

**STRATEGY
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**WHEN TEAMS BREAK DOWN:
A STUDY OF THE ACTIVE ARMY/NATIONAL GUARD
FEUD OF 1997**

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Teamwork is at the heart of all that is good and successful about the U.S. Army. Because it is so critical to warfighting and to all other missions, peacetime and wartime, we are taught not to expect anything good when teams break down. Yet, 1997 was a year of breakdown in the teamwork relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard. The feud was open and contentious and was taken to Capitol Hill. Despite many on-going initiatives to repair the relationship, it remains important to review the feud in light of its seriousness and in light of the mountains of challenges still ahead that will require teamwork. This paper uses organizational theory as the basis for discussion, focusing primarily on teamwork as affected by trust, culture, and conflict. It concludes with discussion of crisis and renewal.

THE HEART OF THE MATTER

Teamwork is at the heart of all that is good and successful about the U.S. Army. We know from our past that teamwork is not just a multiplier; it is essential to accomplishing the herculean tasks of warfighting. The importance of teamwork is stressed in military literature, during military education at all levels, and throughout the everyday course of military life. We are taught not to expect anything good when teams break down.

This past year, 1997, Total Army teamwork broke down between the Active Army and the Army National Guard. This was not the first such occurrence; many serious grievances date back to the birth of our country. One of many examples is apropos in this 100th year since the Spanish-American War. In preparation for the war in early 1898, when the Hull Act was introduced to expand the Active Army from 28,000 to 104,000, aggressive lobbying by the National Guard and the States caused the bill to be defeated. They feared the Act would not only exclude the militia from service in *that* campaign, but over time, would "minimize the role of state volunteers in the framework of national defense."¹

Throughout our nation's history, the many conflicts between the Active Army and the National Guard, to include the one in 1997, stemmed from the same basic issue--the size of the standing army and the resulting role of the militia in national defense.

In regard to last year's conflict, which we will refer to as the "feud of 1997," there are already numerous initiatives

underway to remedy disagreements and chart a new course. In fact, largely due to this feud, the Secretary of Defense directed that all Services "recognize and address any remaining barriers to achieving a fully integrated Force."²

If we are already working to resolve this latest feud (and these recur predictably anyway), why use it as a case study on teamwork? First, the feud of 1997 impacted on Total Army teamwork beyond the senior leadership level and continues to do so today. Secondly, much work remains in rebuilding teamwork that will be strong enough to meet the challenges ahead. Lastly, history will repeat itself with increasingly severe consequences if we do not dedicate ourselves to truly realizing teamwork.

The purpose of this paper is not to propose new initiatives or solutions to issues between the Active Army and National Guard; there are studies and reports galore to do that. The purpose is to look at what organizational theory says about teamwork, and to discuss the Active Army/National Guard teamwork relationship and feud of 1997 in that light. We should find insight into the complex issue of teamwork from professional literature devoted to that purpose. We will not attempt to discuss all aspects of organizational teamwork, but will focus on those of greatest relevance to our topic--trust, culture, and conflict.

In this paper, there will be some necessary references to the Army Reserve but it is not the focus of the review. Also, we

will occasionally refer to the Army National Guard as the "Guard."

TOTAL ARMY TEAMWORK - THE BASICS

With over 50% of the U.S. Army's force in the Reserve Components, it is clear that teamwork within the Total Army is critical. AR 600-100, Army Leadership, says that all leaders are responsible for "Building cohesive teams."³ This reference applies to leaders of the National Guard and Army Reserve, just as the Active Component. FM 22-100, Military Leadership, emphasizes that, "Warfighting is a team activity. . . . Your unit becomes a team only when your soldiers trust and respect you and each other as trained professionals and see the importance of their contributions to the unit."⁴ While much of this was surely written with small teams in mind, FM 22-102, Soldier Team Development, reminds us that the principles of team development and cohesion are "key to success for all teams in all missions at all times."⁵

ESSENCE OF THE FEUD OF 1997

Before we proceed, we need to briefly describe the Active Army and National Guard feud of 1997. It is best introduced with a quote from Major General (Retired) "Red" Newman on the "importance of the point of view."

