Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF USSR GENEVA DELEGATES GIVEN

LD291006 Moscow TASS in English 0945 GMT 29 Jan 85

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS — Follow brief biographical data on the members of the Soviet delegation for the USSR-USA talks on nuclear and space arms. The talks are to begin in Geneva on March 12.

The Leader of the Delegation

Ambassador Viktor Karpov was born on October 9, 1928. In 1951 he graduated from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations. From 1951 he engaged in scientific work. From 1955 — a staff member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1962 to 1966 worked with the USSR Embassy in the USA.


He has a degree of candidate of science (law). He is married and has a daughter.

Member of the Delegation

Ambassador Yuliy Kvitsinsky was born on September 28, 1936. He graduated from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations in 1959 and since then is a staff member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

From 1959 to 1965 he worked with the USSR Embassy in the GDR and in 1978-1981 with the Soviet Embassy in the FRG.

He took part in the quadri-partite talks on West Berlin as well as in the Vienna negotiations. In 1981-1983 he headed the USSR delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe.

He has a degree of candidate of science (law). He is married and has two children.
Member of the Delegation

Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov was born on November 12, 1937. After graduating from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations in 1961, he engaged in scientific work. He has been on the staff of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1965. In 1965-1966 he worked in the USSR Embassy in Thailand.

He participated in the Soviet-U.S. SALT-1 and SALT-2 talks as well as in the talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms.

He has a degree of candidate of science (history). He is married and has two children.

CSO: 5200/1005
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

MATERIALS ON PROSPECTS FOR UPCOMING GENEVA TALKS

Chernenko Answers to CNN

LD011118 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0910 GMT 1 Feb 85

["Konstantin U. Chernenko's Answers to Questions by Stuart H. Loory, Cable News Network correspondent" -- TASS headline]

[Text] February 1 TASS — Follows the full text of the answers given by K.U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, president of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to questions by Stuart H. Loory, Cable News Network correspondent:

Question: Do you think the agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on the negotiations beginning March 12 creates the conditions needed for serious and fruitful discussions that can prevent an arms race in space and halt [perekrashcheniye] it on earth?

Answer: We have no doubts about it. As a matter of fact, the accord [dogovornost'] on the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. negotiations does open up such an opportunity. It contains a correct scheme of solving the problem of nuclear and space arms — the only possible one under the present conditions I would say. Today, no limitation and, still less, reduction of nuclear arms can be attained without taking effective measures which would prevent the militarization of outer space. This organic interrelationship has been clearly recorded in the joint Soviet-U.S. document.

Another fundamental point: The document explicitly states that efforts to the two sides to limit and reduce arms should ultimately lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. I should like to recall that this is precisely what the Soviet Union consistently has been advocating since the emergence of atomic weapons. I may also point out that so far the United States has been unwilling even to talk about the subject.

A basis for negotiating in a serious and purposeful manner, I repeat, does exist. What is required now is to abide in good faith by the Geneva agreement and to strictly adhere to every part of it in practice. We are giving our delegation clearcut instructions to proceed accordingly. We expect the same from the U.S. side.

Question: Why does the Soviet Union so forcefully object to the United States' idea for a strategic defense initiative, taking into account that at present the U.S. Government is speaking only of conducting scientific research in this field?
Answer: Using the term "defense" is juggling with words. In its substance this is an offensive, or to be more precise, aggressive concept. The aim is to try to disarm the other side and deprive it of a capability to retaliate in the event of a nuclear aggression against it. To put it simply, the aim is to acquire the capability to deliver a nuclear strike counting on impunity, with an ABM "shield" to protect oneself from retaliation. This is the same old policy to achieve decisive military superiority with all the ensuing implications for peace and international security. I believe this clarifies why we are so resolutely opposed to this concept and such plans.

All talk that what is involved here has so far been limited to scientific research can only be misleading. It is to be recalled that the A-bomb also appeared as the result of scientific research under the Manhattan Project. Everyone knows how it turned out for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then the entire world and the Americans themselves have lived under the shadow of nuclear weapons. It should not be allowed for an awesome danger to come from space now as well.

I would like to be understood correctly. We are so vigorously opposed to the arms race spreading into outer space not because we will be unable to respond to Washington's plans: If we are compelled, we shall do our utmost, as we have done more than once in the past, to protect our security and the security of our allies and friends.

But one should face the truth: The militarization of outer space would upset the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems, which is of unlimited duration, as well as many other international agreements presently in force. The militarization of outer space would not only mean in effect the end of the process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, but would become a catalyst of an uncontrolled arms race in all directions.

Questions: Many U.S. officials recently have said that the new negotiations will be difficult and will not result in quick accords [dogovorenno]. Do you share that view? What do you consider to be the most serious obstacle to a successful outcome of the talks?

Answer: Indeed, we are aware of such statements made by some people in the United States, including those involved in preparations for the negotiations. The negotiations have not started yet, but there is talk already about insurmountable difficulties; public opinion is being prepared in advance for the prospect of years of fruitless discussion; there are calls not to yield to the "Geneva hypnosis" but to continue an accelerated buildup of nuclear weapons and to intensify space programs. If mention is made at all of the possibility of reaching an accords [dogovorenno], only individual -- and naturally beneficial to the United States -- questions pertaining to nuclear weapons are meant, while it is suggested that the problem of outer space should be deferred to the Greek Calends [1st day of the ancient Roman month from which days were counted backward to the ides].

However, I would not like to make it look as if we, in the Soviet Union, expect the forthcoming negotiations to be easy. We take a realistic view of the situation and see the existing difficulties. And those are no small ones. But they are surmountable. What is required is goodwill on the part of both sides, willingness for reasonable compromises, and strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. And, it is certainly inadmissible that any steps be taken that impede constructive negotiations and run counter to the task of preventing an arms race in outer space and halting it on earth.
The thinking should take a different direction — how to create a climate favorable for the talks. There exist real opportunities for this.

Would it not be helpful for the talks and promotion of the goal jointly set by the two sides, i.e. ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons, if the United States, following the Soviet Union's example, renounce the first use of nuclear weapons? Freezing the nuclear arsenals and completely banning all nuclear weapon tests could securely put the brakes on the nuclear arms race and thus also help the talks.

Question: What effect does the state of Soviet-U.S. relations at present have on the international situation generally? How can the forthcoming talks change that situation?

Answer: Regrettably, things do not work out too well between the Soviet Union and the United States. Of course, this cannot fail to affect the general international situation which remains complicated and strained.

Indeed, agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to hold negotiations on issues central to universal security. It is only natural that this step met with approval and raised hopes throughout the world. But it is not to be overlooked that the causes of tensions existing in the world have not been eliminated. Has the United States cancelled a single of its programs which aim to achieve military superiority? No, it has not. On the contrary, in order to attain that goal the assembly line is churning out armaments at full capacity. Or perhaps the deployment of new U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe has been discontinued? No, it has not either. Nor will the United States renounce the methods of diktat in regard to other states. The international situation today comprises both the undeclared war against Nicaragua and support for the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, and abetment of the racist terror in South Africa — in other words, such manifestations of the policy that are rejected by an overwhelming majority of people of all continents. The peoples repudiate and condemn such policies and resolutely demand that they be ended.

To sum up, I would say that mankind is at the critical point of its history: The very future of human civilization depends on whether the major tasks facing the world today are resolved — first and foremost that of removing the nuclear threat, preventing the militarization of outer space and using space exclusively for peaceful purposes; and combining the efforts of the peoples to resolve global economic and ecological problems.

Incidentally, I believe this also answers the second part of your question. A positive outcome of the new Soviet-U.S., negotiations on nuclear and space arms would favorably influence the world situation and would greatly contribute to solving the cardinal problems of today.

The Soviet Union will work towards this goal seeking meaningful and concrete results in Geneva. But not everything here depends on the Soviet side alone. People are not merely aware of the dramatic times we are living through; they come to understand ever more clearly where the watershed lies dividing the two major policies — the policy of peace and the course aimed at war preparations. The peoples and governments resolutely speak in favor of a healthier international situation, halting the arms race, ensuring peaceful outer space, and eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. Just recently this was rightly and forcefully stated by the heads of state or government of India, Mexico, Sweden, Tanzania, Argentina, and Greece in a declaration adopted in New Delhi.

This is the imperative for our two countries following from their high responsibility before the present and future generations.
The attention of people throughout the world is riveted to the talks between the USSR and the United States on nuclear and space arms that will start on March 12. Well founded hopes and expectations are associated with them.

The realistic and only possible -- under the present conditions -- pattern of studying and solving questions raised at the talks was outlined at the recent meeting in Geneva. Thus ultimate aim at which the efforts of both sides should be directed, liquidation of nuclear arms fully and everywhere, was also defined.

An honest approach to the talks, good will, readiness for reasonable compromises and the working out of weighty accords - if this is displayed by both sides, as was stressed by Konstantin Chernenko in his answers to questions by the American CNN-TV correspondent Stuart Loory -- it will open up the possibility for solving cardinal problems of ensuring peace.

The reaching of an accord on the talks in Geneva gave a big boost to the faith of the people that it is possible to stop the slide toward the danger line by way of accords, by way of concluding new agreements called upon to stop the arms race and reverse it. As is known, many useful things were done in this direction in the 1970's. But heavy damage was inflicted on the process of arms limitation and reduction in recent years as a result of the U.S. Administration's policy and practical actions, and it was in effect disrupted.

At the same time, Washington began to express ever more frequently its scornful attitude to earlier concluded agreements in this field and at times even openly declared its intent to wreck or discard them.

All of the Washington administration's intentions were concentrated on one thing: to try to get military superiority over the Soviet Union at any cost. If some international commitments impeded this, the United States acted according to the principle -- so much the worse for these commitments. The idea was that international laws, norms of morality, and generally accepted rules of interstate relations are not for Washington. In line with this approach, the United States sabotaged and eventually torpedoed talks on strategic arms and intermediate range missiles in Europe, and began to implement military programs of an unprecedented scale. Washington set off on the path of systematically violating and circumventing existing limitations on nuclear arms.

The Soviet Union more than once drew the U.S. Administration's attention to all this and cited concrete irrefutable facts. Suffice it to recall the Soviet memorandum presented to the U.S. Department of State on January 27 and the TASS statement of October 21, 1984. Relevant serious complaints against the American side were repeatedly submitted by the Soviet Union in the standing consultative commission specially set up to promote the aims and provisions of agreements in the field of strategic arms limitation. The United States has yet to provide the Soviet side coherent answers to these questions, despite the fact that we are dealing with extremely serious matters.
First: the United States has embarked on the course of undermining the 1972 ABM treaty of unlimited duration. This intention actually was proclaimed officially by the U.S. President himself when he announced his "star wars" program providing for the creation of a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements that is explicitly forbidden by this treaty. In the United States it is already intended to allocate $26 billion for attaining this unlawful aim. This is merely the first installment of the plans for the arms race and undermining strategic stability, which Washington is prepared to spend more than a trillion dollars in order to fulfill.

In the process they in Washington are engaged by no means only in theoretical investigations and scientific research. Work to create mobile ABM radar stations is in full swing; missiles of the Minuteman type are being tested to impart an antimissile capability; multiple warheads are being created for antimissile missiles, etc. All this clearly contradicts the clear-cut provisions of the 1972 treaty.

The deployment in the United States of the "Pave Paws" radar stations, which ensure radar coverage of the greater part of U.S. territory, is part of Washington's efforts to prepare for creating a large-scale ABM system.

These are generally known facts and the U.S. Administration is not even trying to refute a single one of them.

Second: As for the SALT II treaty, it has now transpired that the American side never intended to "refrain from actions" undermining this treaty. The plan was to demand observance of the treaty from the other side and in the process to prepare a whole series of measures directed at wrecking the military balance and acquiring the capability for a first disarming strike.

They pretended not to have objections to limitations on long-range cruise missiles while in reality they were preparing for the present massive deployment of this new dangerous type of strategic offensive armament. They were reaching agreement on the commitment not to circumvent in any manner the SALT II treaty, which establishes parity in the military-strategic field, while in practice they already had a plan ready for deploying in Europe several hundred essentially strategic nuclear-missile weapons against the USSR and its allies. They were signing the principle of equality and equal security while at the same time planning and doing everything for no equal security to exist and for the United States to have overwhelming military superiority -- such a superiority under conditions of which the United States could count on the impunity of its aggressive actions, on climbing atop the command tower, and dictating from there its will to other peoples.

Third: Let us take the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. Here we see the very same line, the very same handwriting. The United States signed the treaty but has not wanted to ratify it for over 11 years. The reason is a simple one and no real effort is made in Washington to conceal it: They in Washington are afraid of putting into operation the precise and effective system of monitoring the yield of explosions envisaged by the treaty. Were the United States to agree to such verification it would find it that much more difficult to test ever new nuclear charges, including those for new powerful offensive missiles.
As rehearsals of nuclear war that time and again are accompanied by the testing of nuclear charges above the agreed-upon threshold of 150 kilotons and by the escape of radioactive substances into the atmosphere are being held in the tunnels at the U.S. testing range in Nevada, official U.S. agencies engage in inventing all sorts of excuses to dodge observing the established limitations on underground nuclear explosions and prevent the resumption of talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Fourth: Mankind is facing not only the threat of nuclear destruction. Of no less danger to people is such a barbarous means of mass annihilation as chemical weapons. By the 1925 Geneva protocol (the Soviet Union was one of the first to accede to it and strictly observes all its provisions) the world community outlawed chemical warfare. It took the United States 50 years just to ratify the Geneva protocol. Meanwhile, U.S. toxins killed and crippled thousands upon thousands of inhabitants in Indochina and inflicted irreparable damage to that region's environment. Many American servicemen as well fell victim to the chemical war waged by the Pentagon in Southeast Asia.

Even today, while portraying itself as an advocate of chemical weapons prohibition, the U.S. Administration in fact blocks any international agreement on the score, supplies chemical weapons to Afghan bandits fighting against their own people, and prepares for a chemical rearmament of America. A flagrant contradiction becomes obvious between U.S. commitments and Washington's practical deeds that are directed at the nonobservance and circumvention of these commitments.

Fifth: The United States signed the Helsinki Final Act, and, as is known, the United States applied much effort in the past to become a party to the document. Together with other nations, it assumed the solemn obligation to facilitate European peace and security, rapprochement, and cooperation between European nations, deepening development and consolidation of the detente process here.

But what is the actual policy of the United States on European matters? The heightening of military tension in Europe; the deployment here of new first-strike nuclear armaments; the attempts to question the existing European realities; disrupt and hinder normal trade, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in this region -- such is the American "contribution" to developing the Helsinki process. Here as well, the United States puts its signature on one thing, while doing quite a different one.

These facts -- and their number can be multiplied -- cannot but raise a question, in a broad, principled context, as to Washington's conscientiousness with regard to the international commitments it assumes and, consequently, as to confidence in its policy. This question is being raised ever more often in various countries.

As is seen, the U.S. Administration comes to feel this too, but does not draw any proper conclusions. It engages in something else: It tries to cover up its line toward heightening international tension, toward the arms race, and toward violating existing accords by far-fetched accusations leveled at the other side. They draw up "reports" on that score, send them to Congress, and pose almost as keepers of international law and legality.

Another one of such "reports" emerged from the White House recently. It again rehashes the hackneyed inventions concerning the Soviet Union's alleged "violations" of its commitments.
But the investments and pseudoarguments do not become convincing in any way through repetition. Why, then, are they being reproduced again and again and why is this being done precisely now? The aims being pursued are various but their overall unseemly directness is obvious.

First, they would like to put military programs through Congress by slandering the Soviet Union's policy.

Second, they seek to dismantle and bury the existing international treaties on arms limitation on the plea of their alleged ineffectiveness.

Third, they want from the very outset to cast aspersions on the forthcoming talks in Geneva, and to sow doubt as to possibility and usefulness of accords with the Soviet Union.

All that is oriented in one direction: To accustom the public opinion to the idea that there is allegedly no reasonable alternative to the U.S. Administration's present line toward intensification of military preparations and that the arms race is ostensibly inevitable while efforts to end it are futile.

Washington figures have never managed and will not manage, of course, to undermine the high prestige of the Soviet Union's policy. The USSR scrupulously fulfills its international obligations and the whole world knows about this.

However, one cannot but be put on one's guard by the fact that such steps are being taken by Washington on the eve of the talks in Geneva obviously with a view to poisoning the atmosphere around them and to hindering a businesslike and constructive consideration of problems which are subject to solution at the talks.

If Washington believes that by means of propagandist tricks it will be able to shake off responsibility for the unfavorable state of affairs in Soviet-U.S. relations for the lack of headway in arms limitation and in lessening the war danger, such calculations are groundless. It is time for the United States at last to do away with the practice of violating its commitments and to direct efforts in deeds and not in words, toward preventing an arms race in outer space and toward eliminating it on earth. This is made incumbent upon the United States by the Soviet-U.S. agreement reached on holding talks in Geneva, the agreement that should be strictly observed in every part of it.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM031940 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 85 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Peace to the Earth and to Space!"

[Text] Comrade K.U. Chernenko's answers to questions from a correspondent of the American CNN television company are being discussed with great interest throughout the world.

On the eve of the new Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, the peoples want to know the authoritative Soviet assessment of their prospects and the priority tasks facing the world today.
The international reactions reflect the tremendous authority of the peace-loving
Leninist foreign policy, the authority of the words and actions of the CPSU and the
Soviet state. In broad foreign political and public circles the Soviet
leader's answers have been interpreted as a document of great international
significance. They voiced the harsh truth about the lethal danger of imperialism's
belligerent policy for mankind. At the same time they clearly pointed to real possibili-
ties and ways of radically improving the international situation, preventing an arms
race in space, and halting it on earth. People of goodwill are inspired by the un-
bending faith in man's reason and the realistic conviction that the peoples are capable
of coping with the historic task of eliminating the threat of nuclear catastrophe and
ensuring reliable peace and international security.

