NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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FUTURE COALITIONS – LEARNING FROM THE PAST, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE AND LISTENING TO OUR ALLIES

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**Abstract:**
Nothing in life is as simple as it seems. Coalition operations most certainly fall into that category. Perhaps the biggest mistake that operational commanders make is that they only concentrate on one third of the "process" of preparing for future coalitions. It is human nature to look back in history to the last war and gather lessons learned to apply to the next conflict. However, if this is the only preparation that the operational commander does, he may find himself ill prepared for the next ad hoc coalition. Desert Storm, while a major military success, left many Americans with a false mindset about the United States' ability to fight future wars and continue to maintain minimal casualties. Likewise, the ease of coalition warfare left a similar false impression on the minds of many senior military operational commanders who may be involved in future coalition operations. This mindset is based primarily on very limited observations of coalition support during a relatively short Gulf War. The wise commander, in future military or non-military coalition operations, will be the one who takes the time now to sort through the valuable lessons learned, looks at U.S. technological advances and their potential impact on coalition partners, and at the same time, listens to the concerns of coalition partners. If he fails to do this, even though the United States may form a "coalition" in the next conflict - he may find himself fighting virtually alone.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................... i
Table of Contents ............................................................................................ ii
Sections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking Back</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Shield/Desert Storm</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Factors</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking Forward</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Changing Environment</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Traditional Missions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to Coalition Partners</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Interests</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Effort</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperability</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"The only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them."
- Winston Churchill

Introduction

One of the blames placed on operational commanders in previous wars has been their tendency to “fight the last war.” Because of giant leaps in technology and the potential for diverse coalition partners in the future, it has become even more important for the operational commander to focus on more than just looking back at the last war. History can only provide a piece of the puzzle and at times it may provide a piece that does not quite fit the situation at hand. This paper explores a three step process which allows the operational commanders to look at lessons learned, explore technological changes, and finally - and most often neglected - to listen to the concerns of potential allies. Unless future leaders are willing to look at all three steps in this process – they may once again find themselves fighting the next war from an old sheet of music.

Looking Back

In reading the accounts of coalition operations during the Gulf war, anyone who is not familiar with the history of warfare might think that this was the first time that coalition operations were used successfully to fight a war. Actually, coalition warfare has been around for quite some time – going as far back as the ancient battles between Athens and Sparta. Just focusing primarily on United States (U.S.) involvement in coalition operations, we can go all the way back to the Revolutionary War, both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam and of course, the Gulf War. An operational commander can obviously learn quite a few lessons about coalition operations in the above wars. Unfortunately, a lot of our previous encounters with coalition operations have been with standing alliances and not “ad hoc” coalitions. Future coalition operations are more
likely to be Operations Other Than War and our partners could be non-alliance members with whom we have little in common. For this reason, it is imperative that operational commanders investigate the challenges of working in ad hoc coalitions.

At this early point, perhaps a brief explanation of terms might be appropriate. On the grand scheme of things, operations conducted by forces of two or more nations are termed a multinational operation or in military terms – combined operations. Under this broad umbrella the terms alliance and coalition are often discussed as one and the same. However, there are some distinct differences. An alliance is an operation conducted by forces of two or more nations in a formal treaty arrangement, with standard agreements for broad, long-term objectives. Due to the very nature of alliances, they normally have well-developed and established methods in place for integrating their forces.

Coalitions, on the other hand, are operations where the military action is temporary, informal, and usually called for a specific purpose – hence the term ad-hoc. Coalitions usually form as a result of a rapid response to an unforeseen crisis. Due to the issue of national sovereignty, coalition operations, at least in the initial stages, often involve a parallel command structure. Additionally, political considerations also weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations.

