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## EAST EUROPE REPORT
### POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
#### No. 2180

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[III - EE - 63]
Franz Josef Strauss confounded his friends and enemies with his admission that he engineered the billion-mark loan for the GDR. By way of reciprocity from the East Germans, the CSU chairman was able to record new and polite figures of speech from the GDR border guard personnel. But any additional, real reciprocity from the GDR leadership is nowhere in sight.

Member of Parliament Franz Handlos from South Bavarian Regen, who is not affiliated with any parliamentary group, sits in Room 911 in the Lower House on Bonn's Tulpenfeld. Before him, opened to page 71, he has the program of principles of the CSU which he left a few days earlier in protest against Franz Josef Strauss. Shaking his head and rather irritable, the former CSU deputy points to the passage on "Eastern Policy in the Service of Man."

There it says, as adopted in 1976: "The Christian Social Union was and is in favor of cooperation with the East. But that cooperation must serve man and his inalienable rights. Treaties must be in keeping with the principle of reciprocity. Complaisance toward the wishes of the communist governments cannot bring about reconciliation with the peoples oppressed by them!"

Handlos complained that these principles determined the Union's opposition policy for 13 years "and now Strauss suddenly cries 'April Fool.'"

Indeed, there were several reasons that persuaded the arch-conservative South Bavarian Handlos to leave the CSU—he feels that he was betrayed by that Strauss who had raised him politically with the enemy images of the Cold War, revanchism, and anticommunism. But the spirit of opposition inadvertently also stirred in the man from Regen and that meant protest against one-man rule by Strauss. Today Handlos maintained that he is "happy to be able to open the newspaper in the morning now without having to be on the lookout for new directives from the Great Chairman."

With his commitment as "engineer" (Strauss) of the billion-mark loan extended by German banks to the troubled GDR, provided with the seal of approval of a West German guarantee but without guarantee for any reciprocity, the CSU boss stopped the
change in Bonn's foreign policy which he himself had really been wanting so much. Strauss-style change: The German policy from social-liberal times is again in vogue now.

There is now horror and helplessness in the camp of the Right. Is Strauss suddenly ambling in Egon Bahr's footsteps and is he looking for "change through approach?" Was the Bavarian only concerned with once again being noticed as the active politician in West German policies and not just as the querulous echo of the Kohl/Genscher administration? Did the businessman from Munich want to give the banks some juicy business deals?

There are as yet no answers from Strauss. Many of his friends in the party are therefore angry (see below). The CSU chairman has come to feel that his credibility is also damaged in the right-wing camp, that he is tainted with incalculability.

Strauss and his helpers have recognized the danger. A publicity campaign is now supposed to persuade all those, who blame their party boss for an about-face on German policy, that the man from Upper Bavaria, in spite of all of his strong language, has always been a man of compromise.

The word is now being spread around that the Bavarian prime minister has for years been maintaining regular contacts with GDR representatives in Bonn, that he has many different contacts with other East Bloc countries such as Romania and Hungary. During the early 1960's, already his helpers suddenly remember, Strauss supposedly, in every-day politics, began to downgrade the reunification demand out of consideration for the wellbeing of citizens in the GDR.

He also reacted rather moderately to the construction of the Berlin Wall. At that time, in August 1961, Strauss urged the GDR population to maintain "calm and patience," warning it that indignation could lead "to a senseless uprising" and speaking out against the cancellation of the interzonal agreement which is so vital to the East Germans.

When DER SPIEGEL early in 1978 reported on an opposition manifesto from the ranks of the SED and when East Berlin closed the editorial office of the news magazine, Strauss reportedly instructed his helpers in Bonn: "Do not fan the flames." Nothing must be done that might persuade the Soviet Union to hit the GDR any harder. Said Strauss: "They are Germans."

We are now also reminded of a dialogue between Strauss and the then head of government and party boss Leonid Brezhnev. The Bavarian reportedly made this offer to the Soviet fellow in 1978: "If you might one day believe that you are in a position to see Germany once again as a whole, then it would be the duty and the will of the Germans to give you guarantees that you will never again have any problems along your Western flank." Here was Brezhnev's spontaneous reaction: "But, Mr Strauss, we also have other flanks." Strauss: "I know that but I am a German politician. Speaking for other flanks would really take the cake." Strauss—a neutralist?

Early this year, the CSU publicity men now report, Strauss sent a signal to East Berlin. It was hardly reported in the FRG but would seem to have given the GDR additional hope for Bavarian help in getting the loan. The prime minister in public contradicted the demand of CSU hardliner Count Frank Ludwig Schenk von Stauffenberg,
to the effect that economic pressure must be applied to the GDR. He, Strauss, considers it "unwise" to establish "a catalog of ten commandments for relations with the GDR."

But Strauss would not be Strauss if he were not to make sure that the belief in his wondrous conversion from hawk to dove is evanescent. Because he obviously does not think much of his loyalty to principle: In describing his mobility he indicated that he is "so quickly in the other corner" that his critics "simply cannot keep up any longer."

But there is one fellow who caught the whole thing: Helmut Kohl. Rather shrewdly, the chancellor let his opponent handle the loan negotiations with the GDR only until such time as the project was ready for decision. When Kohl had reason to fear that Strauss would go public with the deal all at once and with a big noise—either at the CSU party congress at the end of last week in Munich, or during or after a trip to the People's Republic of Poland and the GDR—he quickly let the deal become known through leaks.

FRANKFURTER ALLEGEIMEINE published a story on the deal right after the closing session of the CSU in the Franconian monastery of Banz and just in time prior to Kohl's trip to Moscow. Here is the consequence: Christian Socialists felt that they had been made fools of and Strauss was in trouble with the rank and file. To save his reputation, all the CSU chairman could do was to pass the initiative off as an invention of his own. He announced that he "did not ask Kohl to ask me."

But Strauss really wanted to underscore his contribution to important West Germany government policy decisions. Now Kohl exploited the deal between the two parts of Germany during his visit to the Kremlin. Bitterly, Strauss last week concluded a 5-page statement with the following comment: In Moscow Kohl "had it much easier" in talking business with the Soviets "since the reference to the helpful role of the federal government in granting the loan to the GDR certainly did not make his job more difficult."

A similar maneuver by the Bavarian had already failed in May: Quite on his own, Strauss wanted to wheedle out of Romanian head of state Nicolae Ceausescu the exit of Germans living in Romania in return for Western loans. But, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher got wind of the matter in time and cut Strauss out.

The GDR deal had begun very promisingly for Strauss. Early in December of last year, the Bavarian had been visited by "an informant" (Strauss) who communicated to him East Berlin's interest in a billion-mark loan. The GDR supposedly needed the money urgently to be able to remain mobile within CEMA and also in dealing with creditors in the West (the GDR is almost M90 billion in debt). After an interval of about 2 weeks, he informed Kohl that he only said "Hang in there." But there is one thing that Kohl did not say: His Minister of State Philipp Jenninger had in the meantime talked to the people in East Berlin and likewise learned that the GDR wanted to get into the Eurodollar market with Bonn's help.

Jenninger was not unprepared. When the Social Liberals turned power over in October 1982, his predecessor, Hans-Juergen Wischnewski, briefed him in detail on
the latest conversation with GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker in September. The topic: Forced exchange and a model as to how East Berlin could get its hands on Euro foreign exchange, that is, by establishing a joint bank in Switzerland.

But Bonn let Strauss continue to believe that Jenninger's trip to East Berlin was only a good-will tour. The CSU boss still thought that he was the only man with the finger on the push button, when on 5 May—after the border incident at Drewitz, which Strauss had condemned as "murder"—Honecker confidant Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski turned up in Munich. He wanted to discuss the relations between the two parts of Germany with Strauss "on a special mission." Strauss demanded that the GDR security agencies should above all change their rude customs in dealing with visitors and transit travelers.

Schalck-Golodkowski returned to the Isar in May: He claimed that he presented this complaint "to the very highest instance" and was authorized to give assurance to the effect that this situation would be corrected. Then the conversation turned to the loan. A short time later, during Schalck-Golodkowski's third visit with Strauss, Jenninger was allowed to be in on the conversation.

The technically most difficult problem turned out to be the question as to how Bonn was to handle the deal: Direct interest subsidies from the budget had to be ruled out because of a lack of funds. The GDR of course was ready, by way of guarantee, to yield its revenues from Bonn's payments for transit traffic and postal fees. But that alone did not make the GDR worthy of a loan. According to the provisions of the Budget Law, the finance minister "in case of an unforeseen need which cannot be turned down" may assume only bonds, guarantees, or other securities." As Jenninger clearly explained to the gentlemen present, transfers are not covered by this regulation. And there was no time to amend the law.