"People are not simply aware of the dramatic nature of our times," Comrade K.U.
Chernenko noted. "They are realizing increasingly precisely where the watershed lies
between the two main courses in policy — the policy of peace and the line which aims to
prepare for war. Peoples and governments are speaking out resolutely in favor of the
improvement of the international situation, the ending of the arms race, a peaceful
outer space, and the removal of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth."

The Soviet Union's approach is fully consonant with these just aspirations. Moreover,
its efforts are aimed directly at translating them into reality. The priority task
along this path is the elaboration of effective accords in order to prevent an arms
race in space and end it on earth.

The fact that an opportunity now exists for a serious and fruitful examination of these
questions is welcomed in all countries. This opportunity has been objectively provided
by the accord on the objective and subject of the upcoming Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva.
This accord incorporates the correct scheme, and essentially the only possible one in
present conditions, for solving the problem of nuclear and space arms. At this time
nuclear arms cannot be limited, or especially, reduced without adopting effective
measures precluding the militarization of space. This is an organic interconnection and
it is precisely recorded in the well-known Soviet-U.S. joint statement.

Another fundamental factor is that the ultimate result of the sides' efforts in the arms
limitation and reduction field must be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
This is no problem for our country with its inherent peace-loving nature and absence
of any groups profiting from the arms race. On the contrary, it is a long-desired
objective. The Soviet Union has consistently and persistently advocated the destruction
of nuclear weapons since the moment they emerged. It is another matter when it comes to
the United States, which until recently refused to even talk about the complete elimina-
tion of nuclear arsenals.

The importance of the basis that has been worked out is understood; it makes it possible
to conduct the talks seriously and purposefully. A great deal of difficult work lies
ahead, but the complexities that exist are surmountable. It is important to honestly
comply with the accord reached in January and strictly sustain [vyderzhivat] it in all
its parts in practice. What is needed is goodwill, a readiness for reasonable
compromises, and strict observance of the principles of equality and identical security.
The Soviet Union has all this. It is up to Washington.

Unfortunately, certain circumstances there cannot fail to arouse caution. The high-
speed American arms production line is not slowing down.
Administration representatives are campaigning for the implementation of the notorious "strategic defense initiative" concept, although no torrents of words can camouflage its aggressive essence. The "Star Wars" plan is an attempt to acquire for the United States the possibility of inflicting a nuclear strike in the hope of impunity by taking shelter from retribution behind an antimissile space "shield." What we see here is the same old course aimed at achieving decisive military superiority for American imperialism with all the ensuing dangerous consequences for the cause of peace and the peoples' freedom. The Soviet Union is resolutely against such a concept and such plans.

How many times has the United States already made a most serious miscalculation in taking our sincere interest in ending the arms race as a sign of weakness and spurring on new military programs? Some people are now also making this kind of interpretation of the Soviet appeal for the nonmilitarization of space. It has long been time for it to be correctly understood that it is not because the USSR will not be able to respond to these plans of Washington that it is so sharply opposed to the arms race spreading to space. If we are forced to do so we, as on several occasions in the past, will do everything necessary to protect our security and also the security of our allies.

Mankind has a vital interest in ensuring that the war threat does not grow. The militarization of space would inevitably lead to this and become the catalyst for an uncontrolled arms race in every area [po vsem napravleniyam]. No one must be lulled by propaganda alleging that the United States' space plans are innocuous and designed for "defense" and "as yet" only boil down to a pure research project. History provides a harsh reminder of how the one-time Manhattan scientific project turned into a nuclear hell for the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To prevent a new terrible danger for mankind, this time coming from space, is a command of the times and of reason.

The peoples react with gratitude and hope to the Soviet Union's line on fundamental questions on whose resolution the very future of human civilization depends. All Soviet people unanimously approve and ardently support the firm course of their own party and state aimed at curbing the arms race and ensuring peace. Together with the whole of peace-loving mankind they demand the elimination of the nuclear threat and the safeguarding of peaceful outer space for the benefit of all people on earth.

Arbatov Interview

AU190925 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Feb 85 p 5

[Interview given by Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to Janos Elek, "foreign policy columnist," and Istvan Zalai, "Moscow correspondent": "The Prevention of Catastrophe Is a Common Interest" — date and place not given; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] New Soviet-U.S. talks will start on 12 March on the comprehensive range of issues of space and nuclear -- strategic and intermediate range -- weapons. The new Geneva opening is anticipated with hope and expectation all over the world. The fate of these negotiations can have a determining influence on the development of world politics, as the issues on the agenda are decisive for mankind -- will they succeed in halting the arms race? Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, spoke about these talks and their background.

[Zalai, Elek] What mutual Soviet-U.S. interests make possible the Geneva talks starting on 12 March? Is there such a general interest?
The mutual interest that makes the negotiations possible and necessary is primarily the interest in survival. The arms race not only threatens to entail large expenses and increased suspicion, it is also one of the main direct sources of the danger of war for several reasons. This is so, for instance, because the political atmosphere naturally deteriorates when the development of new weapons is under way and other countries respond to the challenge in a similar way; another reason is that the new weapons systems appearing now limit to the extreme minimum the time available for the most responsible decisions in the history of mankind. The Pershing II missiles deployed in Western Europe, for instance, can reach certain command centers in the Soviet Union in a matter of 6 to 8 minutes. It is possible to imagine what can be done in this or even a shorter period of time. The current arms race unavoidably leads to new dangers; nor are we living in a too secure world today, although there are only five nuclear powers at present. We can imagine what it would be like if there were 15 or 20 nuclear powers.

Do They Understand the Common Interests on the Other Side of the Ocean Too?

In addition, nowadays everyone is beginning to realize that the current arms race and the way the U.S. is financing it puts the other countries in a very difficult situation, and this is precisely one of the reasons for the increased indebtedness and difficult financial situation of the developing countries. We could talk at great length about this mechanism but, to be brief, the large U.S. military expenses are causing a great deficit. In order to fight this deficit, the current U.S. Administration, afraid of inflation, does not wish to use the banknote presses even more, and instead it makes the money market more expensive by increasing the interest rate. This, of course, artificially increases the dollar's exchange rate. The result of this is that the developing countries receive cheap dollar credits but must pay back expensive dollars, and they receive every additional credit at an increasingly high interest rate. This has led to an impossible situation in the financial world, has had a catastrophic effect on the developing countries, has made things bad for the other countries, and makes the Americans themselves face great problems.

Summing it up: There are mutual interests which can contribute to the reaching of an agreement. But, the big question is whether they understand this on the other side, and a decisive problem is whether they understand the mutual interests correctly. Here begin the difficulties with U.S. policy.

These mutual interests were present earlier, too, but they did not lead to agreement. How is the current situation different from the previous one? Is a new element discernible in the U.S. position?

Is there anything new in the U.S. Administration's position? This continues to be a big question that we are still unable to answer. But let us nevertheless take the past year as an example. The administration continuously stressed that it had not changed its policy. But we of course are well aware — our memory is not so short — that, at least in words, Washington has given up its earlier position.

There is a Need To Make Use of the Opportunity Arising

When Reagan came to power, his openly declared aim in his first years was to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union. This aim was confirmed by the Republican Party's 1980 platform, and was declared in an entire series of speeches. Now the U.S. side refrains from this. They no longer use, for instance, the expression 'limited nuclear war.' At that time they declared that they would not negotiate with us, or if
they did, they would do it only from a position of strength — that is, when they had already reached it they would be ready to talk with us. At present, however, they keep proving that they are willing to negotiate, that they want to eliminate nuclear weapons, and more than that, they even agreed to lay this down in a document. I do not say that this is proof of a real change in their position, but the declarations at least have changed. In any case, it seems that an opportunity has emerged which we must make use of. This is how I evaluate the change in the situation and that is why our position to agree on negotiations emerged.

[Zalai, Elek] What are the interests that can endanger the success of the negotiations and can make them doubtful?

[Arbatov] I would say that now, in the last weeks following the Geneva agreement in January, very disturbing things have begun to occur which strengthen the belief that the U.S. side is again completely consciously creating a tense atmosphere. Using all possible means, it tries to upset confidence in the Soviet Union and to lay the foundations of the necessity for the continuation of the arms race.

This position raises the following question: Does the current U.S. Administration take the negotiations seriously, the negotiations on which an agreement has been reached, or does it need them only in order to show some degree of success in its foreign policy? Does the administration want merely to hide the arms race through negotiations in order to calm its allies and public opinion — that is, does it wish to disguise the same old direction through the negotiations? Comrade Chernenko spoke in detail about this in his interview with CNN-TV.

We Have Many Questions for the Americans

There have been U.S. claims and views that the negotiations will be long and difficult, and that one cannot know how an agreement can be achieved. Another thing has been added to this lately. How can the fact be interpreted that, prior to the negotiations, the U.S. Administration, in its report to Congress accuses the Soviet Union of breaching previous agreements. It can be interpreted only as a sign that "it is impossible to negotiate with the Russians."

They try to persuade Congress and public opinion of this. Can anyone who really takes the negotiations seriously act this way? I do not even mention the baselessness of the declaration at the moment. If we read it more attentively, its form also proves to be the height of perfidy. What are they doing? They write that "it is imaginable," that "it is so, but it is possible that it is the other way," that "there are grounds to think...," that "it is not out of the question," and that "it is possible." And all this in spite of the fact that there is also a direct possibility of discussing it all. We, too, of course, have many questions for the U.S. side. That is precisely why we created the permanent consultative committee which deals with supervising the maintenance of previous agreements. If such questions arise, we can ask each other, and we can also get answers to these questions.

Another thing: Let us consider Weinberger's and Shultz' declarations at the congressional hearing, or some of Reagan's declarations. The impression is that the most important thing for the U.S. Administration is not to prepare the field for successful negotiations, but to "put Congress in its place," to persuade it not to reduce military expenditures or a single military program in the course of the budget debates. To persuade Congress, the administration's hypocrisy goes as far as to say: U.S. armament is necessary for the success of the negotiations. This is the old, bankrupt approach to the
negotiations — and this has already been revealed by serious U.S. analyses too — when
the U.S. side was in fact trying to utilize the negotiations for the same goal as the
arms race: to upset the balance of power. They always used armament for increasing
their own power, and they tried to use the negotiations for reducing Soviet forces. It
is obvious that the Soviet Union is not ready for such an agreement. The Soviet Union
agreed to the negotiations precisely because it believes that by safeguarding the
existing balance, it is possible to seriously and radically reduce armaments. This
position of ours continues to be in force.

Then we have the anti-Soviet outbursts, threats. How, for instance, should one inter-
pret Reagan's words that if there is no agreement to his liking, he will recall the U.S.
negotiating delegation from Geneva? Prior to negotiations, this kind of ultimatum is
not used with any sovereign country. To talk to us as if to a country that has lost a
war is not the way; we have lost neither a war nor battles.

[Zalai, Elek] Is this only propaganda prior to the negotiations or can something
similar be expected at the talks too?

[Arbatov] I cannot give a conclusive answer to this question, but I think that all this
can be interpreted only in one way: The U.S. Administration itself has not yet decided
what it wants. These are only words. It is possible, of course, that the administra-
tion's members have already decided themselves what they want. In any case, we are
witnessing obvious contradictions in their declarations. On the one hand they say that
the most important thing is to eliminate all nuclear weapons. They have signed this.
In Geneva George Shultz and Andrey Gromyko signed a statement that there is a need to
reduce nuclear weapons and that the final aim is their complete elimination. The same
thing applies to "star wars" too: They agreed that this would be the subject of the
negotiations. On the other hand, however, completely contradictory declarations are
made. A situation has emerged which will make the negotiations very difficult. In my
personal opinion, on the basis of what has been going on in the past few weeks, it is
completely obvious that it is presently more important for the U.S. Administration to
get congressional approval for the military expenditures and the military programs than
to assure the success of the negotiations, or at least their successful beginning.

"Star Wars" Defense -- Offensive Plan

[Zalai, Elek] In this connection, how do you evaluate the U.S. Administration's
declarations urging the continuation of the "star wars" program?

[Arbatov] First of all, this is contradictory to the agreement reached. Second, it
is of course difficult to interpret this as other than an attempt to foil the nego-
tiations because, I believe, it is now already clear to the Americans that we will not
agree to any reduction of offensive weapons if they do not give up this missile defense
system. If they stick to the system, they render questionable the possibility of
achieving an agreement. But, of course, other explanations are also possible here; it
can also be, for instance, some sort of attempt to "run up the bidding", to force us
to make concessions in exchange for some sort of relative limitation of U.S. plans.

[Zalai, Elek] Washington claims that without the space weapons plan, the Soviet Union
would not have sat down to the negotiating table. What is the Soviet reply to this
claim?
This is simply not true. We were negotiating long before these plans. More than that, we had successful talks on SALT I; and there were hard but successful talks on the SALT II agreement. We were ready to negotiate conscientiously with the present administration too, but this failed, and not through our fault. We believe that we must not let slip a single opportunity, a single realistic possibility of returning to negotiations. The evaluation of the situation and of the U.S. Administration's position made last year and at the beginning of this year signaled to us that, in spite of all the difficulties, there are such possibilities.

Concerning the appearance of the space arms plans, they brought only one type of change in the Soviet position -- we included the matter of "star wars" in the negotiations. This is a very important issue that we could discuss a lot and that requires special analysis. There are a series of questions here. For instance: How realistic is the whole plan? Talking with experts, it is my impression that the conscious majority of them do not consider a really efficient missile defense system deployed in space to be realistic the coming decades, and even beyond. Many experts believe that there is only one understandable element in this whole matter: The star wars conception is part of the first-strike concept. That is, the MX missiles, the missiles of the Trident II submarines, are directed against the missiles of the other side, the Pershing II missiles are used against guidance centers, and the defense system is used to defend against the counterstrikes of the small number of remaining missiles. But it is the work of the experts to decide whether this is possible or not.

If the Negotiations Drag On for 7 or 8 Years, They Will Be Useless

I consider it entirely possible that certain high-ranking people in the United States, watching the "Star Wars" films, can really think that all this is real. They are so unfamiliar with these issues that it appears that they have been hibernating during these years and forgot about the long debates on missile defense systems, on their connection with offensive weapons -- debates going on at the end of the sixties and at the beginning of the seventies.

There is another element -- namely, to force upon us great expenditures, to undermine us economically. What can I say about this? Of course it is not pleasant to spend unnecessary amounts and I do not exclude our having to do this nevertheless.

But primarily it is my conviction that we have already learned to react to these matters rationally enough and not to step onto the road onto which the Americans try to push us. There are surely other roads that shatter the U.S. conceptions and which are much less expensive than they think they are. As to what these roads are, let the experts look after that. Second, although they are the richest in the capitalist world, the Americans themselves cannot spend unlimited amounts on arms, either. Precisely through extraordinary armament, they have incurred such expenses that have made the budget deficit and state debts the main problem, both for themselves and internationally. I would like to add only that it seems to me that the main line of political struggle in Congress, between Congress and the administration, in public opinion in the coming period, will be how to eliminate or reduce to an acceptable extent the deficit, the state debts.

There are U.S. experts who are talking about lengthy negotiations that can last 7 to 8 years. Does not the development of the military industry entail the threat that the current already complex disarmament issues can become insoluble in the meantime?
I think that if these negotiations take 7 to 8 years to reach the first serious agreement, they are useless. During this time, military technology will indeed advance so much that completely different issues will be on the agenda. We must live through these 7 or 8 years without a catastrophe, and considering the current pace of armament, this will not be easy. Then there also arises the question of what if the negotiations go beyond the current, and even the next President's term? For me, however, it seems most essential that dragging out the negotiations is really in the interest of the most consistent supporters of the military-industrial complex in the U.S. Administration. They simply want to drag out the negotiations in order to arrive in a position in a few years, when -- concerning many issues -- it will simply be impossible to achieve an agreement. Weapons systems can emerge which will simply be impossible to control. Already now there are ocean-deployed cruise missiles which are practically impossible to control.

They Demanded Capitulation, Not Compromise

Prior to the new negotiations, as also in the past, accusations are heard in Washington that the Soviet Union is not ready for compromises. What is your reply to these accusations?

Look, it all depends on what kind of compromise Washington has in mind. Until now they have striven for a "compromise," whereby we reduce our military strategic force's most important element, and they reduce nothing or only a very limited amount. This is unacceptable to us. What they demanded from us would not have been compromise but capitulation. Another U.S. effort is precisely discernible: They wanted to force us to destroy everything that is already operational and is part of the current military balance -- in exchange for the promise that they will give up a part of the future military programs that for the time being are only on the drawing board. We did not agree with this either, because we started from the premise that at present there is a relative balance and the important thing is not what plans we have and what is invented by one or another of our engineers. We claim that we must deal with the current issues, the current weapons, and we must halt their further development. Only in such a framework are we ready for compromises, and we have proved this. We have proved this at the negotiations on the intermediate range missiles at which we were searching very persistently for compromise.

What Washington Wants Has Still Not Been Decided

As a whole, we went rather far to reach absolutely acceptable, and even more advantageous compromises for the West, but also acceptable to us. We were searching for such compromises at other talks too, in contrast with Washington. The question is not simply that they do not want a compromise, but it seems that the main question has not yet been decided -- what does Washington want? Does Washington wish to continue the arms race and to achieve military superiority, or has it understood that an arms race can never be won and therefore it is necessary to come to an agreement concerning the reduction of armaments? I have the feeling that we have still not received the answer to this most important question.