The view you get of anything depends on where you sit. . . . Thus, your opinion may depend on whether you have a rear-area viewpoint, a front-line view or observe from the flank.⁶ . . . The importance of viewpoints in our Army permeates all we do. Morale is a matter of viewpoint, and disagreements are often a question of "Whose ox is being gored?"--a self interest view-point, the most pervasive of all.⁷

The feud of 1997 was ignited by the handling of proposed force structure cuts resulting from the Quadrennial Defense Review. National Guard leaders claimed they had been excluded from the process of determining their share of the cuts and furthermore, that senior Active Army leaders had unethically attempted to shift blame for the cuts. Moreover, they felt that the proposed reductions (38,000) cut at the very soul of the National Guard--not only undermining its combat mission but imperiling its ability to accomplish state missions. In other words, the National Guard felt that its "ox was being gored" without due representation.

Deciding that senior Army leaders could not be trusted, the National Guard took its case to the nation's governors and to Capitol Hill. Many governors sent letters of protest and appeal to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense directed that the Army conduct an off-site conference to resolve differences. During this off-site, modifications were made to the proposed cuts, but disagreement soon erupted again over whether or not senior Army leaders had endorsed 11 principles presented by the National Guard as a condition of agreement.⁸

Throughout the last half of 1997, heated political debate occurred over mission, cuts, underfunding, methods, etc., as well as a proposal to put a four-star National Guard member on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to protect the Guard's interest.

For any reader previously unaware of the hostility surrounding the above events, here are but a few of the hundreds of references to the feud of 1997.

Within the Washington Beltway, the front page of the newspaper screams out that the Army is at war with itself. Inside the Pentagon, groups huddle sharing the latest stories of the most recent affront to a component's dignity or honor, each one anxious to outdo the other with tales of horror.⁹

Congressional Quarterly wrote that,

Even in the best of times, the Army and the Army National Guard don't get along, the centuries-old rivalry of professional and part-time soldiers. But these are lean times at the Pentagon, and in the scramble for scarce resources in new weapons and manpower, the hard feelings between the Army and the Guard have erupted into public animosity.¹⁰

The final National Defense Panel report said, ". . . the Army has suffered from a destructive disunity among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National Guard. This rift serves neither the Army nor the country well."¹¹ Finally, the Chief of Staff, Army said to assembled National Guard leaders in September 1997,

. . . you know and I know that all is not sweetness and light. We have been hit with a very divisive open debate on the way we have reached some of our decisions. This threatens the very fabric of our seamless force. It is not very helpful for the Nation. It is important that we resolve these differences and get them right. The stakes are very high.¹²

Although blame was placed by many during these events, it is not the purpose of this writing to debate blame, but rather to focus on the process of teamwork. It is with the following philosophy in mind that we proceed: When teams lose their way,

it . . . does not necessarily occur as the result of incompetence, lack of ethics or morality, character flaws, or any other simple explanation. Rather, it occurs because the problems are complex, the strategies for solving the problems are even more complex, and the degree of collaboration required by the problem-solving strategies involves intense and constant concentration in order for the goal to be attained.¹³

TEAMWORK AND TRUST

In discussing the teamwork relationship of the Active Army and National Guard, the first word that comes to mind is "trust." Trust, or lack thereof, was one of the common threads in the conflicts of 1997. Let's look at what organizational theory says about trust within organizations.

Trust is one of those mainstay virtues in the commerce of mankind. It is the bond that allows any kind of significant relationship to exist . . . In fact, our research shows a predictable pattern of diminishing confidence once a trusting relationship is violated.¹⁴ . . . What's more, a suspicion is born--prompting you to review and reevaluate events from the past--that perhaps the relationship had never been honest.¹⁵

Past events have a powerful effect on the willingness of team members within organizations to trust.¹⁶ This theory of past events had a volatile effect in 1997 between the Active Army and the National Guard. Because so many previous events were unresolved in the minds of so many,¹⁷ the events of 1997 were

simply "the last straw" to many Guard leaders and supporters. Distrust was expressed openly. The cut of 38,000 for the National Guard was said to be an attempt by senior Army leaders to "marginalize the Guard."¹⁸ Some said that "the Army arbitrarily targeted the Guard for a disproportionate share" of the reductions to save itself.¹⁹

Others felt that the Army was throwing out new missions to distract the Guard and further divorce it from traditional combat roles.²⁰ Some said that Army leaders fail to use the Guard in active contingency plans because they want to deny the Guard a chance to demonstrate the effectiveness of its large combat units.²¹ A common charge was, "the Pentagon's active-duty generals find it in their political interests to keep the Guard underfunded--and thus undertrained--in order to argue against reliance on the citizen-soldiers in times of crisis."²² National Guard leaders said that senior Army leaders could not be trusted to honor agreements or to deal fairly and openly.

