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ANGOLA

UNITA Claims Government Forces Using 'Chemical Bombs'

MB1306083189 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern Africa 0500 GMT 13 Jun 89

[Text] Two MiG-23 aircraft bombed at length Cangala and (Bessenguele) villages [name of province not given] on 11 June, killing many civilians. Twelve hours after the bombing, many people began to vomit and become unconscious. This indicates that the enemy has once again used chemical bombs. Three medical teams from our health services have left for the site and are assessing the bomb's massive effects.

Analysis of Cooling U.S. Pace of Arms Control Actions With Soviets

HK1206062189 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 22, 29 May 89 p 32

["Special dispatch" from Washington by Huai Chengbo: "The Predicament of the Bush Administration"]

[Excerpt] After the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited the Soviet Union from 10 to 11 May, people expected good news on some eyecatching major issues from the two superpowers. However, things have gone contrary to their wishes. Instead of rising, the heat of relations between the two countries is cooling down by some degree.

Before and after Baker's visit to the Soviet Union, Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev put forth two major diplomatic proposal: withdrawal of 500 short-range tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and suspension of weapons aid to Nicaragua. Immediately after the conclusion of talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow, Baker hurried to the NATO headquarters in Brussels to inform the foreign ministers of the allied countries on the Moscow talks. At a press conference, he said: The United States still disagreed with such NATO allies as West Germany on their demand for possible early talks with the Warsaw Pact on the issue of the reduction of short-range missiles in Europe. Shevardnadze flew to Bonn for a visit. After talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he warned that if NATO modernizes its short-range missiles as planned, the Soviet Union will correspondingly manufacture, on its own, a new generation of missiles and might even change the plan to destroy its SS-23 missiles.

Gorbachev's new proposals are widely received by the United States' West European allies, but given the cold shoulder by Washington. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared that since the Soviets have so many missiles in Eastern Europe, abandoning 500 short-range missiles would be "insignificant." Baker said: That is just a very very small step, a minor matter. On 12 May, President George Bush delivered a speech on the policy toward the Soviet Union, demanding the Soviet Union unilaterally reduce its military strength, but made no response at all to Gorbachev's proposals.

The irreverent attitude adopted by the Bush administration toward Gorbachev's proposals has caused an outcry in political and opinion circles. Arthur Hartman, former ambassador to the Soviet Union pointed out: Marlin Fitzwater's statement was "very unfortunate." It shocked him. He found the current government's "fault-finding" attitude really incomprehensible. Les Aspin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, criticized the Bush Administration for its contemptuous attitude in this respect. He pointed out: The government has suffered a defeat because it failed to make a quick and ingenious response to the numerous arms-control proposals put forth by Gorbachev.

This response of the Bush administration is not accidental. It is a reflection of the guiding ideology of the policymakers in handling East-West relations.

1. The Bush administration asserted that the Soviet Union should make more concessions on such issues as arms control, Eastern Europe, and hot spots in some regions so as to test the authenticity of Gorbachev's "new thinking." Through decades of contention with the Soviet Union, the United States has won victories and its "containment policy" has been a success. Consequently, the Soviet Union has to reform its economic and political structures and to draw close to the West. The current U.S. policy needs no change. Defense Secretary Cheney and others also contended: No one knows how Gorbachev's policy will turn out. Therefore, the United States should not make any obligation to it.

2. The Bush administration doubts whether Gorbachev's numerous proposals on building a "European edifice" and easing the strained East-West relations are a "public relation strategy," with the intent of breaking up the relations between the United States and its NATO European allies. As Baker put it, once talks on short-range missiles are started, a danger will unavoidably occur, a tendency, intentional or unintentional, toward the third "zero option" which will lead to the denuclearization" of Europe. This will bring serious damage to the "flexible response" strategy which has been effective in practice over the last four decades and could even destroy NATO. According to the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, there are still people in the Bush administration believing in the "domino" theory and worrying about the "Finlandization" of Western Europe. In addition, the unification of the two Germanys is also a serious hidden danger to the United States though it may not materialize right now.

3. Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft are trying hard to get the new government out of the shadow of Ronald Reagan and to carve the image of the "current administration." The diplomatic policies at the early and latter stages of the Reagan years were widely different. At the early stage, an uncompromising policy was pursued under which high pressure was exerted on the Soviet Union through a arms expansion "pull-back" strategy so as to gain political benefits. At the latter stage, efforts were devoted to peace talks and ,especially, to diplomatic breakthroughs that were made in high-level meetings. According to news accounts, Bush and others were critical of the eyecatching, romantic personal diplomacy Reagan pursued during his latter years in office, asserting that during the arms-control talks, Reagan acted with undue haste and sought dramatic results.

Bush was determined to adopt a more prudent "wait-and-see" attitude and even did not grudge letting Gorbachev score point after point in winning over Western public opinion. Former U.S. arms reduction talks representative Paul Nitze maintained: Being old subordinates of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, some important officials of the Bush administration are deeply influenced by him and, moreover, Kissinger has always adopted an open critical attitude toward the agreement concluded by Reagan and Gorbachev on intermediate-range missiles.

In a speech entitled "The U.S. Diplomacy in the New Era" which Baker delivered not long ago, he listed preservation of U.S. leadership in the West, the facing of reality, and a bipartisan (Republican and Democratic Parties) consensus as the Bush administration's three diplomatic principles. However, analysts here say: The current policies and strategy of the Bush administration are very likely to contradict these principles in the end. The weekly TIME contended: The danger in the Bush administration's "let-the-Soviets-keep-making-concessions" approach is that it may feed the impression in Western Europe and much of the world that the U.S. finds "confrontation" and "Cold War" more familiar. The whole world really does want a reduction in arms that threatens its existence, and Washington must do far more than it has to convince its allies and its own people that the U.S. seeks that result no less than the shrewd Soviet leader. [Passage omitted]

PHILIPPINES

Controversy over Reports of Nuclear Missiles at U.S. Bases

Aquino Orders Probe

HK1306101989 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 13 Jun 89

[Text] President Corazon Aquino instructed Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus to confirm with Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze the report by former [as heard] Ambassador to the USSR Alejandro Melchor that long- range missiles are aimed at U.S. bases here. Mrs Aquino said Manglapus will discuss this issue with his Soviet counterpart during his visit to the USSR next month. The president, in a news conference, said she has instructed Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos to investigate Melchor's allegation to ensure the country's security and to study whether the United States is violating the Military Bases Agreement. There is speculation that the United States has some missiles aimed at the USSR.

According to the president, the United States has not informed the government about the installation of nuclear missiles. The treaty clearly states that we should be informed about any intention to set up nuclear arms. But nothing has been endorsed.

[Begin Aquino recording] First of all, Secretary Manglapus will be visiting Moscow, that is this month, and I would like him to take up this matter with his counterpart—with Minister Shevardnadze. Also I will instruct Secretary Ramos to look into this so that, first of all we can be assured of our security and also to see to it that no violations have been committed with regard to the recently reviewed agreement between the United States and the Philippines. [end recording]

Ramos Orders Missiles Verification

HK1406101589 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 0900 GMT 14 Jun 89

[Text] The military and government's capability to determine and confirm whether nuclear weapons are indeed stored at U.S. bases here is limited. This was admitted by Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos in an interview by the Defense Press Corps at Camp Aguinaldo today.

At the same time, Ramos ordered Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Renato de Villa to discover the truth behind the revelation by Acting Foreign Affairs Secretary Jose Ingles that there are nuclear missiles stored on the U.S. military bases in the country. However, Ramos did not give any details on how the military would conduct its investigation of the matter.

It will be recalled that based on Ingles' statement, several of the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles are directed at the Philippines because of the presence of the same weapons at the U.S. bases here.

Ramos said that the United States' procedures on storage and disposal of nuclear weapons are now ultramodern and that underground silos are no longer necessary. This makes it difficult for the government to determine the presence of these weapons in the country. According to him, the United States' state of the art nuclear defense system has been modernized and its missiles can now be transported by and fired from ships at sea and planes in the air. He emphasized that although the United States and the Philippines have an existing agreement against nuclear storage in the country, the United States could still go against it and keep it a secret.

[Begin recording in English] [Ramos] I have received the orders of President Aquino to verify this report here on the Philippine side. And I have already directed the chief of staff of the Armed Forces to effect a thorough verification of this report. The commanders of our Philippine bases of which these U.S. facilities are located are commanded by Philippine officers. Part of Clark, this is commanded by Major General Jose de Leon in a concurrent capacity. The same is true for Subic Naval Base, which is commanded by Rear Admiral Cunanan in a concurrent capacity. So, we will await the reports of the chief of staff. [passage with reporter's remarks indistinct]

[Ramos] I doubt it very much, although, I suppose this time they constructed a [words indistinct] of ground. But the use of underground silos is already outmoded because of the present state of the art of missile weaponry. All the weapon systems in the arsenal of the U.S. can either be ship transportable or air transportable. In fact, there is a well known delivery system that is launched on a submarine, and this has been in operation, this has been D-day units, for at least 2 decades already. The land-based silo-type missile system is being overtaken by newer developments of the..[changes thought] it is probably considered obsolete already. [end recording]

Minister Confirms Presence of Nuclear Weapons

HK1306104389 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 13 Jun 89

[Passages within slantlines in English]

[Text] Acting Foreign Affairs Secretary Jose Ingles today confirmed the presence of nuclear weapons in the country. He told diplomatic reporters: /It's no secret we have nuclear weapons here in the Philippines. Both sides said they aim them at one another./ He added that there are 32 nuclear bombs, 115 nuclear arms and 80 warheads, totaling 227. Ingles also said that the Constitution prohibits the storage of nuclear weapons in the country but the government does not have the capacity to monitor. Here is Ingles at a press briefing:

[Begin recording in English] There's nothing new, you know, because we have known for a long time that Soviet missiles are aimed in this direction. For example, Secretary of State Shultz said in 1983 that the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in the Pacific had stated that [words indistinct] missiles. He didn't say Philippines. [passage indistinct] nuclear force including 135 launchers, SS-20 nuclear missiles. This was Admiral William Crowe, if you rembember. This was in 1986. [Passage indistinct] state that the Philippines is among eight countries where the United States will deploy nuclear bombs, 32 nuclear [words indistinct], 80 naval nuclear bombs, and 115 nuclear arms will be deployed here. [end recording]

Senator on Soviet Missile Threat

HK1406042989 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0400 GMT 14 Jun 89

[Text] The continued retention of the American military bases in the country poses a threat to the nation's security and economy. This was the observation made by Senator Wigberto Tanada, head of the Senate Committee on Human Rights and originator of the antinuclear bill in the Senate. Jojo Ismael has the details:

[Begin recording] In reaction to President Aquino's directive to Secretary Manglapus and Secretary Ramos to investigate the reported aiming of Soviet ICBM's at Clark Air Base in Pampanga and Subic Naval Base in Zambales, Senator Tanada said he has no need to probe this matter because a top Soviet official has admitted as much. Tanada said great thought must be given to the dismantling of the bases because they are a danger to the country. Here are Senator Tanada's remarks: [end recording]

[Begin Tanada recording] I have long been calling for us not to allow the continued stay here of the military bases after 16 September 1991, because our studies show that they are the main reason we are still not a truly sovereign and free nation. [end recording]

Parliament To Investigate Reports

HK1406094589 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 14 Jun 89

[Text] The House of Representatives will investigate reports claiming that there are nuclear weapons hidden on Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr said the House techinical staff would look into the report. At the same time, he said that the U.S. bases are like magnets, inviting foreign attacks. He also added that it would come as no surprise to find that nuclear missiles are hidden on the U.S. bases.

[Begin Mitra recording in English] It is not surprising [words indistinct] that these bases could be a target of foreign attacks. [words indistinct] [end recording]

Mitra, however, emphasized that the House would not carry out a formal investigation of the matter. Discussions on this issue resurfaced following reports that the USSR has its intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the U.S. bases here. This means that there will be a threat of nuclear holocaust for as long as the U.S. bases remain here.

Editorial on Soviet Targetting of Bases

HK1406032389 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 14 Jun 89 p 4

["Editorial": "Misgivings Confirmed"]

[Text] Filipinos have long suspected that their country would be on the Kremlin's hit list as soon as war breaks out between the two superpowers.

Those who support U.S. military presence in the country somehow find comfort in America's so-called nuclear umbrella, insisting that the Soviet Union would be so terrified of U.S. retaliation that it would not dare launch the first nuclear attack.

However, it's an altogether different matter when the Soviets themselves openly admit that, nuclear-armed ICBMs are indeed aimed at Clark air base and Subic Bay naval base. Unlike the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the deployment of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases in the Philippines, the Kremlin has at least been more candid.

According to the REUTER news agency, a Kremlin official had admitted to Vice President Laurel during his Moscow visit last July that Soviet long-range missiles have the two major U.S. bases in the Philippines as primary targets. The REUTER cited as source Ambassador Alejandro Melchor's 1988 yearend report to the Department of Foreign Affairs [DFA]. Melchor reported that the disclosure was made by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Vorontsov. Vorontsov reportedly went on to say that the Kremlin regards the Philippines as a friend, but the ICBMs remain poised just the same because the U.S. bases "just happen to be" here.

While the Kremlin's confirmation of a long-held suspicion should be enough cause for fright among Filipinos, what is just as disturbing is the obvious attempt to hide, or at least minimize, Vorontsov's admission from the Filipino public. As far as we can remember the REUTER dispatch and a report on the same matter in THE MANILA CHRONICLE a day earlier were the first instance that such a candid Soviet admission has ever been made public. Obviously, unofficial back channels were used to get this item in Melchor's report—which we presume to be at least six months' old—see the light of day. We do recall that Mr. Laurel, on his return from his Moscow trip nearly a year ago, saying something about "Russian" missiles aimed at the Philippines—but not in the clear and categorical terms in which Vorontsov was

quoted by Melchor as saying. Mr. Laurel had either been unable to grasp the full significance of Vorontsov's words or sought to downplay the Kremlin's acknowledgement.

What Mr Laurel's and the DFA's subsequent actions following Vorontsov's confirmation show is that for all the apparent differences between the traditional opposition and the Aquino administration there are now strong indications that they are in fundamental agreement over the fate of the U.S. bases in the country when the Military Bases Agreement lapses in 1991. Most Filipino politicians, whether in power or not, would like to see Clark, Subic and other U.S. military facilities in the country stay.

Soviet Ambassador: No Threat to Philippines

HK1506102789 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 15 Jun 89

[Text] The Soviet Union has no intention of directing or threatening the Philippines with nuclear weapons. This was stated today by Soviet Ambassador to Manila Oleg Sokolov.

Sokolov explained that intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM], whether owned by the Soviet Union or the United States, can be directed and fired at any part of the world. However, he stressed that this does not mean that their ICBM's are aimed at a particular country. He added that based on Soviet defense planning, the expanse of the nuclear facilities network located around the perimeters of Soviet borders has to be considered.

Although Sokolov did not directly admit that there are Soviet missiles directed at the Philippines, he said that this could happen if there are missiles there that are directed at the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Carlito Cunanan has agreed to the creation of a monitoring group whose task will be to verify the presence of nuclear weapons in the country. However, he agreed with Defense Secretary Ramos' statement that it will be difficult to determine the presence of these weapons in the country. But he stressed the importance of having a monitoring group, even in other countries, to study and look into the issue. In an interview with newsmen at Philippine Naval Headquarters on Roxas Boulevard, Manila, Admiral Cunanan said:

[Begin Cunanan recording in English] Well, I think that is needed by any country, especially ours, as far as announce to the world that we want a nuclear-free zone also. [end recording]

Vice President Confirms Reports

HK1506113589 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 15 Jun 89 pp 1, 11

[Text] Vice President Salvador H. Laurel confirmed yesterday a report of Philippine Ambassador to the Soviet Union Alejandro Melchor that Soviet nuclear warheads are aimed at United States military bases in the Philippines.