Thank you for the discussion.
U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

PRC COMMENT ON U.S.-SOVIET GENEVA TALKS CRITICIZED

PM201001 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7, Feb 84 pp 24-25

[Article by P. Dalnev under "China" rubric: "Sitting in Impartial Judgement?"]

[Text] The understanding reached in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the United States on the subject and purpose as well as the opening date of the coming talks on nuclear and space armaments has been widely commented the world over. World public opinion has welcomed the outcome of the Geneva meeting.

The views voiced on this score by official Chinese spokesmen, however, have been highly contradictory. Before the Geneva meeting of the Soviet Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, Premier Zhao Ziyang said in December that China welcomed it. That the Chinese side welcomed the "resumption of disarmament talks" between the Soviet Union and the United States was stressed also at a press briefing arranged by the P.R.C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs the day after the Gromyko-Shultz meeting. Commenting on its results, the RENMIN RIBAO wrote that "the step towards dialogue between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. accords with the wishes of the world's peoples, who are in favour disarmament, and hence it merits approbation."

More frequently heard are variations on the favourite Beijing theme of "the two super-powers," which allegedly are in equal measure responsible for the continuing arms build-up, equally to blame for the absence of progress in arms limitation, and both of which pursue their own selfish ends. Moreover, Washington is credited with the initiative in the organization of the Geneva meeting and in general in the matter of disarmament.

Some Chinese press commentators are already prophesying the outcome of the talks although they have not even started. In effect, they predict a total absence of results. The Beijing magazine LIAOWANG, for instance, writes that Soviet-American negotiations are "talks for the sake of talks," a "dialogue of the deaf," and that the new talks in Geneva will not be an exception. In making these predictions, the Beijing commentators do not feel at all obliged to establish who is in the right and who in the wrong, to go into the substance of the matter.

Clearly, the Chinese side is laying claim as it has done so many times before, to the role of something of an adjudicator that impartially passes judgement on others. But where does impartiality come in if the militarist policy of the United States and the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union are placed on the same plane?
An objective analysis of the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. as regards the problem of disarmament in general as well as its various aspects makes it plain who it is that takes an open and aboveboard approach and seeks the practical solution of important problems and who engages in obstructionism and harbours illusory hopes of being able to gain military superiority. The Soviet Union, as Konstantin Chernenko has stressed, is going to the coming Soviet-American talks with a view to the achievement of mutually acceptable understandings on the entire range of questions relating to nuclear and space weapons, firmly resolved to work for a serious step forward in the matter of reducing the danger of war.

What if not obvious bias accounts for the fact that the constructive stand of the Soviet Union, its activity aimed at checking the arms race, are not subjected to objective analysis in China? Attempts to cast a shadow on the Soviet Union do not testify to an unbiased approach to the question.

Clearly discernible in the coverage of Soviet-American contacts in the sphere of disarmament, which certainly cannot be said to be objective, is the approach to the problem of disarmament and the ways and means of resolving it which dominates in the Chinese press and is propounded by official P.R.C. spokesmen. Lately there has been no dearth in China of pronouncements in favour of disarmament and declarations of intent to help curb the arms race. "China," Zhao Ziyang said at a session of the National People's Congress in May 1984, "is prepared to live up to its obligations in the matter of nuclear disarmament." It is indicative, however, that the formula of disarmament advanced by the Chinese side puts off China's participation in nuclear disarmament to "the distant future." Its participation is made directly dependent on agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a substantial reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

What are the implications of such a position? It hardly need be said that in the present conditions, when the arms race, primarily the nuclear, is being escalated more and more through the fault of imperialism, what are needed are not vague generalities, but concrete initiatives and actions to check this dangerous process and prevent it from spreading to new sphere. Moreover, it is imperative for all states, and primarily those that possess nuclear weapons, to take joint action without delay.

This approach was supported also by the recent six-nation summit conference held in Delhi, which adopted a declaration calling on all nuclear powers to put an end to the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

This by and large is the basis on which real progress is possible in all spheres of disarmament.

What is the Chinese side doing in practical terms on this plane today? An idea of this can be gained from its patently inconsistent performance at the 39th U.N. General Assembly.

On the one hand, the Chinese delegation supported an important resolution aimed at preventing the militarization of outer space. On the other hand, its stand was altogether different on a number of major issues on the Assembly agenda with a direct bearing on the prevention of nuclear war and limitation of the nuclear arms race. The Chinese delegation did not support a single one of the draft resolutions submitted by the socialist and non-aligned countries concerning a freeze on nuclear armament, preferring to be among the small group of countries that abstained from voting.
Neither did the Chinese delegates support the resolution submitted by the socialist countries on renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons which was endorsed by a majority vote. The Chinese delegation abstained also from voting on the resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the drafts of which were submitted by the socialist and non-aligned countries and which were adopted by the overwhelming majority of the world organization. The General Assembly also adopted resolutions on the prohibition of neutron weapons, limitation and reduction of naval armaments, and extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans. The delegation of the P.R.C. again abstained.

Unwillingness actively to support and to join with other countries in efforts in cardinal areas of the struggle for the limitation of nuclear armaments, and attempts to shift the blame on others, to make it appear as if the Soviet Union were responsible for the tension in the world, can only play into the hands of the opponents of disarmament.
IZVESTIYA SEES SDI AS UNDERMINING STABILITY

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Editorial article: "On the United States' So-called 'Strategic Defense Initiative'"—capitalized passages published in boldface]

[Text] The results of the Geneva meeting between A.A. Gromyko, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz generated a broad positive response throughout the world. The path has been opened toward concrete and purposeful talks on the formulation of effective measures which aim to prevent an arms race in space and end it on earth.

It is a question of new talks encompassing a package of organically interconnected questions concerned with preventing the space militarization and reducing nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium-range. In view of the conditions that have objectively taken shape at this time, any other approach to the matter is impossible. A precise reflection of this was provided by the Soviet-U.S. joint statement recently published. During the upcoming talks only strict observance, in all its parts, of the accord reached can ensure real progress along the path of ending the arms race, eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons, the report on the CPSU Central Committee Politburo examination of the question of the results of the Geneva talks stresses.

The path toward the adoption of the agreed decisions will not be easy, of course. But the Soviet Union is ready to go its part of the way. It has a right to expect the same from the United States.

At the same time attention is attracted by the fact that in the United States not only the mass media but also administration spokesmen are not ceasing to make statements whose central theme consists of appeals not to abandon plans for extending the arms race into space, to move toward the creation of a large-scale antimissile defense system, and to attempt to use the upcoming talks to legalize such schemes. Incidentally, at the beginning of January the White House distributed a special brochure entitled "Presidential Strategic Defense Initiative" (this is the official name given in the United States to the "star wars" program advanced by the President in March 1983) in which the militarization of space is elevated to the rank of a priority task of U.S. state policy through the end of the century.

The most important objective of the "strategic defense initiative" is proclaimed to be the creation of an all-embracing antimissile defense system which, according to Washington's assurances, could protect the whole of U.S. territory from "enemy"
strategic ballistic missiles. A considerable part of this system is to be based in space and incorporates means for destroying missiles based on new physical principles (lasers, particle beam weapons, and so forth).

Sums running into many billions have already been allocated to reach this objective. Intensive scientific research and design work is under way to develop experimental samples of individual elements of an all-embracing antimissile defense system. There are future plans to test them to demonstrate that the system will "work." Plans are being drawn up to deploy the system in sequential parts as the corresponding technological problems are solved. Special commands and control centers are being set up for space systems for military purposes.

Encountering resistance to the so-called "defense initiative" both from the American public and from abroad, a broad propaganda campaign has been launched in Washington in which attempts are being made to provide every kind of justification in people's eyes for the White House's course which aims to militarize space. The publication of the above-mentioned brochure was just one such attempt. Complaining that they are simply not understood on this question, people in Washington have served up a new helping of propaganda inventions, fact juggling, and even overt falsification designed to awaken the "uncomprehending" and wavering to the "advantages" of the "star wars" program advanced by the U.S. Administration.

THE FIRST INVENTION. Realizing that people all over the world are deeply worried by the ever-increasing avalanche of U.S. war preparations, the creators of the "strategic defense initiative" place the main emphasis on portraying the creation of an all-embracing ABM system with space-based elements as a means of strengthening strategic stability. U.S. leaders declare that they have opened up "encouraging prospects that it will be possible to defend ourselves effectively" with an all-embracing ABM system and, they claim, to switch "from a strategy based on the threat of offensive might to a strategy that threatens no one." This, they say, will ensure the possibility of achieving "a more stable deterrence."

What is the real situation with respect to this question? The U.S. and USSR strategic nuclear forces have existed for over 30 years, and throughout this time, ever since their appearance, the Soviet Union has been forced in their creation and subsequent deployment to respond to the challenge of the United States, which has been seeking military superiority. The strategic parity achieved in the early seventies deprived the United States of the possibility of blackmailing the USSR with the nuclear threat and forced it to embark on strategic arms limitation talks.

The USSR and the United States then reached a clear understanding that under conditions of parity in strategic offensive forces the acquisition of an additional defensive potential by either side would be tantamount to the acquisition by it of the potential for a preemptive nuclear strike.

The logic of nuclear confrontation is such that the creation of a ramified ABM system by no means pursues defensive aims but is an integral element of a course toward securing military superiority. Such a system would undermine the strategic parity of forces and would destabilize the strategic situation as a whole. In order to restore the disrupted parity under those conditions, in response the other side would be forced to strengthen its own strategic potential either by directly building up its own offensive forces or by supplementing them with means of defense. In either case all this would lead ultimately to an unlimited arms race.
The recognition by the USSR and the United States of the interconnection between offensive and defensive strategic systems was expressed in the simultaneous signing on 26 May 1972 of the unlimited-duration treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The ABM treaty became the cornerstone of the whole process of limiting and reducing nuclear armaments. "The sides," the treaty says, "consider that effective measures to limit ABM systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of an outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." In other words, only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems makes it possible to advance along the path of limiting and reducing offensive arms.

It is precisely this key tenet regarding the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms that the American advocates of "star wars" are now undermining.

They are making out that the sides earlier arrived at this tenet not as a result of a recognition of the role of ABM systems as catalysts in the arms race, but merely as a result of the absence at that time of the technical potential for creating effective ABM systems.

Actually, such an interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive systems is of a permanent nature and exists objectively. It does not disappear, either, with the emergence of the possibility of developing technically more sophisticated and more effective ABM systems. On the contrary, the development of such systems would affect the correlation of the sides' strategic forces even more tangibly and would render it extremely unsteady and unstable. Furthermore, the danger of a nuclear war being unleashed, with all its consequences for mankind, would increase sharply. Expert calculations indicate that, even if both sides possessed approximately equivalent large-scale ABM systems, even the most insignificant differences in their efficiency would be likely to substantially undermine strategic parity and destabilize the entire strategic situation. In addition to this, sober-minded scientists in the United States itself correctly point out that the actual work on implementing the program Washington announced is in itself of a provocative and destabilizing nature, regardless of its ultimate results.

SECOND INVENTION. U.S. Administration spokesmen argue a great deal that the development of an all-embracing ABM system with space-based components supposedly pursues the "humanitarian" goal of rendering strategic nuclear missile weapons "unnecessary" and "obsolete" and almost opens the way to the liquidation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, all actions by the U.S. Administration provide evidence that in reality, something completely different is intended. In embarking on the implementation of its "space wars" program, Washington by no means intends to abandon its multibillion dollar programs to build up all components of its so-called strategic triad, primarily ballistic missiles. What "obsolescence" of missiles can they be talking about when the U.S. Administration is developing, in parallel with the large-scale ABM system, six new types of strategic offensive weapons. The Pentagon intends to have the new MX ICBM's by 1986, the Midgetman by the early nineties, and the new sea-launched Trident II strategic missiles by 1989; it is developing 2 new types of heavy bombers and is planning to deploy over 12,000 long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes.

When Washington talks about "giving up ballistic missiles," it has in mind the Soviet ICBM's which form the foundation of the USSR's strategic might. It thinks that, by significantly reducing their numbers, it would substantially weaken the potential for
a retaliatory strike by the Soviet Union. And all this is taking place while the U.S. missile-carrying submarine fleet is being reequipped with ballistic missiles carrying the potential for a nuclear first strike (Trident II), while the United States has its first-strike nuclear missiles in West Europe, and while there is unrestricted deployment around the USSR of long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes and of new conventional weapons whose efficiency approximates that of nuclear means.

Things are no better as regards the American leaders' assurances that the United States intends, by means of its future ABM system, to supposedly "defend" its European allies. In actual fact, Washington is not very much concerned with the fate of Europeans. The advantages of deploying American space weapons are frankly argued in the United States since this would make it possible to conduct a nuclear conflict over Europe and not over the United States.

The real purpose of the U.S. "initiative" in "strategic defense" is not to strengthen but to undermine strategic stability. The "reliable ABM shield," of which people in Washington are dreaming, is nothing but a desire to create an opportunity to carry out a nuclear attack from behind this shield and deflect a retaliatory strike by the USSR.

It is therefore a question not of weapons for defense against nuclear means but of new weapons to back up nuclear aggression.

But the people in Washington are forgetting that the person against whom these decisions are made will not be sitting idly by. He will do everything to thwart the aggressor's adventurist plans. And they will undoubtedly be thwarted. The United States will never acquire military superiority over the socialist countries, even if they perch their new arms up in space. In that case they would achieve just one thing -- the sharp intensification of the danger of a nuclear catastrophe and a pointless squandering of the material and intellectual resources of their country and all mankind. The U.S. "star wars" plans are by no means a boon, but a deadly threat to the peoples.

THIRD INVENTION. In an attempt to mislead people, the U.S. leaders state that the "strategic defense initiative" is being implemented exclusively within the framework of scientific research and experimental design work and that this work allegedly poses no real threat of the deployment of a comprehensive ABM system and does not violate any existing U.S. arms limitation commitments, above all none stipulated by the ABM treaty.

Not one word of these claims is true. It is clear that billions of dollars are not being spent on scientific research and experimental design work out of love for science and technical discoveries. The tests on components of the large-scale ABM system which are both already under way and envisaged by the Pentagon are directly aimed at creating conditions in which it would just be necessary to take a decision on the practical deployment of the relevant means. They want to present the USSR with the fait accompli of the already predetermined appearance in the United States in the near future of comprehensive ABM defenses, and, if possible, to obtain the Soviet side's consent to such actions.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union will not stand idly by watching to see how the U.S. "research" turns out but will in its turn be forced to take the necessary measures. That is why excuses about "research" do not alter the crux of the matter.
The U.S. plans seriously undermine the basis of the process of limiting the arms race. They are not only an obstacle to any agreements on nuclear arms limitation but directly program (programmirovat) an arms race.

The commissioning of a comprehensive ABM system with space-based elements is only possible at the cost of scrapping (likvidatsiya) the ABM treaty. The carrying out of extensive scientific research and experimental design work and the conducting of practical tests of individual components of the system will objectively lead to this most important Soviet-U.S. treaty being undermined. Pentagon representatives themselves have been forced to admit that this is so. "At the present stage...we are conducting research work aimed at determining whether an entirely reliable system can be created. If it can we will have to go beyond the framework of the ABM treaty," U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger stated unapologetically on 12 September 1984. Not even General Abrahamson, the leader of the ABM program, tries to hide the Pentagon's true intentions; on 17 December 1984 he stated that "when ever part of a comprehensive ABM system has been developed and is ready for use, the United States will have to come to an agreement with the USSR on modifying the ABM treaty, since certain of its provisions will be at odds with the system's tasks."

Washington figures are not embarrassed that the creation of a comprehensive ABM system with space-based elements negates the basic provision of the ABM treaty -- the sides' commitment not to create ABM defenses of a country's territory.

Nor are they embarrassed by the fact that the ban enshrined in the treaty on the creation of components and space-based ABM systems and the restrictions on the creation of such systems based on new physical principles are also being violated. They also want to derail many other multilateral agreements currently in force, such as the 1963 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the three environments, the 1967 treaty on the principles governing the activities of states in the exploitation and use of outer space, and the 1977 convention on the prohibition of hostile influences on the environment.

Continuing the line toward the violation of its international commitments, the United States is vainly counting on hiding behind unfounded accusations against the USSR alleging that it is not observing the ABM treaty and other agreements. It is clear why these accusations are being leveled. It is also clear who is burdened by the agreements that have been signed and who is seeking ways of avoiding their fulfillment and, indeed, of directly violating them.

The United States' so-called "research" in the field of the development of ABM defense with space-based elements is leading to the creation of a situation in which the entire system of international law, which for the time being is still curbing the states' military activism, might be jeopardized, a situation in which it would become completely impossible to achieve constructive accords on arms limitation and reduction.

THE FOURTH INVENTION. In seeking to persuade Americans of the need for the United States to create an all-embracing ABM system, the Washington leaders would like to ascribe to the Soviet Union some programs for creating ABM defense for the country's territory. The Soviet Union has no such plans, and Washington is well aware of the fact. That is why it is deliberately obscuring the issue, as the saying goes: Either the Russians are on the point of creating an all-embracing ABM system or they have already created it. Inasmuch as there is no proof of this, for greater "persuasiveness" mention is made of the Soviet Union's possession of a limited ABM system and of an air defense system.
The authors of these fabrications aimed at the uninitiated are obviously not in the least embarrassed by the fact that the limited ABM system (one-region ABM defense) has been created in the USSR in accordance with the provisions of the ABM treaty (The United States had previously created a similar system) and does not even remotely resemble the broad-scale ABM system with space-based elements thought up in the United States. It is also clear to every unbiased person that the Soviet Union's air defense system bears no relation to ABM defense.