Thus, budget law forced a guarantee from the West German government—although former Finance Minister Strauss did not want to hear of the "stupid word guarantee." To lock Strauss into the billion-mark loan, Kohl figured out a very smart trick: He suggested to Strauss that the Bavarian State Bank, should take charge of the money procurement phase as consortium leader.

The prime minister, who was the protector of this public-law institution could not raise any objections to this offer. And Kohl was thus able to avoid the impression that he wanted to handle this profitable deal at all costs with good acquaintances, such as, for example, his advisor Alfred Herrhausen of the German Bank.

The Bavarian State Bank, directed by former Munich Finance Minister Ludwig Huber, had no problems in placing the first slice of the loan in a consortium consisting of the Luxemburg affiliates of other German state banks but there was trouble with the second one. The private banks felt that they had been cheated out of a rich haul. They pressured the Bavarian banker Huber until a quarter of the entire amount, DM250 million, had been allocated to private money institutions—because this time they were quite right in scenting a good deal.
Just about 3 years ago, when the Schmidt/Genscher administration wanted to help Poland in October 1980, the terms had been considerably worse. Only one-third of the DM1.2 billion loan was guaranteed by the West German government and the money was to be used to open up new coal fields in Poland. Without a guarantee from the West German government, the banks at that time were able to come up only with DM800 million, with a surcharge of 1.5 percent on top of the market interest rate.

Now the risk for the bank was less. The GDR would pay 1 percent above the going rate, that is, the rate which was set every day in London for 6-month transactions between banks—too little if there had been no help from Bonn because the GDR, on the international market, is not among debtors who are in demand. But thanks to help from Bonn, in the words of a banker, "the GDR paper was turned into a West German paper" as far as the money lenders were concerned. The 1-percent margin now looks way too high. According to experts at the Frankfurt banking center, Bonn could have gotten the money considerably cheaper: "This means that West Germany is suddenly below rates which are twice as high as those that Spain has to pay."

Spain currently pays between 0.5 and 5/8 percent above the going rate for a loan and the same applies to Ireland.

And 1 percent risk surcharge must currently be paid by the National Bank of Hungary which wants to get a $200 million loan without additional guarantees. Says a Frankfurt bank manager: "We get the feeling that there were no experts at work here—or they only wanted to give presents to a few banks."

But last week, Strauss rejected any suspicion that he did the banks a favor through this loan deal. The loan deal was negotiated purely "interbank" (Strauss). The newly-appointed Eastern policy expert however tried to cast doubt on the role played by Kohl, his friend in the Union. Said Strauss:"It is perhaps characteristic that the release of the second slice by the chancellor took place on Monday, after his arrival in Moscow."

So, does this mean reciprocity after all? Did the Soviets perhaps agree and did they commit the GDR?

Certainly not. Before the chancellor's aircraft took off for Moscow on 4 July, Kohl's Minister of State Jenninger received an inquiry from Bavarian State Bank, the consortium leader, as to whether Bonn agreed to the immediate transaction of the second loan slice. Jenninger gave his approval, from German soil, still.

So long as the reciprocity expected by him does not materialize, Strauss has to keep himself happy. On television he quoted well-meaning press commentaries and read long reports about the new benevolent behavior of the GDR border police officers. And he was sure that the GDR would shortly become more cooperative in connection with joint environmental protection measures, for example, in the fight against the destruction of forests or in keeping water clean.

Where necessary, he helps—with money. To promote negotiations with the GDR on keeping the border river Roden clean, he suddenly proved to be unusually ready to
spend money: He released almost DM10 million from the Bavarian state exchequer to give the people in Bonn more elbow room in conversations with the GDR.

But here again there was no reciprocity. His opponents in Bonn view Strauss' Eastern policy from a different angle anyway.

For FDP [Free Democratic Party] Economy Minister Count Otto Lambsdorff, it is "horrendous nonsense" for Strauss to try to explain the loan in terms of reciprocity in the area of environmental protection. Lambsdorff: This is where the interest of the two gentlemen converged: Honecker wanted money and Strauss wanted to play politics. There was only one background factor for this deal: "Cash in return for hope."

And hope is fulfilled for Lambsdorff only if the GDR begins to reduce forced exchange.

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CSO: 2300/337
Go into combat by rail is not just a matter of saving money although a considerable economic benefit can be achieved in this fashion. Rail transport offers another advantage for the units involved. Complete and compact arrival in the operational area. In the case of road transport, they are arbitrarily torn apart, they must almost always separate their tracked vehicle from their wheeled vehicles. The differing conditions of the highways alone can cause traffic buildups. The weather can interfere with unit progress. From the very first mile on there are possibilities of technical breakdowns. Recovery and repair teams must be organized. The way in which the unit is thus split up restricts its operational capability and, furthermore, the commander does not have immediate control over the unit after the move. It is above all unit command which is made more difficult in this fashion. Problems with rail transport are far smaller; one can redirect them, one can stop them, or one can let them continue on. Another advantage, which must by no means be underestimated, consists of the break which the personnel gets during the rail trip.

Looking at it from that angle, this way of going into combat is already a part of combat—and it must be prepared and handled with the same care and caution as, perhaps, offensive combat or any other phase in impending operations. Finally, the chances of prevailing in combat are better for complete and fresh units. But, for the purpose of using this route into combat, they need a partner—the German Railroad. Both sides must so cooperate that all traffic and transportation regulations of the railroad will be complied with and that the military mission can nevertheless be accomplished. And that applies even if it happens to involve only an exercise.

That exercise began around midnight for the 2nd "Robert Uhrig" Motorized Rifle Battalion. It moved into its assembly area. From there it dispatched a combat reconnaissance patrol. Probing in all directions, the patrol approached the loading point along the planned march route. The patrol’s three APC’s took up positions at the access ways to the railroad area in such a manner that the terrain immediately around the rail head would be within view and also within the effective range of its weapons. Because the railroad station was free of "enemy," the
The transport director was met at the ramp by the railroad's military transport agent. A switching engine had just pushed the last freight car intended for the shipment into the railroad station. Now, the next step was to assemble the train in accordance with the loading plan. Of course, everything had been spelled out in the plans which had been drafted during the days before but the railroad's rolling stock is constantly in motion and unit exercise planning can also, as in real combat, be changed on short notice. This is why Captain Rockohr, the transport director's deputy, Railroad Agent Kade, the military transport agent, and switching supervisor Railroad Senior Secretary Pollak together inspected the cars which had been made available.

The HKM [expansion unknown] cars--boxcars converted for passenger transport--did not stay there long. They had been made available in the required number and had been equipped with seats and bunks and the emergency brake system was also in order. The situation was more difficult in the case of the flatcars. Overall, the planned axle number turned out to be correct. But there were deviations as far as the car types were concerned; some of the requested four-axle cars had been replaced with two-axle cars. On the other hand, only six-axle cars were ready as reserve. But the train was not supposed to be longer than 570 m to make sure it could pass through the transit stations without any problems. That is the minimum length of a railroad track, measured from one switch to the next. In other words, it was necessary to figure out how the cars could be assembled and loaded. Perhaps it might be possible to get along with less cars. For the time being, that was just an idea because the railroad men wanted to get Captain Rockrohr to give them the count of LUE numbers [expansion unknown] as confirmed in the loading plan. The railroad allows the loading dimensions to be exceeded only for a certain type of combat equipment but requires special precautions during loading and security of such equipment. A catalog lists and numbers these regulations. The train had to be assembled also in accordance with those regulations. It was necessary to put two protective cars, in other words, normally loaded cars, between the engine and the cars that carried equipment with excessive dimensions, to make sure that the excessively wide equipment would not come into contact with other trains at junctions and when passing other trains in railroad stations. Finally it was also necessary to keep in mind the loading of the ammunition vehicles. There had to be as many as six protective cars between them and the engine and those cars are loaded but they cannot be personnel cars.

The cars were not ready in keeping with these requirements. It was astonishing to see how switching supervisor Pollak assembled the cars in sequence with just a few switching runs in a such a manner that they were inserted not only in accordance with the loading plan and the battalion's requirements but also in keeping with railroad traffic regulations. "You can even unload forward. And that is the way it stays even if they switch engines on you under way!" This is the comment the switching supervisor added to his report to the transport director to the effect that he can now start loading.
The loading detachment was now ordered to clear the cars for loading. The side staves were folded down. Then the transport director via radio summoned the first column from the first area to the rail head. A short time later, the lead vehicles were already riding over the head ramp and onto the cars. The crews had dismounted before that. Running ahead, the assistant drivers directed the trucks while the commanders directed their APC's over the ramp onto the cars. The vehicles had to be centered precisely during loading. That was a problem for the APC's because on one side they always still stuck about 3 cm beyond the car surface with their tracks. If they were only another centimeter off, to the right or left, then what happened? There were also some inexperienced drivers in the group. They hesitated often. Looking at it from their driver's seat, the car looked narrower than it was. The patience displayed by car supervisor Railroad Inspector Conrad was admirable. He smiled at them encouragingly even after their third failed attempt although the superior of the young driver who was standing next to him, had begun to frown long before that. It looked as if the car supervisor got the whole thing going without delay precisely because of that.

