that this system is inefficient and creates periods of operational ineffectiveness was disproved during the battle of Kapyong, in which the 27th Brigade defeated a major Chinese attack whilst handing over to the 28th Brigade.

The other moral issue that had the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the combined force was that of a perceived different weighting in either nation's cost/benefit analysis, specifically concerning casualties. It appears that British commanders were much more reticent to expend lives and equipment for nebulous objectives than their US counterparts. This does not imply that they lacked aggression, history alone proves that false, but that they wanted to know that the cost of unleashing that aggression would achieve something of value.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it has been shown that issues existed in each of the components that reduced the effectiveness of the combined force. Many of these naturally stemmed from the differences caused by national and cultural factors. However, these alone were not the cause of inefficiency. This paper finds that it was the lack of an implicit understanding of the other's ways which exacerbated the national and cultural factors to

the point that they became sources of friction. Although a direct result of not having trained together before the war, it was accentuated by the similarity of the cultures involved, the cosmetic similarity hiding the implicit misunderstandings that took place.

Appendix B is a table that lists the issues raised in this chapter, alongside their corresponding criterion.

CHAPTER FOUR

APPLICABILITY OF ISSUES IN THE YEAR 2001

Introduction

In order to fully understand the applicability of the issues raised in the previous chapter upon the forces in 2001, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the major events that have occurred during the intervening fifty years. This chapter therefore looks at three areas before reviewing the issues as they affect the forces in 2001. These areas are (1) Cold War NATO (2) The Gulf War and lastly (3) post Cold War NATO. The review of today's issues will be conducted using the components of fighting power. It ends with the conclusion that the two forces are better prepared to operate together in 2001 than they were in 1950.

Cold War NATO

Although NATO had been formed before the start of the Korean War, it was a relatively new concept with the member's focus being on force levels rather than interoperability. Following the war a great deal of time and effort was spent on ensuring that the alliance was interoperable within itself. Within the physical component, NATO standards were set for areas such as ammunition and the weights and dimensions of certain types of equipment. These were generally adhered to, although individual nations'

choices caused irregularities.[46] On the conceptual side, combined staffs were created and NATO doctrine developed as the platform upon which they could operate. This led to numerous Standard NATO Agreements (STANAGs) that, once ratified, required all nations to adopt internally, thus creating a common baseline on a variety of issues. These ranged from the pattern of lights at an obstacle crossing to the map marking symbols for graphics. The UK went even further to keep in concert with the US and adopted the AirLand Battle concept and, in 1986, began publishing its own doctrine.

As important as the above measures were, the most significant aspect of this period was the regular large-scale exercising of formations. These exercises tested and refined the doctrine and STANAGs to the point that they were an effective base for large scale combined combat operations. They also ensured that the various commanders had first hand experience with the difficulties involved in coalition operations at the tactical level. For example General Frederick Franks as a US Division Commander had a Canadian Brigade Group under his control whilst his Division would occasionally be under the control of a German Corps.[47] Thus, the secondary effect of NATO during this period was that it was probably the best school of combined warfare to ever have existed in the history of military training. Its 'students' having practiced and experienced its vagaries first hand, gaining crucial insights that their forefathers had been forced to learn in war. In particular it ensured that they were aware that their own national system was not universal and that a degree of patience was therefore essential in dealing with the

[46] A classic example being in the 120mm main tank round. Most nations adopted a smooth bore gun whilst the UK kept a rifled barrel, with the net result that different ammunition was required. The same issue arose with the AFV main armament. The US Bradley uses 25mm, the UK Warrior 30mm.

[47] General Franks later commanded the US VII Corps in the Gulf War during which t\he 1st (UK) Armoured Division was placed under his control. General (retired) Frederick Franks, US Army. Interview by author, FT Leavenworth, KS, 9 January 2001.

systems of other nations.

The Gulf War

The Gulf War, as a crisis, followed the pattern of military deployment that had been seen during the Korean War. First, the British Government quickly provided diplomatic support for the US policy and committed naval and air forces to the region. As it deepened, an Armoured Brigade was dispatched which was initially placed under the tactical control of the 1st US Marine Corps Division. The time created by the lengthily build up allowed a second Armoured Brigade and a Division headquarters to be sent. In theatre these assets were pulled together and the resulting Division, the 1st (UK) Armoured, was placed under VII US Corps, with whom they stayed until the end of the war. Following the war another Brigade, 3 Commando, was sent from Britain to operate as part of the US led relief effort, OP PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq. Simultaneously RAF aircraft joined OP NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH. In 2001 they were still deployed as a part of these US led operations.