In addition the arguments used on this issue by the defenders of the "strategic defense initiative" are blatantly inconsistent. On the one hand they seem to believe that to obtain the promised "stabilizing effect" both antagonistic sides — the United States and the USSR — should have all-embracing ABM systems. Nonetheless Washington officials state without a trace of embarrassment that the situation will be "stable" if only the United States has such a system on a unilateral basis, and the sooner the better. If the Russians are the first to create such a system then, according to Weinberger, "it would be very, very dangerous in the world... It would be very powerfully reminiscent of a world in which the Russians had nuclear weapons and the United States had none."

There's the defensive armaments "stabilizing" role which Washington is hypocritically discussing. U.S. militarists have a good idea of the consequences of the creation of an all-embracing ABM system by one side and it is for precisely that reason that they are persistently seeking this for the United States.

Also clear in light of this is the point of attempts to unfoundedly attribute their own dangerous intentions in this field to the Soviet Union and to conceal their own efforts to undermine equilibrium and acquire strategic superiority over the USSR.

Despite the propaganda efforts the Washington administration is making to justify the creation of an all-embracing ABM system with space-based elements, the opposition to this "initiative" is growing both in the United States itself and beyond. The opponents of the U.S. Administration's plans include eminent military and political specialists who have held leading posts in previous U.S. Administrations, the leaders of a number of NATO countries, and representatives of the public.

The U.S. leaders are being cautioned — they are being persistently warned that the "star wars" idea is a very dangerous blunder.

A blunder from the political viewpoint. It is impossible to lay claim to the pursuit of a realistic and responsible policy and at the same time to gamble on creating ever new weapons, to reject the arms limitation accords which have been reached, and to disregard the interests of the security of the peoples, including their own people.

A miscalculation from a scientific and technical viewpoint. This was stated very clearly by members of the USSR Academy of Sciences in their appeal to all the world's scientists. Their opinion concurs with the authoritative statement by the presidents and representatives of 36 academies of sciences of various countries. It is shared by American scientists who describe the assertions about the possibility of creating an "absolute ABM defense" as "the U.S. Administration's most irresponsible statements of late."

Finally, a very dangerous miscalculation from a military viewpoint: The development of work on creating a new ABM system does not strengthen America's security but is a step taking us closer to the threshold of nuclear war, for which the United States will not escape retribution. Attempts to militarize space will inevitably result just in a still more threatening twist to the arms race spiral, for which all responsibility will lie with the present U.S. Administration.
The rapid development of space technology, the opportunities that have emerged for using space for military purposes, and the efforts which the United States is stubbornly undertaking in this direction have made the problem of preventing the space militarization the most urgent task of the present time. The creation of space strike armaments — if they cannot banned — would be an extremely destabilizing factor and serve as an impetus for an essentially uncontrolled arms race.

The problem of the nonmilitarization of space affects the vital interests of all mankind. A fatal mistake will have been made if space becomes an arena of the arms race, a bridgehead for aggression. Everything must be done to prevent such a development of events.

The USSR advocates banning forever the use of force in space and from space with regard to the earth, as well as from the earth with regard to objects in space. No kinds of weapon — conventional, nuclear, laser, beam, or any other — must be launched into space or deployed there, whether in manned or unmanned systems. No space strike arms based on any principles of operation and any kind of basing must be created, tested, or deployed either for use in space or for use from space against targets on the earth, in the air, or at sea. Such means which have already been created must be destroyed.

Given a radical solution of the problem of the nonmilitarization of space, the way would be opened up to substantial reductions of nuclear arms on a reciprocal basis, right down to their total destruction, with, of course, strict observance of the principle of equality and identical security.

On the other hand, it is obvious that it is now impossible to resolve the problem of nuclear arms in isolation from a ban on space strike arms. Questions of nuclear and space arms are organically interconnected, and they must be examined and resolved precisely as a package at the talks. The resolution of the question of space strike arms is of key, priority significance here. Talks on the problem of nuclear arms would be devoid of meaning and prospect without preserving the ABM treaty and without banning the militarization of space. This was stated very clearly and firmly in A.A. Gromyko’s conversation with Soviet political observers.

The Soviet initiative, as a result of which talks on a whole range of questions relating to nuclear and space arms have been made possible, is an expression of the USSR’s principled policy of ensuring real progress in the matter of lessening the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and improving the entire international situation. We would like to hope that understanding of the responsibility which lies with the United States in connection with the upcoming talks will prevail in Washington, and the necessary practical conclusions will be drawn with regard to the task of ensuring their constructive development and achieving weighty concrete results for the benefit of the cause of peace and of reducing the threat of nuclear war.

It is not deception of one’s partner and of public opinion that must be the aim of the talks — we cannot agree with such morality, K.U. Chernenko emphasized — but the search for mutually acceptable solutions which would accord with the interests of peace. The opportunity to elaborate such solutions must not be missed.
Faline describes development, content of SDI

PM041637 Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 3, 4 Feb 85 Morning Edition

[Article by political observer Valentin Falin under the rubric "Problems and Judgments": "Anatomy of Another Adventure"]

[3 Feb 85 p 5]

Text: Sometimes a greater understanding of the essence of a matter is provided by a comparison not of the two sides’ positions, but of the views of one and the same government expressed at different times and under different circumstances. I am prepared to take into consideration the specific nature of bourgeois democracy, which not only permits but even proposes "distortion of the truth, concealment of information, and other improper acts and dishonest actions in the name of the triumph of national will." I am prepared to take this into account as a fact as long as and insofar as deception, self-interest, and treachery do not become the chief substance of policy.

Before and after A.A. Gromyko’s meeting with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, Washington put heaps of propaganda papers into circulation and bombarded listeners and viewers with streams of words. Dozens of speeches were made, and dozens of interviews given, and there were innumerable article and commentaries — semiofficial, confidential, and anonymous. All this was not so much to satisfy a hunger for true information as to mold the psychological mood required by the U.S. ruling circles.

The truth can easily do without deafening publicity. If you set forth the truth openly and clearly, it will find its own way to people’s hearts and minds; only do not hinder it. This is in regard to the truth: And what do we have here? What we have is a desire to pass off black as white at all costs and to prove that, the higher the mound of weapons, the more widely the future’s horizons are opened up from there, and that there is no better means of pacifying the earth than to deprive it of peaceful skies.

But, all the same, why did Washington decide to scorn common sense and declare in 1983: Give me a fulcrum in space, and I will overturn the old concepts of threats and defense, of war and peace?
For even before R. Reagan, American presidents, secretaries of state and defense, and generals meticulously researched the problem of ABM defense in all its forms and variations. Nor did the means of utilizing space-based systems for an active and a passive struggle against nuclear missile weapons remain outside their field of vision. And invariably the logic of facts forced them to draw the conclusion that the game is not worth the candle. New weapons will give rise to new, greater threats and create new, worse instability; and the impasses of military confrontation will become still more hopeless and blind.

The conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of ABM systems in 1972 was not a hasty, precipitated act. The treaty formalized both sides' voluntary recognition of an objective necessity. The absence of a time limit on the adopted pledges emphasized the two powers' conviction as to the correctness of their choice in favor of arms control and equitable cooperation. It would be no exaggeration to say that the ABM treaty was and still is a bridge to the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic arms and to accords on all other nuclear and nonnuclear arms and on the building of peace on the principles of equality and identical security.

On acceding to power, the present administration leveled scathing criticism not just at certain details in the activities of Presidents R. Nixon, G. Ford, and J. Carter. It branded the very approach and the very philosophy of their position as worthless. Security by agreement with another state, the neoconservatives argued, is, as it were, security dependent on another's charity, from another's hands. That is not for the United States. It does not behoove Americans to become directly or indirectly dependent on anyone or to limit their freedom of maneuver and action in any way. The United States with its "inexhaustible" technological and economic resources cannot fail to find "its own" way out of any hopeless situation and make others adapt themselves to Washington.

On 24 February 1983, 1 month before announcing the "long-term program" to create a total ABM defense, R. Reagan made another speech. "For too long," the President declared at the American Legion convention, "our foreign policy developed in accordance with the principle of reacting to a particular crisis situation, reacting to other countries' political initiatives, reacting to offensive actions by the enemies of freedom and democracy. Our enemies have always chosen the arena of competition, the timing, and the questions over which battle would be done. Who knows better than war veterans what it costs to pass to the defensive, how the possibility of advancing gets lost, and all you can do is reverse, retreat." The United States, the speaker demanded, must retrieve its "leading role" by building up its military potential in every possible way and fostering within itself the determination to act regardless of conventions and with unshakable faith in the fact that fate is favorably disposed toward America.

The White House chief was very free in his treatment of history. By attacking Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and organizing intervention in countries in Africa and the Near and Middle East and coups in the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Europe, Washington was in no way "defending itself." However, the present U.S. rulers would like more: to rule out certain events in advance, while bringing about necessary ones at their own discretion, as in Grenada.

Latin jurists maintained that there is nothing in the mind that is not contained earlier in our feelings. It is as though those jurists were looking into the wings of Reaganolitics [za kulisy reygolitiki].

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Ideological dogmas are transformed into concrete military programs, imperialist ambitions into new bellicose concepts, and hostility and suspiciousness toward persons of another faith into a rejection of the very idea of good-neighborliness.

The American Legion speech, however, was not the very beginning. I will not tire you with a journey into the remote past, but will merely mention facts which immediately preceded public notification that the United States had decided to present mankind with space militarization.

On 18 January 1983, UPI familiarized the public with the details of the "Defense Directives for Fiscal 1984-1988." This document, UPI pointed out, was approved by the head of the administration and represents a key element of the confrontation strategy. It "reflects the viewpoint of the Pentagon and the National Security Council on the specific directions of military policy over the next 5 years and its overall development trend during the present decade." The directive, the agency continued, "ignores the possibility of attaining an agreement or of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union." The United States, so the document notes, intends to change the correlation of forces with the USSR and protect its security interests, "if necessary, without establishing arms control." The United States is not disposed to signing treaties that would stop it from creating weapons systems based in space and "adding a new aspect to our (American) military potential" or which would hamper preparations for "moving forces" and "effectively waging war" from space. [The United States will accept] no new inhibiting pledges, and "the possibility of making changes to the treaty limiting ABM systems."

The 136 pages of the still operative secret directive are full of a multitude of other "blood-chilling" revelations, to use UPI's expression. What is the worth, for example, of the directive to "decapitate the structure of military-political power" and nuclear and conventional forces, and to destroy "sectors of industry determining the military potential" of the Soviet Union? Or take the U.S. plan to accumulate a "reserve of offensive nuclear potential" which the most exhausting nuclear war must not deplete. The point demanding "the preparation of options for the use of nuclear weapons" in the event of "the expansion of a conventional war proving inadequate to ensure its conclusion on satisfactory (to Washington) terms" speaks for itself. But we have narrowed our task to investigating the development of the U.S. stand on space, and we will concentrate on this.

So, 23 March 1983 — the date of R. Reagan's "star speech" — was not the announcement of the launch into space. The design was presented to the public like this: In the past 2 decades U.S. security has been maintained on the basis of the guaranteed mutual destruction doctrine. This is bad. Come what may, Americans must survive. It is time to come down from the "balance of fear" platform and adopt the "doctrine of guaranteed survival." For this it is necessary to resolve the problem of "neutralizing the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles" by using fundamentally new technology from the earth and from space. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger specially emphasized during those honeymoon [medovyy] days that "the defense systems of which the president spoke must not be partial systems: We want to build a system to ensure defense that will be totally reliable and all-embracing" against "all flying missiles of any type."

Launching the "doctrine of guaranteed survival" into political orbit, at first Washington did not limit in any way the catalog of methods and means of antimissile struggle. It was quite recently — it was necessary to give some enticement! — that they started saying that nuclear weapons will be rendered harmless by non-nuclear weapons and began depicting the whole undertaking as the first real step toward banning and liquidating nuclear weapons.
At the time of the President's March speech they had not hit upon the idea of accusing the USSR of allegedly "violating" the ABM treaty and alleging that it will have to "answer" to Washington. Or perhaps the wish to be renowned as pioneers in the military use of space and to seize the initiative proved so great that they disregarded their favorite pretext?

Their impatience to have done away with the remaining treaty fetters and unilaterally "restore" absolute U.S. security led to obvious mistakes -- they even forgot to notify their allies of the latest turn. They were in such a hurry that they themselves interrupted and contradicted everyone they came across before he had time to open his mouth. They said and promised so much that toward the end they confused even ardent idolaters, whose rapture does not diminish when faced with an absence of proof, and aroused suspicion in benevolent skeptics. Even their closest friends and partners in blocs did not know whom to listen to or what to believe, or whether to believe at all.

It is harder to disavow one's own words and promises than another's. You can, of course, pretend that you have been misunderstood or interpreted freely. Is it necessary? Try and guess. It is better to try to "systematize." This is probably the most flexible method. And there appeared an opus -- "Brochure on the Strategic Defense Initiative" -- with a foreword by the President addressed to his fellow citizens. "I hope," R. Reagan emphasizes, "that, having read this brochure, you will as a result give, resolute and consistent support to this research program, which will perhaps play a determining role for our country's future."

Just so, perhaps the future is at stake. Willy-nilly you give up reading; if you get through the palisade of provisos, the lack of understanding, and the camouflage nets thrown over the substance, perhaps you will grasp the fact that they are investigating not only methods of intercepting missiles. Still more they are testing people's mental capacities. Have they attained an understanding of the special features of the age? It will be too late to cross oneself after the clap of thunder.

[4 Feb 85 p 5]

[Text] So the future of the United States is at stake, we read in the White House brochure publicizing the administration's space programs. Stop arguing, its authors appeal, roll up your sleeves, and join together in constructing the space castles which are to guard the peace of the "free world." By rendering the other side's weapons harmless while, of course, preserving its own, the United States will fulfill its lofty "humane" design and establish its own unquestionable order on earth.

The brochure is a demagogic work. According to the laws of this genre, every word in it is holy writ and every sentence is a revelation. Otherwise, you cannot make Washington's stance add up or patch the holes in the arguments. How do they now substantiate the abrupt change in U.S. policy, and what do they put forward to justify it apart from "moral" feelings?

By the beginning of the seventies, we read, a strategic stalemate had taken shape between the United States and the USSR. The state of technology did not enable it to be confidently overcome. But science was not standing still, and at a certain moment the possibility was opened up to "make ballistic missiles powerless and obsolete," to "create a really effective non-nuclear defense system," and to "seek other means of preventing war."
For this it is necessary "just" to girdle the earth with several layers of ultrasensitive instruments, ultrapowerful energy sources, ultrasophisticated apparatuses, and superaccurate weapons. Such a pie cannot be baked for everyone at once. It does not matter if the Americans alone are the first to take a bite of it.

"Multilayer" defense presupposes "the destruction of enemy missiles at each stage of their flight": during the "boost phase," "before the missiles have left the aggressor's territory." Enemy strategic forces would be subjected to an attack as soon as instruments gave the signal -- no matter whether it was false or genuine -- that is, war would begin automatically at the whim of a robot.

The second and third "defense" layers would consist of devices designed to hit warheads that "remain undamaged after the boost phase" and that have gone into a combat trajectory. Finally, in the fourth layer, charges that surmounted obstacles in their path and approached targets on U.S. territory would have to be intercepted, as in the best Hollywood movies. The brochure's authors failed to mention the zero phase -- an attack by U.S. first-strike means against missiles while they are still in position. That would appear to be all.

But suddenly we find the first surprise: "The overall effectiveness of the 'multilayer' defense system," we learn, "need not ensure 100-percent defense." It is important, so it turns out, "just to create sufficient uncertainty in the potential aggressor." What is "sufficient" is a state secret. This is understandable, for "uncertainty" might suffer rather badly from an excess of clarity. It seems, however, that the prime movers in the venture are themselves in a state of total uncertainty. "We do not even know," R. Reagan admitted at a news conference on 9 January 1985, "what kind of weapons will be developed, if we succeed in developing them."

The next surprise was not long incoming. The "strategic defense system" will not solve the problem unless supplemented by developed air defenses. Without a reliable antiaircraft shield all ABM efforts would be in vain. Well, did they not know that earlier? They suspected it, of course, but why everything at once? A stealthy approach is needed. They are making public opinion accustomed to unpleasantnesses gradually.

The third surprise: In contrast to the statements of 2 years ago, when they left not a shadow of doubt that American technology is capable of anything, they now stress the need to grow a little wiser, to learn a little more, and to experiment a little. Invariably in parentheses is the idea that perhaps no good will come of it. It is even quite likely that a fiasco awaits at the end. Therefore, they also cut right out any hint of a cutback in offensive means, which supposedly have one foot in the grave, in expectation of "absolutely effective defensive" means. "For some time," the brochure states, it will be necessary to rely "almost exclusively" on offensive forces. Elsewhere this is formulated more elegantly: "A certain combination of offensive and defensive systems is perfectly compatible" with the aim of "preventing war by means of deterrence."

The electronic crane that they have undertaken to teach to peck at missiles soars high in a sky still entirely covered with clouds and mist. You might think it unwise to release the titmouse that hops into your hands of its own accord, and solve earthly problems step by step by mutual consent and for mutual advantage. That is what you would think. But the present U.S. Administration doubts that the titmouse will be "reliable." Most importantly, technology entices and tempts.
Will no one in Washington stake his life that the "star wars program" will justify itself at least minimally? But no one will warrant that failure is inevitable, either. "State wisdom," the White House brochure asserts, "consists not in ignoring technical achievements but in looking into the future and studying the potential pros and cons of these achievements, particularly from the viewpoint of international security." I thought that state wisdom consists in regarding man's right to life and thus to peace, as being of paramount importance and in subordinating all policy, including technical policy, to this. Technology, if its development is not controlled and if you do not constantly ask yourself whether you are funding the right progress, can lead mankind to the brink of an abyss. In fact, it has already approached it — the line beyond which a chasm lies.

