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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (CPA) AND THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION (CPR)

by

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June 1998

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This thesis analyzes the CPA and CPR development process. The modern military of today must engage in a complex game of mixing requirements, capabilities, mission identification, threat, and politics to field the world's premier military force. The introduction of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process improved the process of service requirements analysis. The Chairman combines these assessments and recommendations into the CPA and CPR.

Extensive research was conducted into the historical role of the Chairman relating to the requirements generation and resource allocation processes within the DoD. Numerous interviews of current Joint Staff and Navy Staff personnel familiar with the CPA and CPR were also conducted.

Findings show the CPA and CPR are closely held documents considered personal correspondence between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. This situation creates the potential to dramatically alter Service and Agency POM submissions.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (CPA) AND THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION (CPR)

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ABSTRACT

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 redefined the role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman). The Chairman now assumes many additional roles and responsibilities including the development of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget submission to the President. Two critical elements of this development are the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).

This thesis analyzes the CPA and CPR development process. The modern military of today must engage in a complex game of mixing requirements, capabilities, mission identification, threat, and politics to field the world's premier military force. The introduction of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process improved the process of service requirements analysis. The Chairman combines these assessments and recommendations into the CPA and CPR.

Extensive research was conducted into the historical role of the Chairman relating to the requirements generation and resource allocation processes within the DoD. Numerous interviews of current Joint Staff and Navy Staff personnel familiar with the CPA and CPR were also conducted.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACAT	Acquisition Category
ADM	Acquisition Decision Memorandum
AIS	Automated Information System
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASD(C3I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
BAQ	Basic Allowance for Quarters
BES	Budget Estimate Submission
CAE	Component Acquisition Executive
CD-ROM	Compact Disk - Read Only Memory
CG	Chairman's Guidance
CINC	Commander in Chief
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPR	Chairman's Program Recommendation
DAB	Defense Acquisition Board
DAMA	Demand Access Multiple Assigned
DoD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPRB	Defense Planning and Resources Board
DRB	Defense Resources Board
FBS	Federal Budget System
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GATM	Global Air Traffic Management
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GPS	Global Positioning System
IPL	Integrated Priority List
IPR	In-Process Review
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment
JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JPD	Joint Planning Document
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JRB	JROC Review Board
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSO	Joint Specialist Officer
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
JWCA	Joint Warfare Capability Assessment
KPP	Key Performance Parameters
LSA	Logistic Sustainability Analysis
MAA	Mission Area Analysis
MAIS	Major Automated Information System
MAISRC	Major Automated Information Systems Review Council
MBI	Major Budget Issue
MDA	Milestone Decision Authority
MDAP	Major Defense Acquisition Program
MFP	Major Force Program
MNS	Mission Needs Statement
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
NCA	National Command Authority
NMS	National Military Strategy
NMSD	National Military Strategy Document
NSC	National Security Council
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPLAN	Operations Plan
ORD	Operational Requirements Document
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PB	President's Budget
PBD	Program Budget Decision
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PLSR	Precision Landing System Receiver
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RGS	Requirements Generation System
SAP	System Acquisition Process

TAMD	Theater Air & Missile Defense
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
USC	United States Code
USD(A&T)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VCJCS	Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
VHA	Variable Housing Allowance

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This thesis analyses the processes associated with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman) Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) within the resource allocation process of the Department of Defense (DoD). CDR Gabriel R. Salazar, USN published his thesis in June 1996 entitled *An Analysis Of The Role Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff In The Requirements Generation And Resource Allocation Process Within The Department Of Defense.* At that time, the issues surrounding the CPA and CPR were new and not completely evaluated. CDR Salazar recommended investigating the effects of the CPA and CPR on the resource allocation process within the DoD. Prior to such an investigation, a thorough understanding of the development of the CPA and CPR is necessary.

This thesis summarizes the historical methodology relating to the resource allocation process of the DoD focusing on the role of the Chairman in that process. The intricacies of the formulation of the CPA and CPR are also addressed.

B. BACKGROUND

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 redefined the role of the Chairman. The Chairman now assumes many additional roles and responsibilities, principally as the primary military advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA).

The Chairman also assumes a major role in the development of the DoD budget submission to the President. Two critical elements of this development are the CPA and the CPR.

The role of the services with respect to the resource allocation process is well documented. The modern military of today must engage in a complex game of mixing requirements, capabilities, mission identification, threat, and politics to field the world's premier military force. This force must be able to respond to threats to the national interests of the U.S. as deemed necessary by the NCA. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the emergence of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB) has seen an increased scrutiny in the distribution of resources to the services. The introduction of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process improved the methodology and recommendations into the CPA and CPR.

Not only do the CPA and CPR help form the foundation for the DoD budget submission but they also form the basis for resource allocation. The effects of resource allocation on the individual Services and Agencies cannot be overlooked.

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The research methodology utilized in this thesis included a detailed analysis of books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, applicable directives and publications, current Title 10 U.S. Code, position papers, policy papers, Flag briefings, and other pertinent information resources. The majority of current information pertaining to the

requirements generation process, resource allocation process, and the CPA and CPR was primarily gained from numerous interviews of Joint Staff and Navy Staff personnel relating to the impacts of the CPA and CPR on the above mentioned processes.

D. SCOPE LIMITATIONS

The scope includes an analysis of the role of the Chairman in the requirements generation and resource allocation processes. This thesis focuses on the formulation of the CPA and CPR on these processes. This thesis does not address the development of individual service programs or budgets.

E. THESIS OUTLINE

This study provides background information on the requirements generation and resource allocation processes with respect to the Chairman. An analysis of the current process was conducted. That analysis is followed by a description of the formulation of the CPA and CPR followed by conclusions and recommendations.

The next chapter provides some background information on the requirements generation and resource allocation processes. Special emphasis is placed on the role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in this process.

II. BACKGROUND ON REQUIREMENTS GENERATION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITH RESPECT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

It comes as no surprise that the current budget environment for the Department of Defense (DoD) gives rise to such phrases as "hollow force" and "doing more with less." DoD resources are scarce and are becoming increasingly scarce as time goes on. The demise of the former Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a systematic downsizing of the DoD. Fortunately, the DoD has been able to adjust to the current budget environment. As CDR Gabriel Salazar, USN correctly stated in his thesis *An Analysis Of The Role Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff In The Requirements Generation And Resource Allocation Process Within The Department Of Defense*, June 1996:

> The Department of Defense has adapted its resource allocation process to this post Cold War era through a refinement of the Planning, Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) first introduced over three decades ago. With these austere DoD budgets, what was once a "free for all" competition between the individual services for defense dollars, with each service intent on maximizing its spending authority and weapons system acquisitions, is now becoming a focused, single voice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regards to procurement decisions. [Ref. 1, p. 6]

Title 10, U.S. Code, directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman) to advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans (section 153(a)(3)(c)). The statute further requires the Chairman to establish, after consultation with the combatant commands, a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out assigned missions (section 153(a)(3)(d)), and a uniform system for reporting readiness of the combat support agencies to perform with respect to war or threat to national security (section 193(c)). [Ref. 2, p. VII-1] This chapter will

provide relevant background information relating to the role of the Chairman in the requirements generation and resource allocation processes.

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The end of World War II brought about numerous changes within the DoD. The United States was now a major player in worldwide security. In a message to the Congress on December 19, 1945, President Truman stated:

> Whether we like it or not, we must all recognize that the victory which we have won has placed upon the American people the continuing burden or responsibility for world leadership. The future peace of the world will depend in large part upon whether or not the United States shows that it is really determined to continue in its role as a leader among nations. It will depend upon whether or not the United States is willing to maintain the physical strength necessary to act as a safeguard against any future aggressor. Together with the other United Nations, we must be willing to make sacrifices necessary to protect the world from future aggressive warfare. In short, we must be prepared to maintain in constant and immediate readiness sufficient military strength to convince any future potential aggressor that this nation, in its determination for a lasting peace, means business. [Ref. 3, p. 9]

The innovations in warfare achieved by all branches of the armed forces in World War II allowed the birth of modern warfare and modern weapons systems. Although the world had changed, the Constitution of the United States did not. Services continued to receive funding based upon individual requirements without regard for commonality and redundancy.

Again, President Truman noted:

> Instances of duplication among Army and Navy activities and facilities have been brought to the attention of the Congress on many occasions. The degree of unity that was accomplished during the war in strategic planning and in theater command is in striking contrast with the separatism that prevailed in the whole range of supply and service functions. It will never be possible to achieve absolute coordination of the supply and service functions of all services. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department has been able to eliminate all duplication even within its own organization. But these is no question that the extent of waste through lack of coordination between the two Departments is very much greater than the waste resulting from faulty coordination within each. If we can attain as much coordination among all the services as now exists within each department, we shall realize extensive savings. [Ref. 3, pp. 11-12]

The President was not happy with the current status of the military primarily because the Services by and large did not work well together as a cohesive force. During the Korean War era, it was evident that combined arms, i.e. the simultaneous use of land, sea, and air assets, were the way of the future. [Ref. 3, p. 10] Ultimately, there was a call for total service unification.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first attempt to get a handle on the post-World War II military and to form a force that would meet the current and future national security requirements of the United States. The purpose of the Act was to establish a structure to formulate national security policy for the United States Government. [Ref. 3, Preface, p. 4] The Services continued to submit their budget requests directly to Congress with minimal guidance or coordination from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). By and large the Services stayed within their stated roles and missions. Minimal, if any, coordination to address acquisition redundancy was conducted. [Ref. 4, p. 17]

It quickly became apparent that this structure, based upon the National Security Act of 1947, was not the way to go. Fifteen months after the National Security Act of 1947 was signed into law, then Secretary of Defense James Forrestal noted that there was still much work to be done.