In differentiating the terms even further - the goals of an alliance are often seen as being more permanent, and hence have greater formality and longer duration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an excellent example of this, having been in existence now almost 50 years. It should be no surprise then that coalitions that involve NATO countries usually have a very high degree of formality and a strong unity of purpose. In contrast, the purpose of a coalition is usually going to be transitory or
temporary in nature. Ad hoc coalitions are also formed because of a need for political and public legitimacy.

Unfortunately, there is no standard approach to coalition warfare. Even more critical, there are few detailed resources that are available to prepare an operational commander for the more likely future scenarios involving ad hoc hybrid coalitions. Every coalition will be different in purpose, character, composition and scope.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Most people look at Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm as all-around military success stories. We had a mission, we went into battle, confronted the enemy and in no time at all, with hardly any casualties came out the victor. We also fermented the idea in most peoples' minds that coalition warfare was, if not the only way to fight future wars, at least perhaps it was the best way. While there were indeed a lot of lessons to be learned from these operations, more importantly, there were some lessons that the operational commander should not have taken with him to plan for future ad hoc coalitions.

In the Gulf War, several factors of war were most definitely on our side. Time, existing and substantial infrastructure, and the financial backing of Saudi Arabia among others, led to tremendous coalition logistical success. In this sense – Desert Storm was a "picture perfect" operation. The operational commander must realize that most future coalition efforts will not likely benefit from similar conditions.

Coalition Factors

U.S. involvement in the twentieth century has been a history of coalition participation and support. While the American way of war is not completely dependent on the
formation of coalitions – it is hard to envision the U.S. going into future wars without some form of coalition. The question is – what kind of coalition? More so than ever before, the future operational commander may face an unknown enemy, with unknown allies, in an unknown conflict and most likely, on short notice.

But just why are coalitions so important? Historically, coalitions and alliances have been created for three basic reasons: (1) Provide sufficient power to resist or carry out aggression, (2) Make known to potential adversaries an alignment of powers as a form of deterrence, and (3) Transform common goals to formal commitments. While these factors may well be valued in future coalition operations – several others are becoming more pertinent. The economics of war will undoubtedly be a key element driving the need for future coalitions. It is becoming more obvious that the costs, both long and short term, of maintaining a military force capable of a multitude of likely contingencies are excessive. In this light, coalition forces are highly desirable. The significantly smaller military force structure both in the U.S. and around the world will make contributions of allies more important than ever before.

Perhaps the biggest reason for ad hoc coalitions in the future will be the need to win not just international support, but more importantly “regional” support. While international support will continue to gain us the legitimacy to carry on the operation, regional support will be critical to our continued reliance on forward strategy and advance basing.

Future operational commanders will be faced with many additional challenges; among them the ability to predict potential coalition partners and develop an operational
strategy well ahead of actual operations. He must also be prepared at the drop of a hat to transform joint task forces into combined ones.

Notwithstanding our reoccurring historical experience, the U.S. has at times been remarkably ill prepared for coalition operations. Lessons learned are often two-edged swords. In many ways Desert Storm may have been less a model for the future and more an anomaly. In the future, we cannot automatically expect: 1) the luxury of six months for deployment of forces without hostile attacks; 2) the benefits of international cooperation against the adversary; 3) host nation support including unlimited fuel, water, airfields, and ports; 4) to fight in the flat desert terrain in the winter months and 5) an enemy whose army and air force put up little fight.³

While there is an enormous amount of history to draw from, the operational commander must be able to sift through that information pulling out only those items which can be used in a different type of future ad hoc coalition. While this may appear to be the easiest part of the process – it has the potential to lead the commander down the wrong road if he is not careful.

Looking Forward

Technology is a two-edged sword when it comes to coalition operations. While sophisticated weapons and information systems enhance the commander’s ability to fight the enemy, the diversity of weapons and information systems likewise challenge the commander’s ability to integrate coalition forces. While most political and senior military leaders applaud these developments, future coalition partners (especially non-NATO nations) look at these technological advances wondering how they will ever be able to
maintain this technological gap between them and the U.S. Perhaps the U.S. commander should be asking himself the same question.

