



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
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**A JOINTNESS CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE:
CIVILIANS, CONTRACTORS AND SOLDIERS IN SYNC**

BY

DIANE M. DEVENS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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CONTRACTORS AND SOLDIERS IN SYNC**

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper explores the hypothesis that if current Department of Defense practices of deploying contractors and civilians continues, or increases in the future, then civilians, contractors and service members must become more unified than they are today. While pointing out the cultural differences between civilian and active duty institutions, it focuses on two important structural differences that impact on teamwork and unity-training practices and mobility policies. Drawn from organizational theory, it describes strategy-level issues concerning building cohesive teams for operational success in the future, and identifies broad policy changes that must be considered if we are to continue deploying civilians.

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THE GROWING RANKS OF BROTHERS IN ARMS

Civilians in uniform? It's not new any more. They were in the Gulf War and can be seen every day in Bosnia today. Working at U.S. Army Europe headquarters, I helped commanders establish quality of life programs at base camps in Bosnia and Hungary. I prepared career Army civilians, and then worked with them through two years of rotations, as they spent three to six months at a time deployed in Bosnia. It was soon apparent how vast the gulf is between civilian and military cultures. Civilians and contractors had to be trained at the last minute on everything from the proper way to wear a uniform to the meaning of "force protection." Such issues can be major distracters for a commander who must take civilians and contractors with him and who is in a hurry to deploy.

"People are the Armed Forces; at the end of the day, our success in war or in peace, will rest ultimately on the men and women of the Armed Forces,"¹ asserts *Joint Vision 2010*, as it explains why teamwork grows more crucial to conducting successful operations in a highly complex world. We traditionally think of soldiers when "people" of the Armed forces are discussed, but civilians and contractors play a major role in many of today's deployments, and they may be destined to play a larger part in Army endeavors in the future. Teamwork and unit cohesion, always a main objective for training soldiers, must become a training

objective for civilians and contractors. As the Armed Forces shrink, civilians and contractors are becoming, of necessity, integral parts of the unit team. The future may require the Army to broaden its definition of a unit to include more than soldiers and to enlarge the training net beneath soldiers so it catches civilians and contractors as well. The unit's success unit may depend upon it.

In *Joint Vision 2010* the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that full spectrum dominance on the battlefield is the key to success in the future, and that vision will "draw on our most fundamental strength—people."² That very general statement leads to a key question facing those developing the future Army workforce: Which people need to be trained for the nature of modern and future warfare, so that they can be drawn upon with confidence?

This paper discusses that question in the context of the Army's workforce of the future. It examines the hypothesis that civilians and contractors need to have more training along with the soldiers they support during deployment, and it reviews current workforce management practices which might change to better meet the demands of the future—particularly the areas of training and mobility. Why? Cooperation, collaboration and teamwork are affected by training and mobility. The Army of the future may have to better prepare soldiers and the civilians who deploy with them to improve cohesion and teamwork. Developing a

more responsible, collaborative workforce will require some
fundamental structural changes.

CURRENT WISDOM CONCERNING THE FUTURE

It is now almost a cliché to say that our world grows more complex every minute. Cliché it may be, but as communication networks, virtual reality, robotics, new business systems, and an endless list of innovations become part of our daily lives, it becomes difficult to keep up with the pace.

John Petersen, in *The Road to 2015*, states that in the coming 20 years the American government will be reorganized because information technology will allow better access to the government at all levels, and war will be prosecuted by specialized military groups that can be mixed and matched in a "modular" fashion.³ Certainly his conjectures concerning the military dovetail with what Army strategists predict. A smaller, more lethal, technologically advanced fighting force is exactly what *Joint Vision 2010* projects, as does TRADOC Pam 525-5, which states, "The future Army will be smaller, yet have new, expanded, and diverse missions in an unpredictable, rapidly changing world environment."⁴

Like the active duty force, the Army's internal civilian workforce will be much smaller in the future. By the year 2001 the deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) expects DoD to have 20 to 25 percent fewer civilians.⁵ Most of the jobs will still be done, but they'll be done by contractors instead of DoD civilians, since Secretary of Defense

William Cohen plans to put thousands of defense service jobs on the block for competitive bidding.⁶ Included in his plan is the civilianization of approximately 2,500 military administrative jobs in the areas of personnel management, finance, and property management. So some of those remaining civilians will be in jobs that once belonged to active duty personnel. Contracting out peripheral activities, such as janitorial services, is nothing new to the Department of Defense (DoD). But in the future the DoD will contract outsiders to do more critical jobs, not just peripheral jobs, and will require civilians to work in functional areas closer to the realm of core competencies. There are simply fewer people to do more things in an increasingly complex world.

