



**STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**JOINT VISION 2010 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND ISSUES  
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICK A. DORSEY  
United States Army**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for Public Release.  
Distribution is Unlimited.**

**USAWC CLASS OF 2000**



**U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050**

**DMIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4**

**20000613 118**

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concepts and Issues in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Rick A. Dorsey  
United States Army

Colonel Robert Stewart  
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:  
Approved for public release.  
Distribution is unlimited.



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Rick A. Dorsey, LTC, USA  
TITLE: Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concepts and Issues in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 10 April 2000                      PAGES: 19                      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The premise behind Joint Vision 2010 is that its operational concepts apply across the full spectrum of military operations. Yet very little, if anything, is written regarding "operationalizing" its concepts to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Specifically, much is written on how Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concepts, Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement, can be applied in a Major Theater of War (MTW), but doctrinal application of these concepts to MOOTW is lacking. Additionally, Joint Vision 2010 does not focus on other issues such as anticipated 21st century military challenges. Technology application for MOOTW, JOINT VISION 2010 synergy in MOOTW, and combined and Joint Interagency interaction all affect the application of Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts in MOOTW. In short, there is a void of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures which should be examined in order to provide the next level of detail to move to an experimentation or assessment phase of Joint Vision 2010 in conducting MOOTW.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES.....</b>	<b>V</b>
<b>JOINT VISION 2010 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN MOOTW .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>JOINT VISION 2010 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND MOOTW ISSUES.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW).....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>OPERATIONALIZING DOMINANT MANEUVER.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>OPERATIONALIZING PRECISION ENGAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>OTHER ISSUES.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>21ST CENTURY MILITARY CHALLENGES.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>ACHIEVING JOINT VISION 2010 SYNERGISM FOR MOOTW.....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>ADDRESSING COMBINED OPERATIONS.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>INTERAGENCY, IO AND NGOS.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>A PERSPECTIVE.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>POSTSCRIPT.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>ENDNOTES.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>19</b>



## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1.MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.....	4
TABLE 2.INFORMATION OPERATIONS SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX.....	9



## **JOINT VISION 2010 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)**

"The next task is to operationalize Joint Vision 2010- transforming its concepts of joint warfighting into reality."<sup>1</sup>

General Henry H. Shelton, CJCS

Shortly after assuming duties as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton spoke of "operationalizing" Joint Vision 2010 and its concepts into reality by executing a three-step approach. This approach includes forming a joint headquarters to monitor Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and Service activities, conducting small Joint Vision 2010 warfighting experiments focused on command and control and an operational architecture, and finally, conducting experiments focused on JOINT VISION 2010's operational concepts.<sup>2</sup> General Shelton proclaims that operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 is a relatively simple task provided that this three step approach is conducted. Joint Forces Command (JFC) has been tasked to coordinate the joint community's efforts in operationalizing Joint Vision 2010.

### **Operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 concepts for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)**

The premise behind Joint Vision 2010 is that the synergy of its operational concepts will enable the United States Military to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance through peace operations, up to and into the highest intensity conflict. Unfortunately, little to no doctrine or guidance exists on how Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts apply to MOOTW. Additionally, Joint Vision 2010 doctrine stops short of internalizing other critical factors which are critical to mission success in MOOTW.

The purpose of this Strategy Research Project (SRP) is to examine the application of Joint Vision 2010 to MOOTW, and to address critical issues which affect this application. This project will explore the current guidance pertaining to the concepts addressed in Joint Vision 2010, and then highlight the issues which hinder achieving General Shelton's goal of operationalizing the joint vision.

Specifically, Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts of Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics will be addressed. However, because the joint community has no apparent difficulty operationalizing Full-Dimension Protection and Focused Logistics to MOOTW, the majority of this paper will focus on the issues associated with operationalizing Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement.

In addition, other issues will be addressed which directly impact on the Services' implementation of Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts. These issues include: 21st Century military challenges;

technology application for Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement; and the use of Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership, and People (DOTML-P), to enhance joint operations throughout the spectrum of conflict; executing combined operations using Joint Vision 2010's concepts in MOOTW. Finally, this SRP will explore the role of the Joint Interagency, International Organizations (IO), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) in MOOTW vis-a-vis Joint Vision 2010.

The desired affect of this paper is to provide sufficient insight into the issues while exploring some possibilities which may be applied to the operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 in MOOTW. The goal is that some of these applications may be developed and tested in Joint Vision 2010 warfighting experiments per General Shelton's proclamation.

