# Central Eurasia
## Military Affairs

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19 Oct 91 Union Edition p 8

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent B. Reznik, Khabarovsk Kray: “Secrets of the ‘Dead’ Facility: The People and the Army Are United in Their Mismanagement”]

[Text] The village of Bolshoy Kartel is in fact small, quiet, and in the taiga. It would have vegetated in obscurity, justifying its existence through the manufacture of lumber, if in the middle 1970’s the Ministry of Defense had not begun to build something in its background that raised both the village and its inhabitants to the level of zodiac constellations. When they were drinking, the boys suddenly began to talk about not only the usual things—chopped down cutting areas, whirring gasoline-powered saws, and good for nothing loggers—but to delve into the problems of SDI and became very interested: listen, do not both the village and its inhabitants to the level of zodiac constellations. When they were drinking, the boys suddenly began to talk about not only the usual things—chopped down cutting areas, whirring gasoline-powered saws, and good for nothing loggers—but to delve into the problems of SDI and became very interested: listen, do not quote me mister, star wars, what role will the Bolshoy Kartel super secret facility play in it?

By the way, they knew how to keep a secret. They talked “about this” only with their own and at a whisper. It turned out that the women lost their vigilance when the military exchange motorized store arrived at the “point.”

“Nyura-a-a,” rushed about the village, they have thrown away the chickens at “Kosmos.” Will you get involved with it, pop?....

Meanwhile, facilities of non-earth configuration were erected on the plot of ground behind the double barrier of thick barbed wire under the indefatigably strict gaze of the sentries. The main facility was an item with the code name “Krug” [Circle] which was part of the complex of the mysterious “Yantar” [Amber] Program.

“Krug” actually was a circle—a metal structure, one kilometer in diameter, in the center of which was a three-story building packed from basement to roof with electronics.

Just the construction portion of the new military garrison, in the words of the people, including those involved, cost 50 million rubles and, which it is extremely important to point out today, in the prices of those years. The cost of just the electronic filling is generally a very closely held secret. However, a small flight of fantasy permits me to imagine the astronomical cost of the space complex for detecting targets, tracking them, and transmitting data into the air defense system.

They allegedly erected the “facility,” according to our standards, at strike rates—two years altogether—they handed over a turnkey facility and then it turned out that it could not track any space sectors at all: it was obsolete. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Radio Industry adopted a joint decision on the withdrawal of “Krug” from the functioning space complex and transferred it to a defense enterprise located in... Ukraine for use in scientific research purposes. Indeed, experts flew in several times from there. Later they visited here periodically.

As they report it, the residents of Bolshoy Kartel “could not pick themselves up” from astonishment for a long time when their neighbor Yuriy Chubenko, a great enthusiast of fishing and drinking sprees, replaced the super-vigilant and numerous sentries armed with assault rifles. He, leaning on a Berdan rifle, “performed his duty” well alongside the “facility” until the caviar season began in the river. His soul could not bear this temptation. Chubenko did not give a damn about the space facility from the height of his poaching interest, went fishing, and was arrested for an illegal catch.

The village boys were the first to penetrate the secret and unguarded facility. I do not have the grounds to assert that they were the first to begin to hack up everybody and everything there; to crawl into the enormous halls of endless series of metal cabinets filled with electronic boards, removing the diodes, triodes, and transistors from them... To pull out, as they would later write in the act, “the low-voltage (switchboard) apparatus of the special technical equipment and the components of the technological apparatus that are composed of assemblies and parts manufactured using precious metals.”

I certainly have nothing against the boys because (I am quoting that same act) “the equipment bore graphic signs of directed disassembly for the purpose of stealing the precious metals: the cut up and broken off contact holders of the starters, automated assemblies, and contacts....”

Just how much of the precious metal was stolen from “Krug” items? This is a great secret but we, for example, know that 35 kilometers of cable containing silver had been strung in the building inside “Krug” alone. We can once again resort to analogies. A shipment of dismantled, obsolete equipment was shipped from precisely this very same “Krug” that is located several dozen kilometers from Bolshoy Kartel to stamped [grifovanny] item industry enterprises. There is a letter with the complaint: “The commander did not note the fact that they did not confirm the presence of 1.3 kg of gold, 219.8 kg of silver, and 102.3 kg of platinum worth more than 10 million rubles when they received the indicated items at the plants.”

The military have their own arithmetic and naturally they do not nearly calculate the losses in the prices for precious metals that currently exist on the black market. How much do we have to multiply their figures to provide albeit the approximate amount of money the thieves made?

This monstrous looting of the military garrison had already been going on for several years when workers
General of the Army Tretyak along with First Deputy Minister of the USSR Radio Industry V. Kurochkin designated a commission in order to investigate just what remained after so many years of looting at “Krug”?

They found—it is funny to say—property, subject to being written off, worth R3.6 million according to the Ministry of Defense and worth R2.5 million according to the Ministry of the Radio Industry. The high commanders ordered: Dismantle the remains of the equipment and distribute them among military units, suddenly something is suitable somewhere.

No one even thought about carrying out their order. During the Spring of 1991, Tretyak visited the “facility” and soon “Krug”... burned down.

That is the sad history. For how many decades have the homegrown hawks of the military-industrial complex demanded billions to “strengthen the defense of the Homeland”! For the most part, they used it wastefully and ineptly, they drove the people into poverty, while robbing the sick, children, and the elderly. They artificially and keenly incited secrecy because “stellar” garrisons like Bolshoy Kartel would be impossible under glasnost and people’s control. And it is far from the only one. I know of another such “Krug” that was built near Chernobyl and it has ceased its existence and was also looted a long time before the explosion at the AES [Nuclear Power Plant].

The army and the people. We are united in our mismanagement.

Investigation Detailed
92UM0165B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Nov 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent V. Litovkin: “Secrets of the ‘Dead’ Facility”]

[Text] Our own Khabarovsk Kray Correspondent Boris Reznik’s article “Secrets of the ‘Dead’ Facility” (No 249) which describes the flagrant cases of mismanagement permitted by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry which cast to the whims of fate in the Far Eastern taiga and resulted in the looting of a costly military facility—the “Krug” complex—has caused a great reaction.

USSR President M. Gorbachev tasked USSR Procurator General N. Trubik, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, and Interstate Security Service Chairman V. Bakatin to painstakingly investigate what occurred and to bring the guilty to justice, while considering that this, as we now know, is neither the first nor the last case of unprecedented mismanagement.

A joint commission which included representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Radio Industry, USSR Gokhran, and KGB flew to Bolshoy

from the Far East Military District military procuracy and representatives of USSR Gokhran [State Repository for Precious Metals] arrived there to inspect the accounting, preservation, and use of the precious metals. They were not permitted into the “facility.” Colonel Mukhamedzhanov, commander of the neighboring PVO [Air Defense] garrison, who was tasked to “watch over” the “stellar” garrison thought that the passes they presented for access to secrets were inadequate to visit this super-secret facility.

“I will not permit this without authorization from Moscow!”, he snapped back with a soldier’s steadfastness.

For a week (!) the unwanted guests lived in the village alongside the garrison, not daring to cross the gates of its KPP [Control and Check Point] through which everyone freely passed. Enciphered messages flew and telephone calls were made on the military line to Moscow and to the Main Headquarters of the PVO Troops. Finally, an order arrived from there: “Permit them into the facility for an external inspection. Do not show them the documentation.”

“We were stunned and shocked by what we saw on the territory of the “facility,” especially in structure 253 (this is that same three-story house in the center of “Krug”—B.R.),” recalled Military Procuracy Agent Captain Yevgeniy Loskutov. “Packages marked ‘Top Secret’ were scattered on the floor and in the dirt. We found and seized a ‘Technological Equipment and Specifications Installation Plan.’ Everything was torn down, uprooted, and dirty....”

The paradox consists of the fact that the military district procuracy workers ended up at the “facility”... by chance. Because of its special importance and significance for the country’s defense, the procuracy located at Solnechnogorsk, near Moscow, serves the Bolshoy Kartel “stellar” garrison. Indeed, there is a militia special department on site that is directly subordinate to Moscow and a KGB Special Department special subunit that is also tied only to the capital. Just how could they permit such a thing? Well, they were feeding on this “facility!” In short, it turns out that the militia “...had recorded cases of the detention of individuals who were involved in the theft of material resources that were located in the “Krug” equipment building. And special department personnel transmitted the information “into thin air” because no reaction to it whatsoever followed. To simply place the “facility” under guard and to prevent its looting was not part of the “assigned task” of either the one or the other.

We need to give the Far East Military District Military Procuracy agents their due. Despite the fact that they “were not understood” at the Main Military Procuracy, where they arrived with a demand to pay attention to the looted facility, they continued to send letters and directions to the Ministry of Defense and PVO Troops leadership. Last year, then PVO Commander-in-Chief
Soon after publication of “Secrets of the ‘Dead’ Facility,” a letter arrived at the editorial office from... the USSR KGB Special Department military unit from Solnechnogorsk of Moscow Oblast which services the country’s antimissile defense units. “Department agents,” Colonel V. Slavyanskiy told IZVESTIYA, “unambiguously positively assesses the content of B. Reznik’s article and the editorial office’s principled position... Actually since the beginning of 1989, the special department has been continuously placing before the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Military Procuracy, and also other high state officials the issue of the responsibility of Ministry of the Radio Industry officials (the developer) and the PVO troops commander (the customer) for cases of anti-state practice during the construction of this and other of the country’s strategic defense facilities. We are ready if necessary to present the documents that we have at our disposal...”

So, what was “Krug” that was looted and burned down in the Far Eastern taiga? “It was a system of equipment,” said Colonel V. Slavyanskiy, “designed to support the operation of the main facility—an over-the-horizon radar target detection site.”

“Krug,” like the main facility “Duga” [arc], was to have been part of the country’s antimissile defense system. It was tasked with the mission of constantly probing the atmosphere, to study its condition, and to make corrections in the operations of the missile attack warning radar site. But when its reception site—a kilometer in diameter ring of more than 300 steel antennas along the external perimeter and 270 along the internal perimeter with the most complex, special and technological equipment within it; in the single-story building—was constructed, its adjustment and testing began and it turned out that it was not capable of attaining its assigned goals.

The act of the state commission, signed by its Chairman Major-General G. Vylegzhaniny and approved on April 27, 1982 by PVO Troops Deputy Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General Ye. Yurasov, stated:

“According to the results of state tests and experimental operation, the complex has reliability indicators that are below the requirements of technical conditions....”

And they cite this data: during 1981, 173 instances with a total duration of 120 hours occurred when the radar was out of the “Combat operations” mode due to malfunctions and equipment failure of the equipment system and external power supply. During the first quarter of 1982, there had already been 106 instances with a duration of 249 hours.

Among other conclusions, the commission arrived at the following: “remove from the military unit (commander of the over-the-horizon target detection facility—V.L.) the mission to service the special technological equipment and guard the non-organic "Krug" system. None of the officials paid attention to Commission Member Colonel-Engineer B. Boron’s note that this paragraph provided the opportunity to steal the equipment.

In fact, experts testify that the military unit that operates the “Duga” system never accepted “Krug” into its inventory. All the more so since it could carry out the tasked mission on its equipment. The site remained under the management of its developer—NIIDAR (USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry Scientific-Research Institute of Long Range Radio Communications).

Experiments were conducted at it until 1983 but then they were terminated due to their total failure. The “Krug” equipment was turned off but it was not placed into storage. The leadership of the PVO Troops Main Directorate of Weaponry (GUV PVO) and the Ministry of the Radio Industry made a joint decision on the dismantling and transfer of the site’s technological equipment to NIIDAR in Moscow only in 1985, its affiliate in Nikolayev, to the Khabarovsk Polytechnical Institute and the Kiev Higher Military School of Electronics, and to other organizations. But they did not carry out this task to the end. They did not organize the guards.

The commander of the unit located about 10 kilometers from “Krug” also could not do this.

Why? Because of the drastic reduction of personnel.

“Only five officers now work at that ‘Krug’ complex,” Colonel A. Mukhamedzhanov explained to me, “which 200 officers previously served. There is a catastrophic shortage of people.Besides, no one asked us to guard ‘Krug’ and they did not conclude such an agreement with us....”

We will again return to this argument but for now let us listen to Colonel V. Slavyanskiy:

“We repeatedly reported on the situation with ‘Krug,’ and not only to him, but to the Main Military Procuracy, and to former PVO Commander-in-Chief General of the Army Tretyak, and to my own leadership at Lubyanka, but there were no results,” said Viktor Aleksyeевич. “The GVP generally did not consider it necessary to answer us and Tretyak wrinkled his nose:

“Well, they have once again upset a trash heap.”

The KGB leadership sent him this answer from Lubyanka: “Analysis of the materials received attests to the fact the USSR KGB Special Department has touched upon serious problems of the creation of a missile-space defense system and its combat readiness. However, the experts direct attention to the fact that the facts set forth in the documents do not reflect the actual state of affairs as a whole but assessments and conclusions on individual issues are superficial in nature and are not based on reliable, verified data....”
"I understood the reason for this attitude toward our reports only on August 19," said Viktor Alekseyevich, "when I saw my former Chief V. Kryuchkov and Central Committee Secretary O. Baklanov, who was looking after the defense industry, together on the television screen."

In 1989, according to information of the KGB organs, the PVO Commander-in-Chief and the Ministry of the Radio Industry sent a commission to "Krug" which arrived at the conclusion that 50-60 percent of all existing equipment of the reception center had been disassembled and at the need to write it off for a sum of nearly R6 million. But they did not take effective steps on this act.

At the end of March 1990, in accordance with a special department proposal, a USSR Gokhran and Far East Military District Procurement commission visited the facility. Our Far East correspondent wrote about the results of its work in IZVESTIYA's 249th issue. And although representatives of the new commission who visited "Krug" in November 1991 dispute the figures cited by our correspondent, the fact remains a fact—the losses of precious metals, specifically gold and silver, at the site are quite significant.

"Just a selective investigation of one of the sectors of technological and special equipment," Gokhran Representative Vitaliy Kovalev told me, "discovered the sale of nearly a half kilogram of silver. And how much of it has generally disappeared, God only knows. Until 1989, Gokhran did not have the right to control defense industry enterprises or Ministry of Defense units."

Even one of "Krug's" developers, NIIDAR Chief Engineer Anatoliy Kalinin, cannot name the precise quantity of silver, gold, platinum, and other precious metals that were expended on "Krug" equipment.

"Such information is contained in the 1979 documentation," he said, "It is very difficult to find today."

But nevertheless. Even though it is an approximate representation of the losses of precious metals at "Krug," we can obtain one. If you consider that when the ashes remained after the May 9, 1990 fire at the ownerless site, they shipped the scrap to be reprocessed at "Severonikel" Combine in Monchegorsk and there they discovered the remainder of 1.7 kilograms of silver, nearly 200 grams of gold, and 370 grams of platinum.....

Just what kind of loss did the State and its collapsing economy bear during construction, operation, and from the looting of the "Krug" complex?

Unfortunately, today no one can say this with any kind of accuracy. Therefore the experts also consider these losses in different ways. Some name a figure of R15-20 million, others—R6 million, and still others—R1.5 million.

It is not a matter for the newspaper and its correspondent to take the place of the experts. I think that those law enforcement and investigative organs who are tasked by the President to put an end to this history can name the most precise data and also the specific guilty parties for the flagrant mismanagement. But it is impossible to end the discussion about it without having answered the question, why did such an irresponsible attitude toward the people's property become possible.

In my opinion, one of the answers lies on the surface. The situation with "Krug" is the result of that forced super secrecy, lack of control, and monopolism that permeated our VPK [Military-Industrial Complex] for many long years and which has not yet been overcome.

The secret memorandum of Central Committee Secretary and Deputy Chairman of the country's Defense Council L. Zaykov, who was looking after our military-industrial complex until recently, which had been sent to the Politburo in 1987, states:

"The most effective way to accelerate equipping the troops with modern equipment is the simultaneous development of new systems and their entry into production according to the technical documentation of the main designers prior to their acceptance into the inventory...."

"But this procedure was not carried out appropriately which has a negative impact on the material position of workers collectives, impedes the development of new equipment, and creates a certain reduction of the level of developments.

"It is advisable to task GK SM for VPV [Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Issues] jointly with MO USSR [USSR Ministry of Defense] with the preparation of conclusions on interim parameters of TTKh [Tactical-Technical Specifications] (with the support of the Council of Ministers State Commission on Military-Industrial Issues and the USSR Ministry of Defense) and with a report to the Central Committee, including with the indication of the time period for achieving the assigned parameters...."

This operating procedure gave a "green light" to a state of unfinished business and under construction for a long time in the development of military equipment for very many years and "family" control from the Central Committee where experts worked—who had formerly been with the military-industrial complex or the Ministry of Defense and who plan to return there but to higher and more promising positions—resulted in the fact that some types of weapons and military equipment, like "Krug," never attained the assigned parameters and the very idea of their construction turned out to be utopian and the money that was spent, millions and billions, was cast to the wind.

"Science, like a designer's idea, has the right to be wrong," First Deputy Chief of Missile-Space Defense Lieutenant-General B. Alisov convinced me. "They cannot develop without this."
It is difficult to argue with this postulate. But these errors would have been reduced to a minimum if independent expert control, free from monopolism, existed in military science and in industry and if the right to an error was reinforced with the responsibility for its size.

"If we manage to establish strict personal responsibility, we will finally eliminate voluntarism, working in fits and starts, and nepotism," said G. Kisunko, designer of the USSR's first antimissile defense systems. "We will place the right to an error under the supervision of the Supreme Soviet, and we will make the sphere of secret work the battlefield of scientific ideas and not personalities who are competing for a place under the sun, only then will we avoid billions of rubles in losses."

And I need to say one more thing today.

After the fire at the “Krug” reception site and the dressing-down received from the former PVO Commander-in-Chief, Colonel A. Mukhamedzhanov nevertheless found the capability to organized his own guards at the “foreign” facility. Right now a soldier is on duty there during the day near the electric stove and the intercom.

Indeed, he has practically nothing to guard there, other than the walls covered with soot, the bent steel supports that have been twisted by flame and the black tarred roofing paper which they have nailed onto the burned out window frames for the winter. Repair, reconstruction, and new filling for the building, it anyone decides to do it, will require millions and millions.

"In general, it is our good luck that ‘Krug’ does not sail, does not fly and that no missiles and no projectiles are stored in it," said Colonel V. Slavyanskiy. "Then the size of the losses would be incomparably higher, yes and we would not get by without human tragedies."

Yes, “Krug” is only a grain of sand, a drop in the sea of current military and state problems that have been permeated by our common mismanagement. There actually never was any weapon or ammunition in it. But today so much military equipment, weaponry, missiles and projectiles have been produced by our military-industrial complex and accumulated by our army that their proper guarding and later also utilization, reprocessing and resmelting requires enormous material, human, and financial resources and the main thing—skillful, without negligence or confusion, special posing of the matter. We do not yet have this and therefore the possibility of new fires and explosions in the taiga with irreparable damage has not been excluded.

And the last thing. The joint commission that flew to the site of the accident at the village of Bolshoy Kartel of Komsomolsk Rayon in Khabarovsk Kray is completing its work. But its conclusions are still unknown.

I foresee that it will also not name anyone as personally responsible for the flagrant mismanagement with the “Krug” complex. At this point, we do not know who specifically is guilty for the tragedy with the nuclear submarine Komsomolets, who made the decision on the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar site that violates the ABM Treaty and who cast hundreds of millions of rubles to the wind with it...

Monopolies do not betray their adherents.

FROM THE EDITOR: As it has now become known, a new fire occurred, this time at the “Duga” reception site not far from “Krug,” after the commission's departure from Bolshoy Kartel. Our correspondent was with the commission. The technological equipment on two floors burned.

DOSAAF Successor Group Charter, Organization Chart
92P50073A

[Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKY PATRIOT in Russian No 50, for December 1991 (signed to press 10 December 1991) publishes on pages 3-16 the 4300-word text of the Charter of the Union of Defense Sport-Technical Organizations (Societies) [UDSTO] of the Sovereign Republics (States). The charter comprises the following sections: I. Membership, Rights and Obligations in UDSTO; II. UDSTO Organizational Structure; III. UDSTO Ruling Organs; IV. Auditing Commissions; V. UDSTO Property and Funds; VI. The Rights of UDSTO.

The same paper publishes on page 14 a 1200-word commentary by M. Prorovner entitled “Love Your Stepchildren!,” which includes a proposed organizational chart for UDSTO.

Accomplishments of Armed Forces Employees Unions Plenum
92UM0251A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Pimenov, under the rubric: “Army and Navy Trade Unions”: “What We Have Achieved and What Still Has not Been Done”]

[Text] In April 1991 for the first time in the history of the Soviet Army, an Agreement between the Ministry of Defense and the Federation of Trade Unions of Armed Forces Workers and Employees was signed. A multitude of problems and complaints against the Ministry of Defense have accumulated for many years in workers' collectives of military enterprises, units and institutions and the Agreement provided for their gradual solution. The year is coming to an end and the time has come to sum up the first results. To do this, a Federation Council of Trade Unions Plenum took place and USSR Deputy Ministers of Defense Colonel-General I. Fuzhenko, Colonel-General N. Cheklov and other ministry officials participated in the plenum's work.
Among the vital problems of workers' collectives, three have been singled out as being especially acute and painful: wages, housing, and trade services—that is, essentially those same problems that are characteristic for the country as a whole. But in the army, they have grown to such sizes that they look like discrimination of people. Take, say, wages. Military unit and institution workers and employees wages have turned out to be two to three times lower than the wages of specialists with like skills in the civilian sector. Or can you consider it normal when a man has been working at a unit for 20 to 25 years and cannot obtain housing—go ask the local Soviet. And the Soviet brushes him off: you are not one of ours, let the army provide housing to you, you work for the army. The situation is no better with trade or medical services or other types of social security.