While patching some holes, the brochure's authors at the same time created just as many new ones. They had to convene a special briefing at which a "high-ranking administration spokesman" was to provide additional corroboration for the U.S. leadership's reasons for departing from the principles of the Soviet-U.S. decisions of the seventies. At that time, this spokesman declared, "deterrence based on offensive forces was not just sensible but also necessary (1), since at the time neither side was able to develop a defensive system capable of effectively deterring the other side from inflicting a strike. The ground-launched antimissile missiles being contemplated at that time were both costly and unreliable. Progress in creating such systems was not then so considerable.

Thus, the policy of military superiority was blocked. Never mind that an antidote has still not been found to many varieties of missiles, in particular "cruise" missiles. The end of the century is still a long way off; you see, the something will turn up here.

Less than 20 days later this spokesman, continually developing his own theme, would add: "Our country participated in the SALT I and SALT II talks at a time when we did not have new systems or means that would have constituted for the Russians a reason to agree to a reduction" (of strategic arms).

Let us find the root of what the "administration spokesman" said. U.S. policy is in a state of continuous flux and change. Everything in it is predetermined not by principles but by considerations of current expediency and expected gain. Gain in the most vulgar sense: Yesterday it was too costly to pursue today's policy, and the arsenal lacked weapons uncomfortable for a "potential enemy." But how will it be tomorrow? According to Washington's view of political morality, if it becomes costly, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House will play some new trick or, if worst comes to worst, will try to return to an old one, since "democracy" reigns in the United States, and the next president does not answer for the present one.

How did you like the admission that the United States got involved in the SALT process out of spiritual and physical weakness? What the world saw as a sign of Washington's growing maturity and as belated readiness to settle down in fact proved to be just a kind of ailment. American imperialism in a hurry, made a blunder, lost its way in the cunningly placed snares of detente, and is having to extricate itself by fair means or, more frequently, foul. Reagan's predecessors are no longer reproached with being obtuse. They were let down by simplicity and dullness of imagination, which prevented them from getting to know the charm of bloodcurdling risk.

After the Geneva meeting between the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers, Washington nondiplomats vied with each other in their rush to demonstrate that the aim mentioned
in the joint statement — "the prevention of an arms race in space" — will not entail any changes to the administration's position. C. Weinberger and a number of other figures see it as the purpose of the talks on space to "explain" to the Soviet side the "greatness" and "humaneness" of the President's star plans. The Russians, they say, are so slow-witted that it will take a year, or 2, or 3 of intensive talks and seminars before they realize what resplendent prospects will open up before them as a result of living under U.S. leadership and alongside the "combination of offensive and defensive systems." This is how the Americans are passing themselves off as schoolmarm's.

But the USSR, as is known, is still noted for its ability to champion its interests, measuring words against deeds.

What if we stick to our opinion, if they do not change our mind about the fallacious and extremely adventurist nature of the space venture? Never mind, high-ranking and low-ranking Washington spokesmen hint that the United States will do what it would have done even without the talks.

The schedule for the Soviet-U.S. talks have been determined. The delegations have been appointed. Soon we will learn today's market value of the peace-loving declarations of the head of the administration and the pledges adopted in his name.

K. Dam, U.S. deputy secretary of state, excuses Washington's jigs by saying that in his country, "policy is a result of open debates and political rivalry." With regard to openness, we will reserve our viewpoint. But in regard to "political rivalry," here K. Dam was sincere, as though at confession. It remains, however, to be ascertained: Why are the excesses of this rivalry and of the brutal competition among different groups in the U.S. ruling echelon shifted onto the shoulders of the whole world?

After carefully reading the text of the brochure and statements by Washington officials, it is difficult not to reach the conclusion that the weightiest argument for the powers that be in that state is how much a thing costs. People in the United States have scrupulously calculated the debit and credit of World Wars I and II, how much profit they made for which firms, and who lost out. Everyone there is weighing — certainly not on the scales of humaneness — what it will now cost to "neutralize" rivals and enemies. This is one of the characteristic, innate features of the system. Perhaps this is why the idea recently expressed by the magazine BUSINESS WEEK will prove closer and more understandable to the American — an iron law in the banking sphere proclaims: "Your affairs will never be better than your clients' affairs."

Try to look at this law somewhat more broadly and not so literally. Just think: Is it any different in the sphere of security? Here it is impossible to take anything away from another without harming yourself. Here, allow me to repeat, it is possible to be either better together or worse together. And no inventions or innovations, including political ones, will alter or abolish an elementary fact and an obvious axiom — there is no place for strong-arm exercises on our small and fragile planet.
TROFIMENKO REJECTS 'MUTUAL' SDI

PM191150 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 85 p 3

[Unattributed interview with Prof G.A. Trofimenko of the USSR Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute: "Defense in Reverse" -- first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] The talks between the USSR and the United States on nuclear and space weapons open on 12 March in Geneva. In accordance with the earlier Soviet-U.S. accord, these questions are to be examined and resolved in conjunction with each other. At the same time, the U.S. press is now mounting a manifestly provocative campaign whose thrust is that the United States must in no way abandon the course outlined by the President's so-called "strategic defense initiative." It envisages carrying out large-scale scientific research work with a view to creating and deploying a multitiered ABM defense system with space-based elements.

We turned to Professor Genrich Aleksandrovich Trofimenko, chief of the USSR Academy of Science USA and Canada Institute Foreign Policy Department, and asked him to reply to a number of questions connected with this.

Question: How "defensive" is the program for building an ABM defense system in space, which has been put forward by the U.S. Administration?

Answer: For formal classification purposes it is normal to distinguish between strategic offensive weapons and defensive weapons. The existing land-based ABM systems belong to the latter category. However, these arms are closely interconnected. A strategic advantage can be obtained by both increasing or modernizing one's offensive nuclear potential and by, for instance, protecting one's existing potential with the aid of an ABM defense system. It was an understanding of this fact that led the USSR and the United States to conclude a Soviet-U.S. treaty of unlimited duration in 1972, envisaging a substantial limitation of ABM defense systems in the two countries.

This treaty "broke" the unending chain of competition between offensive and defensive systems, reduced the pace of offensive weapons deployment, and what is more, enabled the Soviet-U.S. strategic balance to be stabilized at the level of parity of the SALT II treaty.

As is known, the U.S. Administration refused to ratify it. Then it tried to get around the parity by starting to deploy new nuclear U.S. Pershing-II and cruise missiles in West Europe. These missiles are strategic vis-a-vis the USSR in the USSR-U.S. nuclear balance because they cover a large part of our country's European territory. Considering that the United States would like to deploy 572 of these missiles, this means that...
it seems to have decided to increase its nuclear weapons potential targeted against the USSR by almost 25 percent in comparison with the ceiling originally established for the sides by the SALT II treaty.

But even this has proved too little for the Republican administration. It has hastened to create first-strike systems such as the MX ICBM and ballistic missiles for Trident II submarines and has started to deploy air- and sea-launched strategic cruise missiles with nuclear charges.

Finally, in March 1983, the U.S. President put forward a new "initiative" -- he announced the start of development of a new multilayered ABM defense system designed to use laser weapons and other very sophisticated military-technical achievements to hit targets. Washington calls this system "defensive." But what is it really?

After all, the space ABM defense system, as conceived by the United States, is not just defensive. Such a system would completely eliminate the differences between offensive and defensive systems. It would be possible to use this to destroy the other side's nuclear means, either above or on its territory -- in other words, to exercise exclusively offensive functions. But the most important thing is the fact that hotheads in a future U.S. leadership could decide that, protected by the shield of a "reliable" multilayered ABM defense system, they could inflict a first -- disarming -- strike against the USSR, counting on the fact that their new ABM defense system would then cope with the weakened counterstrike which the USSR would make with its remaining means.

When you talk to U.S. specialists or politicians about such a "scenario," you often hear the reply: Would the United States really resort to such a step? We only want this for the sake of defense and the protection of our population, and not for attack! But let us try to discuss it without emotion.

Literally just the other day, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE published an article devoted to space ABM defense. Its authors were Z. Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter; physicist R. Jastrow; M. Kampelman, a Washington lawyer confirmed as head of the U.S. delegation at the forthcoming Geneva talks.

In this article, they try to prove that the Soviet Union can already inflict a first, disarming strike against the United States, counting on the fact that the "potential cost," of such a strike, including a U.S. nuclear response, would be "tolerable" for it "in the light of the victory achieved."

It is scarcely worth refuting these completely groundless insinuations by U.S. armchair strategists. But it is possible to note the following: If they are capable of ascribing this kind of "scenario" to the Soviet Union, which advocates maintaining parity with the United States and freezing the two countries' nuclear arms and which has made a solemn and unconditional commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Soviet people and specialists can have all the more justification for suspecting that Washington itself is elaborating such scenarios for attacks against the USSR. Besides, we do not even need to guess: Declassified U.S. National Security Council and Strategic Air Command documents published in recent years in the United States show that the U.S. leadership has not conceived the possibility of a first strike against the USSR just "in the abstract," but has in fact specifically and systematically planned such strikes.

There is much documentary evidence that there were U.S. figures in highly responsible positions who would have liked to carry out a preemptive strike against the USSR, but
they stopped for fear of getting burned — for fear of receiving a powerful counter-strike to their attack. So now this kind of strategist has jumped at the concept of a "salutary" space ABM defense system.

The same article also contains the proposal — as do a number of articles by U.S. leaders — that the relevant technology be all but shared with the Soviet Union so that, it is alleged, both sides can create a reliable ABM defense system and thereby ensure for themselves "mutual, guaranteed survival."

If the United States does not get down to adopting an accord on the demilitarization of space and continues to issue military challenges, whether it likes it or not, the USSR will have to take corresponding measures to protect its own security. We will respond, of course, in our own way and will manage without U.S. "assistance." But essentially, all this talk about "readiness to share technology" is pure demagoguery and nothing more, even if some people in the United States and West Europe believe it.

If the United States really wants to ensure for itself and the other side "guaranteed survival," there is a completely different way to achieve this than an arms race in space. This is the way of radical limitation and reduction of existing nuclear arms on the basis of the principle of equality and identical security. But to achieve this we must avoid the militarization of space. When U.S. experts talk about the need to establish limits for land-based systems while developing the arms race in space, this sounds like a mockery of common sense. Who on earth is going to reduce his systems for breaching potential ABM defenses while the other side is building ABM defenses on a large scale?

Question: U.S. politicians and journalists have called this whole venture concerning space ABM defenses "star wars." But in fact it is a question of wars on earth, isn't it?

Answer: Precisely. But there is a definite point in having given this whole "defense initiative" that title. For several years now a multipart movie directed by George Lucas has been showing in the United States. The first part of this movie was called "Star Wars," and then two more parts came out. The movies were an unprecedented box-office success. Some young people watched the movies of this series 20 or more times each. In them the hero Luke Skywalker fights against a dark power — the Evil Empire.

And then the White House and Pentagon propagandists decided to "sell" the general public on exclusively militarist program as a humane measure. "Star wars," they said, is not so bad at all, it is merely the struggle of good against the forces of evil. Unfortunately, some Americans are rising to this bait, without thinking that whereas Skywalker and company, brandishing their laser swords, are accomplishing their own unthinkable feats on other planets, American strategists would like to wage this kind of battle on our earth, on other people's territory, counting on the space ABM defenses as a panacea.

Forty years after the appearance of the atom bomb they are still trying to invent some "master key" that would enable the United States to establish "peace U.S.-style" on earth. Despite all the failures and defeats of the position of strength policy, they cannot forsake their dream of superiority, of "absolute security" at the expense of others. The only result of these attempts is the emergence in the United States of a powerful military-industrial complex, composed not only of the military or military industrialists, but also of politicians, diplomats, scientists, and financiers, who so to speak, take the pickings from the military preparations.

But it is impossible to engage endlessly in a dance of death on the brink of a precipice. Time does not stand still. If we do not stop a new round of the arms race today, tomorrow it may be too late.

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FALIN CRITICIZES U.S. 'STAR WARS' CONCEPT

PM191100 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Feb 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Valentin Falin "Political Observer's Opinion": "Life With Double Standards"]

[Text] Everyone knows that Americans are very great individualists, and they even take pride in this. Let us recall how Zbigniew Brzezinski elbowed aside everyone in J. Carter's administration, turning his own particularly subjective view into official U.S. policy. As an "uncompromising democrat" (as THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER calls him), Max Kampelman tried to saddle an entire international conference -- the Madrid meeting of participants in the all-European conference. I know little about professor Robert Jastrow in this sense; quite possibly he is far removed from dictatorial ways.

Jastrow is a physicist, and it is almost a rule in science now that the smaller the elementary particle in the literal and the metaphorical sense, the harder it is to cope with it on its own.

Be that as it may, this threesome has united in an authors' collective and published an extensive article in support of space militarization in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE. It is M. Kampelman's official duty to champion Washington's position. R. Jastrow is also tied up with government space contracts and has to earn his bread, but how did Z. Brzezinski end up in this company? Hardly just because of a penchant for sharp sensations. Perhaps he wants to testify that J. Carter's cabinet also was involved in space ventures? Or to make it known that while he was the president's assistant for national security affairs, he himself nurtured similar designs, but no one heeded him?

At any rate, Z. Brzezinski now firmly believes that U.S.-Soviet strategic relations are determined "precisely by the development of military hardware," not by world outlook, economic, political, or other factors, but by weapons, the dynamics of whose improvement is unpredictable. Hence the conclusion -- the "stabilization of the situation" depends, above all, on the nature of the "potential for deterrence." If the United States creates a universal, inexhaustible, impermeable deterrence potential, everything else will follow. The possession of such a potential, we read in the article, will "perhaps even promote arms control." Perhaps it will not either, it is true -- but that is not so important, because the United States must rely not on accords but on its own strength, independent of other people's will.

"In practice, important defense means could be deployed (in space) right now," the authors point out, "if it were not for the restrictions to which the United States
agreed under the 1972 ABM treaty." It is a good thing, though, that the prohibitions provided for in the treaty were not taken literally by the Americans and were no obstacle to intensive scientific research and experimental design work on the creation of space-based weapons. It only remains, the article states, to carry out "some additional research and work," and it is possible to embark without delay on "the deployment of two-layer, or two-tier defense."

Let us bear in mind that it now takes, on average, 10-12 years to design and perfect a new missile, aircraft, or other complex system. Consequently, in order to reach the stage of readiness reported by Z. Brzezinski, M. Kampelman, and R. Jastrow, the United States must have begun turning ideas into metal and semiconductors some time in 1972-74, that is, at a time when its signature had not even dried on the ABM treaty.

A very significant admission. Why do these three veteran Americans flaunt their infidelity to treaties? This, so it turns out, is the reason. R. Reagan's administration is wasting its time waiting for the emergence of "more destructive, but not yet perfected laser weapons, beam weapons, or an electromagnetic gun with guide rail." It will take many years to master this fundamentally new technology, and no one will vouch that the tens of billions of dollars and, chiefly, the time being put into this work will be recouped at all. But "smart" non-nuclear missiles that could hit enemy targets are available here, and you only have to want them. For this it is necessary to "use the technology of antisatellite missiles launched from F-15 aircraft" and slightly alter a supersonic air defense interceptor missile.

Is that all? No, something else will be required. It will be necessary to discard the ABM treaty and put into orbit over the Soviet Union special "space platforms" "protected against attack by strong armor, onboard weapon systems, and high maneuverability." According to the authors' estimates, by the beginning of the nineties it would be possible to launch 100 of these platforms, with 150 interceptor missiles on each one; plus 4 geostationary satellites and 10 low-orbit satellites to keep track of targets designated for destruction; plus "ground communications and battle control" elements.

In short, they have conceived the intention of adding "forward defense" in space to the "forward defense" that the United States set up in West Europe and the Far East and that it is now establishing also in the Indian Ocean zone. "Without defense in the boost sector" (of Soviet missiles), the three emphasize, there is no point in wasting efforts. "The so-called strategic defensive weapons with space-based elements in the decisive missile boost sector are indispensable from the viewpoint of ensuring defense. Abandoning them would mean making the entire defense system inefficient," the article categorically asserts.

The authors understand perfectly that, on the pretext of ensuring U.S. "defense" they are talking about a strike against the territory of another state with all the ensuing consequences, but they reason like this. If aim were taken at land-based missiles, which make up approximately three-fourths of the Soviet strategic forces, then the United States -- even given an adequate ABM response from the USSR -- would at once acquire almost fourfold superiority and, taking into account medium-range means and the NATO allies' nuclear weapons, fivefold superiority. This is because four-fifths of American strategic nuclear weapons are based on submarines and bombers, which are not covered by the planned strategic defense. Given such a correlation, Z. Brzezinski, M. Kampelman, and R. Jastrow believe the Soviet Union would find itself very cramped, while the United States, on the contrary, would acquire its sought-for operational scope.
"All the aforesaid," the article's authors remark, "cannot be considered an attractive option for those who gamble chiefly on arms control." But what can you do? We, too, are not against talks, they say, "but, unfortunately, these ways will hardly of themselves ensure greater security for us (the United States) by being adopted as an alternative to the strategy of mutual security, which combines ABM defense with an offensive counterstrike potential." At last the cat is out of the bag. This was why the Soviet-U.S. arms control talks proceeded with difficulty under J. Carter. This was why the SALT II treaty was not ratified. This was why Washington broke off talks on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons and ditched the talks on strategic arms and medium-range nuclear weapons that were held in Geneva through the end of 1983. It remains to be hoped that this demonstratively antidisarmament philosophy, imprinted so clearly on the article, was not the sole reason for appointing M. Kampelman head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on nuclear and space arms scheduled for 12 March.