But Laurel added that this development should not unduly alarm the country because this strategic positioning of Soviet weapons is a defensive, not an aggressive, posture.

The vice president, who is also president of the Nacionalista Party (NP), told newsmen who accompanied him to Batangas where he opened the NP's nationwide revitalization drive, that Melchor's report is "substantially correct."

Laurel said Melchor was present during his meeting in Moscow in July last year with Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Vorontsov during which the Soviet official told him that Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are aimed at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base.

However, he said it was his impression that this is being done not as an aggressive stance against the Philippines, but as a defensive positioning of Soviet might in this part of the world where the balance of power is heavily in favor of the U.S.

"I was told it's a defensive position on the part of the Soviets," Laurel said. "They are not aiming their nuclear weapons at us as an offensive measure. they are doing it, they said, because they know there are nuclear weapons in those two bases and they are aimed at the Soviet Union, so they are forced to defend themselves and aim their nuclear weapons also on those two bases."

Because of this, he added, the government has "no reason for alarm."

Laurel was reacting to a directive of President Aquino for the authorities to look into Melchor's report, which identifies the vice president as the source, to determine the threat to Philippine security posed by the Soviet policy.

Mrs Aquino also wanted to know if the U.S. government violated the terms of the RP-[Republic of the Philippines]-U.S. mutual defense agreement by keeping nuclear weapons in the two bases without the knowledge of the Philippine government, as implied by the Soviet decision to train its strategic nuclear weapons on the Philippines.

Laurel said he will discuss in more detail his meeting with Vorontsov in a report he will submit to the President next week.

Enrile Urges Aquino To Summon U.S. Ambassador

HK1506041789 Baguio City Mountain Province Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 15 Jun 89

[Text] Senator Juan Ponce Enrile has urged President Corazon Aquino to summon U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt and ask him to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons in U.S. military bases in the country. The call was made by Enrile to prevent any violation of the Constitution.

[Begin Enrile recording] If there are nuclear weapons in the American facilities in Clark and Subic, the logical thing that President Aquino could do is to order her secretary of foreign affairs to call the American ambassador and confront him, and ask him whether there's any truth to this. And if there's any truth, why they have installed these nuclear weapons and nuclear armaments without the approval and consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, unless she wants to show to the world that she's a puppet and that she's tolerating these things. [end recording]

Editorial Urges Clarification

HK1506062889 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 15 Jun 89 p 4

[Editorial: "Nukes Issue Tests U.S. Sincerity, RP (Republic of the Philippines) Resolve"]

[Text] The Department of Foreign Affairs finally lent credence to the widespread, assumption that the United States government has been keeping nuclear weapons on Philippine bases. Acting Foreign Secretary Jose D. Ingles told the press Tuesday that American nuclear presence "is no secret," but that the Philippine government does not have the technical capability to monitor it.

Secretary Ingles is a seasoned diplomat who cannot be unaware of the implications of his statement. That he said what he said is significant, even if he later clarified that he was merely referring to the reports of nuclear presence and not to the presence itself. No wonder it has stirred diplomatic row and some concerned sectors. Even President Aquino has been moved enough to order Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos to check on the reported nuclear presence and possible violations of the RP-U.S. bases agreement.

The amended bases pack provides that "the storage or installation of nuclear or nonconventional weapons or their components in Philippine territory shall be subject to the agreement of the government of the Philippines." (Transits, overflights or visits by U.S. aircraft or ships are not considered storage or installation and are to be conducted according to existing procedures.)

President Aquino was candid enough to confess that she was unaware of any U.S. nuclear presence in this country. "They have to ask us and they have to inform us," she said. "There has been no information."

We take this to mean that as far as the Philippine government is concerned, no permission has been secured or granted for the storage or installation of nuclear weapons. In short, there are supposed to be no U.S. nukes in this country. Now the Defense Secretary has been tasked to determine the truth of the matter.

The nukes question was raised after media revived reports that intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union are aimed at American military facilities on Clark and Subic. If true, this Soviet threat adds another cause for concern for Filipinos caught between the two superpowers. The earlier this is clarified, the better for all concerned.

The Ingles statement should set the stage for testing U.S. intentions in this part of the world. Although it unilaterally holds a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of its nuclear weapons anywhere, the U.S. cannot openly violate its commitment under the bases agreement not to store or install nuclear weapons in Philippine territory without the prior approval of the Manila government. After all, the sites in question are Philippine bases, not American territory.

Nuclear presence puts to a test not only American sincerity, but also the political will of the Aquino administration. The Ingles statement should be handled as a trigger for that test.

Foreign Secretary Denies Being Source of Reports

HK1506133389 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 1300 GMT 15 Jun 89

[Text] Foreign Affairs Acting Secretary Jose Ingles denied being the source of reports claiming the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases in the country.

Speaking at a news conference this morning, Ingles said that he based his previous statements on newspaper reports about the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the Asian region:

[Begin Ingles recording] Even here, there are others who are saying the same thing. Newspaper reports in the Soviet Union, in Europe, and also in the United States, have stated the same thing. But I am not saying that this is proof. [end recording]

Soviet Targetting Viewed

HK1606035389 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 16 Jun 89 p 4

[Editorial: "More Reasons To Resolve Bases Issue"]

[Text] Isn't it ironic that the reports about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles being trained on U.S. military bases in the Philippines surfaced last week just as the two superpowers were signing an agreement aimed at preventing military incidents from escalating into nuclear war?

The U.S.-Soviet agreement calls specifically for the prevention of "dangerous military activities" and commits the two to forswear the use of force against each other in responding to any accidental military contact or incident. The historic agreement was sealed in Moscow on June 13.

The agreement's positive impact on this country, however, was quickly stifled by the report by our ambassador to Moscow, Alejandro Melchor, that Soviet missiles were aimed at two giant U.S. military facilities here, Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. A Soviet foreign ministry official apparently was the source of Melchor's information.

The Soviet missiles were, according to Melchor, pointed at Clark and Subic because these two facilities were "sources of threats to the Soviet territory." The bases were also suspected of storing nuclear weapons.

Although denied yesterday by the Soviet embassy in Manila, the Melchor disclosure elicited a surprising reaction from Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Jose Ingles who said "it's no secret that we have nuclear weapons," and that the two superpowers have aimed these weapons against each other.

Ingles also cited a 1983 report by the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies listing the Philippines as one of eight countries in the world storing nuclear arms.

After the wave of apprehensions that greeted these disclosures, Ingles toned down his position and clarified that he was confirming only the allegations—not the fact—that the U.S. military bases in the Philippines keep nuclear arms.

To many, however, his clarification may have come a bit late. The series of statements succeeded in firing up simmering disapproval of the U.S. bases presence here. Some lawmakers are already invoking constitutional provisions on the presence of nuclear weapons in the country, including the areas covered by the U.S. facilities.

Some comfort may be gleaned from certain beliefs that the Soviet missiles are really intended for defensive, instead of offensive, moves. The threat of annihilation from a nuclear attack, after all, does not fail to strike fear in any peace-loving individual.

Surely too, the Filipino race cannot allow itself to perish in a war that it may not have direct involvement in.

Perhaps these new developments justify calls for an early resolution to the question of extending or not the present of the U.S. bases here. It has repeatedly been pointed out that the bases are necessary to ensure "regional security and stability" in the face of threats of different ideologies. With the thought of foreign nuclear missiles constantly pointed at us, can we sincerely convince ourselves of "security and stability?"

U.S. Bases 'Inherent Threat'

HK1506115589 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 15 Jun 89 pp 4, 5

["This Business of Being" column by Noel C. Cagrera: "No Freedom With U.S. Bases"]

[Text] The farce that is Philippine independence could not have been more clearly underscored than by the disclosure on June 12 itself that Soviet long-range missiles were aimed at the Philippines because of the presence here of the largest American bases outside the United States.

The disclosure—which Foreign Undersecretary Jose Ingles correctly said was nothing new—was contained in a wire agency story which cited a report from Ambassador to Moscow Alejandro Melchor saying that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Yorontsov had acknowledged that Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] were aimed at the U.S. bases in the Philippines.

The wire story quoted the Melchor report as saying: "The meeting was particularly noteworthy in that the former (Yorontsov) used the occasion to inform the Vice President (Salvador Laurel) that Soviet ICBMs were targetted on Clark and Subic," as we must be able to destroy all sources of threat to the Soviet territory."

Ingles went on to say that the U.S. military bases here serve as transit sites for nuclear weapons passing through the nation's territory. Drawing from a report prepared by the Institute of Policy Studies [IPS], a Washington-based think tank, Ingles said that U.S. officials had estimated 100 Soviet SS-20 missiles trained on Asian targets. He also quoted the IPS study as saying that the Philippines was among eight countries where Washington would deploy nuclear weapons.

The government's issuing of twin directives (one to Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus and the other to Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos) to verify if indeed Soviet missiles are aimed at this country and if American missiles systems had been installed in Clark and Subic is predictable as it is pathetic.

President Aquino herself is well aware of the arrogant policy of the United States neither to confirm nor deny the presence and placement of nuclear weapons in a host country, purportedly to maintain the U.S. policy of deterrence worldwide. The Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, could also refuse to officially confirm or deny that missiles are indeed trained on the Philippines, and there's nothing much we can do about it.

For a government that had suddenly develop amnesia by disregarding the anti-nuclear sentiment embodied in the new Constitution when it in effect sanctioned the transit and stockpiling of U.S. nuclear weapons in Clark and Subic during the last bases review, feigning shock and ordering an inquiry is a rather too transparent face-saving measure.

Absence of confirmation that nuclear arms or components are in Subic and Clark does not mean they're not there. At this stage of nuclear arms race, with nuclear-powered ships transitting through our waters, and the Philippines constituting as vital link in the global defense strategy of the U.S. the presence of nuclear weapons in the bases here must be assumed. We don't need an IPS study or a confession to know this.

How many of our national leaders—including the normally vocal senators who chose to keep their peace when the bases review agreement was signed between Mr Manglapus and Secretary of State George Shultz in the U.S. even as they were debating if such a pact should be passed on by the Senate—will now speak out against this confirmed threat to our national security?

Who will point out to Ms Mary Yates, U.S. embassy spokeswoman, that her argument that "American military bases around the world have not proven to be a magnet (for Soviet aggressions)... (because) not one country that has U.S. bases has been attacked" is probably the lamest we've ever heard.

The fact that Soviet missiles are now trained on the Philippines is proof enough of an inherent threat because it is a direct consequence of the presence of U.S. bases in this country. And in the event of a nuclear arms confrontation between the USSR and the U.S., Ms Yates should realize these superpower military bases, wherever they are on this globe, would be among the first to be neutralized or blasted.

The measure of true independence and sovereignty lies in a nation's ability to chart its own course according to its own national interests without the dictation or intervention of a bigger power. In the Philippines, this translates into how far we have gone in casting away emotional and intellectual blinders vis-a-vis Philippine-American relations and in our sawing off economic and political shackles that have remained a hallmark in the continuing American domination of this country.

Only when we have achieved this will our independence be less illusory.

Vice President Says He Tried To Report ICBM's

HK1606104189 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 16 Jun 89

[Text] Vice President Salvador Laurel today criticized the Aquino administration for ignoring his call for the convening of the Council of State and the National Security Council in June to discuss his report about Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] aimed at the Philippines due to the alleged existence of nuclear weapons in the two U.S. military bases in the country.

Laurel was supposed to reveal this information that he had gathered from talks with Soviet officials at a council meeting. The Aquino administration is now alleging that Laurel kept the report a secret.

Laurel asserted that he was not trying to keep his talks with Soviet officials secret and that he had wanted to report them at the National Security Council meeting but that his proposal was ignored by President Aquino.

Laurel added that the government need not be alarmed by the report and stressed that it should not overreact to the issue.

[Begin Laurel recording in English] At that time, I proposed that she convene the Council of State and the National Security Council. I have asked President Aquino to convene the Council of State and the National Security Council because that would be the proper forum or the proper place to submit my formal report. But she never convened them despite my repeated requests. She never convened the Council of State and the National Security Council. And so, she has not... [changes thought] I have not submitted my report to her. But in view of these developments, I have sent to Under Secretary Ingles, the acting secretary of foreign affairs, a copy of my report for transmittal to the president. I think this is something that she should not overreact to. I don't think this is a cause for alarm. [end recording]

Aquino Rejects Convening National Security Council

HK1606113189 Quezon City GMA 7 Radio-Television Arts Network in Tagalog 1030 GMT 16 Jun 89

[From "GMA News" Program]

[Text] President Corazon Aquino today rejected a proposal that she convene the National Security Council to discuss reports claiming that there are nuclear weapons stored at U.S. military facilities in the country.

According to the president, the Departments of Defense and Foreign Affairs are already conducting investigations into the matter, and she is expecting a report by Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Renato de Villa very soon.

Group Denounces Soviet ICBM 'Threat'

HK1506131989 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 14 Jun 89 p 5

[Text] The League of Concerned Citizens (LCC) yesterday denounced as a "billigerent act" the Soviet Union's "targetting of Soviet ICBMs on Philippine territory," as reportedly confirmed by Soviet deputy foreign minister Yuriy Vorontsov to Vice President Salvador H. Laurel.

The LCC was reacting to a news item attributed to Laurel spokesman Icasiano Gutierrez who said the meeting occurred sometime in July last year.

Cerge Remonde, chairman and founder of LCC, said "The government should not take lightly this open admission by the Soviets that weapons of aggression are trained upon us. The Soviets should not be free to turn their massive arsenal on any area they might perceive as a sources of threat to Soviet territory."

The LCC called for the expulsion of Soviet nationals as an act of retaliation for this flaunting of Soviet nuclear might before the Philippines.

"If the Russians consider our hosting the U.S. facilities as an act of billigerence, that they should now threaten us with their awesome nuclear might, then we should also treat them as billigerents, cut off all pretense of diplomatic intercourse, close down our embassy in Moscow, and expel all Russian nationals in the country," Remonde said.

The LCC chairman congratulated the Vice President for exposing the Russian threat but he said Laurel should have exposed it right after his talk with Vorontsov which was almost a year ago.

Remonde suggested that Laurel can go around the countryside to make the people aware of this treat to them. He may yet find out that the Filipino would still prefer the American handclasp to the Russian bear hug, as borne out by recent surveys, he said.

ALBANIA

Commentary on NATO Compromise on SNF Issue

AU0706140489 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 31 May 89 p 4

[Sokol Gjoka article: "NATO's Crisis and a Compromise Statement"]

[Text] A compromise statement was the only solution that the top leaders of the NATO countries could achieve in order to leave the high-level meeting that ended in Brussels yesterday with a semblance of "unanimity." The kind of "unanimity" this was, the "compromise" itself shows best. "NATO's top leaders left Brussels pleased at not being totally divided," foreign news agencies commented at the conclusion of the NATO high-level meeting. At the conclusion of this same meeting, the British news agency REUTER stressed that the agreement reached here represented a concession on the part of the United States and Britain toward the FRG, since Washington and London insisted that there should be no discussion at Brussels about the Lance short-range nuclear missiles. However, it appears that the divisions and contradictions within NATO become ever more evident as the years pass, a fact that can be explained by the growing sense of identity and independence among its member states. This was seen clearly in Brussels recently. The concluding statement was formulated as a compromise that bore in mind the different positions within the alliance, such as those on the imposition of United States policy, on conventional weapons, on short-range nuclear weapons, on entering into talks with the Soviet Union on disarmament, and on East-West relations. According to the statement, the future of short-range nuclear missiles will depend on the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. NATO's top leaders reached an agreement that as soon as the preparatory phase of conventional arms reduction comes to an end, the United States must enter into talks with the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons.