This crisis occurred only two years after the collapse of the Berlin wall. Thus the American and British equipment, doctrine and experiences that had been shaped by their membership of NATO ensured that the 1st (UK) Armoured Division was an effective part of the US VII Corps. At a lower level it also enabled the 142 (US) National Guard Artillery Brigade, which was placed TACON of the UK Division, to be both efficient and effective in its support.[48] The equality of equipment capability and the standard of training ensured that General Franks, the Corps Commander, made decisions on the use of the UK Division according to the tactical scenario (normal problems of time, space

[48] This Brigade was a mix of 8" and MLRS units. The only other unit using 8' were elements of the UK Divisions Arty. The commonality of ammunition natures eased the logistic supply. Ibid.

and enemy) and not because they were the UK Division. A true validation of the level of interoperability that was achieved.

Both Franks and General Rupert Smith, the UK Division Commander, were fully aware of the intangibles involved in coalition operations as a result of their education and NATO experiences. This awareness, coupled with the time created by the campaign plan, ensured that both forces developed a very high level of mutual confidence in each other. Franks' NATO experience led him integrate British officers into his staff rather than keep them in a liaison cell. This worked well and ensured that the British perspective was fully incorporated in all of the Corps planning.[49] It should be noted that the depth of integration was enabled by the various intelligence protocols that exist between the two nations, indeed it was a two way flow as British national intelligence was also fed into VII Corps. This level of integration would have been difficult with a nation that did not have similar protocols with the US.[50]

Despite the efficiency of the combined force and the mutual confidence that both commanders were able to instill in it, there were a few technical and organizational issues that caused some friction or required VII Corps to make special accommodations. As in Korea, and despite the NATO standardization agreements, the two formations' communication systems were not compatible. The electronic gates that supposedly should have enabled them simply did not work. The problem was solved by Smith detaching a series of Ptarmigan nodes to VII Corps and the 1st (US) Infantry Division,

[49] High caliber officers were incorporated in both VII Corps TAC and MAIN Headquarters. Franks regarded them as being full members of the team and even credits one of them, Nick Seymour, with creating the 90 degree turn CONPLAN. Ibid.

[50] Ibid. Franks mentioned that British national intel was of use and in hindsight actually had a more accurate picture of the Iraqi order of battle than the US assets.

who was his flanking unit. This worked well although it should be noted that due to the rate of movement, communications were never reliable. As in 1950 it enabled the US Commanders to speak to the UK formation headquarters when they wanted but did not allow tactical units to talk directly with each other.[51] The major organizational difference was in the size of Division headquarters, the UK Division Headquarters was dramatically smaller than that of its US counterpart. The issue this raised was that it was not as robust in its contingency plan (CONPLAN) maintenance. Franks was aware of this and attempted to avoid overloading them. During the author's interview, Franks highlighted this point with a vignette from the war, in which he tasked them to develop several different CONPLANs once they had completed their initial task (which had been done far quicker than he expected). His feeling was that this had stretched the headquarters to its limit, although he noted that it did manage and eventually executed a branch of one of these plans very efficiently.[52]

In summary, many of the same physical component issues existed that had during the Korean War: incompatible communications, different caliber ammunition and different staff organizations. However, as a tactical formation it was a far more efficient tool. In the author's opinion, this efficiency was caused by three main factors. Firstly, the commanders had experienced the complexities of combined operations during NATO warfighting exercises and therefore knew from practice that they should address the

[51] Rupert Smith. "The Gulf War: The Land Battle." *The RUSI Journal*. February 1992.

[52] General (retired) Fred Franks, US Army. Former US VII Corps Commander during the Gulf War. Interview by author. Franks initially tasked them to plan to become the right hand arm of an enveloping attack on the Republican guard – (this mission was eventually done by the US 1st Div as they were much closer at the time of execution). At the same time he was tasked by the Third Army to plan for a push back south to clear a path, presumably for logistics. This would have been through the heaviest belt of Iraqi Divisions, who up to that point had been bypassed. He did not like that task (neither did Smith) and he worked to cancel it, but planning was initiated. Eventually he used them to push east and cut Highway 8.

intangibles in a conscious and deliberate manner, which they did. Secondly, the units were given a habitual relationship with one formation and perhaps most importantly the time to develop the *rapport* and *respect* that it offered. Lastly, the integration of staff at the higher headquarters ensured an accurate *knowledge* transfer of each partners ways.

Post Cold War NATO

Since the Gulf War NATO has adjusted to reflect the new strategic environment in which it finds itself. Force levels were drawn down, which caused significant reductions in the forces of member nations, and the size and scope of the warfighting exercises were dramatically cutback. However, during this period NATO has seen deployments of its formations to Bosnia and Kosovo in Peace Enforcement/ Keeping roles, and it is to this type of operation that the NATO focus appears to have turned. These operations, although multinational in nature, are no replacement for the large exercises of maneuver, as the nations tend to operate in national sectors, therefore alongside and not within each other. Thus the experience gained of combined operations is not one of warfighting movement but of settled patterns within a set piece of terrain. This diluting of the primary purpose, combined warfighting, has caused adherence to STANAGs or the adoption of NATO warfighting doctrine to weaken amongst its members. Many members have started to develop their own concepts in order to fulfil their national interests better, whilst others remain wedded to the NATO publications and standards.