> As already indicated, the act has been in effect only a little more than a year, and this first period of operation under a statute as far-reaching as the National Security Act cannot be regarded as typical of the years that are to follow. Nevertheless, based on the heavy workload of problems which have required attention and which will be described in greater detail later in this report, and based also on our general experience to date, it is my feeling that the statutory changes suggested herewith deserve serious consideration. [Ref. 3, p. 64]

Secretary Forrestal concluded his report by calling for the creation of a position to lead the Joint Chiefs and provide a focus for the civilian control of the military.

> In short, the Act fails to provide for a fully responsible official with authority adequate to meet his responsibility, whom the President and the Congress can hold accountable. The Act fails to provide the basis for an organization and a staff adequate to achieve the most efficient and economical defense program and to attain effective and informed civilian control. [Ref. 3, p. 79]

As a result of Secretary Forrestal's comments, the Act was amended in 1949. A key element of this amendment was the designation of the Chairman. Secretary Forrestal's recommendations regarding the Chairman included:

> The provisions of the act which deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be changed in the following respects; (a) The provision of the act which names the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be deleted. (b) Provision should be made for the designation of a responsible head for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (In my opinion, this official should either be designated from among the three remaining members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or, in the alternative, should be designated as a fourth person. In either event, he should be the person to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense look to see to it that matters with which the Joint Chiefs should deal are handled in a

> way that will provide the best military staff assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense.) [Ref. 3, pp. 64-65]. . .Finally, I recommend that the Congress provide for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to take precedence over all other military personnel, and to be the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and to perform such other duties as they may prescribe. [Ref. 3, p. 80]

Section 211 of the amended act designated the Chairman as the representative of the corporate Joint Chiefs and outlined his duties and responsibilities. [Ref. 3, pp. 94-95] The seeds were sown to migrate towards an increasingly joint posture within the DoD. Ultimately, the National Security Act of 1947 (amended) led to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 commonly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

B. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

The period of time between the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed an ever-increasing cry to once again reform the DoD. Numerous studies[1] were conducted to determine the problems and solutions relating to the DoD. These studies highlighted two major problem areas. First, the corporate JCS cold not provide useful and timely military advice. Second, unified Command-in-Chiefs (CINCs) lacked the necessary authority and influence to effectively carry out their missions. [Ref. 5, p. 10] These studies convinced

[1] Some recent studies are the 1982 JCS Chairman's Special Study Group report, The Organization and Functions of the JCS; the 1983 book by Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization; the 1985 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Toward a More Effective Defense; the 1985 Senate Committee on Armed Services study, Defense Organization: The Need for Change; the 1985 House Committee on Armed Services report, JCS Reorganization Act of 1985; the 1986 House Committee on Armed Services report, Bill Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986; and the 1986 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management report, A Quest for Excellence [Ref. 5, p. 10, Footnote 2].

the Congress that reform was required. Douglas C. Lovelace noted in his book, *UNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES: Implementing The 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*: "The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of the U.S. armed forces. Congress believed the problems derived from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the CJCS, the CINCs, and the Service components, and the Service Chiefs." [Ref. 6, p. 15] Recommendations typically mirrored service "party lines" without regard to the best combination of assets to employ. In his testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger concluded:

> The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice...[T]he recommendations...must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interest of each...service...[N]o service ox may be gored...
>
> The unavoidable outcome is...log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like...The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. [Ref. 6, p. 21]

Military operations in the 1980s such as EAGLE CLAW (the abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt) and URGENT FURY (the invasion of Grenada) reinforced the views of such reform minded critics, especially within the Congress. Consequently, the efforts of these critics, and associated analysis of the DoD, resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This Act is the first serious change in the DoD since the National Security Act of 1947. [Ref. 1, p. 13]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act drastically altered the formulation of U.S. defense policy. The role of the corporate JCS and its respective responsibilities in the resource allocation process also changed. These changes include:

- Designation of the Chairman, vice the corporate JCS, as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor, and the Secretary of Defense.

- Assumption by the Chairman of additional responsibilities in assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in developing the strategic vision of the armed forces, strategic and conventional net assessments, contingency plans, doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces, and advising the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs and budgets.

- Creation of the position of Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). The VCJCS primarily assists the Chairman and acts for the Chairman in his absence. The Vice-Chairman is subordinate only to the Chairman and participates in all JCS meetings but only votes when acting for the Chairman.

- Removal of the 400-officer limitation on the Joint Staff and placing it under the direction of the Chairman vice the corporate JCS.

- Strengthening of the role of the unified commanders (unified CINCs) at the expense of their component commanders (service CINCs). This resulted in component commanders now having to support their service sponsors as well as their unified commanders especially regarding resource allocation issues. The Chairman was now designated as the spokesman for unified commanders regarding the distribution of resources. [Ref. 7, p. 59, pp. 62-64]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was bitterly opposed by ALL military services. Each Service alleged they would lose their autonomy and their "one-on-one" relationship with the Congress. The Services alleged this Act would result in unnecessary oversight of virtually every aspect of their operations. This oversight was felt to be excessive and stifling. Also, the role of the CJCS was seen as too powerful. [Ref. 6, p. 57] Changes in officer education and career paths were also a major issue with this Act. The requirements for Joint Professional Military Education and subsequent designation as a

Joint Specialist Officer were seen as detrimental to the proper career progression of a typical warrior. [Ref. 6, pp. 54-56] Douglas Lovelace noted:

> Two services have failed to meet the act's prescribed minimum joint tour lengths for flag officers. Additionally, all of the services, on occasion, have failed to meet the joint officer promotion requirements of the GNA [Goldwater-Nichols Act]. There is evidence that the joint education and assignment requirements of the GNA may, in fact, inhibit an officer's potential for promotion to flag rank....Service parochialism has been significantly mitigated but still exists. An admiral assigned to the Joint Staff summed-up the current situation when he said, 'I may wear a purple suit, but it is still double-breasted.' [Ref. 6, p. 60]

The Chairman was now a major player in the resource allocation and requirements generation processes. Also, the influence of the JCS expanded into all phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to effect better decisions relating to resource allocations. The Chairman's role in PPBS is well documented in CDR Salazar's thesis. As previously stated, this thesis will address the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) within the PPBS.

C. CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM ASSESSMENT AND THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION

The results of the Joint Warfare Capability Assessment (JWCA) analyses and their review by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) are inputs to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). Through the CPR, the Chairman provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the annual Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG provides programming guidance to the Services. Through the CPA, the Chairman

provides and assessment of Service programs to the Secretary of Defense. This assessment helps ensure that Service programs adequately address joint warfighting requirements. [Ref. 8, pp. 24-25]

1. Chairman's Program Assessment

The CPA was designed to meet the responsibility assigned the Chairman in the Goldwater-Nichols Act to advise the Secretary of Defense on the prioritization of requirements. It is the primary document that influences the Programming and Budgeting phases of the PPBS within the DoD. [Ref. 9, p. 10] The CPA is developed during the Program Review Cycle of the Programming phase and comprises an assessment of Service Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). The CPA is a major tool utilized to assist the Secretary of Defense in decisions relating to the DoD budget submission. [Ref. 10, p. 49]

The CPA assists the Chairman in fulfilling his statutory duty to do the following:

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the DoD conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and support the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders;

- Submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance furnished by the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with established priorities; and

- Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces, in the area of manpower, conform to strategic plans.

    (a) The CPA assesses how well strategic guidance and the POMs submitted by the military departments, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and defense agencies conform to national military defense priorities and strategic guidance. When appropriate, it may contain alternative

recommendations and proposals to improve conformance with strategic guidance or the priorities established for the requirements of the CINCs.

(b) CPA development is an iterative process that begins before the POMs are published and ends when critical issues are identified for inclusion in the CPA. Services, CINCs, defense agencies, and the Joint Staff are involved throughout the process. This coordination is essential to identify and properly develop specific issues appropriate for the Chairman to formally bring before the Secretary of Defense. Documents considered in CPA development include, but are not limited to, POM preparation instructions, OSD Fiscal Guidance, the DPG, the POMs themselves, the National Military Strategy, the Joint Planning Document, the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), the CINCs Integrated Priority Lists, the Combat Support Agency Responsiveness and Readiness Report, the Chairman's Preparedness Assessment Report, and the Logistics Sustainability Analysis. [Ref. 11, pp. 5-11 – 5-13]

The CPA is where the Chairman assesses the Services' and Agencies' programs for compliance with the CPR.

2. Chairman's Program Recommendation

The CPR was initially submitted in February 1995. In addition to the CPA, the CPR has become the other significant output of the new JROC process. The CPR was designed to inform the Secretary of Defense and the military Services what the Chairman's desires are regarding the Services' POMs. [Ref. 9, p. 16] The CPR establishes the Chairman's measures of effectiveness for assessing Service program efficiency.

The Services receive the information in the CPR and are fully aware of the Chairman's desires relating to their POMs. The CPR has become a critical document for the services to consider as they prepare their programs. It is a strong indication of what will appear in the CPA. The Services are also aware that issues in the CPR, not

adequately addressed in their POMs, have the potential of being raised as alternative program recommendations in the Programming phase of the PPBS. [Ref. 9, pp. 16-17]

The CPR has evolved to become the primary document influencing the force structure depicted in the DPG. The DPG provides the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance and fiscal constraints for the military departments to use in their POM development. It provides the link between the Planning and Programming phases of PPBS. It is the result of a deliberate process that weighs desired military capabilities against fiscal realities. Figure 2-1 illustrates the PPBS cycle and where the CPA and CPR fit into that cycle.



