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MANNING THE ARMY NEXT (AAN) FORCE: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OFFICER ACCESSIONS SYSTEM

BY

KATHLEEN A. DILLON

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MANNING THE ARMY AFTER NEXT (AAN) FORCE: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OFFICER ACCESSIONS SYSTEM

by

Kathleen A. Dillon
Department of Army Civilian

Professor Leonard J. Fullenkamp
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kathleen A. Dillon

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The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), the United States Military Academy (USMA) and the Officer Candidate School (OCS) are pivotal to the maintenance of the Army's officer corps. These sources are increasingly being challenged by resource constraints, availability of qualified applicants, and rapid change in the Army. The research presented in this paper examines the Army's educational officer pre-commissioning sources and their adequacy to meet the needs of the Army in the future.
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MANNING THE ARMY AFTER NEXT (AAN) FORCE: CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE OFFICER ACCESSIONS SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to provoke discussion about the Army’s officer pre-commissioning sources in light of the projected changes in warfare and war fighting in the 21st Century, continuing resource constraints, and the integration of the Reserve Components. The following questions illustrate the complex challenges confronting today’s senior Army leadership in its attempts to build tomorrow’s officer corps.

Who is going to lead the future Army? How should the Army select and educate these future leaders? How will the Army inculcate in them enduring personal and organizational values essential to build and sustain a viable, cohesive Army? How can the Army structure its pre-commissioning sources to prepare its future leaders?

The study analyzes officer pre-commissioning programs with a view toward development of a comprehensive system that will sustain the Army’s heritage and provide for the continuation of its exemplary tradition of education, experience, performance and values. The study addresses the challenges in society that make it increasingly difficult to ensure that adequate numbers of individuals who can meet the Army’s stringent standards and
qualifications are available and interested. It does not advocate one pre-commissioning source over another. Rather, it proposes an alternative methodology that Army can develop over time to leverage the positive attributes of all.

The study focuses primarily on the United States Military Academy (USMA) and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs. These two sources of new applicants similarly reflect the educational and military training, character molding, and inculcation of values so essential to the success of today's officer corps.

The study also includes the Officer Candidate School (OCS), located at Fort Benning, Georgia. OCS provides an avenue separate from USMA and ROTC for the intake of qualified enlisted personnel into the officer corps. It allows the Army to sustain a "warm base" from which to accelerate officer production from four years to fourteen weeks and should be viewed in that light.

**THESIS**

This study is based on the thesis that without change the existing pre-commissioning sources will fail to meet the qualitative criteria and quantitative goals necessary to sustain the Army's officer corps in the coming decades.

On September 29, 1998, General Dennis J. Reimer, Chief of Staff, United States Army, testified before the Committee on
Armed Services, United States Senate. His remarks may be applied to the issue of officer education and training. In those remarks, General Reimer said:

For 223 years, the United States Army has faithfully served this Nation. We have not, however, won every battle or been prepared for every challenge. The difference has, in large part, always been knowing when to change, what to change and how to change and we have not always gotten it right. On those occasions, we have paid a very high price indeed.¹

Change seems inevitable. The question lies in whether the Army is willing to allow external circumstances to drive future changes in officer accessions. The opportunity to recognize and acknowledge the need for changing the sources themselves (USMA, ROTC and OCS) is timely and immediate.

What worked technologically and ideologically in the 18th and 19th Centuries was not suitable for the Army of the 20th Century. As the Nation grew, national interests focused on preservation of the Union, industrial growth and westward expansion. The Army changed with the Nation. From its beginnings, the Nation relied exclusively on the "citizen soldier" for defense. An Army of "Regulars" came into being in the 19th Century. The Nation developed West Point as a source of professional officers and as a basis for a standing professional army.² As well, what has worked well in the 20th Century will likely require change in the 21st for much the same reasons,
i.e., defined national interests, advances in technology, increased reliance on the Reserve Components during peacetime.