Two likely results of this change are that the management of large installations could be contracted out to a corporation, or that the commander positions at all installations could be civilianized. It can be argued that management of an installation is not a core competency of the DoD in peacetime, but that it is a core competency during war, when the installation becomes a critical platform for projecting the nation's Armed Forces. But if base operations in the United States are a core competency during war, then it logically follows that base camp operation in areas of conflict are also a core competency. Yet management and construction of base camps in forward deployed areas are currently contracted to the private sector in Bosnia, as they were during the Gulf War. Since the

Gulf War, private sector employees and DoD civilians have been common in forward deployed areas. Why? In part because we have already contracted out so many functions, and our force is so small that DoD must rely on contractors and civilians to do some of the work. These efforts have been generally successful, and as we accelerate contracting, or "outsourcing," and civilianization of military jobs, this could increase tremendously.

This outsourcing trend mirrors what is happening in large bureaucracies of the private sector. According to Gifford and Elizabeth Pinchot, "Outsourcing is the norm for many fast-moving industries, such as personal computers or fashion."⁷ Nike Corporation, IBM, and even NASA delegate large areas of their complex businesses to compatible and trusted partners. This allows them to get the best talents for peripheral jobs, because most companies cannot be the best at everything. However, it creates a system of support for the organization that is not controlled by the organization itself. While this lack of control is an issue for any organization like the Army (indeed, for any bureaucracy), it is clear that the Army will do more outsourcing in the future. There will simply not be enough internal workers to do all the work that has to be done.

RELIANCE ON CIVILIANS DURING OPERATIONS

Since the Industrial Age, we have relied upon experts, specialists and technicians who specialize in small functional areas of more complex work. Yet a few short decades ago people were often knowledgeable enough about many fields so that they could do a little work in many diverse areas. For example, in World War II a contributing factor to the United States' logistical success was that most soldiers had been backyard auto mechanics. When the not-so-complex tanks and trucks broke down, soldiers could strip parts from destroyed vehicles and repair the damaged vehicles, allowing the columns to push forward.⁸ They were multi-skilled generalists, able to collaborate on basic problems and fix them themselves.

It's different now. Today's infantry soldiers must rely on specialized maintenance units to repair the highly technical tanks and equipment of today. In *Defense For A New Era*, the authors credit complex technology for much of the U.S. forces' success in the Gulf War.⁹ They cite the "thousands of maintenance crews"¹⁰ who, contrary to the predictions of those who criticized overly complex technology, successfully kept complex weapons and equipment running during the Gulf War.

What they do not mention are the thousands of contractors and civilians who deployed in the Gulf War to support U.S. forces. Approximately 5,000 civilian employees and 9,200

contractor employees deployed in the Gulf War.¹¹ With the advent of complex equipment and weapons, the days of generalist soldiers, or even maintenance crews able to fix problems without outside help, are numbered. The extent to which increased reliance on civilians as members of the force will grow has major training and structure implications. Certainly those looking to the future must wonder, as does Raymond Sumser, former Director of Civilian Personnel for the Department of the Army, if civilians are "...potentially part of the 'tooth,' not the 'tail' "?¹²

BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF JOINTNESS

In *The Road to 2010*, John Petersen argues we must learn to stop approaching problems by breaking them down and studying the independent parts, then creating specialists to fix them, as the scientific method has taught us.¹³ In a complex world the people who know the whole system, not just a little piece of the system, are the people who accomplish integration and interoperability. In order to be truly team oriented, the Army and the people serving in it have to be systemically oriented so that the brain-power of all employees can be used to fix problems, not just the problems that their job description allows them to work on. This idea can revolutionize the concept of "Jointness."