The caution displayed by the railroad men is worth noting. Normal traffic operations at the railroad station were not interrupted. Of course, the soldiers had been briefed to cross the tracks only when necessary. They were told to wait for trains to depart outside the danger zone along the tracks and to walk only on the side of the train on which there were no other tracks. But not everything came off perfectly right away and, in all the excitement, some of the orders were not precisely carried out.

"In our occupation it does not do anybody any good to do things in a hectic manner," said Railroad Agent Kade. "And so we explained to the young soldiers that they are welcome to try a second time. I believe we always worked well together when there was any loading to be done at my station. Above all when we were all concerned with running the operation as economically as possible. Even when ordering the cars, they wanted to make sure that they would use up every square centimeter of loading surface. And on the ramp they would rather try heavy equipment out three times over before they yield any spaces on the cars. They are also always ready to overload wheeled equipment, that is to say, to put the front wheels and the rear wheels of a motor vehicle on two different cars; they do that even if that means more work for them. They always arrive on the dock for their loading job. You get the least expenditure when the transport starts at the scheduled time. Then the train can be inserted into the traffic pattern without any time lost for other trains!"

The battalion this time again was rail-borne right on the dot. As senior engineer Lammert put his heavy diesel locomotive in front of the train, the transport director, the military transport agent, and the car supervisor had already checked the cars off. In doing so, they checked every car for the way in which the equipment was secured, they made sure that the side staves were in place, they checked the necessary camouflage as well as the telephone cable from the transport director's car to the engineer and to the stations of the service detachments. The train started at the scheduled time and rode toward its destination. The "passengers" of course were not unanimous in their comments on this way of riding into combat. NCO's Kreisel and Lange would rather have ridden their APC's to that destination. "It is more fun and it gives us driving practice. Of course, riding the rails is more economical." That is the very special opinion expressed
on that score by Comrade Kreisel. His APC was "riding the rails" for the third time. NCO Langes APC was now "traveling" in this fashion for the 12th time. The latter added: "Once you are in your car, everything gets to be quite pleasant. But loading the equipment is a tough job. Especially for us drivers. The APC is not as mobile as all that. In second to fifth gear it is just child's play to switch, using the hydraulic transmission. Driving up, onto the car, you can use only first gear and then you do not switch gears with the hydraulic system. It takes time to develop a feel for the whole thing. But it was especially the patience displayed by the railroad personnel that enabled me to stay calm each time. They never push you!" Both of them then stretched out on the bunk. They knew how to make good use of "their" time.
In the peace discussion, the Hungarian dialogue movement tends to some extent to champion opinions differing a good deal from those of other East European movements committed to peace and human rights (see DIE TAGESZEITUNG of 13 April 1983). The following anticipatory excerpt from OSTEUROPA-INFO on the current status of the "dialogue movement" offers a summary.

The overwhelming majority of the dialogue movement continue to consider it possible that an independent peace movement may exist in an East European country such as Hungary, and that it may be permitted or at least tolerated by the government. For that reason the members were and are still making every effort to refrain from any action likely to arouse the ire of their rulers.

For years a relatively small groups of dissidents has conducted the struggle for human rights in Hungary. Lately it has increasingly caused offense. To avoid this fate and due to lack of political experience (something we will discuss in greater detail below), the dialogue movement does not include the issue of human rights among its concerns, rejects cooperation with the dissidents and adopts an attitude ranging from skepticism to outright rejection with regard to the coupling of peace efforts with the struggle for human rights practiced by the Western peace movements.

The Authorities' Attempts at Exerting Pressure

In early May 1983 the dialogue movement launched its first public action by forming an independent group within an official demonstration and carrying its own banners (reading, for instance, "disarmament in East and West"). The authorities thereupon began to exert some pressure on the movement. However, contrary to some Western press reports, members of the dialogue movement have not so far been subjected to residential searches, nor were they cited to attend police precincts.

Initially pressure was exerted in the form of "conversations" on the job. These conversations were conducted by a superior or functionary at the respective place of work, no doubt following instructions from above. Those invited to these talks were not threatened; they were merely told of suspicions and apprehensions—in the form
of questions. "Are you not worried that your group maintains contacts with dissidents who—as you know—carry on illegal activities?" The officials, "well intentioned toward the young people," feared that some of the views entertained (for example that Soviet weapons also threatened peace) might bring them close to "certain Western circles" that "under the cloak of peace efforts conduct cold war propaganda." Many members of the dialogue movement were intimidated by conversations of this kind. In contrast to some other East European countries, the activists in the Hungarian peace movement tend to be very young people, many of them less than 20 years. They have no political experience and are largely satisfied with the existing social conditions in Hungary. They are distinguished from many of their compatriots by being more aware of the danger of war and having begun to oppose it by their own individual efforts. For many others in Hungary the danger of war tends to be an "abstract" fear, much like that of being struck by lightning or dying from cancer. They do not believe that they can really do anything about it. The majority of the Hungarian people do not consider the Soviet Union to be an aggressive power and are duped by the propaganda of the "equilibrium securing peace."

Outlook

For the time being the intimidation tactics described above do not seem to have missed their mark. Many have withdrawn from the work of the dialogue movement, and a process of differentiation is taking place among the remainder. Many wish to give up any activities that might annoy the organs of power; they are inclined to join with the official peace movement. The others consider this to amount to knuckling under and the virtual renunciation of the efforts for peace. They are quite right! The National Peace Council and the Communist Youth Union, both of which would "welcome them," have long represented a dead horse in their opinion. The current debate within the movement and with the representatives of the state is their first political experience.

We must take into account the fact that the fear of being pushed to the margin is particularly appropriate in Hungary, because the overwhelming majority of the public was almost completely depoliticized after 1956: With the exception of a few courageous intellectuals, dissidents have no support in Hungary and are not even taken notice of, especially outside Budapest. Consequently their opportunities are few.

In such circumstances the generation of an independent peace movement is as significant as it is surprising. For the first time in ages a framework has arisen, that offers an opportunity for the collective development of political consciousness. A dialogue member explained his emancipation as follows: "Even a short time ago I believed that I could not, as an individual, affect major politics. And now reporters from the West come to see me and want to have my views on various issues. My views! Up to now I have never known my opinion to be of any importance whatever in Hungary. Nobody wanted to find out about it. And now it is published in several foreign newspapers. Distinguished Hungarian politicians sit around a table with me and the others of our group! In this brief period I have learn to appreciate that my person and my views as well as those of every individual may count for much more than I used to think!"
To be sure, "distinguished Hungarian politicians" would like to integrate him and his friends in the official peace movement and thereby incorporate them in the applause machine for Soviet peace diplomacy and propaganda. We can merely hope that they will not succeed.

Peace Camp in the Summer

The dialogue movement foresees opportunities for cooperation with Western peace movements mainly in personal contacts and talks. Of course these would need primarily to be initiated by peace fighters living in the West, because they can travel more easily. For this summer the members of the dialogue movement are planning a tented peace camp in the vicinity of Debrecen. They hope that many peace fighters from Western countries will attend (time and place to be published later).

Letter to Berlin Peace Conference

Vienna DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 1 Jul 83 p 8

The dialogue movement sent the following open letter to the European Peace Conference (held in Berlin in mid-May):

The Hungarian peace movement for dialogue very much regrets its inability to attend the conference, due to several unfortunate technical problems—nevertheless we wish our voice to be heard. We salute the conference delegates and hope that their work will represent a significant step toward cooperation and mutual understanding among the most varied peace movements.

In recent months we have been much troubled by the increasing disputes between Eastern and Western peace movements. It is extremely important to prevent any fragmentation of our forces: The cold war must not be allowed to invade the work for peace! We are convinced that this ominous process must be reversed lest it become fatal for the Hungarian 'peace movement for dialogue'.

We propose in particular that you reflect upon the following issues: What image are you purveying about the Warsaw Pact countries? In many peace newspapers this image has only three elements: A strong army within a militarized society; frequent violations of human rights and a few, usually oppressed and tiny independent groups. Does this help to build confidence and resist the rhetoric of the cold war? The appeal for a Europe free of nuclear weapons states "we must disregard the bans and restraints imposed by any national state." Does it not amount to complicity with an ideology of hostility for you so emphatically to emphasize not your independence of Moscow (that would be quite in order) but your extreme rejection of these countries?