Throughout history the Army has changed to accommodate changing circumstances in the Nation and the world and to meet ever-growing technological advancements. In his book, _Hope Is Not A Method_, General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army, relates an anecdote about Robert E. Lee, Commander of the Confederate Army, during the American Civil War. General Lee wanted and needed artillery to equal that of the Union Army. The North supplied the Union Army with superior weapons manufactured in its abundant ordnance factories. The South had to make do with what it had, what it could capture on the battlefield, and what it could obtain through foreign purchase. Lee wanted more. He wrote the Confederate secretary of war asking that southern weapons be modernized. He offered to turn in his existing artillery as a source of metal for the resource-strapped southern factories. Lee was willing to take the time and divest his army of one of its most vital tools to gain the benefit of improved weaponry. Today's Army is in a period of "strategic pause." There is no threat of an equal and unfriendly world superpower. The Army has the time to look ahead in a far-reaching way and make positive changes in its personnel acquisition systems.
Preparing a technologically sound cadre of future leaders while continuing to engender the Army's revered personal and organizational values is a formidable task. The question of how best to accomplish this task is currently being "solved" by "tweaking" (adjusting) the "numbers" produced by the various pre-commissioning sources. At least one senior Army official feels that the officer corps will "naturally evolve" to meet whatever is required of it so long as new officers are "flexible and adaptable." He states further that applicants who are possessed of "adequate intellect" and "flexibility" will meet the needs of the future Army. Although these qualities are vitally important, such a view may be overly sanguine and simplistic. The Army will have to do more than it is currently doing organizationally and systemically to ensure the integrity of the officer corps of the future.

This study posits that it is time to take a hard and critical look at the educational pre-commissioning sources (USMA, ROTC and OCS). The Army of today is changing into an Army of and for the future. In 15, 20, 25 years will the existing pre-commissioning sources produce the officers we need in the right quantities with the necessary qualifications and skills?
ASSUMPTIONS

Two assumptions guided development of the study. The first assumption is that the officer corps of the future must meet the quality and qualification demands of the Army-After-Next and the Army-After-That. The Army does not yet know specifically what those demands will be. If applicants meet basic qualification requirements and are motivated, intense preparation will prepare them to be Army officers.

The second assumption is that the officer corps should reflect the geographic and ethnic diversity of the general population of the United States. This assumption is based on the need to field an Army that is representative of the people of the United States. This idea is in keeping with the spirit and intent of the Nation's founding fathers. Russell F. Weigley wrote that an army that is representative of its citizenry will go a long way toward guaranteeing "democratic polity" for the Nation. The early nationalists feared establishment of an elitist professional army unto itself. They felt that an army that represented the body of the community under civilian control was acceptable—that a standing army could, in fact, endanger the Nation.
PAST

The Army's officer commissioning programs are rich in culture, history, and tradition. Both, USMA and ROTC have played important roles in ensuring the quality of the officer corps of the Regular Army and the Army Reserves. The early years for both sources were difficult and both are yet evolving as they seek to serve the Army and the Nation.

Two hundred or more years ago, the national leadership came to terms with the fact that the Nation needed a national military academy to prepare young men for the profession of arms. In post-colonial America, few institutions of higher learning existed. Those that did (Harvard, William and Mary, Yale, and a few others) were unilaterally "inherited" from Great Britain at the end of the Revolutionary War. By and large, they were modeled on the British education system and focused their educational programs on the Ancient languages (Latin, Greek). They prepared their students for the professions of divinity and law.

On September 10, 1790, the United States Government purchased West Point, New York, for $11,085. "On March 16 1802, Congress authorized the President to organize a Corps of Engineers, which 'shall constitute a military academy'." Long years of experience with the British army, however, had taught the Nation to fear a "professional standing army,"
Thus, the mission of the Academy was not to train officers for wars but to prepare them to serve as engineers with the skills to manage ports and harbors, build bridges, explore uncharted lands, and develop the infrastructure needed to support expansion of the country. To improve the education of these young officers, the Chief of Engineers, a military officer appointed by the President, also served as the superintendent of the Military Academy. The Secretary of War, a civilian presidential appointee, held the purse strings for the purchase of equipment and supplies, thereby, ensuring a measure of civilian control. Students with the rank of "cadet" were to be appointed by Congress so as to be representative of the American community at large. At the risk of paying short shrift to its illustrious history, a safe conclusion is that the Military Academy at West Point, New York, flourished.

