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ANGOLA

Observers Evidence Use of Chemical Weapons

90AF0010B Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Mar 90 p 14

[Text] The government in Luanda is using chemical weapons in its battle against the opposition UNITA movement, foreign observers in Angola told a special correspondent for France Presse.

In connection with the offensive launched last 11 December against the Mavinga area, in the southeastern part of Angola, the Angolan Government forces proceeded to bomb both military positions and the civilian population with chemical agents, according to doctors in the zone and testimony collected by the International Human Rights Society.

The France Presse correspondent, Marc Pondaven, witnessed a bombing of Jamba on the first of this month, during which MiG-23 aircraft dropped two bombs on the headquarters of Jonas Savimbi. They fell in a zone in the outskirts of Jamba, where 15,000 people live, but there were no casualties, since at the time there was no one in the immediate area.

However, after one of the bombs exploded, an ashen cloud formed, causing irritation in the mouths of individuals within a radius of 1 km.

The journalist, who went to the area, noted that a heavy odor of decay was emanating from the small crater left by the bomb. Minutes later, witnesses had a stinging sensation on their tongues and their mouths felt dry.

According to statements gathered at the hospitals in Jamba, Likuwa, the major UNITA logistics base, and Mavinga, the gas which was emitted when the bombs exploded causes instant death within a radius of 20 to 50 meters, leaving no mark or injury on the bodies of the victims.

Those farther away who are affected by the gas may experience respiratory difficulty, a decrease in visual capacity, nose bleeds, loss of consciousness for a brief period, vomiting, difficulty in controlling urine, and paralysis of the lower limbs.

During a visit they paid to this zone, several foreign doctors verified these symptoms, as well as the presence of chemical agents in the bombs dropped by the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola].

For the time being, the exact composition of this gas is unknown, but it is possible that it contains a high percentage of cyanide or phosphorous compounds. It could equally well be mustard gas.

Chemical bombs only redden leaves partially, and do not cause damage to other vegetation. According to Prof Aubin Heydrickx, a toxicology expert at the University of Ghent in Belgium, one of the foreign doctors who visited the zone and who carried out some analyses with his portable laboratory, these gases are unknown in the Western countries, and NATO itself does not know of any antidote for them.

The first chemical bombings ordered by the government in Luanda date back to the end of 1986, according to Colonel Carlos Morgado, a Lisbon-trained doctor who is the clinical officer of UNITA.

Since the beginning of the campaign launched in December, bombings using chemical weapons "have increased considerably in intensity," according to this officer.

In his view, the purpose of the bombings is obvious—it is to disrupt the civilian population, which has had to be evacuated from the Mavinga sector.

These bombings have already caused dozens of deaths, according to UNITA, which adds that it is difficult to establish accurate figures.

Jonas Savimbi's movement has gathered together hundreds of persons disabled by the war in Bienge, near Jamba, in the southern part of the country. Several hundred of them are victims of the chemical bombings.

"These patients have suffered irreversible damage," the official in charge of this center says. "They can never be cured, and some can be regarded as hopeless mental patients."

Members of the MPLA forces taken prisoner have told France Presse that they knew about the use of chemical weapons by their movement. A helicopter pilot explained that these weapons were stored at the government base in Cuito Cuanavale, from which the offensive was launched. He says that they were probably supplied by the Soviet Union.

UNITA, which had no special equipment for protection against chemical weapons, distributed sponge-kerchiefs to those in its ranks and the civilian population, to be be used as gas masks during the bombings. This method has proved effective, although the sponges must be kept wet, which presents some difficulties in an area where water is scarce.

Analysis of U.S.-Soviet Arms Reductions, 1990's Outlook

90WC0048A Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU in Chinese No 1, 13 Jan 90 pp 10-18

[Article by Xia Yishan (1115 5030 0810): "Reasons Behind U.S. and Soviet Arms Cuts and Outlook for the 1990's"]

[Text] **During the last half of the 1980's, arms control talks between the United States and the USSR moved from arms control to a new stage of arms reductions. This was the result of major changes in the economic, political, military, and scientific and technical factors that propelled the arms race between the United States and the USSR for the more than 40 postwar years. During the 1990's, the impetus for U.S. and Soviet arms cuts may become stronger; however, there is a limit as to how far reductions can go. The arms race will go on at a low level. Because of various limitations, the talks may continue to encounter difficulties.**

One major feature of postwar international politics was the antagonism and rivalry between the United States and the USSR; military confrontation and striving for military dominance were also the main aspects of this antagonism and rivalry. This led to a postwar arms race that went on for more than 40 years, escalating step by step. While engaging in an arms race, the United States and the USSR conducted virtually nonstop military control talks for the purpose of weakening the other side, strengthening themselves, controlling the scale of competition, and drawing up ground rules for the competition. They also reached more than 20 bilateral and multilateral agreements. Nevertheless, none of these agreements (the "Treaty to Ban Biological Weapons" being a special exception) went beyond arms control. They did not reduce a single weapon. The history of the postwar 40 years of U.S. and Soviet military control talks is a history of arms control. During the mid-1980's, however, a critical change occurred in the U.S.-Soviet military control talks. The signing of the intermediate-range missile treaty in December 1987 marked the beginning of a new period in which talks between the United States and the USSR about arms control became talks about arms reduction. How did this new period come about? What were the reasons? What will be the trend of developments during the 1990's? This article discusses some views on these questions.

The Historical Process of a Shift From Arms Control to Arms Reduction

The postwar arms race between the United States and the USSR unfolded primarily in the field of nuclear weapons; thus, arms control talks between the United States and the USSR during the past more than 40 years have focused on nuclear arms. U.S.-USSR arms control talks during the period from the end of the war until the mid-1980's may be roughly divided into three stages. The first stage was from the end of World War II until 1959. The United States and the USSR held endless discussions in the UN arms reduction negotiations organization, mostly about controlling and banning atomic weapons and the establishment of an international supervisory organization. Since the USSR did not possess the atomic bomb during the early period, and since the nuclear forces of the two sides were out of proportion later on, after the USSR did have the atomic bomb, no basis existed for reaching an accord. Thus, the talks produced no results whatsoever. The second stage was from 1960 to 1969. By the early 1960's, the USSR gradually closed the nuclear weapons gap with the United States, and began to possess a retaliatory second-strike capability against the American homeland. This resulted in both the United States and the USSR living in nuclear terror. This provided the possibility of reaching an accord on "partial measures" for U.S. and Soviet arms cuts. It was during this stage that the United States and the USSR signed the "U.S.-USSR Hot Line Agreement," the "Antarctic Treaty," the "Outer Space Treaty," the "Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," and the "Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty." These treaties only touched the "fringes" of arms reduction issues, and they did not address U.S. and Soviet arms development per se. The third stage was from 1969 until the mid-1980's. By the end of the 1960's, U.S. and Soviet nuclear strength reached rough balance. It was at this time that the United States presented the "Mutual Assured Destruction Strategy," in a decision to accept nuclear parity with the USSR, which allowed the USSR to feel "equal" and "equally secure" as a means of containing the USSR's momentum in developing nuclear strength. The USSR also wanted to control the number of strategic nuclear weapons in order to be able to concentrate its energies on surpassing the United States in quality. During this period, the United States and the USSR not only reached agreements such as the "U.S.-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War," the "Treaty Banning the Implanting of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed, Under the Sea, and Under the Land" as "partial measures" for arms reduction, but they also signed the "U.S.-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I," the "U.S.-USSR Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II," "Weapons," and the "U.S.-USSR Antiballistic Missile Systems Limitation Treaty" (later signing another revised accord), all of which had a further bearing on the two sides' development of nuclear weapons themselves. The first two treaties played some role in limiting the development of strategic weapons, but the role was limited. This was because only upper limits were set on strategic weapons, with no reductions whatsoever; most of the limitations had to do with quantity, and had virtually no bearing on quality; and they had a bearing only on nuclear weapons delivery systems without touching on warheads and blast equivalent weights. Subsequent treaties had little effect in limiting strategic defense systems, because antimissile techniques had not yet developed at that time to the point of deploying antiballistic missile systems, and because such treaties conflicted with the "mutual assured destruction strategy." Therefore, the United

States did not subsequently deploy even one antiballistic missile system, and the USSR retained its antiballistic missile system around Moscow.

The foregoing shows that the last half of the 1940's and the 1950's was a stage of "spinning around in vain" in U.S.-USSR arms control talks; the 1960's was a period of "partial measures" in arms reduction; and the 1970's was a period in which arms control accords were reached.

During the 1980's changes began to occur in arms control talks between the United States and the USSR. In 1985, the United States and the USSR began wholesale talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and outer space weapons. After only slightly more than two years time, the United States and the USSR scored breakthroughs, first on intermediate-range and intermediate short-range weapons, signing in December 1987 the Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty, which provided for the total destruction within three years of intermediate-range and intermediate short-range land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles making up four percent of total U.S. and Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles. This marked the first time that the United States and the USSR reached agreement on the destruction of nuclear weapons, and the work of destroying these categories of nuclear weapons is proceeding smoothly. At the same time, talks between the United States and the USSR on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons scored major advances, with accord being reached on major portions of a treaty text. Beginning in March 1989, talks between the United States and the USSR, mostly about reduction of opposing conventional forces in Europe, got off to a fast start. Within only slightly more than a half year's time, agreement in principle was reached on categories to be reduced, guidelines for the breakdown of categories to be reduced, and inspection measures. At a conference to negotiate arms reductions that drafted the text of a treaty to ban chemical weapons, differences were gradually narrowed between the United States and the USSR, which possessed the largest chemical weapons arsenals, and other countries. The signing of this three-part treaty will likely occur during the first half of the 1990's, and some countries may sign it within the next one or two years. Talks between the United States and the USSR on arms control have entered a new era of arms reduction.

Reasons for U.S. and USSR Arms Reductions

The shift of the United States and the USSR from arms control to arms reduction during the last half of the 1980's was no accident. It did not result from any intent or the promotion of any policy by U.S. and Soviet leaders, but rather from the tremendous and profound changes that have occurred since the war and particularly during the past more than 10 years in the condition of the United States and the USSR themselves, and in the international climate in which they found themselves. These changes generated a powerful economic, political, military, and scientific and technical impetus that gave them no choice but to decide to reduce arms.

1. Economic Reasons: The arms race between the United States and the USSR following the war was founded on a certain economic strength, but now the economic strengths of the United States and the USSR are relatively weak and no longer able to bear the heavy burden of a high-level arms race. This is the economic reason that forced the United States and the USSR to arms reduction.

During the immediate postwar period, the United States, which rose to power and position during the war, possessed great economic strength. Its gross national product was nearly half the world total. It relied on the three great pillars of advanced technology, a strong dollar, and supranational corporations to control world trade, currency, and investment markets in the establishment of economic hegemony. However, beginning in the 1960's, the United States began a process of gradual decline, and the three great economic pillars began to waver. Although the United States still maintains a certain technical superiority, its absolute advantage was lost long ago. The position of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency declined dramatically, and the postwar international financial system centering on the U.S. dollar has gradually crumbled. The power of U.S. supranational corporations has greatly waned by comparison with the 1950's. U.S. economic strength and financial condition are no longer what they were. U.S. gross national product is only approximately 23 percent of the world total. The United States has changed from the world's largest creditor nation to the world's largest debtor nation. As of the end of 1988, its net external debt stood at $532.5 billion; its domestic debt stood at $2.6 trillion, and its interest payments during 1988 reached $214.1 billion, or 20 percent of government expenditures. Both deficits remain high and show no decline. In 1988, the government deficit reached $155.1 billion, and although the trade deficit was less than in 1987, it still stood at $137.34 billion yuan. The decline of the United States resulted from uneven world political and economic development, but its unrelenting arms race with the USSR accelerated the process of decline. During the eight years of the Reagan administration alone, cumulative military expenditures reached $1,873.7 million. In 1988, military expenditures amounted to more than six percent of gross domestic product, and 27 percent of federal financial expenditures. Because the U.S. economy was unable to bear such a heavy arms burden, the United States cut its military budget for five years in a row. Between 1985 and 1988, actual U.S. military expenditures declined 10 percent. During 1988, 37,000 personnel were cut from the armed forces. The United States began to reduce the number of domestic military bases, and was considering further cuts in its network of foreign military bases. It asked Western Europe and Japan to "share more responsibility for defense." Recently, the U.S. Department of Defense planned to cut military expenditures approximately $20 billion in

1991, and it was preparing to make cuts in military expenditures totaling $180 billion between 1992 and 1994. In this regard, the Army alone plans to cut 200,000 personnel, or one-seventh of its organization.

Following the war, the USSR was the world's second economic power and, for a fairly long time, its economy grew far faster than that of the United States. Thus, the USSR gradually narrowed the gap with the United States. According to official Soviet statistics, its national income in 1950 was only 30 percent that of the United States. By 1965, it had climbed to 59 percent, and in 1975 it was 67 percent that of the United States. The USSR relied on this ever-increasing economic strength to compete with the United States in the arms race. In the 20-year period from 1961 through 1980, Soviet military expenditures increased more than eightfold. During the past 10 years, Soviet military expenditures amounted to between 13 and 15 percent of national income and more than 30 percent of government expenditures. This heavy military expenditures burden was a major reason for the economic stagnation and decline of the USSR since the 1970's. During the 1980's, Soviet economic strength declined to half that of the United States. Its percentage of world gross national product fell from 16.5 percent in 1970 to 12.3 percent in 1986. In 1987, Japan surpassed the USSR economically, the USSR dropping from second to third place in the world. Except for certain kinds of science and technology having to do with military matters, the USSR's overall level of science and technology lagged 10 to 12 years behind the United States, and this gap continues to widen. Soviet agriculture lagged for a long time, grain output remaining at around the 200-million-ton mark. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the Soviet Union's economy was already in a "precrisis state." After more than four years of perestroyka, not only has the USSR's economy shown no improvement whatsoever, but it has become worse. Today it is in financially straitened circumstances. In 1989, the government deficit stood at 120 billion rubles, or one-fifth of national income. Its external debt increased. In 1989, its internal debt was 400 billion rubles, and its external debt was $55 billion. Inflation intensified, food and daily necessities were in seriously short supply, and the people's standard of living generally declined. This situation gave rise to social unrest, and social unrest further intensified economic difficulties. During the third quarter of 1989 alone, coal miner strikes created direct economic losses of 3 billion rubles, and, in order to improve miners' working and living conditions, the state decided to spend 5 billion rubles. The USSR decided to obligate an additional 10 billion rubles during 1989 and 1990 for the import from abroad of daily necessities, and it was preparing to obligate a huge some of money to import food from abroad. The chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Nikolay Ryzhkov, recently acknowledged that the USSR's economic situation was "extremely difficult, extremely complex, and filled with contradictions." Recently, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker expressed doubt that the Soviet Union is the world's third economic power. U.S. congressmen believe that the USSR's economy may be at least seventh in the world. Faced with an economic crisis, the USSR froze military expenditures during 1987 and 1988. In December 1988, Gorbachev had no choice but to announce that the USSR had decided on a unilateral reduction of 500,000 in its armed forces, or 12 percent of the total number of Soviet military personnel, within two years, thereby cutting military expenditures 14.2 percent. On 13 August 1989, Dmitriy Yazov, Soviet minister of defense, announced that the USSR planned to cut military expenditures 50 percent by 1995.

2. Political Reasons: The political driving force behind the arms race between the United States and the USSR during the past more than 40 years was the bipolar system (also known as the Yalta pattern) shaped after the war. This meant that two great East and West military blocs formed following the war headed by the United States and the USSR, and caused sharp military, political, economic, and ideological opposition between these two large military blocs, and the dominant position of military confrontation in this overall opposition. The dawning of a new day after 45 years generated tremendous changes in the political factors driving the arms race between the United States and the USSR.

First was the accelerated development of multipolarity in the world, and the crumbling of the bipolar system shaped following the war.

Economically, the world was already multipolar. In the Western world, Japan rose rapidly. In 1950, its gross national product was only five percent that of the United States, but by 1988, it was 58 percent that of the United States. It was first in the world in international balance of payments surplus and foreign exchange reserves. The development of Western Europe attracted attention. In 1971, the EEC's gross national product was 83 percent that of the United States, rising to 111 percent in 1987. Its trade accounted for two-fifths of total world trade volume. The Western economy evolved from postwar U.S. domination to a triumvirate composed of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. In the Eastern world, for a long time, the USSR relied largely on shipments from Eastern Europe of raw materials and energy at cheap prices, and the shipment into these countries of industrial goods unable to compete in Western markets, in order to maintain the existence of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and to maintain control over Eastern Europe. The USSR's annual economic subsidization of Eastern Europe reached between $11 billion and $15 billion. Today, the USSR lacks the strength to satisfy the tremendous demands of the East European countries whose economic difficulties become more serious with each passing day. It has no choice but to let go, or even to encourage them to seek assistance from the West. The cohesiveness of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance has diminished, and the influence of the USSR as an economic pole in the world has declined markedly.

With the relative weakening of the strength of the U.S. and Soviet economies, centrifugal tendencies in both the Eastern and Western blocs have become stronger. Increasingly, the allies of both the United States and the USSR act according to the interests and desires of their own peoples. In the West, Japan and Western Europe began to demand a military and political position commensurate with their economic strength, and contradictions with the United States increased. For example, during the first half of 1989, the Federal Republic of Germany, together with some small West European countries, had a disagreement with the United States over the modernization of short-range missiles. The UK recently refused a U.S. request to deploy B-52 nuclear bombers in the UK. In the East, during the last half of 1989, sudden changes occurred in the political situation of some East European countries. The USSR has already lost its ability to control Eastern Europe. Today, both the Warsaw Pact and NATO are becoming increasingly lax politically, and the bipolar system is headed for collapse.

Second, the sharp opposition between the United States and the USSR has moderated. The United States and the USSR are increasing dialogue in order to solve differences between them, and they have begun to cooperate in solving problems of common interest. The relaxation in relations between the United States and the USSR began after Gorbachev came to power in 1985; 1988 was a turning point; and 1989 saw further deepening. This relaxation is different from the two relaxations that occurred in the 1960's and 1970's. Both of those relaxations were limited (mostly to political matters) and partial (mostly in Europe), but the current relaxation includes arms control, regional clashes, human rights, and bilateral relations. This relaxation grew out of common U.S. and Soviet interests, but, primarily, the initiative and concessions of the USSR, which was weaker, played a key role. Numerous "hot spot" area problems are heading toward political solution, U.S. and Soviet differences about human rights issues are gradually being bridged, and bilateral relations between the two countries are steadily improving, largely as a result of the USSR's flexibility and concessions. As a result of one Soviet concession after another on arms reduction issues, the United States and the USSR signed the Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty. After Gorbachev announced a unilateral 500,000-man cut in the armed forces, in less than one year the USSR took a series of dazzling unilateral initiatives to cut its armed forces. Examples include the following: A decision to reduce unilaterally its short-range nuclear weapons in Europe; announcement of the beginning of elimination of chemical weapons; announcement of a reduction in the military strength of its Pacific fleet; dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons capable of hitting northern Europe; announcement of removal of all six G-class submarines from the Baltic Sea before the end of 1990, and the destruction of nuclear missiles on these submarines; acknowledgment that the Krasnoyarsk radar station violated the 1972 antiballistic missile treaty, and a decision to completely dismantle it, and so forth. In talks on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and on reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons, the USSR made repeated concessions. Recently, the USSR again proposed that agreement on the banning of outer space weapons would no longer be a condition for the signing of an agreement between the the United States and the USSR to reduce strategic weapons. Through the foregoing actions the USSR demonstrated its willingness to carry out strategic cutbacks and arms reductions, changing its "enemy image" in the West. Most public opinion in Western Europe and the United States is that the USSR "military threat" has passed. This has brought about changes in U.S. policy toward the USSR. After half a year of "policy discussions," on 12 May 1989 Bush proposed to the USSR a policy that goes "beyond containment." At the center of this policy is largely the use of peaceful methods to "encourage the USSR to move toward becoming an open society," "enabling the USSR to blend into international society." In October 1989, the USSR further relaxed its policies toward Eastern Europe, openly announcing abandonment of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" of interference in Eastern Europe. On 23 October, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared that the USSR acknowledged the absolute right of free choice of European countries. On 25 October, Gorbachev reiterated that "the events taking place in these East European countries today are the internal affairs of countries in this region," and that "the USSR has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries." On 29 October, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Alliance Institute [lianmeng yuan 5114 4145 7108], Primakov, stated further that if the Eastern European countries want to leave the Warsaw Pact, the USSR will not prevent them. This further change in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe caused the United States to change from looking on from the sidelines to offering support for perestroyka in the USSR. U.S. Secretary of State Baker said twice that the United States desires to "give active support to Gorbachev's economic and political reforms" to help him get out of a difficult position, and he proposed sending economics experts to the USSR. Although the United States and the USSR have their own expectations on European issues, they both hope that East European reform will be carried out with sure steps and that the situation will not get out of control, in order to avoid an adverse effect on the present pattern in Europe. They have begun to compose their views and coordinate their actions on East European issues, with a certain degree of cooperation. In talking about the huge changes that have taken place in relations between the United States and the USSR, Baker said on 23 October that, as compared with the period of tension, relations between the United States and the USSR today were as "different as heaven and earth."

Third, the position of military factors in national security and international politics declined. This was determined by the following factors: 1) Reliance on warfare to deal with international affairs and solve international disputes is becoming more and more unworkable. The U.S. defeat in Korea and Southeast Asia and the Soviet

Army's forced withdrawal from Afghanistan are examples. 2) Not only did the arms race between the United States and the USSR not achieve anticipated goals, but it moved in a direction opposite to anticipated goals. Their main goal in the arms race was to maintain their superpower status in the pursuit of world hegemony. The result of the arms race, however, was the waste of large amounts of manpower and material resources, which hampered economic development. National power was weakened, ultimately threatening their superpower status. Soviet scholars acknowledge that, for five years after 1979, military expenditures reached more than $1 trillion. U.S. scholars estimate that U.S. postwar military expenditures could build another United States. By contrast, Japan, whose military expenditures were not large for various reasons, rapidly developed economically, vaulting to the position of the world's second economic power. Today, both the United States and the USSR admit that they became "prisoners of the arms race." 3) An all-encompassing national power race in which economics and science and technology are the main components is unfolding throughout the world. The strength or weakness and the rise or fall of a country will be determined by the results of this race. Therefore, both the United States and the USSR must concentrate their main energy on the development of their economies and on science and technology. Reduction of military expenditures is a top-priority task for both the United States and the USSR. The USSR, unless it can quickly get out from under its heavy military expenditures burden, will before long sink to the status of a second- or third-rate country. People in the Soviet Union fear that the nightmare of being a "superpower militarily and an Upper Volta economically" may become a reality. For the United States, unless military expenditures are curtailed to bring them in line with national strength, it will face the specter of going the way one imperial power after another has gone throughout the history of the world. In view of the foregoing, both the United States and the USSR have advanced the idea of "economic security," by which is meant that a nation's security depends primarily on ensuring its economic strength. Economically weak countries, no matter how militarily strong, can come under the control of others, and thus are not secure. As a result of the rise in its position in national security and international politics, which stems from various economic and scientific and technical factors, a substantial number of people in the United States today believe that the main threat to the United States is not the USSR but the ever more economically powerful Japan.