A host of documents and publications, focused on forging the Armed Forces of the future, identify "jointness," or "integration" and "interoperability," as critical to full spectrum dominance on the complex battlefield of today and tomorrow. These words really just boil down to one thing—teamwork. But while jointness has been a funding and training paradigm for the Armed Forces since the Goldwater-Nichols Act was implemented, the focus of jointness remains primarily on interoperability of weapons and communications systems between the armed services. This is short-sighted if we are looking at a more diverse battlefield team in the future. Adding civilians and contractors to the mix of service members on, or near, the

battlefields will require interoperability of the human kind: teamwork.

It is not just matching equipment and technical systems that creates teamwork. While laws like the Goldwater-Nichols Act can mandate change, they do not implement change: only people do. Perhaps it was not until the creation of the joint staff officer position that people in the Armed Forces truly began to learn how other services do business and how to partner with them. Building relationships between service members is just as critical to jointness as building interoperable systems.

The definition of jointness must expand to include all the people who are part of the team. Those people are not only soldiers, but the contractors and civilians who will play increasingly important roles in operations, just as the Air Force and the Navy began to play increasingly important roles in Army operations after the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By taking over jobs now being performed by active duty personnel, civilians and contractors are destined to become integral parts of the team, much more so than they have been in the past. But how can civilians and contractors be integrated into military teams?

Title 5, USC, and Title 10, USC, governing active duty and civilian members of the forces, serve to differentiate between civilians and active duty in every area of management and treatment of employees. Because of these differences in management and treatment, chain-of-command influence on the day-

to-day activities of soldiers is different than it is on the activities of civilians. A simple example of differences between employees in the Army workplace is proscribed work hours. Soldiers can work 24 hours a day while civilians work eight hours a day or get overtime pay if they work longer. So simple a difference between members of the same organization can cause lack of understanding, resentment and distrust. Without learning to understand the differences, and each other, civilianization of military positions could cause disintegration of the team and failure during operations. In the future leaders will have to build trust not only between the service members, but between service members and the contractors and civilians who are doing the jobs soldiers once did alone.

ORGANIZATIONAL SEGREGATION: THE ANTITHESIS OF JOINTNESS

Perhaps it is not surprising that authors of DoD and Army publications do not often discuss DoD civilians and contractors in the same context as soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. After all, civilians are not asked to risk their lives in battle and are not present on the battlefield. Because of this we can easily compartmentalize training: Soldiers get what they need to fight and civilians get what they need to support soldiers. Soldiers do not generally train with the civilians and contractors who support them. Civilian training programs are completely separate from military training programs and are, with very few exceptions, meant to build technical skills for their particular functional area. Contractors are rarely included in any training meant to develop an understanding of the Army.

This training structure only mirrors the Army's organizational structure. We rigorously compartmentalize our Armed Forces: warriors and non-warriors; combat, combat support, combat service support; civilian, contract, active duty. In some commands, like Army Materiel Command, where the presence of soldiers is very small, civilians and contractors can work most of their career without meeting the infantry soldier they support. This industrial-style compartmentalization does not easily allow people to think of the institution as a holistic organization; rather, it encourages thinking within proscribed

boundaries and makes team work and integration difficult to perpetuate.

Yet an ability to see the whole is exactly what every individual needs in order to effect the future synergy envisioned by the joint chiefs of staff. With a smaller more lethal fighting force predicted, and increased support from the private sector envisioned,¹⁴ the relationships between civilians, soldiers, and contractors will have to be strong. Margaret Wheatly, who worked with GEN Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the Army, and is a noted theorist concerning systems thinking, says that relationships are the foundation of teams.¹⁵ Arguably, in today's Armed forces, while we take steps toward improving jointness among the Air Force, Army, Marines and Navy, we are doing little to improve the relationships (or "jointness") among civilians, contractors, and active duty personnel.

THE CULTURAL CHASM

The differences between the military and the civilian personnel systems are many, as outlined in Title 10, USC, and Title 5, USC, respectively. This discussion will focus on only two important differences between the two systems: training and mobility. The soldier has mandatory mobility and civilians have voluntary mobility. For civilians training is primarily occupationally oriented, while for soldiers training is for leadership and military skills. When civilians are mobile it is generally because they want to learn more and to make themselves more competitive for promotion. Civilian rotational assignments overseas are institutionally considered training assignments, and a system is in place for the civilian to return to his or her former job. Just these two differences, mobility and training, create a vast cultural chasm that is difficult to reach across. Civilians generally stay in one place, while soldiers move around all the time, making it difficult to develop relationships or any notion of teamwork.

