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NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM-
SUPPORTING THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

BY

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United States Army National Guard

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National Guard State Partnership Program –

Supporting the Army After Next

by

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program (NGSPP) has been a tool for engagement since its inception in 1992. This program filled a critical void prior to the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 and it continues to develop in Europe under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) PfP program.

Much has changed since the NGSPP originated through partnerships with three nations emerging from the demise of the Soviet Union. Today there are 29 nations involved in the NGSPP, both in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere. This project provides background and analyzes how the NGSPP has evolved as a tool of preventative diplomacy in support of the current National Military Strategy in the context of shape, respond and prepare now. Further, it examines the NGSPP as it applies to Latin America and it suggests how some concepts of the NGSPP could be adapted to better support the National Military Strategy in the 21st Century.
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PREFACE

To the men and women serving
in military forces promoting and protecting
peace around the globe
and
to those whose hope for tomorrow is
a world of peace and democracy
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"I find that the greatest thing in life is not so much where we are, but rather in what direction we are moving."
— Goethe

INTRODUCTION

As we enter the 21st century, the United States faces challenges unimagined a decade ago. The world has indeed changed. The bipolar militaries of the Cold War are no longer facing each other across the Iron Curtain. The planners in the Pentagon, no longer focused on the Fulda Gap, are scrambling to react to regional conflicts that daily pose threats to peace and stability around the world.

The U.S. Army has devoted much of this decade to the development of structure, concepts, and doctrine to face tomorrow's threat. Concepts and experiments such as Battle Labs, Advanced Warfighting Experiments, Force XXI, and Army After Next are logical undertakings designed to provide a well-developed, tested foundation to insure that the U.S. Army is equipped and structured to provide for our nation's future security. As the Army struggles to define this structure, the Department of Defense continues to refine current missions and identify future missions that will support the National Security Strategy (NSS) into the 21st century with a viable, forward-looking National Military Strategy (NMS).
The foundation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) is engagement. This strategy is designed to protect America’s security, prosperity, and fundamental values. Since the end of the Cold War, peacetime engagement missions have increased dramatically.² The Operations tempo (OPTEMPO) resulting from these missions continues to place increasing burdens on Active Component military personnel. Several ongoing initiatives propose increased use of Reserve Component forces in these missions. One such initiative is the National Guard Bureau’s (NGB) State Partnership Program (NGSPP). Begun in 1992, it has continued to develop in Europe under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

The PfP program began as a NATO initiative to improve relations with newly independent nations by training in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue operations. Nations participating in PfP with NATO enter into formal agreements and commitment of resources to the program.³ Participation involves a display of commitment of time and resources to enhance security cooperation with the West.⁴ Most participants view PfP as a first step toward obtaining NATO membership, as well as a means of passage to democracy and governmental reform.⁵

The NGSPP provides a framework to link the Army and Air National Guard forces of a U.S. state with the government
and military of another nation. U.S. states may not only commit their National Guard forces but also state government agencies, universities, and the private sector to the NGSPP. The program initially sought to promote democratic ideals, especially subordination of military affairs to civilian authority within the newly independent Eastern European nations that emerged as the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The scope of the program has since been expanded to include nations within the Western Hemisphere. The following table lists the current NGSPP partnerships.

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<tr>
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<td>Puerto Rico/Honduras</td>
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<td>South Carolina (New Jersey*)/Albania</td>
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<td>Texas (Nebraska*)/Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Utah/Belarus</td>
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<td>Vermont/Macedonia</td>
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<td>West Virginia/Peru</td>
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<td>*Associate Partnerships</td>
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**TABLE 1**

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TABLE 1

State partnerships have been established with several countries in both Central and South America. These countries are very different from the European countries engaged through the original NGSPP model. Even so, historical relations, cultural affinities, geographical concerns, and social and economic differences provide challenging opportunities for engagement within this Hemisphere. This study examines the NGSPP as it is currently used in Latin America. It offers a basis for further research, and the concepts developed are generally applicable to European partnerships.