3. Military Theory Reasons: The postwar theories that supported and stimulated the arms race between the United States and the USSR were principally two: One was the deterrence theory, and the other was the power balance doctrine. However, these two theories have gradually begun to be replaced by the "defensive strategy" and the "theory of reasonable sufficiency of military forces" proposed by the USSR, as well as the "low-level balance" thinking that the United States and the USSR jointly recognize. These are the military theory reasons that drive U.S. and Soviet arms reductions.

The deterrence theory was first put forward by the United States. It meant that at that time only the building of a reliable nuclear deterrent force would make the enemy believe that if it wanted to take actions, the price it would pay would exceed the benefits received, thereby intimidating the enemy and causing him not to dare to launch an attack. According to this theory, attainment of deterrence required the possession of reliable nuclear forces, possession of the will to use these forces, and letting the adversary know that you had these forces and were willing to use them. When the United States possessed a first-strike capability against the USSR, it threatened to carry out "large-scale retaliation" against the USSR, thus attaining the goal of deterrence. After it lost first-strike capability, it turned to reliance on "mutual assured destruction" to attain the goal of deterrence. After the USSR possessed nuclear weapons, particularly after it possessed a second-strike counterattack capability, it also pursued the deterrence theory. Not only did it make a show of nuclear military strength by making verbal nuclear threats, but it also accepted in practice the U.S.-proposed strategy of "mutual assured destruction." It signed the antiballistic missile system treaty with the United States, which exposed both sides to the threat of a "mutually assured destruction" nuclear attack over a broad area except for individual places, so that neither side would dare launch a nuclear war without careful consideration. In order to increase the reliability of "assured destruction" in a nuclear attack, the United States and the USSR vied with each other to improve their nuclear deterrence capabilities. Whenever one side bested the other in some particular, the other side would strive to catch up and surpass it. This caused the arms race to sink to an endless vicious cycle.

The balance of forces doctrine was also first proposed by the United States. Its basic reasoning was that only by maintaining a strategic balance (also termed a "deterrent balance of power" and a "balance of terror") between the United States and the Soviet Union was it possible to make either side consider in advance the possibility and consequences of the opponent's counterattack. Ever since the war, the United States has intensified the arms race under the guise of maintaining strategic balance. During the 1950's, the United States used the pretext that its "bombers were outmoded" to produce large numbers of strategic bombers. In the 1960's, using the "missile gap" as a pretext, it began all-out development of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Subsequently, it used a substantially identical reason to develop nuclear submarines, multiple independently targeted warhead missiles, and cruise missiles. By the end of the 1960's, the United States and the USSR were roughly even in quantity and quality of strategic nuclear weapons, and this situation did not change thereafter. In October 1981, however, Reagan used the pretext that the USSR had surpassed the United States in strategic

nuclear forces to announce a large-scale strategic nuclear weapons modernization plan. He decided to appropriate $2,220 [as published] over a period of six years to modernize the "triad" nuclear force. The USSR also regarded maintenance of strategic parity as an important principle in ensuring national security and the development of armaments. The difference between the USSR and the United States was that before the USSR reached parity with the United States it boasted that its nuclear forces were superior to those of the United States and that it could destroy the United States in one blow. The USSR's goal in doing this was, to use the words of Nikita Khrushchev, "they threaten us with war, and we likewise threaten them with war." It was not until the early 1970's that Leonid Brezhnev changed this tune. He declared that strategic balance existed between the United States and the USSR, and he also emphasized that it was the existence of this balance that made it possible to avoid a nuclear catastrophe; thus the United States would not be allowed to destroy this balance. Ever since the war it was actually with the goal of achieving and maintaining balance that the USSR carried on an arms race with the United States. During the period when the United States was dominant, the USSR strove to catch up with the United States. After the United States and the USSR achieved a balance of power, the USSR wanted to maintain the balance, while continuing to place military work "before all other work." The USSR wanted to develop weapons that the United States did not have, and it wanted even more to develop the weapons that the United States did have. Beyond this, major differences existed between the United States and the USSR in the concept and standards for a balance of power. The United States emphasized a complete balance of power with the USSR, meaning it wanted to attain a balance of power in every category. The USSR emphasized not only maintenance of a balance of power with the United States alone, but also with the entire Western world. Not only did it consider the balance of forces, but it also had to considered the Soviet Union's unfavorable geographic position, and that the USSR was surrounded by numerous hostile countries. In considering the balance of power, both sides allowed themselves a considerable insurance factor, that is, the balance they wanted favored themselves more. Thus, attaining and maintaining the balance of power actually became the pursuit of dominance. The result was that all boats rose as the water rose, and the arms race between the United States and the USSR came to be carried on at an increasingly high level.

After coming to power in 1985, Gorbachev openly criticized the deterrence theory, advocating a low-level balance of power. In a political report to the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, he said that "the Soviet Union's military theory has but a single defensive goal," and that "military power will be held within the limits of reasonabe sufficiency." This was what people subsequently termed the "defensive strategy," and the "reasonable sufficiency doctrine of military forces." This new military theory was reflected in a concentrated way in a document titled "On a Military Theory for the Warsaw Pact Countries" drawn up in May 1987 by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. Subsequently, Soviet leaders and the armed forces made another elaboration, which is capsulized in four articles as follows: 1) The defensive nature of military theory. Military forces should be sufficient to ensure the security of the homeland and to defend against aggression by foreign enemies, but not sufficient to launch an offensive. 2) A low level of balance. Advocacy of a reduction in the level of military confrontation to enable military forces to maintain the minimum level needed for defense. Thus, a tremendous reduction in armaments would be required to realize the minimum level of balance. 3) "Reasonable sufficiency" standards would be determined largely by the opponents' actions, that is, the attitude of the opponent toward arms reduction and his level of arms development. 4) Not to regard any country or the people of any country as an enemy. The USSR's new military theory was a refutation of the theory of deterrence and the theory of a balance of forces. When first proposed, Western countries regarded it as a propaganda ploy such as the USSR was in the habit of using and turned it down. Later, when the USSR began to implement this theory in practice, the West, including U.S. military circles, acknowledged that the USSR's military strategy had changed from offensive to defensive, and that the USSR had gone from verbal approval of arms cuts to really desiring arms cuts.

The United States has not yet abandoned the deterrence theory as a back-up force, but this theory has changed markedly from what it was at the outset, as follows: 1) Diminished reliance on nuclear weapons. Formerly, the United States depended primarily on nuclear weapons, particularly strategic nuclear weapons, for deterrence, but today this has changed to employment of both nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence. Conventional deterrence relies primarily on the superior quality of conventional weapons, strengthening of cooperation with the 43 countries with which the United States has signed security accords—particularly West European allies and Japan—and maintenance of forward deployments for a common effort to defend against the possibility of a Soviet attack. 2) Continued practice of a strategic defense plan, using an offensive deterrence theory of "using attack to control attack, and using attack to defend," a gradual shift to a strategic theory of "readiness to both attack or defend" that relies on both offensive strategic nuclear weapons and on a strategic defense system. Despite economic, technical, and political difficulties in moving ahead with the strategic defense plan, and in putting into effect deployment plans originally conceived with the goal of complete defense, the United States is trying to begin phased deployments during the 1990's. 3) Acceptance of a low-level deterrent balance of power, agreeing to maintain a low level of parity with the USSR in both nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, and emphasizing the defensive nature of deterrence. In this regard, Henry Kissinger proposed the "deterrent arms reduction" concept by

which troops would be reduced to only the number needed for deterrence. Another theory is the "provide only deterrence" theory, which means huge reductions in nuclear weapons, and no modernization of nuclear weapons, only maintaining sufficient force to launch a second-strike counterattack against Soviet cities. Postwar changes and adjustments in U.S. and USSR military theories have been made in response to each other. U.S. military theories will not be discarded, but they will move gradually closer to the new military theories of the USSR.

4. Technology Reasons: After the war, military technology developed by leaps and bounds, ceaselessly driving the arms race to new heights. During the 1940's and 1950's, first the atomic bomb and then the hydrogen bomb were successfully exploded, and the development of nuclear weapons became the main component of the arms race between the United States and the USSR. During the late 1950's, artificial satellites and ballistic missiles were successfully launched, and the focus of the arms race between the United States and the USSR shifted to the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. During the early 1970's multiple independently targeted missile technology made its appearance, and the United States and the Soviet Union competed to develop multiple independently targeted warheads. With the advent of the 1980's, as spaceflight, remote sensing, lasers, directed energy, microelectronics, and electronic computers developed, the arms race between the USSR and the United States began to swing toward nonnuclear high-technology weapons and space weapons. Thus, the advent of new postwar technologies continued to provide impetus to the arms race between the United States and the USSR. However, the development of military technology to its present level also makes it possible for the United States and the USSR to make arms reductions.

First, nuclear weapons have developed as weapons to the reverse of what they were, becoming weapons that cannot be used. The development of postwar technology has generated a profound revolution in weapons systems. This is that nuclear weapons have replaced conventional weapons as the main means by which the superpowers ensure their national security and realize external strategic objectives. After more than 40 years of development, the destructive force of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and their ability to inflict casualties have reached a level with which no conventional weapons can compare. Today, the United States and the USSR possess approximately 50,000 nuclear bombs with a total force equivalent to approximately 15 billion tons of TNT, or approximately 1 billion times that of the atomic bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 that killed or wounded 360,000 people. The United States and the USSR have respectively 14,600 and 11,700 strategic nuclear bombs capable of reaching each other's territory, with a respective equivalent of 3.8 billion and 5.8 billion tons, enough to wipe each other out several times over. Should the United States and the USSR fight a nuclear war, not only would "the first to use nuclear weapons be the second to die," but the entire globe would be affected. The reasons are as follows: 1) U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons are deployed in tens of countries and regions in Europe and Asia, and submarines carrying nuclear weapons cruise the world's major oceans. Should a nuclear war erupt suddenly, these places would become "nuclear targets." For this reason, a nuclear war between the United States and the USSR could not be limited to the soil of the two countries, but would spread to the whole world. 2) The radiation fallout from nuclear explosions would drift everywhere, raining disaster on all mankind. The aftermath of a nuclear reactor accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the USSR attests to this point. 3) A nuclear war would produce disastrous consequences for the planet's ecological environment. Results of a computer simulation experiment that a number of U.S. scientists conducted in 1983 show that a nuclear war having an explosive force of only 1 million to 10 million tons could bring about major changes in the earth's climate and meteorology. The nuclear explosions and the ensuing large forest fires and conflagration of cities would churn large quantities of dust and smoke into the atmosphere, and a portion would enter the stratosphere where it would drift for a long time, forming a dust and smoke screen high above the earth that would block the sun's rays and cause a drop in the earth's temperature by tens of degrees to produce a cold and dark "nuclear winter" that would last several months. In addition, the explosion would produce large amounts of carbon dioxide that could damage the ozone layer that blocks most of the sun's ultraviolet radiation. After the "nuclear winter," an "ultraviolet radiation summer" could occur on the earth. Thus, leaders of the United States and the USSR have publicly announced that a nuclear war cannot be fought. Under these circumstances, nuclear weapons can be used only as deterrent weapons at most, and cannot be used to fight a real war.

Second, modern military technology has developed to the point where it has gradually created the material prerequisite for nonnuclear weapons to take the place of nuclear weapons. Today, the power, speed, range, and target accuracy of some high-technology nonnuclear weapons approaches that of nuclear weapons. The capabilities of these kinds of weapons will be improved in the future. A report from the U.S. Department of Defense Experts Committee said that by 1995 nonnuclear warheads with an equivalent weight of only 1,000 pounds will be able to penetrate the ground to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles ready to be launched from underground silos. They will have a power equivalent to an aboveground explosion of a 100-million-ton nuclear bomb.

Finally, the development of military technology provides the possibility of solving inspection problems in arms reduction. Inspection has always been a major obstacle to arms control talks between the United States and the USSR. Some signed accords failed to obtain approval

because the U.S. Congress emphasized the unreliability of inspection methods. This was the case with the "Treaty Between the United States and the USSR Limiting Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing," the "Treaty Between the United States and the USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes," and the "Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II Between the United States and the USSR." Now very great strides have been made in inspection technology. For example, satellites can distinguish objects on the ground measuring several inches, and seismic methods can detect several-thousand-ton equivalent nuclear explosions, etc. This makes it possible for countries that employ these techniques for supervision to ensure that treaties are lived up to. Furthermore, the USSR has made major concessions on the inspection issue, not only long ago accepting on-the-ground observation, but recently also accepting "open skies." Therefore, the inspection issue is no longer an insurmountable obstacle to gaining approval of arms reduction agreements.

Trend of Developments During the 1990's in the Course of U.S. and USSR Arms Reduction

During the 1990's, progress in U.S. and Soviet arms reduction will continue, the scope of reductions will widen, and their extent will increase. Nevertheless, there will be definite limits to the reduction, and the arms race will be carried on at a low level. Talks will be limited by various factors, and progress will be difficult. The 1990's will be a period of change from bipolarity to multipolarity in the world pattern. There will be many changes in the situation that are difficult to predict, so there will be some unpredictable factors in the development of arms reductions. Nevertheless, the overall trend will be increasing reduction of U.S. and Soviet armaments as the bipolar structure crumbles. Arms cuts during the 1990's may be characterized as follows:

1. Widening of the Scope and Increase in the Extent of Arms Cuts. As of now, the United States and the USSR have reached agreement only on intermediate-range and intermediate short-range missiles. In the future, the scope of cuts will widen to all types of weapons: nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, outer space weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. It will also include all types and all aspects of any given weapon. Among nuclear weapons, for example, not only will strategic weapons be cut, but tactical weapons will be cut too; not only will carrier vehicles be destroyed, but nuclear warheads will be destroyed as well; not only will land-based and air-based weapons be affected, but sea-based weapons will be affected too; not only will cuts in nuclear weapons themselves be addressed, but "associated measures" will also be addressed, such as limitations on nuclear weapons tests and the prevention of nuclear weapons and missile proliferation. On 4 October, James Baker announced achievement of arms reduction agreements with the USSR as a means by which the United States could help Gorbachev achieve reforms. Consequently, agreement may soon be reached in talks between the United States and the USSR on a 50-percent cut in strategic weapons, and talks about East and West cuts in conventional forces in Europe. Talks underway between the United States and the USSR about an agreement to cut strategic weapons, not including large numbers of strategic weapons in storage and sea-based strategic weapons, will mean a reduction of between 30 and 35 percent rather than an actual 50-percent cut. The excess strategic nuclear weapons that the United States and the USSR have are far more than are needed for nuclear deterrence. After agreement is reached in the talks now in progress on conventional weapons in Europe, the surplus weapons in Europe will also be far more than are needed for defense. Therefore, once agreement is reached in these two talks, both sides will not stop at this; they will make further cuts in both strategic nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in Europe.

2. Definite Limits on Arms Cuts. U.S. and Soviet arms cuts during the 1990's will have definite limits. Both will keep nuclear weapons and conventional weapons far larger in number than other countries. The reasons are as follows: 1) Generally speaking, the bipolar system will not completely expire during the 1990's; the United States and the USSR will still be adversaries in competition politically, militarily, and ideologically, who will have to maintain a certain military strength. 2) Although the role of military factors will continue to decline in international politics during the 1990's, it will not decline to a point where it is dispensable. Although military power will no longer be the main characteristic of superpower strength, it will be an indispensable characteristic. For the USSR in particular, which has lost its position as the world's second economic power, if it also loses its position as a world military power, it will not be able to continue to pose as a superpower. 3) International politics during the 1990's will become increasingly complex and go far beyond simple confrontation between East and West. The security challenges that the United States and the USSR will face, particularly the United States, will not come only from the other party, but also from the regional military powers that are now appearing and from the increasingly intensifying four major threats posed by "weapons proliferation, armed insurrection, terrorism, and drug smuggling." Although the United States has increased the use of economic and political means to deal with regional security threats, nevertheless, the use or the threat to use military forces will remain a mainstay of U.S. local security policy during the 1990's. In addition, Japan's ever-increasing military strength, possession of nuclear weapons by the UK, France, and China, and the beginning of joint military self-reliance in West European countries are important considerations that both the United States and the USSR will have to ponder in carrying out arms reductions.

3. The Arms Race Will Not Disappear, But Will Go on at a Low Level and Shift to Quality. The arms race between the United States and the USSR will not disappear during the 1990's, but will continue in concert with arms reductions. The fundamental reason for this is that so

long as the bipolar system continues to exist, the United States will be unable to abandon its security policy in which "deterrence" is the centerpiece, and its military strategy in which "flexible response" is the prime ingredient. Both "deterrence" and "flexible response" are backed by military force. The USSR expressed opposition to "deterrence theory" and has announced pursuit of a policy of "defensive strategy," and "reasonable sufficiency of military forces"; nevertheless, how it will carry out these policies will, in the final analysis, be decided on the basis of U.S. actions. The USSR cannot sit idly by without reacting and watch the United States destroy military parity. However, the momentum of U.S. and USSR arms reduction will increase, and the level of the arms race will diminish. It will also shift from quantity to quality, with mostly the development of nonnuclear new-technology weapons.

4. Progress in Arms Control Talks Will Continue To Be Very Difficult. U.S. and USSR arms reduction is already the trend of events, but to tell the truth, it will be exceedingly difficult. This is for the following reasons: 1) The types of weapons to be cut are numerous and jumbled; making calculations is difficult, inspections are not easy, and in some talks (such as talks on reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, and talks about chemical weapons at the Geneva Conference to Discuss Arms Reduction), many countries take part, their views cannot be easily reconciled, and the talks are rather time consuming. 2) In both the United States and the USSR, forces exist that oppose arms reductions. In the United States, in particular, a huge military and industrial complex and a conservative faction that does not want arms cuts exist. 3) Neither the United States nor the USSR can completely abandon the traditional negotiation strategy of weakening its adversary and strengthening its own position through talks. As a result, at each step of the way in negotiations, intense haggling has to be done.

5. Some Unpredictable Factors Exist in Arms Reduction Prospects. The overall trend of development in the world pattern during the 1990's is for further weakening of the ability of the United States and the USSR to control the world. The bipolar structure and the cold war system formed following the war are verging on collapse, and various forces are realigning and combining. Profound and intense changes will occur in the world. Some situations in these gigantic historical changes are difficult to forecast. Examples include the evolution of the situation in the USSR and Eastern Europe, development of Europe's political and economic structure, and so forth. These situations will occasion some unpredictable factors for the future of arms reduction. The possibility of a speed-up in the U.S.-USSR arms reductions process cannot be ruled out, and it may also suffer setbacks and come to a halt.

Progress, Capabilities of Air Force Cited

OW1804094590 Beijing BAN YUE TAN in Chinese No 4, 25 Feb 90 pp 44, 45

[Report by Cai Shanwu (5591 0810 2976): "Chinese Air Force Today" —with photograph of four fighters in flight formation and another of newly developed spherical full-view flight simulator]

[Text] The Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force has become a powerful fighting force through construction and development over the past four decades.

Born in the same year as the Republic, the Air Force was founded on 11 November 1949.

Though small and weak in the early stages, Air Force units bravely shouldered the combat task of air defense and organized the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to take part in the War To Resist the United States and Aid Korea.

In the early stages, the Air Force imported aircraft mainly from the Soviet Union. Along with the development of China's aeronautics industry, the country entered a new era of basically acquiring the capability to domestically manufacture aircraft, ground-to-air guided missiles, and other weapons and equipment for the Air Force by the mid-1970's. Today, the People's Air Force is equipped with large numbers of relatively advanced fighters, attack planes, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and various kinds of special aircraft designed and manufactured by China. High-altitude high-speed fighters designed and manufactured by China have the capabilities of dogfighting and attacking ground targets both by day and night, and under adverse weather conditions.

The Air Force's aerial weaponry has been increasingly modernized. Since the mid-1980's, hand-operated combat logistic equipment has been gradually upgraded to semiautomatic or automatic. Simulating training equipment for the Air Force's major arms and services have been developed from mechanical and electrical simulation to laser and electronic simulation; from technical to tactical simulation; and from simulators for fighting personnel to simulators for commanding personnel in a tactical campaign. Laser simulators for attacking ground targets have been installed in some fighters, bombers, and attack planes. A simulation command system for tactical campaigns has been set up for airmen. Aircraft maintenance and repair for the Chinese Air Force, which were previously performed by experienced mechanics, are now done with scientific equipment. Aircraft repair plants can repair and rebuild, not only all kinds of indigenous aircraft in active service, but also planes for a few countries with a developed aviation industry.

In navigation communications, a transition from using mainly shortwave double sideband to shortwave single sideband has taken place in radio communications. The installation of radars for guiding landing in all aircraft

has enhanced the capability of safe landing under adverse weather conditions. An automatic weather information exchange system and automatic system of copying and reporting weather maps, which have been put into operations by the Air Force, have basically formed a nationwide weather monitoring network.

In modern warfare, electronic countermeasures are important means for combat, including electronic reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, electronic interference and counter-interference, and destruction and counter-destruction of electronic equipment. The development of electronic countermeasures by the Air Force has greatly improved the aircraft's capabilities for survival and actual combat. Currently, all combat logistic technical personnel have completed regular training at Air Force academies, while the majority of cadres have undergone in-service rotational training. Compared with previous conditions, the time required for keeping aircraft at plants for periodic inspection and repair has been cut down by 50 percent; the number of planes which can be put into operation has increased by more than 200 monthly; and the rate of serious accidents caused by mechanical troubles per 10,000 hours has dropped markedly, reaching the world's advanced level. Logistic support has been improved comprehensively to consistently ensure good take-off and landing conditions for more than 99.8 percent of flying. Today, all flight personnel have at least a college education. The number of "all-weather" pilots in the Air Force has increased 16.4 times over 11 years ago. Eighty percent of flight personnel have qualified for certificates of various grades, including 38 percent in the special and first grades. The Air Force has trained a group of young pilots well versed in the English language. All aviation army, divisional, and regimental commanders are capable of piloting planes; and all aviation divisional commanders can lead a group of airmen in air combat. The "all-directional" paratroopers have reached an unprecedented level of capability to land and fight at any time and in any place. The Chinese Air Force ranks third in the world in the number of aircraft. Every day, thousands of planes fly in various places. For more than a decade, the Chinese Air Force has maintained a flight safety record which is outstanding in the world.

Since its founding, the People's Air Force has mobilized 17,000 aircraft sorties to support 50,000 industrial and agricultural projects for national economic construction, and 25,000 sorties to take part in flood countermeasures, rescue earthquake victims, extinguish fires, and combat other natural disasters on 61,000 occasions; and it has air-lifted 420,000 metric tons of relief materials to 360,000 victims of natural disasters.

To alleviate the strain on local air transportation, the Air Force has opened some 60 special railways to various local authorities since 1982. In the past decades, the Air Force has dispatched about 10,000 sorties to collect reliable data for the mapping of China's border and coastal regions and for key state construction projects.

In the past four decades, the Air Force has dispatched more than 500 aviation, navigation, communications, and other air personnel to replenish the civil aviation departments; it has successively opened 55 military airports for civilian use; and the engineering corps has built 17 airports for civil aviation departments. The Air Force has assisted the civil aviation authority to open 100 new routes by giving up flights or changing training routes, and has provided emergency landing facilities for civilian aircraft on several hundred occasions.