**A Changing Environment**

One critical aspect of Information Operations is that it has pretty much done away with national boundaries in the traditional sense of the word. Future coalition partners may not be able to compete on the same level as the U.S. when dealing with such information attacks by criminal organizations, ethnic groups, or renegade corporations—the kinds of enemies involved in future conflicts. And even if the coalition finds itself on what appears to be a traditional battlefield—a whole new arsenal of weapons (digital deception, hacker attacks, and computer viruses) may be employed by the enemy to bring the coalition to its knees. Warfare in this environment involves complex planning and coordination not to mention the real-time situational analysis tools that just may not be available to most coalition partners. One solution may be to staff our Information Warfare agencies with coalition partners so that this form of war fighting will not be totally foreign to them in the next conflict.

**Non-Traditional Missions**

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have also forecast new and diverse missions for U.S. military forces, both at home and abroad. The absence of a direct military threat has caused our nation to expect greater military involvement in non-traditional missions such as drug smuggling, disaster relief, and law enforcement operations to name just a few. These non-traditional missions are more likely to be seen in the international arena. An extensive amount of training must be done ahead of time to be ready to meet these challenges.
Doctrine

Doctrine provides military organizations with a common philosophy, language, and purpose. Despite an American history rich in coalition operations, no single source document contains the war-fighting doctrine for combined operations. The past few years have seen a large amount of U.S. doctrinal publications for joint operations, but there is still an absence of multinational doctrine to guide allies and coalition partners in operations. Doctrine is critical in combined operations because it influences everything from decision-making to force employment. Likewise, unresolved differences can bring an otherwise perfect operation to a halt. If the operational commander is not aware of doctrinal differences, or makes no attempt to accommodate these differences, it could bring the coalition to a grinding halt. Accommodating the differences is not an easy task, but it must be done. Therefore, the operational commander needs to know the potential allies' doctrine and plan accordingly to avoid any surprises.

Another aspect of doctrine that is often overlooked is the issue of direct or indirect conflict with a host nation's cultural mores. The most acknowledged example is that certain foreign forces do not train or fight at night for fear of nocturnal predators, superstition or religious reasons. Being aware of these up front will save the commander from a potential disagreement with coalition partners.

Doctrine is more than simply how we intend to fight. It is also the technical language with which we communicate commander's intent, battlefield missions, control measures, combined arms and joint procedures and command relationships. Doctrine is another area where a mutual understanding will go a long way. Over the years NATO countries that have operated with U.S. forces have become familiar with Service and Joint doctrine.
– enabling coalition forces to work together. This same benefit is not present in most non-NATO countries. Even in NATO where there are similarities, doctrinal differences still remain. This however is not a showstopper as long as both Commanders and Staff elements understand the differences and work to accommodate the differences while completing the mission.

Rules of Engagement

Joint doctrine defines Rules of Engagement (ROE) as rules “which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U. S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.” Overcoming differences in ROE is yet another difficult challenge for the commander in multinational operations. The common objective of a multinational operation may succeed or fail on the basis of how well or how poorly ROE are conceived, articulated, understood, and implemented by each member of the multinational operation. Rules of engagement may differ radically from the past due to Information Operations and our means to both exploit and defend our own and our allies computer systems. Under these circumstances ROE might consider the offensive use of computer viruses and worms to destroy an enemy’s war-making capabilities without launching a single missile. This adds an entirely new dimension to support from our coalition members who may have business or economic dealing with the enemy in question. Going head-to-head with another country’s military forces is one thing, but going after his banking or transportation network may be something entirely off limits to a future coalition partner. It is necessary for the countries involved in a UN-sponsored operation to reach a prior political agreement with regard to the level of force that each will be prepared to apply.
It is imperative for multinational forces to train with realistic ROE. Regular ROE training among potential partners in a multinational operation would go a long way in communicating how different partners interpret and operationalize ROE.