Figure 2-1 [Adapted from Ref. 29, p. 14]

D. ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

As previously stated, the role of the Chairman was dramatically changed with the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Prior to 1986, the Chairman was forced to rely on individual service and DoD analysis as a basis for his force structure recommendations. The Joint Staff, by law, did not work for the Chairman but rather for the corporate JCS. Title II of the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the Chairman to be "responsible for advising on programs and budgets, reviewing combatant command organization, developing joint doctrine, evaluating preparedness, and performing net assessments." [Ref. 5, p. 2] Admiral William Owens, USN, the VCJCS, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 28, 1996:

> I think that the authors of Goldwater-Nichols had in mind that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should look not only at the new systems that are being bought but the entire range of system and concepts that make up our military capability and to provide recommendations in budget and program form to the Secretary of Defense for his decision. [Ref. 12, p. 5]

The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the Chairman to advise the Secretary of Defense on the following three critical areas relating to requirements generation and resource allocation issues:

- To assess and comment on military requirements and affordability issues for acquisition programs of the Services within the framework of the entire DoD budget.
- To assess requirements prioritization among the Services and DoD agencies and to reflect these priorities in his assessment of the individual Service's budgets.
- To submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals when warranted. [Ref. 10, p. 21]

The additional responsibility to review DoD budgets in order to assess their conformance with established strategic plans and unified commanders' warfighting requirements placed the Chairman at the center of resource allocation issues.

The Chairman is also charged with recommending specific capabilities and acquisition of weapons systems across Service and Agency lines to effect a force structure that can execute the President's National Security Strategy. Working with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman has become the primary player in shaping the nation's military force structure. [Ref. 6, pp. 40-52]

1. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)

The primary process the Chairman utilizes to shape the structure of the United States military is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Developed by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s, PPBS was first introduced to the DoD by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1962. PPBS is a process that attempts to improve decision-making regarding the allocation of resource among numerous programs, initiatives, and alternatives in orders to accomplish specific national defense objectives. PPBS attempts to tie national strategy goals to specific programs and ultimately to an executable budget. [Ref. 4, pp. 1-26]

Lieutenant Thomas A. Simcik, USN, in his thesis *Reengineering The Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) Process*, December 1996, expertly summarized the PPBS process:

> PPBS focuses on objectives and requirements, and what is necessary to meet them. PPBS, in concept, is a simple process. Based on the anticipated **threat** to national security objectives, a **strategy** is developed. **Requirements** to execute the strategy are then estimated and **programs** are developed consistent with the strategy. Finally, the costs of the

approved programs are **budgeted**. [Ref. 6, p. C-2][2] **Figure (2)** illustrated PPBS in a linear format.



Figure (2) Basic PPBS Process [After Ref 6]

Although there have been many changes to the PPBS structure over the years, the basic tenets of the system have remained: three interrelated but separate phases; program and budget guidance to the military services from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF); and, the use of quantitative analysis to choose among competing programs.

The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) coordinates planning efforts for national security for both the civilian and military parts of the organization. PPBS translates force requirements developed by the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) into programs which generate budgetary requirements which are then presented to Congress as part of the President's budget.

The PPBS process operates year-round with each of three components of the procedures (planning, programming, and budgeting) working on various phases of the cycle. In reality, PPBS is not a linear process but an iterative, overlapping mechanism of assessment, review and decision all focused on one objective: to provide the operational commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable with fiscal constraints. [Ref. 13, pp. 7-8]

2. Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

The Joint Capability Assessments Process is a relatively new procedure by which the Chairman influences the Planning phase of the PPBS. The JROC was established in its present form in 1987, as the military oversight body that assesses potential military requirements and determines which major weapons systems will enter the procurement process. The JROC was the mechanism intended to improve the link between the PPBS and the DoD acquisition process. Although the JROC was an excellent forum to address

[2] Ref 6 is "U.S. Department of Defense, Practical Comptrollership Manual, Monterey, CA., March 1996."

procurement and acquisition issues, it was not until the JWCA process was introduced that the role of the Chairman truly changed. The JWCA process was instituted in 1994 to provide the analytical basis by which assessments on future joint warfare capabilities were made. [Ref. 9, pp. 9-11]

The JWCA and the JROC processes provide the JCS with the analytical foundation to assess future military capabilities and the forum to review these assessments. These processes ultimately assist the Chairman in prioritizing requirements that address desired capabilities.

The Chairman also participates in major budget issue meetings to resolve significant resource allocation issues brought up by the Services in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Defense Planning Resources Board. Since these issues are of such a vital importance to the Services, they are typically resolved in consultation with the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense.

When the President's Budget is finally submitted to Congress, the Chairman prepares a Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). This document provides an assessment of the force structure supported by the President's Budget and its affect on the national military strategy. It also services as a basis for the CPR for the following POM cycle budget by addressing required capabilities not funded in previous budgets. [Ref. 10, p. 53]

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In summary, the influence of the Chairman on the Planning phase of the PPBS has increased significantly as a result of JWCA and JROC deliberations, resulting in the development of the CPR. The CPR has become a dominant influence on the DPG, the end product of the Planning phase of the PPBS. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 significantly changed the role of the Chairman in the requirements generation and resource allocation processes within the DoD. The analytical foundation for the CPA and CPR resides in the Joint Capability Assessment Process within the JCS. The JWCA process provides the basis for which the JROC makes resource allocation recommendations. The next chapter will address the requirements generation and resource allocation process. In particular, the role of the Joint Staff, sources of input, requirement evaluations, and process results will be examined.

III. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION SYSTEM PROCESS

Much has been written about the requirements generation process for the DoD. Numerous texts and instructions, both directly and indirectly, address these processes. *Blunting The Sword*, by Dennis S. Ippolito provides excellent background material framing this process within the overall defense budget process and the respective politics behind the processes. *Modernization In Lean Times: Modifications And Upgrades*, by LTC Thomas R. Evans, USA, CDR Kathleen M. Lyman, USN, and LTCOL Michael S. Ennis, USAF provides a focus on this process relating to modifying and upgrading major weapons systems. *The Defense Resource Allocation Process*, by CDR William C. Keller, USN is virtually required reading for all naval officers assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations staff. Furthermore, numerous Secretary of Defense, CJCS, and Service instructions refer to these processes. It is these instructions that are the most pertinent for this thesis.

CDR Keller states, "The [Requirements Generation System] RGS is the process the military uses to identify current and future mission needs to fill a capability deficiency or exploit a technological opportunity." [Ref. 14, p. V-17] Regardless of the Service or Defense Agency in question, maximum capability at the lowest possible cost is the mantra for the DoD. This is becoming increasingly difficult considering that our force structure and budgets have decreased approximately 33% since 1985 including a 65% reduction in procurement. The DoD must now find new ways to maximize each dollar allocated to it. [Ref. 15, p. 1-1] The RGS seeks to accomplish this goal. Former CJCS General John Shalikashvili, USA, commented in the Autumn/Winter 1994-1995

edition of *Joint Forces Quarterly* (pages 4-8) "Today, those of us who serve in the Armed Forces are caught up in the coincidence of three revolutions...the end of the Cold-War...defense budgets are declining along with military resources...the military technical revolution..." General Shalikashvili concludes that the loss of our primary threat (the former Soviet Union) combined with decreasing budgets for the foreseeable future and an ever increasing technological battlefield will require drastic changes in the way DoD does business. [Ref. 15, p. 2-2] Consequently requirements generation takes on an ever-increasing joint perspective and therefore must be subject to joint as well as individual Service requirements. The RGS produces the necessary information for decision-makers to evaluate Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAISs) with missions requiring an interface to the warfighter. [Ref. 16, p. 4]

The RGS is a methodical process that starts with an idea identified as a possible requirement. The VCJCS has the responsibility of oversight of the RGS and is assisted by the JROC and the Joint Staff. [Ref. 14, p. V-17] Requirements are generated from a variety of sources, however, most are derived from the Secretary of Defense, CJCS, a CINC, a Service, or the JROC itself. Figure 3-1, discussed below, provides an excellent flowchart of the RGS.



Figure 3-1 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. V-18]

Once the need is identified, a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) is conducted by the DoD component that identified the requirement. The MAA considers such topics as threat, policy, available technology, the current budget environment, capability, defense strategy, and doctrine. This analysis determines whether the need is derived from a technological opportunity or a deficiency in current military posture. Once the need is identified, a solution is determined that is either material, i.e. a new weapons system, or non-material, i.e. changes in doctrine or tactics. [Ref. 16, p. 3] If the solution is material, a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) is required. [Ref. 14, p. V-17]

The MNS is drafted by the component organization and is coordinated through all CINCs, Services, and Defense Agencies affected by the MNS. Part of this coordination is to determine the Acquisition Category (ACAT) of the requirement. A description of ACAT classifications is provided in the Appendix. The evaluation of the NMS determines if the MDAP fits ACAT I or less than ACAT I criteria. If the MNS is deemed

to be less than an ACAT I program, the Service Secretary or delegated Acquisition Executive validates the MNS. [Ref. 14, p. V-17] If the MNS is an ACAT I program, the JROC will conduct a review of the MNS, validate it, and establish the joint potential of the MNS. [Ref. 16, p. 3] As long as the MNS receives approval throughout the RGS, it will ultimately be incorporated into the lead Service's POM.

A. JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (JROC)/JOINT WARFARE CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT (JWCA)

Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 181, established and empowered the JROC as an advisory council to the CJCS. [Ref. 17, p. 1] Figure 3-2 illustrates the JROC/JWCA



Figure 3-2 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 21]

organization. For all intents and purposes the JROC is the pinnacle of the requirements generation process. The JROC is comprised of four-star representation from each of the Services. Although the CJCS officially chairs the Council, this duty has been delegated to the VCJCS. [Ref. 18, p. 2] Figure 3-3 illustrates the composition of the JROC.



Figure 3-3 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 4]

While functioning in its advisory position to the CJCS, the following initiatives were enacted to formalize the role of the JROC:

- The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to advise the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on the priorities of military requirements.