As is also evident from the concluding statement, the United States was this time forced to listen to the voices of the European majority in the alliance, and even take them into consideration. At first, the Americans arrived at the meeting wielding a big stick. For some time, a conflict has been simmering within the alliance over the Lance short-range missiles stationed on FRG territory. On one side stands a group of such Western European countries as the FRG, Greece, Spain, Denmark, Italy, and so forth, who are calling for the reduction of some other kinds of weaponry, and on the other side stand the United States, Britain, and one or two others who are in favor of strengthening NATO nuclear capability. The United States strained to use every means of pressure to stifle all Western European opposition. Baker, the United States secretary of state, stated more than once to the Western European leaders during his visit to Europe that "We are opposed to the elimination of every kind of nuclear arms on this continent, including short-range missiles." Meanwhile, President Bush tried to manipulate the feelings of the peoples of Europe on the subject of peace when he said, at the graves of American soldiers who died during World War II at Netuno in Italy, that "Without having had the experience of a terrible and destructive war, they (the younger generation) will find it difficult to understand why we need to maintain strong forces of military deterrence in order to prevent war." The message was clear, and was aimed at the other 15 members of NATO. However, Western Europe is no longer the adolescent that the United States cnsidered it 40 years ago. NATO is becoming increasingly aware of this. The FRG finds the modernization of the Lance missiles quite out of place at a time when disarmament in Europe is called for, and is supported by other states in Western Europe. For example, the Greek prime minister, Papandreou, stressed: "We support the German view and I believe it would be a major error to return even indirectly to intermediate-range weapons, which would be called short-range missiles after having been modernized."

There was no way such an atmosphere could please those imposing policies from Washington. Under these circumstances, Washington was forced to change its tactics quickly and lay before the talks a package of proposals to reduce conventional forces. U.S. President Bush stressed that the United States would reduce the number of operational United States troops in Europe by more than 20 percent, fixing them at 275,000, and seeking the same number from the Soviet Union. As for the FRG proposal to reduce the number of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the U.S. President said that it could be acted on when conclusions are reached in the Vienna talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of conventional forces. In this way, American policy achieved two objectives. First, it created an atmosphere of "disarmament" within the Atlantic alliance, and second, countered the many Soviet proposals, thus gaining propaganda capital among international public opinion. Bush stresses conventional forces in these proposals, while the Soviet Union emphasizes nuclear weapons. This, too, is in itself a contradiction, with each superpower seeking to use its strongest points in order to strike at its rival and achieve military supremacy.

It is true that the military policies of the superpowers have occupied an important place in the history of international relations in Europe, and this has had its echo in East-West relations. Under present conditions, the countries of Europe are increasingly trying to replace military policy with diplomacy. However, this does not suit Washington, which relies on its military presence and control for its hegemony in Europe. American President Bush openly voiced this goal of United States policy in Europe at the high-level NATO meeting when he said, "I will not allow the United States to withdraw from this continent. It is in our interests to defend Europe. We are not here simply for philanthropic

reasons." This is an expression of the political philosophy of the United States leadership, which is to preserve its leadership of Europe at all costs, ignoring the fact that this leadership contradicts the reduction of tension, disarmament, and the democratization of international relations. Bush also expressed this at the Brussels high-level meeting when he sought to impose his will on the allies. But times have changed, and the United States had to rest content with a compromise statement. It is a statement that conceals neither the contradictions nor the crisis within the Atlantic alliance.

U.S. Troop Reduction Proposals Critiqued

AU1206163089 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 7 Jun 89 p 4

[Shkelqim Beqari article: "Bush's Proposals and the United States' Presence in Europe"]

[Text] Disarmament, this delicate and involved problem, is being discussed more and more every day. Proposals have been put forth cutting weapons and troops in Europe. Immediately after the high-level NATO meeting in Brussels, the Americans were quick to boast of President Bush's "important" proposal. This gesture of U.S. goodwill toward the disarmament process, as it is called in Washington, provides for a reduction of 20 percent in the number of active armed forces in Europe, and 15 percent in the number of aircraft. Expressed in figures rather than percentages, the two superpowers are to each have armed forces numbering 275,000 between the Atlantic and the Urals. The United States will thus cut its forces by 30,000 men and 750 aircraft. The foreign ministers of the NATO member states will also discuss Bush's proposal this week.

The U.S. proposal for the reduction in troops and aircraft in Europe follows many proposals from the opposite side of Europe. The Soviet Union has also put U.S. policy in Europe in a difficult position with proposals to reduce conventional weapons. Although the United States uses Soviet superiority in conventional forces as an argument, this does not justify American military policy toward Europe in the eyes of the West Europeans, for it runs counter to their aspirations and interests. This was also evident in European opposition to the modernization of the Lance short-range missiles, to which question the United States did not receive the reply it wanted. Bush's proposal hints that the United States is also ready to help in European disarmament, although not in the field of nuclear weapons, but of conventional weapons and troops. The United States is putting forth these proposals at a time when it calculates that it would lose more than it would gain, were it not to make concessions and compromises.

Proposals for reducing troops and weaponry in Europe, whether put forward by one superpower or the other, are matters for the United States and the Soviet Union. Those who themselves deployed these weapons and troops, without the peoples of Europe wanting them, are now suggesting that they be cut. These reductions will not run counter to the wishes of the Europeans, who have always been and still are calling for the removal of the superpowers' military presence from our continent. However, the European peoples want the reduction of troops or the withdrawal of U.S. or Soviet weapons to be a full and conclusive process, in order to fully relieve the European continent from the burden of thousands of tons of conventional and nuclear weapons. Reductions in one kind of weaponry, such as the conventional weapons and troops of the United States and the Soviet Union now under discussion, should not imply their replacement with other, more sophisticated, modern, and dangerous weapons.

The United States requires a troop and armaments reduction proposal for the propaganda consumption of both Europe and its Soviet rival. After the failure of Brussels, it is trying to reassure the Europeans and make them understand that the United States is doing something for disarmament in Europe. Bush's proposal also includes 750 U.S. military aircraft stationed in Europe. This does not affect the fundamental arsenal of NATO's fleet of military aircraft in Europe. The United States cannot in any event accept the total withdrawal of its military presence from Europe. It considers Europe the front line of its confrontation with the Soviet Union, and is therefore at pains to defend it in order to "safeguard" it from all eventualities. "We have made a promise and will keep it, for it strengthens peace," Bush says. He is thinking of the maintenance of the United States presence which, he says, "does not exist simply for philanthropic reasons."

Bush and his administration justify the maintenance of the U.S. presence with the old idea of deterrence. Although they themselves talk about disarmament and troop cuts, they keep coming back to this concept, and attribute the peace that has held up until now in Europe to the presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons. The policy of nuclear deterrence, which the United States has made the essence of NATO strategy, is especially stressed. This means that U.S. nuclear weapons, together with the troops that manage and control them, will remain in Europe. In other words, enough weapons will remain in order to enable the United States to preserve its positions in Europe. This is why President Bush, in a recent interview with the American newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, said that "We must keep our weapons in Europe," thus discounting his own recent disarmament proposals.

BULGARIA

Army Chief of Staff Views NATO, Pact Proposals

AU0806075189 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 5 Jun 89 p 5

[Article by Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army: "The Positions Are Outlined"]

[Text] Hardly anyone doubts that the chief distinguishing feature of the contemporary world is the the great dynamism of the processes in the various spheres of

human society. This affects science, the economy, and the social, intellectual, and ethical spheres. At the same time, the danger for our civilization is also increasing. For this civilization to survive, profound changes are needed in the entire system of international relations. This requirement also determines the immense importance of the dialogue between East and West, North and South, and between all the main political forces in the international arena, most of all on the problems of military security.

At present the attention of a large part of world public opinion is turned toward the so-called Vienna forum, where simultaneous talks are in progress on reducing the conventional armed forces in Europe and on confidence- and security-building measures.

These talks are still at their very beginning, barely 3 months having elapsed since their commencement. However, it may be said that the positions of the two sides are now quite clearly delineated, following the recent proposals made in Vienna by the representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states and the program set out by U.S. President Bush in Brussels on 29 May. These proposals naturally need to be comprehensively studied in depth, but certain conclusions may be reached even now.

It must be noted with satisfaction that the proposals are similar or coincide as regards a number of points.

First, both the Warsaw Pact and NATO declare their support for establishing equal collective maximum levels for armed forces and weapons that are substantially lower than those now existing in either of the two alliances. These levels are shown in table 1.

In his conversation with James Baker, Comrade Gorbachev informed him that, in order to reach these levels, the Warsaw Pact would have to reduce its forces by 40,000 tanks, 46,000 artillery pieces and mortars, and approximately 42,000 combat infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Appropriate reductions would also have to be made by NATO. In this way, the change from the principle of overarmament to the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency is being implemented in practice.

The establishment of equal collective maximum levels removes the danger of the participants in the negotiations becoming involved in senseless discussions on figures and provides an opportunity to reach a just solution of the problem of eliminating asymmetries and imbalances. The side that has a superiority in a given category of weapons and combat equipment will make the greater cut.

Second, both the Warsaw Pact and NATO are placing the stress on the need first of all to eliminate all those categories of weapons that have the greatest potential for sudden attack and carrying out large-scale operations.

Third, both the coalitions taking part in the talks consider that the entire zone from the atlantic to the urals should be divided into regions, and that equal collective maximum limits should be established for each region.

Fourth, neither side has any objection regarding the need to determine the maximum amount of conventional armed forces and weapons that a state may possess within the framework of the coalition, and the number of armed forces that may be located outside national territorial borders.

Fifth, both alliances recognize the need to implement continuous effective verification of the fulfillment of the arms cuts measures.

These are the common features in the positions of the two sides. They undoubtedly create favorable conditions for the negotiation process.

Unfortunately, quite a number of differences also exist. Moreover, these are of fundamental importance.

First, embodied in the NATO position is the desire to avoid personnel reductions in their armed forces. They are inclined to view this issue solely in the context of cuts in specific weapon systems. Surely, however, personnel make up the chief component of armed forces, and personnel cuts entirely fall within the subject of the negotiations.

As far as the Warsaw Pact states are concerned, apart from everything else, this position is unacceptable because of the fact that the personnel strength of NATO exceeds that of our alliance, and this superiority will become even greater when the unilateral reductions announced by the USSR and the other allied countries at the end of last year and the beginning of this year have been carried out.

Second, one cannot accept as logical NATO's position regarding the definition of categories of weapons that provide the potential for sudden attack and carrying out large-scale operations. Originally the United States and its allies only included tanks, armored fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), and artillery in these categories. The proposal made by U.S. President Bush in Brussels on 29 May added a new angle to their approach, namely expanding the list of the most destabilizing weapons to include aircraft and helicopters. However, it must immediately be stressed that this proposal contains certain features that give rise to objection.

As can be seen from his formulation of the issue, Bush has in mind not only "strike" aircraft, but also "combat" aircraft in general, which means the potential for sudden attack and carrying out large-scale operations is taken to include the fighters, military transport aircraft, and all the transport helicopters that the Warsaw Pact has at its disposal, despite the fact that these cannot by designation be classified as destabilizing weapons. Thus, NATO

is attempting to conceal its great superiority over the Warsaw Pact in strike aircraft and ground-attack helicopters. However, surely these are the most advanced and powerful type of offensive weapons, capable of carrying out strikes over the entire depth of the troop groupings' dispositions and against the most important targets on the other side's territory, because of which they are assigned a crucial role in so-called airland operations (battles!).

It is clear to everyone that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states, because of the vast territory of the Soviet Union and in view of the serious consequences that an airspace attack may have, are obliged to maintain a large number of fighter aircraft (more than 1,800 planes). These aircraft are primarily designated to engage the U.S. strategic and carrier-based aircraft. Furthermore, why is the fact "passed over" that multipurpose aircraft predominate in the West's air forces, because of which the number of interceptor fighters intended solely for defense does not exceed 50 planes?

The proposal of President Bush contains a further feature that cannot be passed over. The Vienna talks were supposed to discuss the question of reductions only in land-based aircraft and helicopters. This question indeed corresponds to the mandate of the talks on reducing conventional armed forces, but it was entered there at the insistence of NATO, by which our alliance has been placed in an extremely unfavorable position. It is well-known that almost the whole of our naval aviation is land-based, whereas in nato only 150 planes are based on land. However, the United States and its allies have 10 times more carrier-based aircraft, which, together with the 150 land-based aircraft, comprise 1,630 combat planes, most of which are designated to carry out mass strikes on land targets.

I have touched on this aspect of the problem because it is one of the typical manifestations of the Western countries' selective approach in determining the balance of forces.

NATO's attempts to place our alliance in an unfavorable position are even more clearly evident in determining the initial base for reductions in combat aircraft and helicopters. According to George Bush, every country must reduce its numbers of such aircraft to a level 15 percent below that now existing in NATO. What does this mean, and what is the aim of such an approach to the problem of reducing these categories of weapons?

According to the figures published by the north Atlantic alliance in Brussels on 25 November, the NATO countries have at their disposal a total of 3,977 aircraft and 2,419 helicopters, compared to the 8,250 aircraft and 3,700 helicopters in the Warsaw Pact. It is not difficult to understand that no real existing superiority for us in striking and fire power lies behind this unfavorable correlation of numbers for NATO, because this correlation is formed, as already pointed out above, by unfairly and unjustifiably including in the balance the interceptor fighters from the air defense system of the allied countries. Moreover, the figures for the Warsaw Pact are deliberately exaggerated. In this situation, the implementation of the proposal made by Bush would require the USSR and the other allied states to make cuts of 4,873 aircraft and 1,747 helicopters, whereas NATO would only have to make reductions of 600 aircraft and 366 helicopters.

Third, an objection arises to the principle put forward in the NATO countries' proposal, according to which no country within either alliance may possess more than 30 percent of the total number of tanks, artillery systems, and armored vehicles. This proposal would be acceptable if the numbers and capabilities of the participants in each of the two opposed coalitions were approximately the same or comparable, but this is far from being the case. Whereas 16 states participate in NATO, the Warsaw Pact has seven member states. Moreover, the USSR forms the backbone of our defensive alliance, and its capabilities exceed those of all the other allied countries taken together. Furthermore, NATO, apart from the United States, includes among its members such great, economically and militarily strong states as the FRG, Great Britain, France, and Italy. This is why the establishment for the two alliances of an identical limit on the armed forces and weapons that an individual country may possess is objectively unfair, since it places them in an unequal position. The same is more or less true regarding the question of maximum levels for the armed forces of the states of one alliance that are located outside their national territories.

The statement to the NATO Council session in Brussels (on 29-30 May 1989) and the declaration adopted by the state and government representatives of the bloc propose a gradual reduction in the U.S. Armed Forces' personnel stationed in Europe until a ceiling of 275,000 men is reached for the land troops and air forces. The Soviet troops stationed outside the national borders in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals are also to be reduced to the same ceiling. According to NATO's calculations, this means that the United States will have to withdraw and demobilize 60,000 men, and the Soviet Union—325,000 men. As can be seen, this again disregards the different positions of the two coalitions. Within the Warsaw Pact, only the Soviet Union has troops and aircraft stationed outside the borders of its national territory, whereas in NATO, apart from the Americans, Canada, Great Britain, Belgium, and Holland also have fighting units outside their national borders (on FRG territory).