Agreement with Soviets on Reducing Border Troops

HK2404033490 Beijing ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE in Chinese 0240 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Report by Chen Dawei (7115 1129 4850): "China and the Soviet Union Reach Agreement on Reducing Military Forces in Border Areas"—ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE headline]

[Text] Moscow, 23 April (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—This reporter has learned today that China and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement on reducing military forces in border areas and the guiding principle question of increasing confidence in the military field.

This was disclosed by Li Zhaoxing, director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Information Department, while giving an account of the talks between Premier Li Peng and Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at a press briefing held at 1900 local time today.

According to Li Zhaoxing, Li Peng said at the talks that Sino-Soviet political relations have developed steadily, border talks are in progress, and both sides have reached an agreement on reducing military forces in the Sino-Soviet border and the guiding principle question of increasing confidence in the military field.

Continued Global Disarmament Urged

OW2504214690 Beijing XINHUA in English 1420 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Beijing, April 25 (XINHUA)—The reduction and elimination of the danger of nuclear war will continue to be an issue of paramount importance in the field of disarmament, and complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical and space weapons through law is still a hard task facing the world.

This conclusion was made by Wang Zhiyun, a Chinese expert on disarmament, here today at a panel discussion of the ongoing international law conference.

The participants admitted unanimously that nuclear, chemical and space weapons constitute a severe threat to mankind, so a united and comprehensive international law is needed to prohibit the production and utilization of these weapons.

"It should be mentioned that even if the United States and the Soviet Union reduced their nuclear arsenals by half they would still possess over 90 percent of all the nuclear weapons in the world," Wang said.

Besides, she noted, the modernization of their strategic nuclear weapons has not stopped. Therefore, in order to reduce the danger of nuclear war, the two superpowers should not only reduce substantially the quantity of their nuclear weapons, but also stop the qualitative improvement of those weapons.

On chemical weapons, Wang continued, "The prohibition of chemical weapons has long been an important issue and a subject of international negotiations commanding the attention of people throughout the world."

She called on the international community to urge the states participating in the negotiations on disarmament in Geneva to conclude as early as possible an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Before the concluding of such a convention, she added, all countries should stop research on and production of chemical weapons.

She noted that the non-militarization of outer space can proceed only from the prohibition of the development and production of space weapons, which is otherwise bound to intensify the arms race between the superpowers, thereby bringing an even greater danger to world peace and security.

Support for Egypt's Weapons Proposal Voiced

OW2604101790 Beijing XINHUA in English 0928 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] Beijing, April 26 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman today expressed appreciation of and support to Egypt's recent proposal that the Mid-East should be a region free from destructive weapons.

She was answering a question requesting China's position on Egypt's proposal at a news briefing here this afternoon.

China has all along stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and given its support to the proposal for establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, the spokeswoman said.

"It is our view that should the countries concerned in the Middle East reach an agreement in this regard through consultation and on a voluntary basis, it would contribute to the Middle East peace process and to the stability and peace in the region," she said.

Israel, the most powerful country in this region in terms of military strength, should take the lead in making a response, she added.

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

UN Disarmament Conference Concludes 19 Apr

OW1904141190 Tokyo KYODO in English 0542 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Sendai, April 19 (KYODO)—The United Nations conference on disarmament closed Thursday with calls for the UN to step up its monitoring to stop a qualitative arms race and play a leading role in persuading nations to join a treaty banning biotechnological weapons.

"It was significant that participating nations expressed firm determination to use new technology to achieve peace... Science and technology, which should be neutral, has proved to be a double-edged sword used for both military and civil purposes," UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Yasushi Akashi told the audience at the end of the four-day meeting.

Some delegates called for development of science and technology to be applied not on arms expansion but on such global issues as helping relieve poverty and reducing environmental contamination.

Akashi pledged his efforts to hold the conference on a regular basis, reflecting a strong demand among the participants and in keeping with the current international trend toward easing of tensions.

Over 40 scientists, diplomats, and disarmament specialists from 21 nations, including Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, discussed over the four days the progress of science and technology and qualitative strengthening of armaments which has accompanied such progress. The UN disarmament conference was first held in Kyoto last April.

Against the backdrop of the reduction of East-West tension in Europe, participants expressed high expectations of what the UN can do now to serve the purpose of constructive disarmament.

Suggestions were made that the United Nations accumulate data on advanced technology and movements of weapons around the world, and monitor the negative impact of developed science and technology on disarmament.

Many delegates expressed concern over proliferation of weapons to the Third World, which threatens to cause regional conflicts.

Biotechnology specialists cautioned against possible manufacturing of biotechnological weapons and pointed to the necessity of verification in the research and development process.

Japan proposed to set up a UN monitoring satellite in an attempt to actively use the technology for disarmament. Japan recently confirmed the existence of nuclear power facilities in North Korea by satellite data, according to Japanese officials.

JAPAN

Ishikawa Rules Out Return to 'Military Power'

OW2004061390 Tokyo KYODO in English 0440 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Tokyo, April 20 (KYODO)—Defense Agency Director General Yozo Ishikawa ruled out the possibility Friday that Japan will someday become a military power. The state minister was referring at a press conference to the recently released Pentagon report on U.S. defense strategies for Asia and the Pacific rim.

Ishikawa said, "There is absolutely no fear that Japan could become a military power" as a matter of national policy and added the Defense Agency is following fundamental principles to provide for the nation's defense.

In the report entitled "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," the Pentagon objectives regarding Japan included "discouraging any destablizing development of a power projection capability." Ishikawa, however, said it would be "impossible" to maintain any military capability which would abandon the nation's defense policies.

The Defense Agency chief said he would like to discuss U.S. Far East strategic plans and Japan's defense policies with U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, but he did not specify a date.

The Pentagon report also called for Japan to shoulder more of the cost of maintaining U.S. troops in Japan in the future, but Ishikawa said, "This is not covered by the current U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement." The report, obtained by KYODO NEWS SERVICE in Washington on Wednesday, was based partly on Cheney's February trip to Asia and outlined a plan for limited troop reductions in the area and increased defense burden sharing by Japan and South Korea.

SOUTH KOREA

Pyongyang Said Exporting Missiles to Third World

SK2104024290 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean 21 Apr 90 p 1

[YONHAP report from Paris]

[Text] In its recent report, the French Defense Research Foundation [FEDN] has revealed that North Korea has a considerable level of technology in the field of ballistic missiles and has been one of the main

countries, including the Soviet Union and China, exporting missiles to Third World countries.

In its recent edition of the quarterly "(Strategique)," FEDN, a renowned French military affairs researchinstitute, has termed North Korea as an "intermediary source of exports," while calling the Soviet Union and China primary missile exporting countries. It also noted that North Korea has revised Soviet-made Scud-B missiles for itself and has supplied third world countries with them, thus playing a major role in the international proliferation of ballistic missiles.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Dimitrov on Warsaw Pact, CFE Conclusion

AU2004132890 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 20 Apr 90 p 2

[Norbert Mayer report: "Erosion of Postwar Order"]

[Text] Vienna—"The 23 negotiating teams have to keep up with the pace of history." With these words, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Boyko Dimitrov called on the negotiators in the Vienna disarmament negotiations to intensify their work. He stressed, as a guest speaker in the CFE plenum, that his country is firmly determined to find its appropriate place in the newly developing Europe. The first Vienna treaty already is to account for the fundamental changes on the continent. In the subsequent news conference, referring to the Warsaw Pact's fate, Dimitrov stated that "the erosion of the postwar order can be observed" in the whole of Europe today. "This is happening somewhat faster in the East Bloc." Bulgaria hopes for a pan-European security system. However, his country still needs the crumbling structures in the transition period, he said.

The foreign minister did not see any advantages in closer ties between the Balkan states. "We never considered a separate solution for the Balkans as desirable." However, the idea of a nuclear-free zone in southern Europe is very popular with the public.

Asked about the internal crises in the Soviet Union and a possible connection with delays in the Vienna negotiations, Dimitrov showed great reserve; all over the world, people have scruples to comment on this, he said. "I do not have the relevant information on Lithuania. However, regarding the conflict between the Soviet federation and the Republic of Lithuania, we advocate a solution by means of negotiations. A regulation is desirable and possible," Dimitrov said. He shows cautious optimism about the conclusion of the CFE treaty. "Apart from technical subtleties, only the political will is required for the treaty. However, its development on a solid basis would be preferable," Dimitrov said, while suggesting that it will hardly be possible to stick to the final date in the fall.

CSFR's Harencar on European Security Commission

LD2004221290 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 2030 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Robert Harencar, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, today addressed the Vienna talks on disarmament and measures on strengthening trust and security in Europe. He reported on the Czechoslovak proposal to set up the European Security Commission. On this occasion he was asked for an interview by our special correspondent, Michael Berko:

[Begin recording] [Berko] Mr First Deputy Minister, in connection with our address today at the plenary meeting of the talks of 35 participant states on the measures to strengthen trust and security in Europe, allow me to ask several questions. What was the main subject of your address today?

[Harencar] To brief the participants in the Vienna talks on our concept of solving the questions of security and stability in Europe, above all to explain the substance of the Czechoslovak proposal to set up the European Security Commission as the prototype for a new European security structure on the European continent.

[Berko] Does this mean that the European Security Commission would replace European disarmament forums?

[Harencar] Certainly not. We are not concerned with their replacement but with setting up a permanent platform for solving all the issues of concern to Europe. As to the relation of the commission with the disarmament talks, it should represent a place from which impulses for speeding up the adoption of security measures should arise. It would also deal, for example, with the fulfillment of disarmament agreements.

[Berko] Mr Deputy, you mentioned that the bloc approach toward security should be gradually overcome and that European security structures should be built on an altogether new basis. We also know that, above all, NATO is not considering within the nearest future it self-liquidation, even in the case of disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. What is the position of the Czechoslovak initiative regarding the question of the bloc?

[Harencar] From a prospective point of view, it is in our interest to achieve disbanding both military-political formations. But we are realists, and we understand that it is not a question which will be tackled at once. Our proposal is not aimed against NATO cooperation, which represents a significant element of stability on the European continent. The commission would function alongside the two blocs and, at the same time, it would be the place for contacts, talks between them, possibly even with participation of neutral and Nonaligned states.

[Berko] When, in your view, would it be possible to set up the commission?

[Harencar] The president, Vaclav Havel, stated at the recent Meeting-90 in Bratislavia [9 April] that this year's summit of the 35 participatory states in the Helsinki process should make a decision on setting up this commission. We are aware that the implementation of this intention requires great painstaking and patient work by the Czechoslovak foreign service. However, we are determined to do everything to implement our proposal.

[Berko] Can you say a few words about how you assess developments at the talks on conventional arms in general?

[Harencar] We can see that hard work is going on in Vienna, and that certain agreements have been reached. However, we can see that there are still a number of issues which have to be resolved in order to enable an agreement to be signed at this year's summit of the 35 CSCE states.

[Berko] And what is the reaction so far to the Czechoslovak proposal for setting up a European Security Commission?

[Harencar] The first response is positive, particularly with respect to the timing of our proposal and its orientation toward setting up a modern security structure in Europe, which corresponds to the interests of small and large states. We expect the fundamental standpoints to be presented at a meeting between Mr Dienstbier, our deputy premier and minister of foreign affairs, with the ambassadors of 34 CSCE countries and Albania, which will take place on 2 May in Prague. [end recording]

Reportage on 'Open Skies' Conference

Conference Resumes 23 Apr

LD2304004190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Tomorrow [23 April], in Budapest, the Open Skies disarmament consultation continues. On this occasion, the participants held a closed meeting of experts this afternoon. Julia Tordai's interview follows:

[Begin recording] [Tordai] The conference is seeking to work out an agreement on the unarmed monitoring incursions in the airspace of the 26 participating countries. Don't you think that the negotiations between the countries of the two military blocks are slowing down, I asked Henning Wegener, deputy chief secretary of NATO, whom I met at the opening of the Hungarian Disarmament Information Center.

[Wegener, in English with superimposed Hungarian translation] No, not at all, no, no. On the contrary, I think, today, the expression is more and more outdated. I personally am full of hopes and ambitions regarding the European security system.

[Tordai] The first round of the Open Skies Conference was held in Ottawa last February. How much has been achieved since then?

[Wegener] Well, I think the complexity of the issue is beginning to show. The problem of the Open Skies is much more complex than we thought at the beginning, since it is about 23 sovereign states allowing others to look over their territory like over an open book. I think of the censor equipment that can be allowed at the incursions into foreign airspace. What we must do now is move from the concept to its detailed realization. The strict COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] list ought to be revised. The question today is, what is the lower limit, because defense and security will of course always remain necessary. Thus technology, which is so vital for defense, one should hesitate to deliver such goods. [end recording]

Further on Resumption of Conference

LD2304134990 Budapest MTI in English 1247 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 23 (MTI)—The second round of the open skies conference commenced in Budapest on Monday morning [23 April].

As a follow-up to their recent Ottawa meeting, the representatives from the 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty member countries have now set to the conference table to work out, possibly by May 12, the contract on observation overflights in one another's countries.

The open skies initiative was revoked by President Bush in a speech last May. The idea was first raised by U.S. President Eisenhower at the 1955 Geneva summit of the four great powers. He proposed that east and west reach an agreeent on taking aerial photos on a mutual basis so as to avoid undesirable military suprises. Then the Soviet Union rejected the proposal.

The favourable response to the repeated announcement of the open skies initiative is attributable to the growing demand for reliable, expedient inspection methods and techniques.

Hungary and Canada, the initiators of the conference, proved the viability of the concept in January this year, when the Canadian C-130 Hercules carried out a successful test flight over Hungary.

A major step towards realization was the working out in Ottawa of a 140-page draft agreement which is now to be finalized in Budapest.

In the light of current disputes, however, the hope for signing the document on the scheduled date of May 12 seems to be fading. For instance, there are differences as to the permissible, annual number of overflights, the extension of controls to a base of a given country located in the third state, and whether signatories should carry out the overlights by their own planes or set up a joint stock of aircrafts for the purpose.

Horn Addresses Conference

LD2304111890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] This morning the second, and hopefully the last, phase of the Open Skies conference opened in the Army House of Culture on Nepstadion Road. [passage omitted] The delegates of seven Warsaw Pact and 16 NATO states took their places along two rows of tables. [passage omitted]

Tibor Toth, head of the Hungarian delegation, opened the consultation just after 0930 and then, in the capacity

as organizer and host, Foreign Minister Gyula Horn greeted the participants. We quote from his speech:

[Begin Horn recording] The democratic transformation taking place in the Central and Eastern part of Europe offers huge possibilities, a rare historical chance for these states and for our entire continent.

Security policy now has a dual task: On the one hand, to guarantee that these changes take place within stable frameworks; on the other hand, the shaping of a new European security structure in place of the old one based on the existence of the two military blocs. This new structure, which has to extend to every state on our continent, must be characterized by placing in the forefront the nonmilitary factors of cooperation and security.

The Open Skies system could play an important role in shaping the new European security system. It is indispensable that in the elaboration of the agreement we also assert as consistently as possible the national method of approach [as heard]. We all know that despite the significant work performed in Ottawa, many questions still await solution. The only hope for shaping rational compromises is if the work of every delegation is guided by the principles and endeavors laid down in the communique.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to open the second phase of the Open Skies conference. Perhaps it will not sound immodest if I state that the fact that Budapest can provide a home for a forum of such great significance represents the recognition of Hungary's activities concerning arms limitation, which it has carried out for years. [end recording]

After Gyula Horn's words of greeting, the consultation held a brief recess, and then the diplomats continued their work behind closed doors. And no doubt it will go on like this until the confidence-strengthening Open Skies agreement is completed. Then presumably the foreign ministers will come to Budapest for the festive signing of the agreement. This was planned originally for 12 May. However, if they do not manage to complete the agreement by then, the Hungarian side is ready even after that to ensure the conditions for the continuation of this very important international conference.

Further on Horn Statements

LD2304174790 Budapest MTI in English 1645 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 23 (MTI)—The opening address at the Open Skies Conference, which began in Budapest on Monday [23 April], was delivered by Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn.

Mr Horn said, among others, that the democratic transformation sweeping the central and Eastern part of Europe offers a huge possibility and a rare historical chance for these states, and also for the continent as a whole. Security policy now has a dual task. On the one hand, it should guarantee that these changes take place amidst stable frameworks. On the other hand, that a new European security structure come about instead of the old one that is based on the existence of the two military blocs.

The Open Skies system can play a major role in the creation of a New European security system, Mr Horn noted. He recalled that the political decisions which would have made it possible for delegates to sit down for the talks in Budapest in the sure hope of the final outcome, were not reached in the period between the Ottawa and the Budapest stages of the conference. However, this does not mean there is no chance for success, rather that the delegations face hard work in the coming days.

Further on Conference

LD2304174390 Budapest MTI in English 1606 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 23 (MTI)—Following the opening of the Open Skies conference, the some 250 experts from 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty member states continued debate over the draft treaty in work groups.

Tibor Toth, leader of the Hungarian delegation, held a press conference on the event taking place in Budapest. He said the conference is progressing according to the working order approved in Ottawa. However, changes might be possible inasmuch as participants will include plenary session on the agenda of the conference, which is held behind closed doors. These less formal conferences make it possible for representatives of the neutral and non-aligned countries to also be present. (Representatives of these countries earlier requested full-right participation at the Open Skies Conference, but no consensus came about in the issue.)

Mr Toth said that in his opening address, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn announced: In case the conference ends with success, and the delegates approve the proposal, then Hungary is ready to see to a suitable infrastructure for the consultative committee of the Open Skies treaty, in return for a symbolic payment of one forint.

Romania's Chirila on 'New Climate' for Disarmament

AU2304124290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0913 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Bucharest, April 23—"The new climate requires greater exigencies, responsibilities and efforts for tangible results to be obtained in disarmament, including, or especially, at the Geneva conference" stressed in his address there Romanian representative Gheorghe Chirila.

As reported by "ROMPRES" special envoy to the conference, Constantin Tintea, the speaker showed that the

nuclear issues were considered priorities for the meeting and welcomed the congenial conditions existing for the starting of a more specific dialogue on the elaboration of a substantive mandate for the special committee regarding the banning of nuclear tests. In connection with the problem of controlling a treaty banning the tests, the speaker assessed that considerable progress was marked, namely the devising by the ad-hoc committee of scientific experts of a global system of seismic control. In that context he expressed the Romanian delegation's satisfaction at its participation as of this session in the ad-hoc group and at its expected involvement, with its technology, in the global experiment that will show its conclusions in 1991.

Then, referring to the stage of negotiations on banning and eliminating chemical weapons, the Romanian representative reiterated Romania's full political readiness for the fast achievement of a convention in this sense. "We have clearly declared that Romania does not possess chemical weapons, nor does it intend to produce or obtain such weapons."

The Romanian chief delegate noted that a problem more and more often approached during the debates was the universality of the future document. "We think that the involvement of an ever larger number of countries in the process of negotiations and the endorsement by consensus of the convention are among the conditions apt to favour the legitimate requisite of universality. Romania is ready to endorse as initiator party a convention that should be the result of such a process" he said.

The Romanian chief delegate expressed on the other hand the regret that with respect to other items on the agenda, such as the arms race in the outer space, debates were not oriented toward basic aspects.

BULGARIA

Foreign Attaches Observe Arms Reduction Measures

AU2004172690 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 19 Apr 90 pp 1, 4

[Dispatch by Major Vladi Vladkov and Senior Lieutenant Krasimir Uzunov: "Farewell to Arms in the Bulgarian Version"]

[Excerpts] Veliko Turnovo, 18 April (by telephone from our special correspondents)—The party which boarded the aircraft and departed from Sofia Airport this morning was an unusual and varied one. There was an abundance of military uniforms and a babble of different languages, but all were united by the aim of their trip and the route of the flight.

At the initiative of the Ministry of National Defense, military attaches accredited in Bulgaria were to see with their own eyes that Bulgaria is fulfilling the commitments which it unilaterally assumed at the beginning of the year to make certain cuts in its arms and combat hardware. The group was led by Colonel General Boris Todorov, deputy minister of national defense.

In Karlovo the military attaches saw that the declared 200 tanks were assembled at the base for storing weapons and combat equipment due for reprocessing and destruction, which had been set up at the base of the former tank brigade. The tanks had not only been collected, but some of them had already been converted into tank tractors [tankov vlekach]. Many of the military attaches were amazed that modern T-62 tanks, three-quarters of which were in a fully combat-ready condition, were being stripped down. The ammunition, measuring instruments, machine guns, and batteries have already been removed. [passage omitted]

At the air base near Uzundzhovo 15 MiG-21 fighters silently waited their fate. Why only 15? the informed reader might ask, since it was announced that 20 machines would be taken out of service. It turned out that two planes, with their weapons removed and no longer fit for combat, have been handed over to the aviation museum, and a further three will be mounted on pedestals at military air bases. [passage omitted]

At the "Khan Krum" Machine Repair Plant in Turgovishte the plant director Engineer Ivan Ivanov briefed the military attaches on the tasks allocated to the enterprise in accordance with assumed commitments to destroy a certain quantity of weapons. At the moment, the plant is engaged in stripping down and destroying T-34 tanks that had formed part of the arms of the Bulgarian People's Army. All the tanks have an almost complete service life, following major overhaul. In line with its capacities, the plant has the task of destroying 503 tanks of this type by the end of the year. [passage omitted]

The T-34's which are being destroyed here have been removed from the Army's strength and until now have been held in reserve. Before being mothballed, they underwent a complete overhaul and at the moment are fully combat-ready. [passage omitted]

The end of the tour brought the military attaches to Veliko Turnovo, where they were shown how artillery hardware was being dismantled and prepared for destruction. [passage omitted]

One's unaccustomed eyes are fatigued by the mass of lifeless military hardware, but this apocalypse is not created in order to frighten anyone. It does not form the basis for new weapons of the future. Perhaps for the first time, the destruction of one group of weapons does not arouse fear of new weapons, but creates security. Bulgaria's wise and calm policy of peace and the fulfillment of the unilaterally assumed commitments create new chances for the process of disarmament and strengthening confidence in the Balkans, and this has already received its confirmation in reality.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Figures on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU2404170590

[Editorial Report] Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 21 April on page 3, under the headline "Farewell to Arms," carries a 300-word report on the number of Soviet troops who have, so far, been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia.

Details of the withdrawal were provided by Major General Svetozar Nadovic, commander of the Federal Ministry of National Defense Administration for Guaranteeing the Withdrawal of Soviet Forces From Czechoslovakia.

According to the article, "10,761 Soviet troops and 7,303 civilians have already departed from the CSFR. Two hundred and forty-five tanks, 534 armored combat vehicles, 3,134 trucks, 130 mortars and artillery, 91 combat helicopters, and 18 missile launching systems have also been withdrawn." Before the end of May, 25,800 soldiers and civilians should return to the USSR. This is 35 percent of the overall number of Soviet personnel stationed in the CSFR.

Soviet Withdrawal Oversight Group Visits Localities

Travels to Milovice

LD2404224790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1930 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The parliamentary commission supervising the withdrawal of Soviet troops today visited the Soviet military town of Milovice, where 11,000 inhabitants allegedly live. Apart from quarters housing the families of Soviet Army personnel, it has a comprehensive infrastructure. It will therefore be up to our responsible authorities to decide on the optimal future of the whole compound. According to Lieutenant General Vorobyev, more than 35 percent of the military personnel, including family members, should leave Milovice by the end of May. The general also confirmed that all Soviet troop movements during the free elections will cease totally and as early as 12 May military activity in Czechoslovakia will be substantially restricted.

