KHRUSCHEV'S NEW POLICY TOWARD THE SATELLITES

[Translation]

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205 EAST 42nd STREET, SUITE 300
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
This publication was prepared under contract by the United States Joint Publications Research Service, a federal government organization established to service the translation and research needs of the various government departments.
TREND TOWARD INCREASED INTEGRATION OF EAST EUROPE

A Push to the Left

Many a phenomenon which but a few weeks ago seemed to the observer of East European and especially Polish events to be quite opaque and enveloped in a dense fog of rumors, contradictions, and secrets, has recently become somewhat clearer and can now be categorized. New facts, authoritative declarations of the communist leaders, and highly indicative Soviet publications help us make a more thorough interpretation of events in the satellite countries. In this context one can in part correct the debated background of the upheavals in Poland which had been described in a highly dramatized fashion on the basis of certain fears that, from the point of view of the liberal forces in Poland, were not quite unfounded.

In general, we seem to be dealing at this time with an extensive and profound push to the left in East Europe. This push reaches from the Soviet Union to East Germany and Albania and even finds its repercussions in the tactical adjustments of several West European communist parties, for instance, the Italian CP, as we were able to establish a short time ago on the basis of the surprising changes in Togliatti's tactics. In the Soviet Union itself, the symptoms of a shift of the political center of gravity to the left can be seen in the rooting out of the last vestiges of private property, the radicalization of the atheist measures, and especially in the suppression of the national emancipation endeavors of the non-Russian peoples.

The Events in Poland

This push to the left becomes quite noticeable if we test the quantitative and qualitative changes, which have emerged since the end of October in Poland, for their general trend. It is quite evident that there is a transition from an independent economic pattern, with its farreaching autonomy in the industrial plants and with its loosening
of central economy planning, to the restoration of the command-type management which is more or less identical to that of the Soviet Union and of Moscow's satellite states. As an indication of the recollection of Gomulka's policy from the hitherto-held positions of a pronounced centrum toward a stronger leftward course, we have the personnel reshuffling in the Politburo, the Council of Ministers, the scientific institutions, and the Association of Polish Writers. All those who resigned -- including Politburo members Jerzy Morawski; Education Minister Wladyslaw Bienkowski; Professor Julain Hochfeld, the director of the Institute of International Problems; Professor Jozef Chalasinski, the director of the new dissolved Institute of Sociological Studies; and the no longer reelected chairman of the Professional Organization of Polish Writers, Antonin Sloninski -- can be considered to be exponents of the 1956 October reforms and of a policy which was pursued more or less consistently for 3 years. With similar clarity we can classify on the other hand the successors or holders of the newly created posts: the new deputy prime ministers Eugeniusz Szyr and Julian Tokarski; the vice chief of the Planning Authority, Tadeusz Gede; the new coordinator of the Counterintelligence Service, General Kazimierz Witaszewski; Ostap Dluski, newly appointed director of the Foreign Policy Institute; and the new chairman of the Writer's Association, Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz. An exception is Edward Ochab, Morawski's successor in the party command, and the new Education Minister Waclaw Tulodziecki; but these exceptions cannot disprove the validity of the general trend.

It may be entirely correct that the meat and food crisis in Poland had assumed threatening proportions and had called for urgent intervention, but in the final analysis, Gomulka and his advisers seem to have used this critical situation primarily to tackle the political questions in a much more severe fashion than before. From similar processes in other East bloc states, one can discern that, in Poland, we were not dealing with a separate action by the Polish regime, but with a partial phenomenon of an overall complex in Russian satellite policy. In Hungary, the decisions of the Central Committee as to a more severe course in the agrarian policy were announced early in November; these decisions clearly deviated from the middle road which had been outlined in the directives for the Seventh Party Congress and in the theses on the new economic plan, published one month earlier. The observation of this contradictory process in the Hungarian evolution is important in so far as, until very recently, certain elements of a centrist course, especially vis-a-vis the collectivization efforts, were present in the policy of the Budapest Politburo. In Czechoslovakia, where the leftist trends had become noticeable for quite some time and where these trends had found their expression in a posthaste action aimed at the destruction of private property in agriculture and in the crafts, as well as in the rooting out of the last representatives of the free professions, new facts can be registered. In the middle of November, the party leader and President of the Republic, Novotny, announced an administrative
reform for the country, the preparation of a "socialist" constitution, and the combination of the kolkhozes. These three measures will mean a jump forward in the integration of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet pattern and are obviously supposed to constitute a model worthy of imitation by the other satellites at a later date. In East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, one can likewise note a hardening in the domestic policy climate.