In summary, within the physical component, nations have either not updated the capability of their primary equipment or have developed new ones that are only tenuously within the standardization agreements. Conceptually, the NATO common terms remain

but national definitions have changed in order to support their concepts. This has led to an increase in the different interpretations of common phrases.

Summary of Interoperability Issues that are Applicable in 2001

These events have naturally shaped the forces of both nations. In order to highlight the changes that they have made to the issues identified during the Korean War the components of fighting power are used as the framework upon which the interoperability issues of 2001 are reviewed.

Physical Component Issues

The UK has regularly improved and updated its primary fighting equipment so that today they are as capable as their US counterpart. For example Challenger 2 is equal to the M1A2, the AS 90 is equal to Paladin and both nations now operate MLRS and AH 64 Longbow. However, the differences highlighted in the Gulf War, specifically staff organization of headquarters and incompatible communications, remain. Although the advances of digitization in the US Army would appear to have the potential of multiplying the impact of incompatible communications, as it prevents the common operating picture from being common, the author does not believe that it is any more of a problem than in the past. The reason being that the digital incompatibility that currently exists between digitized US and analog UK formations also exists within the US Army itself, as they currently field a hybrid force themselves. Thus, they have developed the required gates and nodes to enable operations within their own force, which ensures that for as long as this hybrid situation exists, UK forces will be able to operate under a US formation. One issue that has arisen since the Gulf War that could cause minor friction

is that of fuel. The US now uses JP 8 as its common fuel whilst the British Army has remained on the standard fuels of diesel and avgas. [53]

Conceptual Component Issues

Membership of NATO and the ABCA organization has ensured that the doctrines of the two nations are more closely aligned in 2001 than in the 1950's. The differences that remain result from the fact that there is a national way of war, and the British position is not the same as that of the US. However, these differences are now ones of subtle nuances and not opposed concepts, therefore similar enough to enable common understanding to develop. The thought processes and decision cycles, although again subtly different, are comparable enough to translate. These slight differences need not lead to the misunderstanding at the implicit level, particularly between the commanders, which was prevalent in Korea, as long as both parties are aware of them. In this realm the senior leadership of both forces are currently well experienced and therefore able to identify and work through the problems that the intangibles bring to coalition operations. In simpler words they know that theirs is not the only system and, as a result of experience, understand that it is more effective to work through the issues with patience rather than to try and bully the junior partners to adopt their system.

Moral Component Issues

Although the US still uses an individual posting policy and the Regimental system continues in the British Army, the issues that these caused in Korea have been

[53] This friction is regarded as being minor due to its long-term nature. However, it does remain an issue because of the potential reduction in engine life if JP 8 is used in British vehicles. This potential exists because JP 8 burns at a higher heat than diesel, thus placing greater stress on the injectors in diesel engines. However, it is understood that this can be temporarily overcome by adding a quart of 10W oil to every other tank, thus allowing JP 8 to be used in extremis by British vehicles. This capability prevents it from being a major interoperability issue.

dramatically reduced. The US Army is responsible for mitigating those issues by either incorporating its own unit rotation policy, as in the Balkans, or by freezing postings during crisis such as the Gulf. Finally, the perceived difference in the weighting of each nations casualty cost/benefit analysis has been reduced to the point that is questionable if it exists at all. This has occurred as America's institutional acceptance of casualties for minimal gain no longer exists. However, it is worth noting an emerging argument that implies that the issue may well remain, albeit in a mirror image form. It is based on the perception that the UK appears to accept greater risk to its soldiers, in order to aid mission accomplishment than the US. This argument is derived from the national force protection policies that have been imposed in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Whilst it gives a topic of discussion for the soldiers it does not, in the author's opinion, create a issue that could affect the efficiency of a future combined warfighting force. In short, for combat operations the cost/benefit analysis for accepting casualties is now the same in both Armies.

Conclusion

Although many interoperability challenges still exist between the two forces, their combined effect is less that those faced by the forces deployed to Korea in 1950. The primary reason for this is that the years of NATO exercises and combined doctrine development have created in today's leadership a feel for the complexities of combined operations. A side product of this knowledge and experience is the ability to truly understand both the explicit and implicit intent of the other nation's commander. This paper stresses that this understanding is essential if the intangibles are to be addressed in a meaningful, rather than cosmetic, way. As this is present in the commanders of 2001, it

is the author's opinion that the misunderstandings that occurred in 1950, due to a lack of implicit understanding, would not be as prevalent. The efficiency of VII Corps, as a combined force, in the Gulf War providing a more applicable model than the force that was defending the Pusan perimeter in 1950. In summary, both nations Armies and their respective commanders have retained the ability to operate together and thus the option of fielding efficient combined forces remains viable in 2001. A table summarizing the issues that remain applicable in 2001 is at Appendix C

CHAPTER FIVE

APPLICABILITY OF ISSUES IN THE FUTURE

Introduction

This chapter continues the lines of argument raised in chapter three into the future. It does this by looking at the physical and conceptual components before stating the impact that these potential changes could bring to future operations involving British units under US control. Issues in the moral component will continue to exist, but as they are unlikely to impact operations to any greater degree than in 2001, they are not looked at again. This chapter deduces that several factors, from both components, have the potential to reduce the effectiveness of coalition operations involving the Armies of the US and UK to a level even lower than that of the 1950's. It concludes with a series of realistic proposals that could help lessen the effect of this anticipated gap.