Fourth, each of the two alliances has already placed its own plan for the regional division of the European-Atlantic zone on the table at the Vienna talks, showing the numbers of troops and weapons that the coalitions may deploy individually in each region.

The NATO proposal envisages marking out four concentrically located regions within the borders of the zone. Analysis of the proposal shows that the bloc's troops and

weapons in central Europe remain almost untouched, while in the Balkans there is even a possibility of increasing them; that is, this shows that the aim is to preserve the capabilities to implement the so-called "forward defense" concept. At the same time, the adoption of this proposal would inevitably give rise to a major restructuring of the operational and strategic groupings of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces and a restriction of their capabilities.

The plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact for regional division of the zone is radically different from NATO's. It is subordinate to one of the chief aims of the talks, namely the achievement of strategic stability through reductions in armed forces and weapons, primarily in the territories adjacent to the line of contact between the two coalitions. It therefore provides for belts to be specially designated as forward areas on both sides of this line and along its whole extent, and for the territory in depth to be marked out as rear areas. Furthermore, the maximum numbers of armed forces and weapons in the forward areas and in central Europe in particular are to be reduced to the levels shown in table 2.

Fifth, in Brussels the U.S. President proposed a text, and the NATO Council embodied it in its declaration, according to which the treaty on conventional armed forces was to be concluded within 6-12 months, and the reductions themselves completed by 1992-93. The following questions arise: Can such a large reduction in conventional armed forces be carried out within such a tight deadline? What are the motives of the party that is setting these deadlines? Are they perhaps pursuing propaganda aims? Perhaps the U.S. Administration, in reducing the deadlines to the absolute limit, is also guided by a desire to prompt an objection from the Soviet Union, which it might utilize as an argument for accelerating the updating of the tactical missiles and their deployment in Europe.

Despite these differences in the NATO and Warsaw Pact positions and the critical comments made on certain aspects of the proposals put forward by our partners, the overall impression is that the talks are proceeding in a businesslike, constructive atmosphere. The conviction becomes increasingly established that the achievement of accords on the issues under discussion is a completely realistic goal. However, it would be naive on our part to close our eyes to the continuing attempts by the U.S. delegation and their allies to push us mainly toward unilateral concessions that guarantee them a number of strategic advantages.

Nor can one ignore the fact that certain circles in the West are continuing to scare their peoples with the spurious threat from the East. As can be seen from the above-mentioned NATO Council declaration, these circles still have no desire or intention to abandon the policy based on force. In complete contradiction to reality, they ceaselessly persuade their peoples that peace has allegedly been preserved thanks to the "nuclear deterrent" strategy they have pursued, and forecast disaster for the world if they are forced to abandon it. Despite the progress achieved in the talks with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic offensive weapons, the United States continues to carry out the program for their development. The plans for SDI are also being implemented.

The success of the Vienna talks largely depends on NATO's readiness to conduct parallel negotiations on reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons and on reducing naval forces. The intensification of the positive changes in the world also requires a new generation of measures to strengthen confidence and security. It is extremely necessary that these measures should also encompass the independent activities of air forces and navies. The problems of reducing military expenditures, giving a defensive character to military doctrines, overcoming the military division of Europe, and so on are acquiring increasing topical importance.

War—the chief threat to mankind, can and must be prevented. The acknowledgement of the priority of universal human values and interests and the right of peoples to sociopolitical choice, the removal of ideology from international relations, the establishment of mutual confidence and cooperation between peoples—this is the policy in the international arena of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the other allied states, and it embodies a great potential. There is no doubt that this potential will be fully utilized to guarantee the success of the Vienna talks.

Table 1. Collective Maximum Levels

Description	Pact	NATO	Description
Strength of land forces and frontal (tactical) aviation (thousands of men)	1.350.0	275.0, only for Soviet and U.S. troops stationed outside their national borders.	Strength of land forces and frontal (tactical) aviation.
Combat strike aircraft of the air forces (bombers, fighter bombers, and ground attack aircraft).	1,500	15 percent less than existing level in NATO.	Combat aircraft.

Combat helicopters.	1,700	15 percent less than existing level in NATO.	Combat helicopters.
Tanks.	20,000	20,000	Tanks.
Armored fighting vehicles.	28,000	28,000	Armored fighting vehicles.
Multiple rocket launcher systems, guns, mortars, and antitank guns (100 mm caliber and above).	24,000	from 16,500 to 24,000	Artillery pieces (100 mm caliber and above).

Table 2. Maximum Levels of the Armed Forces of Each Alliance According to Regions (Warsaw Pact Proposal)
In Zones of Contact
(forward areas)

Description	Total	Including in central Europe	In rear areas
Personnel	1,000,000	570,000	350,000
Combat strike aircraft	1,100	420	400
Combat helicopters	1,300	800	400
Tanks	16,000	8,700	4,000
Artillery	16,500	7,600	7,500
Armored fighting vehicles	20,500	14,500	7,500

Note: Central Europe is comprised of the GDR, Poland, CSSR, and Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, and the FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and Denmark from NATO.

Bulgarian Army CSBM Expert Discusses START Talks

AU0806153989 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 7 Jun 89 p 4

[Interview with Major General Kamen Petrov, chief of the group on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Ivanka Khlebarova: "Before the START Talks: Updating or Additional Armament"—date, place not given]

[Text] The Soviet-American talks on strategic offensive arms are to begin shortly in Geneva. Developments in the contemporary world have shown the need for real cooperation between the USSR and United States in the disarmament field. At the same time the Pentagon is continuing to implement its well-known plans aimed at rearmament and additional armament. Major General Kamen Petrov, chief of the group on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, answers questions from Ivanka Khlebarova on this subject.

[Khlebarova] Intense discussions are going on today on the issues connected with updating tactical nuclear missiles. Does the updating also cover strategic offensive arms?

[Petrov] I would like first of all to speak about the concept of "updating" itself. In the study entitled "Endless Updating," prepared by the Peace and Conflicts Research Foundation (Helsinki, April 1989), it is emphasized that the concept "updating" conceals from the broad public the fact that in general the issue concerns not only "improving" such systems as the "Lance" missile, but also "structuring NATO's entire nuclear potential," thereby "compensating" for the military capacities after the signing of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty.

The same "broad" interpretation of this concept may be applied to the subject of U.S. strategic offensive weapons.

As soon as it assumed office, the Reagan administration directed its efforts toward achieving strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, declared its opposition to the SALT-2 Treaty and caused its ratification to fail, and then adopted an all-embracing program for updating all components of strategic offensive weapons. In essence, this opened a new stage in the strategic arms race.

The program set itself the goal of creating a potential to deal an "disarming" nuclear first strike, in order to nullify or greatly weaken the Soviet Union's counterstrike capacity.

The updating is aimed at improving the accuracy and increasing the invulnerability of the means of delivery, and substantially increasing the number of nuclear warheads while leaving the number of delivery vehicles relatively unchanged. It is well known that the circular probable error of the "Minuteman-2," one of the older types of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), is over

600 m, whereas that of the "MX Peacekeeper" is up to 100 m. A formula exists according to which a doubling of accuracy permits an eight-fold reduction in the warhead yield in order to achieve the same effect on the target.

Modern ICBM's carry a larger number of individually targeted warheads. Recently, work has been in progress on developing warheads that can penetrate beneath the ground, with the aim of more reliably ensuring the destruction of underground control centers or missile silos.

[Khlebarova] What can you say more specifically about the actual program for updating the U.S. strategic offensive weapons?

[Petrov] In addition to the existing "Minuteman" ICBM's of the older generation (a total of 950 missiles), it is planned to deploy 50 "MX" ICBM's in reinforced "Minuteman-3" silos and a further 50 on rail flatcars. By 1 January 1989, 50 missiles of this type were deployed in underground silos.

Instead of the 500 "Midgetman" ICBM's originally planned, which carried one warhead apiece, 300 missiles will be supplied, each carrying two warheads. This provides financial savings, without reducing fighting efficiency.

Work will continue on implementing the program for building the "Trident" strategic submarine system, comprising "Trident-1" and "Trident-2" missiles and the "Ohio"-type nuclear missile submarine. It is planned to have 15 "Ohio" submarines as a part of the Navy's battle strength by 1995, and 20 by the year 2000. Every submarine will be equipped with 24 missiles, each with eight warheads.

The rearmament of the already outdated "B-52" bombers with cruise missiles and updating of their on-board radioelectronic equipment are in progress.

The production and deployment of air-based long-range cruise missiles are also being carried out.

As a result of the measures taken in the 1981-88 period, the strategic means of delivery of the United States were reduced to about 2,000, while the number of nuclear warheads carried by them increased from around 10,000 to about 14,000. This trend will also be maintained in the future, and by 1995 it is expected that approximately 2,500 U.S. delivery vehicles will be fitted with a total of over 18,000 warheads.

All this provides grounds for certain specialists to claim that, even if a Soviet-U.S. agreement is reached on a 50-percent elimination of strategic offensive forces, the capabilities of these forces on the U.S. side will increase by about one-third during the period of the implementation of the treaty (5-7 years).

[Khlebarova] It is well-known that the Pentagon is now discussing a concept concerning so-called "brilliant pebbles" space strike weapons, which they are intending to include in the basis of the "Star Wars" program.

[Petrov] SDI is aimed at creating an echeloned antimissile defense (ABM) system, including space- and land-based components, to protect U.S. territory against ballistic missiles aimed at it by destroying them during different phases of their flight. SDI is the main element in realizing the idea of achieving a disarming first strike capability without the United States receiving a counterstrike, or, if such a strike takes place, ensuring that the losses incurred are acceptable.

The structure and possible effective strength of the ABM system have still not been finally determined, but it is envisaged that the system will include three levels [eshelona]. The first level is intended to destroy the ICBM's during the initial phase of their flight path, that is, over the territory of the Soviet Union. During this phase the missiles present large and quite vulnerable targets. The second level is intended to destroy the warheads in the intermediate phase of the flight path, and the third is to destroy the surviving warheads during the final phase of flight.

This brings us to the question of the "brilliant pebbles." Recently the press agencies reported the completion of laboratory testing of an interceptor space missile—a component part of the new concept concerning space strike weapons.

What is new in this case is that it is planned to deploy platforms with these homing missiles not only in the first level of ABM defense, but also in the other levels, thus making them the backbone of the "Star Wars" program. The supporters of these ideas maintain that the deployment of about 10,000 such interceptor missiles will eliminate the need for large costly weapon systems.

[Khlebarova] What if deployment of the "brilliant pebbles" proves to be incompatible with the ABM Treaty? The Soviet Union's position on this issue is well known; it was clearly stated during E. Shevardnadze's meeting with J. Baker in Moscow. The Soviet Union once again asserted that the implementation of future cuts in strategic offensive arms is only possible within the framework of observing the ABM Treaty.

[Petrov] SDI itself contravenes the ABM Treaty. The forcing through of the program and the new initiatives associated with it will undoubtedly hamper the work of drafting a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. U.S. Secretary for Defense R. Cheney recently stated to the U.S. Congress that "if SDI proves to be incompatible with the ABM Treaty, then he will insist on renouncing it."

[Khlebarova] What is the reaction to these new steps in additional armament among military circles and the public at large?

[Petrov] It must be pointed out that the SDI program is continuing to encounter serious resistance in the United States itself. Many American scientists, military men, and diplomats are declaring their opposition to the Pentagon's irresponsibility, and are warning of exceptionally serious consequences for the security of the United States itself and for strategic stability in the world.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Commentary Critiques Bush CFE, SNF Proposals

AU0606152189 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Jun 89 p 5

[Bedrich Zagar commentary: "Just a Test Balloon"]

[Text] A caricaturist in some Western newspapers has expressed Bush's disarmament initiatives in a drawing which portrays the American President with a balloon on which is the inscription: U.S. disarmament proposals. This drawing reflects West German public opinion which does not consider these initiatives to be serious. George Bush, therefore, has not even achieved his original intention, which was not so much a disarmament one as a populist one. He had thought, however, that he would repair the reputation of the United States, as well as his own, and that the public would appreciate this step as "peace-creating."

By his proposals Bush is endeavoring to create the impression that he is placing some kind of "test" before the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev about whether Moscow is serious about disarmament. Such jokes should not be made at the presidential level. For in Moscow they are much further ahead with their own proposals for a reduction in armed forces and armaments. Rather, it should be demanded that Bush, instead of "tests", begins to negotiate concretely with the Soviet Union.

In Washington they think that at last they have managed to draft a disarmament concept and to respond "appropriately" to the Soviet initiatives. It was perhaps a hesitant step but certainly not an "appropriate" response. For the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have proposed to the United States and NATO almost everything, from limiting conventional and nuclear weapons to the elimination of both military groups, which it is possible to introduce in disarmament plans. However, all of this is, according to Washington and London, only a "trick."

Reports came from London and Paris that there can be no talk about the reduction of British and French troops in Western Europe. The daily, THE GUARDIAN, even wrote that British units and French forces deployed in the FRG are deliberately not contained in the proposals which George Bush presented because M. Thatcher and F. Mitterrand would not agree to this. In their desire "to test" the Soviet Union on whether or not it will accept their proposals, which, in essence, do not mean very much, they are as one.

No, the West, unfortunately, has not managed to convince us that it has a serious interest in the disarmament process. During a gala dinner with the American president, Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed his satisfaction with Bush's proposals and the compromise on tactical missiles, which supposedly healed the rift and West German-American relations can be once again normalized, but in fact the argument has still not ended. At least not between the American Administration and the West German people because the threat of the deployment of these weapons on FRG territory has still not disappeared. And not one FRG citizen wants to become the sacrificial lamb in the Atlantic military alliance's nuclear game.

Ambassador Balcar Praises Gorbachev, Bush CFE Proposals

LD0806213489 Prague CTK in English 2043 GMT 8 Jun 89

[Text] Vienna June 8 (CTK correspondent)—"The proposal for troop and armament cuts submitted by Mikhail Gorbachev at a meeting with U.S. President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker ranks among the international issues which have deeply influenced the course of the current Vienna talks", head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Warsaw Treaty-NATO talks on conventional forces in Europe taking place here these days, Ladislav Balcar told CTK on Thursday.

He pointed out that President Bush's proposal submitted at the recent NATO summit in Brussels is a serious and constructive proposal meeting half-way the position of the Warsaw Treaty states and creating scope for a dialogue on the six categories of conventional armed forces.

Both Warsaw Treaty and NATO states must exert much more joint efforts to reach an agreement. Differences still exist mainly in the sphere of the air force, Ladislav Balcar underlined.

The proposals now under discussion in Vienna provide already now a broad basis for further talks. The current negotiations are taking place in a constructive atmosphere, the Czechoslovak ambassador said. Political will to hold operative talks without useless delays so typical for previous forums is now apparent. "We believe that the spirit of the talks will be preserved. Otherwise, President Bush's demand for ending the talks within 12 months would become unreal", Ladislav Balcar said.

"The fact is that since World War II, the situation has never been so favourable for solving such important questions as conventional armament in Europe. This opportunity must be be used", Ladislav Balcar stressed.

Austrian Army Group on Confidence-Building Visit

AU0906134889 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Jun 89 p 2

[CTK report in the "Brief Domestic News" column: "Contribution aimed at Strengthening Trust"]

[Text] A delegation of the Austrian Army arrived in the CSSR yesterday [7 June]; it is led by Heinz Fatzel, colonel of the general staff and commander of the Mautern brigade, who is accompanied by Herbert Mischinger, commander of the 31st Regiment. Among other things, the delegation will have the opportunity to observe the course of a tactical exercise carried out by a motorized infantry formation of the Czechoslovak People's Army; the purpose of the exercise is to improve the ability of the exercising units to conduct a defensive battle. The presence of the Austrian side represents Czechoslovakia's contribution to the strengthening of mutual trust between our two countries and armies.