PURPOSE

During the Cold War, the primary U.S. security strategy was one of containment. This very specific, focused strategy ultimately proved to be the correct formula for bringing about the demise of the Soviet Union. However, in our zeal to defeat the Soviet Union, we gave scant attention to our neighbors to the South. Unfortunately, some of this attention often did more harm than good. The wounds from these often misguided efforts have not yet healed. There is much work to be accomplished to rebuild trust with our southern neighbors and the NGSPP may expedite that process.

Can the current NGSPF, envisioned to support NATO efforts in Eastern Europe, be adapted to better support the
National Military Strategy in the 21st Century by expanding the scope of the effort in Latin America? This study examines the NGSP as a tool in preventative diplomacy. It reviews the background and strengths of the NGSP, shows how the NGSP engages other countries in support of the NSS, and shows how it implements the NMS by shaping, responding and preparing now for the future. Finally, it suggests how some concepts of the NGSP could be leveraged now in order to support future military scenarios. This analysis of the NGSP in Latin America concludes with recommendations that may as well apply to the program as it is currently executed in the NATO environment.

The United States has important interests in Latin America, such as: promoting democracy and free trade, preventing instability and terrorism, ensuring access to resources, combating the transnational threats of migration and narcotics trafficking, and safeguarding the Panama Canal. The development of Latin America's militaries as civilian-controlled institutions that promote security and democracy is also a major U.S. concern. The U.S. armed forces support our national interests through over 3,000 annual separate deployments into the region. In 1996 deployed personnel totaled 56,000, - approximately 40 percent were from the Reserve Components.⁶
The NGSPP currently maintains bilateral partnerships with the following Latin American nations: Belize, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Recently Bolivia, Guyana, Jamaica, and El Salvador have shown interest in participating in the NGSPP. NGB objectives for these partnerships are to build democratic institutions, project American values, foster free market economies, promote interoperability between military and civilian institutions, and replace prejudice with informed opinion. The NGSPP implements the National Security Strategy by supporting U.S. Ambassadors' country plans. These partnerships also execute the National Military Strategy through support to the geographic Commander in Chief (CINC).

DISCUSSION

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of engagement relies on the use of U.S. military forces as a tool for preventive diplomacy. One problem facing military planners is how to match the ways (strategic concepts) to the means (resources) to support smaller-scale contingency (SSC) missions while we continue to maintain the forces required for two near-simultaneous major theater wars (MTW) and while we modernize the force at a reasonable rate.

In October 1998, the Administration released “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” While this strategy remains founded on the concept of engagement, the
three core objectives of this document are, “to enhance our security”, “to bolster America’s economic prosperity” and “to promote democracy abroad.”

An integral element of the strategy of engagement calls for using U.S. military force in direct support of a policy of preventive diplomacy. Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Galhi defined preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”. In an interview published in U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, James Steinberg states that in the post-Cold War world “the importance and cost-effectiveness of preventative actions in dealing with conflict and complex emergencies” has been demonstrated in crisis after crisis. To better support preventive diplomatic initiatives, the U.S. military must program and develop appropriate forces, missions, and doctrine.

The NGSPP has developed as an economy of force program that supports the three core objectives of the National Security Strategy. These objectives are implemented through the application of the instruments of national power. The military, economic, diplomatic, and informational elements are most effective when used in a coordinated effort. NGSPP combines these instruments in one program. These
partnerships bring together the people, the militaries, and the governments through the unique relationships of Guard personnel and units; federal, state and local governments; and civilian business leaders.

In describing the imperative of engagement, the National Security Strategy states that:

Underpinning our international leadership is the power of our democratic ideals and values. In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity. Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats, encourage free trade, and promote sustainable economic development. They are less likely to wage war or abuse the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States will support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world. This is the strategy to take us into the next century.12

To implement this strategy, the NSS advocates that the central thrust is “strengthen[ing] and adapt[ing] the security relationships we have with key nations around the world and create[ing] new relationships and structures when necessary.”13 The NGSPP supports these principles and could be strengthened and adapted to support this strategy.

