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Who Should Be the Peacekeepers?

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14. ABSTRACT *(Maximum 200 words)*:

Addresses what kind of soldier should be sent on peacekeeping operations, what kind of training they should have, and how they could be utilized in multi-national, multi-actor interventions.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Peacekeeping

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30 September 1997

Dr. Michael Drillings
Army Research Institute
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Room 6S06C
AMC Building
Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

Dear Mike:

This is my final report on research on "Who Should Be the Peacekeepers?" contract DASW01-96-C-0059. The period covered is July 1 to September 30.

As grant expenditures were allowed until September 30, the final financial report will not be ready until all expenses are processed.

The major activities that occurred during the grant period are:

A. A conference paper addressing some of the grant proposal questions was revised and accepted for publication in the journal *Armed Forces & Society*. This article, "Do Soldiers Hate Peacekeeping?" appeared in the spring '97 issue of the journal and has already been submitted to ARI. In August of 1997 The Washington Times devoted a story to describing some of the major findings of my article (a copy of the story is attached to this report). Subsequently I received a call from William Wechsler of the National Security Council requesting a copy of the article. This article has generated other interest as well: I was contacted by a Major Mark Martins who is writing a thesis at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College. He will replicate one of my questionnaire items on a survey of 170 officers with peacekeeping experience. Adam Baddeley, a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, England

also contacted me to discuss further some of the issues in that article and their relevance for his research.

B. Data collected during Operation Joint Endeavor just prior to the grant period was entered and analyzed. In September I presented my observations and preliminary survey findings at a video teleconference with Army leadership in the Pentagon and in Europe.

C. A substantial number of important books and articles were collected and an intensive reading period was necessary to provide a grounding in the literature for my research.

D. I met with the Army Chief of Staff in March to make him aware of my research and solicit his input. He later granted me research access to soldiers serving in Haiti.

E. A questionnaire and interview schedule was developed for research in Haiti, that would expand my inquiry to assess non-military actors' opinions of "who should be the peacekeepers?" A copy of the questionnaire is included at the end of this report.

F. A ten day research effort in Haiti significantly added to the understanding of my research questions. A summary of my observations preliminary survey results was submitted to General Reimer (Army Chief of Staff), and copies were distributed to other military leaders. (A copy of this briefing is enclosed.)

G. I am preparing a conference paper, which includes NGO/UN civilian mission evaluations of who should be the peacekeepers, and whether they think US doctrine, rules of engagement, and peacekeeping style are appropriate or adequate. This paper will be presented in late October at the biannual meetings of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. At a later stage

this paper will be submitted to an academic publication such as *The Journal Of Peace Research.* A copy of this paper will be sent to you within a week.

H. This project has resulted in a younger scholar taking up one aspect of my study for her primary research. The graduate student I hired as a research assistant for my trip to Haiti, Anne Holohan, has designed her master's thesis as a social psychological analysis of journalists covering peacekeeping operations. She will also conduct a content analysis of their stories, including some that were rejected by the journalists' editors for publication. An Irish citizen and former journalist herself, she possesses some fascinating insights on this American process.

I. Predictably, the format of my larger manuscript has changed significantly since the proposal stage. My review of the literature and my findings have led to a new organization of the text, but it still focuses on the same questions: what kind of soldiers should be sent on peacekeeping operations, what kinds of training they should have, and how they could best be utilized in multi-national, multi-actor interventions. My research conclusions and recommendations, along with a new outline for my work, is included with this report.

A comparison of the accomplishments of the project with the proposal:

A. I anticipated data collection in Bosnia. This indeed took place immediately prior to the grant period, and included participant observation of preparatory training in Germany as well as research with those deployed in Hungary, Bosnia, and the Serb Republic. I anticipated a research trip to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk while the grant proposal was still under review, and this did occur. I also collected data in a return to trip to Haiti, where,

as I proposed, I expanded my research to include interviews non-military international peacekeeping participants who interact with the US military.

B. I anticipated that the research would result in a book-length manuscript. This will most certainly be the case. I have collected all the data I need for the book, completed the literature review, carried out most of the data analysis, and have determined the book's themes, organization, conclusions and recommendations. I am currently beginning my first year of teaching at UCLA, so this book will be my research focus when I am not working on courses. I have received a small grant from the UCLA Academic Senate to support any xeroxing, mail, phone calls, or research assistance I might need in this final stage of preparing the book manuscript. I anticipate having a completed, polished manuscript ready to submit to publishers by the end of summer of 1998.

C. I said that I would also work on articles throughout the research period, and I have done this. One paper became a published article, and a new article was begun in the form of a conference paper.

D. I said that my findings would be disseminated to diverse audiences, and this has been true. I have met with several other scholars in the peacekeeping arena and shared my work, preliminary findings, articles, and advice about working in the field. I have passed on preliminary findings to military leadership, both to local commanders at the field sites and higher-ranking leaders within the organization. I will be presenting a paper at the IUS meetings in late October, which includes American and international military officers and scholars.

In sum, this project has progressed significantly over the past year, and will continue to result in professional publications and presentations. I am grateful for the sponsorship of the Army Research Institute, and naturally I will continue to forward copies of subsequent publications as they appear.

Sincerely,

Laura L. Miller

Who Should Be the Peacekeepers?