A different type of plan also existed in 1783 that provided for the "introduction of military instruction in at least one civilian college in each state of the union." Nothing came of the plan until Captain Alden Partridge, a former West Point Superintendent, introduced military education and training as part of the curriculum of the American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy in 1819. Captain Partridge’s school became Norwich University, Norwich, Vermont, which exists yet today as a private Senior Military College.
Desiring to build "a college that would reconcile the efficiency and discipline demanded by a regular army with the republican values and popular sentiments inherent in the militia system, Captain Patridge embedded the idea of the 'citizen-soldier' in the program at Norwich."¹³ In 1862, Congress passed and President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act, formally the Land-Grant College Bill of 1861, establishing land-grant colleges throughout the nation. By law, the federal government gave each state 30,000 acres of public land for each of its Members of Congress. The land was to be sold and proceeds used to establish and sustain at least one agricultural and industrial college in each state. Under the provisions of the bill, military tactics training was to be a requirement at each of the colleges.¹⁴ Graduates of these schools provided the national community with large numbers of "citizen-soldiers."

A formal Reserve Officers' Training Corps Bill was drafted in 1915 and included in the National Defense Act of 1916. The Act also instituted an Organized Reserve Corps for pooling reserve officers during peacetime. The first ROTC units began operation in 1916 at 46 schools with a combined enrollment of 40,000 cadets. In 1918, ROTC training was replaced by the Student Army Training Corps to provide special assignment training for enlisted men, but college ROTC was reestablished after the World War I armistice. Congress began providing
federal support to ROTC through the National Defense Act of 1920 and by World War II over 100,000 officers had been trained. The idea soon spread to other colleges and, although not yet nationally recognized, the War Department granted Regular Army commissions annually to one outstanding student from each of the 10 most highly rated land-grant and military colleges (Distinguished Institutions). The Nation's most distinguished ROTC graduate, General George C. Marshall, received a Regular Army commission when he was graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1902—14 years before official recognition of a Reserve Corps program. Finally, in 1916, the National Defense Act created the Organized Reserve Corps. That year saw the first ROTC units—46 schools with a combined enrollment of about 40,000 cadets. General Marshall said of them,

The procurement of suitable officer personnel was fortunately solved by the fact that during lean post war years over 100,000 reserve officers had been continuously trained... These reserve officers constituted the principal available asset which we possessed at this time. . . . Without these officers the successful rapid expansion of our Army...would have been impossible.16

The Army established the U.S. Army ROTC Cadet Command in 1986. The command name was changed to "U.S. Army Cadet Command" on January 5, 1994, to reflect its responsibility for monitoring all U.S. Army pre-commissioning training and acting as the TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) Commander's
implementing agent for pre-commissioning Military Qualification Standards for all commissioning sources."

Throughout their histories, both the Military Academy and ROTC have changed to meet the needs of the Army and the Nation. Is it not reasonable to assume that the proponents of these programs will rise to meet the challenges of the future?

PRESENT

The Military Academy was the first official military school and the first engineering school of the United States. Its continuing mission is
to educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the character, leadership, intellectual foundation and other attributes essential to progressive and continuing development through a career of exemplary service to the nation as an officer of the Regular Army.

The mission of the U.S. Army Cadet Command is to "commission the future officer leadership of the U.S. Army and motivate young people to be better citizens." These mission statements are admirable. The succinctly stated and simple Cadet Command mission statement gets to the heart of the job that both pre-commissioning sources do. The Academy normally produces about 25 percent of the Active Component's officer requirement. The ROTC program produces the remainder—about 75 percent. OCS
normally provides only about one percent of the total officer requirement annually. 

Both USMA and ROTC provide cadets at a minimum with an undergraduate degree and both afford selected cadets the opportunity to study for advanced degrees. Both allow for the intake of enlisted personnel: USMA through the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and ROTC through its Green-to-Gold Scholarship program. One major difference is that the USMA undergraduate degree is earned during the four years at the Academy. The ROTC undergraduate degrees may be earned from almost any school in the Nation and ROTC training may be tailored to accommodate the needs of the individual, the school and the Army. Although the Army operates ROTC units at 270 schools, the recruiting program spans the full spectrum of all high schools, colleges and universities. Even so, evidence exists that a shortage of new lieutenants is imminent. 