Visits Mlada Boleslav

LD2404211190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The mixed parliamentary commission for the supervision of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the CSFR today held its itinerant session in Mlada Boleslav. The deputies spoke with town and district representatives about clearing up damage caused by the 20-year stay of Soviet troops in our country, the distribution of the vacated areas, and the final withdrawal of troops from Mlada Boleslav. Concerning these issues, an official from the Ministry of National Defense, Major General Svetozar Nadovic [chief of Directorate for Supervision of the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops] said:

[Begin Nadovic recording] The 18th Artillery Division, which is stationed in Mlada Boleslav and the district, begins withdrawal in December of this year and ends in February 1991. I would like to point out, however, that the Soviet side is being helpful and that already 200 soldiers are leaving Mlada Boleslav, 190 soldiers are leaving Bohosudov, 165 soldiers are leaving Rokytnice, 198 are leaving Zakupy, 188 are leaving Hvezdov and Mimon, 165 are leaving Kurivody—a total of 1,006 [number as heard] are leaving in the near future. I think that this is generally a genuine attitude and what our public wanted.

As far as property is concerned I can assure representatives of the Mlada Boleslav district that the CSFR Army is only interested in three properties. We are interested in the motor fuel store Hejtmanka and the Engelsova large store and small store. All other properties will be handed over to the civilian sector. [end recording]

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

USSR Wants Troop Treaty With United Germany

AU2404122190 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 18 Apr 90 p 5

[NZ/E.W. report: "'Extraterritorial Status' for Soviets in the East of Germany?"]

[Text] The Soviet Union has expressed a wish to the FRG Government to conclude a treaty on the stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of today's GDR with a future all-German Government. As Bonn government circles told the PPD news agency, Moscow is striving for a "form of extraterritoriality," which would practically guarantee diplomatic immunity to Soviet military men. "The Soviets demand that we guarantee comprehensive personal protection to the soldiers in East Germany," a Bonn government official said. They are not to be subject to German laws.

It is said that the Kremlin is striving for a settlement, which guarantees greater protection to the Soviet troops stationed in the eastern part of united Germany than that of U.S. soldiers and the other Allied forces in today's FRG. The Soviets want a settlement, which deviates considerably from the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. In Moscow's view, German police should not have access to Soviet barracks in the various places.

It has been learned that the presence of Soviet troops in Germany after the reestablishment of unity has been the subject of talks between Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow for some time; the FRG Government consults with its NATO partners and does not negotiate behind the backs of the allies.

In 1957, the GDR concluded a treaty with the USSR on the stationing of the Soviet forces in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Erzgebirge mountain range. "In case of a threat to the safety" of the Soviet troops (formerly "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany," today "Western Group of Soviet Forces"), the Supreme Command in Wuensdorf near Berlin may take all appropriate measures it deems necessary. In the view of Bonn's legal experts, this general clause constitutes an emergency regulation without any possibility of participation by the GDR Government. "It must be considered as an essential restriction of GDR sovereignty," the experts say. In addition to the treaty on stationing, the GDR is linked with Moscow by the "Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" (Warsaw Pact) of 1955.

If German unity is reestablished, today's GDR would have to be released from the Warsaw Pact, and the bilateral treaty on stationing would have to be replaced by a new agreement, the experts say. In addition, the occupation law, which the Soviets have only in Berlin, would have to be replaced. Bonn's experts proceed from the premise of a new status of forces agreement for Berlin and a new stationing treaty for the territory of today's GDR. According to available information, State President Mikhail Gorbachev considers the presence of Soviet troops in the GDR or in Germany as a "central issue." Independent of the decision of an all-German government, Bonn agrees to the presence of the Soviet Army in the future laender of East Germany.

According to Western findings, about 400,000 Soviet soldiers are currently stationed in the GDR. There are five armies of the ground forces with 10 tank divisions, eight motorized rifle divisions, and one artillery division. The army staffs are stationed in Neubrandenburg (2d Guard Army), Eberswalde (20th Guard Army), Dresden (1st Guard Army), Weimar (8th Guard Army), and Magdeburg (3d Assault Army). The "Western Group" has about 7,000 combat tanks, 3,300 artillery guns, and 400 multiple-rocket launchers. The Soviet air forces in the GDR are united in the 24th Tactical Air Force Army. They have about 1,530 combat planes and 530 combat helicopters. The Soviet units in the GDR are the most powerful of the Soviet Army in general.

German Membership in NATO, Warsaw Pact Viewed

AU2404115690 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 19 Apr 90 p 2

[Frank Wehner commentary: "Doubled Germany"]

[Text] Shevardnadze did not claim to have found the philosopher's stone. The Soviet foreign minister readily admitted that his proposal on a dual membership of a united Germany in NATO and the Warsaw Pact is unorthodox and still unfinished. But, of course, it provides food for thought.

Apparently, leading NATO circles do not want to take the trouble. The answer came from Washington and Brussels like a shot: "Not desirable."

It would certainly be normal to express doubts. After all, something unprecedented is suggested and instructions on its concrete implementation have not been delivered free of charge by Moscow, where the idea has just been born.

However, in the world of today such a total abstinence from thinking, as revealed by the reaction of the West, is abnormal. Thus, confidence in the future, which will result in a maximum of security for the Germans and all peoples, is not promoted.

The aversion to thinking is probably mainly due to the lack of real preparedness to create a unified and really peaceful and democratic Europe together with the united Germany. According to negative Western commentaries, double membership involves the danger that the military blocs, which already have an identity crisis, will completely lose their meaning.

This is a dreadful vision only for those who are of the opinion that NATO is the best organization that was ever developed for Europe. Consideration of Shevardnadze's proposal will be worth while for all those who want the future Germany to be part of a continent which is completely different from NATO's greater Europe.

Eppelmann Advocates Troop Reduction 'to Zero'

LD2004084990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0506 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Cologne (ADN)—GDR Minister for Disarmament and Defense Rainer Eppelmann thinks a reduction of the 135,000 men of the GDR National People's Army "to 100,000 or between 80,000 and 50,000" is possible. Eppelmann told the Cologne EXPRESS newspaper he would put this suggestion to his West German counterpart Gerhard Stoltenberg at their meeting in Hanover on 27 April. In general, Eppelmann advocated a reduction of the GDR's forces "to zero." However, he conceded that such a solution could probably only be achieved within an international peace order. "Even a European peace order, if we could achieve it by the end of this century, would not mean that there would be a Europe without arms", the politician said.

Eppelmann also spoke in favor of drastic restrictions of low-flying aircraft and announced that barracks, regiments, and ships would "in the future" be newly named "after towns, federal laender, and the men of 20 July 1944 [date of assassination attempt against Hitler]."

Eppelmann Meets Pact's Lushev, Snetkov

Says Pact Obligations To Be Met

LD2004164590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1520 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Strausberg (ADN)—Treaty obligations to allies in the Warsaw Pact are to be kept, and not unilaterally rescinded. Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann reaffirmed this at a meeting in Strausberg this afternoon with Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member-states.

Eppelmann expressed the opinion that military and alliance issues were of particular significance in the process of German unification. One of the highest-priority tasks was to take into account the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and neighbors to the East. Pointing to the government statement, he added that in the case of all steps it was a matter of taking neighbors' security interests into account and of contributing to security in Europe.

Minister Eppelmann pointed out the great significance of the two-plus-four talks within the context of the process of the unification of the two German states.

He stressed to his interlocutor that until the creation of a pan-European security alliance, there will be no extension of NATO's military presence to the territory between the Elbe and the Oder, even in a united Germany that might be a NATO member. In this context, Minister Eppelmann described the CSCE process as the most important level for overcoming the division of Europe into different political and military alliances.

On behalf of the Soviet Defense Minister Army Gen Lushev invited Minister Eppelmann to take part in the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May. Minister Eppelmann gratefully accepted the invitation.

Taking part in the meeting were State Secretary Werner Ablass, Parliamentary State Secretary Dr Bertram Wieczorek, State Secretary for Disarmament Frank Marczinek, as well as Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, head of the National People's Army. After the meeting with Army Gen Lushev, Minister Eppelmann had an exchange of opinions with Army Gen Boris Snetkov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Soviet Forces.

Discusses Warsaw Pact Change

LD2004191690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1701 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Strausberg (ADN)—The commander in chief of the combined forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, Army General Petr Lushev, speaking to the press today, assessed his more than hour-long talks with the GDR's Defense and Disarmament Minister Rainer Eppelmann, as a constructive exchange of opinions on the current situation on prospects for the forces of both countries, and on their cooperation within the Warsaw Pact as a whole. Issues concerning the NATO membership of a united Germany had only been dealt with in a general way. The political leadership of both states had the prerogative on this subject. They also had to wait for the meetings within the framework of the two-plus-four negotiations. Above and beyond this they discussed a series of other issues of common interest.

Lushev said it was difficult at the present moment to give prognoses on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany in the forseeable future. That, too, was more of a decision for the political leadership, and had to be discussed at the meeting of heads of state and government. However, it was clear that there was the certain prospect of a reduction in this area too, the commander in chief said.

According to Rainer Eppelmann, the parties had affirmed with satisfaction that the framework of the Warsaw Pact was in the process of shifting its emphasis. The political mandate was becoming stronger and stronger. As a factor promoting peace in Europe, the GDR also wanted to remain a reliable factor, and for this reason was standing by the obligations it had entered into, the minister said in this context. When political and military circumstances had changed—they had agreed on this—treaties would also have to be discussed and negotiated; however, in that event, jointly. At the moment, Rainer Eppelmann could only imagine one treaty he would revoke or break, one whereby the GDR was to supply crisis regions or regions at war. The minister stressed that they had had friendly and open talks with one another.

NVA [People's Army] Admiral Theodor Hoffmann said, on the fringes of the meeting between Minister Epplemann and Army Gen Lushev, that in future the NVA would have an important task to fulfill within the pan-European framework. However, he assumed that it would not become a part of NATO. The People's Army could be a very good bridge between the two military pact systems. He added that the Bundeswehr could also take on such a function. A very important contribution could thereby be made to the disbandment of the military alliance and to the creation of a pan-European security system on the basis of the CSCE process.

U.S. Delegation Examines Missiles' Destruction

LD2004194690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1858 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A U.S. delegation today acquainted itself with the state of the destruction of the operational-tactical missile "OKA" (NATO description SS-23) base at Demen (Schwerin Bezirk). In an announcement by the GDR Defense and Disarmament Ministry, it is stated that the U.S. representatives were convinced that the destruction of the missile complex ordered by the GDR prime minister in December is nearly finished. Three launchers have been destroyed

already. The fourth is unusable and soon will be handed over to the GDR's Military History Museum. The announcement goes on to say that the manner and the location of the rocket motors is still being examined because of the expected pollution.

Army Chief Favors Warsaw Pact-NATO 'Bridge'

LD2104133190 East Berlin ADN International Service in Germany 1241 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The National People's Army [NVA] and the Bundeswehr could form a bridge between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in transforming these military alliances into political ones, and help in shaping a new pan-European security system. This was stated by Admiral Theodor Hoffmann at the first session of the Professional Soldiers Association of the GDR in Strausberg today. The NPA chief conveyed greetings from Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann to the 378 delegates, who represent the 32,000 members organized in 560 sections.

Admiral Hoffmann stressed that the NPA also has a role and a place in the future in ensuring peace and an ordered disarmament. This however, must be linked with social security, especially for those who leave the Army. In this connection, he thanked the association for its active collaboration, particularly in Armed Forces legislation and the military reform.

Earlier, association chairman Lt Col Eckhard Nickel reported on the work which the association has done in the 91 days of its existence. For instance, members of the soldiers' organization have joined in the activity of local and central round tables and citizens' committees. The speaker described the candidature of association members of the local elections as "a weighty step in the process of democratization". There could be only one principle here: to emphasize what the parties, organizations and movements have in common and to represent that jointly.

An association of soldiers, admittedly must be independent of parties, he said, but it must in no way become politically neutral, since otherwise it would lose its influence on parliament, for example.

Jens Rotboll, president of the European Organization of Military associations (EUROMIL), welcomed the fact that the GDR soldiers' organization is the first Warsaw Pact association to request membership in EUROMIL. As a future member, the association should help to implement soldiers' right of association and coalition everywhere in Europe. The president stated that the EUROMIL presidium will decide on the membership application on 3 May this year.

Defense Minister Eppelman on Two Armies Possibility

LD2204090190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0746 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The new Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann has spoken in favor of retaining universal 12-month-long conscription in the GDR. It is "a piece of democracy", Eppelmann said today on South West German Radio. He also considered it possible that two separate Armies might exist in a united Germany. He stated that troops of the Western allies could remain on the territory of the Federal Republic and Soviet soldiers on that of the GDR "in greatly reduced contingents". Above and beyond this, he announced "unilateral and sensible steps" in the area of disarmament. His aim is an "NVA [National People's Army] which is no longer capable of waging war". The GDR will, however, stand by exisitng treaties and alliance obligations to the Warsaw Pact.

Technical Error Triggers Air-to-Ground Missiles

LD2304100990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0906 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Demmin (ADN)—The technical failure of a generating set triggered off two air-to-ground missiles of the western group of the USSR Armed Forces at Tutow airfield on 12 April, Demmin district. The commanding officer of the military airfield announced this at a meeting convened by the Tutow citizens' committee. He also reported that there were no nuclear weapons at the airfield, but only test missiles. The aircraft are now to be examined and all low flying is to be halted. [passage omitted]

Two missiles were triggered during the start-up preparations of a Su-25 low-level attack aircraft. One missile exploded on the airfield, and the other damaged five silos of the drying plant of the Demmin grain cultivation state enterprises's Tutow storage area. No one was injured.

Eppelmann Announces 49% Military Budget Cut

LD2604110190 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 1000 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] Foreign Minister Meckel has made the membership of a united Germany in NATO dependent on changes in the structure and strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The interests of the Eastern neighbors should not be neglected either, he stated in today's People's Chamber debate. Meckel spoke in favor of doing everything for the creation of an all-European security system and expressed hope that the cornerstone for this system will be established at the CSCE summit in the fall.

Disarmament and Defense Minister Eppelmann gave noncommittal answers to questions about NATO membership. He does not want to anticipate the negotiations.

Eppelmann rejected the abolition of compulsory military service with the argument that the Army, as long as it must exist, should not be a special class in society. He announced a 49-percent reduction in the military budget compared with the previous year. He criticized the Federal Republic's arms budget which is at its highest level historically.

De Maiziere, Ministers Attend Summit in Moscow

ADN Previews Talks

LD2704195990 East Berlin ADN in English 1712 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere, in his first official trip abroad taking him to Moscow on Saturday [28 April], will take along important messages for the Soviet leadership, Government Spokesman Matthias Gehler told newsmen here on Friday [27 April].

De Maiziere first of all wanted to develop extensive bilateral ties. In a meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev slated for Sunday the GDR premier would hail the policy of perestroyka and glasnost which had made possible the changes in the GDR.

Talks would centre on the process of European unification with German unification being part of this process. Further points were disarmament and economic issues, the spokesman said.

De Maiziere's talks in Moscow will also be attended by Foreign Minister Markus Meckel, Economics Minister Gerhard Pohl and Disarmament and Defence Minister Rainer Eppelmann.

In an interview with FRG newspaper BILD ZEITUNG De Maiziere pointed to the great sense for reality the Soviet Union demonstrated in the past in supporting the German unification process.

The GDR's incorporation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be further negotiated. He also wanted to talk about Soviet troops in the GDR, De Maiziere announced.

Discuss German NATO Membership

LD2904161390 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 1500 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] A united Germany's alliance membership was the main topic today [29 April] at the GDR-Soviet summit in Moscow. Premier de Maiziere discussed this with Soviet President Gorbachev and head of government Ryzhkov. GDR Government spokesman Gehler said that the question of NATO membership also dominated the meetings between Foreign Ministers Meckel and Shevardnadze and Defense Ministers Eppelmann and Yazov. The GDR has shown understanding for the Soviet Union's political, economic, and military interests. In its view, no one need fear unity. Yazov said that a united Germany in NATO would destabilize international relations.

A round of negotiations this afternoon was devoted to economic and trade relations. GDR Economics Minister Pohl gave an assurance of wanting to fulfill all contracts and to develop new forms of cooperation. The USSR proposed including representatives from the federal republic in future discussions on economic issues.

Visit Positively Assessed

LD2904171490 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 1600 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] Premier de Maiziere assessed his visit to Moscow, which is coming to an end, as a good and useful one. At an international news conference in the Soviet capital this afternoon [29 April], he said that complicated questions had been discussed objectively and in many respects agreements reached. During his two-hour meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev, they agreed that the internal aspects of German unification are a matter for the Germans themselves. Soviet security interests play a particular part. The Soviet president made it clear that a united Germany in NATO is unacceptable. De Maiziere called for compromise solutions to be found. With the current NATO strategy, he said, the GDR would not enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The aim is for changes, however. The GDR also wants to hold talks with its federal German partners on this. The premier refuted Soviet fears that economic agreements would not be kept. The possibility was considered of tripartite talks with the FRG on economic questions.

Eppelmann on Dual Military Role

LD2804182190 Hamburg DPA in German 1753 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann envisages dual membership of a united Germany in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On the eve of his talks in Moscow with Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, Eppelmann told the German Press Agency today that the proposal by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze for dual membership is a compromise formula in order to bring the various standpoints closer together. "We shall have to consider the Shevardnadze proposal," he said. The GDR's attitude is "very flexible."

Regarding the alliance issue, the GDR itself is "affected existentially and emotionally," he added. In his talks he sees himself primarily as a listener. He understands the Soviet Union's fears of being pushed into the role of an outsider. It remains the objective of the GDR Government "to upgrade" [aufwerten] the Soviet interests in the talks between the four victorious powers and the two German states (Two Plus Four talks). "We want to show

the Soviets that we are not on the other side," he said. The GDR cannot be indifferent to Moscow's attitude toward the European process.

Meckel on NATO Issue

LD2904220390 Hamburg DPA in German 2010 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Excerpts] East Berlin (DPA)—Immediately after his visit to Moscow, GDR Foreign Minister Markus Meckel made plain the GDR Government's expectations with reference to the alliance question, and called upon NATO to take action. Meckel said this evening [29 April], after talks with leading Soviet politicians, that the Soviet side would "no longer persist" with its refusal to countenance a unified Germany's membership in NATO, "if NATO makes some visible movement." This is an important step forward "which the West can take." [passage omitted]

Meckel stressed that a trusting relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union is of particular importance "for a future Europe." The GDR foreign minister spoke of the "central Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow axis," which will play a "central role" in the future.

USSR To Destroy SS-23's

LD2904205890 Hamburg DPA in German 1956 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Moscow (DPA)—The Soviet Union has promised the GDR that it will shortly take out 24 SS-23 missile systems from the GDR and scrap them in the Soviet Union. Defense Minister Rainer Epppelmann told DPA after his talks with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov that this was one of the most important outcomes of his talks with Yazov. For environmental-technical reasons, the GDR has difficulties with the destruction of the missiles, and it therefore welcomes the help of the Soviet Union. [passage omitted]

Another major result of the negotiations is the change proposed by the GDR to the agenda for the meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in East Berlin at the beginning of June. The radical change in the East European countries has made rethinking necessary, in military terms also. The meeting would therefore deal with the changed military situation, and possibly also the conversion of the Eastern military alliance into a "predominantly political alliance."

The GDR defense minister also announced the Soviet Union's readiness to cut its troops in the GDR by about half, to 200,000. A date for the troop withdrawal has not yet been set, Eppelmann said.

Arms Deliveries To Be Renegotiated

LD3004094290 East Berlin Deutschlandsender Network in German 0900 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Supplies of Soviet military equipment to the GDR agreed for this year are to be renegotiated. The USSR is prepared to do this, Defense Minister Eppelmann said after his talks with his counterpart Yazov in Moscow. The original plans provided for deliveries of above all missiles, helicopters, and ammunition to the GDR worth 2 billion marks. These savings, Eppelmann said, could help to reduce arms expenditure by 46 percent.

Soviet Reportage on Visit

WA3004154090

[Text] For Soviet reportage on Premier de Maiziere's official visit to Moscow, including talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and Defense Minister Dimitriy Yazov, see the East Europe section of the 30 April issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT.

HUNGARY

Exchange of Letters on Troop Withdrawals

AU2504110890 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 21 Apr 90 p 6

["Exchange of letters" between Major General Antal Annus, general deputy chief of staff of the Hungarian Army, and Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Southern Soviet Army Group, 14 April and 20 April, respectively: "Exchange of Letters on Troop Withdrawal"]

[Text] To Major General Antal Annus, official of the Hungarian Government in charge of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

Esteemed Major General Annus!

I read with great interest your interview dealing with the problems in implementing the Soviet-Hungarian intergovernmental agreement on the full withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic.

I highly appreciate your competence and your endeavor to deeply understand the problems for which we—together with you, as representatives of our governments—have direct responsibility. Undoubtedly, the agreement signed between the governments of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Republic regulating the issues of temporary deployment and full withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary represents the legal basis of reaching this goal. I think that the reevaluation or free interpretation of the aforementioned agreements exceed the framework of our mandate.

In connection with this, I find it somehow impossible to understand your intention to revise several articles of the agreement signed on 1 April 1958. This primarily refers to the article according to which the expenditures of the Soviet troops on restoring, renovating, and maintaining

the installations that they have been leasing represent the leasing fees for the use of these installations.

Naturally, you are aware of the fact that the Soviet side spent more than 1 billion forints annually on this alone. In addition, we made considerable investments in past years for improving the comfort level of more than 50 percent of the building that we have been leasing, including switching to central heating and supplying hot water. At the same time, we refurbished the housing that we have been leasing in accordance with the Hungarian norms, and all the new buildings were built in accordance with the standards of modern civic design. More than 70 percent of the new buildings and installations were built by the Kozber and other building enterprises on the basis of Hungarian plans, by making use of Soviet resources. Therefore, your conclusion according to which "more than half of the housing buildings do not qualify as apartments" is slightly distorting the reality.

In your interview, you mentioned some construction carried out "illegally." As a professional soldier, you must know that some installations are special and no civilian bodies are involved in setting them up. We coordinated such construction with the competent Hungarian bodies, primarily the Defense Ministry. The fate of these installations is decided individually, on the basis of bilateral agreements.

You are right in describing our position on the expenses incurred in the buildings and installations which we are handing over. We would indeed prefer to settle the bill while leaving the barracks, rather than following the entire pullout. We prefer this in view of our existing experience. Now, one year after leaving these barracks and handing them over to the Hungarian side, a claim has been set up concerning deliberately allowing the deterioration of these buildings, and, in order to discredit us, photographs and other materials are regularly published in the press. The question arises: What happens when we leave every barrack which, as one responsible head of the Hungarian Defense Ministry put it, nobody will even guard any more. This confirms our concept that we will have to settle the bill immediately after leaving these installations and after preparing the necessary documents.