Potential Future Differences in the Physical Component

The British Army has maintained an effective enhancement program that has ensured that its major fighting equipment are equal in capability to those of the US, and there is no reason not to expect this to continue. The fielding of the LAV 3 in the Interim Brigades does not affect this balance greatly as the British Army already operates

wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers (SAXON) and light armor (SABRE).[54] It is when one looks even further ahead to the fielding of the Future Combat System and the objective force that gaps in capability will appear. However, the British Army's historical record of maintaining equipment equality, coupled with the recent bilateral defense technology agreements between the two nations is likely to ensure that this gap will not be permanent.[55]

Of greater concern is the growing gap in the level of digitization. Once the US Army becomes completely digitized the interoperability options that currently exist for the British Army will cease to exist. This will enable the US to leverage the potential of the Common Operating Picture (COP) to new levels. Specifically, it has the potential of dramatically increasing tempo and the realistic opportunity of focusing combat power decisively. Obviously, if the British Army can not receive and add to the COP its physical combat capability becomes of marginal value. It is here that the previous historical pattern of the development of equally capable but different systems, along national procurement lines, will no longer work. Digitization relies heavily on a great deal of commonality to gain its strength, for example common software and databases. Therefore a superb British digitized system that can not directly interact with the US system has relegated the whole system back to the radio era and lost the synergy that a common system has to offer. However, the British digitization directorate is addressing

[54] The optimum solution would see the Mechanized Brigades replacing SAXON with LAV 3 to ensure true equality. The SAXONs released could then be given to the Home Defense Battalions providing them with a greater level of integral mobility and limited protection. The development of the Multi Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV) is acknowledged but it is not anticipated to be equal to FCS in terms of capability. Thus its eventual procurement (2008 at the earliest) may well prevent adoption of FCS due purely to the financial commitment made to the MRAV. The procurement of LAV 3 now could reduce the potential of this situation arising and retain true equality in the mid term.

[55] US Department of Defense. *Strengthening Transatlantic Security - A US Strategy for the 21st Century*, 21

this issue and the adoption of the Foundation Data Concept, which has been embraced by the US, is being considered. Thus, as with combat equipment, although a gap may well appear in the short and medium term it is unlikely to be permanent.

Potential Differences in the Conceptual Component

The conceptual differences of the two nations' doctrine, which are currently hidden by the use of common terms but caused by their differing definitions will, in the author's opinion, actually be reduced by the introduction of FM 3-0. This perception is based upon the observation that despite the differing terminology that FM 3-0 brings, conceptually it will have moved closer to the British interpretation. However, for the reasons given in the previous chapter they should never be expected to be the same. Another advantage of FM 3-0 is that it superbly captures many of the frictions and difficulties that will face a US multinational commander. It also highlights the importance of these potential problems by formally articulating the policy that although the US can act unilaterally, it will normally pursue its interests through alliances and coalitions.[56]

It is between these statements from FM 3-0 that the most dangerous conceptual issue may well be growing. Although the current US leadership understands the problems raised in FM 3-0, it is as a result of their residual NATO experiences (specifically the large scale maneuver exercises), not the current education and training system. In short, little is being done to furnish the leadership of the future with such knowledge or

[56] U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition)*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2000, 2-42.

experience. For example, in the Advanced Military Studies Program (one of the US Army's most highly respected education courses) not one exercise deals with the problems of coalition command in depth, the majority of the exercises being unilaterally focused.[57] Outside of the schoolhouses the US Army has recently been further restrained from gaining this experience, in a training environment, as a result of a memorandum from General Shinseki. This effectively forbids foreign participation on Warfighter exercises without his personal permission.[58] Although fully understandable as a result of financial pressures, training limitations, belief in the argument that you need to train yourself first and the resulting need to prioritize, the question has to be asked where are tomorrow's leaders building their experience base to deal with the complexities of multinational command? Particularly when FM 3-0 clearly accepts it as a likely aspect of the future operational environment? The answer appears to be in the field, and indeed a great deal of multinational training is going on in the field. Central Command (CENTCOM) in particular has a very active exercise program, an example of which would be the Bright Star exercises.[59] However, even when all of these field experiences are combined they are not as inclusive or testing as the NATO exercises that took place prior to 1989. Therefore, by not formally educating Army officers on the complexities of multinational operations in the schoolhouse, there exists the very real possibility that some will reach high command having never experienced them first hand or even thought them through.