TRAINING

Those relationships might be better developed if training programs for civilians and soldiers were integrated. Instead, training is compartmentalized by functional alignments. Civilians are taught skill proficiency and a few move on to become supervisors, managers, and ultimately leaders. Soldiers are taught technical proficiency and leadership from their first

introduction to basic training. They all move on to leadership positions or they are not considered "promotable," and drop from the system.

Another difference is the standardization between the two training systems. While soldiers get much skill-specific training, they all go to the same basic schools. It is a common tie among them that helps to create a "brotherhood." The Officer Basic Training Course, OAC/CAS3, Command and General Staff College, and Senior Service Colleges are the sequential building blocks of an officer's career that inculcate a common body of knowledge among all officers. Enlisted personnel have similar training blocks.

While the skill-specific training is available for every civilian employee, until a civilian employee reaches management level there are no basic "school houses" for them. Army Management Staff College, Senior Service Colleges, and the Federal Executive Institute train a small number of civilians, but not in numbers proportionate to the active duty force.

These differences are built upon the traditional assumption that division of work makes life easier, that complex work can be broken down into small parts that are easier to deal with, and that efficient training develops the technical expertise needed only for an employee's small part. This model will not allow development of the highly diverse but cohesive workforce envisioned for the future if these traditional

assumptions are passé. What if work is more knowledge-based than technical skill-based? People must be able to think in terms of the whole system and make the intellectual connections needed for innovation and creativity in problem solving. The new challenge is for leaders to build the teamwork and trust needed to get excellent contractor and civilian support for the small, highly technical military units of the future. One method is to create the same commitment and teamwork that is instilled in active duty units.

MOBILITY

According to the Pinchots, mobility of employees can often drain an organization's institutional memory and cause them to make the same mistakes over and over again because there are so few who have been there long enough to remember how actions took place.¹⁶ However, large bureaucracies structured along functional expertise lines, like the Army, often use rotational assignments as training augmentation. The DoD's Directive 1400.6, *DoD Civilians in Overseas Areas*, requires that civilian employees move from foreign locations every five years "...to promote the efficiency of worldwide operations..."¹⁷ One stated benefit of the rotation policy is it allows employees to get a chance at first hand experience in a foreign location where they learn about the big picture, and can be better employees upon their return to the continental United States (CONUS).¹⁸ But in the future those chances will be few. United States Army Europe

had 105,000 civilians in 1989. That number is 33,000 in April of 1997 and is planned to shrink to 25,000 in a few years.¹⁹ When this reduction is coupled with a rotation policy for civilians that applies only to overseas locations, the effect is that almost every position has a new person in it every few years. Even without manpower reductions, filling positions every five years (or less) only in overseas locations concentrates the level of turbulence at overseas organizations and drains institutional knowledge.

Meanwhile the civilian workforce in CONUS is comparatively quite stable; often several generations of a family will work as employees at the same defense installation. But they can rarely build relationships with the soldiers who work on the installation because of the soldiers' rotation policy. They are in one location for three years, at the most, before moving on to a new assignment.

This training objective has a price now in terms of high civilian employee turnover at most overseas location. But it may have an even steeper price in a future that relies upon solid teams with well-established relationships. Is mobility an effective training goal if relationships and networks are more critical to success than being able to replace people as if they are cogs in a machine?

Some private sector organizations are finding it pays to allow teams to stay together, rather than split up after a job is

done. The relationships developed generate trust within the team, which allows teams to try new ideas and creatively collaborate on problem solving.²⁰ Just as the nucleus of a professional sports team remains fairly solid, with a few players coming and going each year, so the nucleus of high performance teams in the business world remain stable and productive for many years.

Like any bureaucracy, the Army relies more on written policies and regulations to institutionalize lessons learned, rather than experienced people, who come and go. Our industrial based heritage allows us to think of people as interchangeable cogs that can go from place to place to place with no impact on the organization. But if in the future people are more multi-skilled, and successful teams are required to perform diverse missions, the Army's robust rotation policy may be detrimental to success. Diversity of missions will require diversity of skills, and swiftly changing problems will require that team members know and trust one another.