Organizational literature tells us that when lack of trust is a problem with a team:

There appears to be a lot of maneuvering and a considerable amount of denial and defensiveness.²³ . . . The absence of trust diverts the mental concentration and energy of a team away from its performance objective and onto other issues. The team becomes politicized. Communications become guarded and distorted. Alliances and personal agenda begin to take precedence over the team goal. This wounds the team and often renders it ineffective.²⁴

This effect certainly could be seen throughout 1997. Some Guard supporters were so openly distrusting of the Active Army that all-out political warfare was waged to ensure the "fight for survival" was successful. In this fight, it was clear that the National Guard trusted Congress to protect its interests more than it trusted senior Army leadership to do so.

Another issue related to teamwork and trust that reared its head in 1997 is the significant issue of readiness. Some in the active Army contend that warfighting on the modern battlefield is "Ph.D. warfare that cannot be mastered part time."²⁵ Many distrust the ability of the National Guard to be ready when called, or when some still-to-be-agreed-upon number of post-mobilization training days, are over.

The National Guard distrusts the Active Army to set consistent standards and to share in ownership in reaching them. It remains a grievance of the National Guard that Congress *had* to legislate a mandatory level and quality of involvement by active officers with Reserve Components, (much as it had to do with joint duty), and that duty remains relatively low prestige today. On the other hand, the National Guard is said to be,

reluctant to accept even the advice, much less the instructions, of active-component soldiers because--according to at least one article published by a senior Guard officer--the active component ostensibly does not understand the Guard's culture or how to train a Guard unit.²⁶

The most significant consequence of open distrust among senior leaders in 1997 was the spillover into public and

Congressional debate that resulted in hundreds of articles, letters to editors, and open discussions defending one component over another, fueling debates for some period to come. It has been said that "the rift between the Army and the Guard is mostly generated around the 20-mile radius of the Capitol."²⁷ That may be true, but the effects of the feud can be felt wherever newspapers, magazines, journals, and communication extend. Many more people, inside and outside the Army, are now aware of the differences and thus, are more doubtful about the Total Army. For many who heretofore believed that "One Army" was a reality, 1997 brought a great sense of astonishment and loss to learn otherwise. A loss of trust and confidence occurs when you discover that teamwork has broken down within your Service.

Some closing comments from organizational literature on teamwork and trust:

Trust is a risk relationship, but a necessary one.²⁸ . . . Trust is transforming. . . . Properly placed trust empowers us, misplaced trust spells defeat.²⁹ . . . Without trust, the idea of joint, cooperative action would be unthinkable, let alone practical.³⁰

TEAMWORK AND CULTURE

A discussion of teamwork between the Active Army and the National Guard must recognize the other teams to which each component belongs, thus complicating the basic teamwork relationship. "Where you sit" is determined by which team you

are on at that time and what values and priorities that team holds.

For instance, the Active Army and the National Guard each have a teamwork relationship with the other Army component, the Army Reserve. This is a separate, distinct relationship from the collective relationship that all three must have. The Active Army is also a member of the team of other Services, who jointly must find interoperability and conquer cultural hindrances to cooperation. The Army National Guard's teamwork relationships are even more complex, thus contributing to the conflict just by their very nature. It belongs to the National Guard Bureau, making it a team member of the Air National Guard. Most importantly, however, it belongs to the team of states, which includes the Adjutants General, Governors, Congressmen, and the public. Also relevant to this discussion is the teamwork relationship that both components have with professional organizations that represent them, e.g. Association of the U.S. Army, National Guard Association of the U.S., Adjutants General Association of the U.S., and others.