The operational commander must coordinate to ensure that ROE is consistent among coalition members. For example, even for the non-NATO countries in the Persian Gulf, the coordination of ROE accentuated differences in language and definitions of specific terms such as "hostile act" and "hostile intent."

**Communications**

Communications represents one of the greatest challenges in the conduct of any type of war. It becomes even harder in Operations Other Than War involving not only military, but also government and civilian organizations.

While there are gaps in types of communications equipment used by U.S. and foreign coalition partners it is not an insurmountable problem. In previous conflicts the U.S. has provided "select" countries with portable communications gear and in some cases appropriate crypto for secure communications. Perhaps the bigger problem with coalition operations is the issue of language. NATO has established English as one of the two standard languages that operations will be conducted in; however, once again future coalitions may not be composed of NATO countries. As is the case with many language-trained personnel - foreign officers speak conversational English quite well; the problem arises when they have to use technical terminology or idioms. The U.S. is even worse off because most of our officers (unless they are in an intelligence field or performing embassy duty) are not fluent in any foreign languages that they might encounter during coalition operations. Even with language training, American officers are often not able to
translate or discuss such intricacies of military terminology, weapon systems and Operational Orders. This absence of appropriate language skills is an obstacle to successful interoperability.

Language difficulties can also lead to problems in command and control. Each order given or issue discussed must be translated into multiple languages depending on the composition of the coalition. Obviously, the more diverse the coalition – the larger the problem. In crisis operations, this is a significant time factor that could become a weakness or even a vulnerability. Absent a common doctrine, basic military terms differ from nation to nation. This results, unfortunately, in a severe narrowing in the amount of information conveyed between coalition commanders.

The magnitude of the language problem cannot be overemphasized. Acronyms alone are a language within a language and not easily translated. These problems can be solved – however, not quickly, and the process requires a tremendous dedication of resources.

Listening to Coalition Partners

There is no doubt that developing a coalition is a very difficult task. It often involves finding common denominators and working around issues to come to an agreeable settlement. The operational commander must also be involved in a much more critical task – that of listening to his coalition partners. The following topics highlight some of the concerns of foreign coalition forces.

National Interests

To assume that all members of a coalition possess similar reasons or positive motives for participating can lead to ineffective command and control, disintegration of the coalition partnership, or failure to accomplish the assigned mission. No two nations
share exactly the same rationale for entering a coalition and, furthermore, each nation's rationale tends to change during the life of the union. Even in the best of circumstances there will be constant pulling and tugging as nations seek to maximize their own ends.¹¹

Some nations join coalitions in order to improve their political prestige within the world community. An operational commander must be aware of the national goals and objectives of each member state during a coalition operation. He must also be able to recognize and isolate the political nature of coalitions.

Given the natural diversity of interests among nations, increasing the number of participants reduces the scope of its common denominator. During the cold war, the dominance of the Soviet threat permitted the widest latitude for mutual acceptance among alliance membership. Even when differences existed in other areas, such as economic, political or even human rights, this singular dominance allowed the alliances to endure.

From a military perspective, the commander must realize that coalitions are more vulnerable as a center of gravity. No where is this more evident than during the Gulf War when Saddam sent several SCUD missiles into Israel hoping to unravel the coalition.

The question of subordination of units to other nations' commanders is always touchy as it raises sovereignty issues. In the past, this has been a difficult question, even for the U.S. and it will most likely remain so for future contingencies. As combined staffs and structures are established, each nation is very sensitive about its proper, balanced representation and visibility. Therefore, the designation of senior staff posts in integrated staffs is extremely political, as they serve "ambassadorial" as well as military functions.
Unified Effort

It is no surprise that U.S. commanders traditionally seek unity of command in all operations. The realities of future ad hoc coalition operations and the success of Desert Storm’s unity of effort may continue to limit the span of control only to unity of effort.\textsuperscript{12}

The success of Desert Storm has led many to assume that in future coalitions, unity of command may not be achievable or will be achieved in name alone. While there may be some truth to this statement, it should by no means be an absolute. Unfortunately, history will show that the Arabic-speaking countries were able to work better together and were still able to maintain unity of effort under the Saudi Commander. This perhaps has set a precedence that may be hard to back out of in future coalitions, especially those in the Gulf region. The ultimate objective of the operational commander should be the assignment of forces and missions in ad hoc coalitions to reflect their unique capabilities and create organizations whose combat potential is not degraded by a lack of interoperability.