The purpose of the NGSPP is to promote, through the example of the citizen-soldier, stability, democracy and the proper role of the military in a democratic society. The NGSPP was initiated by former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Air National Guard Lieutenant General John B.
Conaway. In 1992, he led the first Department of Defense team visit between military representatives of the East and West in over fifty years. General Conaway, accompanied by a thirty-member delegation, visited Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. He recalls that:

The administration, primarily General John Shalikashvili, who was then commander of U.S. Forces Europe (USAEUR), Chairman Powell, and Secretary Cheney believed that a delegation of active duty soldiers to those nations, led by an active, warfighting CINC, would send the wrong signal to the Russians. It was typical of the extraordinary political and military acumen of these three men. They knew that the National Guard-led delegation would appear to the Russians as non-threatening and helpful to the emerging democracies and their defense forces.14

The result of this visit was the initial establishment of State Partnerships by the National Guard Bureau (NGB). Partners from within the United States were identified on the basis of the high rate of Baltic populations in the demographics of various states.15 Thus began the National Guard Bureau State-to-State Partnership Program.

This program has since established 29 partnerships in both Europe and the Western Hemisphere. "The goal of each partnership is to build long standing institutional affiliations and people-to-people relationships with nations while strengthening military organizations under civilian control".16 Guardsmen serve as models of dual purpose citizen-soldiers and make a compelling case for the "ideals of democracy, professionalism, and deference to civilian
authority. They also demonstrate the necessity and economy of Reserve Forces with the ability to react immediately to civil and military emergencies".17

The program seeks primarily to instill the fundamentals of military subordination to civilian authority and the utility of military support to civilian authorities.18 Many Guardsmen participate through visits to partner countries as part of Traveling Contact Teams. Others participate by deploying in support of exercises executed by geographic CINCs. Although not a specific requirement of the NGSPP, most CINCs plan for the participation of NGSPP states in exercises planned for their partner countries. Many of these exercises are nation-building projects, that, while not a formal part of NGSPP, provide unparalleled opportunities to foster constructive relationships.

Partnerships are initiated at the request of countries desiring to participate in this program. Upon receipt of a host-country request, the U.S. ambassador forwards the request to the geographic CINC, who forwards it to the State and Defense Departments for ultimate action by the National Guard Bureau. All proposals for military-to-military contacts to be conducted as part of the NGSPP are reviewed and coordinated with the appropriate regional commanders, the U.S. Atlantic Command, the Departments of the Army and Air Force, the Joint Staff and the appropriate interagency
working group. This comprehensive oversight enables the NGSPP to tailor missions to support the Ambassadors' country plans, the CINC's regional plans and any guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This coordination finally establishes the NGSPP as a valuable tool for diplomatic shaping in solidifying democratic processes in various world regions.

Unlike the PfP program, which requires participants to commit to specific, formal agreements, NGSPP is more flexible. Partner nations tailor a plan through mutual agreements with their respective partner states. NGSPP activities include, but are not limited to, humanitarian construction; air search and rescue; professional military education; disaster response planning; medical exchanges; personnel issues; budgeting and administration. Regardless of their specific mission, all NGSPP contacts teach the U.S. military standard and reinforce the tenet of military subordination to civilian authorities in democratic countries.

These military-to-military contacts between National Guard soldiers and those of the partner country accomplish much. Some might wonder how forces structured for military operations could be utilized to foster democracy. The U.S. military has habitually thought that such civics lessons are matters for diplomats. But diplomats can only achieve so
They can open and maintain channels of communication between governments, but they cannot easily gain acceptance within military establishments. Only direct personal contact and the sharing of experiences and perceptions can establish trust. The NGSPP is an ideal medium to accomplish this task. The trust and confidence built through repeated NGSPP contacts allows National Guard citizen-soldiers to become role models for democratic civil-military ideals. Consequently, National Guard mobilization day (M day) soldiers are often viewed as less threatening than their full-time Active Component Counterparts.