Under this series of problems, an Agreement was concluded in April 1991 which is aimed at the protection of the socio-economic interests and rights of army and navy workers and employees. What has been done during the past eight months and what have they managed to achieve? Naturally, it was impossible to untie all of the knots that have been tied over decades and all the more so under the current economic and political situation in the country. Unrestrained price increases, galloping inflation, empty stores and at the same time "frozen" wages have created social tension in workers' collectives.

The Federation Council Plenum participants brought the charge of this tension from the workers' collectives to the Federation Council Plenum. And obviously this is why at first the conversation moved in a confrontational key and at the very gates—directed at the Ministry of Defense. And the essence is generally the same: they say, the Ministry leadership is not manifesting concern toward its civilian workers, is not doing anything for them, and the Agreement is not being carried out either at the center or locally....

It is impossible to say that these reproaches are entirely groundless but in some ways they are clearly unjust. This became clear after Federation Council Chairman S. Arzhavkin, Labor and Wages Directorate Chief Major-General P. Kuchma, and TsFU [Main Finance Directorate] Chief Major-General V. Vorobyev spoke about the epic work associated with increasing worker and employee wages by 50 percent and about the difficulty they experienced while overcoming numerous obstacles. The minister of defense was personally involved with this, as were the chiefs of the directorates concerned—as they say, they "conducted the battle" at the highest levels of the state. Indeed, while the protracted struggle was occurring, those 50-percent raises for which they fought had become noticeably thin by the time the President signed the papers.

Something has also been done on the housing issue. During the first six months of this year, 7,153 families of workers and employees obtained housing from the Ministry of Defense. For comparison, I can cite one other figure: during this same time, local Soviets allocated 201 apartments to them. But if you consider that as before there are still tens of thousands of families of workers and employees who need housing, then it is clear that the problem is still far from a solution.

An order has been issued in execution of the terms of the Agreement, in accordance with which automobiles that arrive for sale at units and institutions must also be allocated to workers and employees which in general was not done previously. This order is not being totally carried out locally everywhere but, as they say, there has been progress. Although we are encountering quite a few cases when some commanders are striving to cut the allocated percentage of automobiles defined by the order or to force their will on the trade union in their distribution.

Through the Agreement, they have managed to resolve certain other issues which have not been resolved for years, despite workers' collective demands. For example, wage differentials have been increased for night work and the assets for bonus payments have been increased to an eight-month wage fund. Commanders have been granted the right, with trade union committee approval, to independently determine the sizes of bonuses, incentives, and other payments that stimulate good work. The right to set contract prices for their production should largely facilitate the solution of socio-economic issues for scientific research institutes and cost-accounting organizations.

In short, there is something to place on the scale with a plus sign. Although we need to frankly say that these results cost territorial and central trade union committee workers and especially, perhaps, the Federation ispolkom staff quite a bit of labor and nerves. But, as it was clarified at the Plenum, Federation Council members poorly informed about the work conducted. Therefore, they decided not only to improve information of trade union organizations but to more actively involve Soviet members in working groups to resolve some issues or other.

As has already been reported in the press, in estimated-budget organizations, workers and employees wages will increase by 90 percent beginning on January 1, 1992. But how much (or when) will prices increase? And the main thing—will there be something to buy? Plenum participants painfully discussed the situation with trade services at units and institutions: people work side by side and fulfill the same task but, when they have arrived at the military exchange store—they divided them into those wearing shoulder boards and those without shoulder boards....

Quite a few problems remain with the protection of labor and with the issue of special clothing and shoes. They propose solving these and many other problems through a wage agreement and an agreement on socio-economic issues in 1992 which the Plenum tasked the Federation Ispolkom to sign prior to February 1.
But people are particularly alarmed and concerned about their status and situation in the former union republics: who are they there and what is theirs? The Federation Council Plenum advocated unity of the Armed Forces and their trade unions on the entire territory of the former USSR. It tasked the Federation Ispolkom jointly with the Trade Union Central Committee to develop the tactics of unified collective actions in defense of the legal rights and interests of the workers and employees of the army and navy.

Injustices in Army Housing Cited

[Article by Major A. Knutov: "Frank Discussion of Crucial Problems. Manipulation With Apartments"]

[Text] For a long time I could not decide to write. I kept hoping for changes for the better. But apparently it is no use to wait for better times. So I cannot remain silent any longer and will resort to what they call measures that are by nature unpopular, namely—complaints to various authorities.

I am a military serviceman, a deputy commander of a technical subdivision for arming a troop unit located in the village of Kalinovka in Vasilkovskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast. I was posted here from Dushanbe in August 1990.

From the moment I started to serve in this garrison I registered for an apartment. In February 1991 they gave me a one-room apartment (14.2 square meters) where I live with my wife and two daughters, 12 and nine years of age. According to the documents, I am considered to be without an apartment and am fourth from the top on the waiting list (judging from the lists posted in the staff headquarters). The list has been "frozen" for almost a year and is not moving, although there are plenty of vacant apartments in the military compound. But, as always happens in cases like this, all of them have potential occupants. Moreover, the apartments are distributed to various people according to phone calls "from above." And this is done in such a way that not a thing can be said about it. Let us say that a new rear commander arrives, and he, incidentally, should be more concerned than anybody else about justice in the distribution of housing. He immediately receives a two-room apartment, which in a moment is transformed from a free one into a dormitory of the unit. And this means that he is living in a dormitory and at the same time is on the waiting list like a simple "mortal." Another example: A political worker comes to the academy to study. An apartment is assigned to a different political worker who is now in the virgin land, but he are impatiently waiting for him and do not put him on the waiting list but hold an apartment for him.

In this unit there is also the practice of distributing apartments as a way of accounting for time spent in this particular unit (as though someone newly arrived has not served in the Soviet Army and it is his fault that he only came here a year ago), again according to how "necessary" the serviceman is, his devotion, and his irreproachable service. It turns out that we have served for the sake of apartments which every citizen not only should but must receive from the state.

Recently the general disorder and impending mass cuts have made the apartment question more and more critical. The unit command understands this and is doing everything possible to extend the time for acquiring apartments for those they intend to cut—it is not advantageous to assign an apartment to a future pensioner and the work to evict military servicemen who have lost contact with the Army is proceeding poorly. I am convinced that if many people were offered good apartments in other rayons and oblasts of Ukraine they would move and leave their apartments for military servicemen.

Let me apologize in advance for the confusion of my thoughts. I have not dealt especially with this apartment problem, but when almost every week you hear the answer that there are no apartments in the garrison when actually there are some, and when problems that could be solved are not being solved, I become offended as a person who has served in Central Asia for 18 years and for a total of 23 years. I become offended for my family who have done nothing wrong. I become offended that during all this time I have earned only 14 square meters for four people.

More and more frequently it enters my mind to fight fire with fire.

For the sake of my family I cannot resort to just any action, even an illegal one.

But still I would like to believe in the justice and decency of our world.

Special Concern Among Servicemen as Minsk Meeting Opens

[Special correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko report: "The Hardest Part Lies Ahead"]
It cannot be denied that many of us, especially the military, were deeply worried before the meeting of heads of the independent states in Minsk. Although the Alma-Ata agreements did inspire Soviet people (sorry, but I cannot call them anything else yet) with some degree of hope that although we live in different republics we will not be divided by borders, visas, or currencies, after the statements by Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan on the formation of their own armies it became unclear what form the Commonwealth armed forces will take and what fate awaits hundreds of thousands of officers and warrant officers and their families.

Moreover even in Alma-Ata it was already possible to detect not exactly disagreements, but what I would call divergences between the views of the heads of various states. Whereas, for instance, Uzbek President I. Karimov admits the possibility of dual citizenship—of a specific state and of the Commonwealth—the president of Ukraine is categorically opposed to this. Whereas B. Yeltsin seeks, as he put it at the press conference, “transparency” of borders between the republics, entry without visas, and the formation of a commission on the protection of the CIS borders, L. Kravchuk, again, believes that this is Russia’s “personal” affair, as he puts it. Moreover Ukraine, although it supported the formation and development of a common economic area and an all-European and Eurasian market, plans in the near future to introduce its own currency.

In short, the development of events in the republics of the former Union since Alma-Ata has not provided grounds for complacency. That is why everyone impatiently awaited the next meeting of the heads of the independent states, this time in Minsk. Documents are due to be signed here which will in future affect the lives of all of us who formerly lived in a single country called the Soviet Union.

...The delegations of the independent states began to arrive Sunday.

The talks began at precisely 1100 hours [30 December]. As I transmit these lines, only the Commonwealth coordinating institutions have been formed.

More in the next issue about the rest, and in particular about those issues that particularly concern servicemen.

Neglect of Baltic Servicemen Scored

[Article by Captain Second Rank S. Lukshich: “I Am Writing as a Last Resort...’ We Are Holding On for Now...”]

[Text] Riga— More and more frequently one finds in the editorial mail letters beginning with the lines: “I am writing to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA as a last resort”... It would seem that the last hopes of despairing people—officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who take their problems through all the echelons right up to the USSR president, are left only with the press, with publicity. And more and more of these letters are from the regions where they are trying to get rid of the Soviet Army or involve it in solving their problems, to draw it into the political and interethnic conflicts where the unsolved problems increase with each passing day like a snowball.

It is perhaps not without a portion of bitter irony that we decided to include such letters under the heading “I Am Writing as a Last Resort...”

Latvia

Even a month ago the words “social protection of military servicemen” burned in our hearts. There was some kind of hope that for us who had been “stuck” in Riga, now the capital of a foreign state, there would be some kind of help from the homeland. At the very least they would welcome us into our homeland. That they would accept us somehow, but... Those who were filled with the most talk and promises, who were always talking about “social protection” and saying “not a single officer, warrant officer, or ensign will be forgotten or ignored,” are now shrugging their shoulders. I have in mind above all our military leaders. And to make sure that we will continue to believe that they need us, that they will look out for us, that they will try to help and support us, they regularly send us various kinds of “pep talkers” and “persuaders.” What good do such meetings do? They cause nothing but irritation and dissatisfaction among the people.

Rear Admiral Ye. Alekseyev, deputy chief of staff of the Navy, visited Riga recently. He spoke to us. What did he speak about? Nothing. He tried to calm us down, told us to hold on... But how are we to hold on? The military registration offices are closed. Nobody is filling out documents for pensions. In the Latvian Republic they have been forbidden to issue passports to military servicemen and their families. My son, for example, has been unable to obtain a passport for four months now. For four years we have written requesting that he not be certified in the Latvian language. As the son of a military serviceman they did not certify him. But now all of a sudden they say he has to take the graduation exams in Latvian or else he will not receive a diploma. And they humor us—hang on. And in Moscow they are saying nothing at all. We decided that our son would enter the military institute. I went there to see the officials. And they said to me: How can we admit someone from a foreign state? Well, and what do we have now—a vicious circle? Who are we now? Whom are we protecting, whose “sovereign people”? We have no passports, or rights to housing either...

Those officers and ensigns who decided to leave the Baltics forever have begun to look for their own possibilities of finding a job somewhere. They went to Pskov. A. Dobryakov, head of the local administration, solved the problem quickly; we were allotted land to build individual housing. In Cherepovets we concluded a
contract for the delivery of 50 cottages for 100 families in 1992. The enterprise that came to meet us halfway requested: Sell eight trucks for their residual value, we do not have enough technical equipment for our work. The fleet commander gave his permission. But that, it turns out, is no longer enough. You have to go to Moscow and kowtow to various officials. From the Navy rear staff they sent people to the Main Automotive Administration—the buck supposedly stops there. I went to the Main Automotive Administration and saw Colonel V. Polovsky. He listened to me and then he too sent me away: The commander-in-chief of the Navy had to sign the letter. The commander-in-chief signed it. The letter went to the minister of defense. And there was not a word. I could not get in to see him. So it took the Pskov officials 10 minutes to allot us the 60 hectares of land; in two hours we concluded an agreement with the Cherеповets officials for the construction of 50 buildings; but we do not know how long it will take our own ministry to decide whether or not to give us permission to sell eight trucks in exchange for the delivery of homes for its "persecuted" officers and ensigns from the Baltics. Instead of operational assistance they send us from Moscow highly placed visitors who do nothing more than appeal to us once again: "Hold on!"

For now we are holding on...

**Officers’ Concerns on Future Talks with Baltics**

92UM0273A Moscow KRNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Dec 91 First Edition p 2


[Text] Already a month ago we learned that the heads of the Soviet delegations at the negotiations with the Baltic countries will be replaced. And the reason is, as it has been reported in the newspapers, that E. Shevardnadze, the current head of the union ministry of foreign relations has been eliminated. Therefore, compromises are needed at the negotiations.

Finally, on December 10 we learned the names of the new heads of the delegations. But M. Gorbachev made these appointments, so it is not worth mentioning their names right now. The USSR already no longer exists and the union ministry of foreign relations has been eliminated. In any case, it is not clear to the Baltic states with whom they should now conduct the negotiations. For this reason, the plenary session planned for the first ten days of December at the negotiations between the former USSR and Estonia have been postponed.

Questions on the status of troops, on the fate of division-sized units, on the legal protection of servicemen, etc., once again remain open. But what is occurring in the troops right now? What do the officers expect from the negotiations?

**THE NEGOTIATIONS**

Major-General Yu. Kurnatov, head of the North-West Group of Forces Training Center:

“I do not have an expectation but a desire for everyone who sits at the table of the new negotiations to manifest the maximum possible common sense. The concern of the leaders of the Latvian State that they will not be able to quarter the foreign diplomats who have been accredited in the republic as rapidly as they would like are quite understandable but the main difficulty is the lack of buildings for embassies. But the underlying theme in conversations and in newspaper articles is: The army, they say, is to blame, it occupies enormous floor space in Riga and some publications even considered it necessary to even cite the number of 250 addresses of facilities with a total floor space of 17 million square meters.

“I do not know who performed these calculations or how much they correspond to reality, but it would also be useful to cite other data in this case: the redeployment of the group of forces headquarters and directorate will require, according to expert calculations, from 2.5 to 4 million rubles. These are previously unplanned expenditures. Besides, time is needed to create a communications system and to reequip buildings in the village of Adazi where the headquarters’ new deployment site has been designated. Therefore, compromises are needed at the negotiations.”

Major-General V. Tyutyunnikov, a motorized rifle brigade commander (Estonia):

“It would be a bit sad for me to learn that Saint Petersburg Mayor A. Sobchak will no longer head our delegation at the negotiations with Estonia. During his stay in Tallinn, he very acutely posed the questions of social protection of servicemen to the leadership of the Estonian Republic. I am convinced that he is a very serious politician. I do not know what high considerations dictated the decision on replacing the leaders of the delegations (although the USSR itself already no longer exists), but I would nevertheless wish to see A. Sobchak at these negotiations, if not as head of a delegation then as part of a delegation and obviously at future negotiations between Russia and Estonia.

“The Military District Officers’ Assembly Resolution contains a paragraph which obliges us to insist that representatives of officer society be included in working groups for conducting negotiations. This is very important under conditions when people do not have any confidence in tomorrow. Let them see and know how their vitally important issues are being resolved. But today they assure an officer on the one hand: ‘Until I can provide every officer with an apartment, they will not leave the Baltic.’ On the other hand, the government of the Estonian Republic is quite seriously examining variants such as using ‘UN armed formations to resolve problems associated with the presence of Soviet troops in the state....’”
The division is living a normal life, there have not been any changes. As of today, I do not have any information whatsoever about the division's future fate. Obviously, this task now lies on Russia's shoulders.
five-story building, two three-story buildings, two dormitories, and Finnish huts without utilities.... And practically none of us have permanent residence permits. It is possible that everyone will end up among the homeless in the new year if Estonia establishes total control over TVVP (Tallinn Higher Military-Political Construction School). Many professors are expressing the desire to be released from the army but under the condition that they will be given an apartment in Russia. But it is as if they have forgotten about us.

"But for now.... A total of 12 people are left in the support battalion. Therefore, officers themselves have to sit behind the wheel of buses to drive the children to school."

We think that our readers have understood what the result will be of a delay on making a decision on the status of our troops in the Baltic Region. Only one thing gives us hope: Right now, judging by everything, Russia will take control of the negotiating process. At a meeting with military commanders, RSFSR President B. Yeltsin cited the approximate time period for the troop withdrawals—5-7 years, having noted that the withdrawal will be civilized.

NATO Model for CIS Viewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 92 p 3

[Reader's letter and first part of series of articles by Major M. Pogorelyy: "Should We Imitate NATO?"]

[Text] Our former republics still cannot agree on what we are going to have—unified armed forces or joint armed forces. And if they are joint, how are they to develop relations among themselves, and, in general, how will the member states of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) interact on military issues... I think we do not need to reinvent the wheel. After all, there is a living graphic example—the NATO military bloc and its joint armed forces. Can we not use their experience?


Now that one of the very acute problems in the emerging Commonwealth of Independent States remains the unresolved military issue and the principles of the military organizational development of the CIS members, proposals to organize the Commonwealth's Joint Armed Forces using the NATO model can indeed be heard increasingly often. It is clear, however, that in order to do this, the relations between the countries of the Commonwealth should also be based on the same principles as those between NATO members. This does not mean, of course, that we should copy somebody else's experience. But it is perhaps worthwhile to look closely at it and borrow the rational ideas from it.

During the last 40 years thousands of tons of paper were expended to prove that NATO is a "bloc of aggression" or, on the contrary, that it is "a shield of democracy." Discovering the correct answer is a separate task, which the author is not going to undertake right now. It is more interesting and important at this point to look closely at how NATO works and at the mechanism for making and implementing decisions in this organization.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, initiated when this treaty was signed by 12 Western countries on 4 April 1949 in Washington, had a military-political orientation from the moment it was born. While NATO's military activities justifiably received priority coverage here, the political aspect of the treaty was ignored. Although it is obvious that just as the economy determines policy (both domestic and international), the policy in itself sets the direction for the development of military doctrine and the military organizational development of individual, or a group of, states.

From the very beginning NATO was headed by a council, where members of the organizations are represented by their foreign ministers and, whenever necessary, by heads of state and government. Later, the institution of permanent representatives of member countries was created in order to make work more efficient in the periods between ministerial meetings. All other structures, including the bloc's military structures, are subordinated to the highest body—the North Atlantic Council. Such civilian control over the powerful military organization has permitted, on the one hand, the role of the bloc's armed forces to be maintained precisely as, and only as, an instrument of the foreign policy of the member countries, and, on the other hand, lately to reasonably painlessly shift the emphasis toward NATO's political functions.

The North Atlantic Council, in which all 16 members are represented today, adopts the most important political, conceptual decisions and establishes the bloc's political strategy. Among such major recent decisions one may mention, for instance, the London Declaration of the last year and the Rome Declaration of this year. These documents chart and later spell out in more detail the changes in the formerly confrontational system of relations between West and East, and set new priorities in the development of political, economic, and military ties with Central and Eastern Europe, including our country.

Bloc members take turns in chairing the North Atlantic Council; each member state has one, equal vote which does not depend on the qualitative characteristics of the country or even whether it has its own armed forces. Decisions are made not by a majority vote but only if the proposal is approved by all NATO members. In practice, as one high-ranking American politician pointed out, sometimes the United States, Great Britain, or France become irritated when proposals made by these giants of the Western world get nixed as a result of a veto by, for instance, Luxembourg, Iceland, or Belgium. But if this is the will of equal partners, everybody has to abide by it.

During the periods between sessions of the North Atlantic Council, which usually take place twice a year, the daily work of the bloc's executive organs (except for the military) is organized by an international secretariat.
headed by the secretary general. At times of a predominately military orientation of the union of the leading Western countries, this was not a very influential figure; as the politicization of NATO increased, so his role and importance have considerably increased. During the past two or three years the political role of Secretary General Manfred Woerner has been much more prominent than that of, for instance, the supreme allied commander in Europe, General John R. Galvin.

It is interesting to note that, unlike the Warsaw Treaty, NATO was created not on the basis of ideological unity but on that of common interests—first and foremost, of course, defense. Changing interests immediately reflected the form of individual countries' participation in NATO and the degree of their involvement in common NATO programs. For instance, in 1966 France removed the French forces from consolidated command. In 1974 Greece withdrew from NATO's integrated military command on the ground that participation in it was contrary to its national interests; however, after the domestic political situation in the country changed, and after revising its military-political strategy, Greece returned to participation in these structures in 1980.

I wish to emphasize that the bloc as a whole is quite tolerant toward internal conflicts of any of its members, not playing policeman in the internal affairs of member states (in Turkey alone, for instance, three military coups took place during the period of its membership in NATO). The same applies to the noninterference of the NATO forces in the resolution of disagreements between conflicting members: If you recall, in Cyprus the Greek and Turkish troops are separated by UN forces, not NATO.

Subordinate to the council are a number of civilian committees organized to deal with theoretical and applied defense problems, such as military science and infrastructure, political and economic issues, crisis management and the challenges of modern society, budget and rear services support, production and procurements of armaments, civil defense, and so on. Also included are the mass media needed by the bloc.

At the end of this year one more very interesting organ in NATO's political structure was created—the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In addition to the "traditional" 16 members, it includes the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including the USSR (at that time), Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. So far, the new council's task is to play the role of "meeting place" to exchange experiences in military organizational development, and to establish contacts between former opponents in the area of defense. It is possible that in the future the North Atlantic Cooperation Council may become a common platform for forming a unified system of collective security in Europe—within the CSCE framework.