The Directives of the Twenty-first Party Congress

In the search for the deeper causes of such a vast complex, we must go back to the decisions of the Twenty-first Party Congress of the Soviet Union. It was Khrushchev himself who in his programmatic speech on 27 January 1959 had made a few basic assertions on the further development of the satellites which were generally neglected in the course of the turbulent foreign political events of recent months. At the time, Khrushchev broached the question of how the development of the socialist countries toward communism would take its further course. He also asked: "Can one imagine that one of the countries advances from socialism to communism and implements the communist principles of production and distribution, while other countries lag far behind in the initial stages of the buildup of a socialist society?" The Soviet Russian dictator rejected such a possibility and in the following words set up a principle in which one can clearly recognize the intention of an extensive integration of the East bloc states:

"Such a perspective is quite unlikely if we consider the laws of the economic development of the socialist economic system. Theoretically more correct is the assumption that the countries of socialism, with the help of the successful utilization of the possibilities inherent in the socialist order, will more or less simultaneously make the transition to the higher phase of communist society. We start from the assumption that in the socialist economic system there are new laws of economic development in effect, such as mankind has not known in the past."

The further words of the Soviet dictator clearly indicate Moscow's determination to push the integration effort between the more and the less developed satellite states. Khrushchev said the following:

"In the socialist economic system, there is in effect the law of planned, proportional development according to which the countries that had fallen behind economically in the past, draw support from the experience of the other socialist countries and from collaboration and mutual aid, and quickly make up for lost time and advance their economy and culture. In this manner, the general level of the economic and cultural development of all socialist countries is equalized."
These statements by Khrushchev were met in East Europe with the limitless applause of the ideological fanatics, but with obvious discomfort by the moderate communists, and with dismay by the anti-communist strata. But these theses about the integration of the people's democracies were forgotten as the Kremlin did not make any practical use of Khrushchev's theoretical principles vis-a-vis the satellites and as the Geneva foreign ministers' conference and Khrushchev's subsequent trip to America completely blanked out this aspect of the relationship between Moscow and the East European countries.

Uncertainty About Khrushchev's Motives

The forceful pushing of the plan announced at the Twenty-first Party Congress can be pinned down in time to the second half of October of this year (1956); as to the motives which caused Khrushchev to do this, we have only hypothetical assumptions, at best. The Soviet Russian ruler began to translate his theses on the development of the satellite states into action shortly after his visit to the United States and immediately after his return from China. We must therefore ask ourselves whether this decision had some connection with these two events. We can imagine that Khrushchev, after his talks at Camp David, formed the opinion that the United States, in view of its interest in the regulation of other problems, such as the Berlin problem or international disarmament, would passively countenance an accelerated penetration of the East European states. But perhaps other considerations also played an important role here, such as perhaps the consideration that, during the phase of the preparations for the coming summit conference, one must meet the subjugated peoples of the satellite countries, not with dangerous mildness, but rather with intimidating toughness in order to nip in the bud any rising East European hopes as to a relaxation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. One might construe roughly identical hypothetical interconnections between Khrushchev's visit to Peking and the new integration wave in East Europe; here the idea would be for Khrushchev to try to play down other differences of opinion -- such as for instance those arising out of his coexistence tactics vis-a-vis the West -- through concessions to the firebrand concepts of the Chinese. But it might just as well be that Khrushchev -- through stronger economic policy and ideological ties of the East European countries with the Soviet Union -- want to forestall any possibility of cross-connections between the East European regimes and the Peking rulers.