### **Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concepts and MOOTW Issues**

Joint Vision 2010 is the "conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting."<sup>3</sup> Joint Vision 2010 promulgates four operational concepts which will facilitate full spectrum dominance into the 21st Century. Full spectrum dominance implies that the Armed Forces of the United States will be able to institutionalize Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts to achieve a decisive advantage in any contingency operations. The four operational concepts are: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics.

Dominant Maneuver is the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint, air, land, sea and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks. Dominant Maneuver will allow U. S. forces to gain a decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace. It requires forces that are adept at conducting sustained and synchronized operations from dispersed locations.<sup>4</sup>

Precision Engagement enables U.S. forces to locate the objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required. It will build on current U.S. advantages in delivery accuracy.<sup>5</sup>

Full-Dimensional Protection is the ability to control the battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels.<sup>6</sup>

Focused Logistics is the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.<sup>7</sup>

Theoretically, the application of these Joint Vision 2010 concepts will ensure that the U.S. maintains a capability to dominate the full range of military operations to include MOOTW. Currently, neither Joint Vision 2010 or its supplement, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010, provides specific applications for MOOTW. Joint Pubs 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, discuss terminology, strategy and policy, but makes no effort to operationalize the four concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010.

Service documents such as the Army Vision, the Navy's Grasping 2010 with Naval Forces, and Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, recognizes the concepts of Joint Vision 2010, but do not add the next step of clarity as one may expect based on mission analysis. All documents discuss full spectrum engagement abilities, but lack specific details for application in MOOTW.

#### **Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).**

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, defines MOOTW as encompassing the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of other instruments of national power (economic, political and diplomacy), and occur before, during, and after war.<sup>8</sup> MOOTW focuses on deterring war, resolving conflicts and promoting peace. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in peacetime and emergencies, and in war situations. Several types of MOOTW may occur during one operation. The types of MOOTW listed in Joint Pub 3-07 are depicted in Table 1:

**Military Operations Other Than War  
(MOOTW)**

Type	Amplification
Arms control	Bosnia and Kosovo
Combating terrorism	USSOCOM, JFCOM Missions/ Support to Interagency
DOD Support to counterdrug Operations	USSOUTHCOM and JTF-6
Enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations	Cuban Missile Crisis and Iraq
Enforcing exclusion zones	Prohibiting specified activities in a specific geographic area
Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight	Re-flagging of ships in Persian Gulf
Humanitarian assistance	Somalia
Military support to civil authorities	Domestic disaster relief
Nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency	Security assistance, foreign internal defense, humanitarian and civil assistance programs, medical, dental and veterinarian care, well drilling and construction projects
Noncombatant Evacuation (NEO)	Grenada
Peace Operations	Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement (Bosnia/Somalia)
Protection of shipping	Persian Gulf
Recovery operations	Aircraft disasters
Show of force	Most recent Chinese/Taiwan crisis
Strikes or raids	Grenada
Support to insurgency	Nicaragua

Table 1

Given the types of MOOTW, it is more likely that the U.S. will continue to be more involved in these operations than a Major Theater of War (MTW). If this is true, why does joint doctrine lack the specificity necessary to operationalize Joint Vision 2010 concepts? Our leadership maintains that if we are prepared to conduct a large scale conflict, we can quickly adjust to conduct lessor contingencies. However, another school of thought advocates that "the strategic thinking and operational doctrine to respond effectively to conventional conflict may be irrelevant to unconventional conflicts and operations other than war, for which U.S. Forces are not configured or trained."<sup>9</sup>

Clearly a dilemma exist. Is it not possible to develop joint doctrine which embraces the full spectrum of military operations? Are the concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010 only applicable to MTW operations with no relevance to MOOTW? I argue that Joint Vision 2010's concepts are applicable to all military operations. However, current doctrine lacks the guidance relevant to all the tasks listed in Table 1.

Two of Joint Vision 2010's concepts, Full-Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics already have sufficient service oriented doctrinal guidance associated with them, and are being applied in the Sinai, Bosnia, and Kosovo today. Protection of the force has been, and will continue to be an important mission related task for all contingencies. Innovative techniques for sustaining the force are tested during every deployment conducted by U.S. military personnel. The application of innovative procedures for these two Joint Vision concepts is not an issue, because success is easily measured and evaluated.