The shortage is so acute that all lieutenants commissioned through the ROTC program, USMA and OCS who are not on a "guaranteed Reserve Forces Duty" contract or who are not slated for an "educational delay" are being placed on Active Duty. Up until a few years ago, ROTC cadets normally had some choice regarding their placement with a particular service component.
However, with the decrease in the numbers of young company grade officers who want to stay in the Army, the full intake of new officers is required to ensure the readiness of the Active Component officer corps. Further, the Army must meet its congressional mandate for end strength.

The Army Reserve will feel the pain of the shortage acutely. Headquarters, Department of the Army policy affords the Active Component priority for officer fill. All USMA graduates and the majority of ROTC cadets are brought on Active Duty status. Although the Army Reserve relies on ROTC as its primary source of lieutenants, it does not have first choice from ROTC. The problem for the Army Reserve is further exacerbated (and complicated) by the geographic dispersion of Reserve units. Because the Army cannot compel ROTC graduates to relocate to satisfy particular staffing requirements of Reserve units, officer shortfalls in some units can continue indefinitely.

More simply stated a dearth of new officers with the requisite educational disciplines, skills qualifications, potential, and values required to lead the Army-After-Next (and beyond) threatens to diminish the Army’s effectiveness and readiness for years to come. The possibility that the current
commissioning sources will be unable to produce an adequate number of qualified lieutenants for the Army is real.

In a December 3, 1998, briefing to the Chief of Staff of the Army, USMA revealed that the Army is facing a potential shortfall of 600-900 officer accessions this year (1999) due to projected ROTC shortfalls and increased company grade officer attrition.22 Included in the briefing were recommendations that the Army allocate additional funding to the U.S. Army Cadet Command to sustain and increase ROTC officer production and that the Army monitor ROTC accessions to ensure that the program is adequately funded. To that end, $6.7 million has been added to Cadet Command's budget in an effort to increase production.23 The Junior ROTC program that supports 1,369 high school programs across the Nation will also be bolstered with additional funding.24 An additional recommendation coming out of the OEMA briefing is a recommendation for Cadet Command to test whether it can recruit graduating college seniors for OCS to increase the production of that source. Discussion with Commander, U.S. Army Cadet Command, indicates that an opportunity may exist to tap the market of rising college seniors and he is working that issue.25

The Military Academy is limited by law to maintain a corps of cadets of not more than 4,000.26 The OEMA briefing recommended that the Military Academy student body be maintained
at 4,000 cadets. Headquarters, Department of the Army, has programmed the Military Academy to produce a total of 923 officers in Fiscal Year 1999, 860 in Fiscal Year 2000 and the out years (Fiscal Years 2001 through 2004). (No such limitations apply to ROTC.)

The annual production mission for the ROTC Program is 3,900 for School Years 1998-1999 — an increase from 3,800 in previous years. The annual production mission for School Years 2000 through 2003 is also 3,900, with an increase to 4,000 in Fiscal Year 2004. To reinvigorate the ROTC program, the Commander, U.S. Army Cadet Command, has requested that the Army pursue the following measures: pursue legislative or policy changes to increase the cadet stipend; reduce the active duty commitment; provide Special Duty Assignment Pay — level 1 to noncommissioned officer cadre; support Air Force sponsored legislation to pay university parking fees; continue the policy to exempt Cadet Command budget from taxation; change Cadet Command’s personnel fill priority to “excepted unit status” so that it will receive at least 100% of its staffing requirements; increase scholarship support to 85 percent of commissions; retain active duty status for active duty soldiers who enter the Green-to-Gold program; and institute a commission-signing bonus.  

In December 1998, the Director of Military Personnel Management, Headquarters, Department of the Army, directed that
TRADOC increase the training workload for the OCS from 475 to 550 candidates beginning with Fiscal Year 2000. OCS has traditionally made up any shortfall in production from the Academy and the ROTC program. Keep in mind that OCS candidates normally come out of the enlisted force or are recruited by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. While a conduit for officer intake, the enlisted force is already short about 5,000 personnel. But, the Army is now faced with a shortfall so great that OCS may have great difficulty satisfying the requirements without increased resources.

