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EVOLUTION OF NATO AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM.
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND U.S. RELATIONS

BY

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EVOLUTION OF NATO AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND US RELATIONS

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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the security architecture in Europe has substantially changed. For many, the end of the Cold War reflected a possible end of NATO’s existence. The prediction of NATO’s inevitable demise has so far been wrong. NATO is still in good shape, but the NATO of yesterday does not exist anymore. The Alliance has been downsized, reorganized, redeployed and regenerated under a different concept. To summarize, the organization has undertaken a double process of adaptation, internally and externally. Internally, NATO military forces have reduced their size and readiness, improved their mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies and relied on a greater use of multinational formations. In addition, an agreement on a new command structure that foretells a reduction from 65 headquarters at present to 20 has been reached. Externally, NATO has opened itself to the East by creating at first the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and in 1994 the Partnership for Peace program. In addition, the Alliance has remained open to membership of other European countries. To date, twelve nations have asked to join NATO and three have already signed the Protocols of Accession. In the meantime, the European Union Member States “reactivated” the Western European Union (WEU) in an effort to establish a European Security and Defense Identity. In 1996, the WEU was given permission to conduct its own military missions using NATO assets, through the concept known as Combined Joint Task Force. These decisions have created the conditions for a valid European defense system. Now the question is to identify a more suitable equilibrium between the two “pillars” of the Atlantic Alliance, American and European. Equilibrium that is essential for the future of European and US relations.
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INTRODUCTION

At the summit in Brussels in January 1994, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed on a series of measures designed to adapt the Alliance to a new strategic situation. The critical elements of NATO's reforms were: Partnership for Peace (PfP), a program of military and political cooperation with former members of the Warsaw Pact; Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), a military arrangement by which some members could act militarily with NATO assets without necessarily involving all the Alliance's members; and the formal recognition of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the European pillar of the Alliance. Later, at the December 1994 ministerial meeting, NATO initiated a study for an expanded Alliance and at the Madrid Summit of July 1997 three countries belonging to the former Warsaw pact were invited to begin accession talks: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (another nine countries have asked to join NATO). At the same time, the Alliance reaffirmed its desire to develop relations with all other Partner countries. This proposed relationship includes strengthening political consultation and cooperation in the context of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, developing more individualized cooperation under Partnership for Peace, as well as giving substance to the
specific arrangements agreed upon during the Spring of 1997, with Russia and Ukraine.

It was also recognized in that forum that security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with stability and security in the Mediterranean. For that reason the Mediterranean Cooperation Group was established with overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue. Six countries were invited to dialogue with NATO: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. A progress report is expected in 1998 on the implementation of the first work program of the enhanced Mediterranean dialogue. Finally, in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Defense Ministers Session held in Brussels on 2 December 1997, substantial progress was achieved on the Long Term Study (LTS) which addresses the internal adaptation of the Alliance. An agreement was reached on a new command structure, as well as on the type, number and location of Headquarters.

To adapt to the post Cold War situation, NATO has behaved as an enterprise competing in a market (whose product is the defense of the nation members according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). Excluding the option to declare bankruptcy, the enterprise can reorganize itself in the same market or differentiate its product or widen its market.¹ NATO has chosen
to change its product (not only defense, but also security and stability projection)\(^2\) and to widen its market (enlargement to East, partnership to East, dialogue and security cooperative to South). The option of simply downsizing NATO has been excluded. That option would have entailed a quick loss of its importance and it might have provoked eventually its disappearance if it followed isolationist trends of the US. In the current decade, NATO has begun a transformation that has already rendered it virtually unrecognizable to anyone serving with the organization earlier, and the changes continue.

NATO efficiency has not suffered for all these modifications. The main reason is that NATO decisions are taken by consensus and therefore, practically, by the US. With its leadership the US conducts a role of effecting regional integration and catalysis. NATO enlargement to East will not change things. American leadership in Europe will remain and the enlargement burdens will affect only marginally the Alliance planning.\(^3\) Above all, the enlargement will affect all the eastern countries (from Baltic to Black Sea) creating a different security architecture. For Europe and its main institutions - European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU) - things are much more complicated. First of all, the EU should profoundly
change its decision-making system. This is not easy as demonstrated by the difficulties that the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) has in order to accomplish the Maastricht Treaty revision. The debate about European defense and ESDI remains conflictual, and the questions it raises— in particular about the future of Euro-American relations— are too often ignored. But what is the usefulness of a common European defense when everybody agrees that NATO must remain the essential institution for Europe’s security and defense? How can ESDI be strengthened without weakening NATO? What will be the effects on ESDI of future NATO and EU enlargement towards the East? What is the role of WEU and EU in the European security and defense environment?

These are fundamental questions. Only giving them appropriate answers is it possible to assess the problem of the relations between ESDI and NATO or, in terms more practical, between Europe and the US.

PRESERVING AND ADAPTING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

For many, the end of the Cold War meant the end of NATO’s main reason for existing, and, although the Alliance was somehow expected to endure in some form, it was hardly expected to
flourish. Many scholars wrote in the early 1990s that the Alliance would not outlive the century. Some of them, indeed, did not abandon the belief in the usefulness of a military alliance, but they were convinced that without a specific and well determined threat, no alliance could continue to exist. However, all of these predictions have been wrong. NATO is still in good shape. The Cold War threat has disappeared, and with it NATO’s main military mission, but the Alliance’s utility is unquestioned. The importance of the military alliance was soon recognized only two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall when a major war in the Persian Gulf broke out. NATO was not officially involved in the 1991 Gulf War, but it is undeniable that a 40 year legacy of close military cooperation, interoperability, and training among the Western allies was crucial in building up the coalition which defeated Saddam Hussein’s military forces.

The following years further proved the usefulness of the Alliance. From 1992 to 1995, the Alliance was called upon to create a “no-fly zone” over Bosnia-Herzegovina and to enforce a maritime embargo on former Yugoslavia. These were limited missions in support of the OSCE/UN peacekeeping operations. However, in 1995 NATO was called upon to undertake a decisive
military operation by bombing Bosnian-Serb positions, thereby forcing the warring parties to negotiate. The rest is recent history: by the end of 1995 NATO deployed almost 60,000 troops in former Yugoslavia, alongside new partners from Eastern Europe, including Russia. The NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR), started Operation Joint Endeavour on 16 December 1995. IFOR’s role was to help the Parties to implement the peace accords. In December 1996, IFOR successfully completed its mission. Nevertheless, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence was needed to provide the stability necessary for the consolidation of peace. They agreed that NATO should organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996. SFOR’s mission (called Operation Joint Guard) is to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilize the peace. SFOR, like IFOR (but half of the size of IFOR) is a joint operation, led by NATO, but with wide participation of non-NATO countries.

Both operations have demonstrated that the Alliance is adapting its forces and policies to the requirements of the post Cold War world, while continuing to provide collective security and defense for the Allies. The IFOR/SFOR operations show that NATO remains vital, relevant and prepared to deal with the new,
multifaceted security risks facing Europe with the end of the Cold War.

What has happened? The Alliance has changed: the 1998 NATO is not the NATO of the past. Its core mission remains collective defense, but its organization, military capabilities and structures have been adapted to enable it to address new tasks, in particular those involving cooperation with non-member countries and crisis management. The organization has been downsized, reorganized, redeployed and regenerated under different concepts than those establishing it. In short, the Alliance has undertaken a double process of adaptation, internal and external.

INTERNAL ADAPTATION

Command and Control structure

Since 1990, NATO has undertaken major reform initiatives, some of them already indicated, such as the creation of the Partnership for Peace program and the approval of the Alliance Combined Joint Task Forces concept. Other important initiatives were the declaration of the end of the Cold War (at the London Summit of July 1990) and the definition of the "Alliance’s New Strategic Concept" released at the Rome Summit in 1991. While
these initiatives are well-known, the changes in the NATO command and control have gone largely unnoticed.

First of all, the Alliance eliminated one of the three Major NATO Commands (MNC), the Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), reducing the number of MNCs from three to two. While there have been practically no changes in the Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) the most significant changes in command and control arrangements have occurred within Allied Command Europe (ACE), which has reduced its Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) from four to three by eliminating United Kingdom Air Forces Command (UKAIR) and transforming Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) into a new MSC, Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) by merging forces previously assigned to ACCHAN, UKAIR, and portions of the former AFNORTH.