Among very important points are the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty itself, the protocols attached to it, and other NATO legal documents clearly delineate the sphere of the bloc's influence and the forms of its activity (the definition of the term "individual and collective defense" in the text of the treaty prevent the plans of a number of member countries to vest NATO as a bloc with the right of intervention—which did not allow it, for instance, to participate in the Persian Gulf War); the obligation of the NATO member states to resolve disagreements among themselves only by peaceful means; and the procedure for joining this organization and withdrawal from it.

A number of the above-mentioned principles could probably be reflected in the development of a package of documents on the interrelations between the CIS states in the area of defense.

The author will describe the structure of NATO's military organization in the next article. All we need to mention here is that the bloc's highest military body is the Defense Planning Committee, in which member states (except France) are represented by their defense ministers. Unified military strategy is developed and cardinal decisions in the area of defense structure are made at this level. NATO's main executive military body is the Military Committee, consisting of chiefs of the general staffs of the bloc members.

(To be continued)

More on NATO Model for CIS

92UM0330A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 3

[Part two of series of articles by Major M. Pogorelyy: "Should We Imitate NATO?"]

[Text] Unlike NATO's political organization, the bloc's military structure is more developed and diversified. This is not surprising—the North Atlantic Treaty was created as a military-strategic union of the states of West Europe and North America united by the idea of providing for defense against the Soviet Union, and then later against the Warsaw Treaty bloc. This necessity literally pushed together in one alliance countries that had traditionally competed against each other: Great Britain and France, France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, Spain and Italy, and the United States and West Europe as a whole.

This competition shaped itself historically not only in the political and economic spheres but also in the area of military organizational development, in the direction of military doctrines and the theory and practice of defense activity, and in the very mentality of the military cadres; in addition, it is reinforced by ethnic, religious, and cultural differences.

While NATO's joint political strategy is developed at the level of heads of state and government or foreign ministers of the member countries of the North Atlantic Council—unified military strategy is the task of the
Defense Planning Committee. This is the bloc's highest military authority, where the defense ministers and, if necessary, the leaders of the defense industries and financial agencies of the member countries (with the exception of France) make the most important decisions with regard to the development of plans for NATO's organizational development as a whole and that of its individual members, coordinate military expenditures and material and technical support for the Western defense effort, and so on.

As is known, France is not a member of NATO's military organization. But this is only in peacetime. In the event of war it will, of course, act together with its allies in the coalition. Therefore, the military-organizational development of France, with all its independence and originality, still "starts from a common starting point" which envisages integration into the NATO structures if needed. Bilateral relations in defense matters with other NATO members are also developed. Therefore it is not accidental that the potential of the armed forces of this country is counted in the joint military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Defense Planning Committee develops the bloc's strategy. In past decades its concepts were invariably based on the need to deter by various methods (thus the concepts of "measured response," "forward defense," and so forth) the threat ostensibly presented by the "giant Soviet tank armies in the heart of Europe." The dramatic changes that have taken place lately in the military-political situation in Europe demanded a corresponding reaction on the part of the Defense Planning Committee. As a result, a new strategic concept was born. So far, its name has not appeared yet in either official documents or in the press; therefore, we will tentatively call it an anticrisis strategy.

Its substance is that in the absence of the traditional "threat from the East" ("the myth of a Soviet military threat" truly turned out to be a myth), NATO should be ready to counteract numerous risk factors: the political and economic instability on the ruins of the former USSR, fraught with chaos, anarchy, and—in the worst case scenario—large-scale civil war; the instability in the countries of East and Central Europe that potentially threatens to turn into a fight to redraw the political map of Europe, something that is already especially visible in Yugoslavia; and finally, the festering sore of the Middle East conflict.

It was noted, for instance, last December at the Defense Planning Committee session in Brussels that these three "high risk areas" make the efforts to prevent and, if necessary, resolve the crisis situations threatening the security of the bloc's countries a priority in NATO's new strategy. These efforts are concentrated on establishing "dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of an effective potential for collective defense," says the communiqué of the Brussels session.

Direct responsibility for carrying out this task rests with NATO's Military Committee. It consists of representatives from the highest military commands of the bloc's 14 countries (again, without France, as well as Iceland, which does not have its own armed forces; by mutual agreement, Luxembourg is represented by Belgium)—the chiefs of the General Staffs.

By the way, this committee is the only organ of military command whose creation is directly stipulated in the text of the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 9). As the main executive organ, the Military Committee is subordinated directly to the North Atlantic Council and directs the entire military structure of the bloc, including the joint armed forces—through the respective commands, the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, and the 15 specialized committees, groups, and agencies (for instance, on standardization, communications, radar-electronic countermeasures, meteorology, and so on) and the NATO Defense College in Rome.

The working organ of the Military Committee is its international headquarters in Brussels. It is composed of six main administrations: intelligence; strategic and nuclear planning (which includes the department for arms control and disarmament); operational and combat training; material and technical support and resources, including personnel; communications and command and control systems; and armaments and standardization. There is also a public liaison department subordinate to the chief of staff.

Along with the Military Committee there is also the Nuclear Planning Group, which is directly under the Defense Planning Committee. This group stands somewhat by itself, since it is not a military command organ in a full sense of the word. The nuclear arms of the bloc's armed forces are under respective national control in peacetime. The group develops guidelines for the use of nuclear arms to the advantage of NATO's main commands in the event of war, selects strike targets, and determines the numerical strength of the arsenal needed, including proposals for its modernization or reduction. In particular, it was on the basis of this group's proposal that the decision was made in 1979 to base intermediate-range Pershing-2 missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe, and in 1983 to withdraw 1,400 tactical nuclear warheads from Europe.

After the well-known statements made last year by the leadership of the United States and Great Britain on the withdrawal and partial elimination of some types of tactical nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Planning Group is "operating" with approximately 700 nuclear aerial bombs and missiles remaining in Europe, plus the strategic potential of the United States and Great Britain, part of which is in the event of war designated for NATO use, particularly by Allied Command Europe. The leading role in this group belongs, of course, to the United States as the holder of the bloc's main nuclear potential.
In general the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming financial-economic and military superiority, solidly dominates NATO. The “junior partners,” some of which are such world powers as Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, are far from always happy with this situation. As the political and economic integration of the West European countries increases, so does their desire for greater independence from the United States in military matters. In this respect one can mention such steps during last year alone as the Anglo-Italian defense initiative, the intention to create a French-German military formation, and so on. To this category also belongs the desire on the part of a number of European states to turn the West European Union into a single military structure of the emerging European Union—indeed, independent from the United States, of course.

So far there is no full consensus between the allies on this issue; besides, not all EC members are NATO members, just as not all European members of NATO are members of the West European Union. Nevertheless, “separatist” tendencies in defense issues are present in NATO, too—the Commonwealth of Independent States is not alone in this respect. In any case, the latest documents of NATO’s command bodies acknowledge the fact that the West European Union will continue to develop as an EC defense structure, while at the same time expressing the hope that it will “strengthen NATO’s European base.” Such a compromise formula has so far prevented the bloc from splitting within.

(To be continued)
Formation of Baltic Armies Viewed


First, an appropriate legal basis for this has been created in the republics, and legal acts that regulate serving in the military have been adopted. For instance, in Lithuania the people called up for active military service are those of legal age, are Lithuanian citizens, and speak Lithuanian. The possibility of serving in an alternative service is also envisaged.

Second, the needed human resources are in place for their creation. One may expect that the Baltic states will use a mixed (draft plus contract) principle of manning their armed forces.

Third, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are starting to form their forces from scratch. These states gained certain experience in organizationally developing, equipping, training, and maintaining an army during the period from 1918 to 1939-1940. One would assume that this experience will become the foundation for the creation of national armed forces.

Based on an analysis of the development of the situation in the Baltic countries, one may assume that during the next few years the creation of their own armed forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will become a priority task. Organizationally, they may consist of ground forces, the navy, and perhaps an air force. The number of tank divisions may be somewhat greater. Combat support, material and technical supply, and maintenance units will also be created. All of this will allow to form full-fledged formations, most likely brigades, and units, most likely regiments.

One may assume that one of the brigades in each Baltic republic (in Estonia it may be a regiment) will probably be designated as a “rapid deployment” unit. In this case there should be no doubt that they will be equipped with the best arms and manned by the best trained, in both the physical and professional sense, officers, sergeants, and soldiers. Later on these formations may form, if necessary, the foundation for the creation of the Baltic states' own “commando”-type special forces.

In addition, separate tank and motorized infantry units will be created in the ground components; they will be assigned, for instance, the task of guarding important objects on the territories of the republics, as well as control over the terrain and the seashore in the area where placement of large formations is difficult or not expedient. It is expected that there will not be many infantry fighting vehicles in the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian ground forces. There will be more armored troop carriers—both tracked and wheel-based.

Speaking of the Baltic states’ navies, one may assert that at least initially they will be mainly designed to operate within the coastal radius. The navy of each Baltic country will not be of significant numerical strength—no more than 2,000-3,000 people, including support personnel. Organizationally, the navy may consist of several groups of ships and cutters. The most widely used craft in the navies will be cutters—escort, patrol, artillery, and multipurpose. Initially, there will be considerably fewer ships (mine-sweeping, landing, and small anti-submarine vessels, as well as corvettes and frigates). Some vessels may be converted from civilian to military use. It is possible that the navies will include a few submarines. Still, in the near future the number of vessels in the navy of each Baltic state will not be more than 15 units.

The air force is, in my opinion, the most vulnerable component of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian armed forces. It is possible that in the beginning far from every Baltic country will have one. It all has to do with the absence of air crews and specialists in the basic professions that ensure the functioning of an air force. Organizationally, the air forces may consist of several mixed squadrons, that is, brought up to strength on an “airplane plus helicopter” principle. In all probability, there will be more helicopters than airplanes in the air forces; however, there will be extremely few purely combat or armed helicopters.

Most likely, the air forces will include anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft units, with the exception of means providing troops anti-aircraft defenses. The air forces may also include several transport planes on loan from civilian airlines. In addition, a certain number of civilian aircraft may be converted to military use by fitting them with light weapons and appropriate equipment. Some of them may be used to patrol the border perimeter of the Baltic states, and to control the situation on the coast, in zones surrounding islands, and in territorial waters.

As part of the national armed forces, national guards will probably also be created. It is expected that part of them
will serve as people's militia on a permanent basis, representing at the same time both a security force and civil defense troops. The rest of the national guard will be a component of organized reserves of the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

However, the most painful issue in connection with the organizational development of the national armed forces in the Baltics is, of course, a free-of-charge allocation or the transfer to them on a commercial basis of some armaments of the Baltic Military District and of the Baltic Fleet. The solution may only be found in the course of negotiations with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on an inter-state level. It is already clear, however, that the Balts will insist that the equipment and armaments delivered to them be of the most modern type and mainly counted against the satisfaction of property claims made by the Baltic leadership against the property of the former USSR. Still, no matter how the events develop in the region itself and around it, there can be no doubt that the national armed forces of the Baltic states will be equipped to an overwhelming extent by arms and equipment of Soviet make. In the future it is possible that a reorientation toward Western-made arms will take place in outfitting the armed formations. One may expect that Germany and Sweden will become the main suppliers of arms for the Baltics. In all probability, they may even arrange for some arms sales on credit in the very near future.

The organizational development of national armed forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia may be facilitated by the fact that during the time the republics were a part of the USSR they accumulated a serious economic potential that will allow them to set up their own production of military items in some areas (although the creation of a powerful defense industry in the region is not a realistic prospect).

In an operational sense, the territory of the Baltic states has a good infrastructure. The republics have about 5,500 km of railroads and over 64,000 km automobile roads, which permits the quick redeployment of troops in different directions. The region has three international-class airports, several republic-level airports, and many field airstrips and helicopter landing pads. There are a number of military airfields, some of which will possibly be used in the future jointly with Soviet airborne formations and units.

The Baltics have five large seaports; one of them (Klaipeda) provides a ferry connection with Germany. In addition, there is a large number of ports for coastal trading vessels and fishing boat piers. All of this will unquestionably become a powerful support in the creation of Baltic national armed forces and permit the creation of an effective defense system in each republic.

What special features may the Baltic states' national defense systems have? It is clear that the republics will be not so much concerned with protecting the borders between themselves as about protecting the borders with "neighbors to the east." Such is the situation for Estonia, which has a border with two oblasts of Russia, and for Latvia, which has common borders with Russia and Belarus. The situation for Lithuania is more complicated—in addition to a border with Belarus in the east, it also has borders with Poland and the Russian Federation’s Kaliningrad Oblast in the south. Here the latter is in an extremely unfavorable geographic position, not having a territorial link with the Russian mainland. However, a large group of troops of the Baltic Military District and the Baltic Fleet are stationed on its territory, making it Russia's strategic outpost in the West. It appears that it will be these nuances that will determine the direction of the Baltic states' national defense systems, will delineate the configuration of the placement of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian defense forces, and will determine the territorial location of their defense regions.

One more specific aspect of the Baltic states' future national defense systems is their obvious orientation toward future consolidation within the framework of a military-political union—the Baltic Union. That such a union may be created, and probably will be in the very near future, is of very little doubt—at least for specialists. Then the Baltic states, with their combined troops potential, may become an impressive military force. Especially if the West has a stake in it. Suffice it to say that in case of need, the Balts will be able to put under arms one tenth of the region's population, that is, about 900,000 people.

Since the leadership of the Baltic countries has taken a course toward the republics' integration into NATO, there is no doubt as to whom the Baltics will prefer to cooperate militarily with in the future. However, in my opinion, whatever changes may be taking place in the Baltic states' policy in the near future, whatever momentary considerations may be chosen as the basis, the renewed Union and the Baltics are doomed to cooperate with each other, including in such a delicate area as defense. It is said that the higher the fence, the better the neighbor. Applied to our relations, one may say that we will be good neighbors unless we are separated by high fences.

Republic Defense Reforms Discussed

Defense Specialist Interviewed

92UN05664 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 1

[Text] Under the conditions of the proclamation of the political and economic independence of the republics which were formerly a part of the USSR particular significance is attached to problems of defense and
national security. What changes have there been in military policy with regard for the new official status of Belarus? On what basis should relations with the Soviet Army be built? How will the draft of Belarussian youth for the armed forces be implemented now—this is a far from full list of the questions troubling people today.

Considering the great public interest in this subject, I asked N.N. Zharetskiy, chief specialist of the Belarus Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs Citizens' Rights, Public Safety and Defense Work Administration, to comment on how decisions in the sphere of military and defense policy adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet and government are being implemented. This is what Nikolay Nikolayevich had to say:

Our republic's parliament has of late, proceeding from the declaration on its state sovereignty, adopted several legislative instruments on matters of defense and national security. These decisions have brought under the jurisdiction of the government the formations and units of border and railroad troops stationed on the territory of Belarus, the local organs of military administration and the headquarters and subdivisions of civil defense. The decree "Procedure for the Deployment of Combined Military Units on the Territory of the Republic of Belarus" has been adopted. A republic Ministry for Defense Matters will be formed for leadership of the military structures subordinate to the republic, support for the realization of legislative instruments and enforceable enactments pertaining to defense issues, and the coordination of actions in this sphere with the corresponding Union authorities.

The adoption of these fundamental decisions confronts us with a number of new and, to be frank, very complex tasks and demands of the organs of state administration specific practical actions. A recent government statement emphasized that the Council of Ministers was working on strengthening the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, including in the sphere of its defense interests.

What has already been done? A regulation on questions of removal from the republic of arms, military equipment, property, and other military freight has been adopted, and supervision of such transactions has been established. A problem which was particularly disturbing to people—I refer to the performance by citizens of Belarus of their military duty—has been resolved. In accordance with the decree "Call-Up of Citizens for Active Compulsory Military Service in October-December 1991," it is envisaged that persons drafted into the army from the territory of Belarus will as of the present fall be sent only to replenish military units stationed in the republic. The conscripts who might wish to serve in the navy, for example, or in other branches of the USSR Armed Forces outside of the republic will as of the present fall be sent only to replenish military units and border troops and military construction battalions and also units of the Belarussian Military District. The executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies and the military commissariats are required to prevent instances of conscripts being sent from areas which were subjected to radioactive contamination to military units connected with nuclear installations or other sources of ionizing radiation, microwave frequencies and rocket fuel components. Young men from such areas will serve only in "clean" territories.

For the purpose of the creation of a legal basis for the activity of the republic military structures preparation is underway at the present time of the bills "State Border of the Republic of Belarus," "The Border Forces," "Civil Defense" and a number of others. Draft regulations governing the local organs of military administration, the railroad forces and the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Defense Affairs are being drawn up. Questions on the financing and material and technical support of the military structures transferred to the jurisdiction of the republic are being tackled also.

But realization of the scheduled program is proving far from simple, primarily in connection with the difficult financial position in which the executive authorities of the republic have been placed. For this reason the Council of Ministers is persistently seeking practicable paths of the assurance of the normal functioning of the military structures and preservation of the level of their readiness to perform professional assignments in the transitional period. In our opinion, the elaboration and conclusion by the republic government of agreements with the USSR Defense Ministry and other Union authorities on a delineation of responsibility in these matters until the Union treaty or an interstate agreement in the defense sphere has been signed should contribute to this. Such an agreement concerning organization of the protection of the state border has already been signed. Draft treaties on questions of the functioning of the railroad troops and civil defense organs of administration and units have been prepared, and a draft agreement on local organs of military administration is being drawn up. In a word, a great deal of intensive work on ensuring that our sovereign republic be reliably defended and that the present "time of troubles" not influence its defense capability is under way.

Military Association Council Appeal
92UN0566B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 13 Dec 91 p 1

["Appeal of the Belarus Military Association Coordinating Council to the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet"—SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA headline]

[Text] The Belarus Military Association Executive Council patriotic movement, aware of its responsibility for the fate of the fatherland and the security of its
people and considering that in the armed forces social and political tension is growing, corruption is spreading and discipline declining;

that the continuation of the current position of the Armed Forces threatens the possibility of an anticonstitutional coup and civil war;

that the leadership of the former USSR and the Union Defense Ministry is not, for personal reasons, interested in fundamental military reform and is losing control of the situation;

that a considerable number of troops are being withdrawn to our soil from East Europe and that such a withdrawal from the Baltic is possible; and

that the uncontrolled seizure of the property of the Armed Forces by certain former Soviet republics is under way, national armies are being formed and that the biggest republics—Russia and Ukraine—have officially recognized the right of each of them to have their own armies;

depends it necessary to propose the following:

1. That the Republic of Belarus Supreme Soviet together with the parliaments of other republics assume responsibility for the implementation of fundamental military reform, the primary purpose of which should be the transition from unified to joint armed forces.

2. That for the implementation of military reform it is essential to address to the other republics the proposal for the creation of a provisional committee of defense ministers of the republics. Representatives of the USSR Defense Ministry could be coopted onto the committee as consultants.

3. That the primary tasks of the provisional committee could be as follows:

—distribution among the republics of responsibility for specific army combined units or formations;

—a decision on the fate of strategic arms, including nuclear weapons and the navy, and the formation of a joint command of the strategic forces;

—a decision on questions of the financing of the strategic forces;

—the deployment of the troops withdrawn from East Europe;

—protection of the social and political rights of the military personnel serving outside of its native republic.

4. That it is essential for management of the military reform in Belarus to afford the republic Ministry for Defense Affairs the possibilities and mechanisms for a solution of all military questions.

5. That for protection of the constitutional system in the period of implementation of the military reform it is essential to promptly form a Republic of Belarus republic guard.

6. That the Supreme Soviet should provide for protection of the rights of servicemen on the territory of the republic and also the rights of servicemen, natives of Belarus, serving outside of it.

The Belarus Military Association calls on the people's deputies to display courage and assume at this difficult time responsibility for the security of their people and peace and tranquility on our long-suffering land.

[Signed] Belarus Military Association

Pridnestro Republic Claims Military Units
92UN0521A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 7 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Strakhov: “Not Recognized, But It Has Its Own Army”]

[Text] By a special ukase of the leadership of the Pridnestro Moldavian Republic (PMR), all military units located on the territory of the republic are transferred to its jurisdiction. A military commissariat has been organized in Tiraspol, which is headed by Colonel V. Kim. Earlier, a similar step was taken with respect to all law enforcement organs, although several subunits of the organs of Internal Affairs declared that, as before, they will subordinate themselves only to orders from Kishinev. The Romanian-Moldavian “tricolor” banner flies over the buildings of the rayon Directorate of Internal Affairs in Grigoriopol and in Dubossary.

As yet, no official reaction to the decision of the Pridnestro Moldavian Republic has followed, but Kiev will apparently also say something in this regard. The fact is that all subunits of the Soviet Army that are deployed in the Pridnestro region are in the Odessa Military District. In turn, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has claims to it.

Kravchuk Confers With Defense Ministry
92UM0276A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Portnikov: “The President Is Creating an Army”; “What Does Leonid Kravchuk Command, For All That?”]

[Text] The Ukrainian leadership aspires, by all accounts, to a solution of the problem of Ukraine's armed forces prior even to the conclusive establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the political map.