One of the major problems the United States must overcome in developing long-term relationships in this hemisphere is the traditional "fatherly" assistance-focused mind-set that has traditionally hampered Washington's standard approach to engagement. Often, in our eyes, our southern neighbors are seen as developing, subordinate states that are needy and underdeveloped. This mind-set has been referred to as the "Evita Perrone syndrome - I have the answers for all of your problems. Trust me, my children!"

On the other hand, these neighboring governments see this paternalistic mindset as a reflection of the U.S. tendency to focus narrowly and impose North American solutions without consultation or understanding of inherent complexities in Latin American countries.
The NGSPP provides a unique opportunity to break up stereotypes and to establish strong links with Latin American partners - links that can be strengthened to provide real dividends for future hemispheric cooperation. Familiarization visits to the U.S. by partner nations' military members provide a foundation on which to build professional relationships.

The NGSPP has even adapted its name to ensure a correct translation of its intent. "Partnership" translated into Spanish literally means "association," which denotes a formal treaty relationship. The current adaptation is translated "campaneros," which connotes a "friendly link," not a formal agreement. Latin American partners are also sensitive to the term "engagement," which they associate with intrusive military action, like an operation. U.S. personnel must be aware of our cultural differences and exercise caution, especially during the initial, critical stages of establishing genuine partnerships based on trust and paving the way for long-term professional relationships.

THE NGSPP SUPPORTS THE NSS THROUGH ENGAGEMENT.

In his preface to the October 1998 "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," President Clinton outlined the objectives of this strategy. He specified that the strategy "encompassed a wide range of initiatives: expanded military alliances..." promoting free trade through the World
Trade Organization and the move toward free trade areas by nations in the Americas..., multinational coalitions combating terrorism, corruption, crime and drug trafficking." The NGSPP supports engagement by maintaining current partnerships and responding to newly submitted partnership requests that, over the long term, will continually and carefully shape the strategic environment and foster democracies in support of the NSS.

Thomas Jefferson established as one of his policies that "democracy throughout the world is the best way to avoid warfare." President Clinton states that "we must also renew our commitment to America's diplomacy... Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return in security and savings." Although the NGSPP supports the NSS by strengthening democracies and free market economies, much remains to be done.

It takes a long time and much effort to achieve a peaceful, productive and democratic hemisphere. "We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. Today's complex security environment demands that all our instruments of national power be effectively integrated to achieve our security objectives." The NGSPP, given proper resources, provides a unique
opportunity to engage using a combination of these instruments in a non-threatening approach. These engagement activities execute the National Military Strategy by shaping, responding, and preparing now for the future.

**THE NGSPP EXECUTES THE NMS BY SHAPING.**

The 1998 NSS acknowledges the viability of NGSPP programs:

The United States has a range of tools at its disposal with which to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests and global security. Shaping activities enhance U.S. security by promoting regional security and preventing or reducing the wide range of diverse threats outlined above. These measures adapt and strengthen alliances and friendships, maintain U.S. influence in key regions and encourage adherence to international norms.²⁷

The NGSPP shapes the environment by modeling democracy and subordination of the military to civilian control. The information sharing and long-term personal contacts between partners that promote trust and confidence provide the basis for effective ad hoc coalitions. The NGSPP builds constructive relationships and helps to promote the development of democratic institutions by increasing understanding and reducing uncertainty.

In his opening remarks at the Summit of the Americas (19 April 1998), President Clinton emphasized that "The Americas have set a new standard for the world, in defense of liberty and justice through our collective commitment to
defend democracy wherever it is at risk in our hemisphere. Concerted action by neighbors and friends already has helped to restore or preserve democracy and human rights in Haiti, Guatemala and Paraguay."28

The NGSPP also plays an essential role in shaping by participation in United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) exercises with partner nations.29 These exercises provide an occasion for direct military-to-military personal contact between partners. These personal contacts then serve as the foundation for the longer-term relationships needed to foster trust. The longevity of National Guard members in their respective states’ units provides a Guard-specific strength. Guard soldiers are generally in it for the “long haul,” so they provide opportunities for long-term partnerships.