Our second question is this: If we want to build up an all-European peace movement, can this be done without the (official) Eastern peace councils and committees? Have you really tried to cooperate with them? Is it really a sound strategy to set conditions and not begin discussions until they are met? We believe that it is possible to reach the Eastern peoples by these channels. Do you want to wait to establish contacts with Eastern Europe until our countries have adopted the Western type of democracy? What if the nuclear holocaust should come first?
Lastly: We understand that, from a Western standpoint, detente may appear as nothing more than the canalization of the arms race. But for us it was much more: It brought us greater freedom, more communication with the West, a freer press and the feeling to be once again part of Europe. Without it there might never have been a peace movement for dialogue. It is not an acceptable alternative for us to risk all of this.

11698
CSO: 2300/325
CROATIAN LC CC SESSION ON PARTY WORK, ECONOMY

LD222104 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1131 GMT 22 Jul 83

[Excerpts] Zagreb, 22 Jul (TANJUG)--The Croatian LC Central Committee today discussed the program and methods of work in the League of Communists, and its methods of work in society. Political tasks in connection with the current economic situation were also on the agenda of today's session.

If we are unable to or do not know how to act together with the rank and file to wage a common, organized political struggle then we will all—the leadership and the basic organizations and the organs of the League of Communists—have even more passive members, basic organizations and even organs of the League of Communists in this complex sociopolitical situation. Assessing in these terms the need for a discussion on the methods of work of the League of Communists and in the League of Communists, Marijan Kalanj, secretary of the Croatian LC Central Committee Presidium, spoke about three questions that must be answered. In his view the key questions are what should be done in the basic organizations of the League of Communists and in the municipal committees, and how the work of the basic organizations of the League of Communists and of the Central Committee should be changed in order to activate the basic party rank and file and increase its influence on all social developments and processes.

Kalanj considers that we must radically change out activities and our work methods to enable the League of Communists, which bears the greatest responsibility for the processes of our revolution, to be more effective in the attainment of established goals.

Kalanj went on to say that it is vital to assess the quality of the conclusions and the livelihood of their realization, and proceeded to illustrate the point by giving examples. Out of the 118 conclusions adopted by the Central Committee, 65 indicate clearly what should be done and who should do it. All the rest were quite generalized.

Consequently, Kalanj went on, we must also change things in the work of the Central Committee, its Presidium and all of us individually. We cannot continue behaving as though the responsibility for failing to implement the conclusions of the Croatian LC Central Committee and the LCY Central Committee lies only with the basic organizations of the League of Communists. This
Central Committee must take a direct part in the League of Communists' action aimed at implementing the conclusions.

Marijan Kalanj went on to say that in all the discussions it has been stressed that the Central Committee has imposed too few obligations on its own members in its conclusions and that the necessary amount of attention has not been paid in the Central Committee's work to monitoring the implementation of the tasks set. According to a rough estimate only 1/3 of all the adopted conclusions could be said to have been implemented in the way that the Central Committee specified and within the agreed period of time. In this connection Kalanj stressed that only the clearly and precisely formulated conclusions have been implemented.

It is fundamental, Kalanj said, that in the Central Committee first and then in the whole of the League of Communists we should apply and develop more modern and effective methods of work. Our attitudes must be clear and definite and must be proved in practice. Kalanj gave a number of details. In the basic organizations of the League of Communists, of which there are 13,841, there are 41,000 secretariat members and about 10,000 other activists. If they were all involved in carrying out tasks and the League of Communists' agreed policy, would our effectiveness not be greater than it is, Kalanj asked.

He considers that a large number of these members are more active verbally than [word indistinct]. This is borne out by the data showing that only 14.6 percent of the League of Communists' members have any specific commitments in the basic organizations of the League of Communists, 9.5 percent in the municipal committees and 10.5 percent in other sociopolitical organizations, which is very low, especially if one considers the number of problems and tasks.

Let us change this manner of work, Kalanj said, adding that only by doing so would we be able to step up and fulfill the responsibility for carrying out the accepted tasks and obligations.

Speaking about the work of the Central Committee, Kalanj recalled that the committee has met at the rate of once a month and said that this practice should be continued, with just one addition: when it meets, the Central Committee should not only make decisions but should also assess the way its decisions are being implemented, in other words it should discuss the implementation the current policy, in order to be able to react in good time to unsolved questions and to deal with them. The conclusions would then also be an assessment of our actions, because the mere fact that somebody is a Central Committee member does not mean that his results should be taken for granted. They should be judged on the basis of activity and the success of his work in implementing the agreed stances.

Further, the Central Committee Presidium should not act as a collective organ only during its sessions but also between them. The Central Committee should likewise not meet only to discuss major themes and the biggest questions of socioeconomic and ideopolitical character, but also for individual practical questions of broader sociopolitical or ideological significance which are most relevant at a given moment, such as problems of harvesting, sowing,
tourism, supplies and so forth, so that after such sessions communists could be directly and in the most tangible manner be oriented toward action within the framework of the policy for which we have already declared our support.

The secretary of the Croatian LC Central Committee Presidium went on to speak about the need to change the method of work of the LC in society in mobilizing all socialist subjects in the LC's current and strategic tasks, and also about the need for better information in the LC.

We can no longer reconcile ourselves with the practice of positively assessing the work of the basic LC organization while at the same time assessing that the work of trade unions, of the Socialist Alliance of the young and of other subjective socialist forces is passive and weak. This should also apply to the Central Committee. Its work cannot be effective if only it is active, if this is not reflected also in the increased activity of other sociopolitical organizations and other organized forces, in particular in the delegate system, Kalanj stressed.

Concluding his speech, Marijan Kalanj stressed that we are not raising the debate on work methods in order to discover something new but in order to advance the existing practice, to understand problems in time, to set in train action in the best possible way and to commit ourselves more strongly, persistently and more responsibly to changing the existing situation and relations in the LC and in society. Everyone must first and foremost reexamine his own behavior and that of his environment. To change old habits will be a long and very difficult conflict. "Breaking will be done mostly by those who demand much from socialism but who put little into it," Marijan Kalanj said at the end of his speech.

In the debate on the promotion of the methods and contents of LC work, most of the speakers insisted on the implementation of conclusions and decisions in practice. As Vladimir Stanic stressed, these conclusions too should be directed at the essential issues of society and of every environment.

Vjenceslav Kovacevic pointed out that the role of the LC leaderships has been neglected for many years already and that their attitudes seem to assume more the character of recommendations than of attitudes binding on the membership.

In closing the debate on this point on the agenda, Josip Vrhovec, president of the Croatian LC Central Committee Presidium, summed up the attitudes contained in the introductory speech and the debate. The problems we face are much graver now and demand a more efficient LC, Vrhovec stressed, in order for it to affirm itself as the leading force of society. The LC's basic role is to clarify fundamental ideopolitical issues and, along with being fully mobile, to organize specific advances.

In stressing the need for LC's full openness toward society and its role in rallying all socialist subjective forces, Vrhovec said that the present social juncture demands the consolidation of ideological unity and of internal democratic relations in the Croatian LC.
The Central Committee adopted the orientational program of its work and of the Presidium and commissions' work for the next 1-year period. This program envisages that the Central Committee should meet once a month and that it should also regularly examine the implementation of conclusions.

After a debate lasting several hours the Croatian LC Central Committee then adopted the Croatian LC sociopolitical tasks and activities program in connection with the current economic situation and the political attitudes on which had been adopted at the previous plenum. The key attitude of the Croatian LC Central Committee is that the current very serious and difficult economic situation in the country and in the SR of Croatia, which is made difficult in particular by the great obligations to other countries, can and must be overcome through the maximum mobilization of, above all, significant domestic forces and potentials.

In this program the Croatian LC Central Committee stresses the need to repay all debts on time in order that delay in repayments by debtors in the SR of Croatian should not lead to the application of financial sanctions against our country.

The Croatian LC Central Committee insists on energetic struggle at all levels against all forms of usurpation and alienation of social property and social interests, circumvention of statutory and social norms, unjustified enrichment based on rents, capital, entrepreneurship and arrogation of somebody else's work as well as against unjustified social differences.

All LC organs and organizations are called upon in particular to implement this program, to find solutions, to take measures and to initiate actions for its implementation. All basic organizations and municipal committees of the Croatian LC and conferences of the Croatian LC of communities of municipalities should either complement their existing programs of activities or adopt new specific ones.

CSO: 2800/395
LCY Analyzer IMPLEMENTATION OF KOSOVO PLATFORM

Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 27-30 Jul 83

[27 Jul 83 1131 GMT]

[Text] LD280154--Belgrade, 27 Jul (TANJUG)--Continuing the policy of analyzing the implementation of its own conclusions, the LCY Central Committee, at one of its forthcoming sessions, will look into how and to what extent the LCY platform on Kosovo has been given life in practice. The LCY Central Committee Presidium has already approved a document on this matter. The document is based on the analyses of League of Communists republican and provincial central and provincial committees (with the exception of the Central Committee of the Croatia League of Communists), the Federal Executive Council and its organs, the Committee of the LCY organization in JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy.