On 12 December President Leonid Kravchuk signed two decrees in accordance with which he will assume the duties of commander in chief of Ukraine's armed forces, except for the troops which are a part of the strategic
deterrent forces. The decree observes that the armed forces of Ukraine are to be created on the basis of the forces of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts, the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, and other military formations which are deployed on the territory of Ukraine. So the assertion which appeared in the preceding issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that in accordance with his wishes, the forces deployed on the territory of neighboring Moldova would also be subordinated to Leonid Kravchuk was an annoying blunder. And Ukraine's armed forces will be created in stages, what is more, in accordance with the concept of defense and the organization of the armed forces approved by the republic's Supreme Soviet. Leonid Kravchuk has entrusted the duties of the commander of Ukraine's armed forces, who is subordinate only to the president of the republic, directly to Colonel General Konstantin Morozov. Prior to 20 January 1992 the defense minister is to have presented the president with a plan of the formation of the armed forces. The minister is to organize strict supervision of the status of the forces and their redeployment and the movement of military equipment, arms, and property. This decree takes effect the day it is signed.

On the day the decree was signed, Leonid Kravchuk and Prime Minister Vitold Fokin held a meeting with the leadership of Ukraine's Defense Ministry, the military districts, and the armies deployed in Ukraine, and the command of the border and internal forces, the National Guard, and civil defense. Leonid Kravchuk thanked the military leaders for having responded to his invitation and notified them of the main points of the Agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States concerning the organizational development of the armed forces. He confirmed the need for centralized leadership of the strategic armed forces deployed in the republics. The procedure of the control of these forces would be formulated in a special agreement of the parties to the commonwealth. As far as the armed forces which are not a part of the strategic armed forces are concerned, the concept formulated by the Ukrainian Parliament remains as before: They will constitute the basis for the creation of an independent army.

Vitold Fokin described problems of the servicemen's social security. The cabinet intends increasing the military's salary scales as of 1 January 1992, raising the wage rates and salary scales of workers and employees of the armed forces and increasing the pay, salary scales, and sizes of the pensions of those released into the reserve. On the basis of the concept of the organizational development of the armed forces, a reduction in the numbers of the personnel is contemplated.

A plan for the social adaptation of former military personnel has been devised also. It includes the opening of faculties at educational institutions and the reprofiling of certain vocational-technical schools for the servicemen's acquisition of new trades. In addition, the cabinet would like to involve discharged military personnel in an extensive network of small businesses and commercial structures.

Of course, the participants in the meeting could not have failed to have inquired whether the orders and commands of USSR Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov would now have the force of law. Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov declared that there should be no dual subordination of the forces deployed in Ukraine: “We are undoubtedly constantly conducting conciliatory negotiations by telephone, and Defense Minister Shaposhnikov knows what is happening. We are coordinating the form and procedure of the change of subordination, and this will by an order of the defense minister be conveyed to the forces in the next few days.”

Ukraine Army, Defense Needs Viewed

92UM0174A Kiev SILSKI VISTI in Ukrainian
24 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Ukrainian People's Deputy M. Porovskyy under the rubric “Point of View”: “Ukrainian Armed Forces for Ukraine”]

[Text] The USSR Armed Forces are the last structure that is keeping the USSR from final collapse. All other state structures of the Union—the banking and monetary systems, etc.—were taken over for all practical purposes by Russia after the victory over the putschists of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. The doctrine of Burbulis to the effect that Russia is the sole legal successor of the USSR, although not adopted as a political ruling, has nonetheless been implemented in practice quite successfully. As a result, if the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet does not presently demonstrate sufficient decisiveness and political farsightedness in the matter of the creation of a Ukrainian Armed Forces, it may happen that the Armed Forces of the former USSR, created through the efforts of all the republics, will end up subordinate to the RSFSR as well.

The concept, recently adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, of defense and construction of an armed forces established the principle of the presence on the territory of Ukraine of forces at two levels: Armed Forces of Ukraine and combined units (units) of a collective strategic defense. The logical question is: To whom will forces of the collective strategic defense be subordinate? To a renewed center? To the president of the USSR? But it is perfectly clear at present that the republics of the former USSR will not agree to subordinate themselves to a renewed center, and without real levers of power and influence over the economy of the republics the president of the USSR (as commander of strategic defense) will simply be unable to resolve the thousands of questions connected with the functioning and supply of the extremely complex mechanism of strategic defense collective forces. As a result, if one rejects the camouflage word “collective,” one may
foresee that in practice these will be strategic defense forces of Russia equipped with nuclear arms and stationed on the territory of an independent Ukraine. What might the future result of this be for the Ukrainian state? Will we not become hostages of the nuclear arms and forces of a foreign state, for the withdrawal of which it will be necessary to lead the same difficult struggle that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other countries of the so-called socialist community have been leading for almost five decades?

On the other hand, there arises a whole complex of problems connected with subordination and relations of units of a collective strategic defense with the command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Naturally, a dual chain of command for units of a collective defense will not lead to anything good.

In any event Ukraine will not only have on its territory nuclear forces of Russia for practical purposes, but will also be financing them; in other words it will be paying tens of billions of rubles to arm and maintain subunits of a foreign army under the name of units of a collective strategic defense.

There is one more problem which arises—it is the threat of interference or other forms of influence by the forces of a collective strategic defense on the political situation in Ukraine. Imagine if, in place of General Varennikov who, accompanied by General Chychevatov, commanding general of the Kiev district, appeared during the coup at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet with the ultimatum of the state criminals, during a new "August" there appeared at the Ukrainian parliament the commanding general of the "collective" strategic forces, a certain Pelmennikov...

Only one conclusion may be drawn: If Ukraine desires not a fictitious, paper independence but rather the sort of independence that each of the world's states have, then there may not be any talk of any "joint" or "collective" strategic forces. All military units without exception stationed on the territory of Ukraine, including units of a strategic defense and the Black Sea Fleet, must be transferred to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine, on equal terms with other states of the world, will take part in the realization of all treaties and agreements concerning nonuse of nuclear weapons and disarmament, but at the present time, when the presence of our neighbors' nuclear arms may be utilized as a means of pressure and a threat to the realization of state independence of Ukraine, we must not disarm ourselves on a unilateral basis.

Taking into account the experience of the historical development of Ukraine and of the continual aggression and occupation of Ukrainian lands, the young Ukrainian state should not remain un-armed by comparison with the RSFSR, the NATO countries, and other near and distant neighbors. After all, one cannot ignore the possibility of a sequence of events whereby neighbors in the East or West exchange a democratic system for a totalitarian regime and some newly appeared "fuhrer," indicating the direction with a nuclear mace, says to his supporters "There are the lands of Ukraine, rich with bread, sausage, and sugar—go and take what you want..." Undoubtedly, in the future Ukraine must become a non-nuclear power in accordance with the Declaration on State Sovereignty. But this process should correspond with the realization of all the other provisions of the declaration and with consolidation of the state's ability to defend itself by providing its Armed Forces with other modern types of weapons.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense must immediately propose that servicemen of the Soviet Army decide as quickly as possible whether they will accept citizenship of the state of Ukraine in accordance with the recently adopted Law on Citizenship. In this fashion those servicemen who receive Ukrainian citizenship will automatically be freed from the oath to another state—the USSR—and will be able to swear fidelity to the state of Ukraine. According to the Law, such an opportunity is granted to all servicemen of units stationed in Ukraine without regard to nationality, knowledge of Ukrainian, or religion.

Unfortunately, not all desire such a development of events. On 3 October encoded telegraph No. 2976 was sent from the headquarters of the missile army to military units stationed in Ukraine; it abused the Union of Ukrainian Officers and proposed "the creation of an organization of officers capable of fighting for and defending our rights against the organs of power" (of Ukraine) [passage in quotation marks published in Russian]. In accordance with the principle of the imperial ideology of "divide and conquer," the political workers of the Kiev Military District have undertaken the creation of a pro-imperial organization of officers—an alternative to the Union of Ukrainian officers. In addition, this is being done on the very eve of the second congress of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, which is taking place on 2-4 November in Kiev. In accordance with experience in the Baltic republics, they are trying to create an organization from those officers who, apparently, do not wish to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine to oppose the "organs of power" in their creation of a Ukrainian Army and also, apparently, to "go out with a bang" [phrase rendered in Russian]. Indeed, it is possible to go out with a bang. In fact this has already begun with the dynamiting of monuments to figures of the Ukrainian liberation movement in Galicia (guards of the monuments have been seriously wounded) and provocations concerning desecration of sacred places.

Who benefits from confrontation between the "association of officers" [rendered in Russian] and the Union of Ukrainian Officers? What do those who unleash opposition and confrontation in the midst of the officer ranks desire?

The knights of the "one and indivisible" are trying to create an organization of officers which will become for
them a bulwark and guarantee that they will receive new high posts. But, respected officers, is it worth “going out with a bang” [rendered in Russian] so that today’s commanders may preserve their epaulets and avoid responsibility for complicity with the state criminals in the days of the coup d’etat? What awaits you in the overcrowded N-skiy garrisons of Russia? Is it not better, following the example of the celebrated Russian General Mikhail Grekov, who in 1919 became minister of the Directory and commanding general of the Ukrainian Galician Army and carried out victorious military operations during the Ukrainian-Polish war that went down in the history of world military art (the Chortkivskyy breach), to join the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in defense of the peaceful labor of the people of Ukraine?

The question of the creation of a Ukrainian army is the cornerstone at the foundation of an independent state. However, the existence of an army is impossible without a spiritual factor which will unite the men of that army. An army without an ideology only amounts to military force, without which it is impossible to consider the achievement of the complete freedom of Ukraine.”

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I request that the honorarium be used to purchase a 1992 SILSKI VISTI subscription for a peasant retiree who does not have the financial means to pay for one.

Ukrainian Officers Seek To Return Home

29 Nov 91 p 2

[Article by Major G. Klyuchikov: “Without Ukraine Even Shoulder-Boards Do Not Make One Happy”]

[Text] A long line forms an hour before the opening of the reception office at the Ukrainian Minister of Defense. Here one can see elderly veterans, officers, and conscripts and their parents. Either grief, or a difficult fate has brought everyone here. However, this is understandable—simple questions are resolved at the military unit level.

Despite the large number of written and oral appeals that are presented to the reception office, they can be divided into several categories. One is the appeal with a request to render assistance in a transfer to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About a hundred such written requests are registered in the reception office each day. And a majority of them are from Ukrainian citizens who are performing service outside its borders.

Frequently, reports are submitted collectively, from the Alliance of Free Democrats of the Ukrainian officers of a given unit.

"Under conditions of the consolidation of the independence of Ukraine and the need to protect its transformation, the future service of its citizens is possible only in their native land. We appeal to you with a request to grant the opportunity to serve in units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces."

This report, which was signed by 23 officers, was sent from Kazakhstan.

But what reasons inspire servicemen to appeal to the Ministry of Defense with such requests? As a rule, they are moved by high patriotism, a feeling of love for the Motherland, and an ardent desire to take part in building an independent state.

Here is what was written by Senior Lieutenant P. Makarenko and six of his comrades: "We took an oath of loyalty to the USSR. But since Ukraine has become an independent state, we want to make our contribution to strengthening the defense capability of our native land, so that it will always remain free and independent. And we are not frightened by those difficulties that will be encountered in the hard task of serving one's own Fatherland."
I want to emphasize a typical feature. Trying with all their heart to return to their native land, servicemen are not discrediting with a single word either the military unit in which they are serving or the republic in which they are living at this moment.

"Even my recently received shoulder boards do not make me happy," writes Lieutenant V. Mikityuk, "without an opportunity to return to Ukraine. Today we have a little hope. Although Russia is not alien to us, the homeland is dearer."

This leitmotif suffuses practically every report. The servicemen are striving to find a patriotic motive in service, which was substantially eroded in recent days. In addition, the officers who want to serve the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not at all intend to be a burden and especially to increase the number of problems coupled with their arrival. The overwhelming majority of them possess valuable military specialties and solid service experience.

A great many of the servicemen believe it is not at all superfluous to emphasize that they do not need dwelling space for their families. It must be confessed that voices can be heard now that with the return of the Ukrainian officers an already disastrous situation in housing will become even more severely complicated.

"My parents live in Kiev," writes Lieutenant Colonel V. Chobot, "therefore, I do not need housing." "I have an apartment on Ukrainian territory (in Borvary)," reports Major S. Bidnyy. And those 23 officers who sent the report have apartments in Ukraine.

However, it would be incorrect to assert that the servicemen are compelled by a desire to return home exclusively to defend the democratic processes that are getting stronger in Ukraine. Life is much different here also. Harsh circumstances frequently compel the writing of such reports.

As fate willed, many Ukrainian citizens have ended up in "hot spots," where Union troops are attempting to separate hostile sides. However, officers no longer see the need to risk their lives for the sake of doubtful objectives. All of this compels them resolutely to demand their return home.

"At the present time, I am separated from my family," reports Captain I. Veshviy. "In Yerevan, there are no conditions for living. The schools have been switched to the national language, and my children do not have the opportunity to study. I am not accustomed to complaining, but I am powerless in this situation." There is also a difficult situation in the Baltics. Asking that he be enrolled in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel V. Chobot, a candidate of technical sciences, explains that their Riga higher military aviation-engineering school is being disbanded, and that they are not needed by anyone in the city. Therefore, Vladimir Mikhaylovich hopes very much that the Motherland that assigned him to serve beyond its borders will take him back.

There is another side to the coin. In connection with a reduction in the Army, many officers are now being released into the reserve who possess not only extensive knowledge and experience, but who are sufficiently healthy to continue to serve. They can be and want to be useful to our Armed Forces. Will they be given this opportunity? The report of Lieutenant Colonel of Medical Service N. Gusak contains penetrating lines about this: "As long as I have the desire, yearning, and strength, I would like to serve in the army that will be established on Ukrainian soil and to defend its sovereignty and independence."

The difficult fate of the officer can be seen clearly behind virtually every report. With some, it is so broken that one can only be amazed by how these people have preserved their respect for military service and a desire to start all over. Senior Lieutenant of the Reserve V. Grinchuk was discharged from the Army because he did not conceal his convictions, and he left the CPSU. In a matter fabricated by the political department, officer of the reserve N. Sergeyev, who had academy training behind him, was discharged. These servicemen ask the valid question: Is it really possible that our Motherland does not need good specialists?

However, far from everything in the mechanism of forming our own armed forces is entirely clear. Even to the workers of the Ministry of Defense themselves. It is easy to imagine the position of servicemen—Ukrainian citizens who perform duty in the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District, or in the Northern Fleet. Ukrainian newspapers do not reach there. And so, anxious letters rush into Kiev.

One of them, rather typical, came from the Transbaykal Military District from Captain S. Gurzhos. "I can still serve. But Ukraine is pulling out of the USSR system. Will we all be given an opportunity to continue service? And to do this, is it necessary to be discharged from the USSR Armed Forces? But, if I continue to serve in them, will my cooperative apartment in Sevastopol be taken from me only because I did not return in time to Ukraine?"

You will agree that the questions are very real, and they disturb practically all officer-Ukrainians who are performing service on the territory of other republics. Each such letter is studied carefully and is analyzed in the reception office of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. And, still, for many the procedure for turning in an application and the mechanism for enlisting in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not clear. We turned for an explanation to Major Vladimir Ilyich Teplukhin, a worker in the Ministry of Defense reception office.

"We have already received more than 1,500 applications from servicemen desiring to perform service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We put all of this data into a
computer. Alas, this does not apply to all reports. Some of them have serious mistakes: They do not show the military specialty or the full name. There are also quite curious cases when, for example, a mother or a wife writes the official document instead of the officer.

"Therefore, I direct your attention to the fact that reports must be written by hand in the first person, with an indication of full data about oneself. The report has to be submitted in accordance with the established procedure for servicemen, or directly to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

"After our parliament adopts a package of laws on the structure of the military force, and the personnel structure of the Armed Forces is confirmed, manning with officer cadres will commence. Moreover, considering the large number of interested persons, on the one hand, and the inevitable reduction in personnel strength on the other hand, the selection of candidates will be conducted on a competitive basis.

Odessa Officer Union Works Despite Opposition
92UM0311B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Major G. Klyuchikov: "Help Yourselves"]

[Text] Many people are reproaching the Union of Officers of Ukraine [SOU] for the fact that while it is a public organization its members are becoming excessively involved in political activity. In response, the leadership of the Union of Officers of Ukraine claims that without a political struggle in our time no issue pertaining to social protection for servicemen will be resolved.

I am not about to judge who is right in this argument. But I do know that it would be wrong to paint the entire union one color. Each of its regional organizations is quite independent and individual. For example, the Odessa organization of the union cannot be confused with any other.

... Early in the fall an announcement appeared in the Odessa newspapers, inviting officers who have an interest in a free Ukraine to meet. A total of 78 servicemen responded, and of these, 47 became members of the Union of Officers of Ukraine on that same day. However, it all stopped right there. The fact is that the situation in the south of Ukraine is quite specific. Here they are in no hurry to change the color of their banner, and they are not swearing any oath of love of democracy. The command of the military district regards the Union of Officers of Ukraine as an unlawful formation. Therefore, most servicemen prefer not to state their position.

Relations between the district command and this public organization remain sharply negative. And this is preventing the members of the Union of Officers of Ukraine from obtaining premises. They are constantly being kicked like a football from one official to another. And without a "roof" it is impossible to be registered, that is, to become a legal entity. So why is this necessary?

Already today many small and medium-size enterprises are showing an interest in cooperating with the union. There have even been proposals from foreign companies. Some of the rayon executive committees are prepared to allot certain sums for the organization. But alas! Without a current bank account and without its own official stamp, this is impossible.

Thus, the inflexible, negative attitude of the command is restraining the activity of the union's Odessa organization.

The union, however, is not about to get involved in a dispute with the command. People here are not quick to take offense. They understand that simply no one will defend their position. So they prefer not to complain but to engage in specific action.

For servicemen in the Odessa Military District, as indeed for the entire Army, the most painful thing is the housing problem. There are 12,000 families in the district that do not have apartments, and 2,207 at the Odessa garrison. So the members of Union of Officers of Ukraine have decided that it is precisely on this sector that their energy and assertiveness are most needed.

The members of the union have set up a working group under the executive committee. It includes economic, legal, and transport sections.

Negotiations have been initiated with the district command for the purpose of acquiring automotive and construction equipment. However, there are other scenarios. They are proposing that small enterprises in the city buy the equipment.

A construction brigade made up of 16 people has already been set up. As soon as agreement is reached with a kolkhoz outside the city for the purchase of a tract of land, the brigade will start on the construction of a development for the officers. It is planned to hand over the first "turnkey" cottage next year. In addition to the brigade, the future owners of the cottages will participate.

At the same time construction of a cooperative house has been started in the city. This is a far from simple business but the city executive committee has promised to help as much as possible.

It should be underscored immediately that the members of the Union of Officers of Ukraine are by no means philanthropic. They are allocating money to officers for them to buy the cottages, but the loan must be repaid, partly by working on the construction of the house and partly by work without pay in the local union organization. For it cannot manage to carry out its expanded work without the help of experts. But there are many among retired servicemen who are ready to play an active part in an interesting business.
The Union of Officers of Ukraine is not going to organize its activity only on construction. The Odessa people have a good idea of business. For example, through conversion they are buying two washing machines for a truck-mounted spraying unit, and they are organizing a small business for watering dacha gardens.

There are plans to set up a gas station, where it will be possible not only to fill up with gasoline but also carry out minor repairs and wash cars. There would also be a small bar where one could purchase snack food. Surely this is not beyond the capabilities of retired officers and the members of their families? They must still be capable of this.

In the Odessa union organization there is no shortage of interesting and very promising proposals. Retired officers possessing diverse special abilities have an inexhaustible supply of initiatives. They are proposing to have an inventory of taxicabs, open their own dental office, publish their own newspaper. And the main thing is that all these plans are fully within the capability of the young organization because its enjoys total support from the city authorities. Even the district command is starting to show a certain interest in its activity.

Just give it time and the Union of Officers of Ukraine will have its own equipment and reliable personnel, and large sums deposited in the bank. It will even have hard currency. There should be no doubt about this, for the people of Odessa do not like to waste time but have already set to work, so there will be no worries about profit.

True, some people are reproaching the chairman of the Odessa union organization, Lieutenant Colonel O. Belomestnov, for blurring this with his political position. But this is incorrect. The Union has a firm political position: While supporting an independent Ukraine officers are not about to sit on its neck. They feel that they have the strength to cope with their own problems. Only there is no need to hang political labels around their necks and draw them into doubtful games.

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1. BESIDES WHITE GLOVES...

Major V. Khandlos' father and grandfather were military men and his brother became an officer as well.

"But our dynasty ends here," said Valeriy Vladimirovich. "This is the fifth district I have served in and I have moved 11 times. And they say that moving is as bad as having your house on fire..."

Unfortunately, many officers are now forbidding their sons to go to military schools. The continuity of the profession and dynasties are mentioned less and less frequently now. There are many reasons for this phenomenon. It is not without reason that people joke that military men have an eight-hour work day: From eight in the morning to eight in the evening with two days off, one in the winter and one in the summer. And the wages are lower than average, even if you compare them with bus drivers, not to mention cooperative members.
The social vulnerability of military servicemen during the period of our economy's transition to the market has become especially noticeable. Thus almost all enterprises now pay additional for the use of kindergartens. Only officers and warrant officers have to pay for all of it out of their own pockets. But even then people do not always pay attention to the man in uniform.

Recently we were standing at a bus stop with Ensign G. Aleksey. We started talking. Aleksey was discussing his ordeals with his children. He himself gets up every morning at five in order to be in the company before reveille. His wife is a teacher. And they do not know what to do with their two sons. They will not take them in the kindergarten. The plant considers them aliens, although in Aleksey's wife's class there are 12 children whose parents work at that very plant.