The application of Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement during MOOTW is less clear and requires additional exploration to permit experimentation and analysis for the development of tactics, techniques and procedures.

### **Operationalizing Dominant Maneuver in MOOTW**

Dominant Maneuver is the multidimensional application of information, engagement and mobility capabilities to accomplish a task. Dominant Maneuver also requires forces that can sustain operations and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to facilitate synergism. Given this simplified version for the definition of Dominant Maneuver, it should be an easy task to find material related to operationalizing this concept to MOOTW. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Vision 2010, and the Concept for Future Joint Operations, focus on large scale military operations. In fact, JV 2010 further describes Dominant Maneuver as being conducted through "a combination of asymmetric leverage, achieved by our positional advantages, as well as decisive speed and tempo [which] allows us to apply decisive force to attack enemy centers of gravity at all levels and compels an adversary to either react from a position of disadvantage or quit."<sup>10</sup>

This MTW perspective permeates the material associated with Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts. The use of words such as "force," "attacks," and "adversary," may not be appropriate for MOOTW operational terminology. The reality is that objectivity, impartiality and the use of other elements of national power (political, economic and diplomatic), may be more important terms to use. Despite the shortage of MOOTW related terminology in Joint Vision 2010, it is still possible to superimpose the general theory associated with Dominant Maneuver across the range of military operations. Several of

the elements contained in the definition can be applied with just a little imagination. The application of information, engagement capabilities, C4ISR, military and other forces are five elements that may be applied to operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 to MOOTW.

**Application of Information.** Information Operations is a relatively new field of study for U.S. military forces. Much of its real application is covered in secrecy. So much so that confusion exist throughout the military community regarding its purpose or utility. One guest speaker at the Army War College pronounced its utility as "negligible" while another proclaimed that it is the sea which "surrounds all other military activities."<sup>11</sup>

I contend that Information Operations in Dominant Maneuver is absolutely critical to mission success in MOOTW. The public affairs effort alone is sufficient in and of itself to warrant additional study. The themes that must be established are clearly related to mission planning and executed similar to a fire support plan. In Bosnia for instance, the 1st Cavalry and 10th Mountain Divisions directed information operations similar to the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with fire support. In fact, both of their fire support elements lead the staff effort. Information Operations Targeting Boards are conducted rather than the traditional Targeting Board associated with fire support. Key staff representation include intelligence, operators and planners, Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Public Affairs (PA) personnel.

**Engagement Capabilities.** Engagement capabilities in Joint Vision 2010 allude to using military force in a MTW. At face value, it appears difficult to superimpose our substantial ability to apply overwhelming force into a MOOTW situation. However, if we shift our thinking "out of the box" and explore the possibility that the term engagement can be used synonymously with shaping, then our ability to engage in MOOTW has application. Consider the utility of the CINC's peacetime engagement plans and their application to MOOTW. In Peace Operations, if we "engage" the entities (various ethnic groups), with our military professionalism and the use of the other national elements of power to influence or shape their actions, then I submit we would be attacking their centers of gravity, i.e., support of the people. More exploration along these lines is required to assist in operationalizing Precision Engagement in MOOTW.

**C4ISR.** Traditional elements of C4ISR in Dominant Maneuver are used in MOOTW. However, more emphasis is needed in expanding the computer, surveillance and reconnaissance in C4ISR for MOOTW. Joint Pub 3-07-3 provides additional insight outside of the traditional means to conduct C4ISR. For instance, space forces can provide communications, positioning, velocity and timing, weather, global geo-spatial information and services, surveillance and reconnaissance. Special Operations Forces (SOF) can provide a full spectrum of air, ground, and maritime support with links to space-based assets. SOF

capabilities also include CA and PSYOPS, which are important in Peace Operations due to the complexity of operating in cross-cultural environments. Even air assets can meet a wide range of operational C4ISR requirements by gathering information regarding violations of cease fire and arms limitation agreements. Here manned and unmanned airborne sensor platforms play a critical role. Finally, airborne platforms provide for the rapid transport of C4ISR equipment, as well as personnel.<sup>12</sup>

**Military Forces.** Dominant Maneuver is usually described as massing overwhelming combat power at a critical place in time to overwhelm the enemy. MOOTW forces however, require tailoring to include units or personnel with specialized abilities such as language, engineering, decontamination, explosive ordinance disposal, PSYOPS and CA skills.<sup>13</sup> Dominant Maneuver in MOOTW also requires a deterrent capability which has sufficient flexibility to react to an uncertain environment. Even in MOOTW, our ability to project power will enable the timely response critical to deterrence. These forces must be able to task organize rapidly and be able to sustain operations indefinitely. In MOOTW, intra-theater mobility may be more important than inter-theater projection.