All these changes in the military structure are far from being over (NATO is reforming its integrated command structure in the form of the "Long Term Study"). Recently, the MNCs were renamed Strategic Commanders (SCs); the MSCs, Regional Commanders (RCs); the Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSCs), Sub-Regional Commanders (SRCs) as Joint Sub-Regional Commanders (JSRCs) or Component Commanders (CCs). The fourth level of command, the Sub-Principal Subordinate Commands (Sub-PSCs) will be abolished in
the new NATO structure, but being essentially national headquarters they will likely remain in the national structures. Although the three new levels do not conceptually differ from the previous ones, actually in the new structure the weight of the Regional Commands would be strengthened compared to those at Strategic level. The RCs would be obviously joint and combined and would constitute the last level of the chain of command wholly financed by NATO funds. In fact, the JSRCs/CCs could have national or multinational features but only limited access to NATO funds. There are also other reasons for which the regional level will constitute the main novelty: one is related to the CJTF concept that will likely be connected with the chain of command just at this level; and another is related to the ESDI, since the Regional level should have a prevalent European profile (with Europeans inserted in key positions).

The last meetings both at political (Ministerial) and military level (Chiefs of Staff) have outlined a command structure (called “Type A”) that foresees:

- 2 SCs (SC Europe; SC Atlantic);
- 3 RCs in Atlantic (RC West, Norfolk; RC East, Northwood; RC Southeast, Lisbon) and 2 RCs equivalents (Striking Fleet and Allied Command Submarine Atlantic);
- 2 RCs in Europe (RC North, Brunssum; RC South, Naples. AFNORTHWEST is to be disbanded and merged into RC North);  
- 11 SRCs in Europe, while all existing PSCs in ACLANT are to be dissolved or adopted to the status of forces and therefore fall outside the integrated command structure.

In summary, the number of NATO Headquarters will diminish, from 65 to 20, due essentially to the abolition of the fourth level of command. Will this reform bring benefits to the Alliance military structure? It is too early to judge this issue, but some comments can be made. Some, like the German defense correspondent, Karl Feldmeyer, see this reorganization simply as an exercise in the redistribution of political influence among key allies (and staff positions for their officers) rather than bringing greater efficiency in the structure. Redistribution is not easily accepted by all countries involved (fewer headquarters available means increased struggles among nations for the remaining command posts), so great challenges remain to be overcome before a final agreement can be achieved. Despite its political importance, less headquarters do not necessarily mean savings for the Alliance; in this case, the headquarters eliminated (Sub-PSCs) are headquarters that already do not receive NATO infrastructure funding. Instead, these headquarters
could have played an important role in linking the land multinational formations to the integrated command structure, overcoming the traditional diffidence of nations to release their command authority to the multinational commander. Finally, the reduction of commands does not take into account the new needs resulting from the addition of a number of new allied nations over the next few years. It is an open question how Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will be included in the new structure? Will they all belong to the North Region, or must Hungary belong to the South Region? What kind of commands should be established to work with the armed forces of these new members, CCs or JSRCs? These are some issues related to the LTS and its recent proposals to reorganize the integrated command structure.

Of particular interest is that focused on AFSOUTH. For over 40 years, NATO's attention addressed the overwhelming threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to Central Europe. This resulted in most of resources being devoted to this region, usually at the expenses of other areas in the Alliance. But now, it is the Southern Region that likely faces the greatest risks and for this reason many believe that most of the efforts of the Alliance should be devoted to this area. Some scholars think that the Alliance's political and military authorities should examine
whether AFSOUTH should be elevated to the status of a SC.\textsuperscript{17} In the meantime, studies and meetings continue in order to decide both the structure of AFSOUTH and the "key posts rotation policy" among the countries involved in the Southern region. CINCSOUTH will continue to be US\textsuperscript{18} (at least for the next 5 - 7 years, despite the French request for this position that raised other southern European countries' opposition\textsuperscript{19}), while the Deputy CINCSOUTH will remain a European (similar to the SACEUR and Deputy SACEUR structure). In order to implement ESDI in the Southern region, it will be necessary to strengthen the position of the Deputy CINCSOUTH according to appropriate terms of reference (TORs). Finally, the Deputy CINCSOUTH would be the focal point in case of WEU-led operations in the Mediterranean area.

Although the Long Term Study is almost completed, all these changes are not easy to achieve because the modification of the existing structure (especially when it reduces its assets) is severely hampered by national interests and positions. Command positions equate to national influence and prestige. Besides, as is well known, the NATO decision-making process needs the consensus of the members. Luckily, the unquestioned US leadership favors this consensus.
Multinational Forces

Following the end of the Cold War, a certain number of multinational land formations have been established in Europe. The main military reason for forming these forces resulted from diminished force structures, following both the agreement to reduce forces under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and the diminished resources generally devoted to the Armed Forces ("peace dividends"). Thus the creation of multinational formations serves the purpose of achieving maximum efficiency from remaining forces and avoiding excessive force cuts from those nations that would want to maximize the peace dividend.

As a matter of fact, multinational formations play an important role in Alliance force structures. They promote cohesion, reinforce transatlantic links, and demonstrate Alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defense.

Multinational formations have a long tradition within Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF). In addition, multinational forces are the norm within the new Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). The ACE Rapid Reactions Corps (ARRC), for instance, can call upon forces from ten different nations. Reaction forces (IRF and RRF) consist of forces composed of active duty formations
maintained at high level of readiness that give the SCs the capability to respond quickly and flexibly (according to the Strategic Concept) to crisis developments. Finally, multinational formations form the core of the main defense land forces of the ACE, which are organized into five bi/multi-national corps, and other multinational units at divisional level. Since 1991, many multinational formations (not only land) have been created and the process is far from being completed. Recent developments are, for example, the Italian - Spanish initiative to create an amphibious force as a component of EUROMARFOR. This process is not limited only to a NATO/WEU. The constitution of multinational forces also involves East European countries. For instance, in 1998, the constitution of a Italian - Hungarian - Slovenian light infantry Brigade is scheduled.

While the merits of multinationality are unquestionable, there are many factors affecting multinational formations to be considered. There are differences of language, doctrine, training standards, logistics assets (included spare parts and ammunition), interoperability, and other procedures that can severely affect the outcomes of multinational formations. A major difficulty that a multinational force commander can experience is obtaining sufficient command authority from other
countries, usually reticent to relinquish sovereign control of their forces. These remarks are not meant to diminish the importance of these formations, but rather to focus on the necessity to improve their command and control assets and other arrangements to become more efficient.

Another important issue related to the internal adaptation of the Alliance is the reorganization of the national military command structures and forces of most European allies to better respond to the new missions. In general, the European NATO allies are:

- significantly reducing standing armies and the readiness of forces;
- introducing greater military professionalism;
- trying to build highly mobile forces to deploy rapidly in an out-of-area environment.

THE EXTERNAL ADAPTATION

Creating a Partnership Program

In 1990 - 1991, NATO put an end to its Cold War military strategy and (according to the new Strategic Concept based on a broad approach to security in which cooperation and dialogue with non-member countries would play a preeminent role) opened itself
to the East by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the former members of the Warsaw Pact. The creation of the NACC established a framework for dialogue and cooperation\textsuperscript{31} with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States (NIS) emerging from the former Soviet Union. Membership of the NACC increased from 25 countries in 1991 to 40 countries by 1997.\textsuperscript{32}

Along with the NACC initiative in 1994, the NATO leaders realized that the Alliance’s adaptation was not advancing as quickly as the international environment required. At the January 1994 summit in Brussels, NATO leaders announced the Partnership for Peace program that would integrate the Central and East European countries more directly and lay the basis for future enlargement. PfP offers the Alliance’s Cooperation Partners the opportunity of taking part with NATO in security cooperation programs including activities such as military exercises and civil emergency operations. The difference with NACC is that PfP goes “beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership”\textsuperscript{33} PfP has been established within the framework of the NACC and offers the way to further deepening and strengthening cooperation between the Alliance and the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe and other states participating in the Partnership (it addresses all OSCE states).\textsuperscript{34}

The Partnership introduces no new mutual security obligation or commitment to the defense of a Partner, maintaining the distinction between allies and Partners that characterizes the NACC. But PfP introduces a significant operational advance over the NACC: it offers a new framework for common action especially in the sphere of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{35} The last purpose of PfP is to prepare Partners for eventual NATO membership. At the beginning, doubts were expressed about this purpose. Some saw the PfP as a means to just postpone the hard question of NATO enlargement.\textsuperscript{36} The risk was to alienate politically significant partners such as Russia. In fact, Russia joined the Partnership in June 1994, but it refused to move forward with the next stage of PfP in December 1994 because it considered that NATO, in initiating its enlargement study, would change its policy and push toward an Alliance's enlargement. Notwithstanding the enlargement process, Russia did not withdraw from PfP because it is in its own strategic interest to continue to be engaged with NATO, both despite enlargement and because of it. The risk still remains and the enlargement process can undermine PfP's equilibrium in the future, but so far its operational value (training and deploying
Partners' peacekeeping forces as in Bosnia) is ensuring its survival and strengthening its role in building a security environment in Europe.