The lack of respect on the part of society for the man in uniform is reflected in the position of military servicemen. In prerevolutionary times an officer's honor of his parents work at that very plant.

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The more he calculated the madder he got. And the conclusion came of its own accord: They have to get away from that practice.

3. ARE THERE BARRIERS?

Have you ever heard someone ask military men the sacramental question: What were you doing on 19-21 August? But since the life of the army and the people are closely linked, it cannot remain completely apart from politics. Therefore in a discussion about how they envision the future army of Ukraine, they emphasized that it must protect the country's borders and sovereignty and must not be an instrument in the political game. If a national army is created to solve national problems, one can only have sympathy for the military servicemen.

Is it possible that there are other problems, particularly the national one? This has never arisen among the officers. The enlisted men have formed groups based on where they come from, but these will disappear since there will not be any soldiers from any place except Ukraine.

Nor will the language of communication be a barrier, whether it is Russian or Ukrainian. If recruits from Central Asia know Russian by the time their service is over, there can be no question about residents of the Ukraine. As for regulations, they are not likely to undergo any serious changes since they were written ages ago and contain the wisdom of military campaigns.

4. LECTURES OR ON-THE-JOB TRAINING?

Over a decade and a half I have had occasion to visit various units for retraining, but the same thing has always impressed me. Even after the training you still do not know your specific duties. I risk arousing the anger of my own military commissariat by expressing a judgment regarding the retraining of reserve officers. Certain details can also be interpreted as random, but on the whole... There is a large number of lectures and almost no practical training. Would it not be better to introduce on-the-job training so that the reserve officer along with the commanders and, where possible, independently, could perform certain specific duties, not excluding details and guard. This would discipline them and enable them to improve their skills for training and educating their subordinates.

Difficult State of Ukraine Troops Viewed

92UM0305C Kiev KOZA in Russian 13 Dec 92 p 5

[Letter from the general assembly of officers and warrant officers of a military unit in Piryatin, Poltava Oblast, in the column "Murmur in the Ranks": "Armed and Very Homeless"]

[Text] The situation of the Army and servicemen in Ukraine is of concern not only to President Bush but also to the Army in Ukraine itself. It appears that the USSR Ministry of Defense did not pamper units deployed on our
territory, bringing the conditions of their existence closer to those in the field. A letter from a general assembly of officers and warrant officers of a military unit, received by the “Post Office Box,” testifies to the situation that had emerged in the forces by the time of the independence of Ukraine.

No housing has been allocated to officers and warrant officers in the garrison of the city of Piryatin since 1986. No housing construction is in progress, and the local soviets do not allocate the due 10 percent of apartments.

The construction of a 119-apartment residential building which had been planned for 1989 was postponed until 1990 and subsequently dropped from the plan. In 1990, the unit did have funds, but they were for the USSR Ministry of Defense to hold exhibition exercises. The exercises held did nothing to improve housing conditions.

On our own we found a contractor, the Housing Construction Combine of the city of Kremenchug (Director Comrade B.R. Skripets), which promises to build a house, with materials it provides, within six to eight months on the condition that six KamAZ prime movers will be sold to the combine to transport construction elements of the house to Piryatin. The officer assembly has repeatedly approached the command of the major unit and the Kiev Military District, and the USSR deputy minister of defense for construction and troop billeting, with requests to assist us in resolving this issue.

However, nobody has helped us. We are left one on one with our problem.

This is what the situation is at present. The number of families without apartments in the unit has set a record—107—and is continuing to grow in conjunction with the discharge of officers and warrant officers. This comes to approximately 75-80 percent of the number of officers and warrant officers of the unit. By mid-1992, ours will be a unit of “homeless” officers and warrant officers.

The uncertainty of our situation and the absolute lack of clarity concerning prospects have created a tense atmosphere in the garrison. The patience of the people has been sorely tested by the heartless attitude of commanders toward resolving social issues in the Piryatin garrison, where it is an insurmountable problem for officers and warrant officers to rent living space.

By a decision of the command of the Kiev Military District the unit sold 270 motor vehicles to various organizations and cooperatives in 1990 and 1991. However, when the issue of allocating six KamAZ’s to build housing for the families of the servicemen arose, insurmountable obstacles immediately appeared. Meanwhile, given the availability of large numbers of materiel in the unit, six motor vehicles will not impair combat readiness.

We resolved that in the future the sale of motor vehicles to the national economy, cooperatives, and private citizens would be effected only by the unit, and the proceeds would go to the commander’s fund in order to solve the social problems of the unit: primarily the housing problem, and also the provision of severance pay when officers and warrant officers are discharged to the reserves, or due to the reduction of personnel, so that they would be able to embark on business activities with capital to their name.

We officers and warrant officers reserve the right to appeal to the heads of states of the world and prominent businessmen requesting that they extend social protection to us and help us solve all these painful social problems.

The general assembly of officers and warrant officers extends social protection to servicemen and members of their families. Not one officer or warrant officer will be discharged from the Armed Forces due to reductions or for other reasons without a decision of the officer or general assembly of the unit, or unless the issue of providing housing is resolved.

Ours is a desperate situation!

Piryatin, Poltava Oblast.

Uzbek OSTO Chief on Republic Relations
92UM0318A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 1, Jan 92 pp 6,7

[Interview with OSTO [Defense Sports-Technical Organization] Central Committee Chairman Major-General Dzhahshir Dzhumayevich Shakhmardanov by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT Correspondent M. Gorbachev, under the rubric: “How Are Things, OSTO?”; “‘We Are Working in the Republic’s Interests’”]

[Text] The months that have passed since the day that the Republic of Uzbekistan declared its independence have not resulted in abrupt undesirable changes. Rally passions have not swept over the people. The transition to an independent path of development have not caused ethnic opposition, because the act on independence was perceived as an objective fact and a historical necessity.

But nevertheless, the socio-political and social situation in the republic is changing, while it is being fit within the framework of statehood with its specific distinctive features. These changes have also affected the defense organization whose activities during the period of upheaval have turned out to be most stable among the republic’s other social structures. Therefore, the first question we asked Republic of Uzbekistan “Vatanparvar” (“Patriot”) OSO [Defense Sports Organization] Central Committee Chairman Major-General Dzhahshir Dzhumayevich Shakhmardanov concerned precisely those changes which have recently occurred in the defense organization.
[Shakhmardanov] Nothing unexpected has occurred in our organization, although there was definite alarm caused by a number of circumstances. And its first symptom was Major-General Khadyrbayev's interview, which was published in the local press immediately after his appointment to the post of Turkestan Military District deputy commander. While answering the correspondent's questions, the new deputy said: "Work in DOSAAF will be organized differently," and "we will radically revise DOSAAF activities." I do not know what he had in mind. Maybe that the military district will begin to completely support our motor vehicle schools in a timely manner with the required vehicles, spare parts, and POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants], of which, incidentally, we have not been receiving enough? But maybe the correspondent did not quite correctly understand Khadyrbayev and distorted his answer? I have not talked with the general on this topic.

The article caused a negative reaction among the workers of our organization. The story about our building which they wanted to take away was rather like adding fuel to the fire. Rumors have spread and I am not certain that they wanted to take away was rather like adding fuel to the fire. Rumors have spread and I am not certain that they wanted is needed by us and the state. Therefore, I do not know what he had in mind. Maybe that the military district will begin to completely support our motor vehicle schools in a timely manner with the required vehicles, spare parts, and POL [Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants], of which, incidentally, we have not been receiving enough? But maybe the correspondent did not quite correctly understand Khadyrbayev and distorted his answer? I have not talked with the general on this topic.

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The trouble is that other resolutions are emerging in offices that do not have knowledge of the specific matters of some or other social organization, or of its role and importance. I think that something like that has occurred in this case. Judge for yourself, the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution states that the Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry of Defense Affairs is being established based on republic voyenkomats [Military Commissariats], GO [Civil Defense], and DOSAAF. Which of these three organizations has the most solid facilities? Naturally, we do. Then the decision emerged to locate the new military department in our building. But, as we can see, common sense prevailed.

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[Shakhmardanov] Here it is not only a matter of the large numerical difference. In my opinion, the inadvisability of transferring the schools to the Ministry for Defense Affairs is supported by other weighty reasons. The motor vehicle schools are organizations with a stable and precisely tuned educational process. I doubt that they can be transferred without disrupting this process. For example, how will the schools' training facilities be improved, how will repairs and additional construction be carried out, and how will other issues associated with major financing be resolved? The 5,000 rubles that is being allocated per year for these measures is nothing according to current standards. Right now, they will probably add to it. But will a motor vehicle school, having, say, R15-20,000, resolve these problems? I am sure it will not.

While training specialists for the army and navy, we invest up to 30 percent of our resources. This is not tens but hundreds of thousands of rubles per year. Where will the Ministry for Defense Affairs find these additional resources and where will it find its own subsidy? We are a cost-accounting public organization. We earn our living ourselves and we invest our own money into a cause that is needed by us and the state. Therefore, I want to say: if we advocate a united Armed Forces and, accordingly, a defense organization, then the previous specialist training system for the army must be preserved. The defense organizations of the sovereign republics can also successfully carry out the orders of their own military departments. New problems, of which we already have many in our time, will arise with another solution of this issue.

[Shakhmardanov] The essence of our activities will not change. We have worked and we will work in the republic's interests. Our educational organizations and sports-technical clubs annually train nearly 150,000 specialists for the national economy. Which other public organization is capable of providing so many trained cadres to the city and village? Only professional-technical schools can produce more. The leadership of Uzbekistan knows this and that is why they regard our work and problems with understanding, and in principle they do not "encroach" upon the organization's vital
functions. But, in order to feel more calm and to be confident in tomorrow, we need to conclude an important legislative act—obtain a registration passport at the Ministry of Justice. I think that we will have that document by the time this article is published.

[Gorbachev] Payment of membership dues is a mandatory condition of each public organization. How will this issue be resolved in “Vatanparvar” OSO?

[Shakhmardanov] In previous times, we will now state it in this manner, payment of dues actually was mandatory for all DOSAAF members. Frankly speaking, this unpleasant task caused many problems for the chairmen of leading and rayon organizations. False rumors circulated that DOSAAF allegedly exists just thanks to membership dues. Alas, this narrow-minded opinion is far from the truth. The membership dues that we previously received were a total of 0.5 percent of our annual budget. We could have and should have refused these requisitions that are humiliating for the Society. But the Charter forced us to. In order not to violate, so to speak, the charter traditions of public organizations, we decided to enter into OSO’s primary document that membership dues are paid voluntarily, that is, how much someone can afford—a ruble, three, ten... Well and no complaints will be made against those people who are incapable of doing this. This factor will also not be considered during the assessment of the activities of Vatanparvar’s local organizations.

[Gorbachev] How will relations be organized between the republic defense organization and the OSTO Council Central Committee?

[Shakhmardanov] We are part of the Union of Defense Organizations of the Sovereign Republics, but not in the capacity of a stepdaughter. The Central Council must carry out coordination of the activities of the independent defense organizations and become involved with training specialists for the Armed Forces and with goods and material support of sports and training equipment, POL, educational supplies....

I think that mandatory participation of representatives from the republics in the work of the OSTO Council Central Committee is an important factor of our joint activity. Say, if the center adopts decisions that infringe on our interests, we retain for ourselves the right to not carry them out and to demand their review right up to convening a plenum or congress and the recall of our plenipotentiaries.

[Gorbachev] Previously, all union republic defense societies, as a rule, operated while being guided by the center’s directives, decisions, and resolutions. What documents lie at the basis of your organization’s activities now?

[Shakhmardanov] The independence of any organization also assumes independence in the adoption of decisions and the existence of a package of documents that are the basis for its activities. But we are not advocates of total isolation. If the OSTO Council Central Committee ultimately takes final form, acquires stability and offers us businesslike advice, directives, and elaborations that promote progress for “Vatanparvar” OSTO, we will undoubtedly take advantage of them. In other cases, we will rely on our own “brain center.”

This issue was touched on at the recent session at the OSTO Council Central Committee and received full support.

Ukraine Publishes Paper for Border Troops

92UM0305B Moscow KRASTNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: “The Publication of the Newspaper POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY Has Begun”]

[Text] Subscribers have received the first issue of the newspaper of the border guard troops of the republic POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY. This is what SOVETSKIY POGRANICHNIK, the organ of the former Western Border District whose troops have now been subordinated to Ukraine, will be called from now on. The State Committee for the Affairs of Guarding the State Border of that state became the founder of the newspaper.

POGRANICHNIK UKRAINY is not a new name. This used to be the name of a newspaper previously, until 1961, when the Western Border District was created in a new capacity.

Ukraine Claim on Fleet Viewed

92UM0305A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Sergey Doronin, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA military commentator: “The Army and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Will the Squadron Die Quietly?”]

[Text] Effective yesterday, Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine took command of the troops deployed on the territory of Ukraine. Only the strategic nuclear forces were the exception. As they explained to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA at the press service of the Ministry of Defense of the sovereign state, the Black Sea Fleet is not classified as such a force. An oath to the people of Ukraine, liberation from tactical nuclear weapons, reforms, and other still unknown things await the fleet, along with all others.

The situation is piquant indeed. After all, merely a week ago in Minsk the presidents of 11 states agreed to consider this fleet a component of the Naval Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], a segment of the strategic containment forces, reporting to the joint command.

So, what went to the jurisdiction of Ukraine? Twenty-four large surface vessels, submarine forces, four naval
bases, naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, a coastal defense division, naval higher and other educational establishments, and many other things, not to mention modern shipbuilding and ship repair plants. It is impossible to calculate the amount of "privatized" assets.

This is beside the point, though. Something else is surprising, namely, the ease with which the agreements signed are unilaterally violated: Are the strategic containment forces to be made into strategic nuclear forces in an instant, and are entire fleets to be automatically "detached" from this class?! This is certainly an instructive example worthy of emulation: Why should Russia not make a claim to the Black Sea Fleet too, along with Georgia, and why should Azerbaijan, Turkmenia, and, once again, Russia not claim the Caspian Flotilla?

At the Main Staff of the Navy they view the position of Ukraine with regard to the Black Sea Fleet with alarm. This is the prediction that one of the admirals made:

"It takes a specialist to understand that in a separate, independent state such a fleet will not survive. As a combat force, it will cease to exist in a year or two because it was 95 percent sustained with funds and personnel from the entire country."

The ships of the Black Sea Fleet have already been scuttled once, in 1918. I hope that our readers are aware of how this was done, and why, from A. Korneychuk's play "The Demise of a Squadron." Will we really have to witness yet another demise?
Nuclear Launch Procedures Detailed

92UM0280A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 52, Dec 91

[Article by Lieutenant General Yu. Kardashevskiy, doctor of military sciences: "In Whose Hands is the "War Button"?"]

[Text] First of all, what is a nuclear button? It is a code clearance and release arrangement [kodoblokirovnoye ustroystvo] of the command and control systems of missile units and formations, and also of the systems for controlling missiles and warheads.

And so, the president does not have any kind of button. He has a written system of ciphers for the employment of various types of nuclear weapons. In the event that it is necessary, he transmits an appropriate cipher (for example, 153) to the minister of defense. He, in turn, adds his cipher (153609) and transmits it to the executive, the commanders in chief of the Navy, Air Force, Ground Forces, and the Strategic Missile Troops. And they add their ciphers (153609731, etc.), and issue these commands to the launch site which is cleared for release, and only after this can it be employed. Given our low level of command and control, 15 to 20 minutes will be spent on this.

All of these ciphers and codes are fed into an automated system, which protects against the unsanctioned employment of nuclear weapons.

But not long ago, the commander of troops of a district could quite independently give the order to employ operational-tactical and tactical weapons, inasmuch as there were no codes and ciphers directly on missiles and projectiles. But there was only an envelope with stamps in which these ciphers appeared. After receiving an appropriate telephone call, the commander was supposed then to open an envelope with the appropriate number, read the cipher, and transmit it to the executor.

Who will Get Them?

The West (most of all the United States) is uneasy about the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons in connection with the breakup of the USSR into a number of independent states. If four independent states of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] have nuclear weapons, this means that the number of nuclear states in the world will increase by three. In the former USSR, all nuclear weapons were under the control of one center—Moscow. The question is this: If Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus do not intend to use nuclear weapons independently, why will they keep them on their own territory?

There is only one way out of the situation that has developed—remove (partially destroy) all nuclear weapons from the territory of these republics.

The reduction of various types of armaments, both conventional and nuclear, is a very critical question. This has to be destroyed, that does not affect stability. If there is no effect, and peace is preserved on the planet without arms, then in general all types of armaments can be destroyed. But we are not taking the latter path—that is the path of madness.

But the first path is the path of errors. It especially revealed itself in the decisions on the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons.

What is the gist of the question? Tactical nuclear weapons have a limited employment range—up to 70 kilometers. In the main, this is artillery, mortars, and tactical missiles. It is perfectly obvious that these weapons do not represent any kind of a threat to the territory of the United States. And the United States gladly support their destruction. But we find ourselves under absolutely different conditions. Neighbors can operate against us—a multi-million army, and we will not in any way defend ourselves against them with conventional weapons. Under these conditions our tactical nuclear weapons are transformed into a strategic deterrence factor. The conclusion from this is that we are defenseless without tactical nuclear weapons.

How Are You Getting Along, Army?

In a political sense, the situation in the Army at present does not give rise to any fears. The Army will not come out (independently!!) for the purpose of conducting a military coup and seizing power.

The psychological situation is extremely negative. All of the officers and generals are disturbed by the haste with which our political leaders are withdrawing troops from the countries of Eastern Europe, being absolutely unconcerned about the social side of this process.

There are more than 200,000 families without apartments, there is a continuous reduction in the officer corps, and there is no future in the service. The prestige of service in the Army has dropped to a new low. The Army is coming apart, and the process "is speeding up." All of this creates great tension. As a great commander said: "He who does not want to feed his own army, will be feeding a foreign army."

Many different committees and groups were set up to work out the military reform. What they are "creating" cannot be evaluated. With enviable energy, they are taking the path of creating an army that is suitable only for wars of the remote past. They are again taking the position of extensive development. The principle is the same: Substitute numbers for quality.

Afghanistan has not taught us anything. The experience of the war in the Persian Gulf zone, against whose background our big mistakes were graphically displayed, is being totally ignored.

What Is To Be Done?

At the present time, three forms of the future armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States are...
being examined: unified [yedinnye], combined [obyedintovye], and state [gosudarstvennye]. The most effective (both from a military and social standpoint) is the unified form.

It is probable that several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (of course, after mutual agreement) will establish unified armed forces. The rest, after creating their state army, will enter into a military-political alliance with those that make up the unified armed forces. The combined armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States will come into being.

If some states do not desire to do even this, then they will resolve their own military problems independently.

What should the armed forces be like?

During the years of the Great Patriotic War and in various local wars of recent years, it was believed that the one who wins, figuratively speaking, is the one who shoots more and whose people go on the attack more. Now, this factor, while remaining extremely important, has yielded to other priorities: command and control systems on the basis of information science and automation and systems of electronic destruction and reconnaissance.

It is precisely by pursuing the new priorities that we must build our army.

Effects of Military Amnesty Viewed

[Article by Major A. Trubitsyn: "Deserters Have a 'Name-Day' in the Disciplinary Battalion: Reflections with Regard to the Law "On Amnesty for Servicemen Who Have Evaded Military Service"]

[Text] Colonel Valeriy Danilovich Sen, the disciplinary battalion commander, took me to the next barred gate made from heavy metal rods and, nodding toward the convict soldiers in the depth of the joiner's shop, loudly stated: "And here are our people celebrating their name day—3rd company...."

"People celebrating their name day"—they are convict servicemen who will be subject to amnesty any day now. The law will give an advantage to many military district units in the sense of servicemen's daily maintenance, feeding them, professional training of regular officers and soldiers, and internal order. I saw single beds in their bedrooms and little alcoves with aquariums for them to psychologically unwind. I know firsthand that the maintenance of personnel is more than 20,000 rubles. But still, no matter what you say, the disciplinary battalion is far from an ideal duty location.

The servicemen, who had been convicted of various offenses, had assembled in Captain Sergey Firsov's 3rd company; the motives that brought them to the dock were not identical, just as their guilt to the army and society for the offenses committed was not equal. But they will obtain their freedom (they will leave to serve the rest of their time at units) at practically the same time. That is what the USSR Supreme Soviet decided.

Many people, especially military people, have unambiguously understood the Law. This is quite understandable and explicable; desertion, which during all times has been considered to be a most serious crime and covered with shame, is being vindicated essentially for the first time in the country's history. Suffice it to recall M.Yu. Lermontov's reading book poem "Beglets" [Deserter], in which the person who is closest and dearest to Gorun—his mother—accuses him of desertion. She does not forgive her son for treason for the sake of life itself.

But it seems that the times are changing and a reassessment of values is taking place. In any case, in our country. How can you otherwise assess the fact that the law frees from punishment individuals who have been convicted according to Articles 9 (absent without leave), 10 (prolonged absence without leave from the unit or duty location), 11 (desertion), and 13 (evasion of military service through self-inflicted injury or other means) of the Law of the USSR "On Criminal Liability for Military Crimes"?

All investigations and court cases are being terminated, and convictions are being removed from those who previously served time for these crimes. For those same servicemen who are on the run today, amnesty is being applied in the event that they appear at their duty location or at the nearest military administrative organs, military commissariats, etc. within a month of the publication of the law (not later than December 4, 1991). Those people who caused a mass of unpleasantness for their commanders and fellow servicemen and the colossal expenditures and training time expended during the search for them are being justified with one single stroke.