**Other Forces.** In MTW operations, we tend to focus solely on military personnel and only reluctantly, engage other players such as other Interagency personnel, International Organizations (IO), and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). However, the "high tech military envisioned in Joint Vision 2010 will likely require support technicians who are less capable of defending themselves."<sup>14</sup> In MOOTW, these other forces will play a greater role in deciding the outcome of the operation, especially in the use of other elements of national power, and therefore, must be included in MOOTW planning from the very beginning. The Army summed up the requirement for utilization of forces in MOOTW with the following statement:

"The force composition for MOOTW must be proportionate to the stated goals of the sponsoring authority and provide sufficient capability to complete the mission and protect the force. The composition of the force should reflect the commander's consideration of the military end state, mission, equipment, training, troops and time, mission specific training requirements, strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, joint and multinational military forces, reserve component forces, non-military U.S. agencies, NGOs, [IOs] and host nation forces. The nature of MOOTW is such that Combat Support and Combat Service Support units may have an equal, if not greater role than combat units."<sup>15</sup>

### **Operationalizing Precision Engagement in MOOTW**

Applying the Joint Vision 2010 operational concept of Precision Engagement to MOOTW requires a little more "out of the box" thinking than does Dominant Maneuver. Even the description offered by Joint Vision 2010 is less descriptive than that afforded to the other operational concepts. Precision

Engagement is that system of systems that enables our forces to locate or target an objective, provide responsive Command and Control (C2), while retaining the flexibility to reengage with precision when required. This concept description outwardly appears suitable to waging war and nothing else. However, Precision Engagement "encompasses more than just attacking targets with advanced weapons systems and high-tech munitions; it also uses a wider range of capabilities [including] actions to identify and locate operational targets, determine the desired effect, select and combine the right forces, engage the operational objective, assess results, and reengage if necessary."<sup>16</sup>

Despite the lack of specifics provided by the reference, one can derive that there are many methods to engage with precision. The questions really are: What is it that I desire to engage? and What precision instruments are best suited to conduct this engagement?

Operationalizing Precision Engagement for MOOTW requires some of the same concepts that were addressed for Dominant Maneuver to include, information operations, utilizing the right forces, use of technology to focus C4ISR efforts, and the application of the interagency.

**Information Operations.** If information facilitated Dominant Maneuver "combat power" in MOOTW, Precision Engagement mandates preciseness in its application, specifically the targeting process. Recall the Bosnia application utilized by the 1st Cavalry and 10th Mountain Divisions in Bosnia. The information targeting board process was so critical for mission accomplishment that the Assistant Division Commanders of both organizations personally supervised the overall operation to ensure unity of effort. Precision Engagement requires that information operations be targeted at the right group (or individual) at the right time to achieve the desired effect. A synchronization matrix was used and reviewed several times before an event was initiated.

Table 2 - Example Information Operations Synchronization Matrix

Elements	PA	CA	PSYOPS	C4ISR	Others
Theme					
New Policy	Newspapers	Engage local leaders	Flyers	Assessment	IO education
Restraint due to emotional event	TV, CG engagement of entity armed forces leaders	Influence-discuss disadvantages of inappropriate behavior	Employed with Peacekeeping Forces	Target trouble makers	Educate on benefits of conformity. Offer incentives

Notes:

1. This Synchronization Matrix was left generic intentionally to preclude classification.
2. Other players can be specified as required by the information operation.

Upon conclusion of the operation, results were assessed and the procedure reevaluated and re-engaged if necessary. Often, the assessment process was as simple as monitoring the entity media.

**Utilizing the Right Forces.** The application of Precision Engagement forces in MOOTW does not necessarily imply a destructive capability. Rather, other forces may be engaged to support the objectives and end state of a particular operation short of war. For instance, medical units may be applied to humanitarian assistance operations to facilitate containment of a disease. Engineer, medical, and logistics units are preferable in military support to civil authorities than laser guided bombs. Planning for precise engagement of combat support and service support forces in MOOTW, is no different than the use of precision munitions against a hostile target. In both cases, an analysis should be conducted to determine the impact the engagement will have on the operation. In operations short of war, the mission analysis must include a process to determine the desired effect of a particular engagement of non-destructive forces. In Bosnia, the 1st Cavalry Division expanded the military decision making process to facilitate more "war gaming" on the social, political, and economic aspects of the Bosnia peacekeeping mission. This enhanced process insured that the right forces were applied against a particular problem (or to preclude the development of a problem), at the precise time required.