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[57] The current Director, Col R Swan, has identified this weakness and has included international Officers in the seminars to provide contrasting opinions. Although a step in the right direction the presence of these officers is not fully utilized in the exercise program.

[58] General Eric K Shinseki, , US Army. *Foreign Nation Participation in the Combat Training Centers Program Guidance*. Memorandum dated 30 October 2000.

[59] Richard A. Lechowich,. "Crossing Boundaries – Commanders in Chief and Areas of Interest." *Joint Force Quarterly*. Spring 2000, 38.

By contrast, the British Army, primarily because of its firm adoption of a lead nation approach to large-scale warfighting, has maintained a high level of multinational training and experience. The training is initiated in the Joint Staff College and then built upon by experiences in the field. These primarily being drawn from its framework role in the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the multinational make up of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division.[60] As effective and efficient as this training and experience is (the size of the British Army admittedly aids in its ability to permeate throughout the officer corps), it is primarily gained in the role of *being* the lead nation. Little is done, with the exception of the CENTCOM exercises already mentioned, to learn about the problems from the other angle, namely being under another nation's control, which is the scenario that concerns this paper and as argued in chapter 2 remains a very real option.

Implications

The impact of the above would be little more than that of the past, if it were not for two inter-linked factors. First is the perception of a reduced political tolerance among western nations for casualties and long term combat. Second is the emerging technology that may at last facilitate the concept of rapid force projection to enable decisive action earlier, thereby reducing the number of casualties.[61] It is important to note here that this concept and its associated technology is enabled not by the common picture but the common understanding that can be derived from it.[62] It is that understanding which enables rapid tempo and the focus of decisive force, not the colorful digital picture that

[60] The NATO organization for this Division includes the Danish Rapid Reaction Brigade.

[61] U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition)*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 2000, 3-40.

[62] "Synergy of Joint Force depends in a large part on a shared understanding." *Joint Publication 3-0*, III-11.

will be in every vehicle. In other words, it is the knowledge of both the explicit *and* implicit intent of the superior commander, which is depicted by the common picture, that creates understanding. This knowledge has to be present before deployment if the new doctrine is to be effective and situations such as described in the vignette about Coad and a US overlay order are to be avoided in the future. Thus the problem, because the issues are not being systematically addressed prior to deployment, this could result in a widening gap between combined concept and capability. The reasons for this gap are understandable, for just as in the diplomatic arena it is impossible to identify future coalition partners with certainty and therefore the money spent in addressing the issue with specific nations could be wasted! However, the reduced time involved in the new concept, which was historically used to work through the interoperability issues, will force the commanders of the future to rely more extensively on their own prior education and experience in tackling them. In other words, in the future there will be far less time for 'on the job training'. The issue obviously being that if he has not been educated or had experience of these problems then he has not, in the author's opinion, been prepared correctly for his command and could well stumble, the effects of which could have strategic repercussions.

Proposals for Sustaining Future Interoperability

If these arguments are accepted the challenge can be distilled into a simple question of how does one develop the level of combined training that validates concepts and builds commanders implicit understanding, in today's fiscally constrained training environment? It is further exacerbated by the fact that the financial commitment to such projects, by both nations, will logically follow the intensity of their relationship and this,

as argued in chapter 2, is likely be more issue specific and episodic in the future. An additional complicating factor is that in peace all allies are equal and thus it would be politically impossible for the US to favor the British Army over others. Despite these points this paper argues that when a shared crisis arises, the civilian leaders of both nations will turn to their militaries and expect results. Therefore, a constant and systematic solution to the challenge must be found in preparation for those occasions. The following proposals are aimed at enabling this to be developed within the constraints raised. The proposals focus on two themes, firstly the strengthening of the experience base that shapes the commander's application of the operational art. Secondly, adjusting and enlarging the current exchange program to provide a base level of staff integration in both nations' maneuver formations. The purpose of which is to expand the transfer of knowledge and therefore hopefully reduce the time it takes to effectively integrate the forces after alert. The proposals do not have applicability to both nations and are therefore listed separately.

The British Army

(1) Continue to maintain approximate equality of combat systems with their US counterpart.

(2) Ensure that the adopted digitization system can link effectively with the US system.

(3) Ensure that all-future simulation trainers for battlegroups or above are able to be linked and interact with US simulations.

(4) Develop video conferencing suites at the home stations of the various formation headquarters.

(5) Expand the exchange officer system to include all of the active US Divisions and Corps.[63] In addition these posts must be regarded sufficiently to enable the officers that serve in them to compete for promotion to the highest ranks, thereby increasing the long-term value of the exchange.

(6) Encourage participation in bilateral exercises with US higher headquarters, predominantly through the medium of simulation and video conference.