Canadian Government Requests Military Inspection Under CDE Accords

LD1306184289 Prague Television Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 13 Jun 89

[Text] The Federal Ministry of National Defense has reported that the Government of Canada has asked in a diplomatic note for an inspection of military activities on CSSR territory to be carried out according to the Articles 65 and 66 of the final document of the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The inspection will be held 14-16 June.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Ambassador Ernst Views NATO CFE, SNF Proposals

AU0206122789 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1000 GMT 2 Jun 89

[Interview with Ambassador Klaus Dieter Ernst, head of the GDR delegation to the Vienna talks on conventional stability in Europe, by Roland Machatschke in Vienna—recorded, date not given]

[Text] [Machatschke] Ambassador Ernst, this week you yourself presented the latest Warsaw Pact proposals at the negotiating table. Now the latest NATO proposals have come from Brussels, even though they are not yet detailed. How do you assess the chances for agreement now, at a time when most matters have been put on the table?

[Ernst] This week we presented the last parts of the proposals of the socialist side. These are very specific proposals on the reduction of tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, attack aircraft, combat helicopters, and troop strengths—that is, six categories. These reductions are to be carried out all over Europe and in individual European regions, for which we have set specific ceilings. To give just a general overview, this involves the reduction of about 2 million soldiers, 10,000 tanks and armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, and thousands of aircraft and combat helicopters—in other words, it involves quite large dimensions.

Our proposals have made a great deal of concessions in many questions to the NATO ideas. The ceilings we proposed are partly lower than the ones NATO proposes; concerning some components, for instance concerning attack aircraft, combat helicopters, and troop strengths there is not yet any way to compare the respective plans, because NATO has so far excluded these attack systems from its proposals.

We proceed from the premise that the—still quite general—proposal that has now arrived from Brussels provides hope that these gaps concerning attack aircraft, combat helicopters, and troop strengths can now be closed. If this happens, it would be very reasonable and would clearly be a step in the right direction.

[Machatschke] With its Brussels decision, NATO has in some way linked the Vienna talks on conventional troop reduction with future talks on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. What does the Warsaw Pact think of this link?

[Ernst] You know that we proposed the start of separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. We are not particularly happy that NATO has linked different levels of negotiations. We think that the negotiations on conventional forces are extremely important, in the same way as negotiations on tactical nuclear forces are also very important in their own right. It is certainly not particularly good if one makes one important level of negotiations the hostage of another important level of negotiations. It would be more reasonable to quickly reach agreements, or at least a start of negotiations, regarding tactical nuclear weapons so as not to permit any blank spots in any field of armament in Europe.

[Machatschke] NATO speaks of 6 to 12 months during which it hopes that substantive results will be reached in Vienna. Do the delegations in Vienna now feel under pressure because of this?

[Ernst] We do not feel under pressure, and even if such pressure were to develop, this would not be quite so terrible. We all are interested in achieving results quickly and we will do everything and work with great speed to bring about such agreements. However, it is clear that NATO will probably present its proposals as late as in September, and that a comprehensive evaluation of

these proposals—answering the questions of to what extent these proposals correspond to the mandate, and so on—can naturally be made only when we have the proposals on the table here. I do not want to go into any predictions as to the periods involved, but I get the impression that all people, everyone who sits here at the table and I think also all governments who have a say in this matter, want results.

Commentary Assesses INF Implementation as 'Encouraging'

AU0606152689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 5 Jun 89 p 2

["-ng" commentary: "Encouraging Interim Balance Sheet"]

[Text] One year after the coming into force of the first Soviet-U.S. disarmament treaty a positive interim balance sheet is available. Of the 2,611 land-based nuclear missiles of intermediate- and shorter-range, which both partners have obligated themselves to eliminate, 1,269 had been destroyed by 1 June. This is almost half of the 1,515 missiles with ranges of 1,000 to 5,500 km and of the 1,096 missiles with ranges of 500 to 1,000 km, which are to be eliminated within 3 and 1 and ½ years respectively.

Stock-taking demonstrates two facts, whose topical importance is obvious. First: Regardless of all profound differences and problems between socialism and capitalism, progress on the path toward lastingly averting the nuclear threat is possible if all sides are seriously willing to do so. This was the case with the INF Treaty. Second, the experiences of the past 12 months show the unity of disarmament and verification of its implementation. Loyalty to the treaty was verified by 340 inspections; in addition, both partners exercised their right to make inspections on short notice.

In this respect everything speaks in favor of letting the first step toward a world without nuclear weapons be immediately followed by others. Outstanding importance is accorded to the speedy conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the 50-percent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons while adhering to the AMB Treaty. After an interruption of more than 6 months—caused by the United States—this will be negotiated again in Geneva as of 19 June. No less urgent are negotiations on eliminating the tactical nuclear weapons remaining in Europe, as the Warsaw Pact has proposed and which is advocated by a wide range of political forces in Western Europe.

However, strong trends to the contrary cannot be overlooked. The NATO summit in Brussels made clear that this military pact adheres to the strategy of nuclear deterrence and to the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe. This cannot be hidden by strenuously negotiated compromise formulas, which can be interpreted in various ways. In order to free our continent and our planet from all nuclear weapons, one needs much patience and steadfast efforts. The peoples are encouraged not to tire in the struggle for peace and disarmament by what they have already achieved.

HUNGARY

Army Colonel Janza Details Defense Expenditure

LD0506132289 Budapest MTI in English 1220 GMT 5 Jun 89

[Text] Budapest, June 5, 1989 (MTI-Econews)—Currently defence expenditures account for 2 per cent of Hungary's GDP, the smallest in Europe, said a top army official Colonel Karoly Janza in a press statement.

On the strength of the budget cut programme approved by parliament last week, state support to the armed forces has been cut from 63.826 billion to 59.766 billion forints. Direct defence expenditures have been cut by 2.7 billion forints, an official of the Ministry of Defence disclosed to Econews.

In December, the parliament approved a military budget of 45.5 billion forints, with 37.752 billion forints to be spent directly on defence and 6.148 billion on non-defence purposes. The Army itself will have to raise 1.6 billion forints. On its own authority the government cut the armed forces budget allocation by 1 billion forints earlier, and with 2.7 billion forints withdrawn now, the Army is left with no more than 34.052 billion.

Compared with the figure projected for 1989 in the 1986-1990 economic plan, military expenditures have already been reduced by 15 billion forints, or 23 per cent. In four years 47 billion forints' state budget allocation has been cancelled, against the original plan.

The dwindling finances of the Army are marred further by inflation. Consequently, the Army has to reduce stocks, and hold fewer military exercises involving less men and equipment.

Ministry of Defence calculations show the budget will save no more than 40 forints on each 100 forints withdrawn from defence because the radical cut in military production involves not only loss of jobs but also of taxes. The Ministry of Defence is not in a position to honour damage claims accrued from terminated contracts, and consequently those damages will have to be paid from the state budget.

It would take additional investment to create a smaller but more efficient military potential, said Colonel Janza, but the Army has to cancel orders and stop running projects because it needs every penny to finance overheads.

Observers say if the Hungarian Army wants to keep abreast of technological developments, it will have to reduce its numbers by 30-40 per cent. This is the only way to establish a sound 60:40 proportion of maintenance and development.

Currently the Hungarian Army numbers about 100,000.

POLAND

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Begins in South

LD1506221289 Warsaw PAP in English 2026 GMT 15 Jun 89

[Text] Walbrzych, June 15—In line with earlier announcements, some units of the northern group of the Soviet Army temporarily stationed in Poland began pulling out of Poland.

The first unit to be withdrawn was an independent automobile battalion. The farewell ceremony took place in Swidnica near Walbrzych, southern Poland. The Soviet soldiers have gained many friends here. In participating in joint training and cultural-educational undertakings with soldiers of the Polish Army from units stationed in Silesia, the Soviet soldiers each day gave an example of Polish-Soviet brotherhood in arms.

The farewell ceremony with the Soviet friends was attended by numerous residents of Swidnica, representatives of local authorities, activists of the Polish-Soviet Friendship society, delegations of work establishments, former combatants, youth. Soon afterwards, a column of about two hundred Soviet military automobiles headed towards Terespol where the Soviet soldiers will cross the Polish border, returning to their fatherland, to Belorussia.

Another unit of the northern group of the Soviet Army, a training tank regiment, will be withdrawn from Poland in a dozen-so days.

ROMANIA

NATO Summit 'Compromise Solution' Scrutinized

AU0806130489 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 6 Jun 89 p 4

[Romulus Caplescu article "After the NATO Summit—Limits and Implications of a 'Compromise Solution'"]

[Text] Being an opportunity to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the founding of NATO, the summit of this organization, which was held recently in Brussels, was marked throughout the preparatory period by controversial projects to modernize (tactical) short-range missiles, which were at the root of the uncertainty that prevailed until the summit opened.

Under pressure from West German public opinion, the FRG Government maintained its position to the last minute opposing these projects or, in any case, opting for their postponement until 1992, so that negotiations could be initiated with the Warsaw Pact countries as soon as possible to reduce the missiles in place to lowest levels on a equal basis; and it was also up until the last minute that U.S. officials flatly refused to accept the principle of any negotiations designed to pave the way to European denuclearization ("a great error," as the White House spokesman said). Washington's viewpoint was supported especially by Great Britain and France, while Bonn's viewpoint was supported by the majority of the other members of the Atlantic alliance. Given this situation, "to rescue what is still left of the cohesion and coherence of the alliance" (le QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS), the United States resorted to what some observers described as "a compromise solution" that was eventually agreed upon by all the members of the alliance, including the FRG.

As a matter of fact, by trying to play down the extent of the controversy over tactical nuclear missiles and even push them to a secondary level, the compromise solution was included as a simple and more or less secondary chapter into the "global concept of arms control and disarmament" that was adopted by the summit, together with a "political declaration" on the basis of a four-point plan presented by President George Bush. This plan mainly deals with conventional weapons and proposes the establishment of equal ceilings within the two political-military alliances in Europe—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—regarding the main categories of ground forces (20,000 tanks, 28,000 armored troop carriers, and 16,500 heavy artillery pieces), and regarding fighter planes and fighter and transportation helicopters (the ceiling of which—for both sides—should be 15 percent lower than the current ceiling of the NATO forces); at the same time, the number of ground and air forces of the two sides, deployed outside the national territory, should be reduced to approximately 275,000 troops (this would mean a reduction of 30,000 men of the total U.S. troops currently deployed in Europe); finally, the pace of the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe should be accelerated to conclude them within 6-12 months, while the decisions adopted should be gradually applied by 1992-93.

It is in this stage (and not immediately, as the FRG suggested initially), that the problem of tactical nuclear weapons can be taken into consideration and that negotiations can be initiated on their "partial" reduction, as was precisely specified in the "global concept," a document that represents the Atlantic strategy for the next 10 years. In other words, this concept rules out the principle of removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, a principle supported by realistic political forces of the continent and which is in the vital interests of the European peoples. The "global concept" specifies in very clear terms that the Atlantic alliance will continue to be based "in the foreseeable future" on a deterrence force

that will combine "nuclear forces with conventional ones," and categorically adds that "the withdrawal of all nuclear forces from Europe (the triple zero option) would harm the strategy of deterrence and would compromise the security of the alliance."

Under these circumstances, the achieved "compromise" is considered as a serious moving back from the viewpoints that the FRG had advocated before. Actually, the compromise means that the United States decided to postpone the modernization of "Lance" type nuclear missiles, while in return, the FRG by giving up—or being forced to give up—its own positions, has accepted the postponement of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until an accord is reached on conventional weapons.

According to many observers, in practice this means that, in this way, the emphasis is being shifted from nuclear weapons—the most destabilizing means of fighting—to conventional forces (LE FIGARO was noting that this means simply to "evade" the issue of short-range nuclear missiles), while the two sides of the issue have been linked in the same common "package". However, the principle of the common "package" has often proved to have negative effects and, in the past, even NATO spoke out against it. It is well known that the NATO countries protested against connecting space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and the intermediate range weapons in a single package and precisely the "opening" of this package has made possible the reaching of an agreement on the elimination of the latter ones. Certainly, the NATO proposals on the reduction of conventional weapons have their own importance. It is known that, in turn, the Warsaw Pact has advanced a series of concrete proposals in this direction. Apart from some inevitable differences regarding control figures and planned schedules, both sets of proposals make a good starting point and it is desired and necessary that, while approaching these subjects at the negotiation table in a spirit of mutual responsibility and goodwill, the sides should reach joint conclusions in a reasonable period.

However, experience has shown that the process of negotiations is not always a smooth one and difficulties and controversial aspects may arise, which take time and effort to resolve. It is known for example that the calculation methodology of the two alliances regarding various components of conventional forces is different; on the other hand, only the American troops have been taken into consideration in the proposed troops reduction and nothing has been said about the English and French troops stationed in the FRG, which make up a considerable force of 100,000 people—this being only two of the many thorny issues that might crop up. As a matter of fact, the Atlantic circles themselves have declared that they will not be able to present a detailed form of the new proposals drafted by the NATO summit before the beginning of this fall, that is, only during the second stage of the Vienna talks.

There are many reasons that caused the leaders of the FRG opposition parties—such as the social democratic and the ecological parties—to criticize the "easiness" with which the Bonn government gave in to the pressure of its allies in not excluding the possibility of failing to conclude the talks on conventional weapons by 1992, when NATO will decide on the modernization of missiles deployed on West German territory. Thus, we are faced with the deeply concerning prospect that, instead of the partial reduction of the "Lance" missiles deployed in the FRG, they will be replaced with a new, more sophisticated version, which would stimulate a new stage of the arms race. Such prospects are rightfully rejected by the West German and West European public opinion in general. Voicing the opinion of this spirit, the former West German Cancellor Helmut Schmidt said that the United States "should deploy nuclear weapons on its own territory if it does not want to give them up" and that in any case, "Europeans want the weapons to be reduced and ultimately completely withdrawn from the European continent." The issue of short-range nuclear forces remains a thorny subject. "These weapons are unpopular in Western Europe"—writes the NEW YORK TIMES in its commentary about the reactions to the compromise that has been reached—while in light of these indisputable realities the BALTIMORE SUN notes that "not all disagreements within NATO have been solved" through this compromise.

There is another aspect: The "political declaration" mentions the need to intensify efforts to "overcome the division of Europe." Apart from reference to the possibility of broader cooperation to protect the environment, nothing specific is actually said about how such a goal could be achieved. First, not a single word is said about the desire to simultaneously dissolve the two military-political alliances and about the elimination of their military organizations as a first step, as reaffirmed in the recent appeal of the Warsaw Pact member countries to the NATO states. Second, the documents adopted in Brussels place stress on "further strengthening the Atlantic alliance and its military potential," including preserving the discredited nuclear strategy. However, the entire post-war experience demonstrates the harmful nature and the lack of prospects of such a way of thinking.

The European peoples and all peoples do not need the perpetuation of doctrines subject to the old policy, but instead they need genuine and undelayed measures for disarmament that is, measures which should simultaneously concern all fighting forces, primarily nuclear ones, to avert the danger of a devastating conflict and to pave the way for broad cooperation, without any obstacles or economic, scientific-technical, ecological, humanitarian or other discrimination on the basis of strict observance of the states' sovereignty and of rejecting any kind of interference in domestic affairs. This is the only course—for which socialist Romania has constantly struggled and continues to struggle—that really serves the interests of peace and stability on our continent and throughout the world.