Operational Commanders must realize up front that their war fighting skills will not be questioned as much as their ability to grasp and mold the ideological and non-tangible fundamentals which address each coalition partner’s social, cultural and doctrinal differences.\textsuperscript{13} The bottom line for the operational commander is that trust and confidence are the fundamental key to unity of effort.

Interoperability

The approved Department of Defense (DOD)/NATO definition of interoperability is “the ability of systems, units or forces to provide service and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate
effectively together.” Standardization of equipment, ammunition, doctrine, and signal procedures, as a major means for eliminating the problems of interoperability, is a highly desirable goal. The experience of coalition warfare would indicate, however, that it is a goal that will never be fully attained.

Because of the length of past wars, trial and error was an acceptable method of determining interoperability; however, this was often a costly proposition involving loss of lives, material and time. Future conflicts, especially if they are as short as Desert Storm, may not provide the commander with the same amount of time to learn these lessons all over again.

Ad hoc coalition operations require a high degree of interoperability. Without it the danger exists of erroneously attacking friendly forces, wasting valuable and perhaps scarce resources through diversity of effort, and violating the principle of economy of force. In addition to equipment and communications issues, interoperability also involves ROE, doctrinal differences, training, cultural differences, logistical support and even personalities of the commanders. Desert Storm has proved and future ad hoc coalitions will continue to prove that interoperability is not as much a factor with NATO allies, but more so with Non-NATO countries. This should be one of the lessons we do take from Desert Storm since future coalitions will involve non-NATO players. Unfortunately, due to the nature of future operations and the increased use of Special Operations Forces, the odds of non-interoperability will undoubtedly expand.

Equipment found in coalitions will vary not only in the degree of interoperability, but also in age, performance ability, and maintainability. These limitations will seriously hinder employment options and create compatibility and interoperability challenges for
the commander during coalition operations. The JTF commander must be astute in identifying disconnects early on when forming the CJTF to enable work-arounds to be established.

It is equally important that he is able to work with forces of other nations to gain broad international support in dealing with regional crises. However, sustaining current levels of interoperability is not sufficient, because the United States is likely to outstrip its friends and allies as more sophisticated equipment is developed. This has the potential of exacerbating the problem of interoperability.\textsuperscript{15} Our forward presence posture and operations with other services contribute to the alleviation of that problem. Joint maneuvers with other services can also increase the confidence of foreign militaries in their ability to work with U.S. forces.

\textbf{Simplicity}

This is one principle of war that is extremely important when working with and planning major operations that involve coalition forces. It has the potential of being one of the most critical planning elements with coalition partners who are not familiar with U.S. or NATO operational procedures. Language barriers, conflicting doctrinal methods and interoperability problems make a simple, easily understood plan essential to success on an already complex battlefield. In planning for coalition operations, simplicity must be taken into consideration.

\textbf{Planning}

Part of the interoperability problem begins with lack of clarity and simplicity of orders and directives. It is essential that the plan be understood and executed by all combat forces in a coalition. This is especially true of those situations in which one or more of
the major allied components of the force is inexperienced. Technological developments such as Secure Video Teleconferencing systems, have helped U.S. staffs plan operations more effectively, more timely and less costly. This technology may however shut out foreign coalition partners who do not have the capability to participate or the overall classification level may preclude their participation.