I also want to mention the problem you put forward concerning the supply of catering services to the Soviet troops. You are well aware of the fact that a certain amount of this service is supplied from the Soviet Union. For the food industry products purchased in Hungary, we will pay according to Article No. 5 of the agreement signed between Soviet and Hungarian foreign trade organizations on 1 April 1958.

The Southern Army Group is carrying out all its commercial transactions in accordance with the Hungarian laws in force. We pay for these transactions from the budget of the Soviet Defense Ministry and in the framework of bilateral foreign trade transactions. Talking about the supplies provided for the Soviet troops, I consider it my duty to remind you of the considerable difference in prices prevailing for some time to the benefit of the Hungarian side in connection with a series of exports from the Soviet Union, like electric power, mineral oil products, and rolled metal articles which, according to experts, guarantee an annual profit of some $1.5 billion for the Hungarian side, and this naturally covers the entire expenditure coming from the state budget of the Hungarian Republic. As for compensations deriving from public road accidents, we will settle this entirely on the basis of the decisions of the mixed Soviet-Hungarian committee.

Several articles have recently been published in the Hungarian press aimed at presenting the Soviet troops in a light that would create antipathy toward them, and the authors do not hide this intention. Obviously, you agree that this unilateral supply of information does not create normal conditions for implementing the troop withdrawal tasks. Given your high rank and your adequate authority, you are able to influence the mass media to present the presence and withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary in an objective way and to refrain from destroying the friendly relations that have developed between the soldiers of the Southern Army and the Hungarian population over the course of the many years, relations for which you also did a lot personally. This would be in harmony with the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Hungarian intergovernmental agreement signed on 10 March 1990, and with this, you would also considerably contribute to the implementation of the articles in this agreement.

I think that today, as we celebrate the 45th anniversary of the liberation of the people of Europe—including the Hungarian people—from fascist occupation, this approach is particularly important. We can hardly agree with the declaration in your interview according to which the liberation mission of the Soviet troops is described as occupation. I think this is not the best way to show due respect to the 140,000 Soviet soldiers who lost their lives in the struggle for the freedom and independence of your beautiful country.

Given the fact that your interview was published in the central Hungarian press and it was widely commented in other publications as well, I decided to make use of my right to publish an open letter addressed to you.

14 April 1990.

With respect, Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army Group and official of the Government of the Soviet Union in charge of the presence and withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

* * *

To Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Southern Army Group.

Esteemed Mr. General!

Although I have repeatedly declared that the details of the Soviet troops withdrawal and its controversial problems should not be solved through a press debate—and I do not oppose the press publicity with this—I nevertheless answer your letter in an open letter now. I am doing this because you addressed a letter to me and sent a copy of this letter to several newspapers.

In the task I was given by the Hungarian Government, my goal has been and continues to be to avoid accusing you of anything or letting my emotions determine my work. Whether they work in the Army or in another field, both my staff and I represent the Hungarian interests. I consider this to be natural because, as Hungarians, we must represent the interests of the Hungarian Republic. I expressed all this during our official meeting on 2 April 1990, and I experienced your full understanding in this respect.

I am sure that Hungary will make it into Europe and will become a full member of our continent by endeavoring to have the best possible relations with every country in Europe, and particularly with our neighbors, and by shaping these relations with new elements where necessary. Shaping good-neighborly relations between your country and Hungary and reproducing the previous relations in accordance with the interests of the two peoples is part of this goal. This is what directs me in all my declarations and work, and therefore, I cannot disregard certain burdens that appear in our relations, irrespective of whether we have already talked about them or we kept silent about them.

I ask you, Mr General, as a highly authoritative Soviet military leader, to understand all I described so far and to treat with adequate patience and understanding the fact that Hungary also has interests in connection with the Soviet troop withdrawal, interests that it naturally wants to assert. In my view, the other side cannot be expected to be tolerant with my own position if I myself do not do the same toward his position. Therefore, and starting from this premise, I propose to evaluate each other's opinions and interests with adequate patience, as I have stated during our previous meetings, and to seek the solution during all our future meetings. I am sure we will find solutions, but if this does not happen, government bodies which have greater and more adequate authority, or the two governments themselves will settle the controversial issues. I ask you to carry out your government commissioner activity in this spirit, although I am convinced that one needs neither to ask you nor remind you of this. In my view, the most important thing is that we should continue the implementation of the Hungarian-Soviet agreement in spite of the still existing various economic and financial differences of views, and I am convinced this activity will continue, and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Hungarian territory should continue in accordance with the agreement signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries and according to the schedule stipulated in the appendix to the agreement. I am confident that, in the course of this withdrawal, we will come to mutually acceptable, wise and professional decisions on every issue.

Esteemed Mr General!

One of the most offensive parts of your letter is for me the fact that you accuse me of allegedly questioning your historical deed in achieving victory over fascism or underestimating the sacrifice, human stand, and military performance of those who participated in this victory. You are greatly mistaken. At the end of my letter, I make use of this opportunity to pay my respects to the allies fighting against fascism, including the Soviet Army, the Soviet soldiers, and all those who did anything for this victory.

I am convinced that, in the course of our meetings commencing next week, based on the negotiations held so far by our experts, we will formulate adequate decisions which will bring a solution to the existing differences of views by serving the interests of both peoples and by also taking into consideration the conditions deriving from the new political situation currently taking shape in Europe.

In conclusion, I ask you, esteemed Mr General, to send a copy of my letter—which naturally I addressed to you in original—to all those Hungarian or foreign newspapers where you had sent your letter. I ask this because I do not know which newspapers received a copy of your letter.

Budapest, 20 April 1990.

With respect,

Major General Antal Annus, general deputy chief of staff of the Hungarian Army and official of the government of the Hungarian Republic in charge of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

Disarmament Information Center Opens in Budapest

LD2204194690 Budapest MTI in English 1755 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 22 (MTI)—In the frame of the UN world campaign for disarmament, the Hungarian Disarmament Information Centre opened in Budapest on Sunday.

One of the main tasks of the centre is to assemble foreign technical literature on disarmament and make it accessible to any enquirers.

In his opening address, Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state of the Foreign Ministry, said it will be the task the new government shortly to be formed, to work out details of the security policy. It can be taken for granted however that active participation at the arms control discussions, and relying on results reached there could be a decisive factor in creating a realistic and effective Hungarian security policy.

Disarmament Roundtable Held in Budapest

LD2204211590 Budapest MTI in English 1846 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 22 (MTI)—Following the opening of the Hungarian Disarmament Information Centre an international roundtable discussion was held by noted disarmament, security policy experts. Guests included Henning Wegener, deputy general secretary of NATO, John Noble, disarmament chief director of the Canadian Foreign Ministry and a number of delegation leaders to the Vienna disarmament negotiations.

Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state of the Foreign Ministry, called it the chief task of the consultation to assess the situation emerging after the Vienna negotiations. He expressed his hope that the agreement can be concluded in the not too distant future.

Regarding the Hungarian position he said, realities emerging in the wake of changes taking place in Europe must be taken into account. According to Mr Somogyi, attention should be increasingly focused on the responsibility of each country, rather than the initial approach at the negotiations which was based on the principle of two military blocks.

The present talks also focused on the issue of including for example the air forces in the disarmament talks, and the creation of a comprehensive concept to result in a reliable system which would not only close down a period but serve as a suitable basis also for the future. Another important and so far unsettled problem is posed by the question of forces stationed abroad, and the agreement to be reached on this should be based on an agreement by the receiving and sending country. The avoidance of an agreement that would run counter to the national endeavours of countries, is held essential by the Hungarian side.

Soviet General on Troop Management in Hungary

LD2404165390 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0900 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] The commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary denied that returning units are leaving their apartments and barracks behind in a dilapidated state. General Burlakov says in the Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the Soviet Army allocates one billion forints annually for the renovation of its establishments in Hungary and it has also spent significant sums for improving comfort.

The general disputes the statement of Brigadier General Antal Annus, published in MAGYAR HIRLAP. He says the troops food supply is partially ensured from the Soviet Union and they buy it from Hungarian enterprises with their own money. In his statement, the commander of the Southern Army Unit says the Soviet soldiers did not sell weapons and ammunition in Hungary and he rejects the accusation that some people in Hungary call the liberating mission of the Soviet Army an invasion.

Defense Communique on Troop Withdrawal Talks

LD2404201190 Budapest MTI in English 1845 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 24 (MTI)—The Hungarian Ministry of Defence has forwarded a communique to MTI.

Accordingly, a series of talks on current issues of withdrawing the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary came to an end on Tuesday in the Ministry of Defence. The talks were headed by Brigadier General Antal Annus of Hungary and Colonel General Matvei Burlakov of the Soviet Union. Government commissioners, and experts of the two countries were present.

A Soviet expert group, whose members represented ten Soviet ministries, arrived in Hungary to prepare the conference in mid-April. The Soviet experts first visited various Soviet troops and military objects, then held talks in the headquarters command of the Southern Army Group. From the second half of last week, Hungarian experts also held talks with the representatives of the Soviet side on the technical, economic, commercial and other issues related to implementing the troops pull-out.

At Tuesday's session, the sides reviewed the experiences of the pull-out. They state that of the 1,769 railway trains scheduled to be used for the pull-out—of which 1,352 would transport only soldiers and military equipment—91 military trains, and passenger and freight trains have left the area of Hungary. This accords to the plans.

The sides agreed that 24-hour, continuous railway transport will have to be ensured in the intensive stage of the troops withdrawal that began on April 20, as this stage requires better scheduled loading and transport work than in the past. Both sides accepted the obligation to pay increased attention to continuously ensuring the necessary conditions in the vicinity of the Zahony transfer station.

The position of the sides has neared in several matters in economic, financial and other issues.

Budapest, April 24 (MTI)—[second dateline as received] With respect to the transfer and reception of the various objects used by the Southern Army Group, progress has been made as a result of the expert talks on creating the methods to realistically appraise the condition of these objects, in the detailed timetable of the transfer, and in determining the sphere of experts to participate in this. It was also agreed that more continuous cooperation should be created between the two sides in this.

At the same time, the expert talks did not yield results in several matters. Differences in views continue to exist between the sides regarding the legality of the Hungarian

financial claims submitted for the unrealized maintenance care of the buildings and objects owned by Hungary and used by the Soviet Army. The Soviet side does not accept the demands of the Hungarian side, and insists on observing Article No. 8 of the Inter-Governmental Agreement of 1958, under which the facilities to be handed back by the Soviet troops will be transferred in the technical condition existing on the day of their being returned to the Hungarian side. The Soviet side invariably persists in immediate accounting after the transfer of the facilities, while according to the Hungarian position, this should be carried out in the form of a last settlement—in one sum, instead of in parts—following the complete withdrawal of troops.

However, these differences in views cannot impede implementation of the troops withdrawal, and the two government commissioners were unanimous in their views that further expert talks and, if need be, decisions on a higher level will be required to create a jointly acceptable position.

Government Spokesman on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD2604225590 Budapest MTI in English 1927 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 26 (MTI)—The Council of Ministers held a session on Thursday, on which government spokesman Zsolt Bajnok and Brigadier General Antal Annus, government commissioner, briefed journalists.

Mr Annus said that the Soviet troops withdrawal from Hungary is progressing according to the plans set down in the agreement. Talks were held on April 23 and 24 with the Soviet delegation, led by the Soviet Government commissioner, about the disputed issues.

At the meeting, the sides were able to separate the disputed issues from the issue of implementing the pull-out according to the contract, as views do not differ in this respect.

The position of the sides continues to differ regarding maintenance, or the lack of it, of facilities leased out by Hungary. The Soviet side does not recognize the Hungarian claims in this area. Progress was made in summing up the debated issues, and experts will continue to deal with these from now on. Further talks are expected to be held in May, and, if no agreement is reached then, the question will go before the Hungarian-Soviet joint committee.

Mr Annus said that in the debated areas, Hungarian national assets valued at more than 100,000 million forints are at issue. The Soviet claims total some 2,700 million roubles. The task of the experts is to reveal precisely what happened in the period between the end of the Second World War and 1956, and the conditions under which the Soviet Army took possession of the Hungarian-owned facilities.

The first agreement under which Soviet troops would use barracks, airfields and other facilities in Hungary, and the ins and outs of their leasing these, was concluded in 1948. Between 1948 and 1953, Hungary saw to a part of the maintenance and renovation of the buildings, and even carried out certain investments, according to investigations so far. The Soviet side only reimbursed around 10 per cent of the sums spent on this.

Mr Annus said the environmental damage caused by the Soviet troops during their stay in Hungary should also be examined. Asked whether the pull-out could be accelerated, Mr. Annus said it was not out of the question, but this mainly depended on an agreement between the two governments. Railway capacities are limited, and this means some of the troops would have to use public roads if the withdrawal were to be stepped-up. This would create a sort of "war zone" in the concerned regions and in sub-Carpathia for several months.

Mr Bajnok said the government mainly discussed themes which will make the change in government and the transfer of matters go smoothly.

The cabinet will prepare a situation analysis on the national economy and the state of governmental activity, and will collect all information that the new government requires in its work.

The government also dealt with the state of this year's budget.

It stated that the budget deficit in the first quarter of the year was lower than planned.

At the same time, Hungarian-Soviet trade shows a major decline, which has unfavourable effects on the budget.

As a consequence of declining turnover, the budget stands to lose revenues of some 10,000 million forints.

In rouble-accounting foreign trade, Hungarian exports to the Soviet Union are expected to drop by about 15 per cent and imports by 12 per cent this year.

The drop in Hungarian foreign trade with the other CMEA countries will also be major: Exports are to go down by 26 per cent, and imports by 21 per cent as compared to last year's level.

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Cuba, Norway Clash Over NATO Base in Bermuda

FL2404194390 Bridgetown CANA in English 1846 GMT 24 Apr 90

[All names as received]

[Text] United Nations, April 24 (CANA)—Cuba and Norway which hold opposing views on the future of Bermuda have clashed at the UN [United Nations] over the question of the impact of the British-U.S. military base on the island's political future.

Cuba believes the NATO military facilities on the island were impeding Bermuda's march to independence but Norway contends that no one could prove that the base was blocking self determination. On top of that, claimed Dag Mjaaland, Norway's representative on the UN sub-committee on small territories, the base was providing economic benefits to Bermuda.

Victoria M. Delgado Ramirez, the Cuba official on the sub-committee, urged the panel at a meeting in New York to send a mission to Bermuda to hear for itself what the real situation was concerning independence. She contended that while Bermuda's Premier John Swan was quoted as having said that independence was "no longer a major issue" and that a "majority of the people" didn't want independence at this time, the opposition in the island was saying otherwise and had in fact expressed support for independence.

Ms Delgado Ramirez charged that despite the improvements in the relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the U.S. with Britian's approval, was continuing a military presence in Bermuda, emphasizing the island's strategic military importance and was occupying a third of the territory.

But Norway's Mjaaland responded by arguing that for one thing the sub-committee was not empowered to consider the question of military activities of colonial powers. For another, he added, he couldn't see how the military bases were interfering with independence for Bermuda. Mjaaland stated that Bermuda which was benefitting from the bases to the tune of U.S. 80 million dollars every year, a sum generated by the spending of American military personnel, had freely entered an agreement for the base.

Norway found support for its views from Chile whose representative, Fernando Cisternas, had previously complained about Britian's failure to provide the panel with up-to-date information on what was going on in Bermuda. Cisternas said that it was clear that the people of Bermuda were benefitting from the various economic and military agreements now in force there. Those arrangements, he declared, didn't represent an impediment to independence.

Naval Conference Analyzes Soviet Naval Power

PY2504192090 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0540 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] Santiago, 24 April (EFE)—The commanders in chief of the Navies of 15 countries of the Americas, who are attending the 15th Inter-American Naval Conference, today analyzed the growing power of the Soviet military fleet and the coordination of efforts to control maritime drug trafficking.

The conference opened on 23 April in Valparaiso, 125 km northwest of Santiago. It is being attended by the Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, Canadian, Colombian, Ecuadoran, Salvadoran, U.S., Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan, Peruvian, Uruguayan, Venezuelan, and Chilean Navy commanders in chief.

In his speech, Chilean Navy Commander in Chief Admiral Jorge Martinez Busch stressed the fact that "Soviet military power continues to grow."

He added that "the fact that the permanent political objective of the USSR is to dominate the world cannot be ignored."

Sources of the conference said that the commanders, who will meet until 27 April, will analyze issues like the technological development of navies and the role of naval forces in antidrug operations. This issue will be raised at the conference by the U.S. delegation.

ARGENTINA

Defense Minister Denies Missile Pact With Iraq

PY2104232890 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 2134 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Buenos Aires, 21 April (DYN)—Defense Minister Humberto Romero said today that Argentina has "suspended and frozen" the "Condor" missile project. He also denied international press reports that the missile was being built in secret with Iraq for potential use against Israel.

During a meeting with reporters this afternoon, Romero said: "The project was suspended because of a political decision, and also because we do not have funds to finance this technical project."

This is how the minister implicitly alluded to the repeated press reports from Europe, the United States, and the Middle East about Argentine participation in the construction of one of the stages of the Iraqi missile system.

Although he did not specifically mention Iraq, Israel, or the report on the missile, Romero said: "We want to put this to rest in the face of publications that appear in the international press every so often." He added: "We

always said the project never represented any risk or danger for anyone, but at any rate the project was suspended, it is frozen."

This week Iraqi President Saddam Husayn said his country can wage a total war against Israel through the use of medium-range strategic missiles that can reportedly carry chemical weapons. Husayn also said any Israeli effort to bomb the Iraqi missile manaufacturing plants would be futile because "our missiles are made in parts in different areas of the world."

On several occasions our country has been mentioned as the manufacturer, in cooperation with Egypt and Iraq, of medium-range —about 800 km—ballistic missiles. Each time Argentina has categorically denied this. The Argentine Air Force successfully developed the "Condor I" and "Condor II" projects. It has been assured that these are for putting a domestic satellite in orbit.

The last missile test was made July 1989 at the Chamical Airspace Base, La Rioja Province, where a stage of the "Condor" missile travelled more that 160 km.

Menem Says Missile Scrapped Over U.S. Concern

PY2604024090 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 25 Apr 90 p 8

[Text] President Carlos Menem said yesterday the project for the construction of the Condor II missile was deactivated some time ago for lack of resources. He admitted, however, that the government made that decision to avoid a confrontation with the United States and other countries.

The U.S. concern for the project was recently reiterated to Argentine officials—including President Menem—by President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and U.S. Ambassador Terence Todman.

The Argentine Government reportedly expects that freezing this project will help get the national aeronautics industry into the U.S. market, especially with the IA-63 Pampa training plane. It has been learned that about 500 of these planes may be sold in the United States in an operation worth several million dollars, and that efforts in this regard had been made under the Raul Alfonsin administration.

This may not be the only reason for the suspension of the Condor II project. London was also pleased with the Argentine decision, because that type of missile would be a permanent threat to its defense of the Malvinas Islands.

President Menem also discussed other current issues at a radio station yesterday. Menem rejected former President Raul Alfonsin's remarks that the government is leaning toward the right by saying the concept of the Radical Civic Union is "strictly demagoguery."

Regarding the social and economic crisis, Menem said the population "is bearing the situation" because the people know the government's economic adjustment program "is not another lie." Menem admitted the percentage of poverty is "extremely high," but said that this is true not only in Argentina but in all the developing countries, "which are in the same condition as we are, or worse."

IRAQ

Envoy Addresses UN on Mass Destruction Weapons

JN2504193390 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1850 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] The United Nations, 25 April (INA)—Iraq today reaffirmed its readiness to make the Middle East region an area free of the weapons of mass destruction.

This came in a speech delivered by Iraqi Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Wisam al-Zahawi before the extraordinary UN General Assembly [UNGA] session on international economic cooperation.

Al-Zahawi added that His Excellency President Saddam Husayn announced this position to a U.S. Congress delegation on 12 April. He went on to say that the president told the delegation that making the region an area free of mass destruction weapons is the only way to end their proliferation, protect the security and stability of the region, and help secure the huge revenues needed by the region's countries to overcome their economic difficulties.

Al-Zahawi indicated the countries which stress the need for banning only chemical weapons or call for the destruction of only this category of weapons, thus excluding nuclear weapons in the region, are taking an unfair stand that allows Israel—to the exclusion of other parties—to possess a weapon of mass destruction. Thus, Israel would be allowed to continue to pursue its hostile and expansionist policy against the Palestinian and Arab peoples, to annex the occupied Arab territories, and to evict their residents, thus defying the whole international community, al-Zahawi added.

Al-Zahawi affirmed that all categories of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, must be banned. The banning of a single category of weapons to the exclusion of other categories, particularly nuclear, is not acceptable, al-Zahawi said.

Al-Zahawi affirmed that developing nations have the right to attain scientific and technological advancement to develop their economy and modernize their industries for peaceful purposes. He added: The transfer of technology to developing nations has not risen to the level of desirable results. The world is currently witnessing serious attempts to cut down to size the scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities of the developing nations by imposing restrictions on their importation of technology from developed nations.

The Iraqi official went on to say: Iraq is one of the Third World nations that currently is the target of a fierce campaign to hamper its efforts to achieve scientific and industrial progress and to create a propitious climate for launching a new aggression on its nuclear installations—which were built for peaceful purposes—an aggression similar to the one Israel committed in 1981.

Al-Zahawi indicated Iraq is being exposed to unjust and biased campaigns despite the fact it is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its installations are under the constant supervision of the International Atomic Energy Authority, and that it accepted all UN Security Council resolutions calling for the establishment of peace and stability in the region.

The Foreign Ministry under secretary added: At the same time, we see Israel—which has committed repeated aggressions on the Arab states, rejected UN Security Council and UNGA resolutions, and refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—taking part in advanced research programs with the United States—a development which opens the doors wide for it to acquire the most advanced and sophisticated technological innovations regarding the means to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

ISRAEL

Iraq Could Conduct 'Simulated Nuclear Tests'

TA2604093190 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Apr 90 p A1

[Report by Re'uven Pedatzur]

[Text] Iraq is capable of linking up to a Cray 2 supercomputer that can carry out simulated nuclear tests and simulations of missile trajectories. The supercomputer, which the Americans did not agree to sell to Israel, was sold to Saudi Arabia and installed there on 26 January 1990. A computer communications network was recently set up between Iraq and Saudi Arabia allowing Iraq to receive sophisticated computer services without anyone knowing or being able to monitor it.

This information was discovered by researchers at the Ne'eman Institute attached to the Technion as part of their research focusing on computer developments in the Arab countries. It seems the Saudis bought the Cray 2, which they announced was meant for use by oil companies searching for underground oil sources. The computer was installed in the town of al-Zahran, but computer experts say it is not used in oil exploration, and that its main edge is in physics research. It is the only computer in the world capable of carrying out very large simulations and therefore also the only one suitable for implementing simulations of nuclear tests.

Data gathered by the researchers also show the Arab countries have made impressive advances in the teaching and use of computers, and that Israel lags behind them in several fields.

The researchers discovered that even the Technion in Haifa lags far behind developments on the Iraqi computer scene. The Iraqi computer activity is being carried out according to a detailed multiyear plan and its achievements are very impressive.