The 40-odd pages of this document speak in great detail about the results attained in the political stabilization of the conditions in this province of ours, but even more about the shortcomings and lapses which should provide a lesson for further and even more resolute action by all socialist subjective forces, first and foremost those of the League of Communists. The general consensus of opinion is that since the platform was passed (in November 1981) the situation in Kosovo has substantially changed. "The communists and the working people of all nations and nationalities have scored major victories over the forces of counterrevolution from positions of Albanian irredentism and nationalism and have laid down clear programs and commitments for further all-round activity in the development of Kosovo on economic, social and cultural planes. All this has resulted in an improvement of the general political and security situation in the province. However, there still remain a number of problems which enjoin all-round activity and the mobilization of organized forces toward implementing the platform."

In the assessment of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins, although reduced, continues and is a problem of the "greatest political gravity and consequence." Proceeding from the fact that an "ethnically pure Kosovo" is one of the strategic aims of the counterrevolution, a clear distinction should be drawn between two things concerning this problem. One is the realization of the constitutional right of citizens
to live and work anywhere on the territory of the SFRY; in other words, some people who emigrate are motivated by socioeconomic considerations.

The other thing is emigration under pressure. All social factors must pay special and constant attention to this second aspect. "These two elements must be clearly distinguished and must be given due consideration in every concrete case of application to emigrate from Kosovo." This is particularly important since emigration has not stopped and in the municipalities of Pristina and Titova Mitrovica it even continues "on an alarming scale." The basic causes are the feeling of insecurity, the feeling of being a member of a minority, inability to find employment or to solve accommodation problems, manifestations of intra-national division, unsatisfactory human relations, bureaucratic obstinacy, looking after one's friends, and so on. While not denying any of what has been achieved in this field, the LCY Central Committee Presidium's analysis concerning the realization of the platform on Kosovo particularly points out the need to struggle against those "who minimize the problem of emigration and reduce it to the level of a socioeconomic question, as well as against those who ascribe every case of emigration to pressure." [passage indistinct]

The LCY's platform on Kosovo concerns the whole of the LCY, but the Communists of Kosovo have the greatest obligations regarding its implementation. This is why the analysis devotes the greatest attention to the ideopolitical and organizational building of the Kosovo League of Communists. "During the past 2-year period, the Kosovo League of Communists was quicker in freeing itself from passivity, defensiveness, lack of vigilance and ideological disorientation...[TANJUG ellipsis] and to a considerable extent from lassitude and ideopolitical confusion." The Kosovo League of Communists today had 93,865 members, organized in 3,287 basic party organizations. This is a vast ideopolitical potential "all of whose parts have not yet been sufficiently mobilized for action." A total of 1,162 members were expelled from the Kosovo League of Communists in 1981 and 1982. The majority of those who had to leave the party ranks were educational, cultural and scientific workers (123), workers in direct production (99), administrative workers (32) and so forth. The national structure of those expelled was as follows: 309 Albanians, 47 Serbs and 9 Montenegrins. However, "differentiation did not reach the necessary degree of intensity everywhere owing to irresolution, the desire not to make enemies and even to resistance. Stiffer party sanctions against individuals are still being imposed at the instigation of the higher organs of the League of Communists instead of on the basis of political assessment and appraisal by the basic organization of the League of Communists itself."

There are still environments in which the basic organizations and organs of the League of Communists have not yet "emerged from their old shell," where opportunism and passivity still exist, where they wait for questions to be resolved at higher party and other levels and where they keep silent and wait "for this campaign to pass." This particularly applies to a number of institutions in the fields of education, science, culture, information, to Pristina University, to organs in banks and to the assemblies of a number
of municipalities. "In some environments there is a certain self-satisfac-
tion now that the situation has been pacified, that the organized hostile
activity has been defeated to a considerable extent and that there are no
hostile activities on a large scale any more. But that attitude blunts the
edge of the ideopolitical action of the League of Communists and other
social forces."

Great attention has been paid during the past period to relations in the
Socialist Republic of Serbia and to the problems of realizing socialist
fellowship and their [word indistinct] in practice. "In the course of
realizing the constitutional functions of the republic and the two provinces,
the most responsible organs in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the
Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Socialist Autonomous Province
of Vojvodina have exerted great efforts to further strengthen the practical
forms and content of cooperation between the organs of the provinces and
the organs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia in order to ensure the effi-
cient settling of questions of mutual interest and the uniform regulariza-
tion of relations in Serbia on the basis of the constitutions of the SFRY,
the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the socialist autonomous provinces."

[28 Jul 83 0955 GMT]

["From an Analysis of the Realization of the LCY Platform on Kosovo (II);
Disturbing State of the Economy"--TANJUG headline]

[Text] LD282217--Belgrade, 28 Jul (TANJUG)--Despite intensive activity by
the social factors in Kosovo in realizing the LCY platform and conclusions
of the third and fourth LCY Central Committee sessions, the general state
of Kosovo's economy in many sectors is very unfavorable and disturbing, an
LCY Central Committee Presidium analysis of the realization of the LCY
platform on Kosovo states.

The unfavorable trends in exports, investments, general, common and personal
consumption, labor productivity, losses, and the problems of dinar and
foreign exchange liquidity--even though characteristic to a greater or
lesser extent for all the other republics and provinces, too--are more
serious in Kosovo than in other parts of the country because of the specific
and more difficult conditions surrounding development there. There are
certain elements which indicate that through more organized and effective
action the situation could be altered. First of all, "certain positive
processes in changing the situation in socioeconomic development, strength-
ening and developing self-management socioeconomic relations and realizing
the prospect of the further economic development of Kosovo have been opened
up." However, activity in many basic organizations of associated labor
has been too inadequate for the situation to change essentially. The LC
basic organizations receive most criticism regarding passivity, imprecise
work and opportunism.

In the analysis of individual segments of the Kosovo economy, attention is
drawn in particular to the worsening situation over its foreign liquidity,
and the view is submitted that it "will not be able to meet its obligations to foreign countries unless the broader social community is involved in this. The problem of the internal liquidity of the economy and banks is also more marked in Kosovo than in other parts of the country." Most disturbing are the losses, which in this province accounted for approximately 12 percent of the income last year (3.5 percent in Yugoslavia as a whole). Generally the losses arose through paying out personal incomes without the necessary backing. In many basic organizations of associated labor the causes are not being eliminated on a lasting basis. "The losses are being largely covered by credits, with the result that the problems are on the whole not being resolved but merely multiplied. Economic responsibility for the losses is not sufficiently apparent."

The problem of unemployment is at present certainly one of the burning issues in Kosovo. It is thus understandable that it has priority in LC activity. The number of unemployed is even greater than in previous years, even though certain efforts in this direction have been made: the development of small-scale economy, trades, agriculture and the introduction of multishift work, and so forth. "The conditions for greater employment in Kosovo are very limited. No important results in employing workers from Kosovo in other republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina have been achieved."

Last year, 190,000 people were employed in the social sector of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which is 3.6 percent more than in 1981. Last year 81,000 people were seeking employment. Most of the unemployed, 54 percent, are unskilled workers. One of the main reasons for such a large number of unemployed lies in the school system, which is not adapted to the needs of the economy and which does not create enough necessary cadres.

The stabilization of the economic and political situation in Kosovo is not only a matter for this province. "The social subjects in all republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina must constantly and efficaciously perform their obligations toward the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo." This task especially applies to the associating of work and resources and to the income-linking of the organizations of associated labor. It is true that in the past 2-year period many contacts have been established between the organizations of associated labor and organs in Kosovo with corresponding organs and organizations in other parts of the country and agreements on the programs and implementation of specific projects, too, have been reached. "However, despite the expressed disposition and interest of many economic subjects and the results achieved in the past year, the self-managing linking and associating between the Kosovo economy and the economy of the republics and Vojvodina is still in its initial stage." The level of associating of work and resources in the first 2 years of the medium-term plan is far below the planned level of resources based on a 50 percent contribution from the federal fund for undeveloped areas. Associating outside this fund is not very considerable. "The obligations of the republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina to build a project each to achieve faster development of Kosovo are still not being carried out."
Investment expenditure, it is said in the analysis of the implementation of the LCY Central Committee platform, is being slowed down much more than in the country as a whole, "which makes a dynamic development of the entire economic activity difficult. On the other hand, there is the problem of a more rational use of investment expenditure, low productivity and so forth." Most of the investment resources continue to be directed for objective reasons toward the completion of large projects which have already been started. "For this reason no particularly important changes could have been made in the structure of the economy aiming to achieve a more decisive orientation toward the processing industry, agriculture, small-size economy and tourism."