There are many more teams within and involving each of the above teams and we will not address them all; simply realizing they exist is important. Their number alone signals how fragile teamwork is when multiple roles are involved, as we will discuss.

If we start by identifying the Active Army as the "parent organization," at least when the National Guard is in its federal

role, we can see in organizational theory what can be expected. "Teams, while separate from the main organization have lasting utility as they relate in meaningful ways to the core tasks and purposes of the larger parent organization."³¹ However:

Our experience with large organizations tells us that at a certain size, the variations among the subgroups are substantial If we find that certain assumptions are shared across all the units of an organization, then we can legitimately speak of an organizational culture, even though at the same time we may find a number of discrete subcultures that have their own integrity. . . . Some of these subcultures will typically be in conflict with each other³²

One can see that you cannot effectively talk about teamwork between organizations, or components of organizations, without looking at culture. Edgar Schein defines culture as:

A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.³³

Culture is a powerful force and is important in understanding teamwork and "obstacles to cooperation." Before any cure can be effected, you must know and fully understand what is "driving" an organization and what may be preventing the creation and use of cooperative systems and ventures.³⁴

Schein clarifies for us that,

A group has a culture when it has had enough of a shared history to have formed a set of shared assumptions. Shared assumptions derive their power from the fact that they begin to operate outside of awareness. . . . They are not only "our" assumptions,

but by virtue of our history of success, they must be right and good.³⁵

Even throughout the feud of 1997, it was clear that the Active Army and National Guard, as a parent organization and a component, have shared assumptions, and therefore, have a shared organizational culture. They both believe that a strong military is critical, that you serve proudly as a member of the military, that strict standards of physical, mental, and emotional conditioning are important, and that we owe allegiance to civilian oversight, just to name a few of many shared assumptions. Yet, there are other organizational cultures that are more dominant in either component, and there are definite cultures within the National Guard that result from its teamwork relationship with the states. Let's look at additional literature for insight on organizational culture and how it influences the teamwork relationship between the Active Army and National Guard.

The organization's culture is founded in core values and beliefs that have evolved in an organization over time (Nadler and Tushman, 1988).³⁶ . . . Organizational culture includes both historical precedent and present experience. It defines current expectations and expectations for the future.³⁷ . . . Every organization has its symbols - ideas, words, objects, or processes that represent aspects of its culture.³⁸ . . . Organizations have not only a natural tendency to survive, but they have a tendency to maintain traditional ways of thinking and behaving. This tendency, like survival, can be either positive or negative.³⁹

It is evident that the National Guard has an identifiable and strong culture of its own; its symbols and messages of culture came through loud and clear throughout the feud of 1997.

The Minuteman was stressed as the Guard's symbol of its basic belief in the ability of the citizen soldier to defend this nation. The National Guard's success, not only to survive but to repeatedly come to the call of the states and the country when needed, has strengthened the militia culture and has fueled the debate about its economy for the nation in today's post Cold War. The Guard believes, as General Creighton Abrams articulated after Vietnam, that if our country decides that a conflict is important enough to commit forces, then it is important that those forces include citizen-soldiers.⁴⁰

The Active Army's culture is no less strong in its values and belief in the preservation of a force that is both trained and ready on a moment's notice. It is a commonly-held and seemingly-logical argument that you can truly accomplish this only with full-timers because of the intricate and complex demands of an optimal level of readiness. Regrettably, some believe that you are actually more dedicated to the Army if you are full-time, rather than part-time. Because of this and the perceived reluctance of the Active Army to use the Guard, for whatever reasons, the Guard "feels like second-class military participants."⁴¹

One can see the dominance of the Active Army throughout the Cold War and during the last major conflict, DESERT STORM. Regarding DESERT STORM, Les Aspin, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was quoted as saying, "We've heard a

number of reasons for not sending Guard and reserve combat units, but they're about as solid as sand. I suspect the most important factor is the active force prejudice against using reserve forces."⁴² Effective teamwork is difficult to achieve, if not impossible, when one component feels a less-than-valued partner, whether "justified" or not.