Asia, Africa Urged To Help End Nuclear Proliferation

90UF0034A Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 3, Mar 90 pp 2-3

[Article by A. Prokhozhev: "A Vital Necessity"]

[Text] **The President's Commission on Disarmament of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) met in Moscow. The representatives of the national organizations of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement discussed a broad range of issues pertaining to disarmament. The following address by Professor A. Prokhozhev, representing Soviet public opinion, is brought to the attention of our readers.**

By now perhaps no one doubts that in the event of a nuclear war, there will be no victors, and that the outcome will mean the death of our entire civilization. Only an isolated group of "Cold Warriors", by now few in number, persist in trying to persuade mankind that it is feasible, under conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, to exploit the power of the atom for military purposes without injury to the world or its inhabitants. This is why efforts have been so stepped-up to promote the use of laser weapons, which actually represent nuclear weapons of a third generation.

Ultimately, however, whatever the source of destruction that is responsible for the annihilation of every living thing on earth, whether conventional radiation, X-rays, neutrons, or simply the blast repercussion, it makes no difference, does it?

That is why the Soviet Union has proposed to the world community, as one of its most important global objectives, a program of action designed to enable civilization to enter the third millennium without the presence of nuclear weapons. In the struggle against the nuclear arms race, the stand of the Soviet Union for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons closely reflects or coincides with the views of many nations in the world, including those of the Afro-Asian region. It is this which allows us to evaluate optimistically the possibility of extending cooperative efforts between the USSR and the Afro-Asian countries in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. In this connection the Delhi Declaration, signed in November 1986 by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi, on principles of non-violence and a world free of nuclear weapons, acquires special significance. This declaration in capsule form provides the essence of the policy of peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age.

The first substantial strides in curbing nuclear weapons under the terms of the INF treaty and the treaty to be concluded shortly between the United States and the USSR, which provides for a 50 percent cutback in strategic weapons, offer reason for optimism with respect to improving the international climate. It should be recognized, however, that the situation in the Afro-Asian region arouses the serious concern of peace-loving public opinion. Here, for the present, not one of the numerous foreign military bases has been shut down, nor have the U. S. armed forces stationed in these countries been reduced in size, and the number of warships of the imperialistic powers in the Pacific and Indian oceans has even increased. The United States, for example, is planning to increase the number of warships equipped with nuclear weapons in its Pacific Ocean fleet to a total of 50 by 1991. There is also a large U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean, consisting of an aircraft carrier, a helicopter carrier, a battleship, 7 cruisers, and 11 ships of other kinds. According to certain assessments, U.S. ships and shore facilities have more than a thousand nuclear weapons concentrated in the Mediterranean. There is also a Soviet squadron in the area, but it consists of no more than a cruiser and three other surface vessels. And, of course, there are no stocks of Soviet nuclear weapons in the area.

A factor that has complicated world conditions is the armed aggression of the United States against Panama. An overwhelming majority of members of the world community have branded this intervention as shameful. The Soviet Government has issued a declaration condemning the aggressive actions of the United States.

Common concerns with ensuring world stability demand that decisive steps be taken in the field of disarmament. Although certain successes have been achieved in this respect during the past few years, thanks to continually stronger confirmation of the principles underlying the new political thinking in the international arena, nevertheless, serious impediments remain on the path toward the desired goal.

The United States and its allies, for example, under various pretexts, stubbornly refuse to enter into negotiations with regard to limiting or reducing naval forces, particularly ships with nuclear weapons or cruise missiles on board.

There can be no doubt that a successful resolution of this problem would have a beneficial effect on the state of international security throughout the world, including in Africa and Asia. For this reason the movement of public opinion calling for the elimination of foreign military units and bases on the territory of countries in Africa, Asia, and contiguous oceans and offshore areas continues to be one that is one of vital and timely importance.

But this is only one of the problems. Another one of no less and possibly of even greater importance is that a number of Afro-Asian countries have become infected with the virus of acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. Over the past decade there has been a pronounced movement, particularly in the countries of these two continents, to gain possession of the technical means of producing nuclear weapons. The number of these countries that, in fact, have nuclear weapons already or are close to producing them is growing. It is no accident that almost all of them refrained from signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.

There is, first of all, the South Africa, which has been working on the development of nuclear weapons intensively for many years, and according to foreign press reports is already preparing to test them. It is estimated that the South Africa is capable of producing up to 18 atomic bombs per year.

There is Israel, which possesses the appropriate technology, and which has already, apparently, managed to acquire a considerable number of nuclear charges. Although Tel Aviv denies that such weapons exist there, it is common knowledge that a fairly large nuclear power industry has been established in the country with the assistance of firms in the West. Since there are no nuclear electric power plants in Israel, it is perfectly clear that the developing nuclear industry has a purely military purpose. The capacity of the reactor in Dimon now exceeds 150,000 kilowatts, which makes it possible to produce up to 40 kilograms of plutonium a year. According to various estimates, Israel has already acquired an arsenal of from 20 to 200 nuclear bombs. There is the actual potential as well for the development of nuclear weaponry of the second generation—that is, hydrogen or neutron bombs. Israel is also actively engaged in U.S. efforts to create a third generation of nuclear weapons as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Since the mid-1970's, a nuclear development program has been vigorously in progress in Pakistan. In 1982 at Kahuta near Islamabad a plant was built to produce enriched uranium, and work has been completed on a plant to refine plutonium received from the nuclear electric power plant in Karachi, which has long been in operation, with a capacity of 137 thousand kilowatts. In March 1987 the director of the nuclear development program, Abdul Kadir Khan, officially announced the existence of a nuclear bomb in Pakistan and the successful testing of a prototype model. Recently, the chief of staff of the ground forces stated publicly that Pakistan seeks to secure nuclear weapons in order to strengthen its armed forces and to exert a "restraining influence" on its adversary.

A quite large nuclear capability is at the disposal of India. Six reactors located at nuclear electric power plants have a total capacity of more than a million kilowatts. From the very beginning of its operations in the field of developing atomic power, and following the explosion of an atomic device in 1974, India has declared its determination not to possess nuclear weapons, and it has maintained the inadmissibility of exploiting the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons in the relations between states. But as everyone knows, no sooner will nuclear weapons appear in Pakistan than India will be obliged to provide an adequate response. Indian leaders have repeatedly warned of this eventuality. India now possesses the requisite scientific, technical and productive potential to take this step.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan also have the technical resources to produce nuclear weapons. In Japan about 40 nuclear reactors are currently in operation with a total capacity of 25 million kilowatts. In South Korea there are six reactors in operation with a capacity of 4.4 million kilowatts, and on Taiwan there are six reactors with a capacity of 4.2 million kilowatts. Although Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, periodically the ruling circles of these countries assert that they have a right to create "a defensive nuclear capability."

The development of nuclear power engineering in other countries of Asia and Africa as well will lead unavoidably to the accumulation of nuclear materials, scientific and technical knowledge, and production experience, all of which without the proper international controls can be exploited for the purpose of mastering the production of nuclear weapons. Whenever nuclear weapons appear in one country or another, the desire of neighboring countries to possess them inevitably arises. Thus the danger grows of a chain reaction that will spread nuclear weapons across the continents of Asia and Africa.

More and more countries of Asia and Africa are on the way to developing nuclear power engineering. Currently in the region there are more than 50 nuclear reactors in operation and as many more are being built or on the drawing boards. As a result the total nuclear electric power plant (AES) capacity in the region will double by the year 2000 and amount to 17 percent of the total world AES capacity. (Presently, it is 12.7 percent.) As the tragedy of the Chernobyl AES has demonstrated, the utilization of the energy of the atom for peaceful purposes is also fraught with great danger. An accident at an AES in countries of high population density, even on a scale ten times less serious than the accident at Chernobyl, could threaten the lives of many millions of people. Moreover, the relocation of these power plants to uninhabited areas makes them uneconomical. Supplementary measures are now being taken to make nuclear power engineering safer and more reliable. But all such efforts pertain to the purely technical side of the problem.

In the event of any kind of incident or armed conflict, an AES is defenseless against terrorist acts or attacks with conventional weapons. A precedent occurred in June 1981 when Israeli aircraft destroyed a nuclear reactor in Iraq. Fortunately, the reactor was not ready to operate and had not yet been loaded with nuclear fuel. The blowing-up of a single operating plant with conventional explosives could lead to incalculable casualties and to unpredictable consequences on a global scale. Calculations indicate that the destruction of an AES with a capacity of a million kilowatts would have consequences comparable to the explosion of a one-megaton hydrogen bomb. There are major hazards also connected with storage of the waste products of nuclear power plants. Many Western countries are increasingly trying to dispose of these waste products at a greater distance from themselves, on the territories of countries in Asia and Africa.

The growing threat of nuclear danger in the Afro-Asian region dictates the necessity of renewed efforts to mount public opinion within the member countries of Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization in pursuit of the following objectives:

—Universal and complete cessation and prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests;

—International agreement by nuclear and nearly nuclear powers, renouncing a first use of nuclear weapons in Asia, Africa, and the world as a whole. It is well known that the first commitment of this kind was voluntarily assumed by the Soviet Union. It was subsequently endorsed by the People's Republic of China. Other nuclear powers, however, have not agreed to adopt such a commitment. It is submitted that the movement for a collective resolution of this grave problem in the form of an international agreement would encourage the ruling circles of the these countries to undertake similar commitments, reinforcing first and foremost trust and mutual security.

—An international agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons against countries and regions maintaining a non-nuclear status based on the three non-nuclear principles: not to have, not to produce, and not to introduce nuclear weapons on their territory.

—Participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the states of Asia and Africa that have yet to sign it, and stronger international efforts to monitor atomic materials and technology under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is necessary to bear in mind, moreover, that this treaty terminates in 1995.

—An international convention recognizing that terrorist acts of subversion and attacks on nuclear power plants with conventional weapons during armed conflicts, as well as the acquired skills and resources to undertake such acts, constitute a crime against humanity that cannot be tolerated. It is entirely fitting that such an urgent problem be submitted for consideration to the countries of Asia and Africa, where the era of atomic energy engineering is only just beginning.

—Elimination and repudiation of the use of chemical weapons, the production of which, as experience shows, can be used as a basis for producing purportedly innocuous precursor components.

—Achievement of these goals can contribute profoundly to ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war, while bringing about a radical improvement in the international situation.

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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner on Alliance's Strategy

AU2504144290 East Berlin HORIZONT in German No 4/90 (signed to press 2 Apr 90) pp 20-22

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Peter Stechmesser in Bonn; date not given]

[Text] [Stechmesser] Dramatic changes in East Europe, including the March elections in the GDR—all this makes strategic concepts and patterns of thought that have been valid for years appear outdated. The vital question for mankind is whether the responsible officials will actually eliminate things that have become anachronistic and arrive at a way of thinking and acting that is in line with the requirements of the present and future. Now I would like to ask you the following question: What can be expected in this respect from NATO's spring meetings?

[Woerner] Your question includes an assumption on which I agree with you—that we need new concepts, new patterns of thinking, and a new political and security architecture in Europe at the beginning of a new era of European history. This does not mean that everything that exists should be eliminated, at least not until solid new and binding structures are created. However, existing structures will partly be filled with new contents. I am referring to the end of confrontation and to the transition to more cooperation between the European states. You must see the series of meetings of the Atlantic Alliance in this light. I expect two meetings between the foreign ministers—one in April and one in June—and two meetings between the defense ministers—one in the form of the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group and one in the form of the Defense Council. We will try to achieve two things: For one thing, we will try to find an answer to the question as to the current role and the task of the Atlantic Alliance in view of recent changes, and how we picture Europe's future security system. The defense ministers will have to try and draw conclusions from the changes concerning the threat from the East and the risks that are involved. There is no doubt that the classical threat in the form that is known to us—Soviet expansionism with the possibility of a surprise attack—has declined, if not completely vanished. This naturally entails consequences for NATO's strategy, the composition of the armed forces, and many other things. Initial answers must be provided here.

[Stechmesser] What role will flexible response play in NATO's future strategy under these changed conditions?

[Woerner] I cannot really anticipate the results of our investigations in my capacity as secretary general. Of course, this strategy will have to be reconsidered as well. However, I believe that one thing will remain indispensable in the long run: A combination of nuclear and conventional weapons at the lowest possible level—with the only aim of making wars impossible for all time. This requires a minimum level of nuclear weapons, designed to prevent war. Decisions will have to be made regarding the number of the weapons and other aspects, probably in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. There are elements that can and must be preserved, and there are others that must be reconsidered and changed. It may happen that we adopt a new strategy. However, I cannot make any binding statements on this.

[Stechmesser] Do you think that a certain arsenal of nuclear weapons will also be required in Europe? The chairman of the Armed Forces Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Les Aspin, for example, claimed recently that NATO is able to defend itself in a conflict without nuclear weapons.

[Woerner] Les Aspin's statements are to be seen from a defense point of view. Defense is of secondary importance for us. What we are interested in is the prevention of war; we do not want to find ourselves in a position where we have to defend ourselves. We want to make it clear that an attack is completely useless. To achieve this, we need a minimum arsenal of nuclear weapons, because nuclear weapons are the only deterrent that have made war completely useless. Since the invention of nuclear weapons, our strategy is no longer aimed at the art of waging a war but at preventing war. I wish nuclear weapons had never been invented, but it is a fact that they exist. The knowledge of how to produce them can no longer be eradicated from people's minds. For me the following idea is decisive: Since the construction of nuclear weapons, there has been no war—neither a nuclear nor a conventional one—between two states that own nuclear weapons. We will have to reduce the number of these weapons drastically. We hope to achieve agreement on minimum deterrence with the Soviet Union.

[Stechmesser] Thus, mankind cannot hope for a future without nuclear weapons?

[Woerner] I do not think that the idea of a nuclear-free world can be realized. One can only try to prevent these weapons from being used, and to think about how their war-preventing effect can be utilized to make conventional wars impossible. Thus, I can only suggest reducing all weapons to a minimum on the basis of mutual agreements. This must be verifiable so everybody can see that war is useless. This is the only thing we are interested in, and there are good chances that this will be achieved. I say this after talks with Soviet officials. The discussion is going in this direction in the Soviet Union as well.

[Stechmesser] If nuclear weapons will continue to exist for an indefinite period, does this also include the danger that a nuclear war might break out accidentally?

[Woerner] I consider this danger to be very small. This is true for the present and all the more for the future when we will establish a network of confidence-building measures, with our neighbors in the East at least, including the Soviet Union, and when we will know what the other side is doing as a result of the disarmament agreements.

Additional instruments designed to overcome crises will most probably be created in the course of the expansion of the CSCE process—in addition to the existing warning center established by the Americans and Soviets—to prevent or further limit the risk of the accidental outbreak of a war. Once East and West have largely opened up and once they are linked by confidence-building measures, and are ready to show their hands—in such a landscape I consider the danger of an accidental outbreak practically nonexistent.

[Stechmesser] Do you consider it possible that the nuclear weapons which, in your view, are necessary to prevent war will one day become the joint instruments of the existing blocs of NATO and Warsaw Pact, that would lead to the dissolution of these blocs into an international security union?

[Woerner] This would only be possible if we succeeded one day in establishing an extremely dense comprehensive security system which would be vested with decisionmaking power and executive organs. This is a distant vision that seems quite agreeable to me. However, this will unfortunately not become a reality in the near future. The tasks we are facing presently are to reduce nuclear weapons, to ensure their balance, and to incorporate them into a network of security-building measures. I see no other way. If somebody finds a better and viable way that can be realized tomorrow, I am quite willing to think about it.

[Stechmesser] The future security-political status of a united Germany has become the most important question in Europe. If I have correctly understood the statements you made recently, on whether a united Germany must be a member of NATO, you differentiate between the military and political integration of the GDR territory in NATO. Can you elaborate on this with a view to the security interests of the Soviet Union?

[Woerner] To prevent a repetition of the old game of the power policy of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, and to ensure the stability of Europe, we are seeking a solution that incorporates Germany into security structures. In my view, this can only be the EC and the Atlantic Alliance. There are no problems concerning the EC. The Soviet Union will probably not object to this solution. Concerning the Atlantic Alliance, the Soviet Union has made contradictory statements. For this reason, we must offer solid guarantees to the USSR which ensure that the membership of a united Germany in NATO will not be directed against the Soviet Union. What guarantees can we offer?

First: NATO's military units are not extended beyond the borders of the present-day FRG. Thus, there will be no shift in the military balance to the detriment of the Soviet Union.

Second: We would not object to the deployment of Soviet troops on present-day GDR territory during a transition period.

Third: We build a joint comprehensive security system within the framework of the CSCE process, which cannot replace the alliances—at least not the Atlantic Alliance—but which certainly supplements the alliances and provides a framework. The Soviet Union would certainly have its place in such a system.

Considering these elements, the Soviet Union can be expected to accept such a solution. Various Soviet officials, including Mr. Dashichev, have recently expressed similar views.

Let me mention a final aspect: As a matter of fact, the Atlantic Alliance was established during the Cold War, but it increasingly lost its confrontational character. It has turned into a purely defensive alliance, and I pointed out to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in a talk that he knows as well as I do that 16 free, democratically organized, and sovereign nations that are based on the principle of self-determination would never be able to jointly launch a war of aggression; 16 free parliaments would have to decide on a war. This is not possible. Regardless of the angle that I view the issue from, I do not believe that a neutral Germany would be a better solution for the Soviet Union than a Germany that is embedded in nonaggressive structures.

[Stechmesser] What prospects do you see for the creation of a comprehensive European security system? Under what conditions do you think NATO and the Warsaw Pact might dissolve into such a system?

[Woerner] The chances for the establishment of such a system have never been more favorable than at this point. Both sides are aiming at this goal, which will one day be realized. However, it will be a long time before a solid foundation is created which will guarantee the security of all of us. I view this as a historic process, whose end I cannot foresee but whose beginning we are currently shaping—by strengthening the individual elements of the CSCE process and by establishing the first institutions. We want to accelerate this historic development with all our force. A great deal will naturally depend on the developments in the Soviet Union, on whether democratization will continue there.

[Stechmesser] Do you still see a need for the modernization of the tactical nuclear missiles planned for 1992 which would be directed toward German territory?

[Woerner] This is a difficult question. We arrived at some sort of compromise within the Alliance and postponed the decision until the year 1992. In my capacity as secretary general, I stick to this decision. I consider possible the discussion of this issue in connection with the opening of disarmament talks, or in connection with a revision of our strategy. We decided to start negotiations on nuclear short-range weapons after the conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna talks and at the beginning of their implementation in the Soviet Union. I think that these conditions will exist next year at the latest.

[Stechmesser] Opinion polls in West Europe have revealed that the majority of people no longer see a threat from the East. In view of this, what remains of NATO's defense motive?

[Woerner] We no longer consider the deterrence of directly imminent attacks to be the main tasks of our armed forces, but the minimization of risks. Nobody knows what will happen in the USSR tomorrow. Developments in East Europe also contain risks and insecurities. Therefore, it is useful to maintain sufficient armed forces and a convincing defense capability so that nobody will see the use of force as a possible solution, no matter what will happen.

[Stechmesser] Are there any changes to be expected concerning the first use of nuclear weapons?

[Woerner] Many people confuse first use and first strike. First use only means that one makes the attacker constantly aware of the risks involved in the use of nuclear weapons, thus trying to prevent him from considering military aggression. If one sees it this way, this concept continues to be useful.

[Stechmesser] How will relations with the Warsaw Pact develop in the future?

[Woerner] The Atlantic Alliance views itself as a cornerstone of the new security system, which is aimed at cooperation, not confrontation. Our Alliance has made a great deal of political concessions to the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. It has not taken advantage of the Soviet weaknesses but supports the reform process. Something like that never happened before in human history. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze came to see me. CSFR Foreign Minister Dienstbier, and Poland's Foreign Minister Skubiszewski paid a visit to NATO. I have received an invitation to visit Moscow. Thus, dialogue with the Warsaw Pact is intensifying and broadening. This is also a confidence-building element. If the Warsaw Pact turns into a civilian and politically-oriented system of treaties including sovereign states with equal rights —as has been suggested by some officials—I see the possibility of direct relations.

NATO is the decisive element of stability at a time characterized by instabilities. I think this is the reason why an increasing number of politicians from the Warsaw Pact want to talk with us. The Japanese prime minister also told me that he considers NATO to be a global factor of stability. It would be unreasonable to abandon the common interests that have developed between the 16 member states of the Atlantic Alliance and the cooperation that has developed in finding solutions to political problems and in the sphere of security. The future should not be dominated by rivalry between individual states, but by cooperation among the states—in supranational organizations, such as the EC, for example, or in multilateral organizations, such as NATO. The future of the European system of states is reflected in an exemplary manner in the structure of our alliance.

Proposal for WEU Multilateral Force Resisted

AU2404090490 Paris AFP in English 1953 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Report by gham]

[Text] Brussels, April 23 (AFP)—The nine members of the Western European Union (WEU) on Monday agreed to strengthen their organisation but failed to agree on setting up a combined European military force, officials said. Defence and foreign ministers of the alliance, which has been dormant for most of its 41 years, said they would work "to strengthen the European identity" in security, a communique said.

Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens, who chaired the meeting, said the WEU would strengthen consultations between its diplomatic and military wings, hold talks with Eastern European countries on aspects of security, and study the idea of setting up a European agency to verify arms accords by satellite.

His French counterpart, Roland Dumas, whose country takes over the WEU chair from July 1, said France "wants to strengthen the WEU and its cohesion, so that it becomes the crucible of the European identity in security matters."

The meeting, diplomats said, gave momentum to ambitions to develop a "European pillar" in NATO that would give Europe a greater say—and greater responsibility—for its own security. The idea has been controversial in NATO, as alliance members conflict over which forum should be in charge of directing the European role, and exactly how far European countries should develop their own military strategy.

The ministers, meeting in a twice-a-year council, agreed that the WEU and NATO, supported by the continued presence of Canadian and U.S. force in Europe, were "essential instruments" for security. But there were differing strands of opinion as to whether the WEU should be absorbed by the European Economic Community if the EEC becomes a political alliance as well as an economic one. The communique said ministers "recognised the need...to promote the process of European integration, including the security dimension." But British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, whose government opposes the idea of EEC political union, spoke out strongly in favour of the WEU, saying "it will certainly continue. He also played down hopes by WEU Secretary-general Wim van Eekelen, supported by Belgium, to set up a multinational European force. Mr Hurd stressed traditional British concerns that any European security forum must not exclude the United States, as this could fuel isolationist sentiment in Washington. "We ought to discuss it (the multinational force) with the Americans, and NATO is the right forum for a decision," he said.

Britain's position was paradoxically supported by France, out of fears that a multinational force, under

NATO command, would prejudice France's independent position within the alliance, diplomats said. French Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement said he had deleted a planned reference to the force in the communique as it could be interpreted as a "covert return" by France to NATO's integrated military command, which it quit in 1966.

Despite this setback, Mr Eyskens insisted that the multinational force idea "is making headway."

The next WEU council will be held in Paris in November.

Mr Dumas said he expected that meeting "to be able to decide" whether to set up a European satellite agency to verify arms cuts.

The 16 NATO and seven Warsaw Pact members have been meeting in Vienna for the past 13 months to discuss reductions in conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.

The WEU comprises France, Britain, the Benelux countries, Spain, Italy, West Germany and Portugal.

The alliance pledges mutual defence among its members in case of attack. But its military functions were swiftly superseded by NATO.

It was revived in 1984 under a French initiative to develop a European security role, but debate has continued as to how the role should be developed and to what extent it should include the United States.