Training

It doesn’t take a lot of experience to know that if we are going to expect future coalition forces to fight side by side with us we need to train together with them at every opportunity we get. History has shown that the benefits far outreach the costs. The dual benefit of this training is that it provides U.S. forces with greater familiarity and understanding of their own operational methods and also highlights areas where procedural adjustments might have to be made. Peacetime training also needs to be designed to engage coalition forces in the most difficult and demanding tasks they may be asked to perform in war. Training should be Joint and should reoccur cyclically at the operational and tactical levels. The purpose is both to build the basis for trust, which will be vital in war, and to identify the abilities and limitations of coalition forces.

Exercises such as UNITAS between U.S. and other navies of the Western Hemisphere allow these countries to gain access to allied doctrine, procedures, and publications and to share live exercise experience on a yearly basis. These years of training paid off when it came time to jump into a multinational coalition such as Desert Storm. Without similar experiences, other coalition members are restricting themselves to operate in isolation or in a very limited area or function.
Intelligence

The intelligence capabilities of the United States are far superior to any other coalition member. The problems in coalition operations is that few nations, including the United States, are willing to share the sensitive sources of intelligence gathering. In future coalitions, as new collection systems are introduced, the U.S. must devise ways to ensure that intelligence products that are gathered from these platforms are made available to all coalition members. Unfortunately, intelligence is a hard nut to crack, even knowing the benefit of shared intelligence— it is often difficult to devise methods to meet these requirements. To expect coalition partners to ascend to our level is almost impossible. NATO, for example, has been around for almost 50 years, and sharing intelligence is still a sensitive area even with some of our closest allies. The best the operational commander can do is to patch together an arrangement that maximizes each nation’s contributions and provides its units essentially the same quality intelligence picture our commanders expect.

Conclusion

The next coalition war and the exact membership of the coalition can hardly be predicted. Perhaps the best alternative is to educate the operational commander about his responsibility to divide his efforts into the three areas discussed in this paper. Ensuring that coalition warfare is an integral part of the education of our senior officers who will be filling positions as operational commanders in the future can increase these efforts.

Only if the operational commander is able to take appropriate lessons learned from history, keep an eye on future developments, and be acceptable to suggestions from
potential allies will be able to mix diverse forces with different capabilities, intense national pride, and often varying levels of readiness into a viable fighting force.

It is obvious that differences in language, culture or interoperability cannot be eradicated, but they can be minimized. Lessons developed in our standing coalitions must be captured and employed in the formation of ad hoc coalitions to accelerate the cohesion of coalition forces.

At the operational level, planning for coalition warfare is like trying to solve an equation where every single factor is a variable.\textsuperscript{16} The commander must realize and push for initiatives that promote interaction during peacetime operations, realizing that they can help to minimize difficulties encountered when coalitions are actually formed. Similarly, our large exercises should always incorporate allies, real or simulated, as an additional challenging dimension.

Desert Storm only provided a "limited" opportunity to examine the complexities of coalition warfare on a large scale. What an operational commander must keep in mind is that it was unique in character and caution must be exercised in extrapolating any lessons learned. The brevity of the war did not test the coalition arrangement, as a longer war might have.

The U.S. currently holds numerous annual bilateral exercises and combined operations with "traditional allies", but more must be done to exercise with those countries we do not have a history of operating with – especially countries whose importance is established by the national interests their countries represent to the U.S. These in turn will provide a means to identify possible interoperability problems prior to entering into a hybrid ad hoc coalition with them in the future.
Notes


5 Ibid.


11 The World War II US/UK debate on the direct versus indirect approach is a well-known example. The French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command structure in 1966 was caused by major differences over strategy.

12 Many coalition partners believe that the successful execution of coalition warfare is not the commander’s ability to achieve a unity of command – but merely a unity of effort, which will normally be accomplished through cooperation, rather than through appointment of a supreme coalition commander.


14 US Department of Defense, Rationalization/Standardization Within NATO, 89.


Bibliography