**Use of Technology to Focus C4ISR Efforts.** The term "Dominant Battlespace Awareness" has tremendous application for conducting Precision Engagement in MOOTW, although I believe this to be more difficult. Locating an individual thug is much more difficult than locating a tank formation. However, technological advances in C4ISR systems will enable U.S. military forces to apply the right element of national power at the right time and place. C4ISR systems can help focus combined and interagency synergism and direct all applicable elements of power.

**Application of the Interagency.** Precision Engagement also has applicability for Interagency operations. To illustrate, consider the plight of reducing the transport of narcotics to the United States. Interagency counter narcotics intercepts within a particular air or sea route will inconvenience drug smugglers, but the flow of drugs will continue via other methods or means. Imagine if we could develop technology which enables us to shift our efforts at the same time drug operatives do. Joint Inter-agencies for counter-drug operations could achieve real results in reducing the supply side of narcotics trafficking. Of course this technological achievement will require much more than improvements in sensor capability. The interagency process must be maximized to speed up C2 for interdiction, while applying diplomatic and economic pressure (or incentives) to nations which harbor drug related criminals. DOD agencies

better assist in this effort by having the right platform to "engage" smugglers throughout the battlespace, even if the term engagement merely applies to C4ISR systems configured to conduct these operations. Obviously, this is easier written than executed, yet we must begin to explore technologies which are applicable to the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Then we must execute tactics, techniques and procedures which will result in analysis that allows for continued improvements in our capabilities to strike with precision, no matter what type of operation, or how striking with precision is defined.

To summarize, if we claim in doctrine that we can conduct Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement throughout the spectrum of military operations, than we should be able to quantify our success in achieving the stated goals. Unfortunately, more meat is required on the doctrinal bones of these operational concepts, before we can achieve the detail necessary to move to an experimental or assessment phase of development. Further, the doctrine as currently stated fails to consider other issues which affect our ability to execute MOOTW efficiently. These issues are at least as important as the Joint Vision operational concepts, and must be considered as enablers or concepts in and of themselves.

#### **Other Issues**

To gain a better appreciation for the scope of the problem of operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 in MOOTW, several other issues exist that must be addressed. Although some of these issues do not necessarily directly relate to operationalizing Dominant Maneuver or Precision Engagement, then exploration of these issues can serve as force enablers during MOOTW. These issues are : 21st Century military challenges, technological application for Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement in MOOTW, Joint Vision 2010 synergism in MOOTW, combined operations, Joint Interagency and NGO/IO integration.

**21st Century Military Challenges.** Joint doctrine must address all 21st Century military challenges to include all MOOTW, weapon proliferation, transnational threats (drugs and terrorism), weapons of mass destruction, and information security. As stated earlier, few joint publications discuss the utility of operational concepts for these asymmetrical threats. Military theorist and intellectuals devote most of their energy toward major conflict scenarios rather than MOOTW. Although several agencies do exist to explore challenges in other operations short of war, (Peacekeeping Institute, Strategic Studies Institute, Joint Interagency Task Force for Counter Drugs, USSOUTHCOM, SOCOM, JTF-6 and USSPACECOM to name a few), they lack the guidance for operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 Operational Concepts.

### **Technology Application for Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement in MOOTW.**

The exploration of technology is another area which tends to focus on MTW operations. When students of military art read about technological advances in weaponry, the vignettes that are used are excerpts from Desert Storm or the air operation in Kosovo. Precision Engagement and Dominant Maneuver are more easily studied and applied to MTW. I could find no literature on applying technology to MOOTW. No after action reviews alluded to the use of technology in Somalia, Bosnia or even the KFOR phase of Kosovo, which may be related to Dominant Maneuver or Precision Engagement. Given that the vast majority of the U.S. military's efforts are placed in MOOTW, should we not also place similar emphasis in technological experimentation for these operations? General Shelton underscored the importance of experimentation by saying that it "means the freedom to fail, because it is through such failures that we discover truths which help the next experiment."<sup>17</sup> We must find a way to measure technology application in MOOTW, even if the focus is oriented on C4ISR systems.