The US Army

(1) Enhance the current exchange program to the UK, to include officers in both British Division Headquarters.[64]

(2) Encourage UK participation in bilateral exercises with US higher headquarters, predominantly through the medium of simulation and video conference.

(3) Adjust education and training system to ensure that all future commanders fully understand the complexities of coalition operations.[65]

Conclusion

The central theme of this paper is that mutual confidence, which both nations accept as being the key to efficient multinational operations, depends greatly on the commanders having a developed understanding of the others intent, both explicit and implicit. For the last fifty years this understanding has been developed in commanders as a by-product of the NATO warfighting exercises and doctrinal development. The end of the Cold War naturally reduced the tactical intensity of the alliance. A result of which is that those experiences no longer happen and are not been provided elsewhere. The effect of this is that the commanders, who gained their experience through NATO, will retire and their successors will not have had the same opportunities to develop a similar sense of

[63] Currently there are 3 British officer integrated into 3 different US Divisions. They are: 1st Cavalry, 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain. Even with the increase proposed here the Army exchange program will still be substantially smaller than that of her sister services.

[64] Of the 40 current US exchange officers in the British Army none are in field units at the formation level.

[65] A cost free initial step would be to formally utilize the presence of the International Officers that attend courses at the various school houses. This could involve a spectrum of things from simple briefings on their own doctrine and services to the role playing of a contingent from their nation under US command.

multinational understanding. The impact of this is greatest within the US Army, which maintains a strict unilateral training focus.[66] This is despite their doctrine, which acknowledges that they are likely to operate in a multinational environment and due to the preponderance of their resources, command it. This training shortfall could well create a situation that replicates the scenario that the 27th Brigade and the 24th (US) Division found themselves in on the Korean peninsula in 1950. However, the strategic impact of this shortfall will potentially be far greater as the political and public will of the future is unlikely to be as understanding of mistakes as that of the 1950's. This paper proposes that a deeper exchange program coupled with greater combined training, specifically at the formation level (using simulation and video teleconferencing systems to ease the fiscal burden), is the most realistic method of mitigating the effects of that shortfall.

In conclusion, the two Armies might appear similar on paper but in reality they are not. These subtle differences can be overcome and even utilized so long as efforts are made to educate the other; assumption of implicit understanding was shown to be a flawed concept in Korea. These differences will always exist as the forces quite correctly represent the nations from which they are drawn. They should not be viewed as a weakness, for as in the diplomatic relationship they provide a different viewpoint or insight, which will often be a source of strength.

[66] By contrast the other services are not as unilaterally focused and have a much more multinational flavor. An indicator of this is the size of their exchange programs, which for both services is dramatically larger than the Army's. This is not to say that they have got it right, by their own admittance they should do more, but that they have identified the need and are attempting to address it.

Appendix A

British Involvement in the Korean War

The tables below chronologically shows the activities conducted by the various British formations. Where no US Division is listed the British formation worked directly for the higher US formation headquarters. These dates have been complied from a review of the British Official History of the Korean War.[67] These dates have been cross-referenced with the material available at the Center for the Study of the Korean War in Kansas City and found to be valid within a couple of days.

Table 3: The 27th Commonwealth Brigades Activities during the Korean War

Date	Activity	US Formation	US Division (if applicable)
18 Aug 50	Warned for deployment to Korea (Op GRADUATE)		
25 Aug 50	Embarked at Hong Kong for Pusan		
29 Aug 50	Arrives Pusan and moves to assembly area east of Taegu.	Eighth Army	24th Div
4 Sep 50	Conducts relief in place on Pusan perimeter.	I Corps	1st Cav Div
16 Sep 50	Break out and advance (Point 282)	I Corps	24th Div
4 Oct 50	Air and Road move north to Kimpo	I Corps	
17 Oct 50	Takes lead on advance to P'yongyang	I Corps	1st Cav Div
21 Oct 50	Takes lead on advance to Chongju (link up with 187 ACT). Chongju taken on 29th.	I Corps	24th Div
3 Nov 50	Holds Bridgehead at Pakch'on (Chinese have entered war, withdrawl has commenced)	I Corps	

[67] Source: Anthony Farrar-Hockley. *The British Part in the Korean War, Volumes 1 and 2*. (London: HMSO, 1990).