"For really effective arms control," the article states, "it would be necessary: 1) to impose restrictions on the qualitative improvement of arms; 2) to establish direct control in some form over mobile systems; 3) to find a means of distinguishing between cruise missiles with nuclear warheads and similar missiles with non-nuclear charges; 4) to elaborate accords on monitoring the observance of agreements in order to prevent the secret design, testing, and deployment of new systems." All right, but what happens in practice? The United States is resolutely opposed to limiting the development of new types of weapons. It is opposed to a ban on cruise missiles, even though there is no other way of resolving the warheads conundrum. And, as for secret design work and so forth, you and I have just ascertained who engages in this and how.

By putting forward the program for space militarization under the guise of "the only means available at present to prohibit the use of Soviet offensive ground-based systems for a first strike," its creators are gunning for the foundations of states' peaceful coexistence, which is possible only on the basis of equality and identical security. You have to be totally lacking in a sense of humor to allege that stability will not suffer "even if at first the United States alone possesses such a strategic defense system." "A possible strike by our (American) side," while depriving the other side of this capability, is, you see, "a valid but misplaced cause of concern to the Russians." It is as though the three never heard C. Weinberger when he stated: If the USSR created an efficient ABM system in the absence of a U.S. one, this would be equivalent to American unilateral nuclear disarmament. Washington would rather split the globe than permit such a thing.

There is no denying that life with double standards is sweet and cozy. Everything that suits the United States must be good for the rest. The Americans have a right not to believe anyone, but everyone is obliged to believe Washington. When the United States moves weapons up to other people's borders and prepares to suspend these weapons above other people's heads, it is "defense." But if someone takes measures against missiles targeted on him or, God forbid, takes measures against bases deployed above him in space, this will be an "infringement of the security" of the United States. And what if this other person decides to respond to the American forward defense with his own forward defense and suspended -- the first to do so -- garlands of his own countermissiles above U.S. territory? Well, really! That would be unprovoked aggression -- intolerable.

Washington has gone so far as to assert that U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan or Nicaragua is an "act of self-defense." R. McFarlane, the current presidential assistant for national security affairs, warns that the United States
does not intend to stop at what has been achieved and will interfere in other people's affairs "whenever such an opportunity presents itself and when "America's important interests, whether in the Western Hemisphere or somewhere in another region," are at stake. [quotation marks as published]

The article by Z. Brzezinski, R. Jastrow, and M. Kampelman is entitled "Defense in Space Is in No Way 'Star Wars.'" It happens, albeit rarely, that there is just one truthful phrase, and that is in the title. Just so. The so-called defense in space is designed for wars on earth. Its chief task is in this way to make wars less dangerous for Washington and absolutely dangerous for all others. If you look at the situation from this angle, then everything comes together. Everything falls into place, except for logic and common sense, which eke out a miserable existence as political outcasts in modern America.

CSO: 5200/1004
SPACE ARMS

U.S. 'SLIDING AWAY' FROM AGREED GENEVA PLATFORM

LD161752 Prague International Service in English 1630 GMT 16 Feb 85

[Text] Once again the past week has demonstrated that the United States is gradually sliding away from the platform agreed upon for the Soviet-American disarmament talks in Geneva by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and United States Secretary of State George Shultz.

At least Thursday's press conference in Geneva, Viktor Israelyan, head of the Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference, told newsmen that America's continuing research into the star wars program is certain to adversely affect future Soviet-American arms control negotiations. If the Americans insist on discussing other types of weapons, the Soviet diplomat was quoted as saying, while carrying on their preparations for star wars, their approach will certainly torpedo the talks.

Such a straightforward statement by a Soviet representative was to be expected as Washington has in the recent past been making it quite clear that it views space weapons as an ace it means to keep at all costs. For instance, the 22d meeting of NATO politicians, diplomats, experts and writers specializing in military affairs, held in Munich, was dominated by American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or rather by his speech delivered there. Its main tenor was a eulogy of President Reagan's space weapons project and an attempt at winning the Pentagon's West European allies over to the program. And, to be quite frank, some of the participants, notably West German clerical party leaders, headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his defense minister, Manfred Woerner, lent a sympathetic ear to the idea.

Caspar Weinberger's West European mission was backed by President Reagan himself, who, in an interview for THE WASHINGTON POST, admitted that at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva the United States is not prepared to barter its military ambitions in space for any agreement on nuclear weapons, neither strategic nor intermediate-range ones. In other words, the American President has virtually negated all that the world so enthusiastically hailed on 8 January this year when Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and United States Secretary of State George Shultz signed an agreement which says in part that both sides agree to new, mutually connected talks on three areas, namely intermediate-range nuclear missiles, strategic nuclear arms and space-based weapons. The agreement stipulated that the talks would be conducted by one delegation on each side which would discuss all the three subjects, and it is quite clear that none of the problems under discussion may be taken out of the context of the talks, none may be placed above the other two. This is the groundwork on which the Soviet and American delegations are to build when they meet in Geneva on 12 March.
As Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko recently emphasized, in his reply to the Argentine peace organization Movement of 100, of primary importance is that the talks will discuss questions concerning nuclear and space weapons in an organic link-up. We resolutely insist on this position because a militarization of space and star wars project would trigger off practically an uncontrolled arms race in all spheres, undoing the good work of many important arms control agreements. The vital interests of humanity require that space should be saved exclusively for peaceful uses.

So much the words of Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, spelling out the Soviet position. This was the stance which Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko expounded to George Shultz in Geneva last month and which the United States eventually accepted. Nowadays Washington seems to be interpreting the agreement in its own fashion. Ronald Reagan and his defense secretary, Caspar Weinberger, can hardly be suspected of not having read the text of the agreement signed by George Shultz. What we are currently witnessing is purposeful pressure being exerted on the Soviet Union. American speculations as to Moscow's eagerness to open the talks at any cost are futile.

CSO: 5200/3002
USSR PROPOSES NON-USE-OF-FORCE TREATY AT CDE OPENING

Document Detailed

LD291152 Moscow TASS in English 1150 GMT 29 Jan 85


Ambassador at Large Oleg Grinevskiy, the leader of the delegation of the Soviet Union, made a speech at the session emphasizing that the most important thing now is to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and to preserve peace. The reaching of the understanding in Geneva on the holding of Soviet-U.S. talks on space and nuclear arms is a step towards improvement of the international situation. This also creates a more favourable atmosphere for the productive work of the Stockholm forum.

The formation of two working groups at the end of the conference's previous session, in which the Soviet proposals on the simultaneous consideration of political and military confidence-building measures found reflection, makes it possible to start practical talks in Stockholm. If the United States and other NATO countries in practice, not in words, show readiness for honest and equal talks, the conference may without wasting time start an in-depth study of the items which are on its agenda.

As far as the Soviet Union and other Warsaw-treaty countries are concerned, the Soviet representative stated, they are ready for a constructive conduct of affairs in Stockholm. The proposals which they have put forward are aimed at basically changing the situation in the European Continent for the better, and cover a broad spectrum of important problems -- from not being the first to use nuclear weapons to notifications about large-scale exercises and troop movements.

In order to direct the conference's work into the channel of businesslike discussion from the very first day, the Soviet delegation tabled a working document, "Basic Provisions of the Treaty on Mutual Non-Use of Military Force and on Maintenance of Relations of Peace."

Central to the proposed treaty, to which all the 35 states represented at the conference could be parties, is the pledge not to be the first to use either nuclear, or conventional armaments and, therefore, not to use military force against one another altogether.
This pledge, the document says, would mean that its participants

-- would refrain from any use of military force, incompatible with the aims and principles of the U.N. Charter, against other participating state, especially from invasion or attack against its territory;

-- would not threaten the safety of international sea, air and outer space lanes crossing areas which are not within anyone's national jurisdiction.

It would also be stipulated that they would not use force against third countries, with which they maintain bilateral allied relations, or against non-aligned or neutral states.

The parties to the treaty would undertake efforts to prevent the race of space armaments, terminate the race of both nuclear and conventional weapons, restrict and reduce armaments and achieve disarmament on the basis of the principle of the equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for security interests.

The parties to the treaty would cooperate in enhancing the efficiency of the United Nations in implementing its tasks, stipulated by its Charter, for a peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflict situation, suppressing acts of aggression and averting the threat to international peace and security. In case of the emergence of the threat of war and the use of military force, they would hold urgent consultations, make inquiries and provide one another with necessary information. At the same time, the treaty would not restrict their inalienable right to individual and collective defence in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The treaty would be open for all other states, and would enter into force after all members of the Warsaw treaty and the North Atlantic alliance joined it.

The first comments show that the Soviet proposal evoked broad response at the conference.

Lomeyko Press Conference

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As was reported at a press conference in Moscow by head of the Press Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry Vladimir Lomeyko, the substance of the Soviet stand is not just to reiterate once again the principle of the non-use of force, as it was recorded in the U.N. Charter or in the Helsinki Final Act, but to develop and concretise that principle, to make it most binding, and to make renunciation of the use of force a law of international life.

The key provision of the treaty, of which the main points were set forth in the document submitted by the Soviet delegation, would be an obligation by the parties to the treaty not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional arms against each other and, hence, not to use military force at all, Lomeyko said.

A concretisation of this provision would mean specifically that parties to the treaty:
Would refrain from any use of military force, inconsistent with the aims and principles of the U.N. Charter, against another party to the treaty, which, of course, would not limit the inalienable right of parties to the treaty to individual and collective defence under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter;

under provisions of the treaty parties to it would not threaten the security of sea, air and space communications passing through areas not covered by any national jurisdiction;

their obligation not to use military force would cover the territories of all parties to the treaty, as well as their military and civilian personnel, naval, air and space craft and other facilities belonging to them, wherever situated;

the treaty would envisage an obligation by the parties to it not to use force against third countries; the treaty would be open for participation in it by all other states who would so desire;

the treaty would envisage an obligation by its parties to consider jointly and individually practical measures aimed at preventing the risk of a surprise attack;

the treaty would envisage urgent consultations between the parties to it in the event of the emergence of a risk of war and the use of military force; they could make inquiries and provide necessary information;

parties to the treaty would cooperate in enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling in accordance with its charter, the tasks of peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflict situations, suppressing acts of aggression, removing the threat to international peace and security;

parties to the treaty would make efforts to prevent a space arms race, to stop both the nuclear and conventional arms race, to limit and reduce armaments and to achieve disarmament on the basis of the principle of equal rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the interests of security.

The Soviet side is sure that there is a possibility for achieving progress in Stockholm. What is necessary for this is that none of the conference participants should try to secure unilateral military advantages and that all sides should display readiness to take such steps as would actually help strengthen confidence and security in Europe.

Lomeyko said that the Soviet delegation went to Stockholm with the intention to continue exerting vigorous efforts in order to attain positive results that would help improve the political climate in Europe, lessen military confrontation there, remove the threat of war. We in the Soviet Union are firmly confident that major steps towards attaining that goal would primarily be an obligation by all nuclear powers, participating in the conference, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and conclusion of a treaty on mutual non-use of military force and maintenance of the relations of peace.

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CONFERENEC ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

PROSPECTS, ISSUES FOR CURRENT CDE SESSION EXAMINED

PM041621 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by A. Alekseyev under the "Stockholm Conference" rubric: "A Constructive Approach: In Word and Deed"]

[Text] The participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe have gathered again in the Swedish capital.

The first of the four sessions of the Stockholm forum planned for this year has begun. What can we say about it now? The conference's work is continuing and, by all accounts, is planned to last a long while. Matters in Stockholm have not reached the stage of talks in the direct sense. Any agreements that have been reached so far are of a purely procedural nature.

Does this mean that the year that has passed since the conference opened has been wasted? Such an assessment would be an oversimplification and therefore wrong; it would be to ignore the intensive political and diplomatic struggle that was launched at the Stockholm forum and that may be said to have already passed through certain stages essential in any multilateral talks.

Certain states or groups of states have officially presented their proposals in the form of working documents for the conference to examine. Our delegation put forward proposals on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe back on 8 May 1984. The Soviet initiatives, based on the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states, aroused particular attention, not only from the Stockholm forum delegations but also from the international public at large, which is deeply alarmed by the fact that the situation in Europe has worsened sharply through the fault of the militarist circles of NATO and above all, the United States. This response to the Soviet proposals is no coincidence. The fact is that, in strict accordance with the agreed mandate of the Stockholm conference, they place the major questions at the focus of its discussion, as the very situation in Europe demands, and outline the kind of measures whose implementation would really strengthen the atmosphere of confidence and security on our continent.

Unfortunately the NATO countries have still not backed up their statements on their readiness to hold constructive talks in Stockholm with anything concrete. As before, their official contribution consists of a "package" of military-technical measures whose function, it has been stated, is to increase the "transparency" or "openness" of military activity on the European Continent, whereas in fact the real aim is to lay
bare the structure and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces and their allies to the
detriment of their security and to place the NATO bloc and, above all, the United
States in an advantageous, favorable position.

At the same time -- and this is a significant result achieved in Stockholm -- the NATO
countries have failed to exclude the large-scale Soviet initiatives, no matter how much
they tried initially, and to avoid examining them at the conference on various far-
fetching pretexts. The Soviet proposals and, in particular, the idea of a treaty on
the nonuse of military force, are becoming an increasingly firm part of the political
thinking of the European countries' government and public circles. All this permitted
the Warsaw Pact states to observe at the foreign ministers committee session held in
Berlin last December that the course of work at the Stockholm conference "will include
the earliest possible transition to concrete talks."

The decision to create two working groups adopted at the end of last year on a proposal
by Finland, speaking on behalf of the other neutral and nonaligned countries, was
designed to assist the conference to switch over to constructive talks. All the
previously submitted proposals were divided up between these two working groups in
such a way as to ensure their examination on equal terms. As the conference rightly
noted, this decision was in accord with Comrade K.U. Chernenko's idea on the need to
combine political and military confidence-building measures in order to guarantee their
success.

What have the NATO countries' delegations brought to the new round in the Swedish
capital? It seems that there are no new constructive ideas in their diplomatic
baggage.

There are no visible signs of a change in NATO's negative attitude toward the
proposal for a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In connection
with the upcoming Soviet-U.S. talks on a range of questions concerning space and
nuclear arms, the United States is laying particular emphasis on the need to reduce
strategic offensive weapons and is even announcing -- to justify its plans for space
militarization -- its willingness to completely abandon the concept of "mutual nuclear
deterrence." Does the rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons not spring to
mind here as a move toward this goal?

The members of the NATO bloc cited an imaginary conventional arms "gap" with regard
to the Warsaw Pact countries in their attempts to justify the NATO doctrine based on
the permissibility of a first nuclear strike. At the end of last year the North
Atlantic bloc's military and political authorities ratified a decision to "try to
strengthen their non-nuclear potential." At the same time they adopted the so-called
"Rogers doctrine" which envisages pinpoint strikes using non-nuclear means against
targets deep inside the Warsaw Pact countries' territory. But in terms of destructive
power these facilities are virtually the equivalent of weapons of mass destruction.
In this respect, however, the NATO bloc has not abandoned the concept of the first use
of nuclear weapons at all.

Recent comments by U.S. officials have again been emphasizing their negative attitude
toward such measures as the freeing of Europe from chemical weapons, for example, or
the reduction of military spending. It is claimed that they are incompatible either
with the mandate drawn up at the Madrid meeting or with the agenda of the Stockholm
conference. But the corresponding Soviet proposals -- with the general consent of
all the participants in the conference -- have already been included on the working
groups' agenda. They are concerned with the serious and important problems of strengthening confidence and security in Europe and do not represent at all an attempt to "replow a barren field," as J. Goodby, leader of the U.S. delegation at the Stockholm conference, said in Lisbon.

Let us note in passing that in the same speech, the U.S. representative stated that he sees the point of the Soviet proposals at the Stockholm conference as being to "establish the kind of security system in Europe which would exclude the United States and Canada." It is common knowledge that the United States comprehensively obstructed the fulfillment of the idea of the conference to the point where it risked isolating itself. Why does it need to use this scheme now? There can only be one aim: to try to discredit this forum in the Europeans' eyes at a time when it is close to the talks stage and to sow doubt in those West European countries -- and there are quite a few -- which are showing an interest in ensuring that these talks are conducted in earnest and with the intention of achieving positive results.

If we look at the facts objectively we can surely see that the Soviet proposals on confidence- and security-building in Europe apply just as much to the United States as to the other countries taking part in the conference. If we consider the real situation on questions of European and international security, we can see that they apply to the United States first and foremost. Unfortunately, it is the United States itself which is trying to block the businesslike discussion of the Soviet proposals, and this fact cannot be concealed by the White House's assurances to the effect that the United States is bringing the "spirit of practicability, justice, and compromise" to the Stockholm conference.

Against this background there was a very strange ring to President Reagan's statement that the United States was proposing "to meet the Russians halfway in Stockholm on those questions which worry them" but that a "Soviet reply to our proposal on talks has not been forthcoming." In so saying the President was referring to his own speech in the Irish parliament last June where he proposed discussing the Russian's expressed "interest in the principle of renouncing the use of force if this prompts them to hold serious talks on specific measures capable of implementing this principle."

Reality is different. The Soviet proposal on concluding a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations is not aimed at repeating -- and in a form which is far from binding, furthermore -- the principle of the rejection of the use of force since this is enshrined in the UN Charter and the all-European Conference Final Act. Such a repetition would serve little. The aim is to develop and give concrete form to the principle of the nonuse of force in light of the present-day situation in Europe and the world, to make it as binding as possible, and to make the renunciation of the use of force a law of European and international life. The United States and its allies have still not given a definite answer to this proposal either in Stockholm or directly to the Warsaw Pact states which sent the corresponding appeal to the NATO members back in May 1984.