The feud of 1997 resurrected many cultural debates regarding the above, but also one regarding conversion of combat divisions. Just as is true for the Active Army, the Guard's "history and traditions are inextricably linked to the combat divisions."⁴³ Combat divisions are the source of greatest status and prestige in the Active Army; so it should be expected in the National Guard, as well. The Guard's culture is also linked to units, whatever the size. The notion that Guard units provide individual fillers or small elements to backfill active duty personnel in rear areas while the active go forward is a negative one to the Guard.⁴⁴

The cultures of the various teams to which the Active Army and National Guard belong have great influence on the conduct and behavior of members. Let us look next at the most complicating aspect of the Active Army and Guard teamwork relationship.

"The militias were and continue to be dual mission forces with dual loyalties. Each remains under the governor's control in peacetime, but is available to the Federal Government in time of war or national emergency."⁴⁵ Dual loyalty to a state team is

perhaps difficult for many active duty personnel to reconcile. A typical active duty career does not allow for roots to take hold in any particular state, much less a home state.

Politics are expected to be silent and private for active duty members. For many, this contributes to a cultural suspicion that the National Guard is somehow "spoiled" when it exercises its teamwork relationship with the political team of its state Adjutants General, Governors, and Congressmen. To further complicate the teamwork relationship, the Active Army is the "least politically adept" of military organizations, while the National Guard is arguably one of the best.⁴⁶

Earlier in this section, we presented the notion that the Active Army might be viewed as the "parent organization" when the National Guard is wearing its federal hat. What is the relationship of the Active Army and National Guard when it is not? Is it possible that some in the National Guard never see the Active Army as its "parent organization" and therefore, always see their relationship as one of competitors? Is it possible that the Active Army is victim to the same in reverse, and therefore it does not truly embrace the National Guard as "one of the family?" These rhetorical but cultural questions are some that have made the practical endeavor toward teamwork so difficult when multiple loyalties are involved.

The basic teamwork relationship between components of the military is then, of course, not exclusively the result of

military leaders' actions, but is partly at the heart of civil-military decisionmaking.⁴⁷ Congress is the final authority in managing the reserve of the various Armed Services⁴⁸ and over time, has refined and revalidated the dual mission and dual loyalties of the Guard. It is true for almost all organizations that "the external support and recognition that are often important to the team may involve constituencies beyond the specific organization of which the team is a part."⁴⁹ The result for the Active Army and the Guard is a teamwork relationship that is awkward by design. Regardless, the cards have been dealt and the components must find a way to play.

The last aspect of culture that we will discuss pertains to the teamwork relationships that each component has with its professional associations. This was an extremely influential one in the feud of 1997. Many, if not most, of these organizations are led by retired or former members of that component. One expects them to be committed to the causes that would strengthen that component, and in fact, that is the stated objective of most. Membership is solicited from as many as will join, so that lobbying power is greater as one voice for that component. Fueling the feud of 1997, the National Guard Association of the U.S. hoisted the banner of civil war on the senior leadership of the Active Army. The Association makes no apology for that in its writings, as it felt that survival of the Guard was at stake, but one cannot help but conclude that the viciousness of their

printed words in 1997 dealt a serious blow to the teamwork relationship.

The influence of professional organizations, or any organized effort to rally constituents, has significance in organizational behavior. Social psychologists refer to a *group polarization effect*.

Many group members strive for approval and status in the eyes of other group members. . . . When the cultural values of a group (or organization) favor risk, individuals perceive this and take greater risks in the group than they would in making decisions alone. When group values favor caution, individuals take less risk in the group than they would alone. They hope to gain approval from the group by being on the leading edge of the group's values.⁵⁰

It appears that in the feud of 1997, risk was selected over caution in taking the battle to the highest levels. The long-term effect on the teamwork relationship will not be known for some time.