The Theoretical Foundations

The topic of the "new laws" in the development of the satellite states has recently been strongly popularized by the Soviet Russian party ideologists. Thus, the communist historical philosopher Fedor Konstantinov wrote a brochure entitled Transition of the Socialist Countries to Communism, in which Khrushchev's theses of the Twenty-first
Party Congress are spelled out in detail. Konstantinov writes the following:

"In place of the irregularity in the development of the individual countries under capitalism, the law of the planned and proportional development of the socialist countries begins to take effect. More than that, under socialism we have not only the elimination of the irregularities in the development, but rather the lifting up of the countries, which had fallen behind in their development in the past, to the level of the advanced countries and the gradual levelling of the development level of all socialist countries on the basis of their common upswing."

Even clearer are the two prominent party ideologists Petr Fedoseyev and Ivan Pomalov, who together wrote a work on The Development of the Socialist World System to Communism. The authors, among other things, voice a series of thoughts which clearly illustrate the basic trend of Khrushchev's current satellite policy. Here we have first of all the following statements:

"The theoretical thesis on the idea that the countries of socialism will make their transition to communism more or less simultaneously is revealed in the following main trend: in the socialist world system, there is not and must not be the phenomenon that some countries endeavor to forge ahead while other countries just keep on marking time; it must not be that the advancing countries are forced to retard their development tempo in this or that phase and pace themselves according to those countries which did not walk the path of socialism until later." The authors furthermore point out that "no single socialist country must shut itself in within its borders and resort only to its own national economy, its own forces and resources. The advance of the socialist countries under communism in a common front demands the development and consolidation of the entire economic base."

As the most important characteristics of this accelerated "movement in a front," the Russian party ideologists mention the welding together of the national economies of all East bloc states with the economic organism of the Soviet Union into one unit, the completion of collectivization in the agriculture of the satellites, and the elimination of the remnants of the hostile classes, as well as the overcoming of the bourgeois mentality and of bourgeois morality among the nations of East Europe.

Continuation of the Class Struggle

In connection with this, we come to the question as to the means and methods with which this process is to be pushed. Unless the theoretical principles of the "movement in one front" toward communism
and of the coordination of the development tempo of the various satellites -- something directed primarily against Poland and Hungary -- are to remain a lot of words on paper, the weapon of the class struggle must be used. That this danger must be considered as extremely acute was proved by Khrushchev in his 1 December speech to the congress of the Hungarian communists. That can be gathered both from his remark that "watches will have to be synchronized" in all East bloc states, and from the passionate avowal of the collectivization policy as the only method for the raising of the living standard. Of utmost importance however was Khrushchev's declaration on the meaning and value of the class struggle in the building of socialism. To be sure, he stated that the revision of Stalin's thesis on the growing class struggle in the advance of the socialist system, which he and Mikoyan had undertaken at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, is correct, but he added a comment on to this finding with respect to the development in the satellites which is highly indicative for Soviet Russia's current East European policy.

In the light of these assertions of Khrushchev, all the changes now emerging in the satellites are becoming clearer. The Soviet dictator stated that the criticism of this thesis (of Stalin) did not signify a rejection of the unavoidability of the class struggle in the period of the construction of socialism. And he went on to say: "The entire experience of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and in the people's democracies has convincingly confirmed the generally known Leninist thesis that the class struggle does not disappear in the dictatorship of the proletariat, but that it takes on other forms. In connection with this, it is quite natural that the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the successes of socialist construction will consistently lead to a change in the relationship of the class forces in favor of socialism and to the weakening of the resistance of the hostile classes. This is the general development trend of the class struggle in the interior of the countries which have trod the path of socialist development."