"The overall economic trends in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina show that in essential spheres we are not successful in implementing the policy of the fastest development of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and in reducing the differences in the economic development between the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, and as regards the average development in the country as a whole." It is thus necessary to consider thoroughly the reasons and then on this basis to determine within the framework of the development policy and the policy of economic stabilization the directions of development, supplementary measures and social actions for a consistent implementation of the policy of the fastest development in Kosovo. "To this end it is necessary to examine the need for adopting a special program of economic development of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo in agreement with all republics and provinces."

[29 Jul 83 1333 GMT]

["From an Analysis of the Implementation of the LCY Central Committee Platform on Kosovo (III); the Most Reactionary Slogan 'Kosovo-Republic'"—TANJUG headline]

[Text] LD292355—Belgrade, 29 Jul (TANJUG)—In spite of the measures that have been taken and the achieved results, organized illegal hostile activities from positions of Albanian nationalism and irredentism continue in Kosovo. Since they are not in a position to carry out bigger actions and excesses, the Albanian irredentists and nationalists have changed tactics and become oriented toward deeper illegal actions. Their aim is to provoke tension, uncertainty and aggravation the political and security situation in the province and the country.

Proceeding from this reality, the analysis of the implementation of the LCY Central Committee platform insists on still better organization of the system of all-people's defense and social self-protection which, in spite of undoubted results, still "lags behind in relation to the conditions." Since the outbreak of the counterrevolution (in 1981), until March this year, a total of 8,567 slogans have been written and 2,358 pamphlets distributed. Six hundred and 88 authors, half of them juveniles, have been discovered. In the past 2 years, 2,503 people have been sentenced for crimes and offenses.
The Albanian nationalists and irredentists' basic slogan is "Kosovo-Republic" which is, otherwise, the most dangerous slogan in the arsenal of nationalist-irredentist propaganda and indoctrination. "It must be admitted however that our organized activity to convincingly unmask it is weak and insufficient." Apart from this, most of the other slogans support Albania's policy, glorify the Albanian party of labor and Enver Hoxha and attack the LCY policy and the leaderships of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, especially personalities from the ranks of the Albanian nationality.

The LCY Central Committee Presidium considers that "it is necessary to clear up the counterrevolutionary and hostile essence of this slogan in a comprehensive and deeper manner from Marxist positions." This must be "an essential part of our ideopolitical consciousness and action." The security organs have played a large role in stabilizing the economic and political situation in the province. The internal affairs organs have increased the number of their workers by about 60 percent, but they are still short of workers with appropriate professional training and necessary working experience. The armed forces, especially the Yugoslav People's Army, made an important contribution toward the implementation of the platform stances. "By their presence and engagement in the sociopolitical, economic and cultural life of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, the Yugoslav People's Army units helped the sociopolitical factors of the province to overcome the crisis situation, preventing the counterrevolutionary forces from undertaking actions in the forms and proportions they had at the beginning of the counterrevolutionary events."

The League of Communists and other subjective factors have made important efforts to implement the tasks from the platform which concerns upbringing and education because "Albanian nationalism and chauvinism have the greatest influence in schools and faculties with regard to the indoctrination of pupils and students." The syllabuses and plans of the primary, secondary specialized and high education were assessed in a critical manner. Some textbooks and accompanying literature, mainly imported from Albania, were eliminated and 116 new ones have been prepared. It is planned to print 113 textbooks this year.

So far 216 teachers have been removed from primary and secondary schools, 360 have been expelled from the League of Communists and over 20 school directors have been replaced. At the same time, 576 pupils had to quit school and about 160 were expelled from the League of Communists. Special attention was paid during this period to the university in Pristina. Ideopolitical differentiation at this high school institution was not as it should have been at the beginning. Only when working groups of the League of Communists of Kosovo Provincial Committee and the League of Communists of Pristina Municipal Committee were engaged "this process was intensified and deepened."
Great efforts were made to appoint teachers from the ranks of all nationalities. So far, 80 teachers of Serbian and Montenegrin nationality have been included in the teaching process. However, the maintenance of "an even national structure of the teaching cadre has been made more difficult with the departure of a certain number of university cadres of these nationalities from the province."

Considerable efforts have also been made to eliminate numerous weaknesses and shortcomings in the scientific, cultural and creative fields. In spite of the measures that have been taken, it is necessary to say that ideopolitical differentiation is still not sufficiently deep. Nationalism, opportunism, neutralism, elitism and dogmatism still exist and this hinders the transformation of the ideopolitical consciousness and Marxist criticism in the ranks of the intelligentsia. "The consequence of this is that sometimes works are being favored which are burdened with nationalist romanticism, exclusivism and self-indulgence and which do not fulfill the basic criteria of scientific and cultural values." The nationalists do not interpret the struggle against such phenomena as "as struggle against counterrevolution, Albanian nationalism and irredentism but as a struggle against the Albanian intelligentsia."

The analysis of the implementation of the platform on Kosovo states that there are phenomena of "neglect, belittling and rejection of certain true values from the Albanian cultural tradition, history and creativeness." The growing practice of cooperation and linking between the cultural and other institutions of Kosovo with corresponding institutions in other parts of the country is positively assessed. In order to achieve a still more developed continuation of this cooperation, it is necessary "to eliminate in all environments of Yugoslavia the attempts to create mistrust toward members of the Albanian nationality. This mistrust is most often spread by nationalists and other hostile elements who exploit counterrevolutionary events in Kosovo for attacking the LCY, the federal order in Yugoslavia LCY policy and our society in the field of national relations, as well as the personality and work of Comrade Tito."

The activity of the information media is on the whole positively assessed because in the main "they made a notable contribution to this all-out social action, although this activity was sometimes accompanied by certain shortcomings and bias." In this connection two basic weaknesses dominated which have still not been entirely eliminated. One is the sensationalist and biased treatment of the events in Kosovo, and the other is the tendency to minimize them.

[30 Jul 83 0746 GMT]

["From an Analysis of the Implementation of the Platform on Kosovo (IV); Albanian Leadership Continues Its Anti-Yugoslav Policy"—TANJUG headline; all punctuation as received]

[Text] LD301758—Belgrade, 30 Jul (TANJUG)—The active stance adopted by our diplomatic-consular missions and the activity by other organs at home
and abroad have considerably narrowed the enemy's scope of influence on our citizens of Albanian nationality who live abroad. It is estimated that the enemy managed to recruit about 2,000 Albanians for hostile activity against the SFRY, out of some 50,000 members of this nationality living abroad. "However, the process of ideo-political differentiation is also hampered by the fact that most of these citizens have become extremely passive." According to some assessments, anywhere up to 80 percent of them shunt all social activities, very likely to avoid conflicts, labels and so on.

The Albanian nationalists and irredentists, as well as all other nationalists, hostile fascist emigrees, reactionary clergymen and other reactionary forces independently and in league with each other try to expand and intensify the irredentist indoctrination, to separate the Albanians from other citizens and to recruit them for subversive activities against the SFRY. In their work, they especially reckon with the widespread anti-Yugoslav propaganda but they also resort to other tested methods—threats, blackmail and also physical violence. It must be said, however, that "further frustration of the protagonists of the hostile activity will above all depend on how much our activity will attract and encourage that great majority of loyal citizens who have now isolated themselves." This presupposes better information about events at home, especially in Kosovo, more work by our diplomatic-consular missions and greater activity by all our official representatives on the basis of the platform.

In the past year and a half, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian policy has further escalated. "The Albanian leadership openly strives to make hostility towards Yugoslavia a permanent component of Albanian policy, as well as of the attitude of the Albanian people toward the peoples of Yugoslavia." This was especially expressed in the preelection speech by Enver Hoxha (November 1982) and in the book "Titoites" which assumed the character of a political platform for the Albanian policy toward Yugoslavia. "They formulated the immediate and long-term hostile aims of the Albanian leadership toward Yugoslavia, such as the attempts to destabilize the SFRY, the open encouragement and support for the irredentists and their 'Kosovo Republic' demand with clear territorial pretensions."

Albania's aggressive and arrogant expression of hostility toward us shows that the Albanian leadership does not care about the dangerous consequences which may result from this policy, especially in view of Albania's readiness to make all kinds of political pacts in order to ensure support for its anti-Yugoslav political aims. "Albania is trying to expand its room for maneuver in order to lead an anti-Yugoslav policy, that is, it is presenting demands in connection with Kosovo in the West and also attempting to expand its propaganda in some nonaligned countries."