During the 1997 spring meetings, Europeans leaders discussed the future of these two organization. In particular, the Foreign Ministers of the NACC, following the success of this organization, inaugurated the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at their meeting in Sintra, on 30 May 1997. The purpose of this new body, which replaced the former NACC, is to raise political and military cooperation among participating countries to a new improved level. Finally, at their spring 1997 Ministerial Meeting, Alliance Foreign and Defense Ministers agreed on a set of new initiatives to further strengthen PfP as an enduring element of the European Security Architecture and as a vehicle for developing closer relations between NATO and Partner countries.

NATO Enlargement

At the NATO Madrid Summit of July 1997, heads of state and government invited three countries to begin accession talks. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have been asked to join the current 16 members. The Protocols of Accession with these
three countries were signed on December 16, 1997 during the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Brussels.\textsuperscript{41} The Madrid Summit has represented the first step of the enlargement process; the Alliance remains open to further accessions in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.\textsuperscript{42} The "why and how" of enlargement was examined by the Allies during 1995 ("Study on NATO Enlargement").\textsuperscript{43} With regard to the "why" of NATO enlargement the Study pointed out that it represents a further step towards the goal of enhancing security and stability of all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. With regard to the "how" of enlargement, the Study referred to Article 10 of the Treaty. In order to reassure the Russian Federation, the Study emphasized the fact that enlargement will threaten no one: "NATO is and will remain a purely defensive Alliance whose fundamental purpose is to preserve peace in the Euro-Atlantic area and to provide security to its members".\textsuperscript{44}

Although the enlargement process has been launched, many tough issues lie ahead. There are divergent opinions about it. Advocates of NATO enlargement consider some arguments for widening the Alliance. The most important are: NATO enlargement is needed to deter Russian aggression in Eastern and Central Europe and assure Germany's security. This is a weak argument
because Russia does not constitute at the moment a military threat to East and Central Europe (Russian military is in disarray and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) obligates Russia to keep much of its military power east of the Urals). Another argument is that even if there is no Russian military, enlargement would project stability in that part of Europe (but the countries in that region are quite stable at the moment). Yet, expansion is necessary to bridge the gap for those countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These countries want primarily to join the European Union, but they cannot do it at least for the next few years. This expansion will allow the Visegrad states to join a security organization while waiting for the more important European institution: the economic one. In addition, enlargement towards the Visegrad states would help to promote democracy in the region.

Against these arguments, enlargement may present some potentially harmful consequences for European and American security. Enlargement could strengthen the power of radical nationalist and political opportunists in Russia and so threaten the democratic reforms in that country; lead Russia to adopt a more aggressive policy in Eastern Europe to balance the influence of Western countries threatening the European security;
and allow Russian military leaders who see NATO enlargement as a strategic threat to make a politically case for reviving their military forces. It is true that NATO enlargement is seen in Moscow as a change in the balance of power and an extension of America and Germany sphere of influence, so it is important in this process of enlargement to reduce the possible risks of destabilizing Russia and also Ukraine and its relations with Russia. The Alliance must reassure Moscow and Kiev about NATO enlargement. The signing on 27th May of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the signing of a special Charter between NATO and Ukraine on 9th July 1997 represent a visible step in the process of cooperation and enhanced relations between these countries and the Alliance.

In the US the debate about the enlargement is also controversial. Former Ambassador Jonathan Dean thinks that enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky and unnecessary. The costs have been estimated at $27 - $125 billion for the first group of candidates. And the US is likely to pay the largest part of that amount of money. The risks are that the enlargement would expand the scope of current US security commitments in States with traditional mutual hostility like Hungary and Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, etc., without counting the Russian
reactions to this issue. Finally, some believe that expansion is
unnecessary because what those countries really want and need is
a form of membership that provides economic and social support.
For this purpose the EU is more qualified than NATO.\textsuperscript{51} Professor
Micheal Mandelbaum, Director of the Project on East-West
relations at the Council of Foreign Relations is of the same
opinion.\textsuperscript{52} A supporter of NATO enlargement is Zbigniew Brzezinski
who sees in the expansion a useful tool to the vitality of the
American-European link and to their ability to work together for
the promotion of international security.\textsuperscript{53}

Another point about this issue is that the historic Madrid
Summit represented a loss for some European countries
(epecially Italy and France) which wanted to admit along with
Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, two other countries (Slovenia
and Romania). What mostly irritated the European allies was the
White House's preventive announcement about an enlargement
limited to three countries- an announcement that looked
unrespectful of the fact that decisions within the Alliance are
made by unanimous consensus. (i.e., the US attitude sounded like
a weakening of the authority of NAC and Secretary General
Solana.)\textsuperscript{54} The Italian and French motivations about Slovenia and
Romania were essentially related to geo-political reasons. From a
strategic point of view Slovenia would assure a geographic continuity with the Alliance,\textsuperscript{55} and would provide a land-bridge to Hungary which remains isolated among non-NATO countries.\textsuperscript{56}

There were also a political reason about the inclusion of these two countries in the first round of expansion. There is the risk of emargination of the Alliance's south flank; the choice to select the three VISEGRAD countries and the shift of command from AF SOUTH to LANDCENT to lead IFOR in October 1996 suggests that the focus of the Alliance remains the North Region, while risks are preeminent in the South Region. It seems that in this phase of enlargement, political rather than military factors have influenced the selection of members, even though Slovenia and Romania will likely join the Alliance the next turn. In the future the economic factors, so far left out, will play a greater role in selecting additional members. In addition, there is the concrete risk that too many additional members can destroy the Alliance instead of strengthening it.\textsuperscript{57}

TOWARD A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

A COMMON EUROPEAN DEFENSE

The notion of a common European defense is not new. It began in 1948 as the "Western Union" by the UK, France and the Benelux
states as a response to a growing Soviet threat. The Western Union was replaced by NATO the following year.\textsuperscript{58} In 1954, the Western Union became the Western European Union (WEU).\textsuperscript{59} As an international organization dealing with defense and security matters, it never developed any characteristics required of a defense institution, such as organization, forces, and credibility. Forgotten, but not completely abandoned, the WEU was officially “reactivated” in 1987,\textsuperscript{60} and especially in 1991, when it formally became the “European Union’s defense component”.\textsuperscript{61} This was the natural consequence after the decision to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the Heads of State and Government of the European Community Member States on the Treaty on European Union on 10 December 1991. In this context the WEU plays a pivotal role between the European Union (EU) and NATO in the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Initial American reaction to ESDI was polite but skeptical. The United States saw the WEU issues as an internal European matter with limited implications for the Alliance.\textsuperscript{62} However, at the NATO summit in January 1994, the United States joined its allies in endorsing ESDI, under the WEU.\textsuperscript{63} Finally, at NATO’s 3 June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting, the WEU was given permission to conduct its own military missions using NATO
assets, through the concept known as Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

With these decisions a problem of great complexity and very difficult solution arose: the problem of the relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and the new European defense system which is still difficult to describe, to design, and to carry out. The implications of this relationship are political, military, and economical.

The Atlantic Alliance represents an essential factor of security and stability, of which Europe cannot do without. However, there exists an imbalance: from one side there is a political, economic, and military colossus, the United States, by now the only planetary superpower; from the other, there are some small and middle powers that together weigh less in military terms than the American giant. The knot to untie can be summarized in one question, simple in its expression, but full of uncertainties in the reality: is it possible to find a better balance than the current one, between the two “pillars”, American and European, of the Atlantic Alliance? A better balance between the two pillars will be achieved only through the creation of a valid European defense system. In other words, can ESDI become a reality or, to remain according to many people, only a "vague
theory on the periphery of serious military activities"? To such purpose it is necessary to examine the WEU's functions and the principles of CJTFs. Together they could allow military actions with the support, but not necessarily the participation, of the United States. Additionally, a discussion WEU-EU-NATO relationship and some improvements of the WEU's military assets will be presented as a necessary step for further understanding.