Of course, one can partially agree with the union parliamentarians' decision. The "war of laws" has even touched the army now and individual former union republics do not consider their citizens to be deserters if they are deserting from the Soviet Army. Still previously the efforts of the USSR Parliament created a split of conscription-age young people when one half leave to carry out their "sacred duty" and the other half continue their studies at VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. In short, as the poet would say, there is a thick fog on this issue in the minds of a certain portion of young people.

Only will it become less after this law? I am certain that it will add to the fog that the other category of convict servicemen has. And, actually, in all honesty, how are the deserters better than violators of traffic regulations or of regulations concerning guard duty? Why did Themis turn her gaze precisely on them?

The law's preamble states that "as a result of the numerous appeals of servicemen and members of their
families, the proposals of the all-Union Council of Parents of Servicemen, and also considering the conclusions of the special commission for verification of the objectivity and completeness of the investigation of the causes of deaths and trauma of servicemen and military construction personnel during peacetime and, being guided by the principle of humanity...."

I do not know, maybe, there is also an indirect link between the deaths and trauma of servicemen during peacetime and desertion but I did not see such a pattern among Colonel Sen's subordinates who have been granted amnesty. First of all, all of the convict servicemen left their units in outstanding physical shape which permitted them to spend long weeks and months successfully hidden and, secondly, only one in 15 of them managed to more or less intelligibly place their offense in the "insults from fellow servicemen" category during an anonymous study of the causes of desertion at the disciplinary battalion.

I will say that more, over 60 percent of 3rd company's convict servicemen, ended up at the dock after having served more than a year, that is, they were not newcomers in the collective.

Just what prompted them to set out on the path of desertion? I am convinced that it was not the notorious dedovshchina [hazing of conscripts] in the overwhelming majority of cases. A study of the cases and conversations with the convict servicemen attests to something else....

I will cite several deserters' stories.

**Convict Private S. Korovnikov:**

"I was performing my service in Nizhniy Novgorod and, while on pass, another serviceman and I decided to visit my folks' house in Moscow. We had a good time there but, since we were afraid of being 'caught' at home, we left to visit friends in Sverdlovsk...."

He was sentenced to one year in prison only because, while being absent from the unit for a month and 12 hours, he was brought to his unit by his mother.

**Convict Private M. Nazmetov:**

"I was already completing my service and I wanted to have some fun. I got on a train in Poltava and rushed off to visit friends in the Caucasus. They found me a month later."

Sentenced to two years at the disciplinary battalion.

**Convict Private A. Romanov:**

"I served in Krasnoyarsk Kray for a year and a half and I was a squad leader. A friend sent me an invitation to his wedding but the commander did not let me go. I left without authorization."

He was absent from his unit for more than 10 days and received two years.

And I repeat, the majority of them have the same motives for their offenses. But there are also those servicemen among them whose commanders and fellow servicemen did not come to their aid at a difficult moment—they were not granted leave based on family circumstances or they did not permit them to meet with relatives who had arrived at the unit, they simply offended them.

I wholeheartedly vote for their amnesty and I still demand that they punish the heartless commanders or barracks hooligans. But there are only 12 of these convict servicemen among the 143 servicemen in 3rd company...

"Three to four years ago," said the company commander, "there were significantly more of them—up to 40 percent. Right now the picture is different...."

Sergey, who has served in the battalion for nearly six years, is convinced that this indiscriminate approach to amnesty will cause greater harm than good.

I agree with him and his deputy for educational work, Captain Gennadiy Butskoy, who thinks that the decision on amnesty should be made specifically for each convict serviceman.

And Colonel Sen supports their views.

"Let the commission come to the battalion," said Valeriy Danilovich, "along with representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. And all interested parties—the procuracy, battalion administration, and representatives of society would specifically decide the fates of the convict servicemen.

"We could give a comprehensive character reference to each one: how he worked, how he lived after the conviction, what his relations were like with his commander and fellow servicemen."

"Indeed, two women from this committee visited us a long time prior to the amnesty but they were interested in something else...."

It is difficult not to agree with the battalion commander whose service has essentially occurred among convict servicemen and which suggests great life experience.

There is some logic to this.

Actually, the convict servicemen have arrived at the battalion with different "baggage," they have conducted themselves in various ways here, and they have worked. Even now, while I was observing the activities of the convict servicemen in the joiner's shop, I saw these differences for myself. There were conscientious workers but there were many of them who only appeared to work. And, as we all know, you can judge a man by his attitude toward his work.

A reasonable question arises, what kind of educational effect can we expect from the law that has been adopted? I do not know. But an effect of a different kind took place..."
in the battalion immediately after they learned about the amnesty for deserters. Other convict prisoners, who previously also did not like the deserters very much, received it in a stormy manner and they had to isolate 3rd company from the two others.

"Yes, they are mama's boys," stormed Private A. Topilskiy, who was convicted of barracks hooliganism. "They do not want to serve and they do not know how to work. Their mamas and papas have done everything for them all of their lives. Do you think that they will stop deserting after February 5? Let us see...."

"The lads served for them while they were under the wing of their wives and mothers," Convict Private V. Abrashitov continued the conversation. "How are they better than us, barracks hooligans and those who were involved in accidents? They have betrayed their oath and the Homeland...."

In some ways, my interlocutors were correct. It is no accident that both they and the battalion officers (several of them) regard the deserters as possible traitors at a difficult moment.

But this is what is curious. While watching the work of the Congress of Soldiers' Mothers on television, which occurred on the eve of the law's emergence, I did not hear condemnation of the deserters from the mouths of the leaders of the movement not desert from the troops for the slightest reason or without it? The split has been occurring for a long time," noted Colonel Sen. "First, they released students from service and now there is an amnesty for deserters. I think that either the law or a dictator must rule in the country. Right now, we do not have either the one or the other. And it is very dangerous when a law is promulgated for the benefit of a specific group of individuals...."

There is no denying that the battalion commander is correct a thousand times over. The pressure of the leaders of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers on the country's leadership during the congress was more than obvious. I see a direct link between the congress' work and the Law on Amnesty.

But here a reasonable question arises: do the children of those same leaders of the movement not desert from the troops for the slightest reason or without it?

Really, can anyone seriously think that the amnesty for deserters will be of any benefit in its current form? On the contrary, I am certain because, with rare exceptions, desertion was not by chance. And here is a fact to confirm that thought. At the present time, as Krasnaya Zvezda reported on November 26, there are 6,000 servicemen who are evading military service. But for the greater portion of the month that the deserters were granted amnesty to return to units, a total of 220 men showed up at military administrative organs. Maybe, Barracks Hooligan Convict Private A. Topilskiy is correct: they deserted and they will desert? The blessing now has, so to speak, legal grounds—it is as if deserting from a unit is not a crime....

No matter how you twist the law, it is difficult to see its positive aspects. Although, who knows, maybe this is the next step toward professionalization of the army? But then, as the experience of the U.S. Army attests, servicemen who are absent without leave or who desert, and whom we must punish and educate, will not disappear once and for all.

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A Journalist's Point of View

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Current Food Supplies in Military Stores Discussed

[Article by Major A. Stasovskiy: "What Is for Sale in Military Commissaries? Not an Idle Question"]

[Text] We are still waiting for a market system to arrive; meanwhile, there are increasingly fewer goods in the stores and they are becoming more and more expensive. Judging by everything, there is no relief in sight. Naturally, the eyes of the military are on the commissaries. People are hoping that perhaps on the eve of the New Year some things will appear there that will warm their hearts. We have contacted trade administrations of various military districts and asked them what food supplies they have on hand.
In Turkestan Military District, our contact was V. OSHOVSCHITY, deputy chief for commercial trade of the Alma-Ata Military Trade Administration:

"We cannot, of course, promise that we will fill our stores with all kinds of food products. As they say, miracles do not happen. At the same time, based on realistic possibilities, I can promise that the military commissaries will have the basic minimum of goods.

"This basic minimum includes, first and foremost, bread. I think that we will have an uninterrupted supply of it. Using the ration coupon system, we are able to regularly provide the families of military personnel, workers, and office workers of the Soviet Army with flour, sugar, and cooking oil.

"At the same time, this year the commissaries have not received 900 tons of margarine and 186 tons of hard cheese from suppliers in republics. We have practically no hope to improve the supply of cookies and candy for our consumers.

"At the same time, I want to express gratitude to the employees of the Kazakh Meat and Dairy Trade Administration, which supplies our stores with meat and dairy products in this difficult time.

"The commercial center of our trade administration promises to have fowl, eggs, apples, and canned fish in time for the holidays. Also, cognac. At quite affordable prices."

Colonel N. FESENKO, chief of the Black Sea Fleet Military Trade Administration:

"We have used up all the stocks in the fleet. The situation is difficult. Most likely, there will be no holiday rations for officers, warrant officers, and servicemen in the Soviet Army. Still, we think we will be able to find something for the children of military personnel. They will get New Year's gifts. There probably will be some restrictions, but there will be some confectionery items and fruit available for the kids at the New Year party. All of this, of course, at state prices."

Lieutenant Colonel O. KUREVIN, chief of Carpathian Military District Military Trade Administration:

"There is a certain assortment of goods, albeit not generous, in the military commissaries. We want to lift the mood of the military families on the eve of the holidays. As in previous years, we will do everything possible to accomplish this. Holiday food rations will most likely include champagne, wine, meat, chicken, candy, citrus fruit, apples, and canned goods."

These are the replies from, so to say, official persons. In some districts we have not been able to contact any military trade personnel. We had to settle for an appraisal of the situation proffered by Soviet Army officers or servicemen. It turns out that the food supply is far from satisfactory in the commissaries of the Siberian and Volga-Ural Military Districts.

Of course, nobody can blame the military trade system for having difficulties in supplying military personnel with basic necessity goods. Most often it happens because of the disruptions in procurement deliveries, and because food industry enterprises have started to engage increasingly often in barter deals. What can the military offer in this case? They cannot barter equipment and arms.

In terms of food supply, the best protected people today are those who are entitled to special order food selections. Now the military gets included in this system, too—although not everywhere. But then strange things start happening around it. As soon as these selections are mentioned, somebody tries to hush it up. There is no need to advertise it, they say. Why? One explanation goes like this: If people learn how the military is supplied with food, they will immediately decide that the military has it too good and is impervious to any crisis in society and the economy. But is this really so? I am not sure that many people would fling this kind of accusation at the Army. After all, these food selections do not contain bird's milk, or red or black caviar. Officers receive 2kg of meat, 450g of butter, and 900g of sugar a month.

How are we to feed our families? This is the question officers ask themselves increasingly often. Judging by all signs, the military commissaries are not going to be a reliable helper in this. It means we will see increasingly more people with shoulder boards in immense lines, on and off duty. But what can they do if the necessities of life force them to keep their hands more often on mesh and tote bag handles than on tank sticks or aircraft controls. But this is already a topic for another conversation.

Siberian Military District Chief Interviewed

92UM0316A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Viktor Kopylov, commander of the Siberian Military District, by Captain A. Beklich, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA permanent correspondent for the Siberian Military District; place and date not given: "What Service Is Like in Siberia"]

[Text] We have already presented Colonel General Viktor Andreyevich Kopylov, the new commander of troops of the Siberian Military District, to our readers. Today, he answers questions from Captain A. Beklich, who has been appointed permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Siberian Military District.

[Beklich] As a person who just arrived from Tashkent, I am interested first of all in whether the troops in barracks and the families of officers and warrant officers in their apartments and quarters will freeze in the Siberian winter?

[Kopylov] Of course there are problems. But on the whole the troops of the district have coped with the task of preparing for winter. I receive a daily report from the
operations duty officer on the air temperature in the barracks. There are interruptions in the heat supply. But we have working groups always at the ready made up of specialists of the KEO [building maintenance department] and military builders. We remove defects in extremely short periods.

[Beklich] Viktor Andreyevich, with a fresh look, what are the most severe problems that you saw in the district?

[Kopylov] I see the chief problem in the retention of officer personnel, first and foremost, the junior section. As a rule, failure to fully man units and subunits with them leads to primitivism in the organization of the training process, and in some cases even to a breakdown in operational training studies. In addition, in a number of garrisons officers, regardless of the positions they occupy, are carrying out the functions of builders, suppliers... Questions of operational training are almost in the background.

[Beklich] But what is the solution?

[Kopylov] The situation is not hopeless, and we are able to maintain control over the situation concerning the organization of the training process. Just before the final check on the past training year, emphasis was placed on perfecting field training during the course of complex exercises. For example, during tactical training exercises personnel are simultaneously working out questions of firing training, combat vehicle operator training, and engineer training.

The fact that simulators for teaching mechanic-drivers and gunner-operators have stopped arriving for the troops of the district causes concern. Their output has been cut significantly by industry. It will be necessary to conduct training sessions directly on equipment.

[Beklich] Viktor Andreyevich, it is far from simple to organize the training process when on the street, for example, it is 30 degrees below zero. In this connection there is a need, for example, to engage in drill training for soldiers and sergeants who are wearing felt boots? Or is a rational change in exercises envisaged?

[Kopylov] If we are talking about experience in the organization of training under Siberian conditions, then I myself, the generals, and the officers of the staff of the district and large units and units have it. If the cold, as you say is 30 degrees below, personnel train in the field without a break for no longer than half an hour. Afterward, the commanders send the people to warming points that we tried to set up in the training centers on training grounds. The district has all of the necessary warm clothing on hand. All of this is issued to people as necessary and without delay. Moreover, the commanders of units and subunits have weather forecasts to hand that indicate in which 10-day period a lowering of the temperature is expected. Naturally no one plans to conduct exercises in drill training in felt boots. They can be replaced by training in hand-to-hand combat in an athletic center or by exercises in general physical training in the sports clubs of subunits.

[Kopylov] Because of undermanning in subunits and the diversion of personnel to fulfill various administrative operations, probably not only operational training suffers but also routine garrison duty...

[Kopylov] As much as possible we are introducing technical means of security at facilities. For their acquisition we turn to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the border troops, and even the Directorate of Trade. We are inventing "homemade" alarms. But if in the first case we are indebted to superior departments, in the second, the risk is still great. Where is the guarantee that the handicraftsman did not leave himself a loophole in his invention which he himself could use for selfish purposes?

I see two solutions. Produce such systems at defense enterprises that have switched onto the conversion track. And the second version: Establish militarized security in a number of units, and I have in mind depots and bases for the storage of combat equipment. In this way the soldier and the officer will have more time and opportunities to engage in the perfection of their own professional training.

[Beklich] How are relations with the local authorities coming along? After all, the vital functions of the military collectives depend on this to no small degree.

[Kopylov] Our relations are normal, and, I will put it this way, they are working relations. If we need some kind of help and support, then we are not ashamed to ask each other for it. That is the way it was, for example, when the troops took an active part in harvesting the crops. Thousands of tons of grain were transported to the elevators. Harvesting battalions also actively joined in the transportation of potatoes from the fields and also of other types of fruit and vegetable products. At the time of interruptions in the delivery of bakery goods this winter we helped with transportation to stores in Novosibirsk at the request of the local authorities. In a word, we do not refuse people help. But do not think that the picture of our mutual relations looks ideal. Simply, when discrepancies occur, we try to find a solution together.

Of course, we would like the administrations of the krays and the oblasts on whose territory the troops of the district are deployed to resolve the problems of housing for servicemen more efficiently, and according to the ukase of President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin. For the time being the question of housing has been resolved only in Kemerovo Oblast. Its leadership met us halfway, despite their own serious difficulties. Other regions of Siberia at present refer to the new economic conditions in which they are working, lack of building materials, the slack in construction, etc.

We cannot fully resolve this problem with our own forces, despite the fact that we are engaged in housing construction. In Novosibirsk alone 997 officers' families
are without apartments. But all told in the district there are about 8,000 who need an improvement in living conditions.

[Beklich] Today the district is receiving units of our troops that have been withdrawn from countries of Eastern Europe. Has a base been prepared for their accommodation?

[Kopylov] Such a base partially exists. We are partially creating it ourselves. Recently, adjustments were made to the withdrawal plans. For some this is just a stroke of the pen, but for us this means enormous expenditures for the transfer of material valuables, building materials, and the sudden deployment of military construction detachments from one place to another. A very difficult situation also developed with the purchase of building materials, which are much more expensive in Siberia than other regions.

We are able to accommodate the soldiers and sergeants of arriving units in barracks. The matter is more complicated with officers and warrant officers and their family members. Some of the families are housed for the time being in training buildings, garrison officers clubs, and other accommodations that have been adapted for dwelling. In a number of garrisons the problem of housing will be resolved in 1992-1993.
Continuous Problems with Radioactive Submarine
92UM0274A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Captain 1st Rank M. Zhuravlev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Non-Staff Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank A. Mokhun, Northern Fleet: "After the Reactor Accident: New Details of the Story that Created a Sensation Two Years Ago"]

[Text] During the summer of 1989, while returning from combat duty, a nuclear submarine commanded by Captain 1st Rank Yu. Kasatkin experienced a rupture in the reactor's first loop water pipe. Thanks to the timely measures taken, they managed to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination. The submarine has now been taken out of service. But work on cleaning up the ground surrounding the submarine does not exceed the parameters of the accident continues and, having described in detail what happened two years ago, KRA-SNAYA ZVEZDA returns to that theme in an interview which our non-staff correspondent conducted with Captain 1st Rank M. Zhuravlev, Head of a Northern Fleet fleet force Nuclear Submarine Radiation Safety Service.

[Mokhun] Mikhail Pavlovich, until now the exact cause of the reactor accident has not been made public....

[Zhuravlev] Yes, it was not possible to do that without delay; the high radiation level did not permit us to gain access to the location where the water pipe had ruptured to conduct an investigation. As a matter of fact, it is still impossible to work there without protective gear, but I can already cite the direct cause of the accident—as we thought, it was metal fatigue, its natural deterioration.

I would like to talk about the work our specialists performed on the damaged boat after its return to base. During the first months, we were actively involved with cooling the reactor and cleaning radioactive substances from the compartments. Right now, the gamma background surrounding the submarine does not exceed health standards—you can walk around on the upper deck without any protective gear whatsoever. You also do not need to wear special clothing while you are in many of the boat's compartments. Nevertheless, access here is restricted, there is only a special watch on the boat, and its personnel have been issued protective gear.

Complete normalization of the radiation situation aboard the submarine is hardly likely in the foreseeable future although, I repeat, the boat presents no threat whatsoever to the environment. And from all appearances it will not be returned to service.

[Mokhun] What lessons will be extracted from what has occurred?

[Zhuravlev] First of all, you need to respect nuclear energy. By this, I mean that you cannot demand excessive rates from people or from equipment when operating nuclear submarines, in particular. Say, American nuclear submarines are in service for no more than 25 years. Our damaged reactor was 27 years old. It had reached a more than venerable old age and such "elderly reactors" should be "pensioned off" in a timely manner.

The accident distinctly demonstrated something else. Our material capabilities are extremely meager with regard to eliminating the aftereffects of large-scale radiation leaks. We have few radiation and chemical monitoring instruments, first of all alpha contamination monitoring instruments. At any rate, in my opinion, ship, unit and special subunit supply tables for these instruments do not meet contemporary requirements. God forbid that there should be a serious accident with a ship nuclear power plant or nuclear munitions since there will be practically nothing with which to decontaminate contaminated facilities due to the lack of required gear and equipment. And there is a shortage of special protective breathing gear for personnel in emergency subunits.

It is no secret that we do not have sufficient canisters for burying equipment that has been contaminated by radioactivity. The need to build a special emergency mooring at our base has long since passed. The fundamental difference from the ordinary mooring to which the damaged submarine is moored is that it is coated with an epoxy-based paint that is less susceptible to the diffusion of radioactive fallout. Otherwise, we need to break up the contaminated asphalt cover on the pier with pneumatic drills and make a new one.

[Mokhun] Is there a solution to the situation that has developed?

[Zhuravlev] Of course, we need to invest additional resources to resolve the problem we have been discussing. This will require substantial expenditures, but they will permit us to avoid more significant expenditures in the event of a global accident from which, as Chernobyl demonstrated, we were totally uninsured.

We can also do quite a bit directly at the local level. So, some existing types of engineering equipment in the fleet can be utilized for operations under conditions of radioactive contamination after being reequipped—hermetically sealed cabins and equipment and equipping them with special filters that do not require excessive expenditures. We are quite capable of organizing training for ship and unit personnel and the garrison population on proper actions in zones of radioactive contamination and on rendering first aid to the injured.

In a word, a reactor accident is too serious a thing to fight only after it has occurred.

Soviet Naval Interests May Continue To Play Part in Castro's Policies
92UM0279A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Dec 91 p 4

[Article by Leonid Velekhov: "Why Fidel Is Serene"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The situation in Cuba is really bad. Production is in the grip of total collapse, the
first signs of which appeared several years ago, but which have of late been stimulated sharply by two main factors. One is the appreciable reduction in subsidies from the Union, whose significance for the life of Cuba is so great that we cannot today make an adequate estimate of it. The other is the blockade on the part of the United States, which has not only been steadily maintained for 30 years but which was intensified noticeably in the last year. [passage omitted]

All this, combined with the intrinsic collapse of the Cuban economic system, has created a situation of which the Cuban leadership itself knows no way out, which it has acknowledged, essentially, in its recent appeals to the people, calling on the latter to independently produce their daily bread and to this end "sow anything they like and where they like." [passage omitted]

At the same time Castro is entirely serene. He wishes in the current economic situation to see nothing either out of the ordinary or explosive and imperturbably tells the grateful audience which has assembled to hear him—pioneers: "We must live and work as in 1868, when there was neither fuel nor electricity nor trains nor buses nor fresh-frozen broilers..." [passage omitted]

So what is meant by this outward serenity, imperturbability and total obstinacy displayed by Castro at what is undoubtedly the most critical, peak, moment of his political career? I have two explanations for Castro's seemingly totally inappropriate behavior. And one does not, what is more, exclude but, rather, complements the other. The first, most obvious, explanation: Having learned from the experience of East Europe and the USSR, Castro clearly understands that any retreat, even by one step, isakin to death and for this reason he is deaf to the appeals of the internal and external opposition for liberalization. But this reason would not seem to be exhaustive. [passage omitted]

The second explanation: Behind Castro is someone on whose powerful support he is counting at the most critical moment. This "someone" is not, of course, the romantic Count of Monte Cristo. He himself is with his own real, very appreciable interests "involved" in Castro's Cuba. And it is this that imparts to Castro the pragmatist the absolute, almost incomprehensible confidence in himself. Who is he, this "someone"?