"Proceeding from the policy of goodneighborly cooperation and the desire to overcome the abnormal situation in relations, our country has taken several initiatives for a positive development of Yugoslav-Albanian relations." Efforts are being made not only to maintain the present level of cooperation but also to increase it, for which real possibilities and mutual interest
exist. In the fields of waterpowering engineering, transport and some others, cooperation mainly exists according to agreed obligations. "Albania is not hindering the Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation where it already exists. In recent times, Albania accepted a few of our proposals aimed at putting this cooperation on a reciprocal and mutually beneficial basis, although it continues to try to recoup the privileges it had in the previous period."

After the breakout of counterrevolution in Kosovo, the earlier agreement on cultural-educational cooperation was suspended by our side for well known reasons. "The new draft agreement which we proposed, and which is based on principled foundations guiding cooperation with all countries and which envisages the inclusion of all our republics and provinces into this cooperation, was not accepted by the Albanian side."

In pursuance of our foreign policy based on well known principles, the League of Communists considers that "there is no reason why we should not openly raise the question of the position of our national minorities in Albania which are exposed to pressure and assimilation." In this neighboring country, there are some 50,000 Macedonians and Montenegrins.

The Presidium of the LCY Central Committee has also developed great international activity in connection with the LCY platform on Kosovo. "This activity has considerably contributed to better information in the world about the anti-Yugoslav policy of the Albanian leadership and a correct understanding of the events in Kosovo. This enabled the progressive and democratic parties and movements, in spite of varying degrees of reaction to grasp more comprehensively the essence and danger of the greater-Albanian nationalist policy of Enver Hoxha."

As regards further tasks and help by the wider social community, it is emphasized that it is important "to cover the province by qualitative radio and television programs and to develop better information and propaganda activity among the workers who are temporarily employed abroad and among the emigrants."

The LCY and the SFRY have consistently strived and will continue to strive for the development of Yugoslav-Albanian relations on the basis of good-neighborliness, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, independence, autonomy, non-interference and mutual benefit. "This principled stance represents the only real basis for a successful development of equal Yugoslav-Albanian relations and cooperation in the interest of the peoples of both countries and has special importance for the preservation of peace and security in the Balkans and further afield in Europe. The Albanian leadership, however, does not show readiness for such a development in relations and is not giving up its anti-Yugoslav aims, territorial pretensions towards our country and interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs."
[Excerpts] Sarajevo, 22 Jul (TANJUG)—When we speak of the political security situation it should be pointed out that we do not have enough critical and comradely frankness in the LC. Very often well-mannered diplomacy prevails. At this point in time what we need in the LC as a whole is unity in implementing established goals and tasks, as well as against anti-self-managing forces and tendencies and the activities of internal and external enemies. This unity cannot be achieved by opportunism, diplomacy, and petit-bourgeois flirting.

This was stated by Hamdija Pozderac, president of Bosnia-Hercegovina LC Central Committee, in his speech opening a session of the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC Central Committee. The political security situation, immediate LC activity, and other subjective forces in working out and implementing the tasks of the long-term economic stabilization program.

The fact is that more and more the external enemy is organizing the internal enemy. In their activity together they (attack) all main issues of our life: brotherhood and unity, federal relations, socialist self-management, all-people's defense and social self-protection, nonaligned policy, and, in particular, the LC's role in society, Hamdija Pozderac said. However, they cannot really build up their influence by opposing these basic truths of our revolution. Where does the enemy build his influence? On our disagreements,—on our discords on some important issues in the development of socialist self-management. Of course, it is not unnatural for us to have different views on some issues, but it would also be natural—and even necessary and inevitable—that the differences be bridged by the democratic method of discussion inside the LC itself. As a rule, whenever we discuss issues equitably and patiently we have agreed on them.

Above all the enemy tries, the president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC Central Committee went on, to mobilize individuals to create dissatisfaction on account of our genuine weaknesses, and through skillfully launching various fabrications and wrong presentation of the situation. Using the method he manages to use half-truths and life to penetrate certain social strata and create the moods and atmosphere he wants. Our political and ideological
action still does not aim at exposing such enemy activity broadly enough. Such an action, would, among other things, also certainly demand that we admit and eliminate the weaknesses and omissions in our work more quickly. We have also become—and I stress this in particular—often immune to the real criticism of our weaknesses and omissions.

Stressing that he had spoken in severe tones and emphasized negative aspects in our practice, Hamdija Pozderac said at the end of his speech that along with everything that had been said, one should also speak of the cohesive elements in our community, the strong consciousness of the working class and working people, the immense strength and resolve to protect and defend the achievements of the revolution, and the will to give up all sorts of things for the sake of progress and society's stability.

Speaking about the implementation of the long-term economic stabilization program, in his speech Milanko Renovica, president of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnić-Hercegovina, stressed that this would inevitably demand new radical changes in all interstices of social life and work. The concept of such a program, which in essence means further developing and strengthening self-managing production relations, making workers masters of social reproduction, and making economic laws more effective, introduces new qualities in self-managing production relations. The fundamental prerequisite for the successful implementation of the program is a radical change in everyone's comprehension and behavior—everyone and at every place.

In his introductory report Drasko Popovic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC Central Committee Presidium, stressed the basic tendencies that are characteristic of the practice of implementing established policy on income and the changes that follow. He stressed that it must be understood that this is not some kind of correction in the system of economic activity, to which one has to adjust. A radical change is needed in the existing situation and practice. In fact, the measures in the long-term program of economic stabilization demand the deepest changes in the sphere of income, both from the point of view of acquiring it, and, particularly from the point of management and decisionmaking on income.

In a debate, which lasted for several hours, following the introductory speeches examples, cases, and conditions of the political security and economic situation were listed and measures in the long-term program of economic stabilization were backed. The need for a more resolute redistribution of income for the benefit of productive and creative work, as well as to strengthen the general climate, and the fact that only with greater production and better productivity can the existing problems in society be resolved were emphasized.
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA PLANS TO AMEND CONSTITUTION

AU221527 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jul 83 p 4

[V. Mandic report]

[Summary] Sarajevo, 20 Jul--At the last session of the Sociopolitical Chamber of the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina delegates discussed and expressed support for the proposal to begin work on amending the Constitution of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

"The past experience and activities on promoting socialist and self-managing relations and on ensuring that the workers class actually holds and executes authority, the development and strengthening of the delegate system, and an increased effectiveness in carrying out social affairs have imposed the need, as was assessed, that certain amendments be proposed to the Constitution of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina, primarily the following:

"In the powers of the Sociopolitical Chamber, as well as in the powers of the other two chambers of the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the electoral system;

"In the position of the Council of the Republic;

"Amendments of certain constitutional solutions pertaining to the all-people's defense;

"In the term of office of the presidents of the assemblies of the sociopolitical communities, the president of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina and judge of the Constitutional Court, as well as in the term of office of the vice president, or the vice presidents of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina."

These are for the time being the most important amendments proposed in the Constitution of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina. A discussion on these amendments should be concluded by the end of the first quarter next year.

The substance of changes in the work of the assembly chambers is on further strengthening the influence of associated labor in the delegate assemblies
and in providing the opportunity for the sociopolitical communities to develop as much as possible as self-managing communities, and less as state communities.

Certain constitutional amendments have to be made in connection with the duration of the term of office of presidents of the sociopolitical communities, the president of the Presidency of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the president of the Constitutional Court. Although the principle of a 1-year term of office should remain, the possibility should be created so that this term can be extended for an additional 1-year period. The proposal that the 8-year term of office of judges of the Constitutional Court should be reduced to 4 years, but that the opportunity should be provided to extend this term of office for another 4-year period, deserves particular consideration.

It is also proposed that the Council of the Republic be an advisory body of not only the Assembly of the SR of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is also proposed that there can be two or more vice presidents of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Executive Council.

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DELEGATE ELECTION PROCEDURES TERMED CONFUSING

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1688, 8 May 83 pp 13-15

Article by Stevan Nikisic: "The Secrets of the Electoral Boxes"

A study entitled "Assembly Elections '82," performed by the organization of the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade, served as the occasion for an interesting discussion at the Marxist Center of the Serbian LC Central Committee. The participants in the discussion, prominent scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and jurists from Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and Novi Sad were close to an assessment that the present electoral system, within the framework of the delegate system, should undergo changes.

Several different opinions were expressed on the nature of the changes to be made. In any case, it was undisputed, as was confirmed by the results of the study, that the delegate elections, in the form in which they were conducted last year (indirect elections on the basis of "closed" ballots), are too complicated, and that the citizens are not sufficiently familiar with the complex electoral process and frequently do not understand it.