- In 1994, General Shalikashvili directed expansion of the JROC charter to more fully support statutory responsibilities. The JROC accordingly established its Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, including increased involvement by CINCs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

- The JROC's mission was codified in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act, effective January 31, 1997.

- As the CINCs' spokesman, the Chairman approaches the assessment of military needs from a joint warfighting perspective to ensure interoperability and identify opportunities for joint or multi-Service applications.
- The JROC/JWCA process is the Chairman's primary vehicle for obtaining a capabilities-based assessment of broad mission areas across Service lines. [Ref. 18, p. 1]

In essence, the JROC functions as the lynchpin for the entire JWCA process. This body is the central focal point and, as such, yields a great deal of influence with the Chairman. They become the "honest brokers" for the Chairman by rigorously examining all aspects of every proposal thereby aligning mission needs with operational requirements and performance criteria. Perhaps the most important task of the JROC is to assure the approved requirements not only meet the needs of the warfighters but also allow the acquisition community enough "trade-space" (flexibility) to negotiate the best possible contracts to fill the stated and approved requirements. Ultimately, the JROC must be the focal point, or primary link, between the CINCs and Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The role of the JROC is summarized in Figure 3-4.

JROC ROLE

- **Direct the Joint Warfighting Assessment Process**
- **Tie Acquisition/requirements process to the warfighter**
- **Challenge and validate key requirements**
  - **Mission Needs Statements (MNS), Operational Requirements Documents (ORD), Key Performance Parameters (KPP)**
- **Requirements written in warfighter terms to allow trade-space for acquisition community**
- **Be THE link with Services, CINCs and OSD**

Figure 3-4 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 5]

The JROC Review Board (JRB) provides assistance to the JROC in the requirements generation process. The JRB assists the JROC by:

1. Overseeing the requirements generation process by reviewing major defense acquisition program requirements and performance parameters, thereby ensuring programs are affordable and achievable.

2. Providing a focus for the JROC assessments by shaping and directing the JWCA process through initial reviews of JWCA insights, findings and recommendations and providing appropriate guidance, suggestions, and direction prior to the final JROC review.

3. Nominating topics for JRB/JROC consideration and advising the JROC Chairman on issues requiring Council review.

4. Interfacing with the CINCs staffs on capability issues to ensure that the assessment process incorporates the joint requirements of the various CINC areas of responsibility (AORs). [Ref. 19, p. 6]

The JRB is chaired by the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8) and is comprised of two-star representation from each Service. Figure 3-5 provides an illustration of the composition of the JRB.



Figure 3-5 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 6]

Again, much like the JROC, the JRB functions to provide the best possible systems to the warfighting community. Although the JRB is far more parochial from a service perspective than the JROC, it does perform a critical function in the JWCA process. Without the JRB, the JROC would never be able to wade through the myriad of proposals for joint systems and capabilities. Consequently, the JRB screens the proposals and only those that prove to have exceptional merit are passed along to the JROC. The role of the JRB is summarized in Figure 3-6.

JRB ROLE

- **Shapes and directs JROC's Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process**
- **Reviews major defense acquisition programs requirements and performance parameters**
- **Ensure programs are affordable and achievable**
- **Interfaces with CINC staffs on capabilities issues**

Figure 3-6 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 7]

Part of the JROC charter is to "...review all (ACAT I, or potential ACAT I) Mission Needs Statements (MNSs) and review major programs prior to acquisition milestone decisions." [Ref. 15, p. 2-4] In order to perform their functions more effectively, the JROC devised a process within the RGS that sought to:

- Decrease service rivalries.
- Eliminate duplication of effort and/or redundant systems.
- Achieve the best requirements to meet current and future threats. [Ref. 15, p. 2-5]

This process is known as the Joint Warfare Capability Assessment (JWCA) process.

The JWCA process is governed by CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01. It assists the CJCS in his statutory duty under Title 10 U.S. Code to provide the Secretary of Defense assessments of the DoD. [Ref. 19, pp. 1-2] By definition, the JWCAs "...are continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Agencies, and others as required." [Ref. 19, p. 4] The role of the JWCA is summarized in Figure 3-7.

JWCA ROLE

- **Assess joint military capability areas**
- **Identify opportunities to improve warfighting effectiveness**
- **Analyze critical deficiencies and strengths in joint warfighting capabilities**
- **Provide insight into issues of requirements, readiness and support**

Figure 3-7 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 9]

Although all of the points illustrated in Figure 3-7 are important, perhaps the most critical aspect of the JWCA is the ability to thoroughly analyze a program or project from a wide variety of disciplines, thereby allowing an honest evaluation. All of the Services and Agencies participate in the JWCA as well as each JWCA team sponsored by a Joint Staff Directorate. In one way, shape, or form, the JWCA can provide the necessary analysis to make an informed decision for the right reasons.

A Director in the Joint Staff sponsors each JWCA team. JWCA teams perform various functions for the JROC that include:

- Identifying deficiencies and strengths in joint capabilities.
- Providing the JROC with assessment results and recommendations to satisfy warfighting requirements and operational efficiencies.
- Establishing JWCA teams to conduct assessments. [Ref. 18, pp. 2-3]

Ultimately these assessments provide the critical cornerstone for the development of both the CPA and the CPR. Without these assessments, the Chairman would have an extremely difficult time justifying his assessment and recommendations in the CPA and CPR.

There are twelve JWCA domains as depicted in Figure 3-8. (This figure is known throughout the Joint Staff as the "galactic radiator.") [Ref. 20, p. 8] Although complex in appearance, this matrix demonstrates the interactivity of the JWCA process. For



Figure 3-8 [Adapted from Ref. 20, p. 8]

example, the Director for Command, Control, Communications, & Computer Systems (J6) sponsors the Command and Control JWCA team. Specific members of the Joint Staff, the Services, OSD, the CINCs, DoD Agencies, and other necessary parties form this JWCA. Unless the CINC has a specific interest in the JWCA issue, a common block approach is usually utilized. In other words, the interested CINC will vote for the other CINCs or function as the coordinator amongst all CINCs and voice all opinions for the remaining CINCs. If no CINC has a direct interest with the JWCA, the Joint Staff functions as the CINC liaison for that JWCA. All issues relating to Command and

Control are analyzed by this JWCA. Consequently, any issues relating to Command and Control that are raised to the JROC are referred to this JWCA for analysis. Figure 3-9 outlines the Joint Staff Directors who function as sponsors in the JWCA process.



Figure 3-9 [Adapted from Ref. 11, p. 2-18]

The JWCA process is an annual cycle of events that helps frame the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). Figure 3-10 summarizes this the JWCA assessment cycle. [Ref. 24, p. 56]



Figure 3-10 [Adapted from Ref. 24, p. 56]

Pages B-2 through B-6 of Reference 19 provide an excellent synopsis of the JWCA process. The process commences after the issuance of the DPG in the September timeframe. This commencement is marked by briefings on issues relating to deficiencies in joint military capabilities. These briefings are known as contract briefs. Issues are derived from various sources including:

- CJCS
  - National Military Strategy (NMS)
  - Joint Vision 2010
  - Previous CPA/CPR
- JROC/JRB
- CINCs
  - IPLs
  - Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR)
- Military Departments (e.g. Navy) [Ref 19, p. B-2]

Contract briefs are then addressed by one of the twelve JWCA teams as illustrated in Figure 3-9. The JWCA teams evaluate the contract brief focusing on the relationships and interactions with respect to joint warfighting. [Ref. 19, p. 2] Upon completion of their evaluation, the JWCA team will brief their findings and recommendations initially to the JRB, during the first In-Process Review (IPR), then to the full JROC for approval. (See Figure 3-11) [Ref. 19, p. B-2]



Figure 3-11 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-21]

After the JROC has approved the contract brief for consideration, the JRB conducts a trip to each CINC. The purpose of this trip is to brief the CINC's staff on the status of various JWCA issues and to obtain their inputs to these issues. [Ref. 19, p. B-3] Although the JRB is a joint body, Service sentiments on these issues are a bit more parochial at this level and are therefore the subjects of extensive debate. To more effectively pursue a common position on the JWCA issue, upon return from this trip, the JRB divorces itself from the confines of the Pentagon and conducts an offsite conference to discuss which JWCA topics will be presented to the JROC and makes its recommendations for inclusion into the CPR. [Ref. 19, p. B-3]

Upon receipt of the JRB recommendations, the JROC conducts an offsite conference to review these recommendations and resolve any contentious issues from the JRB. The JROC then visits the CINCs and briefs them on the status of critical JWCA issues and obtains their final input to the CPR. [Ref. 19, p. B-3] The major difference between these conferences and visits is that the JRB is a two-star and below body while the JROC is a four-star body. The CPR is produced as a result of these visits and briefs. As depicted below in Figure 3-12, the CPR serves as a major input into the Secretary of Defense's DPG. [Ref. 19, p. B-3]

Detailed JWCA Cycle



Figure 3-12 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-3]

Production of the CPR marks the halfway point of the JWCA cycle. Because of the dynamic nature of the strategic environment of the DoD, a Midterm JWCA Contract Brief allows the CINCs, Services, and Agencies to submit new issues to the JWCA process. Normally, these issues are critical in nature and cannot wait until the start of the next JWCA cycle. [Ref. 19, p. B-4]

A second set of JWCA assessments is performed on the original contract brief issues. The JRB conducts another IPR to evaluate these assessments and considers the new contract briefs submitted midterm. About this time, the Services have completed and submitted their POMs. (See Figure 3-13)



Figure 3-13 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-4]

JWCA teams now compare the Services POMs with the CINCs requirements and the submitted CPR. This comparison serves as an input to the CPA, which in turn is a major input to the Secretary of Defense's Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). (See Figure 3-14) [Ref. 19, p. B-4]