THE WEU’S ROLE AND FUNCTIONS

WEU plays an important role between the EU and NATO as the only organization prepared to conduct European military operations in the humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management fields. The bases for WEU's current activities and development are the Maastricht Declarations (in political terms) and the Petersberg Declaration (in operational terms). The WEU’s current functions can be summarize as follows: providing an identity to European security and defense efforts; performing military missions; shaping the security environment by outreaching to the East, and providing the defense of Europe.

Providing an identity to European security and defense efforts is perhaps the most visible function performed by the WEU. This is due to a European desire to maintain and strengthen
the sense of unity and solidarity between member states after the end of the Cold War. It is no surprise that proponents of European integration stress the need for a more visible European role within the Atlantic Alliance. NATO will remain the provider of collective defense, while the WEU limits itself, for the time being, to crisis management.

Performing military missions is the most practical function of the WEU. The WEU does not have standing forces or command structures of its own, but has flexible procedures by which the WEU Council can assemble the force packages needed to undertake operations and assure their political control and strategic direction. Since 1988 WEU has performed a number of military missions, that are becoming more and more important as time goes on. Since the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU has increased its operational capabilities and even though they are modest, there are some missions that WEU can perform alone. For example, it is possible to conduct small peacekeeping operations, especially in Central Europe for which the WEU might be an appropriate force. This would constitute a sign of Europe's willingness and ability to police its own continent rather than to rely on NATO or US. In addition, there might be the necessity to intervene along Russia's borders. Here the WEU becomes the
only option possible because of the negative image of NATO in Moscow's perception, especially after the NATO enlargement policy. It is possible that Russia will have little or no objection to a WEU intervention along its borders while it would vehemently oppose a NATO option. Finally, the possibility that the US might refuse to not only participate but also to refuse the lending its own or NATO's support (implementation of CJTFs concept) to an European action cannot be excluded. This would leave the Europeans with the option to do nothing or to do something alone. In the latter case, WEU must become more capable.71

Shaping the security environment by reaching out to the East is a third potential function of the WEU. This function is better understood if we examine the membership of WEU. At present, 28 countries make up the WEU family of nations, encompassing four types of status: Member States, Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners.72 The status of Associate Partners was created in Kirchberg in May 1994.73 It covers the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) which have signed a "Europe Agreement" with the European Union. Ambassadors to the WEU from all 28 countries meet twice per month, and
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense once every six months. Additionally, even though the Central and East Europeans are not full members and cannot vote, they participate fully in most WEU meetings.\textsuperscript{74} WEU represents the only security organization to involve nearly all the European countries, with the exception of Russia (and, of course, the US). Even so, the WEU has developed a dialogue with Russia\textsuperscript{75} that provides for political consultations and practical cooperation on subjects of mutual interest.

The last and essential function is providing the defense of Europe. This is the reason why the WEU was established. In fact the Article V of the WEU treaty requires all signatories to give "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" to any of its allies that are the object of an armed attack in Europe. Considering NATO this WEU function should be redundant. However not all the members of the EU are full members of the WEU or members of NATO. This situation is becoming crucial and the solution depends on what conditions the United States is prepared to guarantee the defense of a European Union that encompasses non-NATO's Members. In other words, what is the US interpretation of NATO's Article 5?\textsuperscript{76} In case of excessively restrictive US interpretation of NATO's Article 5, it will need to accept, in the same Union, different zones of security (NATO and non-NATO
countries). Although some European countries seem to accept the concept of a "united European Union, but differentiated", the question remain fundamental. In the long run, European political and economic union will require the reciprocal engagement of all the EU members to defend each other collectively, with or without the United States.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES CONCEPT

The CJTF concept\textsuperscript{77} is intended to give NATO's military structure\textsuperscript{78} different capabilities for the future in order better to respond to crises across a spectrum of new peacetime operations. This is an evolutionary part of NATO in the post Cold War.\textsuperscript{79} NATO's immediate tasks have changed: in the future, crisis management will call for smaller multinational forces with the flexibility to respond to contingencies over a wide geographical area. In addition, the CJTF concept allows for the support of the European Security and Defense Identity by offering the WEU a "separable but not separate" military capability. In fact, in order to avoid duplication of capabilities, NATO has agreed to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultation in the NAC, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in implementing a Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP). CJTF is far from being an operational reality; there are some critical problems to solve before the concept’s minimum requirements are met. It is important to examine the case of WEU-Led CJTFs, in which the WEU would organize and command a military mission, using NATO and even US assets, without necessarily involving US troops. Under this option, a NATO military command (SC or RC) would probably assume a support role. It is clear that the WEU can only conduct small and local military operations. In fact, despite the Europe’s efforts to strengthen the WEU’s operational role, Europeans are still military dependent on NATO and especially on the US. Only the United States has the types of military forces necessary to conduct operations that involve large numbers of combat-ready troops to a distant location quickly. At the moment, it is difficult to think that Europeans can solve their military deficiencies, in the short time. Besides, the so-called Revolution on Military Affairs (RMA), of which the US has the monopoly, will increase the European military dependence on the US. While a collaboration with the US is essential for the Europeans, a collaboration with Europe is not essential for an American unilateral intervention. Of course the WEU can borrow NATO’s assets, but NATO has few assets of its own. In fact, most
of the forces that make up the Alliance are nationally owned and nationally controlled ("earmarked" for NATO). The only assets actually owned by the Alliance are an air-defense system; some C3 assets; Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants (POL) assets; and 18 airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). Even if the WEU is allowed to use the NATO's assets (and that depends on the agreements of all 16 members of NATO) it is difficult to think that it can conduct any important operations (at least in the short term) without the help of the US.

IMPROVING THE WEU'S MILITARY ASSETS

As already stated, it is clear that for a certain number of years the WEU will have to count on forces and equipment conceived for the Cold War requirements. In addition, WEU has no formal military command structure similar to NATO. This means that for several years no important military missions will be conducted without the decisive help of the US. In order to achieve a real partnership with the US it is necessary to build up an effective military system. Such a system cannot rely on bodies that meet only occasionally and whose tasks are very limited. This is particular true in the field of armaments cooperation. The solution to this problem is creating a stronger
European Armaments Agency to coordinate not only research and technology but cooperative equipment programs and common economic and industrial policies (especially in the fields of standardization and interoperability). The final purpose should be to conduct a real industrial "rationalization" within the European Defense Industries Group, through mergers and industrial concentrations. Some European enterprises would assume a weight compared to the correspondent US enterprises. This is not an easy issue: more than any other area of defense, arms production is strictly a national affair. In fact, the major European arms producing nations defend less efficient industries on political, security, and economic ground. The fear of losing jobs have precluded mergers to rationalize the European defense industry.

Another step towards a better WEU operational development would be to strengthen the operational capabilities of the WEU Planning Cell. It represents the only military element of WEU that operates in normal times. This organization is in fact too small to pursue important planning tasks. In short, notwithstanding the improvement of WEU military capability in the last five years, much more work remains in order to strengthen its structure.
THE WEU - EU - NATO RELATIONSHIP

Maastricht Treaty (article J4) and Maastricht Declaration define WEU as the defense component of EU, and as a means through which to develop a genuine European Security and Defense Identity to promote European responsibility in the field of defense. But Maastricht Declaration also establishes the tie between Europe and NATO in the concept that defines WEU as the defense component of EU and also as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, the Berlin NAC Ministerial of June 1996, established that the deputy SACEUR would act as liaison with WEU. However, the role of WEU, as a link between the EU and NATO has been, so far, more a concept than a reality. Today, with France’s new relationship with NATO and the possibility that ESDI can implement itself within NATO as “separable but not separate” military capability, new horizons have opened that put in discussion the WEU’s role as an independent organization. There are two different visions of its ultimate role. Some countries (led by France, Germany, and Italy) sees the WEU as “the defense arm” of the EU. Others (led by the UK) defends the WEU’s independence from the EU. A merger of the two organizations will solve many practical problems and will give the EU a security and defense dimension. There are, however, some objective obstacles
to this fusion: the different composition of the two organizations. The 10 WEU’s full Members are all members of the Alliance while among the 15 EU’s Members there are 4 countries that are not members of NATO (Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden). These countries have marked neutrality traditions that will make it difficult to join the WEU, at least in the short term. In addition, there is the problem of EU’s enlargement. More countries would take part in the EU, but not the WEU (at least as full members), if these countries do not also become NATO’s Members. This diversity of composition constitutes the major conceptual difficulty in merging the WEU into the EU because the WEU’s full Members are linked by a treaty that assures their common defense within the Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that NATO, and the US in particular, will not likely grant the guarantee of defense to those members of EU that are not also NATO’s Members. In this context, the process of merging the WEU with the EU can be only seen in the long term. Till such time, Europe will exist in different levels of security.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND US RELATIONSHIP