A second and critical reason for refocusing our technological applications from a primarily MTW focus to a more balanced approach, is that any future adversary will not challenge our technological superiority in a MTW. Instead, future threats will utilize their strengths against our weaknesses and simply not play to our set of rules. If we do not experiment and test technologies which can deal with asymmetrical threats, then "the high tech which underpins so much of the template found in Joint Vision 2010 might have wholly unintended effects. Decision makers should insist that its tenets be continually tested not only against U.S. perspectives, but also against those of potential enemies."<sup>18</sup>

**Joint Vision 2010 Synergism for MOOTW.** Synergism is a term often used to address a well coordinated and executed effort amongst the Services. Again, most of the literature published today speaks to the requirement for achieving synergism in a MTW environment as a joint team. Joint Vision 2010 however, discusses achieving full spectrum dominance through the synergy of its operational concepts. During a lecture at the Army War College, a distinguished guest stated that "synergy can only be achieved through co-evolution of joint doctrine, agile organizations, joint training and education, enhanced material, innovative leadership, and high quality people (DOTML-P)."<sup>19</sup> This speaker also acknowledged that much work needs to be done in joint doctrine to operationalize Joint Vision 2010 concepts to MOOTW. His concepts however, has validity in addressing the heart of the issue associated with Joint Vision 2010 and MOOTW.

Doctrine. Co-evolution of joint doctrine must also occur if the joint community is to achieve General Shelton's goal of operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 throughout the spectrum of conflict. As stated earlier, each of the Services acknowledged the concepts in Joint Vision 2010, but none offered specifics on how each will facilitate Precision Engagement and Dominant Maneuver in a MOOTW. A simple mission analysis in support of Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts as applied to the full

spectrum of conflict surely should have generated some thoughts pertaining to each service capabilities to facilitate joint doctrine in MOOTW. However, specific application of service abilities were related to MTW operations. Services should as a matter of mission analysis take Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement to the next level and discuss applications for MOOTW. To the Army's credit, a future update of FM 100-5 will explore MOOTW as a reality in military operations, but even this attempt appears hung up in coordination. Clearly, only the Services can provide the supporting doctrine which discuss tactics, techniques and procedures which truly operationalize Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Organizations. Several arguments have been made that address whether the United States' Armed Forces' organizations are optimized for MOOTW. If the U.S. went to a MTW today, it is likely that existing C2 elements at battalion, brigade, division, corps and even Army level (ARCENT and USFK), would be used to provide C4ISR. On the other hand, ad hoc organizations are developed to provide C2 for MOOTW. In Bosnia for instance, a division headquarters is used to provide C4ISR for Multi-National Division-North, yet much of the division headquarters is filled with "augmentees" to facilitate the various tasks required in that operation. One primary example is the Joint Military Commission (JMC), which serves to coordinate and monitor the actions of the various Bosnia entity armed forces. This critical position is not a part of the division's normal peacetime structure and personnel to man the many critical slots are taken from other key staff positions in the division, or provided by the European Command, Forces Command or the Department of the Army. PSYOPS, CA, G-5 and Information Operations requirements are also examples of shortcomings in existing organizational structures. Indeed, one brewing controversy in the Army is whether or not we have the right force mix to accomplish the missions we are expected to execute in the post cold war world. CA personnel are in great demand for MOOTW operations and only one battalion exists in the active Army from which to draw personnel or sub-units. The obvious alternative is utilizing Army Reserve personnel, but even they are being stressed by the great demand. No doubt that we neither have the force structure nor the requirement to maintain the required number of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) personnel slots for each division, yet it is time to at least analyze our structure to maximize their capabilities throughout the spectrum of conflict. Much can be said of the Air Force's decision to develop Air Expeditionary Forces which can be easily tailored to accomplish any assigned task.

Joint Training and Education. The current Army thought is to continue to focus on Mission Essential Task List (METL) wartime training and education vice conducting MOOTW training as a matter of routine. The premise is that it is much harder to train for a MTW than a MOOTW, and forces will have sufficient time to "train-up" when given a MOOTW mission. I do not debate the logic or wisdom of this policy. Indeed, U.S. military resources, including time, are scarce. However, leaders often become frustrated over the asymmetric challenges associated with MOOTW for three reasons. First, despite

Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE), leaders simply can not be prepared for the political, economic, and diplomatic elements of power that tend to dominate MOOTW, particularly in the later stages of Peacekeeping Operations. Second, many of the key staff and line personnel do not have an opportunity to train with the deploying unit and must be assimilated "on the fly." Finally, junior leaders are often placed in situations which have strategic implications in a MOOTW. Officer Basic or Advance Courses, Primary Leader Develop Courses or Advance Courses, and even Command and General Staff Colleges simply do not have the wherewithal to provide future junior leaders with sufficient education to deal with the variables associated with MOOTW. It is generally not until the Senior Service College level that leaders are afforded an opportunity to study MOOTW in an academic environment.