Detailed JWCA Cycle



Figure 3-14 [Adapted from Ref. 19, p. B-4]

After completion of the second IPR, the JRB conducts a second trip to visit the CINCs staffs to:

- Provide feedback and status of JWCA topics going to the JROC.
- Update the status of midterm JWCA topics.
- Obtain input. [Ref. 19, p. B-5]

A second JRB offsite conference is held prior to the Chairman's submission of the CPA to the SECDEF to:

- Review the status of completed JWCA topics.
- Review the assessment of Service POMs.
- Provide additional guidance to JWCA teams for midterm issues.
- Identify critical issues to be presented to the JROC at their offsite conference. [Ref. 19, p. B-5]

The second JROC offsite conference provides decisions on relevant JWCA issues and decides which issues will be presented during the next JROC trip to the CINCs. These issues are then presented to the CINCs. The CINCs then provide their comments and

concerns regarding these issues to the JROC. Upon completion of the visit to the CINCs, the JROC provides its input to the CPA. The CPA is then finalized and submitted to the SECDEF as input to the PDM. [Ref. 19, p. B-5]

B. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Although the primary threat to the national interests of the United States is, for the most part, eliminated, the necessity for providing our armed forces with the best equipment possible is still a national priority. Without an effective requirements generation process, the ability to maintain our capability as the world's premier military force is greatly diminished. An integral component of requirements generation is the JWCA process and its interaction with the JROC and ultimately the CJCS and the NCA. The next chapter will address how the military transforms valid requirements from the requirements generation process into tangible resources in the resource allocation process.

IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS

The United States is embarking on an era where resource allocation decisions cannot be made with any degree of certainty. Decision-makers no longer know exactly what to expect. During the Cold War, decision-makers functioned in a bipolar world. Consequently, information relating to threats to our national security allowed easier prediction of requirements and therefore the decision-makers could allocate resources more effectively. The Cold War resource allocation process reflected a national policy to contain communism at any cost. Today, decision-makers must struggle with conditions of risk and uncertainty. [Ref. 22, p. 18] Lt. Col. William H. Jackson, USAF, in his research project *The Role Of The CINC In The Defense Resource Allocation Process*, stated: "The defense resource allocation process involves many factors including the federal budget, weapons system acquisition, joint federal budget, joint planning, and domestic political issues." [Ref. 22, p. 3] It comes as no surprise that resource allocation is what the Services do 90% of the time. [Ref. 22, p. 36] If resources are not matched with rational plans and concepts, national objectives cannot be achieved.

The first step in this process is to identify our national policies and objectives and the threats associated with those policies and objectives. From these, a national security strategy is derived. CDR Keller expanded on this topic by stating: "While the defense resource allocation process looks primarily at acquiring and maintaining resource needed for effective execution of the military strategy, the process also supports various elements of the national political and economic strategies that are closely integrated with the military strategy." [Ref. 14, pp. I-2 – I-3]

The resource allocation process is driven by strategic decisions which answer questions such as how much, what kind, when, etc. These decisions answer many force planning issues relating to the national interests and objectives of the United States. However, it is crucial to remember that the resources available to the DoD are finite and must compete with other requirements within the federal government. In a nutshell, the Services must compete for very limited resources. Consequently, a continuous battle wages on whether to fund defense programs or other federal programs. The potential impact on the DoD is that the force structure needed to address all of our national interests and objectives will most likely never materialize. Politics is a game of compromise. Programming is where objectives are reconciled with available resources. [Ref. 14, p. I-3] A respectable programming effort must be completed to ensure that the DoD obtains the maximum amount of resources available. Once programs are approved, they receive a budget authority to obtain the resources allocated to them in order to perform their mission(s) in accordance with the developed military strategy. The end product of the resource allocation process determines what is dedicated to support nation interests. [Ref. 22, p. 2]

A common misconception is to equate the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the resource allocation process. Although the PPBS comprise a significant portion of the resource allocation process, it is not the process in its entirety. The PPBS is used to determine the resources necessary to combat the threat. [Ref. 22, p. 32] A clear concise national military strategy assists the DoD in determining the necessary resources via the PPBS.

The resource allocation process is actually comprised of four separate systems. These systems are the:

- Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
- Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
- Federal Budget System (FBS)
- Systems Acquisition Process (SAP) [Ref. 14, pp. I-3 – I-4]

Within each system, numerous personnel function to assure the process operates as designed. Some personnel have critical roles in all four of the systems noted above. Of particular note, the following personnel, and their associated functions, play extremely critical roles in the resource allocation process:

The President	
The National Security Council (NSC)	Strategy and policy guidance.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)	Develops fiscal constraints, collating data, and monitoring budget execution.
CJCS	Strategy force planning, mission definition, and program assessment.
CINCs	Provide input for near-term requirements and expend budgeted resources.
Service Chiefs	Build programs and prepare for war.
DRB	Oversees the entire resource allocation process. Critical role in force development planning guidance, resource issue resolutions, and reviewing the total resource allocation program.
DAB	Resolves various issues, provides guidance, and makes recommendations to SECDEF.
JROC	Oversees requirements generation process and mission needs determination.

Figure 4-1 [Ref. 14, pp. I-4 – I-5]

A. THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)

"The JSPS is the formal review of the national security environment and the national security objectives, threat evaluation, assessment of current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets, military strategies and forces necessary to achieve national security objectives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)." [Ref. 22, p. 6] There is no doubt that the JSPS is the primary focus of DoD military planning. [Ref. 14, p. II-1] The JSPS functions as the "framework for developing military advice on resource allocation considerations and converting national security policy into strategic guidance." [Ref. 22, p. 13] Although the JSPS is a separate process from the PPBS, it is integrated in and is complementary to the PPBS. It follows a relatively simple process that identifies the military threat to our national interests, assesses our forces on their ability to engage the threat, develops a strategy to meet and defeat the threat, allocates existing forces and resources to the CINCs to carry out the strategy, and provides the required planning to properly program for future force requirements. The CINCs provide their inputs via their respective sponsor Service and the Chairman. [Ref. 22, p. 7] The JSPS provides an avenue for the Chairman to provide input to the Services for their PPBS activities. [Ref. 22, p. 4] The JSPS produces the following documents:

- The National Military Strategy (NMS)
- The Joint Planning Document (JPD)
- The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)
- The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

Figure 4-2 illustrates the JSPS and the associated documents for the system.



Figure 4-2 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. II-4]

1. The Joint Strategic Review (JSR)

The JSPS commences its biennial cycle with the Joint Strategic Review (JSR). The JSR gathers information, addresses issues, and assists with the integration of strategy, operational planning, and program assessments. [Ref. 14, p. II-2] This review produces:

- JSR Issue Papers – Addressing changes in the strategic environment.
- JSR Annual Report – Summary of issues studied during the previous year. Also makes recommendations for changes to the NMS and the Chairman's Guidance (CG)
- Long Range Vision Paper – Addresses the future environment 20 years from now.

CDR Keller summarized the JSR as providing "a process that gathers inputs from the CINCs, Services, Joint Staff and other appropriate parties and considers trends, projections, issues, and situations that can affect national security planning. The JSR process provides the Chairman with information which he may use to provide guidance regarding the NMS." [Ref. 14, p. II-5]

The CG primarily functions as a framework for developing the National Military Strategy and for setting priorities in the JPD. [Ref. 14, p. II-5] It may be promulgated at any time during the JSR process. Additionally, the CG acts as the bridge between the JSR process and the process utilized to draft the NMS. [Ref. 14, pp. II-5 – II-6]

The NMS is the document utilized by the Chairman to advise the National Security Council on a recommended strategy for military forces within the constraints of the current fiscal environment. These recommendations lead to the desired force structure necessary to support the national security objectives of the government. The NMS also:

- Provides the Secretary of Defense with an appraisal of the current defense policy and any recommended changes to that policy based upon the JSR.
- Provides a current intelligence assessment regarding threats to our national objectives.
- Recommends the force structure available within the constraints of the current fiscal environment that still meets our strategic objectives.
- Provides an evaluation of the risks associated with the recommended force structure relating to the recommended strategy. [Ref. 14, pp. II-6 – II-7]

The Joint Planning Document (JPD) provides detailed information regarding items within the NMS. The JPD is utilized by the Secretary of Defense in preparing the DPG. The JPD is comprised of seven volumes:

- Volume 1 – Intelligence
- Volume 2 – Nuclear
- Volume 3 – C4 Systems
- Volume 4 – Future Capabilities
- Volume 5 – Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
- Volume 6 – Manpower and Personnel
- Volume 7 – Logistics [Ref. 14, pp. II-7 – II-8]

The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters however it is important to note the CPA plays a critical role in the resource allocation process. For clarity purposes in this chapter, the CPA provides the Chairman's personal assessment to the Secretary of Defense on the adequacy and capabilities of the DoD as deinfed in the most recent Program Objectives Memoranda (POMs) from the Services and Defense Agencies. [Ref. 14, p. II-8] The CPA comments on the Services' abilities to execute the NMS and the allocation of resources within the DoD. The CPA is also recognized as a key input to the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). [Ref. 14, p. II-8]

In summary, the CPA:

- Is submitted biennially to the Secretary of Defense no later than 45 days after the release of POMs.
- Assesses the overall balance of military forces.
- Assesses POM conformance with CINC priorities.
- Provides alternative recommendations to the Secretary of Defense within mandated parameters.
- Recommends changes to POMs for greater conformance to CINCs priorities. [Ref. 14, p. II-8]

The Joint Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is a document, classified Top Secret, which provides guidance to the CINCs and Services on accomplishing tasks within current military capabilities. The JSCP is derived from various sources that include national security objectives and policies, intelligence estimates, force structure predictions, and Secretary of Defense guidance. [Ref. 14, p. II-8]

All in all, the JSCP:

- Provides strategy and missions, as well as apportionment of active and reserve forces, to the CINCs.
- Is reviewed and revised on a continual basis. (It is published as required.)
- Tasks the CINCs to submit Operations Plans (OPLANs), Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), and contingency summaries to the Chairman for approval.
- Serves as a framework for military advice to the NCA.
- Provides intelligence estimates relating to the impact on operational planning and force apportionment.
- Includes 15 annexes providing detailed guidance, capabilities, and taskings. [Ref. 14, p. II-9]

B. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)

The reader can find a multitude of source material such as books, theses, articles, directives, and instructions, relating to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). As a matter of fact, references 1, 3, and 4 of this thesis directly address the subject of the PPBS while virtually every reference utilized in this thesis addresses the PPBS in some manner. The intent of this section is not to completely describe the PPBS process but rather to indicate the relationship of the PPBS process with the resource allocation process. CDR Keller observed that:

> Budgeting previously had focused on such things as salaries, overhead, and capital expenditures rather than on the objectives or results to be achieved with those resources. PPBS was introduced in DoD so that resources for national defense could be allocated in a more rational, systematic way that related more directly to the mission and role of the department. [Ref. 14, p. III-2]

He further stated: "The purpose of PPBS is to make a proposal that will field forces. PPBS is nothing more than a rational decision process. PPBS takes national security objectives and, using available resources ($), produces forces." [Ref. 14, p. III-5] The primary function of the programming phase of the PPBS is to optimixe defense resource allocation. The PPBS is the DoD's resource allocation process and that process, like the PPBS, is cyclical. Figure 4-3 provides a summary of this process. [Ref. 14, p. I-2]



Figure 4-3 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. I-2]

Always remember that the ultimate objective of the PPBS is to provide the CINCs with the best forces, equipment, and support possible within fiscal constraints. [Ref. 22, p. 13]

The PPBS cycle utilizes six basic documents to accomplish its purpose. These documents are:

- The National Military Strategy (NMS)
- The Joint Planning Document (JPD)
- The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)
- The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
- The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)
- The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)

The NMS, JPD and the POM have been discussed previously. For the purposes of this thesis, the PDM and FYDP will not be analyzed completely but rather only in the context that they may affect the resource allocation process. The DPG does have an impact on the resources allocation process and will be discussed.

1. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)

The DPG is a document from the Secretary of Defense to the Services and Agencies providing guidance for the development of their respective POMs for a specified period. [Ref. 14, p. III-8] It is the primary planning document utilized by the military departments and serves as a link between the JSPS and the PPBS. [Ref. 22, p. 8]

The DPG is derived from the NMS and the JPD inputs from the CINCs, Services, Agencies, and the Chairman. The primary purpose of the DPG is to provide guidance on resource allocation decisions within the DoD. [Ref. 14, p. III-8] The DPG becomes the link within the PPBS cycle between the Planning phase and the Programming phase.

C. FEDERAL BUDGET SYSTEM (FBS) AND THE SYSTEMS ACUQISITION PROCESS (SAP)

The Federal Budget System (FBS) and the Systems Acquisition Process (SAP) are beyond the scope of this thesis. They will be discussed as required to show the affect and/or interaction on or with the resource allocation process. Reference 14 provides an excellent description of both the FBS and SAP. Figure 4-4 illustrates the four phases of the FBS. [Ref. 14, p. IV-26]



Figure 4-4 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. IV-26]

By and large, the SAP follows the policies and procedures in various DoD regulations and instructions particularly the DoD 5000 series of instructions. Figure 4-5 illustrates the acquisition milestones and phases of the SAP. [Ref. 14, p. V-20]

Acquisition Milestones & Phases



Figure 4-5 [Adapted from Ref. 14, p. V-20]

CDR Keller expertly summarized the resource allocation process as:

> JSPS produces strategy, resource needs and mission tasks; PPBS proposes a six year plan to field the best mix of forces, given resource constraints; the acquisition system defines mission needs, and produces and maintains weapon systems; the federal budget process provides the funds. Without all of these subsystems interacting, we cannot achieve the objective: forces in the field and at sea, properly equipped and supported. [Ref. 14, p. VI-1]

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In summary, the resource allocation process is complex, cyclical, and extremely interactive. It utilizes input from various sources in the joint warfighting community, such as the JROC and the JWCA process, to assist the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense to evaluate and program for the most cost effective military force possible within current fiscal constraints. The next chapter will discuss how the CPA and the CPR are

formulated. Special attention will be given to the sources of input to the CPA and CPR as well as the true nature and intent of these documents.

V. FORMULATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (CPA) AND THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION (CPR)

So far in this thesis, I have analyzed the requirements generation process, the resource allocation process, and the role of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in these processes. A reference to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) was reflected in these processes. Within these topics, the interaction of many other processes related to requirements generation and resource allocation was demonstrated including the role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), and so on. Each of these processes not only serves a particular purpose but also builds on the others with the ultimate objective of a defendable DoD portion of the President's Budget. An integral part of this objective is the ability of the Chairman to assess programs and budget and recommend alternatives to the Secretary of Defense through the CPA and CPR.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3137.01, *The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process*, (Reference 19) is the instruction utilized in preparing items for inclusion into the CPA and the CPR. This instruction characterizes the CPA and the CPR as:

> ...the basis for fulfilling the Chairman's program and budget advisory responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. Designed to offer the Chairman's personal viewpoint, the CPR and CPA are supported by both the deliberate planning process and the JWCA process but are produced and delivered separately from other Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents. [Ref. 19, p. 3]

The CPA and the CPR are derived from the cyclical and interactive JWCA process thereby assuring the Chairman has the best information possible to base his assessments and recommendations.

A. ROLE OF THE JOINT STAFF

Since the CPA and the CPR are products of the JWCA process, it is only natural to assume that the Joint Staff would be central in the development of the CPA and the CPR. After all, JWCA sponsors are Joint Staff Directorates. It is critical that the reader never loses sight of the fact that the CPA and the CPR are considered personal correspondence from the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense and, as such, they are closely held documents. These documents highlight the Chairman's position on programmatic and budgetary issues to the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 14, p. III.5-6] If the reader should ignore this point, then the CPA and the CPR appear to be just better staffed Joint Staff documents up and down the chain of command.

The Directorate for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8) is the primary directorate responsible for the development of the CPA and the CPR. They work closely with the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) in the formulation of these documents. J-8 is the focal point in the Joint Staff for PPBS issues. They provide recommendations on force structure, develop trade-off analysis on resource levels, produce military net assessments, and develop resource-constrained force structures. Additionally, they are responsible for program and budget assessments and reviews and function as the point of contact for the CINCs, Services, and OSD for resource allocation

and budget issues within the PPBS. [Ref. 23, p. 25] Various divisions within the J-8 organization exist to accomplish this task. With respect to the formulation of the CPA and the CPR, this function falls under the direction of the Joint Requirements Division (JRD). The JRD as a whole is comprised of three functional areas:

- CINC Liaison
- JROC Secretariat
- Plans and Integration

Specifically, the Plans and Integration branch addresses all JROC and JROC Review Board (JRB) issues as well as providing the Chairman a draft CPA and CPR. [Ref. 26] The J-8 is the link in the integration process for the Joint Staff. The criticality of the role of the Joint Staff cannot be overstated. Although the Chairman cannot unilaterally modify Service POMs to meet his expectations or joint warfighting requirements, he can utilize his position as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend such changes to the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 22, p. 36]

B. FORMULATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (CPA)

The CPA transmits the Chairman's programmatic concerns and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense as required by Title 10 U.S. Code. In CJCSI 3137.01, the CPA is described thusly:

> The CPA contains the Chairman's alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for the Secretary of Defense's consideration in refining the defense program and budget. These adjustments are intended to enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and more adequately reflect strategic and CINC priorities. [Ref. 19, p. D-4]

As previously stated, it is submitted as personal correspondence from the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense as input to the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). [Ref. 19, p. B-5] The delivery of the CPA occurs near the end of the Summer Program Review cycle around the early to mid-September timeframe. In a nutshell, the CPA describes how the Chairman perceived how well the DoD did with respect to the programmatic guidance found in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). [Ref. 26]

Inputs to the CPA are compiled from a variety of sources such as the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), various CINC Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), CINC issue papers, etc. [Ref. 27] Topics become CPA issues from a dual stream approach of Service and Agency POM evaluation. On one side, the JWCA teams assess the POMs for DPG compliance while simultaneously the CINCs are assessing the same POMs. JWCA results are reported to the JROC while CINC results are reported directly to OSD. (See Figure 5-1)



Figure 5-1

CPA issues cover a wide range of topics. Some even seem to be out of the "warfighting" role of the DoD but they do affect the overall effectiveness of the armed forces and, as such, warrant Chairman and Secretary of Defense attention. Several topics included in CPA 97 were:

- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Integration
- Ultra High Frequency Demand Access Multiple Assigned (UHF DAMA)
- Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
- Anti-Personnel Landmine
- Theater Air & Missile Defense (TAMD)
- Enroute Fuels
- Global Air Traffic Management (GATM)
- Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ)/Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) Compensation

[Ref. 21, p. 23][3]

In this section, the structure of the CPA is described.

1. CPA Structure

The structure, or layout, of the CPA makes it a relatively easy document to read and understand. A review of a previous CPA revealed that the document is subdivided into 4 distinct topics.