It is now time to turn to a very odd and puzzling business which occurred in Soviet-Cuban relations in recent days. I refer to the negotiations on the question of the withdrawal from Cuba of the so-called "Soviet training brigade." A delegation headed by roving ambassador Ustinov arrived in Cuba on 14 November. This seemingly plenipotentiary group tackled for over two weeks with the Cuban side in an atmosphere of total secrecy not the most complex question of the return home of fewer than 3,000 soldiers. And... having resolved nothing, left for home. Spare me, what was there to resolve if it was really a matter of withdrawal of the brigade? Who could detain it, and who could be so vitally interested in doing so? Cuba has the second biggest army in terms of power (after Brazil) in Latin America, and the Soviet training brigade neither detracts anything from nor adds anything to it, nor in the event of a military conflict with the United States would the Cubans forcibly compel the Soviet soldiers to fight. So however much official sources may try to persuade us, believing that the question revolved around withdrawal of the brigade is simply impossible.

A curious coincidence: Simultaneously with Ustinov's delegation, as the PRENSA CUBANA Agency reported (without the least comment), Cuba was being paid a visit by another delegation, which was headed by Admiral Chernavin, commander of the USSR Navy, and which had arrived at the personal invitation of Raul Castro. So perhaps it was this, not the Ustinov delegation, which discussed the main questions, unresolved as yet, connected, we assume, with the basing of Soviet submarines off Cuba's shores? This is no training brigade: After all, were the Soviet Union to lose Cuba as an ally and military base, the above-mentioned submarines, which ply the year round, not only for curiosity's sake, the waters that wash the American continent, would be forced to head home for refueling—10,000 km—and suffer other inconveniences, to put it mildly. And the vast eavesdropping and tracking station near Havana, at Lourdes? Or do some people believe that with the end to the Soviet-American confrontation eavesdropping on the Americans' secrets has become wholly uninteresting?

So perhaps it is the powerful and long-term Soviet military-strategic interests in Cuba which are a guarantee of that composed confidence of Castro in his political present and future with which he is astonishing everyone currently. After all, in this case it is not only he who is a hostage of the Soviet Union but also the latter which is a hostage of him. And the Union will be forced to continue to render him economic assistance—in one form or another, with this sauce or the other.

Cuban wits have nicknamed Castro "Mango": they say that everyone is just standing around, craning their necks, and waiting for him to fall. I fear, however, that their necks will become numb: supposing they have a long time to wait....

Fleet Cooperative to Build Housing
92UM0306B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain 2nd Rank P. Ishchenko: "Severnyy Cooperative Requests Assistance, or About How Northern Fleet Officers Have Built Homes for Themselves"]

[Text] Nearly 100 officers gathered at the organizational meeting of Severnyy [Northern] Housing Construction
Cooperative in the training room of the aviation regiment commanded by Colonel V.Perfilov. But the conversation went in a not totally “officer” manner: about credits, start-up [startovyy] capital, and about a commercial secret.

“We decided not to wait for the state to provide us with housing in the central zone or in the south,” said ZhSK [Housing Construction Cooperative] Chairman Colonel V. Osipenko after the meeting. “The initiative group from the officers who have been released into the reserve visited the city of Temryuk in Krasnodar Kray and came to an agreement with the local authorities on the allocation of 15 hectares for the housing development. After this, they also founded a cooperative which was recently registered with North Sea Gorispolkom.”

This cooperative—is the first of this type in the fleet. It is well known how long officers, who have been released into the reserve or who have retired, must wait to receive apartments in those locations from which they were drafted onto active duty or where they wished to settle after their release. Right now, as a result of the large Armed Forces reduction, the issue has become even more acute. And the officers, who face release in the next three years, did not want to end up on the endless gorispolkom housing lists and they agreed, so to speak, to help the state to solve their problem.

Actually, this problem is not so much a personal matter for each of those officers being released into the reserve as it is a problem for the state itself which at one time assumed the obligation to provide housing to officers who have served for the agreed-upon time periods. But the composition of Severnyy Cooperative attests to how little faith there is in the state’s “creditworthiness.” It is composed of officers in the rank of captain to major-general who have served as a rule, more than 20 years. A quarter of them—24 men—are captains 1st rank or colonels. And if these officers, who have dedicated their entire lives to the navy, have been compelled to join the cooperative than, as they say, they had nowhere else to go.

It would seem that the state must wholeheartedly support the officers’ initiative and render all kinds of support to the housing construction cooperative—this cooperative will relieve it of a significant portion of the workload. Severnyy members have reason to count on this support. If the native ministry partially pays officers for the cost of cooperative apartments and individual homes on, so to speak, a personal basis, then why would it not help an entire cooperative?

Full of bright hopes and having obtained the support of the fleet commander, representatives of the cooperative drove to Moscow—you will not find the six million rubles needed in the North. Having decided to knock on all of the doors, suddenly one of them will open, they began with Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy’s staff: still, he himself is an aviator and more than half of the people in Severnyy Cooperative are aviators. But local bureaucrats politely explained that no one here will give them anything—they need to appeal through the channels of their department, to the Ministry of Defense. Osipenko’s references to the RSFSR President’s Decree on Increasing the Social Protection of Servicemen only helped them to obtain a promise to send a letter for this purpose.

They found understanding from V. Migulin, president of the recently founded International Foundation for the Support of Aviators. The Foundation is prepared to act as an intermediary between the cooperative and a German firm which will begin building houses in Temryuk.

In short, the authorities of this city manifested the most lively interest in the prospect of the appearance of one hundred officers’ families as city residents in their city. Still young men, full of strength and energy who have higher educations, the experience of organizational work—a good acquisition for a small city. And there they are ready to create the most favorable conditions for Severnyy Housing Construction Cooperative. There is only one thing missing—money.

Still not losing hope for assistance from the state, the cooperators in shoulder boards paid the first entrance dues of R1,000 each. But what is R100,000 for such a large-scale construction project? Then a cooperative members general meeting decided to establish a special commercial group which would be involved with earning money for the construction of homes.

“We received authorization to sell some of the motor vehicles which had been borrowed from the naval air forces to gather the harvest,” Colonel Osipenko shares his plans. “We have rock-shell rock and we can conduct the required barter operations for building materials....”

The cooperative chairman did not begin to talk in more detail about the work of the commercial group—he said, it is a commercial secret. And although this is not quite that secrecy to which we are accustomed in the military service, we understand it.

Life itself compels the officers toward activities which are not altogether characteristic of their rank. You can relate to this in different ways but it is impossible not to see the advisability of this work during this transition period which the country is undergoing. It appears that the task consists only of the state, and currently—all of the sovereign states on the territory of the former USSR—letting this type of officers’ activity that has arisen against their will take its course, so that the states legally formulate it in a timely manner and still assume responsibility for financing officer housing construction cooperatives.

As for Severnyy Housing Construction Cooperative, I think that it will nevertheless receive its millions. Or earn them. The people who have gathered there are
dependable and purposeful. Yes and they have nowhere to retreat—they have no housing south of the Arctic Circle.

Health of Naval Recruits Scored
92UM0306A Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 2

[Letter to the Editor by Major N. Romanov, Pacific Ocean Fleet: ""Like Being Up Against A Brick Wall....""]

[Text] Those are the words you will want to say when you become more familiar with some results of the autumn draft among Pacific Ocean Fleet military construction personnel. It is similar in other Russian voyenkomats [military commissariats]; they are not rushing to carry out the requirements of Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov's September order on making the selection process more stringent for those conscripted and, as before, they are driving up the "plan's gross numbers." The physical condition of young recruits can be characterized as follows: 50 percent healthy lads to 50 percent not very healthy lads.

I will cite some specific figures for the sake of argument. So, by the middle of December 1991, 239 draftees arrived at Dalvoyenmorstroy. During their initial medical examination, it was established: 75 people have mental deviations, and 29 are afflicted with diseases of a surgical or therapeutic profile. For example, in the medical record of Conscript R. Yarmukhametov, who was conscripted from Aginskiy RVK [rayon military commissariat] of Chita Oblast, the surgeon made the notation: congenital anomaly of the development of the fingers of the hands. In other words, this person cannot bend his fingers and naturally he is incapable of working.

I would like to know what the rayvoyenkomat [rayon military commissariat] military medical commission was thinking when it sent this conscript for duty? Remember: people who had similar defects were not accepted for the front during the war years. So, why are they being drafted now?

The Pacific Ocean Fleet Military Medical Commission has already ruled that Conscripts R. Yarmukhametov from Chita Oblast, A. Sukhimenko, drafted from Arsenyev RVK in Primorskiy Kray, and V. Samsonov, drafted from Mazanovskiy RVK in Amur Oblast, are unsuited for military duty. Right now, there are many others on the list to be sent home.

As a result, a far from idle question arises: how long will voyenkomats continue to draft young people who are unsuited for active military service due to the state of their health? Really, apart from the moral damage caused to many illegally conscripted young people, all this nonsense entails ever with it ever increasing financial expenditures. Calculate what it costs to send one conscript to his duty location and back again. And if a hundred of these are added up annually? Well I think that the time has come to force the guilty parties to pay for this. Then, perhaps order will finally appear.
Scientist on Need for Nuclear Arms, Continued Testing

924P0045A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Dec 91 p 5

Interview with R. I. Ilkayev, first deputy chief designer at the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics [ARIEP], conducted by Sergey Brezkun, staff member of a design department at the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics: "Nuclear Arms Shield"

[Text] Interviewer: From the very outset we decided that we would speak, in so far as possible, not about today (and even less, about yesterday), but about tomorrow. However, I began with a traditional question: "Radiy Ivanovich, you are a professional nuclear arms specialist and the developer of many weapons systems and experimental weapons. A natural question is whether what was done should have been done?"

Ilkayev] I will permit myself to answer in the words of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, who said in reply to a similar question: "At the time I believed, as I presently believe, that in turning that weapon over to the Soviet government I was contributing to the maintenance of strategic stability." At any period of our work, that circumstance was so self-evident for all of us that it helped us cope with any doubts, if they arose.

Brezkun] But they did arise?

Ilkayev] To doubt even the obvious is a natural property of human nature. And if I said that I have no doubts as to the correctness of the undertaking in which we were engaged, that means that the doubts were always constructively resolved. How can you waver, as a citizen and a patriot, as to whether your country should be reliably defended? For us professionals the essence of the matter always lay not in ideological confrontation but precisely in the simple fact that not a single major state can get by without weapons, and therefore, if you have chosen the lot of developing them, you should make the most effective and powerful weapons.

Brezkun] But Radiy Ivanovich, can this terrible creation of inhuman power be called a weapon? Isn't it a means for the self-destruction of humanity? After all, it has long since been understood that this "weapon" should not be used.

Ilkayev] No, it should not be, but does that mean that it could or should be abandoned? I do not want to assert some sort of truth and am merely inviting my contemporaries to think about the past, present and future—not of nuclear weapons, but of global civilization. Personally, for the next few decades I do not see any real substitute for the nuclear component of global stability, especially if we have in mind that "part" of it that belongs to our country.

This, of course, is a very complicated matter. I must say that in our milieu there was never even dislike, not to mention enmity, toward, for example, the United States of America and the American people. On the contrary, we did and do regard them and all other states and peoples of the earth with respect. I am profoundly convinced that it is absolutely essential to reduce the level of confrontation and raise the level of trust. We are not militarists.

However, the status quo is the status quo. And just as people do not have the right to resort to methods of force to settle disagreements, they do not have the right to a frivolous forgetting of their own history. The major states' interests are still, alas, inseparable from military power. And in Russia this truth has special significance.

Brezkun] "If you want peace, prepare for war." But Russian Admiral Markov said: "Remember war." I think there is greater wisdom in those words.

Ilkayev] I wouldn't like to talk about war, even in purely theoretical terms. Properly speaking, it is precisely in order to make it impossible that we are doing what we do. Therefore, I would only try to give a new interpretation to the old saying: "Remember past wars in order never to have wars in the future."

Brezkun] One gets the feeling that not just the public at large but many of those who have to do with real politics do not have an entirely clear idea of what "nuclear weapons" are in the concrete, material sense. It is long past time to say: in a certain sense a nuclear weapon, once it has been brought "into the world," is physically indestructible! Whereas the uranium-235 contained in a warhead still could, after considerable effort, be ground up, say, into fine dust and mixed with the natural rock from which it was once extracted, plutonium is an artificial element. It is extremely dangerous ecologically and alien to both the living and nonliving nature of the planet. And the problem of dismantling nuclear weapons is, perhaps above all, the problem of plutonium.

Ilkayev] In many respects, yes. There are difficulties in stockpiling and storing it—both for economic reasons and for reasons, as we say, of critical-mass safety. For environmental reasons, and for many others.

Brezkun] Perhaps enough has already been said to understand: getting rid of nuclear weapons once they have been created is no easy task. And no cheap one, either. But so far we do not see any desire in our society to analyze the situation thoroughly and painstakingly. Instead, a kind of disarmament euphoria is spreading.

One of the main areas in which you have been applying your efforts today, Radiy Ivanovich, is enhancing the safety of weapons. How is one to understand the term "enhancing," generally speaking? Does it mean that so far safety has been poor or inadequate?

Ilkayev] Sergey Tarasovich, I understand that you are asking the question from the viewpoint not so much of a professional as of someone who is simply the citizen of a nuclear power, and that is right. It must be explained. In
particular, I will remind you: over the decades of the existence of weapons in the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, France and China, and the operation of tens of thousands of units of weapons, not a single disaster has occurred with them. Yet these are nuclear weapons!

And have mercy, friends! Constantly improving and enhancing the safety of such systems is our sacred duty. The point is not that safety is "poor" or "inadequate", but that it can always be improved. But now, unfortunately, the situation is developing in such a way that even such a key problem as the problem of safety is being pushed to the background. Just quite recently my colleagues were already speaking out on this account, but here it is impossible to overstate the case, and I am simply obliged to warn one more time: "In stopping or curtailing much arms work, we are, for all intents and purposes, embarking on a course of losing both our country’s nuclear weapons complex and nuclear weapons themselves!"

[Brezkun] However, I somehow have not heard any statements from state leaders repudiating the doctrine of nuclear equilibrium. On the contrary, one constantly hears about the nuclear attentions of first one then another republic. Just what is going on?

[Ilkayev] As for nuclear intentions, let’s talk about that later. But here is what is happening among us: the prestige of our endeavor has declined. And as a result, people are leaving us. These are cadres of scientists, experimenters, engineers and workers who are unique in terms of knowledge and ability and are in many respects less, but often even more, valuable than the most costly equipment.

And if all of them quit the ARIEP (and the second nuclear center, the All-Union Research Institute of Theoretical Physics in the Urals), that could create a new national, or even global problem.

[Brezkun] Why?

[Ilkayev] First of all, because nuclear weapons would then almost inevitably fall into the hands of nonprofessionals! And the threat of the lack of professionalism in nuclear matters is an extremely serious threat. Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with just any old way! The professional possesses not just knowledge but also a sense of responsibility cultivated over decades. And to a significant extent it is that sense that will not allow him to work without a feeling of the importance of his work and without the corresponding material accompaniment to it: equipment, research, testing. The nonprofessional does not sense the complexity. He is bold, but bold with the bravery of ignorance. He will unquestionably be tractable, and that will be to the liking of many people. Those same government bureaucrats.

These new “professionals” will not need either appropriations or testing. They will be prepared to dismantle weapons practically with their bare hands, and it is extremely distressing to imagine in advance what else they will be prepared to do. What price will society have to pay for such a readiness?

I would like to say something else. Right now we must not only preserve the old professionalism but acquire a new professionalism.

There can be no doubt: a considerable part of the potential of the ARIEP should be reoriented toward purely economic work. We should help the fatherland by working to provide not just peace of mind but also abundance.

There is also the extremely important problem of recycling the reduced weapons, destroying and storing the nuclear warheads that are being taken out of use and other environmentally dangerous components of military hardware that is being destroyed. We can solve it in an informed and comprehensive fashion, but all this requires great effort.

However, not just our efforts! A concrete state conversion program must be developed, and the country’s leaders must give their attention to it. I have no doubts: a wise and statesmanlike attitude toward the ARIEP today cannot fail to pay off even in purely market terms tomorrow. After all, many billions have been invested in the scientific, engineering, experimental and social infrastructures.

Under the “roof” of one research institute, the equivalent of ten research institutes and design bureaus, by ordinary measures, have worked (and not worked badly) for decades. And our entire past, and not just ours, indicates that the concentration in one place of major research, engineering and production potential provides for the successful and rapid accomplishment of very large and serious tasks.

[Brezkun] At a recent conference you, Radyi Ivanovich, said approximately the following: “A new constructive nuclear policy is needed.” In this connection, a question: “Just what is it, a constructive policy, as a professional nuclear specialist understands it?”

[Ilkayev] I think that it is even more important to know how politicians, rather than weapons scientists, think about it. But I would like to finish with this theme. I would only like to note one thing: It is to be desired that we understand correctly. We were taught by the very character of our work to feel its state significance in our bones. We were sure that for any knowledgeable and responsible man the proposition—that nuclear weapons and everything connected with them were the holy of holies of the state’s sovereignty—was obvious and needed no proof of its truth. It was an axiom. It turned out that proof was needed. Very well, we are ready to consider both general and concrete themes. And I would like to emphasize that—to any audience and in any mass information media.
[Brezkun] There is one more concrete theme, about which there has been a lot of noise: "Are weapons tests necessary?"

[Ilkayev] To be brief, they are necessary—One encounters statements by certain physicists to the effect that one can get by without testing. Interesting statements. I would be extremely grateful if their authors would some to see us in Sarov and teach this to us.

It has always been common for us in our country to take the approach: "And how do the Americans over there do it?" For some reason with regard to testing this approach has suddenly proved inapplicable, although to this day it continues to be popular in other areas. And the United States is carrying on normal and essential work to develop more modern weapons and, of course, is conducting tests. Although, honestly speaking, both its laboratory and computing capabilities are greater. Nonetheless, it is not abandoning testing. Incidentally, our de facto abandonment of testing, which is hard to explain from a professional standpoint, is capable, objectively speaking, of reducing rather than increasing confidence in us.

However, I would like to shift the discussion from tests to a different, rather controversial plane. Tests are necessary. But minds right now are confused and inflamed. Could it be that for a time, until heads calm down and the economic situation improves, we should undertaking a kind of compromise? The arms specialists do not insist on an immediate resumption of testing, and the politicians, the mass media and the peoples try to understand that nuclear tests are not a whim but a necessity.

Might it make sense—let's put it this way—to put on the brakes? Not to close down testing ranges, say, but to mothball them? And then, to see how things stood?

[Brezkun] Personally I think this idea merits consideration. Especially since, before analyzing whether testing, modernization, etc., are needed, it would not be a bad idea to determine, not just in words but in deeds, whether we, our country, need nuclear weapons. Let us put the question to ourselves as follows: Shouldn't nuclear weapons, as a factor of coercion to peace, be not the first but the last weapon with which humanity parts?

[Ilkayev] That is what it should decide now. Just so a mistake isn’t made, especially in our country. Whether the union or Russia. Because the problem, in general, is invariable with respect not just to states but even to changes in social institutions. And here, incidentally, it is appropriate to mention the republics' nuclear intentions. They, of course, are groundless. Not just because their implementation would create a mass of problems for the entire world community, but because only a major power that is comprehensively developed in terms of science and technology is capable of having a nuclear complex! A power that possesses nuclear centers and methodologies, equipment and personnel, and test ranges. A nuclear weapon is not just a charge with an appropriate index, but a complex set of ideas, work, knowledge and traditions.

Now for the main thing. Here it is important to proceed from the recognition: does our society needs a defense complex, as a centuries-tested guarantee of sovereignty, or not? I will refrain from citing certain proposals and ideas on this score, but I dare hope that no responsible state or political figure can deny the need itself for a defense complex. Granted, the defense complex was attached to the obsolete system and requires profound transformations. I agree. But changing does not mean destroying!

Nuclear weapons are a reliable, tested factor in peace. A means of deterring global irrationality and adventurism. If this is understandable, it is also understandable that it is impossible not to preserve them. Indisputably, their numbers and types must be steadily reduced, but we must not allow their main, primarily deterrent functions to be lost.

That is, first: the set of properties that ensures, within the limits of sufficiency, a deterrent role must be realized. This is a complex and extensive aspect, and for now I will only designate it, moving on to the second one. It is more understandable, since it entails the familiar problem of security. Nuclear weapons must be secure in peacetime (however, I cannot conceive of any other time) for the country and people that possess them. That is what must be understood. That is what must be recognized more quickly.

[Brezkun] By whom?