A few closing thoughts on teamwork and organizational culture:

The task is to accept the best from those cultural features represented in stakeholder groups. . . . Failure to respond to problems on a cultural level, as well as a technical one, is risky. It leads to cultural factions--a kind of balkanization--which is detrimental to trusting relationships. Cultural factionalism in the organization costs leaders time and resources. Dealing with special interests and advocacy groups and responding to such things as charges of bias takes considerable time and resources. . . . Poor morale is also a frequent result, as well as a loss of productivity.⁵¹

TEAMWORK AND CONFLICT

It has been said that, "Some degree of competition is considered good in America, but active-Reserve competition is not a competition of equals. No known military or human purpose is served by the degree of rivalry that currently exists. . . ."52

It is regrettable that 1997 proved to be a "feud year" because it was actually a year with great potential for strengthened teamwork within the Total Army. In spite of conflict, "one will find that organizations have common assumptions that come into play when a crisis occurs or when a common enemy is found."⁵³ Going into the Quadrennial Defense Review, there was anticipation that forces would be "under attack" and that hard questions would be asked of all services and components. The Active Army and National Guard knew instinctively that they needed to fight the cuts on a unified basis, and readings early in the year would indicate a kind of comradery and team effort as they faced the "common enemy." As known, however, teamwork collapsed and conflict erupted as already described.

By looking at organizational theory about team conflict, we find relevance for the Active Army and National Guard. In the 1970s, psychologist B.W. Tuckman characterized team development in four stages that he felt all successful teams had to pass: Forming, Storming, Norming, and Performing. The philosophy is that some teams get lucky and go through all four stages with a

minimum of struggle but "no team goes directly from Forming to Performing. Struggle and adaptation are critical, difficult, but very necessary parts of team development."⁵⁴

As a result of the feud of 1997, it can be seen that the Active Army and National Guard are in the "Storming" process of teamwork. Harvey Robbins and Michael Finley describe it best:

Storming is a pathway to teambuilding. Rank with individual emotion, group conflict, and change, Storming is not for the squeamish. . . . What a team fails to settle during Storming will surely return to haunt it at a later date - and probably to return the team, kicking and screaming, to the eye of its own Storm. . . . The best one can hope for is that it not drag on forever, as a gruesome war of attrition that no faction can win. . . . You do not want Storming to outgrow the office, spill over into the lunchroom, run riot in the streets, and finally head down the street, torches ablaze, pitchforks poised, toward the Bastille. . . . Storming is where the most important dimensions of a team are worked out--its goals, its roles, its relationships, identifying likely barriers, and the infrastructure support mechanisms necessary to sustain long-term team health. . . . Sniping, blaming, and belittling remarks that have no bearing on the work of the team are pure poison not only to the targeted individual but also to the sense of trust necessary for the team to function as a whole.⁵⁵

What happens to the leaders of organizations and teams while Storming is underway? As we have noted, during the feud of 1997 many placed blame, and viciously so, on senior leaders. Again, we will not debate blame here, but it is useful to look at what organizational theory tells us:

The worst news of all for leaders is that Storming extracts a terrible toll from them personally. Among the many charming occurrences in mid-Storm is a rash of blaming that generally trashes leadership at all levels. Suddenly, you're the reason the group can't coalesce, you're the reason deadlines aren't met,

you're the reason individuals feel unfulfilled, misunderstood, dead-ended. As team members wrestle with their identity and direction, leaders are led out for judgment, sometimes gagged and bound.⁵⁶

Once through the Storming stage, no easy feat, the Norming state is defined by "acceptance of the very roles that Storming raged against. . . . The group can finally be said to have a relationship with itself."⁵⁷ In the relationship between the Active Army and National Guard, once Storming has further subsided, it is reasonable to expect that the Norming phase will remain tenuous for some relatively long period of time as wounds are healed and trials are made with new commitments, missions, and challenges. "The paralyzing effect of conflict seems to be related to the size of the conflict, and conflicts have a way of growing. The longer we try to bury them, the bigger they get."⁵⁸ We can conclude from organizational theory that the road to health for the Active Army and the Guard will be long and tough as a result of the feud of 1997.

But, for successful teams, the goal--the final stage--is Performing. We are reminded in organizational theory that, "There is no guarantee that your team will make it as far as Performing. . . . The workforces of America are riddled with teams that never emerge from Storming, who continue to batter or ignore one another."⁵⁹ In the case of the Active Army and the National Guard, it will take tremendous dedication on both their parts to reach Performing, the *genuine* admission by each that it cannot do the job without the other. With Performing comes:

the sense of knowing where other team members are, a sense of fierce loyalty even to members you may not be friendly with, and a willingness to find a way through nearly any challenge that arises. . . . Disagreements are confronted, discussed, considered, and adjudicated.⁶⁰

FROM CRISIS TO RENEWAL

The teamwork relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard was one of conflict for much of 1997. Trust and respect for and among components were openly and contentiously strained as grievances from years past were brought forward and added to new grievances, creating debate in every forum imaginable, from individual soldier to Congress.