- Introduction
- Standard Topic of Discussion

[3] QDR Integration focuses on the implementation of recommendations and directives resulting from the QDR. UHF DAMA allows numerous users to simultaneously utilize the same UHF satellite channel for communications traffic. GCCS is a global network of satellite and landline communications apparatus enabling the warfighters to communicate with each other anywhere in the world. The antipersonnel landmine issue is a high priority in many nations around the world. The current initiative is to eliminate all antipersonnel landmines. The United States, to date, has rejected this initiative. TAMD utilizes a myriad of antiair systems to successfully defeat air threats on the battlefield. The subject of enroute fuels in an ongoing concern for joint warfighters. This topic addresses potential problems of fueling in foreign countries under various conditions of alert. GATM is an over-arching approach to aerial navigation of the future utilizing such systems as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and Precision Landing System Receiver (PLSR). [Ref. 28, p. 1] BAQ/VHA compensation is a hot issue with service personnel throughout the DoD.

- Subtopic
- Summary of Recommendations

a. Introduction

The Chairman opens the introduction with general remarks relating to the CPA. A statement is then made indicating the CPA was conducted in accordance with Section 153, Chapter 5 of Title 10 U.S. Code. This statement reaffirms the statutory duty of the Chairman to conduct this assessment and report his finding to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman states in this section that he has reviewed the POMs of the Services and Agencies and recommends program adjustments in order to enhance joint readiness and to better satisfy joint warfighting capability requirements. He also provides comments on how the JROC, JWCA, and the CINCs contribute to the development of the CPA. In other words, his assessments and recommendations were not made in a vacuum but rather from an extensive and exhaustive series of evaluations, discussions, and briefings.

b. Standard Topic of Discussion

Due to the nature of some topics, the CPA is a classified document and, as such, discussions and comments of exact topics will not be made in this thesis. Rather, a generic topic of Information Security will be utilized as an example of a CPA topic. This section of the CPA is relatively straightforward. The topic is identified, e.g. Information Security, and a short narrative description of the issue(s) relating to the topic is made.

c. Subtopic

This item is self-explanatory. If there are additional issues requiring the attention of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense relating to the topic, they are

listed here. For example, issues relating to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) would be considered a subtopic of Information Security. Additionally, the subtopic area is where the Chairman would make any recommendations to the Secretary of Defense relating to the topic.

d. Summary of Recommendations

The Chairman summarizes his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense by outlining his fiscal recommendations in tabular form for ease of reading and analysis. The tabular form utilized contains fiscal recommendations for POM adjustments in three primary areas:

1. Shifting of Funds Recommendations
2. Plus-Up Recommendations
3. Potential Savings Recommendations

Keep in mind that the CPA is an assessment of how well the POMs of the Services and Agencies conformed to the DPG and, as such, becomes a critical input to the Secretary of Defense's PDM.

C. FORMULATION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S PROGRAM RECOMMENDATION (CPR)

While the CPA looks back and assesses conformance with the DPG, the CPR is a look ahead with recommendations for the future. The CPR is delivered early in the POM cycle thereby providing programming and budgeting inputs prior to the completion of the DPG. It contains the Chairman's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense relating to future programs deemed important in the creation or enhancement of joint warfighting

capabilities. [Ref. 11, p. 5-20] CPR development considers the initial input provided by the Joint Planning Document (JPD). This input may expand, refine, or modify JPD programming priorities. [Ref. 25, p. D-6] The CPR is primarily comprised of recommendations from the JROC to the Chairman for consideration and ultimately inclusion into the DPG. However, it is true that once the CPR goes to the Chairman, it is anyone's guess on what will be included in the final document. Again, since the CPR is considered as personal correspondence from the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense, the best indication as to the recommendations in the CPR is what is published in the DPG. Several of the topics in CPR '98 include:

- Anti-Personnel Landmines
- Force Readiness
- Joint Regional Installation Support
- Weapons Modernization
- Frequency Spectrum Sell-Off
- Combat Identification
- Sealift Shortfall
- Theater Air & Missile Defense Strategy
- Force Protection/Anti-Terrorism
- Information Assurance

[Ref. 21, p. 24]

Some of the items mirror items in the CPA but some also recommend a long-range look at joint warfighting issue for the DoD.

In this section, the structure of the CPR is described.

1. CPR Structure

The structure of the CPR is strikingly similar to that of the CPA. Again, this structure makes it a relatively easy document to read and understand. A review of a

previous CPR revealed that the document is virtually a copy of the CPA with respect to the 4 distinct topics addressed.

- Introduction
- Standard Topic of Discussion
- Subtopic
- Summary of Recommendations

a. Introduction

Much like the CPA, the Chairman opens the introduction with general remarks relating to the CPR. A statement is then made indicating the CPA was conducted in accordance with Section 113, Chapter 2 and Section 153, Chapter 5 of Title 10 U.S. Code. Again, this point reaffirms the statutory duty of the Chairman to evaluate the joint warfighting capability of the DoD and report his findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman states in this section that the CPR provides program recommendations for the development of the DPG. He also provides comments on how the JROC, JWCA, and the CINCs contribute to the development of the CPR. Once again, it is crucial to note that his recommendations are not made in a vacuum but rather from an extensive and exhaustive series of evaluations, discussions, and briefings.

b. Standard Topic of Discussion

Like the CPA, the nature of some topics makes it a classified document and, as such, discussions and comments of exact topics will not be made in this thesis. Again, I will use a generic topic called Information Security as an example of a CPR topic. This section of the CPR is relatively brief. The topic is identified, e.g. Information Security, and a short narrative description of the issue(s) relating to the topic is made.

c. Subtopic

This item is self-explanatory. If there are additional issues requiring the attention of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense relating to the topic, they are listed here. For example, issues relating to Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) would be considered a subtopic of Information Security.

d. Summary of Recommendations

The Chairman summarizes his programmatic recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Appendix A of the CPR provides specific programmatic recommendations in a similar format to that seen in the CPA. It is important to remember the CPR does not address fiscal issues relating to the proposed programs. That is the function of the CPA.

Finalization of the CPR runs concurrently with the drafting of the DPG. Many of the same issues appear in the CPR and the DPG. The CPR provides the recommendations but the DPG lists the priorities of the programs. [Ref. 27]

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The CPA is best summarized from a passage in the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, (Reference 11):

> The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the CJCS's assessment of the composite POM. It summarizes the views of the CJCS on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and support level required to attain U.S. national security objectives. [Ref. 11, p. 5-13]

The CPA is the vehicle utilized by the Chairman to fulfill his statutory duty under Title 10 U.S. Code. These duties include advising the Secretary of Defense on issues relating to program recommendations and budget proposals of the DoD Services and Agencies. These issues relate to how well the Services and Agencies conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and support the priorities established by the CINCs. The Chairman is also required to submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, as required, to the Secretary of Defense. These alternatives must remain within projected resource levels and guidance as provided by the Secretary of Defense. The CPA development process begins well before the Services and Agency POMs are published and ends when critical joint warfighting issues are identified for inclusion in the CPA. Services, CINCs, Agencies, and the Joint Staff are intimately involved throughout the entire development process. This coordination is critical to properly identify and develop specific issues appropriate for the Chairman to formally raise to the Secretary of Defense. Documents considered in CPA development include POM preparation instructions, OSD Fiscal Guidance, the DPG, the POMs themselves, the NMS, the JPD, the JWCA, the JMRR, the JMNA, the CINC's IPLs, the Combat Support Agency Responsiveness and Readiness Report, etc. [Ref. 11, pp. 5-13 – 5-14]

Likewise, the CPR can be summarized as:

- Being delivered early in the POM cycle
- Providing input in the programming and budgeting process prior to completion of the DPG.
- Articulating issues deemed critical for the Secretary of Defense to consider when identifying priorities and performance goals in the DPG. [Ref. 19, p. 3]

The Secretary of Defense considers these recommendations when finalizing the DPG. The DPG then identifies the relative priorities among established and emerging capabilities and provides measurable performance goals for attaining them. CPR recommendations are not restricted to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and are therefore not fiscally constrained. The CPR focuses on specific recommendations that enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and joint training, and better satisfy overall joint warfighting requirements. [Ref. 19, p. 3]

In conclusion, the CPA and the CPR have a magnifying affect on the "purple lens" on the PPBS. [Ref. 14, p. III.5-7] This is evident from the fact that the JWCA assessment process and the PPBS cycle are connected via the CPA and the CPR. These documents provide the Chairman's personal input to the Secretary of Defense's PDG and PDM respectively. [Ref. 19, p. C-1]

The CPA and the CPR have a profound impact on the Secretary of Defense's decisions relating to the DoD, and ultimately, the President's Budget. The potential downstream affects on the Service and Agency POMs are enormous. Attention to the formulation process of the CPA and the CPR cannot be taken lightly nor should it be overlooked. The next chapter will provide a summary of this thesis as well as additional issues to pursue as follow-on subject requiring further research on this topic.

VI. SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

A. SUMMARY

Regardless of the environment, (operational, political, fiscal, etc.) changing times require an adaptive military. It should come as no surprise that we cannot support a wartime force structure during periods of relative peace. However, we must be vigilant in order to protect our national interests and objectives. Consequently if the military adaptation to its environment is not properly planned and managed, the results could be disastrous.

History shows us example after example of the results of improper planning. Post World War II, Korea, and Vietnam are classic examples of "slash and burn" tactics utilized to downsize the military. These tactics resulted in a hollow force. Today, the term "peace dividend" signals the approach of another hollow force.

Despite the tact that Congress has not learned a lesson from these experiences, the military, in an effort to become more effective at warfighting, has become increasingly better at combined arms since World War II. This effort commenced with the National Security Act of 1947. This act, as amended, designated the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the principal advisor to the President on military matters. Regarding the Chairman, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal recommended:

> ...that the Congress provide for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to take precedence over all other military personnel, and to be the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and to perform such other duties as they may prescribe. [Ref. 3, p. 80]

Although a good first step, the National Security Act of 1947 did not cure all of the problems within the DoD. As the Cold War escalated, and the political and fiscal environments in the United States changed, further reform of the DoD was required. These actions culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Among other things, this Act significantly increases the power and influence of the Chairman. He is now a major player in the requirements generation and resource allocation processes of the DoD. Although the Chairman does not have the influence nor the authority to adjust Service and Agency Program Objectives Memorandums (POMs), he does have enormous influence on these POMs through the Secretary of Defense. The influence of the Chairman is demonstrated in two documents known as the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).