The Soviet Union is now taking an important new step which aims to achieve the transition to businesslike talks on the question of the nonuse of force. On 29 January, the first day of the Stockholm conference's work this year, the USSR delegation submitted for its examination the "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Reciprocal Nonuse of Military Force and the Maintenance of Peaceful Relations." This is an extensive document which sets out specific considerations on the subject and number of the commitments in the treaty, the...
parties to the treaty, its correlation with commitments in the UN Charter, and the procedure for its entry into force -- in brief the whole range of questions which arises during the preparation of a major international legal act.

The Soviet Union's initiative, which is dictated by a concern to avert the threat of war and to ensure a reliable peace in Europe and throughout the world, requires attentive, unprejudiced, and constructive treatment. It is aimed at achieving the Stockholm conferences' main goal -- expressing and implementing the commitment of states to refrain from the use of force or the threat to use force against one another. The political will of all the participants in the conference is needed if this aim is to be achieved.

CSO: 5200/1006
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

DELEGATE TO STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE GIVES VIEWS

Lulea NORRSKENSFLAMMAN in Swedish 13 Feb 85 p 13

[Article by Susanne Bjorkenheim: "Czechoslovakia Believes in the Stockholm Conference"]

[Text] In the center of the Swedish capital, by Sergel's Square, representatives of the European countries plus the United States and Canada are sitting and deliberating about confidence-creating measures which would bring the world several steps in the direction of relaxation of tensions and disarmament. Every day thousands of people pass by the conference building. But do we really know what is happening inside the building? Who is willing to discuss nuclear disarmament and who is not? NORRSKENSFLAMMAN has lifted the veil a little. In Prague in the Foreign Ministry we met Zdenek Skoba. He works especially with the Stockholm conference, and is the expert member of the Czeckoslovak delegation. He said, "The Stockholm conference can achieve positive results. But it depends on the international situation, and on whether all the parties concerned show political willingness to show increased confidence through concrete negotiations. And concrete negotiations means steps toward a relaxation of political and military tension and toward nuclear disarmament."

Zdenek Skoba sits in his workroom in the Foreign Ministry in Prague. It is a really pretty old palace! The last time he was in Stockholm was in December at the fourth conference. The fifth opened on 29 January, the same day we met.

He talks about the proposal made by the Soviets in the name of all the Warsaw Pact states the same day in Stockholm. For a binding treaty of nonviolence.

It is the same proposal by the socialist countries, made in Prague almost exactly two years ago. The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers repeated it at their meeting in Budapest last April, and now in Stockholm. But during these 2 years although the international situation has changed and worsened, the NATO side has not once replied.

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"The Stockholm conference is a good forum to discuss the proposal not to use violence, according to our judgment," said the Checkoslovak representative.

Positive Features

Zdenek Skoba sees certain positive features in the work of the conference since December. Then it set up two working groups.

One deals with political measures to increase confidence between participating countries, the other deals with military-technical measures. The latter is the hobby of the NATO side in Stockholm.

For ordinary people it seems unbelievable that the West can not join in a treaty not to use violence against countries in Eastern Europe. The Soviet proposal in Stockholm is serious. As Skoba says, it is the beginning of creating confidence—that countries will not use violence against each other.

"On this point NATO's opinion and ours differ," he said. "We ask the NATO side, 'Why not? Why will you not join a nonviolence treaty?' They say that it is not needed, that that is part of the Helsinki agreement of 10 years ago and the UN charter.

"That is true. There is a prohibition against violence in both, but in general terms. What we propose is something concrete, which will help to create greater confidence in Europe."

NATO Will Not

The other important element of the Soviet proposal, according to Zdenek Skoba, is a prohibition against first-strike strategy, a proposal which the Soviets made first at the UN second special session for disarmament. But the United States and NATO have not answered that either.

"We want to discuss it, but NATO does not," said Skoba.

We are aware of NATO's reply also in Sweden. It is the old story about the Warsaw Pact having more conventional weapons.

But that is of course just the question of creating confidence, they say in Prague and Moscow.

"Why do they expect attacks from the east? They know that such a threat does not exist. It appears that the West is not concerned about confidence. We must make that judgment based on the actions of a number of governments."

That is a judgement which the peace movement in Sweden was also forced to make.
NATO's Proposal

"In the Soviet proposal in Stockholm there are also demands to freeze military budgets, a prohibition against all chemical weapons, creation of nuclear weapon free zones both in the Balkans and in the Nordic countries and the so-called corridor in central Europe. Further proposals were about certain military-technical measures.

"The NATO side believes that the most important issues in Stockholm are the military-technical measures. They propose a certain broader flexibility with information about military maneuvers and a greater exchange of observers in connection with these.

"We are naturally ready for that. But at the same time we say that increased confidence can never depend on only small mention of military maneuvers and inviting military observers to attend. That is good, but not sufficient. We want more substance. To build a stronger framework around that. Otherwise our military are invited just for the sake of form, to see NATO's preparations for war. Against us, naturally. That will not work."

The Stockholm conference is meeting at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union have decided to conduct a dialog in Geneva. How does Czechoslovakia evaluate the importance of the Geneva meeting for the Stockholm conference?

"We hope that the meeting between Gromyko and Schultz will help to create a more hopeful atmosphere in Stockholm."

Zdenek Skoba said that the conversations in Geneva will begin on 12 March. He believes that they will be both long and difficult, but that all discussions about disarmament also have a positive effect on Stockholm.

"Geneva is the beginning of something new. If only the political will can be retained. It is clear that the United States must adjust to a new development in East-West relations.

The Importance of the Neutrals

How do you view the importance of the NN states (the neutral and nonaligned bloc of states at the conference) to the conference?

Zdenek Skoba nodded, pondered and said that the NN group and especially the personal actions of the Finnish delegation leader Matti Kahliluoto in December to get the conference to form two working groups was good. That is appreciated!

On the other hand, he said, his delegation was a little surprised that Sweden did not work further with Olof Palme's proposal for a nuclear weapon free corridor through central Europe. The Czech delegation asked the Swedes why the
corridor was missing from the actions of both the Swedes and the NN bloc. The answer was that Sweden as the host state did not believe it was in a position to carry the proposal farther.

The same applied to the demand for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Nordic countries. It did not appear in the actions of the NN bloc or the Nordic countries at the conference.

"Our opinion is that there is a general closing with NATO's positions, when these demands are missing from the declaration of the NN states. Certainly the military-technical measures are important, but they are not the only ones."

As the issue now stands, it is the socialist countries which advance the demands of the Swedish and the entire Nordic peace movements at the Stockholm conference. Why? That we must ask our own government!

What Prospects?

What prospects does Czechoslovakia see for the conference?

"We have the working groups and three interest centers--NATO, the neutral group and the Warsaw Pact countries. We now have good possibilities for concrete discussions in the working groups. Previously it was only a general conference forum.

"Prospects? A positive result is not very close--in the fall of '86 the conference will move to Vienna. It would be good if we could have a result by then. We are ready for positive results. The Soviet Union's proposal gives a basis for a lot. But the entire conference is built on consensus. The presumption is that all decisions will be made jointly. And that requires the same attitude from the other side also."

Prospects exist, therefore, but they are not easy to achieve. That requires political will. That exists in the socialist camp, does it also exist in the West?

Reagan tried to get the conference to deal with the "human rights" questions. That was defeated, by Sweden among others.

"And rightly so. The so-called third basket from the 1975 Helsinki conference, meaning questions about human rights and how they are carried out, do not belong in the Stockholm conference, but at the human rights forum which begins in May in Ottawa, with the same basis as the Stockholm conference."

10 Years Since Helsinki

This summer it will be 10 years since the Helsinki conference, when the national leaders of Europe, the United States and Canada approved a common doc-
ument. We appreciate the Finnish effort to prepare a 10-year jubilee on a high level. How high it will be depends on diplomatic activity. But the basis of the entire Helsinki process is that the political questions go forward. We place high political value on this 10-year jubilee.

Many active members of the peace movement in our country participated 2 years ago—summer of '83—in a world meeting for peace and life against nuclear war, which was held in Prague. At that time we experienced the deep desire for peace of the Czech people. We see it again in the actions of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in Stockholm. That also gives us a perspective.

And the possibility to incorporate the Stockholm conference more than before in our peace activity. In the conference hall at Sergel's Square there are delegations asking the same questions that thousands of people ask every day in Swedish peace work on the streets and in the markets, in the schools and unions.

Think about it!

9287
CSO: 5200/2501
USSR PROPOSES REDUCTION-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

Lomeyko Briefing

LD141332 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1247 GMT 14 Feb 85

[Text] Moscow 14 Feb (TASS) -- At a briefing held here for Soviet and foreign journalists Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the Press Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, today stated that "we are convinced that progress at the Vienna talks is possible. It is only necessary to remove the artificial obstacles erected in the way of such progress by the NATO countries." He stressed that the NATO countries should abandon attempts to undermine the agreed principle of avoiding actions detrimental to the security of any of the sides involved and abandon the aspiration to obtain one-sided military advantages.

Vladimir Lomeyko disclosed that the USSR and the other socialist countries, which are direct participants in the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, today put forward a new initiative. They have submitted a draft entitled "Basic Provisions of an Agreement on an Initial Reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of Land Forces and Armaments in Central Europe and the Subsequent Nonincrease in the Levels of the Sides' Armed Forces and Armaments in This Region" for examination by the participants.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman reported that, proceeding from the desire to undertake practical steps in reducing armed forces and weapons in central Europe, the Soviet Union is proposing that an agreement be reached for the USSR and United States to withdraw during the course of 1 year 20,000 and 13,000 men, respectively, from the moment the agreement comes into force. The withdrawal indicated would be carried out by combat units and their assigned complement of weapons and combat equipment, to involve up to 10 percent of individual military personnel. Certain elements from the West's proposals are borne in mind in the given initiative. The troops being reduced would leave the central European zone through declared observation points, of which each side would have three or four. Other measures are also envisaged to safeguard the fulfillment of the agreement. The agreement would be operative for 3 years, during the course of which all participating states would pledge on a collective and on a national basis not to increase the level of their armed forces and weapons in central Europe.

The socialist countries' proposal, Vladimir Lomeyko emphasized, envisages continuing the talks on concluding a comprehensive agreement, in accordance with which the total number of personnel in the armed forces of each country would be reduced to equal collective levels -- 900,000 people each, including 700,000 each in the land troops.
The aim of the new initiative put forward by the USSR and the socialist countries, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized, is to give fresh impetus to the Vienna talks and to set them on the path toward swiftly reaching specific, mutually acceptable accords, which would aid in reducing the dangerous level of military confrontation in central Europe.

Details of Proposal

LD141235 Moscow TASS in English 1215 GMT 14 Feb 85

[Text] Vienna February 14 TASS -- At the Vienna negotiations today, the Soviet Union tabled draft "Basic Provisions of an Agreement on an Initial Reduction of Land Forces and Armaments in Central Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States and on Subsequent Non-Increase in the Levels of the Sides' Armed Forces and Armaments in the Area". This new constructive step has been taken on behalf of the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia -- direct participants in the Vienna negotiations.

Ambassador Valerian Mikhaylov, the leader of the Soviet delegation, made a speech at the plenary meeting. He emphasised that the Soviet Union, guided by invariable concern for averting the war threat and for improving the international situation and ending the arms race, together with the other Warsaw-Treaty member-states strives for businesslike and resultative conduct of negotiations, be it in Geneva, Stockholm or Vienna.

The socialist countries' proposal tabled today is called upon to give an impulse to the Vienna negotiations, to achieve the first concrete results at them and to set the beginning of a process of reducing the concentration of forces and armaments in central Europe. With this end in view it is suggested that attention be focused on effecting reductions of part of the troops of the USSR and the USA in interrelationship with a subsequent freeze of the level of the armed forces and armaments of all direct negotiators in the above-mentioned area, doing that in legal treaty form.

Within one year of the agreement's entering into force, the land forces of the USSR and the USA in central Europe would be cut down by 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively, which would involve combat military units together with their organic armament and combat hardware, with up to ten per cent of such cutbacks to involve individual servicemen. It is further envisaged that after the Soviet and American troop cutbacks are completed, all states -- parties to the agreement would undertake on a collective and national basis not to raise the levels of their armed forces and armaments in central Europe for the period covered by the agreement. [punctuation as received]

Along with the use of national technical verification means available with the sides, such concrete measures to ensure the implementation of the agreement are suggested as an exchange of lists of units subject to reduction and withdrawal, notifications about the start and completion of practical cutback activities, and the setting up of three-four observation points by each side for the troop withdrawal period, the observation points through which the troops' withdrawal would be effected.

The draft agreement proceeds from the assumption that negotiations on further, larger cutbacks of the armed forces and armaments would be continued with a view to achieving equal collective levels of the sides' armed forces in central Europe -- with 900,000 men on each side, including 700,000 men in each side's land forces.
The prospective agreement would enter into force from the day it is signed and would remain in effect for three years. The draft agreement is based on the approach and the cutback scheme which were laid down in the socialist states' initiatives dated February and June 1983. Fully retaining their topicality, they ensure the shortest way to reaching a mutually acceptable accord.

The new initiative of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is constructive and practical. It takes into consideration a number of elements of the stand of the Western negotiators and makes it possible within a short period to achieve the first tangible result at the Vienna negotiations. This would undoubtedly contribute to creating the necessary trust, a favourable climate and ground for further joint efforts to strengthen peace and stability in Europe without detriment to the security of the sides.

Lomeyko Remarks Summed Up

PML81627 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 85 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists in connection with the new initiative made by the USSR and the other socialist countries at the Vienna talks on mutual reductions of armed forces and arms in central Europe was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 14 February.

Speaking at the briefing, V.B. Lomeyko, deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Department, told the journalists that the socialist countries directly participating in the Vienna talks had submitted a draft "Basic Provisions for an Agreement on Initial Reductions of Ground Forces and Arms in Central Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States and the Subsequent Nonincrease of the Sides' Armed Forces and Arms in the Region" for the participants' examination. The Soviet Union proposes coming to an agreement in which the USSR and the United States would withdraw 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively within 1 year from the time the agreement comes into force. The reduced forces would leave the central European region by way of observation posts -- three or four on each side -- designated in advance. Other measures to ensure the fulfillment of the agreement are also envisaged. The proposal in question also takes into account the West's wishes. The socialist countries' proposal envisages continuing the talks on concluding a comprehensive agreement under which the total number of each side's armed forces personnel would be reduced to equal collective levels -- 900,000 men each, including 700,000 ground forces.

Replying to journalists' question, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed confidence that progress at the Vienna talks is necessary and possible. It is only necessary for the NATO countries to renounce their attempts to undermine the agreed principle of not damaging the security of either side and the desire to obtain unilateral military advantage.

CSO: 5200/1008
NEW USSR MBFR PROPOSAL OFFERS 'TANGIBLE RESULT'

AU201128 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 16 Feb 85 p 5

[Bedrich Zagar article in the "A Word on the Events" column: "A Tangible Result Is in the Offing"]

[Text] Progress in the Vienna negotiations on armed forces and armaments reduction in central Europe has received new momentum. Ambassador Valerian Mikhaylov, head of the Soviet delegation, submitted on behalf of the direct participants in the negotiations -- the CSSR, the GDR, the PPR, and the USSR -- a basic draft of the treaty on initial reduction of Soviet and American ground forces and armaments in central Europe and on subsequent maintenance of armed forces and weapons levels between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

The proposal provides that, as soon as the agreement becomes valid, the numerical strength of the USSR and U.S. ground forces in central Europe decrease in 1 year by 20,000 and 13,000 men respectively. Simultaneously, the signatories would commit themselves, on a collective and national basis, not to increase the level of their armed forces during the agreement's period of validity.

In this way a new proposal has found its way to the table, one which takes into account the stances of the Western participants and which makes it possible to achieve a tangible result in the shortest possible time.

It must be recalled that the United States itself has proposed the withdrawal of 13,000 members of its own armed forces deployed in central Europe. Although the United States has demanded the withdrawal of 30,000 Soviet troops, the delegations of the socialist countries are nevertheless constantly pointing out that the West is forgetting that the USSR unilaterally withdrew 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks from GDR territory in 1979.

The delegations of the NATO countries have indicated that this step is welcome, but that they will have to "intensely study" the proposal in order to be able to assess whether it is a step forward. They merely lack "details." Should the West want to return to the old "problem of numerical data," this will prove yet again that it has not withdrawn from its position of blocking and hampering progress. This proposal of the socialist countries would hurt neither side and its realization would only push the negotiations forward, which is exactly what the socialist countries desire. The proposal would undoubtedly help create the necessary trust, a favorable atmosphere, and the prerequisites for further joint efforts to fulfill the mandate of the Vienna negotiations. The delegations of the NATO countries, too, have come to Vienna to reduce the number of troops in central Europe on both sides, and by so doing to diminish the danger of military conflict.
By their new initiative the socialist countries merely affirm that their proposals of February and June 1983 remain topical. So far the West has rejected these proposals, explaining this by its lack of new numerical data and of associated control measures. But the 14 February proposal in Vienna nevertheless provides an incentive for action which would hurt neither side and would instead lead to further reduction steps, up to control and verification of the final limit of armed forces in central Europe agreed on -- 900,000 men on each side, 700,000 of them being ground forces.

The Western delegations at the Vienna negotiations persist in their claim that the socialist countries have 150,000 more soldiers in central Europe than they are willing to admit.