It is regrettable that this essential teamwork relationship broke down, for we have seen from organizational theory that organizations cannot remain focused or productive when conflict "spills over into the streets" as this one did last year. But organizational theory also gives us guidance for renewal of organizations, and with that we shall conclude our discussion.

In organizational theory, crisis plays an essential role in the process of renewal. "Renewal is about the restoration [in mature organizations] of something of value, something important, that has been either lost or forgotten as an organization has grown and prospered. Renewal, then, is about values and the central role that they play in the lives of organizations undergoing renewal."⁶¹ "Renewal is about how we need to go

backward in order to go forward."⁶² That is what the teamwork relationship between the Active Army and the Guard must do.

Carl Larson and Frank LaFasto say that "unified commitment is often the most clearly missing feature of ineffective teams"⁶³ and, "if unified commitment is absent, establishing a new team structure does little to help."⁶⁴ In much of the feud of 1997, there was controversy over structure and missions, and these are extremely important. Nevertheless, these may be symptoms and not causes of the true conflict. The core cause may well be that unified commitment was missing. Instead of the thought that, "National defense is too important to be left to the other," a sign of unified commitment would be the thought that, "National defense is too important *not to use the other.*"

Throughout organizational theory, there are "fixes" for broken teams, but none of them are fail-safe or applicable to all teams. It has been concluded over and over again that group spirit and teamwork are indispensable to superior performance, but these only come about as a result of *identification with a team.*⁶⁵ There are two recurring themes having a "positive effect on the emotional tone, spirit, or identification with the team."⁶⁶ These two themes are key to our Total Army's finding its way from crisis to renewal.

The first theme is that "*Involvement enhances commitment.*"⁶⁷ The more integrated and involved parts of a team are in accomplishing a mission, the more they will identify with and

foster that team. Simply put, the Active Army and National Guard must invest more quality personnel and effort into integrated training, missions, and assignments.

The second theme is "*Balancing differentiation and integration* (i.e. the delicate balance between appreciating differences and requiring unity)."68 The Active Army and National Guard will never be identical, nor should they be, so they must find the balance between differences and commonality to achieve unified commitment and effective teamwork.

Leaders have the greatest challenge in guiding teams through crisis to renewal. "Leadership cannot take place in a culture where people distrust each other, doubt other's motives or sincere intent, and pursue independent action agendas."69 Trust is a key element of teamwork and both the Active Army and National Guard must exercise extreme care not to derail the renewal process by a resurgence of distrust.

As of this writing, initiatives and resolution are evident in many areas between the Active Army and National Guard. Leaders at all levels have committed themselves to finding the necessary balances for effective teamwork between diverse parts of the Total Army. However, the feud of 1997 has revealed to many, previously unaware, that the wounds are deep and severe and the challenges ahead formidable. Organizational theory has told us that all the structural and procedural initiatives in the world will not compensate when teams break down in organizations

that rely on them. The feud of 1997 is an important case study that illustrates why organizations, to include the Active Army and the Army National Guard, cannot give "lip service" to the fundamentals of teamwork. Failures to resolve the most basic issues and to maintain trust relationships, reconcile cultures, and resolve conflicts merely pave the way for new feuds of the future, with potentially graver consequences.

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ENDNOTES

¹ David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1981), 150.

² Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, "Integration of the Reserve and Active Components," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, D.C., 4 September 1997.

³ Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Army Regulation 600-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 17 September 1993), 2.

⁴ Department of the Army, Military Leadership, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 31 July 1990), 7.

⁵ Department of the Army, Soldier Team Development, Field Manual 22-102 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2 March 1987) v.

⁶ Aubrey S. "Red" Newman, Follow Me III: Lessons and the Art and Science of High Command (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1987), 222.

⁷ Ibid., 224-225.