BRAZIL

Successful Launching of Sonda IV Rocket Detailed

33420061 Rio de Janeiro MANCHETE in Portuguese 13 May 89 pp 120-122

[Text] With one more launch as successful as that of Sonda IV, fired off last weekend at the Barreira do Inferno launch base close to Natal, RN, Brazil will be ready with its rocket launcher within the year. The launches of the Sonda IV family, set at five in number and designed to perfect Brazilian space vehicles, should be completed with a new space trip next May. The good news is that everything is going well, both on the ground and in space. It is going so well that Brazil is already being viewed abroad as a future supplier of services for putting satellite services into orbit, such as those for telecommunications, data gathering and remote sensing, in addition, obviously, to those for military applications, also built in Brazil by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) at Sao Jose dos Campos, SP.

Descriptive parameters of the Sonda IV performance include its height, 11.5 meters (about the height of a five-storey building), its weight, 7.3 tons at takeoff, and the fact that it climbed in a straight line to an altitude of 820 km with no hitches. Since it is two-stage, with a working cargo of 500 kg, comprised of instrumentation that sends flight performance data to earth stations, the rocket needed only 16 minutes to achieve target altitude. This target altitude, it should be noted, is higher that the level needed to put the service satellites into orbit. Sonda IV took off at about 3,000 meters per second despite its more than 5 tons of motor propellants.

The operation, called Rio de Janeiro, was designed to make further tests of some components developed by Space Activities Institute (IAE) technicians, also at Sao Jose dos Campos, SP. There was a 25-hour delay in the launching due to bad weather. Interestingly, it was the same set of unfavorable weather conditions that delayed the Atlantis space bus launching at Cape Canaveral. There was heavy rain in Natal on the 27th, the date set for blastoff. The cloudy conditions would have created turbulence during the rocket's climb, and could have caused it to stray from its trajectory, which would have caused the computer that tracks its performance to destroy it in flight. And the tests were very important. The countdown, also controlled by computer, was interrupted, frustrating those who had been especially invited to the launching, among them the minister of aeronautics, Brigadier Moreira Lima. But, from the looks of engineer Jayme Boscov, the father of the Sonda rocket family, called the Brazilian Von Braun by his friends, it appeared that everything would go well the next day. And it did, in spite of the fact that cloudy conditions persisted at the launch site.

The Sonda IV tested a series of innovations, such as the use of a hydroxilized propellant for the motors, which measure 1 meter in diameter. The propellant was of 99-percent national design.

Tests were also made of a newly designed type of valve, developed to be more efficient than those used on board previous Sondas. The new type made it possible to reduce the number of valves from 20 to 12. In the opinion of technicians, it was an unexpected success. They were also successful in verifying the utility of a system of movable tubing, equipment that is highly critical in rockets, since it is this system that executes the steering of the second stage of the Sonda IV. Also tested was a reciprocal inertial platform, also researched and developed by the Boscov team, and responsible for piloting the entire flight. The second stage, upon reaching its apogee of about 820 km in altitude, plummeted into the ocean, as planned, about 600 km from Natal.

This fourth test of the five that are planned has already demonstrated the operational capabilities of the rocket and its systems and components, all of them to be used in the Satellite Launch Vehicle [Veiculo Lancador de Satelites] or VLS, as it is called. Actually, this fifth generation of the Sonda family will have added, most importantly, three additional thrust motors mounted on the vehicle's base in a cluster, which, with the Sonda IV rocket engine that was used in the present flight, constitute the prototype for the satellite launcher.

The launch also attested to the efficiency of the personnel and the earth instrumentation. The telemetry station precisely monitored the entire flight, receiving data emitted by the onboard working cargo, and transmitting them to the battery of computers for performance analysis. Also, the precision radar system—at Barreira do Inferno there are two, should one fail—monitored the entire ascent, the achievement of apogee in outer space, and the descent of the stage through to its ocean landing. The radars are part of the flight security sector, and not only track the ascent and descent routes, but also, in the case of any deviation from trajectory, trigger the self-destruction equipment on board the rocket.

According to the minister of aeronautics, the new launch base at Alcantara, in Maranhao, will probably be ready this year. Some of its buildings, such as those for telemetry, meteorology, approach radar, sound-balloon preparation, precision radar, and microwave are already built, and require only the installation of equipment. This does not mean, though, that the launch base at Barreira do Inferno will be deactivated. It is very important. So important that France uses its services to monitor the launches of its Ariane rockets from the base at Kourou in Guiana. Also, precision vehicles, of the same size as Sonda IV,, will continue to be launched there, and its services will be leased to friendly nations. Like the base at Alcantara, Barreira do Inferno has a special significance understood only by technicians and insiders: Since it is located on the equator, the launching of

vehicles to be put in orbit from there involves a 25-percent saving in fuel consumption; that is practically a quarter of the weight of the engine propellant, allowing more space for working cargo or for heavier satellites. Sonda IV, it should be remembered, was the largest rocket yet built in Brazil. It is in the class of the space vehicles of the nations belonging to the exclusive cosmic club, of which Brazil is already a member. In spite of a great deal of justifiable international resistance. With a little more time and a slightly expanded budget for the development of space technology (which no one sells nor shares), Brazil will pass from being a buyer to a seller, and then to a competitor, including the military applications sector.

INDIA

Soviet Envoy Commends India, Assails U.S. on Agni IRBM

BK1306091289 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0830 GMT 13 Jun 89

[Text] The Soviet ambassador in India, Mr Viktor Isakov, has said that the successful launching of Agni [surface-to-surface missile] demonstrated India's ability in the field of missile technology. Speaking to newsmen in New Delhi today, Mr Isakov commended Indian scientists for their achievement.

Referring to the American criticism of India's missile program, the Soviet ambassador said it is wrong to say that Agni would spark a missile race in South Asia.

Accusing the West of adopting double standard, Mr Isakov wondered why Pakistan's statements that it did not possess nuclear weapons were accepted and India was suspected when it developed missile technology.

Officers Assess INF Treaty Implementation

52000052 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel A. Belousov: "One Year After Ratification"]

[Text] **On 1 June 1988 during the course of the summit meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan there was a ceremony of exchange of the ratified instruments putting into force the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.**

The computer at the control center for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles provided just in minutes the information on what has been done during the year. Of the 809 intermediate-range missiles available in the Soviet Union, 265 have been eliminated: 192 SS-20's and 73 SS-4's. Some 200 launchers have been destroyed. A total of 20 operational bases have been eliminated. The indicators for the American side are as follows: 157 of the 677 missiles available (Pershing-2's and BGM cruise missiles) and 58 launchers. In all, about 1,000 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles have been destroyed in the USSR and more than 300 in the United States.

"We have covered the first third of the path right on schedule," said Colonel General Stanislav Grigoryevich Kochemasov, chief of the Main Staff in the Strategic Rocket Forces. "We are confident that there will be no hitches later. We have already gained the necessary experience. Although, of course, at first it was difficult. For we had to solve an entire set of quite new tasks. They included developing the technology for eliminating the missiles, launchers and auxiliary equipment, organizing a system of notification, and training people for work with the American specialists both here at our bases and in the United States. To this must be added worries that that all this work would be under the unremitting gaze of the world public. The missile men, of course, did not become spoilt by all this attention, and they did not lose their heads but showed themselves worthy. Let me cite you just one fact. In the late summer and autumn of last year we conducted 72 SS-20 launches from the regions of Chita and Kansk for the purpose of eliminating them. Seventy two! And not one hitch. Only people who know their business well can operate like that..."

At the same time the process of reduction worries people because their weapons are covered by the treaty. For the present we have managed to find acceptable assignments for a significant proportion of the officers and warrant officers—vacancies have been filled and people have been moved to the other branches of the Armed Forces. But the mail sent to the editorial offices includes increasing letters from officers of the Rocket Forces: Where will they serve (and will they serve?) after their units have been disbanded? This is not a simple question and evidently special attention must be paid to it.

"During the last year," deputy chief of the control center for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, Aleksandr Alekseyevich Shilo, told me, "special automobile and engineering equipment and buildings and installations worth more than R6 million have been transferred to the national economy. But more could be done in this direction if there were publicity and information about the equipment being freed up."

And how are things with the inspections? U.S. inspectors have checked 18 missile operations bases. Our specialists have also carried out checks. Colonel Vladislav Arsentyevich Alekseyev, who recently returned from an inspection trip to the United States, said that good businesslike contacts have been established and virtually no problems are arising. The two sides are complying fully with the requirements of the INF Treaty.

Tank Division Commander Reflects on Withdrawal From GDR

18010578 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Guards Colonel S. Dokuchayev, commander of the 32nd Guards Poltava, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Tank Division, under the rubric "Beneath Colors Covered With Glory": "It Will Remain in the Heart"]

[Text] **The Soviet forces to be removed from the GDR this year include a formation with a glorious combat history. It is the 32nd Guards, Poltava, Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Tank Division. We are giving Guards Colonel Sergey Aleksandrovich Dokuchayev, its commander, an opportunity to comment.**

The nearer the day approaches when the division will begin its departure from the nation which it liberated from fascism in the spring of 1945, the more acutely we recognize the historic mission which it performed here in the preservation of peace in Europe. Yes, the time for summing up the results is coming: the first trains will move out to the East within the next few days. And today everyone who stands beneath the division's colors no doubt wants to look back mentally, to glance over the path traveled.

The division's combat history began in the hard year of '42. It entered into combat as a rifle formation of the Northwest Front on the Staraya Russa sector. The former assault troops, Pacific sailors and workers of Moscow Oblast's Lyuberetskiy Rayon who comprised the backbone of the newly formed division did not flinch in those difficult battles.

Our division happened to participate in the most important battles of the Great Patriotic War. And always in the first echelons, always at the edge, on the most crucial sectors: the battle at Prokhorovka, Poltava, Kremenchug, the forcing of the Dnepr, Kirovograd, the famous Sandomierz bridgehead, Dresden, Prague....

It is not difficult to imagine the courage demanded of the division's soldiers and commanders at Prokhorovka, let us say. There is practically no mention of the infantry's participation in that tank battle. But our division was located on the axis of the main thrust and switched to the offensive along with the tankmen. Where the historical account speaks of participation in the liberation of cities, one invariably finds the words: "Stormed...," "Concentrated on sector... and captured by storm...." This means that the Guardsmen were in front. This is particularly exciting to me. Somewhere there my father traveled the frontline roads....

The glorious combat traditions of our army were born in the heat of those extremely fierce battles: courage, steadfastness, mass heroism and selfless devotion to the homeland. Our division's Guardsmen have exhibited all of these things too. During the war 62 of them were made Heroes of the Soviet Union, and the names of three—Guards Capt G. Balayan, Guards Sr Sgt I. Shabanov and Guards Jr Sgt V. Levin—have been entered in perpetuity on the rosters of division units. More than 9,000 were awarded orders and medals.

We inherited a truly valuable legacy. And the division's entire postwar history has been one of continuing the heroic traditions of the frontline fighters.

After the war the formation was stationed in the GDR. It was not an easy time. The waves of the "cold war" threatened to burst out of their banks. In that complex situation the division's daily life was filled with intense combat training and the mastering of new equipment. The Guardsmen held their honor high. In 1974 the division was awarded the Banner of the USSR Minister of Defense for courage and military valor, and it has been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the Ground Forces three times. There have been instances in which the Guardsmen, like the frontline fighters of that regiment, have demonstrated real valor and heroism, and the best features of our Soviet soldier have been manifested in their actions.

The spontaneous explosion of a shell left from the war started a forest fire in May 1971, for example. Fightingmen from our division went to the assistance of the German fire fighters. At the height of the battle with the fire, a group of our soldiers was cut off by the flames. Shells began to blow up nearby. The fightingmen continued to battle the fire in that extremely difficult situation, however. Not until all possibilities had been exhausted did they begin to break through the ring of fire. Pvt Aleksandr Yakovlev, a Komsomol member, died, performing his duty to the end and setting an example of courage and valor for his comrades. The grateful German comrades erected a monument at the site of the valorous fightingman's death.

Last year Guards Sgt Karimzhan Rezhametov and Guards Pvts Vladimir Ivasik and Stanislav Patyukov helped deal with a traffic accident. A citizen of the GDR was saved thanks to their bold action. The fightingmen risked their life and did not leave the individual in trouble. They were awarded honorary certificates by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR.

And how many times the fightingmen have come to the aid of our German friends with the farm work! These incidents unquestionably strengthened even more the friendship between the division's fightingmen and the workers of the GDR. And, naturally, we never felt like strangers on German soil.

During a recent meeting Paul Richmann, secretary of the district board of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship, made the following comment: "It is sad to part with the division, with our friends.... One feels as though he is losing a dear friend...." These simple words say a lot.

Our friendship with fightingmen of the National People's Army grew even stronger on the combat training fields. We repeatedly took part in joint tactical exercises. Fightingmen of the subunit commanded by Maj Yu. Vetrov were frequent guests in the R. Sorge Battalion of the GDR's National People's Army. Personnel of the National People's Army's radiotechnical battalion commanded by Maj W. Zeitler and the subordinates of Lt Col A. Shabalov have equally close ties.

Now we are leaving. I believe that the German friends will be left with good memories of the division. We came to this country to establish peace. We remained here to preserve peace. Our departure is also a peace-loving act.

The division's traditions will remain in the hearts and the actions of those who continue to serve in the USSR, of course. And some officers and warrant officers have been given the opportunity to continue their service in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. They will therefore bear our traditions into the lives of other military collectives. And we truly have remarkable people. The tank battalion commanded by Guards Maj S. Glagolev, for example, has had a good reputation in the forces for several years. One of this battalion's companies was the winner of the competition among tank subunits of the GSFG. The platoon commanded by Guards Sr Lt M. Piterskiy was best in the group of forces.

I have not commanded this renowned division very long. It seems like only yesterday that I accepted its colors from Guards Col V. Kurtsev, my predecessor. It seems to me that I have not yet had time to get a real feel for its combat history, but I now know that this time was an important stage in my life.

Many of our formations are undergoing organizational changes today. If one of them would take over our fighting colors and become the heir to this heroic history, both I and all of the division fightingmen would breath a sigh of relief. The [former] frontline fighters are making such suggestions in their letters. It is especially hard for them to accept the idea that the renowned formation will

cease to exist. I do not believe that carrying out this suggestion would conflict in any way with our state's decision to demobilize units and formations withdrawn from the GDR.

We need also to think about the exhibits in our combat glory museum. We need to see that they continue to have maximum effect. Some displays and documents will go to the museum of the group of forces. I believe that the rest of them could be turned over to the area museums of Lyubertsy, where our division was formed, and Poltave, whose name it bears.

The date 9 May is not just a celebration of our victory. It is a day of triumph for peace over the entire planet. We came to German land in May of 1945 to provide peace and rid peoples of the brown plague. We are departing in May of 1989 to give mankind a chance to establish a world without wars and weapons on the planet. I personally feel a sense of pride in having had a part on both May of 1945 and May of 1989.

Letter to Editor Urges Joint NATO-Warsaw Pact Armed Forces

52000055 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 23, 11-18 Jun 89 p 4

[Letter from I. Barabanov, candidate of engineering sciences, Mirnyy, Arkhangelsk Oblast: "Attention, Policy Makers!"]

[Text] The problem worrying everyone at the moment is how to avoid a catastrophe that could destroy humanity. Individual states can hardly protect their populations from such a catastrophe; the concerted efforts of mankind are needed.

I therefore propose that:

1. The guaranteed inviolability of existing national borders be ensured by a system of international legal, political, economic and military measures.