Mid Nov 50	Becomes I Corps Reserve	I Corps	
27 Nov 50	Moved to IX Corps to conduct rearguard actions. Takes up initial position near Chasan	IX Corps	24th Div
3 Jan 51	Continues rearguard action, this time on the Han Crossing point. Temporarily under 24th Div Continues rearguard role to Line D.	IX Corps	24th Div
27 Jan 51	16th Field Regiment from New Zealand joins the Brigade.		
13 Feb 51	Holding in vicinity of Yoju. Transferred to X Corps.	X Corps	2nd US Div
14 Feb 51	Advances North to clear route 24, this was parrallel (east) of the relieving route for Chip'yongni, which was under severe pressure at that time. Secures Chuam-ni.	X Corps	2nd US Div
Late Feb 51	Rejoins IX Corps. Continues advance.	IX Corps	
4th Mar 51	Gen Ridgeway orders IX Corps to withdraw the Bde for a complete rest.	IX Corps	
Mid March	Placed under 24th US Div for advance to Line Kansas.	IX Corps	24th US Div
6 Apr 51	Operates directly under IX Corps when 24th US Div is passed to I Corps. Reaches Line Kansas on 8th Apr. Relieved on 17th Apr and becomes Corps reserve.	IX Corps	
23 Apr 51	Handover to 28th Bde Headquarters in process. Ordered to take up blocking positions above Kap'yong.	IX Corps	
28 - 30 Apr 51	Battle of Kap'yong.	IX Corps	
1 May 51	Handover complete 28th Bde replaces 27th Bde	IX Corps	
28 Jul 51	Placed permanently under 1st Commonwealth Div		

Table 4: The 29th British Independent Brigades Activities during the Korean War

Date	Activity	US Formation	US Division (if applicable)
28 Jul 50	Warned for deployment to Korea		
Early Sep 50	Battle Inoculation Teams arrive in Korea. Mostly attached to 25th Div		25th US Div
1 Oct	Embarked at Liverpool for Korea		
5 Nov 50	Arrives at Suwon. Starts conducting guerilla sweeps along Army LOC's	Eighth Army	

1 Dec 50	Placed under I Corps to conduct rearguard actions. Takes up initial positions south of P'yongyang.	I Corps	
3 Dec 50	Placed under 24th Div. Continues rearguard action. 27th Bde passes through on the 4th.	I Corps	24th US Div
12 Dec 50	Becomes I Corps reserve. Vicinity Imjin River. Continues to conduct rearguard actions.	I Corps	
Early Feb 51	Becomes Army reserve	Eighth Army	
Mid Feb 51	Rejoins I Corps for advance North. After a series of engagements becomes Corps reserve on 22nd Feb	I Corps	
Early Mar 51	Returns to Army Reserve role. Its FA Regt is attached to 3rd Div.	Eighth Army	
29 Mar 51	Returns to I Corps. Conducts relief in place on Imjin river line(Line Kansas). Placed under 3rd US Div.	I Corps	3rd US Div
22 – 25 Apr 51	Battle of Imjin. Withdrawal to Line Delta ordered by I Corps on 25th.	I Corps	3rd US Div
28 Jul 51	Placed permanently under 1st Commonwealth Div		

Table 5: The First Commonwealth Divisions Main Activities During the Korean War

Date	Activity	US Formation
28 Jul 51	Division formally activated. Placed under I Corps	I Corps
7-14 Sep 51	Conducts Op MINDEN to cross Imjin and straighten the defensive line. This was to bring all I Corps up to Line Wyoming.	
1 – 19 Oct 51	Partakes in Op COMMANDO to secure Jamestown Line.	
Oct 51 onwards.	Minor raids along the line throughout this period. Several large defensive battles fought around a feature known as the Hook.	
27 Jul 53	Armistice signed. Combat actions cease.	

Appendix B

Summary of Interoperability Issues Identified from a study of the Korean War

The following table lists the main interoperability issue that were identified during this papers review of British Units under US control during the Korean War. They are listed against their corresponding criterion.

Table 6. Summary of interoperability issues identified during the Korean War

Rapport	Not established before, indeed the Montgomery image still haunted many of the US Commanders. Not fully developed in theatre due to constant changes in the task org.		
Respect	Reliance on US assets and the inherent unreliability of their provision eroded the respect with which the British soldiers initially regarded their US counterparts. Conversely, the performance of the British Brigades ensured that the US held them in high regard.		
Knowledge of Partners	Conceptual	Physical	Moral
	Different decision and orders process. Different doctrine. Different definitions for common terms. Different emphasis on estimates and figures. Different use of the English language.	Different equipment, but of similar capability. Different ammunition natures. Incompatible communications. The British Army had a greater proportion of regular soldiers to national service (draft). Different staff organizations and size. Different emphasis on commanders rank. E.g British Brigade Commanders were one stars, company commanders were Majors.	The British Army placed greater reliance on NCO's. The British Army used a Regimental system and therefore a unit rather than individual rotation policy. Different approach to the purpose of combat operations that expend soldiers lives.
	Little had been done before the war to build a base knowledge about the other Army.		

Patience	The only issue that arose form this criterion was the lack of patience with the other nation, due to different approaches or methods. The need for compromise on some issues proved to be more effective than a complete hands off approach.
Appropriateness of Missions	The lack of integral artillery, armor or heavy transport obviously limited the appropriateness of missions for the 27th Brigade. This was overcome by task organization. The general capability of the headquarters and the fighting soldiers of its sub-units was not an issue as regards this criterion. The British Government did not interfere with US tactical commanders over the tasking of the formations. Any interference was done purely through the chain of command (for example the establishment of a national rear link after Point 282). The presence of the right of appeal to a higher headquarters ensured that tactical concerns were kept in theatre rather than instantly escalated to the international stage.