Enhanced Material. A requirement for enhanced material refers to the application of technology and experimentation which has already been discussed. The basic problem remains that there is insufficient resources from which to obtain doctrinal or tactics, techniques and procedures for MOOTW.

Innovative Leadership. Flexibility and innovation are important attributes to leading Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines in a MOOTW. Each operation is different and requires a flexible response when dealing with troubled areas. One wrong move and our legitimacy will be questioned.

High Quality People. MOOTW requires a higher level of quality in our Service Members. Everyone has the capability to promote or destabilize MOOTW tasks, especially in decentralized operations.

**Combined Operations.** If operationalizing Joint Vision 2010 is troublesome for U.S. military forces, this problem is compounded when conducting these operations with coalition partners. Although missions are generally focused by the United Nations (UN), North American Treaty Organization (NATO) or some other regional organization, application of tactics, techniques and procedures vary from country to country and confusion is inevitable in combined operations. Several examples are evident. In Bosnia for instance, each Multi-National Division has different procedures for carrying out tasks. During one particularly fragile operation, one MND used a show of force to facilitate calm, while another chose to back off and let tensions run their course. Both were extremely effective, but the potential for thugs to take advantage of these differences exist. In Somalia, differences in C2 and ROE as applied in Operation Provide Relief (USNOSOM I), Restore Hope (UNITAF), and USFORSOM (UNOSOM II) could have led to overly ambitious U.N. mandates that led to the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers and 18 Americans. Clearly, these operations are "unique because they are conducted with the increasing involvement of the international community...these partnerships can create some real challenges on all sides."<sup>20</sup>

There are some significant advantages in conducting these operations with the international community as a coalition and "the bottom line is that our ability to build and support multinational coalitions is now an important part of our national security strategy in the post- Cold War world."<sup>21</sup> We must be prepared to operate in this environment and have a sound doctrinal base from which to operate.

**Joint Interagency and NGO/IO Integration.** Obviously, no military operation can occur without interaction with joint interagencies, IOs or NGOs. However, this interaction is much more pronounced in MOOTW than MTW. There are Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) which facilitate interaction, but do not maximize unity of effort.

PDD 2 directs the organization of the National Security Council (NSC) system and promulgates the principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy.<sup>22</sup>

PDD 25 establishes policy for the entire spectrum of activities from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The policy provides limited guidance and direction on U.S. policy toward those operations.<sup>23</sup>

PDD 56 is the Clinton Administration's policy on managing contingency operations, and directs all U.S. Government agencies to "institutionalize" lessons learned from previous peacekeeping operations. The policy requires the creation of interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and execution of complex contingency operations.<sup>24</sup>

These PDDs provide a framework for general policy regarding peacekeeping operations and interagency cooperation. However, the guidance has failed to alleviate the problems associated with interagency cooperation and execution of their various tasks. Although much progress is being made due to interagency exercises and LNOs, we need an interagency strategy or doctrine that projects out to the year 2010 and beyond. Phasing command and control of MOOTW operations can ensure continuity of action, express our resolve against potential threats to international stability and provide predictability for our allies. DOD should once again, assume the lead in development of joint interagency doctrine for MOOTW operations that involve the preponderance of military effort and solicit tactics, techniques and procedures from other agencies within the executive branch.

Cultural differences must be overcome and rice bowls eliminated when lives are at stake. DOD has historically led the way in developing procedures despite heavy opposition and should continue to do so in the interagency process. Since no documents exist which provide guidance and facilitates military

interaction with IOs or NGOs, DOD can assume the lead once again and develop doctrine in conjunction with the primary non governmental organizations.

### **A Perspective**

Clearly, there is no debate that U.S. Armed Forces will continue to be involved in MOOTW. Limited resources require that Services maximize individual capabilities to support our political strategic objectives, no matter what they are.