Overshadowing the ROTC program are the same problems that the Army and the other services have had with enlisted recruiting. Like the enlisted force, the officer corps is an "all recruited" force impacted by the vagaries of the recruiting market. Successful recruiting activity is subject to many variables: propensity to serve in the military; exhibition of societal values that are unacceptable to the Army; competition from the robust economy—full employment in the private sector; the desire for higher education without a corresponding military obligation; availability and attainability of financing for higher education; discouragement of eligible individuals from military service by parents and others brought up during the turbulent Sixties and Seventies when patriotic service was especially frowned upon in general society; and lack of
knowledge about the Army. The recruiting dilemma exacerbated by retention difficulty is being most readily felt in the Army Reserve where officer strength is already down to 94.1%.

Congress terminated the active Selective Service System in 1973. At that time, the Nation initiated voluntary military service. During World War I (1917-1918) a total of 2,666,867 American were drafted; in World War II (1940-1946) 10,110,114 were called to serve; during Korea (June 1950-June 1953), 1,529,537; and during Vietnam (August 1964-February 1973), 1,766,910. Veterans of World War I are rare. World War II and Korean veterans are aging rapidly. Vietnam War veterans, bitter and disillusioned after an unpopular war, carried with them into society their bitterness and distaste. So strongly did the American public feel about termination of the draft that Congress took action. In the 25 years since the end of the draft, the strict, values-based, authoritarian institutional Army has become foreign to many individuals who would probably have experienced some obligatory military service under the Selective Service System. Society and the Army are moving toward the new millennium on parallel, not interwoven or intersecting, trajectories. The hiatus of Selective Service since Vietnam and the lack of an identifiable threat to the homeland have been decisive in guiding the attitudes of the country.
In *All That We Can Be*, Dr. Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler lament the end of the draft and its impact on African-Americans. Their belief that patriotism underlies military service holds true today. They advocate a period of "national public service" to imbue the youthful citizenry with a commitment to serve their country.\(^3\) The realization of such a program in these robust economic times coupled with the permissiveness of society is unlikely indeed. Suggestions that the nation "return to the draft" will not be taken seriously by politicians who would make it happen since the public would likely at this time find such a proposal distasteful.

**FUTURE**

The following excerpt from the 1997 Annual Report on the Army-After-Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army visualizes the future Army as requiring

"a process that anticipates the nature of warfare in the next century and the evolution of US national security requirements.... The Army After Next focuses on the year 2010 and beyond. The choice of a 30-year point of focus is intended to place a distant intellectual beacon far enough in front of the pace of change so that ideas and a vision of the future will not be constricted by near-term budgetary and institutional influences. Such an approach is needed to break free of the action-reaction cycle of incremental change, which can only hold the future hostage to the past. By 2010, the Army will exploit the Force XXI effort to achieve nothing less than a technological and cultural metamorphosis. By then, over a decade of experimentation and field exercises
will create a knowledge-based force, Army XXI, balanced across our traditional imperatives and possessed with a clarity of observation, degree of decentralization and pace of decision-making unparalleled in the history of warfare."  

Quantity is only one facet of a larger officer accessions problem that the future Army faces. Of greater concern is whether officer candidates will be able to meet the necessary qualifications and skills requirements. The qualities the Army seeks in an officer candidate are essential for future Army leaders. Moreover, as warfare becomes more complex, future warrior leaders must also become more technically competent to understand the power and limitations of technology. Their counterparts in the Combat Support and Combat Service Support arenas must likewise be adept. They must understand the needs of the commander and the soldier on the front line. In his foreword for Sir John Smyth's history of Sandhurst, the Royal Military Academy of the United Kingdom, Field-Marsh Viscount Montgomery addressed the numerous attributes that officers, as leaders of the British soldier, must possess: mastery of their tools of war and stamina. He also talks about the importance of "moral courage"—"standing firm by what you believe is right—and not being afraid to do so."  