Western European Union Discusses Military Plan

LD2304154590 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1200 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] In Brussels this morning the Western European Union—WEU—began a ministerial meeting in which it will be debating the prospects for a new military balance in Europe, above all if an agreement on conventional arms is arrived at in Vienna between the two superpowers. The creation of possible multilateral European forces and consideration of a report on security in the continent for the five years 1991-1995 will also be subjects for analysis. (Joan Barrios) has an up-to-the-minute report from the Belgian capital.

[Barrios] This spring meeting of the WEU Council is the first one in which Spain and Portugal have taken part as full members. This morning WEU secretary general Netherlander van Ecklen explained to the foreign and defense ministers of the nine member states his ideas on the creation of multinational units formed by soldiers from different countries. Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez has stressed the need for a conference on cooperation and European security devoted to dealing with the problems of the Mediterranean. For his part Defense Minister Narcis Serra expressed his support for a plan which envisions verification agreements on disarmament. This plan advocated a division of the work of the inspectors, a common training for them, and the incorporation of inspectors from other countries in the national inspection teams.

Woerner Cited on European Security System

LD2404222890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1630 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general, has given an exclusive interview for Czechoslovak radio to Zdenek Vilimek, our London correspondent. We have selected the following section for Radio Newsreel in which our correspondent asked:

[Begin recording] [Vilimek] Mr General Secretary, you have talked about the necessity for a future European-wide security system. What do you think of our government's proposal in this field?

[Woerner speaking in English with superimposed Czech translation] Foreign Minister Dienstbier has put forward a very interesting proposal about the future security system in Europe. That proposal contains very interesting components. We agree with some of them; some will have to be the subject of ongoing talks and there are also elements in it with which we do not agree. The main interest of acquiring a total, combined security system in Europe, which would be accessible to all, is understandable and we will support it.

I do not want to go into details now. I want to reply to your minister's letter this week. I do not want to preempt my written reply but the general line of our standpoint will be precisely that.

It is not easy to judge the present situation within the Warsaw Pact and to be quite honest it is not a NATO secretary general's role to give answers to questions which Warsaw Pact member countries should resolve in their free decisionmaking. I will leave it to the Warsaw Pact members to determine their future, whether it will continue to exist, whether it will have a political role to play and what kind of military role it is to have. All these questions are now open. I said the following to Minister Shevardnadze: It does not matter what your joint decisions are provided they are taken freely of course. We will then respect them.

If on the basis of an agreement of all member countries taken freely and within the framework of self-determination of the Warsaw Pact becomes a political alliance we will then naturally be in contact with such an organization and it can also be a part of the mentioned security system. [end recording]

Genscher on Unification, Multilateral Force

AU2404112290 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 24 Apr 90 p 1

[AFP report: "Genscher Briefs Partners"]

[Text] Brussels (AFP)—At the beginning of the ministers' meeting of the West European Union (WEU), FRG

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher briefed the partner states on the process of German unity. In this context, he welcomed again the intention to convene a special NATO summit on this topic. This also applies to the summit of the CSCE states, which provide an "important framework for stability," Genscher said. According to Genscher's own words, the German proposal to establish a center for the prevention of crises as a further confidence-building measure in Europe met with the "colleagues' interest." Considerations on the establishment of multilateral military units also played a part in the deliberations of the ministers. The interest in this is "very great," a military representative stated in Brussels.

NATO's Galvin Interviewed on Arms Policy

LD2704184890 Hamburg DPA in German 1752 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] Frankfurt (DPA)—Gen John Galvin, NATO commander in chief in Europe, does not rule out the complete elimination soon of short-range nuclear weapons. In an interview for the "FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU" (Saturday edition), Galvin said that in view of the changes in Eastern Europe he has to revise his attitude on this issue. In this context he expects "very far-reaching decisions" from NATO's nuclear planning group in Canada at the beginning of May.

As FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU goes on to report, quoting sources in Brussels, it is to be a matter of the formal ending of production of the successor to the Lance nuclear missiles currently based in the Federal Republic. However, Galvin pointed out in the interview that the work on the successor to Lance is far advanced, with the result that a new weapon would be quickly available.

The article was prereleased to DPA in an edited form.

Woerner Outlines NATO Reorganization

AU2904152490 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 Apr 90 p 5

[Report by F.Y.]

[Text] Bonn—NATO does not yet have a finished concept of the reorganization of security in Europe, but meanwhile the outlines of its reorganization can be discerned. This was stated by NATO Secretary General Woerner in the Bundeswehr's Internal Command Center in Koblenz. Judging from all that can be seen so far, this reorganization will not consist of one organization, but of several elements, he said. NATO, the CSCE process, which is to be developed, while including the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and which has to be provided with instruments, for example, for the prevention of war and for verification, certainly belong to them. They also include the disarmament process and the EC, which has to be prepared for opening up to the East European states and for association agreements. It is necessary to accept that the Soviet Union does not want to be ousted from Europe, Woerner said. It has to be given the opportunity to continue safeguarding its legitimate interests in Europe. This includes refraining from shifting the balance in Europe. For this reason, it should not be ruled out that Soviet troops continue to remain in Germany for the time being.

Woerner dealt in detail with the role which, in his opinion, a changed NATO has to play in a changed security structure in Europe. Woerner rejected the view that NATO should only have a temporary role. The Western Alliance is irreplacable as a guarantee for security. The CSCE cannot fulfill these tasks, he stated. "If everybody guarantees the security of the other, nobody will guarantee it in an emergency because interests are not identical," the secretary general substantiated his rejection of the idea to use only the 35 CSCE states' cooperation in security policy as a support. Such an organization is a "small United Nations," which is valuable, but it can neither replace NATO today nor will it be able to do so tomorrow. The Western Alliance is adapting its defense concept to the changed situation in Europe. However, three structural elements of the alliance will not be changed: the transatlantic connection, the community of values, and the determination to take the necessary precautions to maintain its own defense capability. He especially mentioned the participation in the development of a pan-European security organization as new tasks for NATO. In the foreseeable future, the EC cannot take over NATO's political or security policy tasks. Political importance and influence is not the consequence of intentions, but of achievements, Woerner added.

In the opinion of the secretary general, three principles have to be considered when German unity is established: First, a neutral status of all-Germany is out of the question because it would foment the permanent danger of instability. On the other hand, no discriminating special regulations must be made for Germany; finally, the legitimate Soviet security interests must be taken into account. If the Soviet Union accepts these considerations, it would benefit permanently in the long run. One characteristic of the situation in today's Soviet Union is its lack of real allies, he said. However, the reorganization of Europe on the basis outlined by him would provide the Soviet Union with partners which would be "sincerely connected" with it because of their own interests. Woerner reported that he had received invitations to Prague and Warsaw and is looking forward to responding to them.

AUSTRIA

U.S. Denies Reports on CSCE Summit in Vienna

AU2804134890 Vienna Domestic Service in German 1000 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Washington has denied reports according to which Secretary of State Baker suggested Vienna as the

venue of the planned CSCE summit. The ORF correspondent in Washington reports that Baker suggested Vienna as the venue of a preparatory meeting for the summit, but that in a letter to the NATO foreign ministers, Baker does not express any preference for a specific venue of the summit. In the opinion of the United States, several European capitals, among them Vienna, are still under consideration. Besides Vienna, Paris also wants to host the CSCE summit.

DENMARK

Schluter Views German Unity, NATO Future

AU2804154090 Hamburg DIE WELT (Supplement) in German 27 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with Prime Minister Poul Schluter by Martina Schlingmann; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Schlingmann] How do you assess the political development in Eastern Europe?

[Schluter] I think that the development of the past few years is the most agreeable experience in our part of the world since the end of World War II. General skepticism prevailed for many decades. We did not really believe that such a change would happen soon. This peaceful revolution really happened suddenly. This gives us all hope for a better future.

[Schlingmann] At the end of last year you said that you did not want a unified Germany. What is your present attitude?

[Schluter] I was incorrectly quoted at that time. I actually used a very precise formulation: I do not call for unification. This demand comes from the population of the two parts of Germany. The Danish people and I believe in self-determination. Provided that the two sides want unification, we should regard this as a fact. It is that simple. By the way, German reunification has always been an objective of NATO.

[Schlingmann] That is to say, you would welcome unification?

[Schluter] I believe that German unification is the natural consequence of the Germans' release from a period dominated by Communism.

[Schlingmann] Are you concerned about unification?

[Schluter] No. Many people in many European countries, above all the older generation, are, of course, still affected by the events of war—also emotionally. However, it is far more important to state and to acknowledge that the FRG has developed a very solid democracy based on respect for human rights. Moreover, the FRG has been a solid and helpful member in numerous international organizations for years. Therefore, I do not see any reason for concern, on the contrary. Finally, it has to be taken into account that the objective of the leading personalities in Germany is the integration into the EC of a united Germany.

[Schlingmann] To what conditions do you want to subject the unification of the two German states?

[Schluter] I would like to see solutions that can be advocated by all neighboring states, so that the general climate will ease. Of course, the decisions are to be made in the two parts of Germany. However, it is important that the rest of Europe can fully agree to the solutions found. It would be a nice gesture if importance were to be attached to the CSCE states' acceptance of the conditions. I do not think that this is a must. But it would internationally create a pleasant atmosphere.

[Schlingmann] Was the Schleswig-Holstein question solved to everyone's satisfaction?

[Schluter] We can be proud of both sides of the Danish-German border. The way in which both governments have treated the minorities is an example for the solution of minority problems. Frankly speaking, the Schleswig-Holstein question is no longer a problem today. On the contrary, it is a positive addition. We are proud of the German minority, and I know that my colleagues on the other side are proud of the Danish minority. This is a historical quality from which others can learn.

[Schlingmann] How do you see NATO's future role?

[Schluter] I proceed on the assumption that in the next few years the same nations as today will belong to NATO. Of course, German unification will raise problems. However, I would like to deal with this unpragmatically. It is natural and necessary to include the present GDR territory in NATO after unification. However, we also have to ask ourselves what we can do to respect the legitimate and natural Soviet defense interests. It would certainly be comforting if we were to refrain from stationing troops of the FRG or other NATO states on the present GDR territory. Moreover, we should provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to deploy a limited number of its troops on GDR territory for a certain period. It must be a very limited number. However, I think that this is a fair price.

[Schlingmann] Do you see a realistic chance that the NATO will agree to this concept?

[Schluter] I see a chance if the number is small and the period is limited. One should also have in mind how the other side—in this case Moscow—sees a problem. And, in view of the defeat that Communism had to suffer, one should not maneuver the Soviet Union into a too weak position.

[Schlingmann] What time frame do you envisage?

[Schluter] This has to be clarified in negotiations with the Soviets. In general, however, the military problems created by German reunification should be connected with the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces. [passage omitted]

[Schlingmann] How competitive is the Danish economy in view of 1993?

[Schluter] I am sure that it is competitive—though not in all fields, but this is not necessary. Our policy aims at strengthening the private sector. At the same time, cuts must be made in the public sector. The main instruments are a tough tax policy and the creation of an economic climate that is favorable for entrepreneurs. We do not think much of subsidies. We are the EC country with the lowest level in this area.

[Schlingmann] Denmark always wanted to build a bridge between the EC and the European Free Trade Association [EFTA]. Have you been successful?

[Schluter] I believe that we have successfully fulfilled a bridging function between southern and northern Europe for many years. However, today I already see several EFTA countries that might apply for full EC membership. The reason is clear: In the next 10 or 20 years no EFTA country can be content with not being involved in the decisionmaking process. Apparently, the first country that will become a member might be Austria. Then I expect Norway to be the next.

[Schlingmann] Do you believe that, in addition to the EFTA countries, many states will strive for admission to the EC?

[Schluter] I do not doubt that some of the East European countries have such dreams. However, we first have to wait and see to what extent they actually practice real democracy and to what extent they know how to deal with free market economy. However, I am sure that many will be admitted in the long run. Until that time it is our duty to strengthen economic ties. We would be missing a great historic chance if we do not do everything to stablize the democratic and liberal tendencies. [passage omitted]

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

SS-20 Transporters Converted in Joint Venture

90EN0339A Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT MAGAZIN in German 13 Feb 90 pp 10-12

[Article by Hans Steenmans: "Where Swords Are Turned Into Ploughshares"—first paragraph is HANDELSBLATT MAGAZIN introduction]

[Text] Construction cranes are being built from mobile rocket launching ramps: This is the spectacular highlight in the product program of one of the first East-West joint ventures. The Kranlod Company in Odessa is a joint venture which is being tried out by the construction equipment manufacturer Liebherr and the Soviet state enterprise with the pithy name "January Uprising."

In front of the plain, 50,000-square-meter hall, which is the pride and joy of Kranlod's director-general manager Yuri Oserov, Odessa's joint venture takes on its political dimension. Next to brand-new mobile cranes with telescopic jibs, which have been under construction for one and a half years using designs and components from Liebherr, there are dusty, dented military vehicles. Most of them are in typical olive drab, but some of them have unusual bright yellow upper structures: Cranes have been installed on the carriages that were intended to be mobile launching ramps for rockets.

"What you see here is a kind of tangible disarmament," announces director Oserov. "Some of the carriages and tractors for the SS-4 and SS-7 rockets are equipped with crane superstructures here, and some of them are fitted next door at the January Uprising Company." At the January Uprising factory, lighter, smaller cranes are mounted on the military vehicles—German and Soviet workers from Kranlod completed the pilot project, which was more important because of its significance and political meaning. On a carriage that originally transported the feared SS-20 rocket, they built a huge 120-ton construction crane—the "Progress 2000."

The prototype, which made its first appearance at the Bauma in Munich as a much admired product of the new harmony between East and West, was thoroughly tested recently on site at the factory in Odessa before its departure to Siberia. Now it will have to prove itself under severe everyday conditions in Irkutsk. It is a colossus, which would not be pemitted on German roads because of its enormous dimensions and weight, but that is no problem in the trackless wastes of Siberia and in the Soviet coal and ore mining regions.

The conversion and the new SS-20 superstructure were developed jointly by Liebherr and Kranlod. "It was damned tricky work converting a former rocket carrier into this monster," one of the Soviet engineers recounts. "The proverb 'Beat swords into ploughshares' is easy to say, but when it is a question of actual conversion, then the difficulties crop up. But we managed together," he says with satisfaction. Then he shows all the changes that had to be made on the carriage before the crane could finally be assembled. "Progress 2000 is exactly the right model number for this crane," he says, and adds: "Take the middle letters and numbers (..SS 20..) and you are reminded what the thing originally carried."

For the Kranlod factory on the Black Sea this spectacular disarmament recycling will remain only a small part of the production program. "Currently we employ 650 workers and we build 100 cranes annually," Oserov explains in unaccented German. The factory work force consists almost exclusively of Soviet citizens, most of whom formerly worked in the partner enterprise January Uprising. Besides the technical director Peter Weisser, there is just one other employee from Liebherr in the administration, two experts in final assembly, and two welders in the factory, who explain how to use German welding equipment to their Soviet colleagues.

"Our cranes comply precisely with the standards, regulations, and quality requirements of the products that are

manufactured at the Liebherr Crane Company in Ehingen. The cranes that we assemble here are certified on the test bed by a German official from the technical testing office for welding technology in Fellbach, Stuttgart, which is responsible for Liebherr. So we could sell the Kranlod products in the FRG, but that is not our plan," Weisser states.

About 75 percent of the crane components come by ship on the Danube from the FRG to Odessa. Weisser says: "That is still our major problem. There simply are no suppliers here, like the ones we are accustomed to in the FRG. We have made plans to derive about 90 percent of our components from the Soviet Union in four years. But I still have my doubts. What we are doing here is pioneer work, and we learn something every day." The background: As the result of a centrally planned economy, Soviet industry is structured quite differently from what a German manager is accustomed to at home. The enormous factories, such as the neighboring January Uprising enterprise, manufacture everything themselves, from a screw to the finished product. As a result, there is no supplier industry.

"But we will manage to create one," Yuri Oserov interjects optimistically. "You have to consider that this is all new territory for us as well, and we learn something new every day too." About 20 Kranlod workers are trained in Ehingen in all areas of the enterprise, from modern marketing to organization. Oserov says: "They all return full of enthusiasm and bring new ideas and suggestions to our enterprise. Liebherr's smooth organization particularly impresses them. I think the personal meetings in Ehingen are very helpful for these people in every respect. That applies both to their attitude to work, as well as to their personal life. For the most part, the people are totally transformed and now know what can be achieved, where the weaknesses are in our system that have to be eliminated."

Problems with work morale or differences in the attitude to work compared with German workers do not exist, according to observations by German workers at Kranlod. They say the work climate is excellent. "The people want to work; they can become enthused and are willing to learn," they say.

The cranes from Odessa are basically produced for the Soviet market. One problem is that the components from Ehingen must be paid for in hard currency. The amount that the factory has to pay in a purchase in foreign currency shows up again in the sale price: The buyers also have to pay a proportionate amount in foreign exchange. This situation will not change until the enterprise makes its own components. But manufacture is faltering because of another deficiency in a planned economy: Kranlod is allocated almost no raw materials. The reason: According to plan, priority is given to—purely—Soviet factories.

Progress will have to wait. Just as additional Progress 2000's will be manufactured only in small numbers. Even without that, only every second or third retired rocket carrier is suitable for conversions. The remainder arrive in such battered condition that they are suitable only for scrap.

Stoltenberg Meets With Czechoslovakia's Vacek

LD2104202190 Hamburg DPA in German 1908 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Fuerth (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] and Czechoslovakia's minister for national defense, Colonel General Miroslav Vacek, have agreed on a two-year program for the development of military-political contacts at their first meeting today at Fuerth in Bavaria. In a joint statement both ministers point out that the program is based on mutuality and takes into account the countries' memberships in different military alliances. They assess their meeting as "a good first and important step toward building confidence between the countries and their armed forces."

The program is to improve "openness and transparency" by means of subject-related talks between the ministries. It would make possible both the exchange of experience and encounters, including cultural and sporting ones, through contacts between the forces and their training institutions. The planned cooperation only relates to those things that can be implemented. Vacek stressed that it is important for the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia's army to understand the relevant practices in the Bundeswehr.

Vacek said of the unification of the two German states that the greatest complications will be in the area "where the military is involved." It is an important issue which alliance Germany will be a member of in the future. There will have to be a compromise on that. He stressed that Czechoslovakia has no reason to resist German unification.

On the subject of security policy in Europe, the defense politicians agreed that every effort must continue to be made to achieve the reduction of disparities in conventional weapons by specific disarmament agreements, thus creating the prerequisites for stability in Europe. For that reason, the Vienna disarmament talks should be "brought swiftly to a successful conclusion."

Polls: GDR, FRG Opinions on NATO Differ

AU2404201790 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Apr 90 p 103

[Text] "What about NATO when Germany is unified?" The East Berlin Usuma Institute let people choose from three answers. The results and, compared with them, the answers by a representative selection of FRG citizens who were asked the same question by the Emnid Institute last month are as follows:

"Germany will continue to be a NATO member; the territory of the present GDR will belong to NATO":

GDR citizens: 15 percent; FRG citizens: 27 percent.

"Germany will continue to be a NATO member, but the territory of the present GDR will be free of NATO troops":

GDR citizens: 30 percent; FRG citizens: 49 percent;

"The FRG will leave NATO; Germany will become a neutral state with only its own border troops":

GDR citizens: 53 percent; FRG citizens: 23 percent.

FRANCE

Chevenement on Nuclear Arms, European Defense

PM2304091690 Paris LE MONDE in French 22-23 Apr 90 p 16

[Text] In an interview granted to the specialist magazine AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL, Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement expressed the view that France should continue to have a diversified nuclear arsenal. For the first time, he explained in particular that the Rafale plane, armed with an air-to-surface missile with a nuclear warhead, could replace the existing Mirage-IV.

"Maintaining the credibility of our deterrent, which is based on the concept of sufficiency, implies a reasonable diversification of strategic forces and final warning capabilities," Mr Chevenement said. "There is a need to diversify our strategic capability. This is principally based on submarines. We are also making provision for the modernization of missiles based on the Albion Plateau with a view to the year 2000."

"It is conceivable," the defense minister continued, "that Rafale planes, equipped with longer-range air-to-surface nuclear missiles could provide a successor to the current Mirage-IV-2 planes due to be withdrawn from service in 1996, at least as regards the Mirage-IV-P planes with medium-range air-to-surface missions. There are plans to keep some of these planes for carrying out photographic reconnaissance missions."

With a 300 kiloton nuclear warhead (around 15 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb), the medium-range air-to-surface missile, launched by a Mirage-IV-P plane at a safe distance from the target has a range of between 100 and 300 km according to the altitude from which it is launched.

"There is no doubt," the defense minister added, "that maximum diversification will continue to be the best guarantee of the survival of our strategic strike capability." This idea of a Rafale plane intended for a nuclear strike has been put forward by the general staffs for some time.

No European Army

In his interview with AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL, Mr Chevenement goes even further, saying that the Rafale could be armed with a longer-range nuclear missile, like the long-range air-to-surface missile which, according to aviation experts, could cover more than 1,000 km and would be designed in cooperation with the British.

"We are busy exploring with the British the possibility of jointly developing an air-to-surface nuclear missile," the defense minister admitted. "No decision has yet been made. If it is, development will not be completed before the next decade."

Mr Chevenement also ruled out the prospect of an integrated European army in favor of the European states reaching closer cooperation agreements (which is also called interoperability, in other words the capability of allied armies operating jointly in the field) among forces which he thinks should continue to be national.

"A European defense structure will result more from close cooperation agreements among national armed forces than from mere integration within a European army. The spirit of an army is inextricably linked with the feeling of belonging to a national community," the defense minister stated. "And it is the coordination among the different defense potentials of the big European powers—I am thinking of France, Germany, and Britain, but also increasingly of Italy and Spain—which will ensure that we can talk of a European defense identity. The creation of the Franco-German brigade contributes to that effort, serving as a laboratory to test the interoperability of forces in particular. For reasons of cost, there is also talk of setting up a joint Franco-German training center for helicopter crews."

NETHERLANDS

Prime Minister Views Germany, NATO, Europe

PM2704100890 Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Apr 90 pp 1,6

[Interview with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers by Jacques Amalric and Christian Chartier in The Hague—date not given]

[Text] The Hague—[LE MONDE] Like other European leaders, you have been particularly cautious on the question of German unity. Why?

[Lubbers] The Netherlands—the government but also public opinion, I think—is not opposed to German unification. Quite the reverse. Opinion polls indicate that most of the Netherlanders are in favor of it. They think that it is the Germans' right, and here we do not have the feeling of apprehension about a greater Germany which may exist in some other countries.

But there are specific aspects, notably the question of the border with Poland. In this sphere, the word "caution" is appropriate. Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek and I have argued that the FRG should not just agree to recognize the existing border as such, but should also make this recognition clear to the Poles, simultaneous to the acceptance of unification by its European partners.

[LE MONDE] So, are you in favor of an international German-Polish treaty?

[Lubbers] That is a technical point which already belongs to history because I think that the German Government and political circles have fully accepted this viewpoint. Moreover, the other European countries—France, Britain, Italy, and Benelux—have fully accepted German unification.