Appendix C

Interoperability Issues remaining in 2001

The table below summarizes the issues remaining in 2001 with reference to those identified from the study of the Korean War. The comments in Italics show changes or alterations to the Korean issues.

Table 7: Interoperability issues remaining in 2001

Rapport	*Established by 50 years of NATO exercises, reciprocal exercises, exchange postings and Combined Operations in the Gulf, Bosnia and Kosovo*		
Respect	*Reliance is no longer placed fully on US assets, force packaging attempts to reduce it.* The performance of the British Units *on the various mission raised* above has ensured that the US holds them in high regard.		
Knowledge of Partners	Conceptual	Physical	Moral
	Similar decision and orders process. *Similar* doctrine but different definitions for key terms. Different emphasis on estimates and figures. Different use of the English language.	Different equipment, but of similar capability. *Some* ammunition natures different. Incompatible communications. *Different fuels.* Different staff organizations and size. Different emphasis on commanders rank. E.g British Brigade Commanders are one stars, company commanders are Majors.	The British Army *still* places greater reliance on NCO's. The British Army *still* uses a Regimental system and therefore a unit rather than individual rotation policy. *Similar approach to the purpose of operations that cost soldiers lives. Indeed the perception of US casualty aversion may well have created a new issue.*
	Much has been done to build a base knowledge about the other Army. These initiatives range from reciprocal exercises to individual exchange posts within each Army.		

Patience	The only area that could be listed under the heading of patience is in the realm of digitization and transformation
Appropriateness of Missions	*The similarity of capabilities between the two nations legacy equipment is such that tactical decisions are not influenced by differences in capabilities.* The British Government did not interfere with US tactical commanders over the tasking of the formations in the *Gulf*. Any interference was done purely through the chain of command. The presence of the right of appeal to a higher headquarters ensured that tactical concerns were kept in theatre rather than instantly escalated to the international stage. *The Jackson/ Clark interaction over the importance of Pristina Airport and the Russians is the first clear example of this being used. It has not affected the relationship*.

Appendix D

Potential Interoperability Issues of the Future

The following table lists the changes or alterations that may occur to the issues that were identified as applicable during the Korean War or in 20001. The comments in italics highlight those that are likely to change.

Table 8: Potential Interoperability issues of the future

Rapport	*The reduction in NATO exercises reduces the scope of exchange between the two Army's. Peacekeeping operations, although combined, do not practice maneuver warfighting due to their national sector structure.*		
Respect	*Reliance is no longer placed fully on US assets, force packaging attempts to reduce it.* *Although regular upgrades have ensured that British equipment is equal in capability to its US legacy counterpart, the fielding of Intrim forces and Future Combat Systems creates capability differences. This is particularly relevant in the differing levels of digitization. These gaps decrease the respect that the US has for the UK force.* The performance of the British Units on the various Balkan missions continues to ensure that the US holds them in high regard for those type of operations but the capability gap causes a different opinion to be formed when considering warfighting.		
Knowledge of Partners	Conceptual	Physical	Moral
	Similar decision and orders process. *Similar* doctrine but different definitions for key terms. Different emphasis on estimates and figures. Different use of the English language.	*Different equipment, potentially of differing capability.* Different staff organizations and size. Different emphasis on commanders rank. E.g British Brigade Commanders are one stars, company commanders are Majors.	*Less difference as the US starts to place greater reliance on NCO's.* The British Army will use a Regimental system and therefore a unit rather than individual rotation policy.

	Much continues to be done to build a base knowledge about the other Army. These initiatives range from reciprocal exercises to individual exchange posts within each other Army. However, they are not all inclusive and the vast majority of US officers will progress with little or no knowledge of multinational warfighting operations, particularly at the formation level. *The restrictions placed on US exercises, particularly formation warfighters, widen this gap and implicitly trains US commanders with a unilateral approach to warfighting*
Patience	The differing levels of digitization and fighting system capabilities will ensure that patience becomes a point of friction. *A lack of awareness of the other system exacerbates this problem.*
Appropriateness of Missions	*The difference in capabilities between the two nations equipment is such that tactical decisions become influenced by these differences.* The British Government continues to follow a policy of not interfering with US tactical commanders over the tasking of the formations. Any interference will continue to be done through the chain of command. The presence of the right of appeal to a higher headquarters is retained to ensure that tactical concerns are kept in theatre rather than instantly escalated to the international stage.

GLOSSARY

ABCA	American, British, Canadian and Australian Organization
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
ESDI	European Security Defense Initiate
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
JTID	Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKPA	North Korean Peoples Army
ROK	Republic of Korea
STANAG	Standard NATO Agreement
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TTP	Tactic, Technique and Procedure

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