The world and warfare have become increasingly complex since Field Marshal Montgomery's time. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 99 specifies that the environment of the future
will require that leaders be ethical, mentally prepared, emotionally resilient, conceptual thinkers, operationally adaptive, motivational leaders, and physically fit. Further, these future officers must understand interpersonal relations, information systems, people and cultures; strategy, operations and tactics, how to influence others, and interagency coordination and processes.

This formidable list of qualifications and skills represents the great challenge to the Army's pre-commissioning sources. Finding, recruiting and preparing officer candidates to develop these attributes is a formidable task. The leadership requirements are complex and will be difficult to achieve and sustain over many years. Indeed, they often may not be realized after even a lifetime of military service. Yet the Army must strive to instill the values in the young men and women who will serve in the Army's future officer corps and lay the groundwork for its success. If the Army is to create an officer corps in the next millennium made up of individuals who possess the necessary qualities and qualifications, the pre-commissioning sources must be made ready. Statute directs both the Academy and ROTC. Both are constituent based and strongly supported by individual congressmen and congresswomen and by Congress as a corporate body. Both are important sources of officer applicants for the Army. But, they are unable to
provide now nor will they be able to provide the future officers needed by the Army.

Sandhurst is a model that the U.S. Army should study. The Royal Military Academy was founded in April 1741, by authority of a royal warrant from King George II. With its proud history rooted in the traditions of a nation whose empire stretched the globe, change has been difficult but Sandhurst has changed over the years driven by changes in warfare, society and the nation’s physical and political structures. Rather than denigrating its proud military heritage, the United Kingdom has used change to renew the dedication of the Royal Military Academy. Throughout its history, the United Kingdom has routinely reinvigorated the Sandhurst motto, "Serve to Lead." Sandhurst’s continuing purpose is "to train the leaders of the future." British cadets are recruited based on potential and all are trained at Sandhurst to the same standards. They are each given the "same foundation of military knowledge and skills." At Sandhurst cadets develop a common background. Their future instruction throughout their career is based on and developed from this common background whether they enter any one of the 13 regiments and corps of the Army.

Reasonable people can and do differ on the best path to lead the Army to a pre-commissioning program for the 21st Century. For example, one author, pleads for the protection of
the existing commissioning sources with no change. He asserts that the Army should perpetuate the current system of a separate Military Academy and ROTC stating that

Every so often a politician with no military experience and the penetrating intellect of a rabid Chihuahua comes out with a blustering statement about the high cost of an academy education, suggesting that more populist and less expensive means of educating officers are better suited to our needs and times. It is a profoundly wrongheaded notion.\(^4\)

Another Army critic holds forth that the Army should terminate the Military Academy and rely solely on ROTC as a source of officers. He asks

Why do we continue to use USMA as a source of officers when ROTC is capable of producing the same product: A 21-year-old college graduate who is ready for a basic branch officer’s course?\(^2\)

and argues that

 Tradition is not a bad thing entirely, but in the case of the USMA, it comes with a very high price tag. The real issue is that the overall product is no better than what the competition products at a much lower cost.\(^3\)

These comments represent both ends of the ideological spectrum.

Following are suggestive alternative methods that may be explored to ensure a first-class officer corps in the future. In the first instance, the Army could simply concede defeat and resign itself to fact that junior officers will be perennially in short supply. To find the necessary skilled personnel, the Army will have to recruit them later in life after they have
acquired the education and experience the Army seeks. Limited military training would suffice to ensure that these individuals are adequately "greened" to understand the basics of military service and its unique requirements. Such "contracted" military personnel could provide the technical and technological expertise so essential to the success of the Army-After-Next. Granting them "military" status would also subject them to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, an important behavioral control mechanism.

An alternative methodology could also be considered. Rather than undermine the heritage of the Military Academy, the Army could establish it as its premier institution for education and training for all officers - Active, Reserve and National Guard - as a two-year military institute/university with an appropriate faculty and program of military training and instruction. The Army could recruit and contract civilian college students at any level as cadets. These cadets would then come to the Academy with an undergraduate degree for necessary military training.