2. Joint NATO-Warsaw Treaty forces be set up preventing possible aggression against individual countries or groups of countries inside and outside this military alliance.

These joint armed forces (JAF) shall be governed by international legislation. They shall be removed from the authority of national governments and subordinated to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the states forming the alliance, or a specially elected international non-governmental council. The size of the armed forces and armaments (conventional and nuclear) shall be reduced by at least 50 per cent.

3. An international system of financing the JAF and the military industries of the alliance member-countries shall be organized.

4. The proposed military alliance shall be made open to all countries with the idea of joining the world's armed forces. As the alliance expands, the JAF structure, armaments and military production capacities shall be revised.

5. The staff of military industries, servicemen and auxiliary personnel made redundant due to closures and reorganization of the armed forces, shall retain all their present privileges until they find new jobs.

It would be interesting to know the opinion of the USSR people's deputies about this proposed plan, since they will be influencing the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policy making.

Foreign Observers Invited to Pacific Fleet Exercise

18010592b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 89 First Edition p 3

[Report: "In the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] From 10 to 12 June of this year the forces of the Pacific Fleet will conduct an exercise with the goal of perfecting the defense of the Soviet coast.

Participating in the exercise will be 20 combatant ships and crafts and 37 airplanes and helicopters. About 10,000 people will take part.

The government of the USSR wishes to demonstrate good will on the issue of confidence-building measures for naval influence in the area of the Pacific Ocean and seeks to promote an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the USSR and the countries of the Pacific Ocean region. To that end it has invited to the exercise in the capacity of observers representatives of the naval forces of several states in the region: the People's Republic of China, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, Canada, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, India, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Stoltenberg, Akhromeyev Discuss Conventional Arms During Gorbachev Visit

LD1306141989 Hamburg DPA in German 1349 GMT 13 Jun 89

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] has invited his Soviet counterpart Dmitriy Yazov to visit the Federal Armed Forces. Stoltenberg conveyed the invitation on Tuesday [13 June] during his meeting with the military adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, the former Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev. The Soviet guest expressed Yazov's hope to meet Stoltenberg "in the foreseeable future". [passage omitted]

According to a Defense Ministry spokesman, Stoltenberg recalled in his conversation the appeal by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl that the USSR should remove her superiority in short-range missiles. The reduction of conventional arms had played a special role in the talk. Here a rapprochement of the opposing viewpoints has become discernible. Stoltenberg and Akhromeyev expressed the wish for early results at the Vienna negotiations. There should be a worldwide zero-option for chemical weapons. Akhromeyev discussed with Wellershoff the further expansion of contacts between the Soviet Army and the Federal Armed Forces.

Genscher, Shevardnadze Discuss Need for CW Ban

LD1406140689 Hamburg DPA in German 1333 GMT 14 Jun 89

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze have stressed an early conclusion of a worldwide ban on chemical weapons as the main priority of their disarmament efforts. It is urgently necessary to put forward such a convention soon.

In a joint statement published by the Foreign Ministry, Bonn and Moscow underline their intention to be among the first signatories and stress their "great concern about the proliferation of chemical weapons." The envisaged worldwide verifiable ban is the only solution to the problem.

The statement, which is the only separate disarmament document to be published during Gorbachev's visit to Bonn, also underlines the great importance of "strict international controls." At the same time, both sides express their agreement also on a compromise on industrial verification. The text says on this topic that one must favor "a balance between the need for extremely meticulous verification and legitimate industrial and commercial interests."

Further confidence-building is also to be promoted by means of the exchange of data. German and Soviet experts are to meet in the future in Geneva for regular consultations. No government can evade the great responsibility for a ban, the document concludes by saying. [passage omitted]

SPD Official, GDR's Krenz Discuss Disarmament

AU0906140189 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Jun 89 p 2

[Martin E. Sueskind report: "Agreement Only on Disarmament"]

[Text] Saarbruecken, 8 June—At the conclusion of his talks in Saarbruecken with Oskar Lafontaine, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], GDR Deputy State Council Chairman Egon Krenz relegated all expectations or hopes for profound social reforms in the GDR to the realm of fantasy. At a press conference after the 2-day dialogue with the SPD, Krenz said the GDR is undergoing a steady process of reform and added that "all hopes for an erosion of socialism on German soil have been built on sand."

Krenz affirmed his assessment that it would be good if representatives of both German states were to hold discussions and implement proposals to improve cooperation. What is decisive in this respect is that the realities that have developed in Europe must not be called into question. "The peoples of Europe can live well with two German states," he said, and this will remain so "in the long run; I stress: in the very long run."

Honecker's deputy noted that the comprehensively common views of the delegation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the SPD representatives in questions of disarmament are a success. In his assessment, Lafontaine, too, spoke of broad agreement in this field. A declaration accepted by both sides says that strategies that fail to exclude the use of nuclear weapons in central Europe are not acceptable and that, parallel to the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament, the elimination of nuclear battlefield weapons and short-range missiles must be discussed now.

The individual disarmament steps are to be accompanied by new confidence-building measures: "Practically as a supervising body" an overall European "alliance-transcending authority" is to be established. SPD Presidium member Egon Bahr explained that if the Vienna negotiations should really lead to results within 6 to 12 months, an enormous need for control and monitoring measures would develop. For this purpose, "control instruments" as an organ of European security would be indispensable. Horst Ehmke spoke of an idea that should be implemented within the framework of the CSCE participating states.

Concerning the discussion of domestic policy issues, Lafontaine said the different views were clearly articulated, even though no side intended to persuade the other to accept its opinion. However, dialogue is necessary if one wants to try to improve mutual understanding. SPD circles said Krenz advocated the view that the two parties should "not continuously hold up the mirror of socialism to the other." However, Ehmke energetically contradicted this.

FRANCE

Defense Minister's 5 Apr Moscow Speech

PM1306094289 Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 89 pp 13-34

[Text of speech by French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement to Soviet Academy of the General Staff in Moscow on 5 April 1989: "The Defense of France, and the Security and Future of Europe"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

French Doctrine

The main objective of France's defense, as President Francois Mitterrand said, is to safeguard its independence and identity. This objective is inextricably linked to France's desire to make every effort to guarantee peace in Europe that implies a balance of forces, respect for the principle of sufficiency, and the search for stability.

That is why France has defined its own strategy, based on a national concept and resources which aims not to win a war in Europe, but to prevent such a war.

Deterrence

Nuclear weapons marked a radical departure in the art of war. For a long time, some theoreticians saw nuclear weapons only as a more powerful weapon of destruction than conventional artillery or an even more terrifying weapon than those used in the air raids on cities during World War II.

Indeed, the destructive power of nuclear arsenals makes war outdated as a rational political means of settling conflicts among developed countries equipped with such weapons.

As the president of the Republic said on 11 October 1988, nuclear deterrence, which forms the basis of the defense doctrine of a medium-sized country like ours, but one which occupies a strategic position in Europe, "is not intended to win a war, but to prevent it. We must keep our forces at an adequate level—as quantity, quality, and performance—to be capable of inflicting damage on the aggressor which is at least equivalent to the stake we represent."

I could not find a better definition of our doctrine. Because nuclear weapons aim to deter, we regard them not as weapons to be used, but as diplomatic weapons to establish balance and resist blackmail from any quarter. They strip war itself of all rationality.

The concept of deterrence thus corresponds to the interests of Europe as a whole, because any war, even a limited and purely conventional one, would now have terribly devastating effects.

CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev admitted that when he wrote in his book "Restructuring" that "nuclear war is impossible to win" and that "there would be no victor or vanquished in a general nuclear conflict. World civilization would inevitably perish; it would be suicide rather than war in the usual sense of the word."

The threat of nuclear weapons is undoubtedly an evil, but since the end of World War II it has delivered us from worse evils, and by that I mean World War III. It forces us to be intelligent and invent more civilized solutions to the inevitable conflicts in human societies: the development of trade, technological progress used to serve the development of the least advanced sections of mankind, respect for peoples' self-determination, and, above all, constant cultural development. Moreover, is this not the meaning of the "new thinking" to which you now refer?

Until the causes of conflicts have been eradicated, every country has the legitimate right to safeguard its security. This is the meaning of our deterrent based on the concept of a strictly adequate level. It is deterrence "by the weak of the strong," which is also known as "proportional" deterrence because it must be able to inflict on any aggressor damage at least equal to the stake France represents.

We, therefore, do not intend to vie with the Soviet or American superpowers: Our strategic nuclear weapons make up a tiny percentage of the world total. But, in view of the atom's equalizing power, we regard this small percentage as reasonable and adequate.

This is therefore the principle on which our defense doctrine is based. At this stage in my speech I would like to point out that this French deterrence doctrine is defensive by nature and, as the president of the Republic pointed out, tends to safeguard peace and stability in Europe.

All our weapons participate in deterrence defined in this way. This is naturally true of our strategic arsenal, which includes three components—air, land, and sea. It is also true of our so-called pre-strategic or final warning weapons. These weapons are not theater weapons aimed at restoring a broken balance on the battlefield. General Poirier, one of our theoreticians, has shown that France could not win a tactical nuclear battle in Europe. This is, therefore, not our objective.

As the president of the Republic recently stated: "Our pre-strategic nuclear weapons are not intended to be an extension of conventional weapons. Their place is, by definition, at the start of the nuclear process. Delivered in a single, once-only strike, they would be a final warning, with their own military effectiveness showing any aggressor that in pursuing his undertaking he would expose himself to strategic nuclear fire." The theory of the final warning potentially paving the way for final negotiations strengthens the overall deterrent. Indeed, the very possibility of this strike prompts wise restraint in any aggressor. This final single warning should not be confused with NATO's flexible response. Indeed, if you try to make the response too flexible, you are likely to abandon the deterrent nature of the nuclear weapon and give substance to the idea of a devastating nuclear battle in Europe.

The modern French view of deterrence is therefore a detailed one whose objective is still to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used.

Indeed, our nuclear forces protect both our national territory, which is defined in geographical terms, and our vital interests, which are defined in political terms. However, given the small area of the European theater and the high density of its population, France's fate is particularly closely linked to that of its neighbors; in other words its vital interests can be very quickly affected.

The French deterrent is therefore an essential contribution to balance and peace on our continent.

To end this outline of our doctrine, I would like to emphasize three points: Deterrence as we understand it is, as you will have realized, a concept which is both political and purely defensive. It is a national concept.

To be effective in our view, it need only have a sufficiently credible arsenal that can satisfy the principle of equivalent risk, which I mentioned previously.

To be effective, the deterrent does not need to rival the superpowers' strategic arsenals. It does not imply participation in any arms race because a minimum threshold of credibility is maintained.

This principle of adequacy was adopted in France as soon as our nuclear strategy was defined, and it has been constantly reaffirmed since then.

We welcome the fact that this idea is now emerging in the Soviet Union. On 9 February, General Yazov himself referred to the search for "new ways of guaranteeing security thanks to an effective change from the principle of excessive levels of weapons to that of the minimum reasonable level of defense," and we naturally hope that this idea will be put into practice.

I would like to end this outline of our deterrence doctrine by reaffirming that it is by definition a purely national concept.

The threat to use nuclear weapons, which is linked to the French nation's very existence, requires totally independent decision-making. At the level of institutions, the decision to use nuclear weapons rests with the president of the Republic alone because he embodies the national will because of his election by universal suffrage. In case of attack, it is therefore he alone who assesses the threshold from which our vital interests would be threatened. The nuclear decision, by definition, cannot be shared. France intends to control its nuclear forces and decide its own strategy. That is why it withdrew from the NATO integrated military structure. That is why its nuclear weapons are entirely independent from NATO and the United States. That is why French nuclear weapons, whatever the category of weapons considered, are entirely French designed and produced.

Finally, it is appropriate to point out that in our view the threat of nuclear reprisals is valid whatever the nature of the weapons used by the enemy, be they nuclear, chemical, or conventional, if a major aggression is launched against France's vital interests.

France and its Alliances

The principle of independent decision-making which governs our defense doctrine does not prevent France from having allies.

For geographical, economic, political, and historical reasons, France is part of an alliance, and it would show solidarity with it in case of attack.

The Atlantic Alliance

The conditions in which a country like France ensures its defense are radically different from those that prevail here in the Soviet Union, for geographical and historical reasons.

The lack of strategic depth from which Western Europe suffers, contrasted with the vast Russian plains, forces us to think about our security in liaison with that of our neighbors and prevents us from ignoring what happens on our borders.

I would also like to remind you that the Atlantic Alliance was born in the postwar historical context, at a time when Stalin was imposing regimes of his choice in the countries of Eastern and central Europe, including countries with a democratic tradition. Western Europe, which was devastated and exhausted, was unable to ensure its own defense and, to guarantee its security, had to form an association with the United States, whose aid for the second time in one century had proved decisive in regaining our freedom.

This alliance with the United States was designed as a defensive and geographically limited alliance at a time when the Soviet leaders thought that the struggle between political and social systems should lead to the triumph of the Soviet system and the elimination of capitalism, if necessary by military destruction.

France, however, thought and still thinks that societies should develop by democratic means and not by foreign blackmail, interference, or war. It was, therefore, to safeguard its independence that France formed an alliance with peoples who shared the same democratic concept as it.

But our alliance membership—the expression of our solidarity with friendly countries—does not mean alignment. Since General de Gaulle decided to withdraw from NATO's military structure in 1966—a decision which the United States accepted—France has not been part of the integrated command and has not placed troops at its disposal. In case of attack in Europe, France would intervene to support its allies, but in its own way—in other words, according to its own assessment of the situation, and of the reasons and purpose of the conflict. France's decisions are its own and every time the situation has warranted it, it has shown this, as in 1986 when it refused to allow the American planes which had taken off from Britain to bomb Libya to overfly its territory. Similarly, it dissociated itself from the SDI as early as 1983. However, it had occasion to show its solidarity with its allies very firmly during the Cuban crisis and when the SS-20 missiles were deployed.

I know that there is speculation now and then about the possibility of France rejoining NATO's integrated military organization.

The president of the Republic himself spoke on this subject in a definitive way on 11 October 1988: "The independent nature of our decision-making relates particularly to NATO's integrated military bodies. Please let us stop all speculation on this subject. There is no question of our changing status. This does not prevent military relations within the alliance...but nothing can encroach on the decision-making power that rests with France and which the president of the Republic alone can exercise."

The Joint Defense of Western Europe

To more effectively guarantee this autonomy, to which we attach importance, France wants to see the emergence of a European defense pole, in an increasingly multipolar world— a pole that would be both a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and a pillar of European security on the whole continent.

A revitalized Western Europe cannot indefinitely depend on an external protector. It must take increasing control over its own destiny.

The future belongs to big entities—the United States, the USSR, India, Japan. Without aspiring to rival the superpowers, the West European nations could not abandon the idea of taking their place in this multipolar world. No one can deny them the right to an independent existence. This implies the ability to defend themselves, and this is why France is trying to promote practical cooperation among Europeans.

This cooperation has an institutional form. This is the purpose of our action in the Western European Union [WEU]. France has played an essential role in the revival of this organization. It is not threatening because it has no operational competence. It is a political forum, a place of consultation among countries whose objectives are peace and stability in Europe. Moreover, France has proposed to its partners that the WEU might play a role in the disarmament sphere, in particular with regard to the verification of future disarmament agreements.

It is important that our support for this principle of a common defense for West European countries should not be interpreted by our Soviet friends as a threat. The Soviet Union stands to gain from there being a stable political focus in Western Europe open to the world and anxious to maintain relations of trade and cooperation with Eastern Europe. The policy of this entity can only be defensive and fully committed to the arms control process on our continent. A Western Europe in control of its destiny would be a guarantee of reconciliation and openness for the whole of Europe.