THE ARMY AS A LEARNING ORGANIZATION

If the vast growth spurt of technology and complexity is driving the Department of Defense toward improving jointness, it should come as no surprise that the private sector is also focusing on the benefits of team work, not only in the future, but also in today's world. That technology growth spurt has hit corporate world bureaucracies and their traditional employee management structures hard. As a result, there is a growing move towards what we call "jointness," but what the private sector calls "Organizational Intelligence,"²¹ "Systems Thinking"²² or even "Learning Organizations."²³ All these labels define in various ways how organizations move from strict chain-of command practices to practices that reduce the role of supervisors and encourage collaboration, self-management, and teamwork within functional areas, and between functional areas.

Some of these practices and theories of the corporate world have relevancy to our Armed Forces structures. The DoD isn't the only institution wrestling with the challenges of a rapidly changing world, and the training and retention of the people doing the work. And more importantly, the DoD is not the only institution coping with massive changes caused by reduced funding, fast technology changes and the difficulties of planning for a future that will arrive very quickly. In fact, the private sector companies that cannot change fast enough soon find themselves without the cash flow to survive. What are their

strategies for success? Can the Army apply some of these strategies to improve interoperability, speed and integration?

Whatever label it is given by the Armed Forces or by management theorists, there is one common strategy considered necessary for private sector organizations to succeed in the future: a strong network of relationships between teams, and within teams, that integrates the spectrum of functional specialties. In other words, the specialists broaden their horizons by knowing people outside their functional area, training outside their functional area, and doing work outside their functional area. Benson Shapiro, in "Functional Integration: Getting All the Troops to Work Together," says "A major part of an organization's culture and tone comes from how interfunctional coordination is considered and accomplished."²⁴ Many private sector theorists and practitioners argue that this coordination between peers allows teams to be fast and innovative. By building cross-functional relationships with diverse people in the organization, they create a network of support and knowledge that drives people to think in terms of the whole system, not just their piece of it.

Jim Harris, in *Getting Employees to Fall in Love With Your Company*, argues that the only long-term advantage for any organization is the collective brain-power of its people.²⁵ The Army has always aggressively emphasized learning for its active duty component because training and readiness are directly

linked. However, civilians and contractors are not often included in the vast amount of readiness training, so the "collective" brain-power of the Army's employees is not generally approached by trainers. This practice is, in essence, keeping civilians, contractors, and soldiers from understanding each other, and from understanding the entire system within which they work. "Learning Organizations" do the exact opposite. They provide rich training opportunities for all employees at every level and encourage the dialogue that is critical to team performance.²⁶

The term "Learning Organization" appears to be fairly fixed in the lexicon of organization theorists. Two of Peter Senge's definitions can help us understand the term. First, learning organizations "discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at *all* levels in an organization."²⁷ The second is that a learning organization is "continually expanding its capacity to create its future."²⁸ Gifford and Elizabeth Pinchot assert that "intelligent organizations" tap the intelligence of every employee, and as a result can, "Implement whole-systems thinking without robbing units of local flexibility, rapidly apply what was learned in place to others, and integrate learning across the organization to use it creatively and flexibly."²⁹ Does any of this theory concerning the types of emerging organizations in the private sector apply

to the Armed Forces? Perhaps so, when warfare is looked at in the context of the future.

The Army has the typical hierarchical chain of command developed during the Industrial Age in order to manage complex but repetitive tasks, and to bring order to large groups of people doing the same thing. Bureaucracies like these achieved efficiency through the highly defined specialization of labor and functions. According to Max Weber, a founder of bureaucratic theory, the regular activities of an organization should be distributed in a fixed way as official duties.³⁰ Certainly the Army's organization is built around this philosophy of specialization and the creation of experts instead of generalists. Career specialties number in the hundreds, and designations of combat, combat support, and combat service support for the active duty members alone, narrowly circumscribe what people do. Add to this situation the functional and structural division between civilian, contractor, and active duty personnel, and it is clearer why there is so little interaction between the components.

As discussed earlier, change management theorists believe specialization and fixed duties are no longer as germane to today's world, and will be less so in the future. Repetitive tasks are being replaced by diverse tasks and missions, unskilled work is being replaced by knowledge-based work, single-skilled work is being replaced by multi-skilled work, and coordination

from above is being replaced by coordination amongst peers.³¹ Is this true for the Army? It is, even in the broadest of contexts. For example, only two decades ago the Armed Forces prepared to do one thing only: fight wars. Today the Armed forces is involved in a wide range of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, and training of other nation's militaries, just to name a few new activities. It is critical that the Army be able to rapidly tailor organizations for diverse operations—there are almost no more one-dimensional, regular activities in terms of Army missions.