The Kentucky National Guard (KYNG)/Ecuador partnership offers one example of building real trust. The KYNG participated in SOUTHCOM exercise ‘New Horizons 98’ through the deployment of Joint Task Force (JTF) Esmeraldas to Ecuador. Kentucky’s portion of the exercise planning was conducted from August 1997 - April 1998. The deployment, execution and redeployment spanned from early April through late September 1998. The duration staff, which remained in Ecuador throughout the exercise, provided command and control and was manned primarily by Kentucky National Guard
personnel. The work was executed by units and personnel from the Kentucky and Missouri National Guard (Army and Air), Active Army, Marines and Air Force. Several platoons of Ecuadorian engineers and security personnel participated, providing assistance and base camp support.

During this exercise, conducted in the aftermath of El Nino, U.S. forces completed the construction of five schools, three clinics, four latrines and maintained 30 kilometers of main supply routes (MSR). U.S. medical personnel also conducted three Medical Readiness and Training Exercises (MEDRETES) that supported a total of 5,400 local national patients.

Then Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG Edward D. Baca, accompanied by the Ecuadorian Minister of Defense, the Ecuadorian Army Chief of Staff, and the Adjutant General of Kentucky, MG John R. Groves, visited the Task Force in June 1998. They toured the Area of Operations and took time to meet with the local civilian leadership. General Baca’s language skills allowed him to converse fluently with all military and civilian local and U.S. personnel. This visit and the overall exercise contacts provide an excellent example of how the NGSPP program can be used to shape relationships that build coalitions, promote peace and stability, and support the continued growth of democracy in the region.
THE NGSPP EXECUTES THE NMS BY RESPONDING.

As currently resourced, the NGSPP cannot actively respond to threats and crises. As stated in the NSS “Our resources are finite, so we must be selective in our responses, focusing on challenges that most directly affect our interests and engaging where we can make the most difference.” But, the NGSPP does respond to requests from partnership countries, which include military to military contacts and exchanges. Using the unique position of State Adjutant General, state leaders can also use the NGSPP as a vehicle to foster academic and business partnerships.

The NSS specifically advises that “we must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools - acting in alliance or partnership when our interests are shared by others.” The NGSPP provides a role model for building civil-military relationships and can, through visionary leadership and preparation today, be resourced and developed to provide support for partner nation participation in coalition operations in the 21st Century.

THE NGSPP EXECUTES THE NMS BY PREPARING NOW.

We must prepare for an uncertain future even as we address today’s security problems. This requires that we keep our forces ready for shaping and responding requirements in the near term, while at the same time evolving our unparalleled capabilities to insure we can effectively shape and respond in the future.
As mentioned previously, the NGSPP provides a foundation for the establishment of long-term relationships. John Cope suggests that "the U.S. ability to act as a great power in a financially and technologically integrated world is enhanced by identifying shared interests with Inter-American neighbors, developing mutual confidence, and creating capabilities for multinational cooperation on international issues."\(^3\)

The emerging paradigm calls for respect for state sovereignty while working closely to achieve common interests. Likewise, we are constantly reminded of the need to pursue U.S. interests with limited resources. The focus is on cooperation, which implies reciprocity, transparency, and institutional accountability. Such cooperation requires time, innovation, understanding, and perseverance.\(^4\) The NGSPP is the ideal tool for cooperative international relationships.

"Commitment and reciprocity in military partnerships encourage close working relations and ultimately interoperability. A formal hemispheric alliance structure is unnecessary. Building confidence in the idea of ad hoc partnerships within sub-regions for a few common missions is a start."\(^3\) The NGSPP could be tailored to support, with limited resources, the U.S. ability to build coalitions from
within this hemisphere and many nations are interested in this benefit.