Military requirements for force structure and resources are developed through an exhaustive process known as the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA). The JWCAs are "continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense agencies, and others as required." [Ref. 19, p. 4] Granted, other processes influencing requirements generation and resource allocation are occurring at the same time but the JWCA is the focal point for programmatic issues in the DoD. This process is directed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), a critical element of DoD reform noted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The JROC is where the Services have the ability to shape the capabilities of the joint warfighting environment and ultimately the shape of the overall DoD budget.

The two primary products of the JWCA cycle are the CPA and the CPR. The CPR is produced in the March timeframe and has a significant impact on the composition of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The CPA is produced in the September timeframe and has a corresponding impact on the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). Figure 3-10 provides an excellent illustration of the JWCA process. The requirements generation process is cyclical and continuous just like the JWCA.

The resource allocation process in the DoD includes input from a variety of sources such as the federal budget, weapons system acquisition programs, joint planning and domestic political issues. [Ref. 22, p. 3] These inputs are manifested in such systems as:

- The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
- The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
- The Federal Budget System (FBS)
- The Systems Acquisition Process (SAP) [Ref. 14, p. II-8]

Much like the JWCA and requirements generation, a methodical process of debate and evaluation determines resource allocation. This process commences with the identification of national policies, objectives and threats and concludes with the budget authority to procure the required resource to address these items. The defense resource allocation process is illustrated in Figure 4-2. Since resource allocation is politically sensitive (pork barrel projects), it is subject to compromise within the Congress and is not necessarily congruent with military necessity. Consequently the CPA, in particular, is a critical document in the resource allocation process. The CPA comments on the ability

of the DoD to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS) and overall resource allocation within the DoD.

As previously stated, the CPA and CPR are the primary products of the JWCA cycle. The CINCs, Services, and Agencies have a direct input in the development of the CPA and CPR via the JWCA process. The Joint Staff, J-8 Joint Requirements Division (JRD) coordinate inputs from the CINCs, Services, and Agencies in the preparation of the CPA and CPR for the Chairman. Although similar in design and format, the CPA and CPR are different in function and purpose. The common format is:

- Introduction
- Standard Topic of Discussion
- Subtopic
- Summary of Recommendations

The CPA assesses Service and Agency POMs with respect to fulfilling joint warfighting requirements as reflected in the DPG. It tells how well the Services and Agencies did in their POMs. The CPR provides recommendations for future joint warfighting requirements that Service and Agencies should consider in future POMs. It takes a look ahead. Both documents are considered personal correspondence between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense and, as such, are closely held documents.

B. OBSERVATIONS

The Goldwater-Nichols Act brought about much needed changes in the DoD. Although developed during the Cold War, it provided an excellent framework to address

the current issues of downsizing and realignment of resources to support national interests. The increased power of the Chairman allows a "white knight" into the requirements generation and resource allocation processes. There is now a credible military voice for the DoD in the Congress and the Executive.

Enormous amounts of time and effort by senior military personnel go in to the development of the CPA and the CPR. Pertinent issues are evaluated and debated in the:

- Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) (One Star Level)
- JROC Review Boards (JRBs) (Two Star Level)
- Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) (Four Star Level)

One aspect of the current process that appears to have the potential to jeopardize the system is the "veil of secrecy" associated with the CPA and the CPR. If the issues are identified, evaluated, and debated in such senior military groups, then why is it necessary for a "veil of secrecy" surrounding the final CPA and CPR documents? The CINCs, Services, and Agencies provide fully staffed input and ultimately the approved drafts of the documents to the Chairman. These documents have a potential to severely impact on Service and Agency POMs. In order to maintain technological proficiency, Service priorities may require expenditures above and beyond fulfillment of DPG requirements.

Consider this scenario. Albeit unlikely, it illustrates a potential problem of the current environment surrounding the CPA and the CPR. The U.S. Navy currently possesses 12 aircraft carriers. Each carrier is considered a national asset and therefore subject to the primary direction of the National Command Authority (NCA). One of these carriers, the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY, is additionally designated as the Navy's reserve training carrier. When not deployed, this carrier is dedicated to the training of

naval reservists for readiness qualifications. Considering the current drawdown of active forces, more emphasis on selected reservists (SELRES) involvement in worldwide contingency operations is required. As this requirement for SELRES personnel in contingency operations increases, the SELRES community cannot maintain currently with a fully deployed carrier such as the KENNEDY. Consequentlv, an additional carrier is required allowing for a permanent carrier dedicated solely to maintaining the proficiency of the SELRES community for contingency operations. This requirement is deemed by the Navy to be a priority for the long-term stability of carrier battle group air assets and effective SELRES integration into naval aviation forces. It is assumed that the JROC has already approved this initiative based upon CINC desires to have a reserve force ready to respond on short notice that is fully capable of meeting the desired mission requirements. The Chairman, not agreeing with the recommendation from the JROC, unilaterally rejects the Navy's proposal via the CPA and/or the CPR. Since these documents are closely held, the Navy must deduce the Chairman's recommendation either from back-channel sources in the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff or from the DPG/PDM when published.

Consideration should be made to life the veil and allow the corporate Joint Chiefs to formally rebut, to the Secretary of Defense, the appraisals and recommendations of the Chairman. There is no statutory requirement for this secrecy. The Chairman can continue to fulfill his statutory Title 10 U.S. Code requirements and let the Secretary of Defense decide any contentious issues. Under the current system, the Chairman has an audience with the Secretary of Defense that could alter the Service and Agency POMs significantly. It is conceded that the chances of this scenario occurring are small. The

professionalism of the officers in the DoD, in concert with the exhaustive staffing process of all proposals, will minimize the change of this scenario of ever occurring however, it still remains a possibility.

The CPA and the CPR, as currently derived and implemented, are excellent tools for minor programmatic adjustments and refocusing resource allocation efforts within the DoD. Regardless of how these documents are derived, implemented, or the potential impact they may have on Service and Agency POMs, all officers involved in programmatic issues should have an appreciation for the CPA and the CPR. These documents are relatively new in the DoD. Keep in mind, the first CPA was published in October 1994. [Ref. 1, p. 63] The number of officers knowledgeable in the process and content of the documents remains few. In the coming years, more and more officers will be assigned to the Joint Requirements Division (JRD) of J-8 and will gain an appreciation for the CPA and the CPR. Most of these officer will have prior Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) experience.

1. Recommendations

As these officers become familiar with the process, an examination of the effects of the CPA and the CPR on the Service and Agency POMs can be analyzed. Also, a review of recent program changes relating to the CPA and CPR action may be studied. Finally, the effect on the CINC Major Force Programs (MFPs) may also be investigated. Regardless, the CPA and the CPR are documents that are here to stay. It is incumbent upon DoD personnel to become familiar with this process and utilize it to its full potential.

APPENDIX

Categories of Acquisition Programs and Milestone Decision Authorities

Acquisition programs are categorized as:

1. Acquisition Category (ACAT) I Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP)
2. ACAT IA Major Automated Information System (MAIS)
3. ACAT II (major systems)
4. ACAT III (all other acquisition programs)

A complete description of each ACAT follows.

ACAT I

ACAT I programs are MDAPs. An MDAP is defined as a program estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (USD (A&T)) to require eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more then $355 million (FY 1996 constant dollars) or procurement of more than $2.135 billion (FY 1996 constant dollars), or those designated by the USD (A&T) to be ACAT I.

ACAT I programs have two sub-categories:

1. **ACAT ID** [MDA is USD (A&T)]. The "D" refers to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which advises the USD (A&T) at major decision points.

2. **ACAT IC** [MDA is the DoD Component Head or, if delegated, the DoD Component Acquisition Executive (CAE)]. The "C" refers to Component.

The USD (A&T) designates programs as ACAT ID or ACAT IC.

ACAT IA

ACAT IA programs are MAISs. A MAIS is estimated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD (C3I)) to require program costs for any single year in excess of $30 million (FY 1996 constant dollars), total program in excess of $120 million (FY 1996 constant dollars), or total life-cycle costs in excess of $360 million (FY 1996 constant dollars), or those designated by the ASD (C3I) to be ACAT IA.

ACAT IA programs have two sub-categories:

1. **ACAT IAM** [MDA is the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Chief Information Officer (CIO) (formerly the Senior IM Official, the ASD(C3I)]. The "M" refers to Major Automated Information Systems Review Council (MAISRC).

2. **ACAT IAC** [MDA is the Department of Defense (DoD) Component Chief Information Officer (CIO) (formerly the Senior IM Official)]. The "C" refers to Component.

The ASD (C3I) designates programs as ACAT IAM or ACAT IAC.

The DoD Component is responsible for notifying the USD (A&T) or ASD (C3I) when cost growth or a change in acquisition strategy results in reclassifying a formerly lower ACAT program as an ACAT I OR IA program.

ACAT II

ACAT II programs are defined as those acquisition programs that do not meet the criteria for an ACAT I program, but do meet the criteria for a major system. A major system is defined as a program estimated by the DoD Component Head to require eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $75M in fiscal year (FY) 1980 constant dollars (approximately $140M in FY 1996 constant dollars), or for procurement of more than $300M in FY 1980 constant dollars (approximately $645M in FY 1996 constant dollars), or those designated by the DoD Component Head to be ACAT II. The MDA is the DoD CAE.

ACAT III

ACAT III programs are defined as those acquisition programs that do not meet the criteria for an ACAT I, an ACAT IA, or an ACAT II. The MDA is designated by the CAE and shall be at the lowest appropriate level. This category includes less-than-major AISs.

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