The Army could recruit provide scholarships to students entering any institution of higher learning depending upon the projected discipline needs of the Army. These students would contract with the Army much as ROTC students do today. They would complete their undergraduate degrees along with Academy
training and educational activities. Once graduated, these students would report to the Academy for intense training for a two-year period. The Academy would be able to provide opportunities through which to multiply and expand the capabilities and depth of the officer corps.

Further, to ensure the success of the future seamless Army, officers would have a common indoctrination to ensure a strong base of understanding, centrality of focus and purpose and mutual respect. Such a method would preserve the democratic ideology of the "citizen soldier" demographically representative of the general population but with the added benefit of soldierly professionalism.

The Army is swiftly moving toward Force XXI and the Army-After-Next with no answer to the issue of manning the officer corps in sight. And, the questions remain. Will the commissioning sources as currently configured be able to provide the officer corps of the future?

CONCLUSIONS

The expedients being offered by the leadership to solve the officer shortage situation will not guarantee success; and, they appear, at least on the surface, to be short-term solutions. None of these "expedients" address the issues raised earlier in this study about the need for a long-term solution to the
commissioning issue. The Army's pre-commissioning sources, as currently configured and operated, will not be able to meet the quality and quantity needs of the Army of the future. In fact, the system is currently hard pressed to produce the number of new officers required for the Active and Reserve Components of the Army. The National Guard Component with its own pre-commissioning program is facing similar production challenges to that of the Active and Reserve Components. Piecemeal measures will not "fix" the long-term problems in ROTC.

RECOMMENDATION

Recommend that the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army jointly commission a task force to study the Army officer accessions sources and processes. The task force should seriously and comprehensively address all aspects of USMA, ROTC and OCS in its study and should be chartered to develop and offer alternative plans for commissioning future officers in light of anticipated changes in the next century. The study should include a survey of the methods used by the United Kingdom at the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel should share responsibility for oversight of the study effort.

Word Count 5392
ENDNOTES


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10 Ibid., 22.


12 Ibid., 8.

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14 Ibid., 9.

15 Ibid., 12.

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17 Ibid., 178.


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32 Ibid.
36 "Army Strategic Planning Guidance '99," Coordinating Draft, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 23 December 1998, 33. Although an exhaustive listing of the attributes that will be
expected is not available in this research, the following definitions give some inkling of what may be expected of future leaders: Ethical - displaying professional standards of conduct that encompass the army’s core values of honor, duty, courage, loyalty, integrity, respect and selfless service; Mentally prepared - possessing cognitive resilience, high conceptual capacity, the ability to act autonomously, and mental dexterity; Emotionally resilient - thriving in ambiguous situations; Conceptual thinkers - capable of critical, creative thought (can identify critical information and discern complex patterns); a self-driven learner; Operationally adaptive - capable of making informed but rapid decisions; willing to experiment and innovate; effective in a decentralized environment; Motivational leaders - inspiring others to perform effectively under stress; supportive of continuous learning by subordinates; and Physically fit - optimizing health, physical fitness and professional bearing.

Ibid. Defining these “knowledge and skills” attributes is daunting: Interpersonal Relations - treating others with dignity and respect, possessing conflict-management skills; Information Systems - being able to understand and apply technologies; People and Cultures - maintaining a broad appreciation of other cultures; having a language proficiency; demonstrating awareness of family, social, and cultural problems; displaying political acumen; Strategy, Operations, and Tactics - appreciating strategic and operational implications of tactical situations; How to Influence Others - applying effective indirect leadership; quickly assessing and shaping organizational culture, rapidly building teams; and Interagency coordination and processes.


The British Army, undated, available from <http://www.gti.co.uk/employers/armyoff.htm>; Internet; accessed 3 March 1999.

The Army of the United Kingdom includes the following: The Household Cavalry; Royal Engineers; Royal Army Chaplain’s Department; Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineers; The Royal Armoured Corps; Army Air Corps; Royal Corps of Signals; Royal Logistics Corps; Adjutant General’s Corps; The Infantry; Royal Regiment of Artillery; Intelligence Corps; and Army Medical Corps.

43 Ibid.
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