However, so far they have been unable to substantiate this claim in any way; they merely proceed from their own estimates. And they also wish to use their own estimates even in the further exchange of numerical data -- in other words, the numbers problem could go on forever. In endeavoring to circumvent the dispute over numbers, the socialist countries are proposing, first, to achieve the limits agreed on, and then to submit the strengths of armed forces to mutual control.

The West often refers to its proposal of April 1984. This proposal is essentially based on the old stands of the NATO countries, which demand an exchange of new numerical data. Moreover, the proposal of 1984 has greater complications. Only one conclusion can be drawn from all this: The West does not wish to give up its original plan at the Vienna negotiations, namely to achieve unilateral advantage to the detriment of the Warsaw Pact.

Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the press section of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed at a Moscow press conference that such a course by the West will deepen conflict between the sides and turn back negotiations in several aspects. If the Western delegations in Vienna really wish to achieve an agreement, as they constantly reiterate, then the new proposal of the socialist countries provides a good opportunity for taking an important step forward toward the common goal.

CSO: 5200/3001
NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

COPENHAGEN NORDIC ZONE CONFERENCE SPARKS RENEWED INTEREST

Newspapers on Absent Foreign Minister

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 28 Nov 84 p 1

[Editorial Roundup: "Why Vayrynen Wasn't in Copenhagen"]

[Text] The absence of Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen from the Copenhagen meeting dealing with a Nordic area free of nuclear weapons gives substance to claims that Finland's interest in a nuclear-free zone has weakened, writes Rafael Paro in HUFVUDSTATDSBLADET. In his opinion, however, because of the country's internal political situation it was not exactly unforgivable that the leader of the Center Party thought it best to take part in the Kouvola meeting.

HELSINGIN SANOMAT gave attention to the same matter. "It is unforgivable to withdraw from the Nordic area's own endeavors. This is what Paavo Vayrynen did, who placed the interests of his own party ahead of advancing the affairs of the country.

AAMULEHTI writes about the same Kouvola meeting and its statements. "The party committee wanted to eliminate completely the taxation of the so-called residence income. The committee was on the right track, but if it had its ear to the ground, Foreign Minister Ahti Pekkala trampled on it by observing that no date for elimination of the tax was mentioned in the decision. But the decision was being made on a day of recreation and everyone has his own pleasure."

The Center Party is considering why it cannot get ahead in the south, in the big cities. Perhaps a quotation from a column by Seppo Sarlund, editor in chief of SUOMENMAA will give a clue: "Two different Finlands are visible more and more clearly: this Helsinki, with its neighbors Turku and Tampere, and then Finland proper, where people are seeking equality with the first [Finland], but which would be too little for them."
Effect on Foreign Policy Pondered

Helsinki UUSI SGOMI in Finnish 28 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Copenhagen's Nordic Conference"]

[Text] The conference of national organizations that met last weekend in Copenhagen to consider a nuclear-free Nordic area showed that this initiative by President Urho Kekkonen in 1963 has made more progress on the level of principles than has been observable in years.

It is no longer only Finns who are speaking in favor of the zone. On the contrary, the Swedes and Danes showed such activity in Copenhagen that the initiative for moving the matter forward seems to be slipping away from the Finns.

Even though the Copenhagen conference was unofficial, its most momentous speeches were given by political leaders. The proposal of Anker Jorgensen, Danish opposition leader, to organize a parliamentary meeting marked a shift to a new, more significant level.

The "missionary work" of the Finns, sometimes more active, sometimes more passive, on behalf of the nuclear-free zone seems to have assimilated viewpoints from various countries. A statement before the meeting by the Foreign Ministry of Sweden showed that all the parties in that country support active efforts to ban nuclear weapons. Thus in Sweden people have arrived at about the same attitude as we have.

Anker Jorgensen, who gave the most prominent Danish speech, represents the opposition, to be sure, from which position it is always easier to make new openings than it is when sitting in the government. On the other hand, however, prime minister Poul Schluter, who brought greetings from the Danish government to the meeting, limited himself to presenting reservations about accomplishing the undertaking instead of rejecting it outright, as would have been expected a year or so ago.

Of course there are sufficient reservations in various Nordic countries toward any nuclear-free Nordic area, perhaps strongest in Norway. Nevertheless, progress has been made in the discussion of the matter to a new level of quality above the previous emotional confrontations pro and con. Now there are discussions of the prerequisites for eliminating nuclear weapons. The significance of guarantees from the super-powers is being weighed along with the geographical size of the zone. In this sense the Soviet Union's announced readiness for measures in its own territories, which, it is true, have not yet been detailed in any way, is in a key position.
The Copenhagen meeting can be regarded as the most significant individual step forward in the pursuit of a nuclear-free Nordic area up to this point. For this reason it has been felt strange that foreign minister Paavo Vayrynen did not follow the wishes of the Finnish organizers of the meeting by giving Finland's main address as Sweden's foreign minister Lennart Bodstrom did. Vayrynen considered a routine meeting of his party's committee more important than the Copenhagen meeting. Placing matters in this kind of priority has aroused discussion of whether the position of a nuclear-free Nordic area has changed at all in the priority sequence of Finland's foreign policy.

The planned routes of the various nuclear weapons criss-cross in such a tight network across the Nordic countries. This map illustration was part of the documents at the Copenhagen meeting.

Insufficient Details from USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Nov 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Nuclear-free Nordic Area Received New Leaders"]

[Text] The proposal for a nuclear-free Nordic zone was aired last weekend in Copenhagen. In the discussions among over 200 members of parliament and representatives of national organizations, the zone received new life in a way that presaged new growth for the plan, which had been thought to have become mummified.
The broadly representative meeting reminded us in a very refreshing way that the zone proposal rests in the hands of the Nordic residents themselves. Even talking about the zone is worth the trouble, because in this way Nordic residents are protecting their right to manage their own affairs. Foreigners will not start to watch out for the interests of Nordic residents if they do not do so themselves.

The suggestion of Danish opposition leader Anker Jorgensen to organize a Nordic parliamentary meeting to debate the zone told of new interest in regard to it. The idea of holding the meeting in parallel with a session of the Nordic Council received support from various countries. Similarly there was apparent unanimity about keeping the parallel meeting unofficial.

A parallel meeting would mean in practice the creation of some kind of second chamber for foreign policy in connection with the Nordic Council.

Even though unofficial, it would become a permanent authority, because threshing out a nuclear-free zone will require at least a decade, if not two. The zone proposal has not been able to saturate more than Finland in its first 20 years, in Sweden it has just penetrated the surface. The others, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, are still behind.

If implemented, Jorgensen's suggestion could yet elevate discussion and thinking on Nordic foreign policy incomparably. The biggest short-range question for the proposal is, however, the permanence of Denmark's change in thinking. During his decade-long term as prime minister, Jorgensen was not a particular friend of the zone. His opinion will not necessarily remain unchanged after successful elections, and it is not at all sure that his Social Democratic party will necessarily follow the same course under its next leader.

Both Denmark and Norway have stated officially that the present situation already means a nuclear-free Nordic area in practice. The United States has often repeated the same thing and does not see any reason to start actions.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has repeatedly offered actions in its own areas bordering the zone as an appendage to it. However, it has not consented to publishing its thoughts sufficiently clearly. Moscow's secrecy has not helped the matter along, even though it has announced itself as its warmest supporter.

Within the Soviet Union there seem to be conflicting attitudes about both the position of the Baltic Sea and actions in its own territory. The Soviet Union probably has not solidified its position.

The most interesting challenge of the Copenhagen meeting still reflects back to Finland. Since president Urho Kekkonen's speeches on the zone in 1963 and 1978, the initiative in the matter has slipped to Sweden. Finland has not developed its position beyond general ideas. Finland has remained waiting a change in the super-power atmosphere and almost forgotten that only its own actions can make its own interests known.
During a cold period in super-power politics it is of course unrealistic to demand loudly concessions from the great powers on behalf of a nuclear-free Nordic zone, which is for them largely a matter of indifference. But on the other hand, it is unforgivable to withdraw from the Nordic area's own endeavors. This is what Paavo Väyrynen did, who placed the interests of his own party ahead of advancing the affairs of the country.

Nuclear Disarmament Movement's Impact

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Dec 84 p 2

[Article by Rene Nyberg, foreign-affairs secretary in the Finnish embassy in Brussels: "Nuclear Umbrellas' Protection Extends Indirectly to Finland As Well"]

[Text] A nuclear weapon is not the wonder weapon of fairy tales. It has not brought world domination to its possessors nor ended war. On the basis of the short history of nuclear weapons, it is easy to agree with the Marxist viewpoint that there is no absolute weapon in existence. But the second fall from paradise is irreversible.

Now 40 years after Hiroshima, the use of nuclear weapons is still debatable. After the initial enthusiasm that nuclear weapons received, strategist in both the East and the West have gradually started to doubt whether nuclear weapons can be used militarily in any sensible way.

Even a calculated use of nuclear weapons carries with it the danger of escalation and the possibility that the situation will get out of control. Miniaturization of nuclear weapons does not eliminate the taboo on their use. Concern for the ecological consequences of nuclear war—nuclear winter—supports these doubts. A credible nuclear threat is more important than ownership of nuclear weapons.

Limits of Nuclear Threat

The claim that nuclear weapons are unusable is, however, a misleading simplification. Nuclear weapons have so far prevented the outbreak of a third world war. Some time ago nuclear weapons prevented a spread of the Korean War. Fear of a direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States has kept warring factions in the Middle East in check. But nuclear weapons were not able to prevent the United States' military defeat in Vietnam. The nuclear threat is always directed, in the final analysis, to the other superpower. Therefore it is an ineffective weapon against non-nuclear countries.

Because of the threat created by nuclear weapons, the possibilities for use of conventional military power have diminished decisively, especially in Europe. Military power cannot be used across the boundaries of alliances without upsetting the balance between the alliances decisively. This kind of change could cause an international crisis reflecting to Europe even more easily than weapons technology, any advantage obtained from which the other side has so far always been able to catch up to.
Internal difficulties within both alliances can also set in motion incalculable developments. A wavering of the balance between the military alliances would subject the neutral countries especially to pressure.

The history of nuclear weapons shows that military supremacy cannot be achieved through nuclear technology. The difficulty in utilizing the military power of nuclear weapons in a sensible way has compelled both military alliances to reconsider the foundations of their defense.

But it must be kept in mind that the threat of nuclear weapons does not eliminate [the need for] strengthening conventional defense and rewriting the tenets of the military. The threat can at most be alleviated by weapons readiness, developing general crisis management and reducing the dependence of defense on nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons changed fundamentally the situation of European countries outside the military alliances as well. Their security is dependent on preserving the situation of balance in Europe, which is both an important goal of the policies practiced by these countries and also their only option.

Prediction of changes, prevention of negative phenomena, and preparation for them are the most important forms of activity for the security policy of a country like Finland. The security of a small country requires political as well as military ability to manage crises. In the nuclear era the moment of truth is not war but crisis.

The change in thought as compared to that which preceded the Second World War has been enormous. Upsetting of the peace, in other words a crisis, has become central, because of the threat of nuclear destruction. Before, a crisis was just an intermediate phase in preparation for continuing politics by other methods according to the doctrines of Clausewitz.

It is apparently irrational that the existence of nuclear weapons is not purely a negative thing from the point of view of a country like Finland. It strengthens above all the security of small countries inasmuch as the use of military power becomes more difficult. The protection to the nuclear umbrellas of the Soviet Union and the United States extends indirectly to the European terrain in between.

It has always been possible to transform military power to political power. Nuclear weapons do not, after all, prevent political or economic pressure or political-economic support, but in the era of nuclear weapons a misinterpretation of these messages could be fateful. Direct military pressure across alliance boundaries and concentration of forces in the Europe of today would be playing with fire. It would return us to the insecurity of the time of the Berlin crisis.

The difficulty of using military power has not by any means eliminated the threat of war from Europe. The efforts of both military alliances to develop conventional armament speak of an effort to break the stalemate or of a necessity to maintain it in this way as well.
The shift of the center of military power concentrated in Europe from nuclear weapons to conventional defense has taken place gradually, during a couple of decades' time. It has been overshadowed by the deployment of Euromissiles and other new nuclear weapons systems that have attracted attention.

A conventional threat cannot replace a nuclear one and conventional war is not an option for Europe. From the standpoint of the non-aligned countries, however, it is a fact that both military alliances see that their security requires conventional defense. For this reason the threat facing countries in between is first of all conventional. Construction of a defense based on the assumption of a conventional threat is justified.

The defense possibilities and needs of non-aligned countries cannot therefore be measured any longer by reference to nuclear weapons. Neither does it lessen, but rather strengthens the possibilities for non-aligned countries to promote the finding of political solutions.

The super-powers easily mistrust any kind of defense system that they do not control. An independent defense system always contains a certain degree of uncertainty and in the end an exhortation to give up arbitrary meddling in affairs.

The defense of a country located in between depends, however, mainly on how that country is seen as resisting pressure and being capable of preventing its air and land from being used [by others]. For this reason the inviability of a country outside the bloc division is an alarm cord that the super-powers watch with mistrust.

The possibility of a super-power to pressure a small state militarily is comparable to the firmness of nerves and ability to defend just mentioned. The use of military force against a politically stable and determined small state in Europe is not worth the risk even in the most critical situation.

Finland's Security

The assumption that an upsetting of the balance situation in Europe would cause the military situation to intensify with conventional moves at first requires that a country like Finland prepare itself for surprise changes in situations. Possible conventional strikes increase the possibility that non-aligned countries will be pulled quickly along, especially if it is thought that their territories offer the other side an easy field of operations.

Defense cannot be concentrated in just one part of the country, such as northern Finland. Nor can defense be built on just one branch of the military, such as the air force. A flexible area defense requires first of all mobile and well-armed ground forces and the ability to adapt to the most surprising changes in situations.
Keeping up with development in weapons technology is one measure of successful development of defense capability, although technology itself does not decide anything. New weapons technology and numerous applications of electronics do, however, open new horizons also for a small country like Finland that is a leader in industry.

By Political Means

The test of the credibility of the policies and defense of small countries is the "gray phase" or crisis.

It requires first of all the ability to influence a relaxation of the crisis by political means. This in turn is possible in the case of Finland only if our foreign policy has succeeded in convincing the parties of Finland's determination to fulfill its treaty obligations and its stay out of the conflicts between the super-powers.

The Nordic area is a model example of mutual dependence in Europe. Finland's own security requires a correct evaluation of developments in neighboring areas, but also an understanding of the psychological security needs of the Soviet Union, as well as Sweden and Norway.

In addition to desire, the ability of neutral countries to stand behind their words is also being weighed. Finland must be able to guard and govern its own land and sea areas and its air space. Without such an ability, which is the basis of regular defense ability, crisis management would lose its basis. Finland would be in danger of losing its right to speak in its own affairs in the smallest crisis situation before a single shot had been fired in Europe.

SKDL Urges New Initiatives

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Dec 84 p 2

[Article: "SKDL Proposes Zone Clarification"]

[Text] The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] is proposing that the Finnish government make an initiative to the other Nordic countries to set up a working group of officials to clarify the formation of a nuclear-free zone and to set forth the viewpoints of the Nordic countries on the matter. In the opinion of the SKDL's joint board, it is imperative that Finns push forward the zone proposal in all possible ways.

The goal will be a zone free of nuclear weapons, covering the land and water areas of the five Nordic countries. The joint board contemplates that in addition to formation of the zone, there also be separate agreements on activities concerning the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic, by which their nuclear weapons would be fundamentally limited or that at least part of their area be nuclear free.
The SKDL wants the revision in state rules presented to Parliament to be handled as a whole. All four proposals should be handled as a single unit, and their less significant parts should not be approved separately if the socially more important part might fail to be accomplished, the league emphasizes.

Of the changes proposed by the government the SKDL is most worried about the possibility of implementing wage controls. The SKDL demands that in connection with Parliament's consideration [of this matter], care be taken that the revision in state rules does not affect the freedom of action of the trade unions and that passing the law should not be used against unions that have withdrawn from the suspended labor market solution.

Other parts of the proposed laws may require refining in Parliament. The SKDL considers that the government's statement, according to which the government will soon present Parliament with a proposal for the so-called "readiness" rules, and which was recorded along with justifications for a proposed law, to be clearly opposed to its goals.

Paper on Sobolev Comments

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Dec 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Guarantees Have Already Been Purchased"]

[Text] Ambassador Vladimir Sobolev of the Soviet Union clarified Wednesday in Helsinki his country's views on the nuclear-free Nordic zone. The correction was appropriate, because partly contradictory statements given by the Soviet Union during the past couple of years have mislead some who have interpreted them.

As a result of Sobolev's speech it is now clear that the Soviet Union has not given up its rights beforehand, and has not even committed itself to giving up anything it regards as its own security interest. According to the ambassador, the Soviet Union also has no intention of making more precise statements until the Nordic countries themselves have made a decision in principle to negotiate.

Various interpretations have arisen partly because, contrary to earlier practices, many observers and interpreters have published contradictory opinions in the Soviet Union. It will of course take some time for the Nordic countries to learn the new Soviet way of handling information, because until now it has been supposed that every published idea was official.

Ambassador Sobolev also reminded us of his country's guarantees not to use nuclear weapons against countries that join the zone. However, there is no longer any room for bargaining on this point. For example, the Soviet Union gave a commitment in the UN disarmament session of 1978 not to use nuclear weapons against such countries. Like other countries, this was done unilaterally and with certain reservations. The non-nuclear countries bought the right not to become the targets of nuclear weapons by joining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, by which they also approved the nuclear countries' monopoly. The Nordic countries no longer need to make additional concessions about that either.