On behalf of the scientific team that carried out the above-mentioned study, Miodrag Vismjic, a sociopolitical worker from Belgrade, made the statement that we "are somewhere halfway between what we wanted and what we have achieved," concluding that "there are several points on which improvements in the electoral system can and must be made." Similar views were also advocated by Milan Matic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, also one of the authors of the project, who primarily drew attention to the process of candidate selection, which in his opinion is excessively burdened by formalism ("there are many filters between the voter and final confirmation of the candidate"). This, according to Matic, results in obscuring the substance and in a "ritualization" of the electoral process. He thinks that the content of the selection of candidates for the delegate process should be linked to "a broad exposure of the individuals to the voters and the public," since the candidates are now anonymous, and the elections are depersonalized. "Structures and groups are elected, but not enough consideration is given to the individual people who will go to the assembly and their personal responsibility."
Criticizing the authors of the project because the degree of criticism in their comments was below the level in the responses from the participants in the questionnaires conducted, Vladimir Goati from the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, at the very beginning, attempted to "provoke" a statement from the participants in the discussion regarding possible directions for more radical changes in the system. He noted first of all that only a 10th of those responding to the questionnaire felt that nothing should be changed in the existing electoral procedure.

A large number of those asked responded that working people and citizens are not familiar with the electoral procedure; 62 percent feel that they do not know it well, and 19 percent feel that they do not know it at all. Only a seventh of them think that working people and citizens are quite familiar with it. This eloquently explains why only a minority advocate maintaining it in its present form.

"There are good scientific reasons why people are demanding an electoral procedure that will be understood and accepted by at least the majority of the citizens, since one cannot speak of real democratic participation when the majority are not familiar with the electoral mechanism" Goati concludes. When one furthermore has in mind the fact that (according to the 1981 census) 12 percent of the population of Yugoslavia is illiterate, another 24 percent is considered "functionally illiterate" (according to UN standards), and more than half of the Yugoslav population has not finished the eighth grade, this means that "an electoral procedure that cannot be understood excludes a large part of the population from democracy," he says.

All of this, in his opinion, supports a change in the existing electoral procedure. Advocating that citizens directly elect delegates to the assemblies of sociopolitical communities by secret ballot, with a large number of candidates necessarily on the ballots, Goati emphasizes that "such elections are the standard below which theoretical arguments cannot go." Thus, he says, we would at least succeed in eliminating the middlemen who can express or even modify the will of the voters in indirect elections. He asserted that the main course of contemporary Marxism--today a universal and equal right to vote, and direct and secret voting--does not exist as the trappings of the bourgeoisie, but rather as the "heritage of civilization."

While in agreement on many things, the participants in the discussion nevertheless advocated quite different views and assessments on several things. Miodrag Zecevic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, categorically asserted that "we have not made serious blunders," although the system has to be "continually modified." Mijat Damjanovic, a professor from Belgrade, observed that the recent assembly elections were "a very serious blunder," that this was "indicative" and "a reminder." Asserting that there are elements "almost contrary to logic" in the procedure for conducting the elections, he concludes that it is necessary to find new solutions that would restore the "soul" of the elections and give them the necessary dignity.

He also advocates direct elections, and a larger number of candidates on the ballots, observing that research throughout Yugoslavia has shown that this is
the desire of a majority of the citizens, and he therefore feels that the existing electoral system should necessarily be changed (modified) in that direction.

Milan Podunavac, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, noted that the politicization of interests is resulting in a growth of the political-managerial stratum, while the inability to resolve the disputes that have arisen is only increasing and the actual possibility of doing so is decreasing. At the same time, he spoke critically about the Yugoslav social sciences, which in his opinion are essentially "defending the state and the political-managerial stratum"; criticism of the political system is therefore reduced exclusively to "external aspects." The consequence of all this is a "restoration of an etatist political culture" with "a marked depoliticization of the electoral base." Budimir Kosutic, a professor at the Law Faculty in Belgrade, feels that even the very complexity of the electoral system, which everyone sees, could be perceived as "a search for forms and methods for reproduction of the political-managerial stratum," and it is already to a certain extent a "brake on the development of the system." Bostjan Markic, a professor from Ljubljana, spoke in a similar tone about "personalized cadre centers," which "are changing fairly rapidly" in certain republics. One of the conditions for the creation of an electoral system that would be adequate for the needs of a socialist self-managing society is that we "get rid of all these phenomena as quickly as possible," Markic feels. The "partialization and territorialization" of cadre policy, which Milan Matic also calls a "personalized alignment with given cadre centers," has also resulted in a weakening of the essential and generally adopted cadre criteria, based on work and the results of work, and in preference being given to specific criteria such as group loyalty, the ability to represent narrow interests, "getting along," and other such "useful skills."

Proposals That Are Wrecking Each Other

One question on the research questionnaire dealt with the work of the "cadre coordination bodies." Stojan Tomic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo, criticized the authors of the study for having "formulated the question suggestively," since the question itself says that they (these bodies) are doing "very sensitive and responsible work," and that they are "doing it conscientiously." (It is interesting, however, that the respondents, regardless of this fact, were very critical of this institution in their responses.) In his opinion, more serious commentary is deserved by the fact that a majority of the citizens do not know who their delegates are, while a majority of the leaders polled (the researchers processed separately the positions of the political officials participating in the questionnaire) are unable to explain why the citizens do not know this.

Wishing to illustrate the assertion that the electoral system today is complex and that people are not very familiar with all of this, Zdravko Tomac, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb, told how he asked third-year students to enumerate all of the elected posts in the delegate system. A satisfactory if not complete answer was given by only two students. Borivoje Pupic from the Law Faculty in Novi Sad that even his postgraduate
students in this field are not completely familiar with all of this. The conclusion is that the electoral system should most of all be simplified. Tomac, however, warns that at the present stage, scientific workers, before undertaking any changes, should first of all make a determination as to the strategic direction of future changes, since, he says, a characteristic of our policy recently is that "one day we make proposals that go in the direction of Zagreb, and the next day, in the direction of Belgrade," and so the measures are "wrecking each other."

Recalling that thus far some people are advocating direct elections, more candidates, rigid electoral units, and even platforms from individual candidates, and thus demanding that certain principles of the representative system and of the "civilized heritage of bourgeois democracy" be reappraised, while others are insisting that the emphasis should not be on the individual delegate but on the delegation, the delegate's mandate, and replaceable delegates, he observes that we have to make a determination. Tomac, in any case, says that he personally is in favor of "realism," noting that "we have to modify the delegate system on the basis of the positive achievements of bourgeois democracy." He feels that "our citizens are demanding this" and that "we cannot have a pure delegate system because the conditions do not exist for this."

New Challenges in Sight

Analyzing the postwar experiences with various forms and solutions in the electoral system, and the characteristic "traps" that each of them contained, Vojislav Stanovcic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, reaches a similar conclusion on the existence of dilemmas that should be resolved at this time. "I would like to have some sort of intermediate solution by which all of these dangers could be avoided, but I do not see one," he concludes. Bostjan Markic, analyzing the results of similar studies conducted in Slovenia, concludes that people are fairly critical of the delegate election process, and that in 1982 this critical attitude was much more pronounced than (in studies) 4 years earlier.

Before the end of this discussion, Dusan Bilandzic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb, who says of himself that he is "an advocate of radical democratization," attempted to make a brief sketch of the "course of development" of this segment of the political system in the course of the last few decades, and to draw the appropriate conclusions from this. "When the slogan 'democratization' was launched during the struggle against Stalinism, and it had to be a real slogan and not a formal one, we decided in favor of more candidates in elections. The 1953 elections showed, however, that this led to a conflict even among good comrades in the party, and a gathering of groups of adherents around individual candidates, all of which looked like the seeds of some new miniparties. This course was energetically suppressed. For the most part, we returned to nomination."

It was only in the mid-1960's, when a sort of "democratization movement" appeared, that the country's political leadership again threw out the slogan of "as many candidates as possible," "making elections as democratic as possible." Tendencies toward political pluralism, however, were observed
again, especially in the 1967 elections and later in the 1969 elections. Immediately after the 1967 elections, the federal political leadership performed an analysis of these phenomena, after which a political decision was made in principle (although the public in any case remained unaware of it) to head for a delegate system....

We thus had an oscillating circle. As soon as the system opens up, the doors are opened to all sorts of interests; as soon as it is shown that these interests are hindering the functioning of the basic mechanism, this process is terminated. "This is the way it has gone," Bilandzic notes. In his opinion, the delegate system just now is undergoing a historic test, and it is not difficult to predict that new challenges will come, and "the institutions will suffer blows from these new challenges." He therefore concludes that "there is no other choice except to continue tending toward democratization, and in this case (among other things) that means that it will make it possible for people to elect the best of the candidates," he says.

The participants in this interesting discussion at the Marxist Center of the Serbian LC's Central Committee disagreed, however, on whether this subject ("the elections") is already a somewhat neglected area in political doctrine, as some people asserted, or whether for the most part science has already said everything about this subject, as others claimed. Judging by this discussion, Yugoslav science cannot neglect it, and there is obviously a great deal more to be said. Possibly the greatest value of the debate lies in the fact that it was begun.

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