However, we have not yet reached this stage. As the president of the Republic recalled: "Only France and Britain have nuclear weapons.... As a result of World War II, Germany cannot have such weapons. Moreover, it is not asking for them. This difference in status leads to differences in approach."

This naturally prompts me to raise the question of Franco-German cooperation. I know that you are anxious about the expansion of this cooperation. However, I would like to explain to you that there is no reason for this anxiety.

France and the FRG have preferential relations that obviously stem from geographical factors, but also from economics and history. This last aspect has special importance. I do not need to go into detail about the upheavals that have characterized Franco-German relations since the proclamation of German unity in Versailles by Bismarck in 1871. The treaty signed in 1963 by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer sealed the reconciliation between two peoples who seemed to be set against each other by an inexpiable hatred.

It is in this sense that Franco-German cooperation is a message of peace that has exemplary value for our whole continent. Its extension to the security sphere symbolizes with particular strength the overcoming of antagonism born of history. It is an association between two peoples

who, having known horror, want to create the right conditions to ensure that it does not happen again. This cooperation between two peoples who have succeeded in overcoming the past is intended to create favorable conditions for progress and peace on our continent.

European Security and Europe's Future

Stability on our continent depends on two inseparable policies:

A defense policy based on a level of sufficiency on both sides and an arms control policy aimed at creating greater security at a lower level.

Defense and Sufficiency

I do not think that the USSR today has aggressive intentions, and I do not doubt the goodwill of its leaders or the sincerity of the efforts being made to promote a new approach to international relations. However, you must understand that the accumulation of the Warsaw Pact's military means in central Europe have given the Europeans the feeling of being the object of a terrible threat.

In my job I cannot merely deal with intentions, and I must above all take account of actions. That is my duty as defense minister. I am therefore forced to note that, at least so far, the Warsaw Pact has not reduced its defense effort, particularly concerning the production and deployment of new advanced conventional weapons. The unilateral disarmament pledges that have been announced still must be put into practice. Moreover, they will not be enough to eliminate the imbalances and asymmetries recognized by the Warsaw Pact, particularly with regard to tanks, armored transport vehicles, and artillery weapons. Even if the differences are less obvious for helicopters and fighter planes, they are still generally to the advantage of Warsaw Pact forces. I am aware of the problems of counting equipment. With regard to France, I can tell you that even if the equipment stockpiled is counted in addition to the equipment in service in the units, you credit us with many more tanks, guns, and antitank missiles than we actually have.

In the negotiations that have started in Vienna, it will undoubtedly be necessary to define criteria for calculation that are accepted by all the parties concerned. The negotiations will then have to be developed. Their very existence is a positive thing.

The fact remains that lasting security presupposes the elimination of existing imbalances, which cause distrust and the arms race.

I know and fully understand that the USSR must maintain a major defense potential. It is 45 times bigger than France, borders on the changing Asian and Muslim worlds whose future is uncertain, and must ensure its security on all its borders.

I understand this particularly because France's security is not limited to the European theater. Its overseas departments and territories—Reunion, Martinique, Guiana, Guadeloupe, Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon—are scattered over all the oceans of the world. It has inherited special responsibilities in Africa for guaranteeing the integrity of its young states and peace, which is the precondition for development. Like all European countries, it must be capable of protecting its nationals abroad and supplying them with energy and raw materials.

The defense tool that France intends to maintain in accordance with its programmatic law does not in any way threaten Soviet security. As defense minister, my only aim is to maintain the credibility of our deterrent, which must not fall below the threshold of sufficiency.

This is precisely why arms control is not only compatible with our view of international relations but is an integral part of it. Arms control and security are, as the president of the Republic has said, two sides of the same coin.

Arms Control

France's objectives with regard to arms control are clear and have been stated by the president on several occasions.

In the immediate term France, which approved of the Soviet-American agreement on intermediate nuclear forces and is following its implementation closely, wants an early conclusion to the START negotiations, because there is no question of arms control talks being confined to Europe alone.

It also wants substantial progress to be made toward an accord on chemical weapons. Out of a desire not to hinder this, my country has relinquished its demand that countries currently without chemical weapons be allowed to maintain a safety stockpile for the interim period pending the destruction of existing stockpiles.

On 28 September 1988, speaking from the UN rostrum, the president appealed for an immediate ban on not only the use, but also the manufacture, of chemical weapons. This is the objective of the Geneva conference.

The recent Paris Conference provided an opportunity for the entire international community to reaffirm its unqualified condemnation of chemical weapons and to advance the consensus on this point. It also imparted a new boost to the Geneva talks in connection with banning them. It is necessary now to concentrate on defining effective verification measures, without which the signing of a new convention would be illusory.

Furthermore, France, loyal to its steadfast position, is opposed to the deployment of weapons in space, and especially to the development of antisatellite weapons, in the belief that observation satellites can contribute to stability, particularly by facilitating the verification of disarmament accords.

With regard to Europe, the priority is conventional weapons. On 28 September last, speaking to the UN General Assembly, President Mitterrand defined France's priorities in this field: to reach a secure balance at a lower level of armaments, to avert surprise attacks and the waging of prolonged wars, and to achieve a situation in which all the armed forces in Europe adopt a defensive posture.

France welcomes the opening in Vienna of two sets of negotiations—on conventional weapons and on confidence-building measures. The latter must not be neglected, as they too often are in public discussions, because they are the political precondition for the achievement of further progress in disarmament. As for conventional disarmament, you know the position held by France, which believes it would be a mistake to separate this from the CSCE. Europe's security is not a matter for the blocs; it concerns all Europeans and is a global issue: disarmament and human rights, disarmament and economic relations are different aspects of the same thing. Only the establishment of lasting ties and a rapprochement of our world views can in time guarantee our security.

France intends to contribute actively to the pursuit of these objectives and has already exerted major influence on the package of Western measures submitted at the start of the Vienna Conference. Comparing these measures with those proposed by the Warsaw Pact, I was pleased to note that there seem to be grounds for serious negotiations with a view to significant reductions in current armament levels.

The unilateral measures announced by Mr Gorbachev to the United Nations last 7 December and later by other Warsaw Pact countries are unquestionably very encouraging steps in the right direction.

I also welcome Mr Gorbachev's acknowledgment of the existence of imbalances between East and West.

Last, I pay particular attention to the assertion by Mr Gorbachev and top Soviet military authorities of concepts of a defensive approach and reasonable sufficiency—concepts that have long dominated French strategic thinking.

Of course, we are very anxious that the unilateral reductions announced by Mr Gorbachev be put into effect.

For its part, France has already made unilateral reductions of its forces on several occasions. Following the war in Algeria it made major forces reductions broadly comparable to those now announced by the Warsaw Pact. Since the early eighties further substantial reductions have been made, affecting 40,000 men out of a total then close to 500,000.

France does not rule out in principle participating some day in arms control in the nuclear field. However, this mainly concerns the two superpowers, which possess excessively large arsenals 50 times greater than ours. Their massive reduction is a precondition for France's participation in nuclear disarmament.

The president has specified the conditions governing such participation: the reduction of the two superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals to a size similar to ours, that is, to a purely defensive level; a halt to the vicious circle of antimissile, antisatellite, and antisubmarine weapons; and, last, the elimination of conventional and chemical imbalances.

Disarmament is one of the great tasks of the end of this century, and we believe it contributes to the security and stability of our continent. For this is indeed what is at stake at the negotiations in which we are involved 43 years after Yalta.

Europe's Future

Security is not confined to either defense or disarmament. We must find the source of conflicts to extricate ourselves forever from the cycle of cold war alternating with detente that has dominated East-West relations for the past 4 decades.

As long as Europe remains divided, it will not know real peace. As President Mitterrand has said, the rapprochement of the two sides of Europe will be the major task of the end of this century and of the next century.

But this rapprochement can only be based on relations of confidence between states, made possible by a virtually universal sharing of the same values.

We hail the signs of the emergence of a "new thinking" in the USSR. I mentioned our positive assessment of the measures adopted in the disarmament field and our hopes for their implementation. I note with pleasure that the new approach to international conditions is not confined to disarmament. We hail the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Even though it is not enough to guarantee that unfortunate country peace and prosperity, it does end a situation that we deplored. We also welcome the evolution of the situation in southern Africa and of the part the Soviet Union plays there.

With regard to the situation in the Near East, our two countries have convergent stances on the convening of an international conference designed to guarantee every people the right to self-determination, security, and peace.

We welcome the establishment in Europe of EEC-CEMA relations on a new footing.

More generally, we approve of the emphasis placed on international cooperation and the idea of values shared by the whole of mankind. We see in this the promise of an abandonment of the concept of international relations that I mentioned earlier, whereby mankind's progress depends on the struggle between the blocs. We all know now, as Mikhail Gorbachev has said several times, that certain fundamental problems face all men, wherever they live, and can only be resolved through international cooperation that transcends political systems. I have in mind war, of course, but also water and air pollution and the underdevelopment of the Third World countries—a huge open area for cooperation between East and West in their mutual interest, partly with a view to averting the emergence of new hotbeds of tension difficult to control.

We must go still further. Each country must find its own path, its own model of development. This is true throughout the world, and especially on our own continent.

We know that the reconciliation of the whole of Europe can only happen gradually, through a process of rapprochement that must be handled responsibly. We know the tensions that could be created here in the USSR and throughout Europe by an approach designed to transform societies too fast, ignoring the specifics of their history. Europe has foundered on two occasions in this century. For its part, France takes account of the time factor in progress beyond the Europe of Yalta. It is the direction that counts, but Europe's history cannot stop at 1945.

We will build a common future if we succeed in sharing the same values.

The concept of the "common home" deserves attention. However, it will only take shape if we, on both sides, bring our conception of human and citizens' rights closer together.

The EEC is itself seeking a better defined social, cultural, and political identity. A dialogue with East Europe can contribute to this, as long as such a dialogue is sincere, balanced, and mutually respectful.

Much in this regard depends on you, because the Soviet Union is a very major power, and this makes it responsible for some very major duties. Among the West European nations, France pays particular attention to you on account both of historical memories and of a natural sympathy between our two peoples. While concerned about universal matters, it is also particularly committed to ensuring respect for its independence and freedom.

Let us be sure to respect our mutual options. Let us try steadily to improve our mutual acquaintance. Each people is entitled to security, but security entails more than just defense: It depends on confidence, which must be further developed.

Europe is enriched by its diversity. Let us make the Europe of tomorrow a balanced model of organization on a world scale—a pluralistic organization of nations which, as Jean Jaures rightly observed, is the basis of real internationalism.

Conclusion

I have spoken to you frankly, because my remarks are intended as a contribution to better mutual understanding. And we cannot hope to understand each other if we lack the courage to speak the language of truth.

I am pleased to have been able to speak in this lofty forum of Soviet military thinking with complete freedom, just as I could have done at the Paris Military Academy.

I am anxious to thank the Soviet authorities and, first and foremost, Defense Minister General Yazov, and you, too, for making me so welcome.

My visit not only marks the resumption of our military relations at the highest level—that of defense ministers—but will also permit the definition of a program of military exchanges, which I am sure will contribute to better mutual understanding.

I came to your country with a great deal of curiosity about and interest in the bold transformations you have undertaken in your country under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership. We are looking forward to his coming visit to Paris in July.

For my part, I hope to have helped you to better understand France and the fixed points of its policy, which is the result of both experience and foresight. My dearest wish is that our two countries can, despite their differences, develop a fruitful dialogue for the sake of peace throughout the world, and especially in Europe, where history and geography have allotted them major responsibilities.

Government Conducts Nuclear Test in S. Pacific

LD1106093789 Paris Domestic Service in French 0900 GMT 11 Jun 89

[Text] A sizeable French nuclear test in the South Pacific, according to New Zealand and Australian seismologists. It is believed to have taken place on Fangataufa Atoll. The director of the Welling Seismology center in New Zealand said the explosion was one of the most powerful ever recorded. The New Zealanders are talking of the strength of a 70 kiloton bomb.

UNITED KINGDOM

Howe Queried on NATO, 'Special Relationship'

PM1306140489 Paris LE FIGARO in French 12 Jun 89 p 3

[Interview with Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe by Charles Lambroschini—date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [LE FIGARO] There are also problems and disagreements within the Atlantic alliance. The recent NATO summit restored a consensus thanks to the proposals made by George Bush—a radical reduction in armaments. But when the U.S. President stopped in London at the end of his European tour, Mrs Thatcher's ill humor seemed to indicate that relations between Britain and the United States were no longer as special as they were in Ronald Reagan's day. It is as if Britain is now criticizing the United States for preferring Germany.

[Howe] The United States has friends and allies throughout Europe and in the whole free world. That pleases us. A good friendship has no reason to exclude other friendships. The U.S. President has shown himself to be as determined as we are to safeguard strong relations between our two countries. I think that our relations still have the qualities which make them unique. This is especially true of our heritage.

[LE FIGARO] Why did Mrs Thatcher change her mind about the short-range missiles at the NATO summit? Before that she had been even tougher than the Americans in demanding the modernization of its weapons and rejecting negotiations with the Soviets which Germany wanted. However, she now accepts the negotiations proposed by President Bush.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: There is no inconsistency in that. This outcome was the result of a very tough and very intelligent debate among the allies. The British position was very close to that of France and, of course, that of the United States. We are convinced that the defense of the Atlantic alliance and of Europe depends on a whole range of military means—conventional and nuclear—with short-range as well as strategic missiles in the nuclear sphere. The alliance has not changed its doctrine.

[LE FIGARO] During the press conference which followed the NATO summit, a journalist asked whether Britain was now prepared to make peace with Germany. The British answer was diplomatic. Does this mean that the question is still relevant?

[Howe] I think that question was intended as a joke. There is no reason to make peace because we maintain a constant dialogue with Germany, France, and with all our European partners. This dialogue enables us to assess the different shades of opinion on the future consequences of the changes taking place in the USSR.

[LE FIGARO] Is it not surprising that President Bush was able to calmly announce a forthcoming withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe without causing panic among his allies?

[Howe] The modest reduction proposed by President Bush comes at a good time because it is combined with a proposal for a much larger reduction in Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. We can therefore react positively because this offer for a reduction in U.S. troops is the key which will make it possible to have Soviet troops removed from East Europe.

[LE FIGARO] But are you not afraid that this might be the start of an irreversible trend toward U.S. withdrawal from Europe?

[Howe] I would be worried if there were really signs of such a trend. But this is not the case. Quite the reverse; President Bush reaffirmed in Brussels the U.S. pledge to safeguard Europe's security. This is the great difference between us and the Warsaw Pact whose members dream of the day when the Soviet troops turn their backs on them and leave. You would certainly not see a smile on the faces of the socialist bloc prime ministers if the Soviet Union told them at a Warsaw Pact meeting: "We intend to keep our boys on your territory."

[LE FIGARO] Is the Soviet Union still a threat?

[Howe] In the course of history, the USSR's attitude has been characterized by the desire for isolation, suspicion, and aggressiveness. It is therefore too soon to conclude that all that has changed. I think that President Gorbachev's efforts are sincere. That is the impression that I received from my talks with Eduard Shevardnadze, his foreign minister. They are people who are trying to end a foreign policy based on class struggle and replace it with a foreign policy aimed at making existence tolerable for all nations. But this is still rather experimental.

We must make every effort to fan the flame of freedom, to encourage the success of restructuring. And on this basis, we will adapt our own defense. But we must remain cautious. We cannot ignore History's lessons.

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