The military leaders of potential coalition partners seek operational contacts with U.S. forces in order to improve professional capabilities and develop interoperable doctrine. "Reciprocity, common standards for technical and tactical interoperability, and interest in a genuine partnership have long been absent. Consequently, when Washington needed to assemble a large multinational force in the Persian Gulf in February 1998, regional governments refused to contribute, in part because their forces lacked cooperative experience with the United States."36

RECOMMENDED CONCEPTS FOR TAILORING THE NGSPP

The NGSPP can enable partner forces to gain that cooperative experience. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., makes the point that the U.S. has fought all of its modern wars as a member of a coalition. He observes that "[a]ny officer knows intuitively, if not from experience, that interoperability of equipment and compatibility of doctrine and operational procedures pose significant challenges in any coalition."37 He offers compelling examples to frame this argument. The technologies of U.S. communications and intelligence systems are not generally available to potential partners. Coalition partners have
required, and will in the future require, liaison assistance from U.S. forces in order to be able to operate.

The NGSPP could provide liaison support during a crisis by linking potential coalition forces to the U.S. Army. Instead of drawing heavily on AC forces to create liaison cells for coalition partners, NGSPP liaison cells — established, trained, and deployed during this period of strategic pause — would deploy to peacekeeping missions with their partnership countries' force packages. An additional dividend of this established relationship is that coalition partnership countries can be expected to have older equipment that will be familiar to National Guard personnel.

How can we strategically leverage the NGSPP in order to prepare to support potential missions? Most nations involved as partners in the NGSPP do not see themselves engaged in future high intensity warfare unless participating as members of a coalition. It is reasonable to assume that the United States will be the dominant coalition member and will essentially determine how those wars will be fought. Many NGSPP participants do see themselves involved in a peacekeeping role and want to continue to prepare for that contingency.

We should support the NGSPP participants in combined training with partner countries to support coalition
peacekeeping operations. Although this would involve some lethal force training, peacekeeping training focuses primarily on force protection. It is not offensive warfighting per se. It supports a mission for which partner nations have the resources and a legitimate interest in conducting.

Thus we should plan and prepare to build on established relationships created through the NGSPP. This concept would require the creation of liaison cells from state partner contingents. Language training would be required to enhance the capabilities of the cells. Small contingency command, control, and information transfer cells should be developed, resourced, and trained. They could be provided resources from the headquarters elements of the six ARNG divisions without current missions. These cells would require technology upgrades to ensure interoperability between digitized U.S and non-digitized partner forces. The liaison and command and control cells should be task-organized to form nodes for peacetime engagement or combined combat operations. Each node would be assigned to a geographic CINC, with one node designated as a strategic reserve.

This initiative will involve providing some additional training, limited force structure adjustments and full-time support resources. After completing the necessary language
training, National Guard officers could be attached to the country team at the military mission for further training. At the same time, they could serve as the NGSPP representatives in the partner nations. During this time they would gain practical experience in the cultural, historical, and political influences of the partner nations. Most importantly, these officers, working closely through the NGSPP with the partner nations' military, would be building long-term relationships and an enduring trust between the partner states. This is where the full range of state support could be utilized for long-term institution to institution continuity.

This should sound much like the Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. Many argue that the Army should provide more support to the FAO program. "Recent experience indicates a clear requirement for a cadre of officers whose skills and capabilities would transcend the norms of the Foreign Area Officer program. In an era of short-notice deployments, the Army and the other services need to examine the requirement for sophisticated liaison personnel — officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians — in the active and reserve components." This concept would contribute significantly to that cadre of personnel. If operating as liaison officers in support of their NGSPP partner country it can be expected that they would be
working with familiar personnel. More importantly these long-established personal relationships — relationships built on trust — would provide a solid foundation for coalition operations.