Assuming that all of the people working for the Armed Forces will have to know more in order to accomplish the complex and diverse missions of the future leads one to the argument that people cannot be narrowly specialized any more. They will have to find ways to work together and to respond flexibly to the diverse requirements that come their way. This almost dictates that leaders build "flexible networks"³² that give people the freedom to change their roles and relationships as they quickly respond to new problems. The challenge is to establish a viable "community in the workplace"³³ in which everybody contributes to leadership and in which relationships between peers take on more importance than relationships between subordinate and supervisor, because it is peers in other functional areas who can help a worker be creative and see things in new ways. Much of this is diametrically opposed to the traditional chain-of-command

structure. But as the force gets smaller, leadership positions will become fewer, and leaders will not be able to quickly make all the decisions needed in a fast-paced, diverse world.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Organizations often implement strategic change, but they don't change the systems that can support the change, such as job boundaries, pay, and policies.³⁴ In fact, these systems are often built upon the old roots of an organization and traditionalists in the organization will always resist changes to these "basic roots" of the organization. It is true for a company that is only twenty years old and it is certainly true for a several centuries old institution such as the Army.

The barriers to changing a culture are many, and as embedded in law as the civil service system is, the difficulty in making substantive changes to the systems surrounding civilians requires patience and commitment. However, assuming that civilians and private sector contractors will become bigger players in the Army of the future, it will be imperative that they all work together as a team, and that they be as fast, efficient, and responsive as they can be.

What must the Army change in order to better prepare its soldiers, civilians and contractor workforce for future success? Some of the problems and inequalities found in today's bureaucracies are caused by a real difference in people's ability to add value to the organization.³⁵ Changing the structure of the Army's training could move all employees to being more productive members of the organization, rather than productive in

just their functional areas. Specific changes should initially center around the Army's major training centers and schoolhouses.

For example, one possible change is to expand training exercises to include contractors and civilians. If contractors and civilians are going to deploy with soldiers, or be linked to soldiers on the battlefield via computers or virtual reality technology, then civilians and contractors should be wholly included in training exercises. This is done to some degree today, but it has been typically a bottom-up change for certain functional areas like logistics or base operations support. To create a truly uniform sense of learning in the organization, to open the eyes of soldiers and civilians so they can understand the whole system of deployment, the Army needs to include civilians, contractors and service members in regular training rotations. There could be at least one major long-term return on investment: a network of diverse employees with developed loyalties to one another, who can better anticipate problems and innovate solutions.

Another change has to do with integrating basic schoolhouse training for soldiers and civilians and contractors. The benefits of treating all components of the workforce as equals in the training realm could far outweigh the costs of expanding the training. Civilians and contractors and soldiers would develop relationships in the schoolhouses that would last their careers, just as soldiers do now. This alone could greatly improve the

cohesion of the total work force and help to bridge the differences between civilians, contractors and soldiers. It would also give people the breadth of knowledge they need to think systemically rather than functionally. Systems thinking can no longer be the purview of managers if we are to have a speedy, flexible and responsive Army. Units of the future are envisioned as operating independently; as being able to think on their feet. They will need all the help of the contractors and civilians who work on their equipment and provide them with their supplies. Training to encourage the teamwork necessary for such autonomy is limited today, but is critical for everyone in the future.

Such a training change could start the Army on a path towards becoming a true learning organization. It could begin to blur the differences between civilians, contractors, and active duty personnel that are encoded in law, but blurring differences is exactly what develops a sense of community and integrates learning across the spectrum of the organization. This is a critically important leadership issue now and in the future.

A third change has to do with reviewing mobility policies for soldiers and for civilians. Civilian rotation policy today is unevenly applied among the services, short-sighted in its approach to training and team building, and lacking in any return on investment analysis. Soldier rotation is centrally managed and is built into doctrine. However that doctrine may not meet

the needs of the Army envisioned for the future, with its small, skill-diverse, highly technical units. The civilian and military rotation policies of today make high turnover in teams a constant, thus limiting organizations' abilities to learn from institutional knowledge and making it difficult to establish trust and long-term relationships. The disparities between these two policies must be looked at in terms of their effects on relationships between the people of the services—our most fundamental strength, as *Joint Vision 2010* claims.