Joint Vision 2010 provides a sound framework for maximizing and integrating Service capabilities and functions toward achieving these goals in a MTW, but fails to elaborate on how individual Service capabilities can support MOOTW. This problem is compounded when trying to operationalize the Joint Vision concepts of Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement.

Each Service must conduct a mission analysis approach to support Joint Vision 2010 (or its successor) throughout the spectrum of military conflict. Tactics, techniques and procedures must be developed in supplemental Service manuals and publications to facilitate operationalizing Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts.

Additionally, Joint Vision 2010 or its successor, must address other issues which are enablers to Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement concepts to include evaluating these concepts for all 21st Century military challenges; applying technological advances for Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement in MOOTW; achieving synergism for MOOTW by using evolving DOTML-P principles; and developing a doctrine and training methodology for using Joint Vision 2010 concepts in an environment which includes allies and NGOs/IOs.

This paper contends that the concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010 support other sound and viable joint doctrine, but all documents must focus on engaging the lower military spectrum of conflict to facilitate full spectrum dominance and synergism.

### **Post Script**

The Joint Staff is currently in the process of staffing Joint Vision 2020. Surprisingly, many of the issues addressed in this paper were included in the coordination draft of Joint Vision 2020. The document now specifically addresses MOOTW in its explanation of achieving full spectrum dominance via Joint Vision 2010's operational concepts, and has included a section on information superiority. The document also includes a discussion on DOTML-P, Interagency interaction, and combined operations as

addressed in the later portion of this SRP. However, the premise behind this SRP remains valid. In order to truly operationalize Joint Vision 2010 or 2020, Services must develop supplementary doctrine and TT&Ps which facilitate understanding of the joint vision.

WORD COUNT = 6988

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Henry H. Shelton, General, "A Word from the New Chairman," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter, 1997-98, pp. 6-8.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, p.6.

<sup>3</sup>JCS, Joint Vision 2010, America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow, p. i.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid, p.21.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p.22.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, p.23.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p.25.

<sup>8</sup>JCS, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, p. GL-3.

<sup>9</sup>Sam C. Sarkesian, "The U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice," ORBIS, Summer 1998, Vol 42, No 3, p. 423.

<sup>10</sup>Joint Vision 2010, JCS, p. 347.

<sup>11</sup>AWC CLS, Non Attribution.

<sup>12</sup>JCS, Joint Pub 3-07-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, pp. II-4-6.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, p. II-4.

<sup>14</sup>Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment,, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter, 1997-98, p.48.

<sup>15</sup>USA, FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, p. 8-1.

<sup>16</sup>JCS, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding JV 2010, p.51.

<sup>17</sup>Henry H. Shelton, General, "A Word from the New Chairman," Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter, 1997-98, p.7.

<sup>18</sup>Charles J. Dunlap, Jr, "Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment," Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter, 1997-98, p.49.

<sup>19</sup>AWC CLS, Non-attribution.

<sup>20</sup>Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, National Defense University Press, Ft McNair, Washington, DC, Jan 1995, pp.xv-xvi.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>William J. Clinton, "Organization of the National Security Council," USAWC Course 2: War, National Policy and Strategy, Volume II, p. 248.

<sup>23</sup>William J. Clinton, "The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy," USAWC Course 2: War National Policy and Strategy, Volume V- Part A, p. 58.

<sup>24</sup>William J. Clinton, White Paper- The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive- 56, May 1997.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allard, Kenneth, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, National Defense University Press, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., January 1995.
- Blank, Stephen J., NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do?, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, November 18, 1997.
- Bunker, Robert J., Five - Dimensional (Cyber) Warfighting: Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies?, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, March 10, 1998.
- Clinton, William J., "Organizations of the National Security Council," USAWC Course 2: War National Policy and Strategy, Volume II.
- Clinton, William J., "The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy," USAWC Course 2: War National Policy and Strategy, Volume V- Part A.
- Clinton, William J., White Paper- The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56.
- Dunlap, Charles J., "Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Assessment," Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter, 1997-98.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding JV 2010, May 1997.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-00, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 Coordination Draft, 18 February 00 Version.
- Marcella, Gabriel and Donald E. Schulz, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, March 10, 1994.
- Metz, Steven, Refining American Strategy in Africa, Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, February 2000.
- Sarkesian, Sam C., "The U.S. Military Must Find It's Voice," ORBIS, Summer 1998, Vol 42, No 3.
- United States Army, FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, May 1995.