Improving a European Security and Defense Identity is not dangerous for the Alliance’s cohesion and can serve both the WEU
as a NATO’s pillar and the EU as a defense component. ESDI has a cohesive effect because it keeps alive the project for a political Europe, contributing to minimize the potential disputes among the European states. Besides, it can increase the sense of responsibility of Europeans and so to realize a more balanced burdensharing with NATO, curbing the disastrous decrease of European defense budgets. ESDI is a “bridge” between EU and WEU as the CJTF is between WEU and NATO. Without ESDI, US would have to engage in Europe more than its internal problems, its defense budget and its Asian interests could allow. Notwithstanding its weakness, ESDI strengthens the Alliance. The divergence with the US in some issues, like the more critical and unstable area, the Mediterranean, is due not to ESDI or CFSP existence, but to their shortcomings. In this sense, all the proposals made during the Inter-Governmental Conference for increasing the Europe’s role, weight, and identity should be rightly evaluated in Washington. These improvements are indispensable to conform the EU’s structures to the new challenges; structures that have remained an outcome of the Cold War. The Americans cannot demand to have a Europe -its principal ally- strong and at the same time subdued. Instead, they should aim at having it strong and loyal.
The main issues are the merging the WEU into the EU; the CJTFs' command chain; and the strengthening of the CFSP. On the first point, most of Europeans are in favor of a gradual merging. Exceptions are the United Kingdom that would maintain the two organizations separated, and the Benelux countries that would want an immediate merging. There is no sense in merging them immediately, at least until EU is able to elaborate a more incisive CFSP. About the CJTF, the adoption of the concept and the possibility of using NATO's assets in WEU-led operations is the most important practical realization of the statement that WEU strengthen NATO. The problem is essential political. It is necessary to define consistent mechanisms for the delivering of NATO's assets (that is, USA) to WEU, and to establish suitable procedures to absorb possible divergence between the US and Europe during WEU-led operations. Finally, it is necessary to strengthen the CFSP with the creation of an analysis, planning and execution body, able to work in the field of foreign policy and common security.

Of course the relationship between US and Europe will not be completely balanced. In fact, PESC will be common, but not unique. The PESC will not be able to compete with the US foreign policy. Foreign policy is not based on compromises. Rather, it is
based on decisions that only a single state can take rapidly and incisively. On the other hand, if PESC and the European defense policy become autonomous from the US, that is, if the US will have a Europe that could tell it "no", that means that Washington will have diminished interest in NATO. In this case, a strengthening of the European pillar and defense arm of EU could turn out incompatible with NATO’s existence. It is a question of finding a difficult balance between opposite demands - the American guarantee and the European autonomy - theoretically irreconcilable. A pragmatic approach can help solve the contradiction. For the necessary collaboration with the US, it would require a new Euro-Atlantic pact. In its absence, it would be possible to proceed pragmatically, that is, to define European policies and interests, taking in account American policies and interests, and vice versa. One thing is sure: in the short term a quick merging of the WEU into EU will not be possible because it would reduce the capabilities of the WEU to be the NATO’s European pillar and, more important, its possibilities of intervention. In the long term such a merger could be the necessary condition for the building of a future, but still undefined, European security architecture.
CONCLUSIONS

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall the security environment in Europe has substantially changed. Its most important institutions have reformed themselves. The NATO of yesterday does not exist anymore. The Alliance has been downsized, reorganized, and regenerated under different concepts. The Strategic Concept outlined a broad approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. In this context the launching of the Partnership for Peace, in order to establish cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, became an essential step. Countries from as far west as Slovenia and as far east as Kyrgyzstan have accepted invitations to join the PfP. At the same time the Alliance has remained open to membership of other European countries; so far twelve nations have asked to join NATO and three have already signed the Protocols of Accession. Paul Cornish described the changes in NATO as a shift from "an alliance of necessity" to "an alliance of choice". A practical example of that is the assortment of NATO and PfP members participating, under the CJTF concept and according to their individual interests, to NATO operations, like those undertaken in the Balkans. In addition, a major awareness toward the
problems of the Mediterranean area has brought to a "virtual" enlargement to the South. Six countries belonging to the Mediterranean region have already started a dialogue with the Alliance. Many questions on NATO expansion remain unanswered, including: the scope of the mission; the composition of the new membership; and the associated costs, not only to the three new members but also to the many more waiting in line. It is also not clear what effects these measures will have in Eastern Europe regarding the relations with Russia, if more than three states will be added (especially the Baltic states).

Along with these external changes, the Alliance has undertaken, always in the context of the Strategic Concept, an internal adaptation affecting its integrated military forces, including substantial reduction in their size and readiness, improvements in their mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies and greater use of multinational formations. The Alliance's efficiency has not suffered from these modifications. Of course some issues remain indefinite such the changes in the Command and Control chain and the real capability of multinational formations to perform missions.

Things are different for Europe and its main institutions (i.e., the EU; WEU). In fact, approaches between the foreign and
security policy and the economic policy are completely different. The first needs a legislative and constitutional approach. The economic integration on the other hand needs an administrative approach. The EU's enlargement towards the East will impose modifications of some basic policies, such as agricultural, to avoid prohibitive costs. It also will request modification of the current decisional mechanisms to avoid a decisional block. While there exists a well accepted principle of American leadership within NATO, the EU is formed by a parity number of states with different cultures and interests. A leader state does not exist in EU such as in NATO. In the EU, integration has been obtained by diminishing the power of larger states and increasing that of smaller states. The progressive enlargement of EU has already provoked big problems; a further enlargement without institutional changes might provoke the collapse of the Union.

Some difficulties of creating a CFSP and a common European defense are objective; others are subjective. The objective ones are due to the different composition of the two organizations (UE: 15 members; WEU: 10); the presence of the US in Europe that remains essential; and the existence of NATO that remains the fundamental institution of European security. The last two points are unquestionable. American engagement in Europe remains firm.94
The "great strategy" of containment has been substituted by President Clinton's strategy of engagement and enlargement. The Bosnian experience has shown the indispensability of American leadership as a means for the regional integration.

The subjective difficulties derive from the differences of European countries' interests and perceptions about the future of Europe, and in the security sector, about the fundamental aspect of this future: that is the relations with the US. There are two approaches: the British approach, that is focused on the practical aspects of the European security policy, and that of France/Germany's, that is focused on the formal aspects of the security and defense policy: ESDI. These two approaches are not in opposition; they simply refer to different periods of time. The first (the pragmatic one) in the short term; the second (the formal one) in the long run. Both are necessary for the collaboration between Europe and NATO, and in the end, between Europe and US.

Finally, since NATO's assets are far more capable than those of the WEU, and the US remains engaged in Europe, some people argue that there is no need for a separate European security organization that could only be redundant. However, for the US, which needs a stronger partner in Europe, and for the Europeans
who want to take primary responsibility for their own regional
security, ESDI is an initiative to encourage. To develop an ESDI
inside NATO, as a separable but not separate capability, rests on
the WEU. The WEU may not have great military capabilities, but
there are certain limited functions it can fulfill. In some cases
the WEU's involvement could be the preferable response. CJTF,
more than any other initiative since the end of the Cold War,
offers hope that these objectives can be achieved. The CJTF, as
soon as it becomes completely operational, will lead to a greater
balance in the transatlantic partnership which many believe is
essential to keep NATO strong. On the other hand, the limited
steps the WEU has taken to strengthen itself are positive, but
much remains to be done in order for Europe to perform a real
security defense identity and become a real pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance.
ENDNOTES


2 NATO military structures must be able to provide a different type of security capabilities. That means that security lies in having a military option to respond to any crisis that threaten the collective interests of the Members. US Senator Richard Lugar referred to this change when he challenge NATO either to develop the capability to operate “out of area” or to go out of business. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “NATO’s Last Chance”, *Washington Post*, 2 July 1993, A 19.


4 For instance Kenneth Waltz was confident in 1990 that “NATO is a disappearing thing” and “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are”. Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2, Autumn 1993, 16.