⁸ "The Eleven Principles Guiding the Future of the Total Army," National Guard, September 1997, 30-31.

⁹ Margaret Novack, "One Soldier--One Army," AUSA News, January 1998, p.2.

¹⁰ Pat Towell, "Budget Crunch Has a Service At War With Itself," Congressional Quarterly, 3 January 1998, 5.

¹¹ National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: December 1997), 52.

¹² Dennis J. Reimer, Speech to the National Guard Association of the United States, Albuquerque, NM, 8 September 1997; available from <<http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/970908>>; Internet; accessed 30 December 1997.

¹³ Carl E. Larson and Frank M. J. LaFasto, Teamwork: What Must Go Right/What Can Go Wrong (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1989), 37

¹⁴ Ibid., 85

¹⁵ Ibid., 87

¹⁶ Gilbert W. Fairholm, Leadership and the Culture of Trust (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 99.

¹⁷ Just a few of these unresolved issues are the controversy over the 48th Mechanized Brigade's readiness for DESERT STORM, the off-site agreement in 1993 about combat missions, and GEN Sullivan's "surprise" assertion that it would take 365 days for Guard units to be ready to fight.

¹⁸ Towell, 11.

- ¹⁹ Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "The Conspiracy Theory: Army National Guard's Complaints of Victimization By The Active Army Ring Hollow," Armed Forces Journal International, January 1998, 30.
- ²⁰ Towell, 6.
- ²¹ Towell, 8.
- ²² Peter Bacque, "Guard Battles Cuts to Stay Sharp," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 25 January 1998, 1.
- ²³ Larson, 90.
- ²⁴ Larson, 88.
- ²⁵ Towell, 8.
- ²⁶ Jacobs, 31.
- ²⁷ Katherine McIntire Peters, "On Guard," Government Executive, January 1998, 37.
- ²⁸ Fairholm, 96.
- ²⁹ Fairholm, 97.
- ³⁰ Fairholm, 98.
- ³¹ Fairholm, 156.
- ³² Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2d Edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 14.
- ³³ Ibid., 12.
- ³⁴ Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, The We-Force in Management: How to Build and Sustain Cooperation (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1994), 5-6.
- ³⁵ Schein, 12.
- ³⁶ Fairholm, 34.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 42.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 152.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 212.
- ⁴⁰ Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt-From the Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond as quoted in Leading and Managing in the Strategic Arena: A Reference Text 1996-1997 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 77.
- ⁴¹ Jonathan S. Landay, "New Roles for America's Weekend Warriors," Christian Science Monitor, 6 January 1998, 1.
- ⁴² Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 65.
- ⁴³ Peters, 36.
- ⁴⁴ Steve Buyer and Paul McHale, "Recommitting to the Total Force," The Officer, January-February 1998, 29.
- ⁴⁵ Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), 12.
- ⁴⁶ Towell, 6.

⁴⁷ Richard A. Chilcoat, "Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders," reprinted in Leading and Managing in the Strategic Arena: A Reference Text 1996-1997 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), 25.

⁴⁸ Heller, 7.

⁴⁹ Larson, 109.

⁵⁰ Randall B. Dunham and Jon L. Pierce, Management (Scott, Foreman & Co., 1989) as reprinted in U.S. Army War College Selected Readings Academic Year 1998, Course 1 Strategic Leadership, 208.

⁵¹ Fairholm, 195.

⁵² William E. Barron, "Reserve Component Roles and Missions," ROA National Security Report, The Officer, September 1997, 25.

⁵³ Schein, 15.

⁵⁴ Harvey A. Robbins and Michael Finley, Why Teams Don't Work: What Went Wrong and How to Make it Right (Princeton, NJ: Peterson's/Pacesetter Books, 1995), 187.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 191-193.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 194-195.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 197.

⁵⁸ Maureen O'Brien, Who's Got the Ball? (And Other Nagging Questions About Team Life) (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995), 70.

⁵⁹ Robbins, 199.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 199.

⁶¹ David K. Hurst, Crisis and Renewal: Meeting the Challenge of Organizational Change (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995), 1.

⁶² Ibid., 4.

⁶³ Larson, 73.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 80.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 76.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 77.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 78.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 79.

⁶⁹ Fairholm, 141.

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