**SUMMARY**

The NGSPP cannot support this expanded mission in its present form. Although the NGSPP provides a logical springboard for this mission, in many cases the program has not moved beyond the briefing stages, supported by some high level visits between partners. Although these relationships are extremely important, we need to move into an environment that provides for training exchanges and involvement in combined field exercises. This is where trust is built and interoperability becomes a reality.

Congressional legislation governs security assistance programs between U.S. and foreign countries. The NGSPP is coordinated between the Department of Defense and the State Department and through the resident U.S. ambassador. The routine restrictions placed upon lethal force training events prevent, rather than promote, the contacts we need to create coalitions. Policymakers need to understand that foreign army leaders view combat operations as their critical core requirement, just as we do. Thus training in support functions can go only so far toward fostering military partner relationships.
This expanded NGSPP concept supports all three elements of the NMS. It provides the ability for the NGSPP to better shape, prepare, and respond in support of the Army After Next. In future ad hoc coalition operations, instead of drawing heavily on Active Component forces to create liaison cells for coalition partners, NGSPP liaison cells would deploy to peacekeeping missions with their partnership countries' force package.

These National Guard forces — properly manned, funded, structured, trained and equipped — will provide an interface with coalition partners both doctrinally and operationally. Additionally, they will promote interoperability based on the trust needed for such coalitions to be successful.

Many of these partnerships, especially in Europe, have been established for several years. They have served us well. But the opportunity to make a revolutionary change is before us. Many envisioned conflict scenarios suggest that the U.S. will fight future wars as part of a coalition.

If coalition warfare then is a valid planning assumption, the NGSPP, in an era of decreasing military programs, represents an important means through which to build potential coalitions. It can integrate partner nations in preparation for future combat operations. This expanded NGSPP program thus supports not only the National
Security Strategy but also specifically the National Military Strategy. It provides the ability for coalition forces to deploy to a combat theater with the training, liaison personnel and compatible communications equipment necessary to immediately conduct seamless combined operations.

In conclusion, the United States today has the real opportunity to enhance interoperability within future coalitions by developing the long-term relationships built upon lasting trust. This opportunity is imbedded within the National Guard State Partnership Program. Currently a positive example of effective and innovative use of a Reserve Component program during a period of declining resources, NGSPP has the potential to be an effective instrument of preventive diplomacy and a catalyst for coalition operations. Many states and their partners are today forging the beginnings of long-term, trust-based relationships. These relationships can be the cornerstones for forming the coalitions with which we will fight future wars.

The problem today is "enthusiasm without resources." Army National Guard leaders must be careful not to create expectations leading to disappointments. "A senior military leader in Albania harshly criticized the National Guard for creating false expectations when a two-week assistance visit
by a North Carolina engineer unit failed to produce the basis for a modern, American-style hospital."

The Army National Guard, through leveraging the NGSPP, can provide trained Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and equipped liaison cells capable of supporting their partner nations' forces in coalition operations. These cells would bring the inherent strength of practiced interoperability forged through long-term relationships to coalition warfare. This interoperability is critical for coalition members to participate in future U.S. lead coalitions.
ENDNOTES

1 COL (Ret) Daniel L. Whiteside, “Modernizing the Force...How Do We Get There from Here?”, National Guard Review (Summer 1997), 4.

2 As of 1996 the Clinton Administration had deployed forces on over twenty-five different occasions while continuing to support contingency missions inherited from preceding administrations. These are listed in Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1995, CRS Report 96-119F, 6 February 1996, pp.18-25.


4 As part of seeking membership in the PfP, candidate countries are required to outline their own level of participation through preparation of an individual Presentation Document. See S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia, Section entitled Partnership for Peace, Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 35.


13 Ibid., 2

14 John B. Conaway, LtGen (Retired), Call Out the Guard!, (Kentucky: Turner Publishing, 1997), 220.

15 Ibid., 222.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.


20 Ibid., 43.


22 Ibid.


25 Ibid., iv.

26 Ibid., 1.

27 Ibid., 8.


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