5 The political basis for the NATO’s role in the former Yugoslavia was established at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Ministerial Session in Oslo, in June 1992. In that forum it was agreed to support, on a case by case basis, peace support operations under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)). Later, in December 1992, the Alliance’s Foreign Ministers stated that NATO would support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council. Between 1992 and 1995, the Alliance took several important decisions, which led to operations both by NATO naval and air forces.

At sea, NATO ships (belonging to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)) began monitoring operations in the Adriatic sea in June 1992 supporting the UN arms embargo against all the former republics of the former Yugoslavia (according to UN Security Council Resolution UNSCR 713) and the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (UNSCR 757). In November 1992 maritime operations were extended (according to UNSCR 787) including stopping, inspecting and diverting ships when required. In June 1993, at a joint session of the NAC and the Council of the WEU, a combined
NATO/WEU operation was approved, named Sharp Guard. Operational control (OPCON) of the Combined NATO/WEU Task Force was delegated, through SACEUR to the Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOOUTH). With the termination of the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia on 18 June 1996, operation Sharp Guard was suspended, following the aftermath of the Peace Agreements on 21 November 1995.

In the air, NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft began monitoring operations in October 1992 in support of UNSCR 781, which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 31 March 1993, UNSCR 816 authorized enforcement of the no-fly zone extending the ban to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. On 12 April 1993 a NATO enforcement operation, called Deny Flight, began: it initially involved some 50 aircraft (fighters and reconnaissance aircraft), but later the number increased to more than 200. During the operation, in February 1994, four war airplanes violated the no-fly zone and were shot down by NATO aircraft (this was the first military engagement ever undertaken by NATO). Along with Deny Flight operation NATO provided protective air power for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). NATO aircraft also provided several missions of Close Air Support (CAS) to protect UN personnel in Bosnia and Croatia during the period 1994 - 1995. In addition, NATO aircraft provided air strikes, in close coordination with UNPROFOR. For instance, on February 1994, the NAC, at the request of the UN Secretary General, authorized CINCSOUTH to launch air strikes against artillery and mortar position around Sarajevo. Air strikes were carried out in September 1994 against Bosnian Serbs near Sarajevo, and in May 1995 air strikes were conducted targeting Bosnian Serb ammunition depots in Pale. On 4 August 1995, NATO aircraft conducted air strikes against Croatian Serb air defense radar near Udbina and Knin in Croatia. Finally on 30 August 1995 NATO aircraft commenced a series of air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets in Bosnia, supported by the UN Rapid Reaction Force on Mount Igman. The operation (named Deliberate Force) was decided by CINCSOUTH and the UN Peace Forces Commander. On 20 September 1995 Operation Deliberate Force practically concluded and NATO conducted two additional air operations under Operation Deny Flight. Deny Flight’s mandate terminated on 20 December 1995 with the creation of the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia, following the Peace Agreement signed on 14 December.
Following the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris on 14 December 1995, NATO was given a mandate by the UN, on the basis of UNSCR 1031, to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. Although the implementation of the Peace Agreement was the responsibility of the Parties themselves, IFOR played a pivotal role in the transition to peace in the first year after the Dayton Peace Agreement. It ensured a secured environment in which the other organizations, responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, could carry out their work. IFOR had a unified command structure where the military authority rested in the hands of SACEUR. All NATO nations contributed to IFOR. But IFOR was more than a just a NATO operation. Non-NATO forces were incorporated into the unified command structure along with NATO forces. At the end of the IFOR mission, 18 non-NATO countries were participating in Operation Joint Endeavour, most of them belonging to Partnership for Peace. Russia also joined IFOR in January 1996. The participation of Russia and other non-NATO countries was an important element in the success of the IFOR’s mission. It also contributed to the evolving NATO-Russia cooperative relationship.

The IFOR operation was NATO’s first ground force operation, its first deployment out of area, and its first joint operation with non-NATO countries.


“GUIDELINES FOR THE ALLIANCE’S FORCE POSTURE: ...To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies’ forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary...” (The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, Rome, November 1991, Point 47).

The Strategic Concept combines a broad approach to security based on dialogue and cooperation with the maintenance of NATO’s collective defense capability. The Concept emphasizes three aspects: a broad approach to security, in which cooperation and dialogue would play a prominent role; military capabilities would be reduced but restructured for crisis management missions, as well as collective defense; and the European Allies would assume a greater responsibility for their continent’s security. As a
result, the Concept introduced major changes in NATO’s integrated military forces, including substantial reduction in size and readiness; improvements in their mobility; major adaptability to different contingencies; increased use of multinational formations, etc. The Concept is not a static one, NATO Foreign Ministers decided at their meeting in Sintra, on 29 May 1997, that the Strategic Concept should be reviewed to ensure that it remains consistent with the changes which have taken place since its formulation. “Basic Fact Sheet no. 12”, NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1997.

10 In July 1, 1994, the Alliance eliminated ACCHAN, even though its subordinate elements largely remain in existence, absorbed within Allied Command Europe (ACE). For more, see William T. Johnsen, “Reorganizing NATO command and control structures: more work in the Augean stables?”, in Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations, edited by Thomas-Durell Young (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997), 11.

11 Ibid., 14.


13 The following SRCs are foreseen in the Strategic Command Europe: Component Command Nav, Northwood (now Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe); Joint Sub-Regional Command, Stavanger (now Allied Forces Northern Europe); Joint Sub-Regional Command, Karup (now Allied Forces Baltic Approaches); Component Command Air, Ramstein (now Allied Air Forces Central Europe); Joint Sub-Regional Command, Heidelberg (now Allied Land Forces Central Europe); Joint Sub-Regional Command, Verona (now Allied Land Forces Southern Europe); Component Command Nav, Naples (now Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe); Component Command Air, Naples (now Allied Air Forces Southern Europe); Joint Sub-Regional Command, Izmir (now, Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe); Joint Sub-Regional Command, Larissa (new); and Joint Sub-Regional Command, Madrid (new).

14 Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung, August 5, 1996.

15 For the South European countries and Italy in particular it is fundamental that Hungary be part of the South Region both for strengthen the south flank of the Alliance and to increase the strategic motivation to support the continued existence of JSRC Verona.
This shift of importance and resources between Central and Southern Region is not easy to effect. Central European nations have long been used to receiving the largest part of the Alliance's resources and this constitutes a habit difficult to modify.


The main arguments for retaining a US Commander in this RC are: AFSOUTH is the only US-led regional command in Europe and loosing it will weaken US leadership in Europe; US command can help stabilize tensions in the Mediterranean area; and US command is useful to maintain the link with the Sixth Fleet, especially in time of crisis. For more, see Ronald Tiersky, "French Military Reform and NATO Restructuring", Joint Force Quarterly, (Spring 1997), 98-99.

Since 1990, French leaders have stated a desire to rejoin the integrated command structure, but only if certain key reforms were implemented. The most important changes they wanted are the Alliance's support for an European Security and Defense Identity and a greater European leadership within the Alliance. In 1996 French President Jacques Chirac wrote to President Bill Clinton arguing that the position of CINCSOUTH should be European, and specifically French. Americans and many Europeans (especially Spanish and Italians) argued that only the US has the authority and power to keep together the South Europe's countries (especially thinking to the frequent disputes between Greeks and Turkish). As a result, at the Madrid Summit, French leaders said that the lack of this concession would preclude France to rejoined the integrated command structure.

The multinational formation concept was announced in 1991, with the development of plans for the ARRC. See "Final Communiqué", Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Press Communiqué M-DCP/NPG-1(91)38, Brussels, NATO Press Service, May 29, 1991.

Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1997), 2. Young also focused on other two reasons about the creation of multi-national land formations: to preserve higher
level command structures for smaller nations, and maximize residual military capabilities, especially of smaller nations.

22 William T. Johnsen, “Reorganizing NATO command and control structures: more work in the Augean stables?”, in Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations, ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997), 21.

23 Immediate reaction forces include the ACE Mobile Force (AMP)-Land and Air, and Standing Naval Forces: Atlantic (STANAVFORLAND), Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), and Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).

24 ARRC contains one multinational division (Multinational Division Central), three framework divisions and other five national divisions. Another multinational division (South) envisaged for the ARRC, composed of brigade-sized units from Greece, Italy, and Turkey, has yet to be created, largely due to Greek-Turkish political differences.