Laura L. Miller

Revised Manuscript Outline 9/97

This book makes the following conclusions and recommendations:

1) The best peacekeeping force includes participation from a mix of nations and a mix of peacekeeping styles. This includes forces from wealthy and poor nations, from aggressive or former colonizing countries and from the never colonizing and neutral countries. No one peacekeeping style is best: each are suitable for different reasons and address different needs in the country, and all can serve as a check and balance system on extreme behavior in any direction.

2) Within the US military, peacekeeping forces should include a heavy concentration of human relations personnel, including reservists who are especially valuable for civil-military relations. Soldiers originally from the peacekeeping area should always be activated and deployed, and again, a mix by race, gender, MOS, unit, and service acts as a check and balance system against "groupthink" or extreme behavior.

3) The current US military systems for collecting, coordinating, and disseminating human relations information in the field are inadequate and need to be centralized.

4) The US military should utilize area scholars, anthropologists, immigrant communities, and relief workers as cultural resources for the regions in which they are deployed.

5) The individual soldier needs to understand the political, cultural, and social context and basic conflict management strategies as well as any officer does. Soldiers are often in positions to act as informal ambassadors or make decisions that could have international repercussions.

6) As an organization, the US military is slow in learning how to deal with human relations issues, in part because the military is so married to technology and quantifiable data. Social and cultural interactions are very complex and "fuzzy", and are not easily converted to charts, slides, graphs, maps, or statistics. "Absolute truths" are few, the social world is always changing, no expert has all the answers, and many issues are debatable or depend on judgment calls according to context. This is not the kind of environment the military is comfortable with, but it is one that they must address.

7) Enhancing human relations skills is not a peacekeeping issue alone, and would not detract from the military's primary mission to fight and win wars. Better human relations skills will be invaluable for any type of deployment, and might have even prevented some unfortunate events in Vietnam. On some level, the military has always valued these skills because it has trained its elite (Special Forces, Marines in small wars) to integrate well with civilians. It needs to make this priority service-wide.

8) One of the reasons for sending military forces to areas of conflict is what they can do that other intervening actors cannot because they possess weapons. Many international actors believe that the US is not really doing all that it could, because it wants to avoid the loss of American lives and public support. However, an intervention that is truly successful with long-lasting effects may require greater risks and sacrifice on the part of armed forces.

9) The UN needs to recognize that intelligence gathering is a vital part of the success of these missions, and give the official okay for armed forces to do so. The necessity ranges from protecting international actors, to adequate preparation for emerging conflicts, to confidence building among belligerents.

Outline for the Text:

Chapter 1: Introduction

A. Overview of how peacekeeping missions have changed in the 1990s, brief literature review spelling out the current debates

B. Increased importance of individual soldier

C. Increased importance of human relations dimension

D. Decentralization, organizational flattening during missions

E. Brief overview of missions covered in this study (Somalia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Haiti)

F. Methodology (Interviews, surveys, analysis of military documents, participant and non participant observation of training seminars and exercises)

G. Demographics of survey results

Chapter 2: Analysis of US military in Peacekeeping

A. US Peacekeeping Doctrine, Peace Operations manual

B. Training and preparation of troops for deployment

C. Rules of engagement/use of force

D. Characterization of American peacekeeping "style"

Chapter 3: Who Should Be The Peacekeepers?

A. Advantages and disadvantages of sending Americans

B. Importance of a mix of peacekeeping nations and styles

C. Importance of diversity of personnel; disagree with principal of sending primarily combat soldiers (as has been done past 15 yrs in the Sinai)

D. Necessity for more human relations people (civil-military affairs,

psyops, military intelligence, foreign area officers), reservists, Americans from that region (pros and cons, pros outweighing)

E. Necessity for better coordination of data sources, analysis, and dissemination. Currently too fragmented, too late, too few comprehend the situation.

Chapter 4: Coordination with other actors:

A. NGOs, very underdeveloped. Legal problem with military collecting intelligence on Americans, but there's a difference between interrogation and consulting/ mutual exchanges. NGOs see need for military intervention, but still suspicious of soldiers, which may be somewhat healthy in that it may help keep extreme behavior on the part of soldiers in check.

B. Media: again, check on inappropriate behavior.

1. Local, in-country: must be monitored, can influence sentiments toward UN, potential asset for relations with locals
2. International, may be reluctant to write up positive stories because of fear of being coopted by military or rejection from editors.This may in turn effect peacekeepers assessments of the importance of their work (if they think all missions end bad or have done no good, they may be less committed, take their mission less seriously).

C. Other peacekeepers, need appreciation for other styles, rather than disdain, devaluation. Multinational forces often keep to themselves, even when sharing common dining facility: planned cultural events seem to go over well, though, help build respect, good atmosphere.

D. Missing: need to also reach out to scholars who are expert in the area

Chapter 5: Conclusion: Reconfiguring needs to account for importance of human relations dimension and information coordination. These will improve PK mission and, far from detracting from combat ability, will aid it. Big debate over "revolution in military affairs" not really an issue here. US technology advances are a minimal advantage: most critical is not highest tech aircraft, Global Positioning System, or "digital battlefield". Internet/teleconference valuable because of facilitation of human relations/info transfer, but most critical realm is our ability to interact well with the other participants in the international intervention and with the local population and leaders.