But why has the Netherlands been so cautious. It is because I felt that it was not easy to reconcile a positive attitude as a European partner of the FRG with such a sensitive political question as the border question. But we are now at a different stage—that of unification and its repercussions on the EC. This is the agenda of the Dublin summit. I hope we will start to detail the tasks of the Community and its institutions, especially the Commission.

At the same time, the two-plus-four process has started: This is the more specifically political dimension of unification. As regards NATO, a unified Germany should continue to be a member. I have the feeling that France is still afraid that Germany might be tempted by neutrality. But the readiness with which the Germans have agreed to remain NATO members shows the importance which they attach to the Western institutions—the Alliance and the EEC. They are perfectly aware that freedom stems from these institutions and that they must be strengthened.

[LE MONDE] Do you not think that French short-range nuclear weapons are a problem and that weapons with a range of between 400 and 500 km no longer have any meaning, in view of the situation in Eastern Europe?

[Lubbers] The developments which have taken place in Europe raise questions about the function of nuclear weapons, especially surface-to-surface weapons. We must think about this. But I am reluctant to be more precise: The problem is being discussed in France and in other countries, and we must not be too hasty to draw conclusions. I do not rule out a development of the French position with regard to short-range weapons. I also think that a unified Germany will accept the need for France to have a nuclear arsenal.

[LE MONDE] Should NATO's function not also be redefined?

[Lubbers] NATO's main function is to guarantee peace; it must remain the same. But the threat has changed. It is now less clear. That is why the role of the Alliance and the tools it needs are different. In my view they should be less linked to a military analysis than before. Another important aspect in my view is that we must take as much advantage as possible of the opportunity which an alliance like NATO provides for dialogue with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to safeguard peace in Europe and the world. We would no longer exercise this responsibility against the USSR but would share it with the present-day USSR. I say present-day, because you never know. We must change the setting, abandon the idea of an enemy with a capital E, while maintaining a tool for safeguarding peace in a future which may be uncertain.

[LE MONDE] Do you think it is possible to keep Germany within NATO if France does not agree to play a more important role in it?

[Lubbers] The strengthening of the European pillar of NATO presupposes that France will play a fuller role in NATO than at present. The development of the European integration process should make things easier for Paris. I will add that I have noticed a change of behavior by French politicians over recent years. France has become a real European country. When I took office eight years ago, it was still backing the Europe of nations. But, year after year, it has moved closer toward integration. That is why I hope that it will accept an integration of security policies.

[LE MONDE] You want a strengthening of Europe's political union, but is it possible to envision such a development if a clear decision is not first made on the European currency?

[Lubbers] I think that this decision has already been made. We still need the intergovernmental conference, but I regard it as accepted in principle.

[LE MONDE] Does this imply an independent European central bank?

[Lubbers] Yes. But so-called independence is just a question of words. We must make things clear: Independence does not exist in the democratic institutions. All the structures need a degree of political control, including the central banks. The independence of the European bank means in fact that it would be protected from the risks of everyday political interference.

[LE MONDE] You say that the decision on a single currency has been made. But is not the German position still very ambiguous?

[Lubbers] I am almost sure that Bonn will accept the European central bank. Germany certainly has doubts, not on the principle but on the role which the bank will play. To put things clearly, we must not create an institution intended to finance the member states' deficit.

[LE MONDE] Another obstacle on the road to monetary union is Mrs Thatcher....

[Lubbers] This is rather difficult. But I can see the start of a change; at least this is what the finance ministers are saying. I hope that the British will accept this European bank. It is all a question of the pace. Mrs. Thatcher has already accepted the idea of the intergovernmental conference.

[LE MONDE] Regarding political union, what is your preference? Do you want the parliament's powers to be increased? Should the commission become a political authority? Or are you in favor of creating a new political authority?

[Lubbers] Your question has three aspects. The first concerns the possibility of making more effective decisions within the Community. This is necessary and it raises the question of the relative majority vote. We then need a more political, more democratic Community, in other words we need to strengthen the role of the Commission and, at the same time, the role of the Parliament. If the Commission was politically answerable to the Parliament, it would have more authority.

The third aspect is that Europe should be less bureaucratic because this is the danger which threatens a Community which is developing without being responsible to Parliament in the political sense of the word.

[LE MONDE] Are you in favor of the current system of a rotating chairmanship which is increasingly criticized?

[Lubbers] I think that it is a good system. Similarly, the troika formula suits me (Footnote) (The troika comprises the current Community chairman, his predecessor, and the man who will succeed him at the end of his six-month term of office).

[LE MONDE] What do you think of the creation of a second European house which would be a house of states?

[Lubbers] I would prefer the political and democratic functioning of the existing institutions to be improved, including the European Parliament's competence, and for them to be given political responsibility rather than creating a new institution.

[LE MONDE] This presupposes greater abandonment of sovereignty whereas we can detect the beginnings of a revolt against such abandonment in several countries. What is the view on this in the Netherlands?

[Lubbers] We are observing the same signs. This is linked with specific problems, for instance the immigrant problem. It is almost a cultural question relating to countries' historical heritage, to the notion of national identity. I think we must try to bring out a regional identity which would be that of a Europe formed from specific regions, without being an American-style "melting pot." Regarding immigration, the Community member countries should define a policy for the integration of foreigners and, at the same time, should harmonize their legislation on the reunification of families and on asylum seekers.

[LE MONDE] What is the political significance of Mr Onno Ruding, your former finance minister, standing against Jacques Attali for the chairmanship of the Bank for the Reconstruction and Development of Eastern Europe?

[Lubbers] It is vital for us to be partners in the EC. However, what are we now seeing? Frenchmen, who are very capable, are at the head of the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and the IMF. I greatly value these officials but it would not be wise to have only Frenchmen at the head of our common institutions. In view of the fact that a man like Mr Ruding, who was not only finance minister for eight years but also a banker and member of the IMF administration council, is available, the sound political choice is to give meaning to the notion of partnership.

[LE MONDE] What is your position on the Lithuanian crisis?

[Lubbers] I think about the Lithuanians constantly. I think it is essential for the Moscow government and Lithuania to find the path to negotiations with dignity, in order to draw up the Lithuanians' right to independence in everybody's interests.

[LE MONDE] Do you draw a distinction between military intervention and economic asphyxia?

[Lubbers] I prefer to answer a different question: How can we repeat the success of the Poles—another Catholic and nationalist people who began their "long march" several years ago? How can we create a similar situation for the Lithuanians, while allaying Moscow's fear of establishing a precedent for the other republics, of losing strategic access to the sea? This process presupposes patience on the Lithuanians' part and confidence on the part of the Soviet leadership. We can contribute to that by calling on the two sides to engage in dialogue.

[LE MONDE] In a more general way, how do you analyze Mikhail Gorbachev's position?

[Lubbers] He mirrors the USSR's political situation. He reflects a double image: on the one hand, strength, the courage to be democratic and humanist, to have more confidence in men than in the system; and on the other, uncertainty, poor economic results, fear of instability, and the ethnic minorities. Mr Gorbachev is at the center of this mirror, in the middle of this double image. Some people say he is going too far in one direction, others that he is going too far in the opposite direction. In this respect, Lithuania is a test.

NORWAY

Continued Popular Will for Strong Defense Seen

Poll Statistics Cited

90EN0507A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Apr 90 p 6

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Majority In Favor of Military"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] An overwhelming majority of the population believes the military should either be built up or kept as

it is today if there is the danger of unrest in the Soviet Union. Just about as many people believe such a danger exists.

This is what emerges from a public opinion poll which the "Free Norway With NATO" organization conducted from 12 to 21 March. Altogether 78.3 percent believed that Norway's military force should be built up or kept the same if there is the danger of rebellions within the Soviet Union while 12.5 percent believed it should be scaled down. A percentage of 9.2 had "no opinion."

At the same time 74 percent thought there was the danger of disturbances in the Soviet Union while 19.2 percent said the situation was stable. The question was as follows: "Do you think the situation in the Soviet Union is stable or do you think there is the danger of disturbances?"

A large majority was also of the belief that a Soviet military threat to Norway did exist. To the question of whether the Soviet military force on the Kola Peninsula on the border with Finnmark was being built up, being kept the same, or scaled down, 21.7 percent replied that it was being built up while 40.8 percent thought it was being kept the same. A percentage of 19.4 said the Soviet forces were being scaled down. But on this issue there was also a surprisingly large group which either had no opinion or did not wish to answer, 18.2 percent.

Gorbachev's Future

When it comes to President Gorbachev's future prospects, the population divides into roughly two equal camps of pessimists and optimists. A percentage of 46.3 believe Gorbachev is firmly in power but 45.4 percent say there is the danger that others could take over.

An interesting feature revealed by the survey is that there does not seem to be any appreciable difference between women and men with respect to views on the military. Among women almost as many in the majority believe the military should either be built up or kept as it is today when there is the danger of unrest in the Soviet Union. On this point as well the survey confirms other studies' findings regarding women's positive attitudes towards the military.

Support in All Parties

There is also a sizeable majority among voters in all the political parties in favor of keeping the military [as is] or building it up. Not unexpectedly, support is the greatest in the Conservative Party, with 92 percent, while the Labor Party is close to the average for the entire sampling, with 75 percent. But in the Socialist Left Party (SV) as well there is a solid 64-percent majority for building up the Norwegian military or keeping it [as is]. The figures for the Progressive Party and the center parties are 82 and 79 percent, respectively.

Division Between Socialist and Nonsocialist Camps

Likewise there seems to be a division on the issue between the socialist and the nonsocialist camps in Norwegian politics. Despite the major support for the military in both the Labor Party and the SV, there is nevertheless a sizeable number of voters in these parties who want to scale down the Norwegian military regardless of whether there is the danger of rebellions in the Soviet Union. This group is the largest in the SV with 29.9 percent, while it constitutes 15.4 percent of the Labor Party. By way of comparison, the same group in the Conservative Party constitutes 4.9 percent, whereas in the Progressive Party it is 11.9 percent.

Analysis of Poll Results

90EN0507B Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Apr 90 p 2

[Editorial: "A Determination to Defend"]

[Text] In a public opinion survey carried out by the Gallup Institute for the "Free Norway With NATO" organization, what emerges strongly is the determination to defend. The [survey's] conclusion is encouraging and promising—all the more so because earlier this winter we witnessed a debate in which influential voices on both the right and the left were clearly of a mind to reduce defense appropriations quite significantly. Inspired by the ever fresher wind of change blowing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, many people suddenly thought they could imagine a state of permanent peace—in our part of the world, at any rate. The expectations and the joy were so great that some seemed to want to anticipate the result of what was happening. It now turns out that those who urged composure and said that there was no need to hurry were right. Even as the bells of freedom were ringing, Soviet soldiers and tanks were moving back into Lithuania. The occupation was once again a fact.

The Gallup figures we published yesterday reflect this reality. Even if we all want to believe in a better and a more secure future, something these events also lead to, we know that the situation in the east is extremely unstable and can produce a number of undesirable outcomes. For this reason wisdom is demonstrated when an overwhelming majority of the population believes that our military should either be built up or in any event maintained as it currently is if there is the danger of unrest in the Soviet Union. This latter point can certainly not be denied. A large majority is also convinced that a Soviet military threat to Norway does exist, and that the military forces on the Kola [Peninsula] are being kept constant. For our part, we must draw the consequence of this finding and maintain the preparedness which the international situation demands.

Eide on Soviet Kola Forces

90EN0507C Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Apr 90 p 7

[Article by Olav Trygge Storvik: "Soviet Forces Are Being Modernized"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] "Soviet forces are constantly being modernized. Soviet tank production continues to be greater than in all the Western countries put together," said General Vigleik Eide.

As the chairman of NATO's military committee, Eide was on an official visit to Norway yesterday. He presented his report to the King and held meetings with both the defense and foreign ministers. Eide declined to give details of his conversations but they concerned the security policy situation in Europe and Norway's place in that picture.

"From the NATO side, we have a favorable view of policy developments in Eastern Europe," said Eide, adding that the military consequences have not been as great as the media had led people to believe.

"Generally speaking, the pullback of forces which the Soviets declared unilaterally has been carried out according to plans. Certain minor adjustments have been made in the meantime, but we assume that the reductions will be carried out as announced by Gorbachev. But we are looking at a very complex picture. Modernization of the Soviet forces is still going on and to some extent weapons programs are being revised and carried out, for example in the Navy and Air Force. Though there has been a major drop in tank production, Soviet manufactures are still much higher than those of all the Western countries combined," he said.

He stated that reductions and troop pullbacks are positive signs but that it was necessary to carry out such actions within the framework being provided by the Vienna disarmament negotiations. These are the vehicle for arriving at binding agreements and satisfactory arrangements for inspections and confirmation of the fact that the agreements are really being adhered to.

Thus far the West has been unable to obtain satisfactory confirmation that Soviet forces are really being pulled back, Eide observed. Nor is there an agreement about what will happen to these forces or their weapons. But it is precisely problems of this sort which are the main issue at the so-called CFE [Conventional Forces Europe] negotiations in Vienna.

Norway has had indications that Moscow is now hesitant about proceeding further with the disarmament negotiations. It is assumed, among other things, that events in Lithuania are having their effect on the negotiations while at the same time opposition to the force reductions from the Soviet military system has become stronger.

Not More Stable

Despite the gratifying political events in the East, these have scarcely led to greater stability in Europe, in Eide's opinion. Nevertheless, he believes that in the long run they will lead to greater security but he knows that much work, firm policy-making, and many political initiatives are needed to make true progress.

TURKEY

World Developments' Impact on Defense Industry

90ES0661A Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 1 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by engineer Dr Mehmet Erdas of Iris Executive Consultants, Limited: "New Developments in the World's and Turkey's Defense Industry Strategy"]

[Text] The "Turkish Defense Industry Development Strategy," last revised in 1980 and then from a very narrow point of view, must be updated with a new threat assessment in light of new world developments. Our defense needs are procured entirely by contract abroad except for the MKE [Machine and Chemical Industry] Eskisehir and Kayseri Supply and Maintenance Centers, the Golcuk Shipyard, the Arifiye Tank Modernization and Armed Forces Ordnance Factories, and ASELSAN [Military Electronics Industry]. A lot of defense-related projects costing $19.8 billion all together will be recontracted soon by the Defense Industry Undersecretariat. As much as 18-25 percent of the budget is spent every year on defense needs. The public has not been adequately informed for many years on important decisions on selection of technology for reasons of confidentiality, but it would do more good than harm for these decisions to be openly discussed again along the lines of world developments. Openness, participation, and solidarity have now replaced the principle of secrecy. Instead of being left out of these current developments, the Turkish Army should become even more integrated with Turkish society and its universities, industrialists, workers, and students.

World economists and politicians have recognized the limits of growth and prosperity in the 1990's, and it is now well understood that our world is one world. Developments in the East Bloc, though it is still uncertain as to where they will end, have not occurred by themselves. Technological uncertainties experienced in the 1980's, the 1973-74 oil shocks, shrinking world markets, growing protectionism trends, and exorbitant defense spending by the super powers were significant preliminary reasons. Large American corporations spent billions of research and development dollars in vain in the 1980's to produce new technologies.

What happened is that growth and prosperity took away as much as they brought. The youth of Western countries became fearful of technology and the future. This fear produced a young generation more sensitive to the arms build-up and environmental pollution. World youth

want the billions of dollars that are being spent on the arms race to be used for social purposes. For future security, they are much more sensitive to spending for education, health, and social security, with top priority given to unemployment and unfair income distribution. High inflation and credit interest, unemployment, income distribution, and regional social imbalance must be assessed as important elements of internal threat. Events in the our southeast, as well as our neighbors Syria, Iraq, and Iran, are known to be contributors to the economic and social structure.

The basic deficiency of the existing economic model is that it accepts the unemployment problem as some unrelated datum. The state is heedlessly sawing off the branch on which it is sitting. It is significant that while the world is rushing to peace, our country is being pushed into isolation. A climate of social reconciliation and security depends at least as much on philosophical and psychological reinforcement of the citizen's belief in the state, thanks to spending on education, health, and social security, as on arms.

The accumulation in the Defense Industry Fund of $500 million each year is clearly nothing to sneeze at. TAFICS [Turkish Armed Forces Integrated Communications System], the largest defense industry project, scheduled for completion in the next 10 years, will cost around $10 billion. Fifty percent of the project is to be financed by the Turkish Government and 50 percent by NATO. The true cost and final concept of the project have not been revealed. No decision has yet been made on whether to proceed with automation at the corps level or the brigade level. Automation at the corps level would cost something on the order of $10 billion. If dropped to the brigade level, the total project cost would probably be around $20 billion. To date the PTT has met the Turkish Army's telecommunications needs. The General Staff has drawn up preliminary specifications for TAFICS and turned them over to the PTT. The PTT has set up a special office devoted to TAFICS endeavors.

The main goal of our national defense budget ought to be to transfer resources directly to the education and health sector to accomplish the transfer of advanced technology. No increase is occurring in the defense budgets of the Western industrialized countries. The damage to the economy by lack of demand and the crisis in acceptance of nuclear technology are being postponed with state support by national defense purchase orders. The defense budget in Turkey, as regards spending, ought to have the essential goal of providing engineering, consultant, and quality control services domestically in the procurement of weapon systems and improving the engineering data base. The industry that cannot obtain high quality inputs on time from subsidiary industries is not yet organized and cannot attain the military materiel standards.

It is highly unlikely that uncoordinated weapon systems could be used at a moment of threat, even if the National Defense Ministry and Armed Forces spend a great deal of money to buy them. Moreover, the systems rapidly become obsolete, bearing in mind the rapid pace of technological development. Instead of wasting one-fifth of the budget, priority ought to be given in defense industry projects to examination of our existing industrial structure, choosing technologies more appropriate to our economy, and enabling the public and private sectors to become competitive on world markets.

National security cannot be obtained by buying ready-made weapon systems and aircraft. Consistency, continuity, and credibility are possible through an economic development model that comes down to the individual and applies a defense concept based on the prosperity and security of the individual. The Strategic Goal Plan and the Economic Development Plan ought not to be the products of two separate worlds. The same state is responsible for prosperity and protection.

The infrastructure of the defense industry consists of the semiconductors, special integrated circuits, and supply and sensor technologies used in electronics and chemistry. The provision of engineering services domestically by importing major components instead of complete weapon systems should be encouraged by offering rewards. The defense industry cannot be considered a separate sector, and no such definition appears in the sixth five-year development plan. It may be described as a branch of domestic industry that uses the inputs of other sectors for specifically military purposes.

Standardization and quality are the main pillar of defense industry organization. Our universities offer no courses in either software or hardware in connection with modern arms and command control systems. Existing standards are being revised for the European single market but are not being put into practice in state and company purchases. However, German, French, and British firms are in a standards war for 1992. No product, regardless of how perfect, has any economic value if it has no market or demand. The establishment and development of the Turkish defense industry is possible if it can address world markets, the EEC, or the Middle East, not by off-set trade. Otherwise, we will have bought a cow to obtain one glass of milk. It is not easy to accomplish economies of scale vis-a-vis today's economies of the Western allies, in which intensive competition and idle capacity are the problem.

Countries including the NATO allies are having problems with surplus supply, inadequate demand, and idle capacity. In the East Bloc, however, even the most basic consumer supplies are scarce. The Soviet Union, which made great sacrifices to bring the arms race to the 1990's, did everything it could to head off the American SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative—project. The United States is trying to use the SDI project and Pentagon orders to overcome the problem of inadequate demand that afflicts its economy. Turkey should not stand by as a spectator to the common interests and detente of East and West, but should try to take its share of orders.

The mid-term goals and security strategy of firms and states in the West are the same. In Turkey, however, firms can accumulate capital only by state orders. The scales are very different. We are continuing to practice etatism in the name of a mixed economy and liberalization. Defense industry projects can be carried out only through the agreement and participation of units at the very top and the very bottom. We will not establish an aircraft industry by insisting that 1,000 Turks can do what it takes 4,000 Americans to do, and that we will do local assembly for $4.2 billion, as in the F-16 project, and paying two or three times the world price. We will build only the number of aircraft permitted, not the number we need. Everyone in the world protects his profits, his added value, his prosperity and security, and his own work force. At the same time, Turkey is playing the role of a good customer, faithful only to his debt. We will gain neither security nor respect, but at most isolation, by going into $10 billion projects like TAFICS with this concept and in a climate of high inflation. To know our optimum capacity, we all have to consider national security and our children's future as one and the same. We cannot use weapons bought in the past and military aid to guarantee that future generations will have security, jobs, and the ability to earn foreign exchange, and that they get a bellyful of braggadocio and nonsense and move into the modern era. We cannot get anywhere by having a revolution every 10 years.

This writer, as a communications lieutenant assigned to the National Defense Ministry Office of Defense Industry and Technical Services, and a project officer having a doctorate in electronic engineering and economics, witnessed from 1982 to 1984 many different specifications and domestic-foreign purchases from the Turkish Armed Forces' communications systems to F-16 aircraft, closed-circuit televisions, and computers for the war academies and radar projects. It is sometimes hard for me to believe my experiences myself. We have to lay the groundwork for the hope and progress, development, and industrial potential for this society and the future generation. However, it is necessary to say openly and sincerely that, on the contrary, we are holding the freedom and prosperity of future generations hostage in order to splurge undeservedly today. There is no other way to explain obligating ourselves to using half the national income for foreign debt service.

Society must be informed, as far as possible, of defense industry projects. The spending of billions of dollars without even submitting the technical specifications to the universities, firms, and public and private organizations concerned for their information and participation is tantamount to the transfer of capital abroad by the state. Preparation of technical specifications, contract techniques called contract management, and off-set agreements, are very important matters requiring expertise. They require years of experience and compilation of technical, economic, financial, and military data. In fact, many important mistakes were made in the F-16 project, on which $4.2 billion are being spent. In 1975, the European Consortium concluded an agreement whereby 1,000 F-16 fighter planes would be built jointly in Belgium, each F-16 to cost a maximum of $6 million, and other NATO member countries would be able to take advantage of the agreement. Despite this, Turkey did not sign the framework agreement, called an MOU—memorandum of understanding—but instead accomplished a fait-accompli in signing directly an order and letter of intent, called an LOI. With the LOI, hastily signed on 9 December 1983, Turkey agreed and contracted to pay $26 million for each F-16, excluding the radar and weapon systems and, thus, seven years ago postponed the GAP project and destroyed the resources-spending and foreign loan balance. The Turkish economy was taken in by false promises and we did not lift a finger, but stood by while orphans', peasants', and workers' rights were squandered. A country's businessmen and capitalists control its state, market, and foreign relations. At least this is the Western concept. In that case, why have Turkish businessmen not done their duty to date, before the way was completely blocked, and instead are taking coal to Newcastle by arranging a "Seminar on Industrial Development Strategies in Market Economies in the 1990's" 10 years later? It is too late now. A significant resource has been transferred out of the country. Moreover, the world is changing rapidly. You cannot create resources as easily as you used to. Financial circles have changed the way they evaluate risks. Capital has become the only resource that creates resources, and the importance of labor, land, and geographical location has been turned over to advanced technology. Knowledge and humanity have been overthrown, and nations are obliged to accept basic universal values and coexist peacefully as one and as a whole. No right to an alternative life exists. We must evaluate, in fact, with the Ataturkist political concept, the many rapid new developments in the world and the mistakes that Turkey has committed in what may be considered, as the lives of states go, its brief 67 years, and establish a modern defense industry. And we must avoid distraction and deceit.