25 These land bi-multinational formations are: Corps LANDJUT, I German/ Netherlands Corps, V US/German Corps, II German/US Corps, ARRC, 1st UK Arm. Division, 3rd UK Division, 3rd Italian Division, EUROCORPS, EUROFOR. With the exception of the ARRC, Multinational Division Central, and Corps LANDJUT, all other multinational land headquarters are not part of the integrated command structure. In addition, I German/Netherlands Corps, MND(C), EUROCORPS, and EUROFOR are “Force Answerable to the Western European Union (FAWEU)”. This proliferation of multinational formations outside the NATO military integrated structure shows an increased political will for an European military integration as a manifestation of greater assimilation.

26 ibid., 22.

27 Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1997), 1.

28 For more about command authority of NATO land multinational formations see John Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, “Command Authorities and multinationality in NATO: the response of the Central Region’s armies”, in Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations, ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997), 53-78.

29 Major land combat unit available to NATO have been reduced by 35%. Only 35% of this reduced force is kept at 30 days
readiness or less, compared to 90% which was maintained at 2 days readiness or less in 1990.

30 The rise of professional military forces in some NATO European countries is the answer to a more reduced draft time. In fact, countries that retain the draft have reduced the required time in uniform to an average of nine - ten months, making meaningful training and specialization almost impossible.

31 Activities related to the NACC focus on consultation and cooperation in the following areas: political consultation; economic issues; information matters; scientific and environmental issues; defense support issues; airspace coordination; civil emergency planning; and military cooperation. NATO - Handbook. Partnership and Cooperation, NATO Office of Information and Press, (Brussels, 1995), 46-49.

32 They are: the 16 NATO countries plus Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.

Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland participant in PfP, and have observer status in the NACC.

33 NATO Press Communiqué, M-1(94)2, Brussels, 10 January 1994.

34 Twenty-eight non-NATO countries (also belonging to NACC) have since 1994 accepted this invitation, and in most cases detailed Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) have been agreed and are being implemented.

35 It is true that the NACC had also aimed to facilitate cooperation in the field of peacekeeping, but the emphasis was put on doctrinal rather than operational issue. In the PfP context two important structural and procedural features have been introduced: the permanent representation at NATO Headquarters (through the Partnership Coordination Cell alongside SHAPE) and the promotion of interoperability between NATO and Partner forces that allowed non-NATO countries to be included in NATO contingency planning for Bosnia. For more see Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset", in NATO's transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 226-230.

36 This suspicion was confirmed after US President Clinton’s visit to Russia in 1994 where the joint US-Russia Declaration described PfP as an “important element of an emerging new European Security architecture” rather than a preparatory process for NATO membership. And in an August 1994 news conference,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin expressed his satisfaction that NATO had not been expanded. Ibid., 222.

37 The members of EAPC are the same of PfP. About EAPC activities and other information see NATO Madrid Summit - Press Info, "The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council" 8 December, 1997. Available from <http:www.nato.int/docu/comm/m970708/infopres/e-eapc.htm.

38 For more the enhanced PfP program see “The enhanced Partnership for Peace Program” NATO Press Info, 1997.

39 So far twelve countries have asked to join the Alliance and dialogue sessions were held with them: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the FYROM.


43 “As I have said, (NATO expansion) is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region... And now what we have to do is to get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps should be”. President Bill Clinton, Warsaw, July 1994.


45 There have been negative reaction to NATO enlargement both in the PfP process and in the Russian Duma’s refusal so far to ratify START II and its general blockage of arms control agreements. According to Senator Joseph Biden the Duma’s refusal to ratify START II has nothing to do with NATO expansion: “They need START II, but they cannot even afford START II”. Joseph Biden, “Response to critics of NATO Expansion”, in NATO Enlargement Debate, Reserve Officers Association National Security Report, December 1997, 30.
Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Enlargement", in NATO’s transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 121-139.


It would be a serious error to interpreter Moscow’s acceptance of the NATO-Russian Founding Act as support for NATO enlargement. Nevertheless, a useful means to improve relations between NATO and Russia may be an adapted CFE Treaty. If handled properly, an adapted Treaty may reduce Russian concerns and offer greater security not only for Russia but for all CFE parties. Of course, efforts to adjust the CFE Treaty are simply a policy tool in the NATO enlargement process and not a panacea. For more about this issue, see Jeffrey McCausland, “NATO and Russia Approaches To Adapting the CFE Treaty", Regional Strategic Appraisals-Europe, AY 1998 (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA).  

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There was three cost estimates about the enlargement: the Pentagon’s, Rand Corporation’s and the Congressional Budget Office’s. DOD’s estimate was about $27-35 billion for the years 1997-2009; Rand’s estimate was about $30-52 billion; and the GAO’s estimate was about $125 billion, for the same period of time. The General Accounting Office said recently that of the three cost estimates they could not say which of the three was valid, as each were based on a different set of assumptions. Considering the lowest of the three (DOD’s one) and according to the Clinton Administration, the US would pay only a small portion of it, about $2 billion, that is $200 million a year. The assumption on which this amount is calculated, assumes that the US burden sharing formula is only 6%. Given the austerity measures underway in Europe to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency, it is hard to imagine an easy solution for this issue. In fact, at the Madrid meeting in July, France and Germany said they would pay nothing for the expansion. So it is likely that US will pay most of the costs. Richard L. Kugler, “Costs of
NATO enlargement - Moderate and Affordable”, Strategic Forum,
National Defense University, Number 128, October 1997.

Jonathan Dean, “NATO Enlargement is Unnecessary”, in NATO
Enlargement Debate, Reserve Officers Association National

Michael Mandelbaum, “No clear strategy for NATO”, in NATO
Enlargement Debate, Reserve Officers Association National

Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Global Implications for NATO
enlargement”, in NATO Enlargement Debate, Reserve Officers

Even though many Europeans supported the US' decision to
include only three countries, in Germany, an editorialist wrote
in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung “NATO is not an American vassal
but an alliance of equal countries”, and French government-
financed France Inter radio stated the allies had been treated
with “brutality”. Susan Eisenhower, “Testimony to the Senate
Budget Committee”, October 29, 1997. Regional Strategic Appraisal
- Europe, AY 98 (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA), 13.

This is also the thinking of Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkenson
(US Army retired). According to him the inclusion of Hungary will
substantially lengthen the existing belt of non-member states
which have traditionally complicated military planning for the
security of the West. This could have been ameliorated by the
inclusion of Slovenia. Hungary will be an island, surrounded by

There are two other reasons to support the inclusion of
Slovenia in the Alliance: first its accession would reassure
Moscow that expansion does not only concern the countries of the
former Warsaw Pact, and second its inclusion would be useful to
project stability in the Balkan area.

Howard Baker Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft, and Alton Frye
wrote in the New York Times, February 4, 1998: “We are dubious
that consensus can be found on the Administration’s premise that
NATO should be receptive to many additional members. That is the
prescription for destroying the alliance. It guarantees future
discord with present allies, few of whom are prepared to follow
the Clinton policy to its logical end, the inclusion of Russia”.

The Western Union was created by the Treaty on Economic,
Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense
signed at Brussels on 17 March 1948 (The Brussels Treaty). The
Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. It was especially conceived as a response to Soviet threats after imposing control over the countries of Central Europe. The Brussels Treaty, demonstrating the will of some European countries to work together for a common defense purpose, helped to overcome the reluctance of the US to participate in shaping the European security environment. Talks between these European countries and US and Canada led to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. Later the desire to integrated the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the emerging European security structure brought France, in October 1950, to propose the creation of a European Army, which would operate within the framework of NATO. The proposal had to lead to the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC), in which France, Italy, the Benelux states, and the FRG were to participate. Because of the French Parliament opposition to this initiative, the EDC failed.

The failure of EDC meant that an alternative had to be found; in September 1954, at a special conference in London, the Brussels Treaty countries decided to invite Italy and FRG to join the Treaty. The positive conclusion of the conference (that was formalized by the Paris agreement, which modified the Brussels Treaty) created Western European Union as a new international organization that included Italy and FRG as new members.

In October 1987, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted a "Platform on European Security Interests" that set out general guidelines for WEU’s future program and focused on the necessity to strengthen the European Pillar of the Alliance.

The first WEU Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991 on "the role of the Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance" states that “WEU will be developed as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role”. Western European Union - Secretariat General, WEU TODAY (Brussels, Belgium: WEU Secretariat-General, 1997), 9.