The implications of such changes are serious and both civilians and active duty service members will not want change. To include civilians/contractors in training rotations and in schoolhouse training at all levels will cost money, may require regulatory and statute changes, and could be seen as a civilian invasion on the profession of military arms. To change rotation policies so that civilian employees and service members have some common ground for building relationships, teamwork, and trust will require a new kind of training philosophy, will defy norms in both cultures and will not necessarily be welcomed by all.

The deeply different cultures of active duty military, civilians, and contractors make recommendations like these difficult and slow to implement. But it is the culture that must change. Just as the differences in service cultures set up resistance to Goldwater-Nichols, requiring top-driven mandates for joint staff officer positions, so the differences in civilian

and military cultures will cause resistance to training and rotation policy changes. However, to quote Jamieson and O'Mara in *Managing Workforce 2000*, "A fundamental shift in attitude is needed. This shift must recognize the interdependencies among an organization's policies, systems, and practices."³⁶ Perhaps the shift in attitude can be tested by the creation of a cadre of civilians and contractors who sign up for deployment, go to the same schools as the soldiers they work with, and meet many of the same standards soldiers as the they deploy with. They could be managed by the soldiers' personnel system and counted upon as a trained asset during deployments. This would allow incremental change rather than radical changes to the existing civilian personnel system and could result in better planning at every level, better teamwork, and could begin to change the culture.

The existing cultural barriers between active duty, civilian, and contractor employees, will not allow the Army to have the creativity, flexibility and speed that it needs to efficiently and effectively perform the diverse missions of today and the future. Training and assignment policies that drive employees to focus on their relationships with one another, and to develop a sense of loyalty to the total organization rather than their professional area of expertise, will be a critical element in transforming the Army to meet the challenges of the not-so-distant future.

5,810 words.

ENDNOTES

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⁶ "Defense Department To Make Deep Cuts In Civilian Personnel," Wall Street Journal, 11 November 1997, sec. A, p. 20.

⁷ Gifford and Elizabeth Pinchot, The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of Intelligent Organizations (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1993), 168.

⁸ Stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 64.

⁹ Les Aspin and William Dickinson, Defense For A New Era (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992), 16.

¹⁰ Ibid., 17.

¹¹ Raymond J. Sumser and Charles W. Hemingway, "The Emerging Importance of Civilian And Contractor Employees To Army Operations," Landpower Essay Series, No.95-4, (June 1995): 2.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Petersen, 9.

¹⁴ Department of the Army, Joint Vision 2010, 24.

¹⁵ Margaret J. Wheatly, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1992), 39.

¹⁶ Pinchot, 279.

¹⁷ Department of Defense, "DoD Civilians in Overseas Areas," 15 February 1980; available from <<http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/d14006p.txt>>; Internet; accessed 16 April 1998.

¹⁸ Steve Harding, "Times of Change for USAREUR's Civilians," Soldiers 52 (August 1997): 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., 2.

²⁰ Pinchot, 202.

²¹ Ibid., 5.

²² Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 6.

²³ Ibid., 3.

²⁴ Benson P. Shapiro, "Functional Integration: Getting All the Troops to Work Together," in Managing People and Organizations, ed. John J. Gabarro (Boston: Harvard Business School Publications, 1992), 364.

²⁵ Jim Harris, Getting Employees to Fall in Love With Your Company (New York: American Management Association, 1996), 77.

²⁶ Senge, 10.

²⁷ Ibid., 4.

²⁸ Ibid., 14.

²⁹ Pinchot, 20.

³⁰ Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," (1946); trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (Oxford University Press, 1973), 1; quoted in Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, eds., Classics of Public Administration, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1992), 51.

³¹ Pinchot, 30.

³² Ibid., 45.

³³ Ibid., 215.

³⁴ The ideas in this passage are based on remarks made by USAWC students during an oral presentation on the book Creating Strategic Change by William A. Pasmore participating in Course 115 at the USAWC.

³⁵ Ibid, 242.

³⁶ David Jamieson and Julie O'Mara, Managing Workforce 2000 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991), 9.

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