In the United States, after the suspicions of the Bush administration, the Clinton administration began claiming to support genuine European cohesion. In backing the ESDI the Americans realized - taking note of the lessons of the Bosnian
conflict - that it is in the US’ own interest that Europeans be sufficiently organized to provide a management of limited crises that do not imply the automatic engagement of the US (see Nicole Gnesotto, “Common European defense and transatlantic relations”, in NATO’s transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 40). In fact, President Clinton has signaled his desire to move American national security strategy thinking in the direction of multilateralism. This school of thought advocates a “new internationalism” that would build upon existing multilateral institutions. The preferred strategy is to expand Western regional alliances to deal with new and common problems (see US Army War College. Selected Readings. Course 2 - War, National Policy and Strategy. Academic Year 1998), 82-83).

Why the Atlantic Alliance is still necessary and important for both US and Europe? Because they have common values and interests to share, and institutions, like an alliance, are necessary to implement common action when their interests are threatened. It is possible that, in case of the absence of a military organization, the US and Europe might be able to act together if common interests are threatened; but cooperation seems more likely to take place when alliance structure already exists. For a more complete evaluation, see Philip H. Gordon, “Recasting the Atlantic Alliance”, in NATO’s transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 21-24.

At Petersberg, near Bonn, on June 1992, WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers, reviewing the implementation of the Maastricht Declarations, took a major step in defining WEU’s operational role. WEU Member States declared their preparedness “to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU”. The types of WEU military tasks were defined: “Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with article 5 of the Washington Treaty and article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU Member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. These tasks have thus become known as the “Petersberg tasks”.

WEU Member States and Associate Members have designated the military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Such units and headquarters are known as "Forces Answerable to WEU". In addition to national units, a number of multinational formations have been designated as Forces Answerable to WEU: the EUROCORPS (Europeans Corps), in which France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg participate; the MULTINATIONAL DIVISION (Central), consisting of units from Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and the United Kingdom; The UK/NETHERLANDS AMPHIBIOUS FORCE; the EUROFOR (Rapid Deployment Force), in which France, Italy, Portugal and Spain participate; the EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force), in which France, Italy, Portugal and Spain participate.

In the 1988 Iran-Iraq war the WEU sent mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf; in the Persian Gulf war, it deployed a modest flotilla to assist the American-led task force. Subsequently, WEU participated in the Kurdish rescue operation in northern Iraq. In the Balkans, WEU took part in the maritime embargo. It also took part in the Danube River arms embargo operation and policed Mostar. Although not under WEU, the Italian-led humanitarian operation in Albania can be seen as an effort achieved by some European nations to act together.

After the Petersberg meeting, WEU has moved its headquarters from London to Brussels; established a defense Planning Cell of more than 40 officers; set-up a satellite interpretation center in Torrejon, Spain (receiving data from the Helios satellite and in the future from the post-Helios satellite); created a Situation Center to monitor crisis situations, and so on. For more information see WEU Today, (Brussels, Belgium: WEU Secretariat-General, 1997).

Philip H. Gordon, "The WEU and NATO’s Europeanisation", in NATO’s transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 259-261.

The WEU encompasses: Member States (modified Brussels Treaty - 1954): Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK (they are also NATO and EU Members); Associate Members (Rome - 1992): Iceland, Norway, Turkey (they are also NATO Members); Observers (Rome - 1992): Austria, Denmark, Finland (they are EU Members, but only Denmark is a NATO Member); Associate Partners (Kirchberg - 1994): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia). In Maastricht, WEU Members invited States which were Members of the EU to accede to the WEU on
conditions to be agreed in accordance with article XI of the Modified Brussels Treaty, or become Observers if they so wished. Other Europeans Members of NATO were invited to become Associate Members of WEU in a way that would enable them to participate in the activities of the Organization.

73 On 9 May 1994, at the meeting in Luxembourg, the WEU Council of Ministers issued the "Kirchberg Declaration", according the nine Central and Eastern European members of the Forum of Consultation the status of "Associate Partners" distinct from the "Associate Members" to which Iceland, Norway and Turkey belong. The Kirchberg meeting created a system of variable geometry with three levels of membership and so with three levels of security.

74 Associate Partners have the opportunity to participate in all aspects of European security policy-making and in WEU planning and execution of military operations. For example, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were full participants in the WEU Danube operation that represents a concrete example of their integration in Europe. Philip H. Gordon, "The WEU and NATO’s Europeanisation", in NATO’s transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 261.

75 On the basis of the Ministerial guidance from the meetings in Kirchberg in May 1994 and Noordwijk in November 1994 and a Permanent Council decision in March 1995.

76 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or the Parties so attacked by taking... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces...".

77 How can a CJTF be defined? US doctrine does not define explicitly a CJTF; nevertheless some components of the concept are clearly defined. US joint doctrine describes a "task force" as a temporary force for carrying out a specific mission. Joint task forces involve components from two or more services, while combined task forces include forces from two or more nations. In this context a CJTF can be described as a multinational, multiservice, task-tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited duration peace operations, under the control of either NATO’s integrated military structure or the WEU. Charles Barry,

CJTF capabilities have to be acquired without adding structure, but by modifying procedures and new employment concepts. But it is difficult to think that these modifications will be achieved without additional costs. Likely there will be some costs due to improve mobility and to acquire modern and powerful automation equipment.

The CJTF concept is not a revolutionary concept. The novelty is that it institutionalizes the multinational task force concept which has always been a temporary C2 arrangement within an ad hoc coalition.

There are a lot of problems to solve such as the harmonization of different national doctrines, the definition of appropriate C2 linkages between commands. In summary, NATO will have to approve a new C2 concept, new common procedures, and even new headquarters.

It is possible to envisage three CJTF employment scenarios: a NATO-Only CJTF; a NATO-Plus CJTF; and WEU-Led CJTF.

One of the central issues is to define the role of the SCs (ACE and ACLANT) in the planning and conduct of so-called "non-Article 5" operations. There are some differences between France and the US regarding that, and one solution might be the UK's proposal for a European deputy SACEUR, who would ensure the link with SACEUR, that in a WEU-led operation would have the function of supporting commander to the WEU operational commander.

Europeans countries have large and capable armed forces, but at present, most of these forces are devoted for territorial defense. Only the UK and France possess the capability of deployment troops (10,000 soldiers) abroad. In the future things might change. For example, by 2002 a French force of some 50-60,000 troops is scheduled to be capable of deployability.

To deploy rapidly troops abroad implies the acquisition of expensive systems, but European military budgets have been falling since 1990 and are likely to be cut further in an effort to meet the Maastricht criteria for the monetary union in 1999.

The 18 NATO E-3A aircraft are one component of NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF). The other component consists of 7 E 3-D UK-owned aircraft.

A better thing would be to establish a permanent European General Staff, with the task to define the characteristics and the size of the forces to employ in the context of different
scenarios; their armament and equipment; the logistic requirements, etc.

87 The four year old Planning Cell has a joint combined staff of 55 members, of whom 40 are military officers. It provides advice on the strategic level to the Permanent Council, and it has six functional sections that makes it fully compatible with the NATO headquarters. For more about this issue, see Graham Messervy-Whiting, “WEU operational development”, Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1997), 72.

88 In case that the WEU and EU are really going to merge, it is clear that the countries that do not want to join the WEU would not have a veto in the European Council when decisions concerning the WEU are taken.

89 Any EU country can become a WEU member (or observer), but the WEU, in turn, has a formal link with NATO and WEU States accept that NATO membership is a prerequisite for WEU membership, even though the reverse is not true. Thus, if Austria or any other new EU states, for example, asked to join the WEU they would only do so by also joining NATO, and therefore with the agreement of the US. Nicole Gnesotto, “Common European Defense and Transatlantic Relations”, in NATO’s transformation, ed. Philip H. Gordon (Rowman, Boston, 1997), 45.

90 ESDI is the result of different allies’ perceptions: France needs it to claim a greater role for Europe as political cover to come back into the Alliance; Germany needs it to show progress towards European political reunification in order to convince its public opinion to accept monetary union; Italy needs it as a means to claim their belonging to the core group of European countries; and the US administration needs it to claim to Congress and its people that the Europeans are now prepared to share part of the burden of the Alliance.


92 The proposal made during the March 1997 ICG session foresaw the merging in three steps: first step is to establish a better cooperation between WEU and EU; second step is the embodiment of the WEU in the European Council; and third step is to guarantee the military solidarity of the Member States.

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The reaffirmation of US presence in Europe was stated by President Bill Clinton during the 1994 NATO Summit: "At least 100,000 US troops would remain in Europe not out of habit but because the commitment was justified".
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