[Ilkayev] First of all, by the leadership of the country and leadership of Russia. And in the final analysis, by all of our fellow countrymen.

[Brezkun] Do they understand, Radiy Ivanovich? Do they recognize it?

[Ilkayev] It appears that they do not very well. Hence both the erosion of policy and the failure understand that any research and experimental-design work, especially in defense, is the least costly but also most vulnerable part of the military budget.

And we—here there can be no ambiguity—sincerely want both understanding and a strengthening of our working relations with the political leadership. The times right now are not easy, but it is precisely in our “eparchy” (although, of course, not only in it) that accord must reign. After all, that eparchy is a highly specific one.

[Brezkun] And, most likely, it is important to eliminate the anonymity of defense policy, anonymity of decisions, and lack of glasnost on the level of world standards?

[Ilkayev] That, too. But what is especially dangerous is the lack of proper attention on the part of the top
leadership. Nuclear policy as the basis of defense doctrine as a whole should be the object of constant attention by the top people in the state! Just as it is, for example, in the United States! This is an area in which we find numerous examples where we can imitate them.

[Brezkun] Speaking of the United States, do you have in mind not so much the defense policy itself as the approach to it?

[Ilkayev] Of course. And if you compare ours and the Americans' potential policy, you have to say that what we need to do right now is strive not for parity, but to ensure the sufficiency of our nuclear weapons. Because parity means, generally speaking, a continuation of the arms race.

[Brezkun] Radiy Ivanovich, first of all, thank you. And second, how shall we finish?

[Ilkayev] Well, I dare say, as follows: It sometimes seems to me that today's country—both the leadership and all of us—still has yet to clearly understand what a vast legacy we possess. A vast legacy developed over decades. Including a legacy in the area of defense. We would have to try awfully hard in order not to be capable of dealing with that legacy intelligently. For the good of humanity.
Comparison of Military Reforms Plans

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[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: “How To Divide the Army—Honestly or Justly? The Soviet Army Is Being Transformed into the Allied Armed Forces of the Commonwealth”]

Text

The Army

When Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich agreed at Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 8 on how to first disband the USSR and then take apart the vestiges of the inheritance, they did not begin to consult either with President Gorbachev, Nazarbayev, or moreover, with Bush. The only person they called was USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Shaposhnikov. Republic leaders could never have acted so decisively without a mutual understanding with the highest military leadership. But then again, the preliminary agreement was, we need to assume, reached beforehand, most likely during Marshal Shaposhnikov’s meeting with President Yeltsin on December 3, 1991.

We have every reason to believe that it was the then Minister of Defense who finally coordinated with the Russian President personnel changes in key leading posts in the army and, first of all, the retirement of General of the Army Lobov who was removed from his post as Chief of the General Staff on the morning of December 7. Other rearrangements were also made in expectation of inevitable changes: the elimination of the USSR Ministry of Defense in its present form and the creation of the new Commonwealth military structure where, instead of the previous, purely formal Supreme Commander—USSR President Gorbachev—a quite real Commander-in-Chief of the “Combined Armed Forces” from the military will appear (so far, the only real contender for this post is Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov).

On December 11, during an expanded session at the Ministry of Defense, President Gorbachev called on the military leaders to “save the Union” but he encountered little understanding or sympathy among them. In the corridors, they joked maliciously: he should have issued those appeals, they said, on August 19—then things would have been worked out. In December 1991, the military leadership had quite different problems: how to adapt to the new state (more accurately, non-state) structure and to the newly-emerged CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States].

By the conference at Alma-Ata on December 21, when the republics of Central Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova had joined the CIS, the Ministry of Defense had prepared and submitted a package of documents on the new armed forces structure (See Diagram 1). However, the republics did not adopt this proposal (although they anticipated some sort of independent armed forces for Ukraine). Besides, an alternative draft was submitted from the Committee for Military Reform (Chairman—General of the Army Konstantin Kobets), which received serious support in the republic delegations (see Diagram 2).

After Alma-Ata, the agreements were continued and a compromise plan for the transition period was drawn up during the conference with the republic ministers of defense in Moscow on December 26-27: An Agreement on Defense Issues Among the CIS Member-States. (Elements from the drafts of both the committee on military reform and the ministry of defense were utilized in the agreement reached). Representatives from all CIS Member-States agreed that an adequately lengthy transition period was needed for a relatively peaceful transformation of the armed forces of the former USSR.

The Agreement on the Status of the Allied Armed Forces on the territory of the Commonwealth Member-States was approved (without any special friction) (troops will not interfere in internal matters and servicemen have been directed "not to participate in any political activity"; separate agreements will be concluded on all remaining issues in each specific case). An interim provision on the CIS Council of Ministers of Defense was also approved. The CIS Council of Ministers of Defense will consist of the republic ministers of defense (the chairmen of the appropriate state committees) and also the Combined Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief and the Combined Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff. The Council of Ministers of Defense must coordinate the policies of the individual independent states on issues of military policy and also insure civilian control over the army that was left and still exists when the state that created it at one time already no longer exists. The Council of Ministers of Defense will convene in turn in the capitals of all of the independent states and a representative of that state which hosts the Council of Ministers of Defense at that time will be the chairman. Any decisions will be adopted by the Council of Ministers of Defense only unanimously and at the same time they will be recommendatory in nature.

They have not yet managed to find a streamlined formula for an interim compromise on more substantive issues.

During the session, it was ascertained that although all “Commonwealth member-states confirm their legal right to establish their own armed forces” (article 6 of the agreement), so far only three states are actually insisting on the immediate establishment of their own army: Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan. The remaining republics have agreed to transfer the share in the common inheritance owed to them to the allied command since they understand very well that they (with the exception of Russia) have neither the economic nor financial resources even to simply maintain those modern armed forces that are deployed on their territory.
Diagram 2

Structure of the Military Organization of the Commonwealth of Independent States

Council of The Heads of the States

Heads of the Independent States

Main Staff/ Combined General Staff of CSAF

Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Strategic Armed Forces

Budget Finance Committee

Committee on Cadre Policy

Committee on Rear Support

Committee on Purchases of Equipment, Weapons, NKTR

Main Medical Directorate

Committee on Construction & Billeting of Troops

Combined Strategic Armed Forces

Strategic Deterrent Forces

Strategic Missile Troops

Aviation Strategic Nuclear Forces

Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces

Aerospace Defense Forces

Space Support Means

Strategic Mobile Defense Forces

Air Forces

Navy

Ground Defense Troops

Airborne Troops

Standing Committee

Military Planning and Reform

Commission on Defense Expenditures

Commission on Nuclear Planning & Safety

Commission on Social Protection of Servicemen

Commission on the Standardization of Armaments & Military Equipment

Commission on the Reduction & Elimination of Armaments

CIS Coordinating Council (Defense Council)

Ministries (State Committees) of Defense of the Independent States

Armed Forces of the Independent States

Civil Defense Troops

Organs of Local Military Command and Control
Today. Already not talking about conducting further rational military structural development.

Thus, the army will still be divided, but into quite unequal shares:

—into the Combined Armed Forces which in turn consist of the “Strategic Forces”—“armies, division-sized and smaller units, institutions, institutes, strategic and operational reconnaissance, the RVSN (Strategic Missile Troops), the Air Forces, Navy, Air Defense Troops, Airborne Troops,” and so forth; and also “Combined General Purpose Armed Forces”—“armies, division-sized and smaller units, institutions, institutes, and other military facilities that are located on the territories of the Commonwealth member-states concerned that are not part of the strategic forces of the independent state (the list for each Commonwealth participant is defined by a separate protocol)”; or,

—into some independent states’ own armed forces.

If a large number of the states that have proclaimed their independence see the need and advisability of concluding a defensive alliance (they actually were ready to sign a treaty on the CIS at Novo-Ogarevo), the current Ukrainian leadership does not intend to participate in military alliances and the Agreement on Defense Issues must cease to be in force with regard to Ukraine by the end of 1994 (the Ukrainian delegation’s amendments to Articles 4 and 9).

There is every reason to assume that verbal formulas for an interim compromise on defense issues will be found in Minsk on December 30. In any case, the majority of the participants in the negotiating process are expressing themselves with sufficient optimism. General of the Army Kobets, while answering a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent’s questions, stated: “There are no fundamental differences between Russia and Ukraine on defense issues. I think that the agreement will be adopted in Minsk.”

But after the solemn signing, the number of problems will not diminish. Specifically, one more coordinated document has been prepared for the Minsk meeting: the Resolution on the Oath. The resolution’s essence is reduced to the fact that servicemen will take an oath to that independent state of which they consider themselves to be a citizen (in each case, individually and regardless of the location where they are performing their duties at the present time). This interpretation of the concept of the military oath caused the well-known interference in the ranks of the Ukrainian delegation, according to eyewitness testimony; however, Stepan Khmar, the ancient fighter for human rights and for an independent Ukraine (whom they sent to the negotiations in Moscow as a sort of “commissar for nezalezhnost [not further identified]” under Minister of Defense General Konstantin Morozov), obviously was at a loss as how to counter this proposal that is democratic to the extreme.

This political burlesque will certainly disrupt to some degree the campaign planned by the Ukrainian authorities to compel servicemen deployed in Ukraine to take the new oath “for loyalty to the Ukrainian people.” At the same time, it is easy to imagine how difficult it will be for Marshal Shaposhnikov to command the remaining army (Combined Armed forces), now officially totally composed of different nationalities, when he achieves what he is seeking and has been confirmed as its Commander-in-Chief.
Reform in Officer Education, Assignments Urged

When carrying out the military reform and creating the Ukrainian Armed Forces it is essential to take into account all the stereotypes that previously became ingrained and have now become obsolete, and to review them or totally discard them. In this case I would like to draw attention to the military schools, where the existing structure has long been obsolete and requires improvement, otherwise the officer corps of the Armed Forces will be outdated. It must be borne in mind that, as in past years, the lowest officer rank—lieutenant—is conferred upon graduation from a school, and all graduates are appointed to the post of platoon commander. In the past, however, the period of training at the military schools was two years, and when the lieutenants went among the troops they were aged 19 or 20, and two years later they became company commanders, and then again after two or three years they became battalion commanders. Thus, company commanders were aged 21 to 23, and battalion commanders 23 to 26. Now, however, after four or five years’ training in schools the lieutenants go among the troops when they are aged 22 or 23, and also as in the past, they are made platoon commanders, that is, just as in the past, the company commanders, and sometimes the battalion commanders are of the same age. A Paradox? Of course! It should therefore be corrected, to which end it is necessary to review the system used to place and train cadets, and the system used to allot assignments after graduation and conferment of rank.

It must be recognized that in the schools, independent action by the junior officer is very restricted. Therefore, for more than a year after graduation from the school the junior officer must literally be “allowed to wander” independently in a unit while he acquires experience in independence in his work and everyday activities and in resolving all vital questions. And this occurs because for four or five years at school commanders under training are literally led about by the hand in all matters by the teachers and warrant officers, that is, the cadets are unable to resolve almost any questions of life or service independently. Even when they go on leave their travel papers are drawn up by warrant officer “nursemaids.”

So the time comes for yesterday’s cadet to receive his new rank—lieutenant—which puts him in an ambiguous position: On the one hand his military rank has brought to a qualitatively new situation by giving him independence and greater opportunities, for which he is not at all ready; on the other hand, he has been deprived of his “nursemaids,” which leads to confusion because he has to deal with numerous questions that have nothing to do with his military rank or his readiness for life and independent decisionmaking.

The routine chores and problems literally devour the young officer. And asking for advice from a warrant officer is not now apropos: He must always live up to his rank; it is also improper to importune his own commanding officer. So the young lieutenant languishes for a year or more until he masters the problems of the Army, of life, of the family, and the difficulties that he could have dealt with while still at school.

It is one thing when family questions had to be settled on the run, leaving the barracks by being given a discharge or by being absent without leave, but it is quite another when they must be resolved constantly as the head of a family. This is why a system of training with maximum emphasis on independence and being close to the family must be organized immediately!

This question can be resolved in part as follows: At the end of the third period of training in a five-year course, the officer rank of junior lieutenant could be conferred, particularly since after graduation from a middle-level military school the rank of lieutenant is conferred after three years. Subsequently the junior lieutenants could be regarded as officer cadets and paid a monthly allowance of money according to military rank and given permission to live in hostels, hotels, and apartments, including private apartments. Bearing in mind that if this is done, after graduation most of them will be living in precisely those kinds of conditions. All of this will exert a positive effect not only on questions relating to cultivating independence as the officer becomes established and has to deal with life’s everyday questions, but also (and this is very important) bring order to his family relations, since many cadets already have family concerns by this time.

What about the question of how to deal with duties and details in these cases? Very simple! What is needed is a set of “Instructions for Cadets” that makes provision for them to carry out all duties and daily details except, of course, kitchen and barracks details. They could be detailed not only as commander of the guard and corporate of the guard, but also as guards at the post at the school. I am sure that all of this can play only a positive role, and the costs will be recouped a hundredfold, so there is no need for anyone to fear this or complain about it! It is necessary to analyze, decide, and test.

It would be possible (as an experiment) to do this work first in a few schools according to region as early as this year.

I believe that the question of assigning duties after graduation should also be brought into good order, for there is a great deal of stereotyping here: “Everyone has to be a platoon commander!” But it is common knowledge that for four or five years the best of them have already worked conscientiously as section commanders among the students and as deputy platoon commanders and senior cadet officers, and during that time have acquired great experience in work with subordinates. However, when they graduate, for some reason they are all (both the rank-and-file cadets and those who have
been junior commanders) put at the same level, not only in terms of rank but also in terms of duty assignment, all of them starting out as platoon commanders. Surely it would be more correct and expedient for former cadet sergeants to be appointed to the duties of company commander when they graduate, the more so since they all have a higher education?

Given positive work among the troops, these officers—former cadets who were junior commanders—should be given the next military rank of senior lieutenant at least 18 months before the others.

There is certainly no doubt at all that even these insignificant measures to improve the system in the military schools will yield only positive results, not only at the schools but also among the troops.

P.S. I request that my fee for this article be given to the NARODNAYA ARMIYA survival fund.
U.S.-Swedish cooperation to plan nuclear strikes alleged

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[Article by Izvestiya Correspondent M. Zubko, Stockholm: "Declassified sensations from the Military Archives: Neutral Sweden’s Air Force Planned to Conduct Nuclear Strikes Against the Territory of the Soviet Union"]

[Text] The port cities of the former Soviet Baltic Republics—Tallinn, Liepaja, Ventspils, and Klaypeda, and also Leningrad could have been subjected to nuclear strikes by neutral Sweden’s air force. Strange? Incomprehensible? But it is true. Archival documents, which have just been declassified by Swedish Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Bengt Gustafsson, attest to the possibility of such strikes.

With the end of the Cold War, a process of extremely interesting historical admissions has begun here in the West: various facts are becoming more widely known to the public, for example, about preparations for a third world war, things which a simple man could not even think about before.

The Swedes, in particular, recently learned about the close cooperation of their country’s intelligence services with NATO and the Pentagon which continued throughout all of the postwar years, and also that the CIA at one time trained sabotage detachments in Sweden in case “Soviet troops occupied the country.” And here is another discovery more sensational than all its predecessors: according to published data, the Swedish military began work to develop their own atomic bomb no later than the 1960s. The country’s government at that time formally allocated funds for a program to protect against nuclear destruction. But this money was in fact used by an “atomic bomb team.” Without waiting for the manufacture of the Swedish atomic bomb, former Swedish Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief T. Rapp and former Defense Chief of Staff K. Almgren developed a plan for preventive strikes against the Soviet Union.

During those years, Sweden’s military doctrine proceeded on the assumption that during an attack on Western Europe, the Soviet command would inevitably violate Swedish neutrality and land their amphibious troops on the country’s eastern seaboard. That is why T. Rapp and K. Almgren planned to conduct (one may assume, within the framework of the West’s general response) bomber strikes against the Baltic ports and Leningrad where, according to their notions, the attacking army would be concentrated.

During the attack on the port cities, the Swedes thought of using no fewer than 10 atomic bombs, each of which would have been more powerful than the one dropped at Hiroshima by the Americans.

One other variation existed which was associated with repelling a possible Soviet invasion into the northern part of Sweden through Finland. The “atomic bomb team” experts wrote the following on this score: “The nuclear weaponry needed to repulse an attack from Finnish territory is 50-100 nuclear warheads.” (This was obviously a question of tactical weapons.—M.Z.)

But that is not all. Naturally, the leadership of Sweden’s armed forces understood very well that their use of nuclear weapons would cause retaliatory strikes against their country’s territory. In so doing, the military realized that the civilian population would also suffer. At defense headquarters, taking population density into account, they even predicted how many Swedes would die during the explosion of an atomic bomb in each of the attacked areas.

It is time to say that the Swedish atomic bomb was never developed. Restricted discussions on the theme of neutral Sweden’s supposed need for weapons of mass destruction took place in the country’s political and business circles in the 1960s. The military actively tried to win over the leaders of the business world and the bankers. But the Social-Democratic Party leadership then governing the country gained the upper hand and succeeded in rejecting the advocates of the bomb.

Ambassador Inga Thorsson, who headed the Swedish delegation on disarmament talks for many years, had this to say about that time in an interview with the Swedish press: “Those opposed to Sweden signing the treaty banning nuclear weapons testing were not a majority in the ranks of the Social-Democrats, however, I think the military leadership never really realized what the atom bomb represented. Really, the idea of dropping 10 such bombs on Soviet ports is monstrous. And I know the military had senseless plans of subjecting Leningrad to a nuclear strike.”

In 1968, the Swedish government decided to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, thereby putting an end to the “atomic bomb team’s” activities, and canceled the military’s plans associated with the doctrine of nuclear strikes against the enemy. Stockholm newspapers, commenting on the Ministry of Defense archival documents that are being made public, asserts that work on developing weapons of mass destruction in Sweden continued even into the beginning of the 1970s despite parliament’s ban.

Naturally, neutral Swedes are astonished by the military’s plans which the local newspapers are now describing in detail. But we think it is also important for our readers to know this story, to gain a deeper consciousness that until quite recently nuclear confrontation was so very acute and dangerous that neutral Sweden’s military strategists even attempted to become involved with it and did not consider possible losses to the peaceful populations of either the Soviet Union, Finland, or Sweden itself.
Continued Presence in Vietnam Questioned

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in Russian 7 Jan 92 p 5


[Text] Hanoi—I read in a Bangkok newspaper that the USA has decided to reduce its military presence in South Korea by another 6,000 men. Only 30,000 American soldiers will remain there by 1995. Military intelligence is probably not so difficult here, when anyone is not too lazy to read the newspapers can learn about military forces in the region without difficulty. When the volcano Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines, for example, a detailed report on how many and what kind of forces the Americans were transferring from ash-covered Clark Field, how and onto what kind of vessels they were loaded, and where they were being sent was handled like the lively subject of a detective story. In addition, there was public discussion in the USA about how military doctrine would change as a result of the loss of Clark Field and the Filipinos' demand that they leave another base, Subic Bay. The Filipinos, in turn, figured their financial losses in detail, reporting even how many tens of thousands of their citizens employed at the bases would now become unemployed.

This is all very interesting. There is a major gap in my file, however. It still contains no official information about my own country's armed forces in the state in which I live and work as a correspondent, in Vietnam. A year ago my first attempt to meet with the chief military advisor at the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's Ministry of Defense, a Soviet army general, was a complete failure. The people there simply refused to talk and called up embassy officials to request that the excessively nosy journalist be put in his place. The advisor's successor agreed to receive me only after receiving a letter from the General Staff. "Tell me," I asked him, not trying to gain access to any military secrets, "what, in general terms, is the strategy for our military presence here, and what is its significance?" "I decline to answer that question," he announced. I could obviously not be upset at them for this. They are military people and adhere to a discipline laid down by superiors. But just what is this "secret mission" which the reticent people with whom I talked were loath to discuss?

The military records contain many glorious chapters of the history of Soviet-Vietnamese military cooperation. We supplied weapons to help the Vietnamese during their war of liberation against the USA. The first American bombers were shot out of the skies of Vietnam by Soviet missiles launched by our soldiers. Incidentally, documents on this assistance, which could in no way damage the army's prestige, are kept under lock and key in the archives of the Ministry of Defense at Podolsk, which are about as easy to access as a secret range.

In 1979, during the Vietnamese-Chinese border war, we landed an airborne force to protect Hanoi for whatever contingency. That same year we thoroughly reinforced Vietnam's combat aviation and navy. Our assistance to Vietnam reached its apogee at that time (I am forced to rely on Western sources for this), amounting to around a billion dollars a year. I will not venture to say whether this was a little or a lot, but I believe that our taxpayers have a right to know that they were not only maintaining the largest army on earth but were also arming another army, the fourth largest in the world. Vietnam's air defense and aviation were 100 percent Soviet; its naval air fleet, 80 percent.

It would probably have sounded absurd to ask what our military were doing in Vietnam at that time. Common enemy No. 1, China, loomed over the nation from the north. The entire assistance strategy was based on the possibility of an attack from there. In the south, Cambodia, torn away from the Chinese and occupied by Vietnam's army, was asking for bullets. Without the military support of the USSR, it is doubtful that the Vietnamese would have decided to take this action. And for the game of naval combat with the U.S. Pacific Fleet, we needed a tiny spot where submarines could be refueled and strategic bombers kept at the ready.

In short, the logic was ironclad for that period. That makes it all the more curious what our nation's interests are here today, when both we and the Vietnamese have officially reconciled with China. Vietnam has withdrawn its army from Cambodia and reduced it by half, and the Americans are markedly reducing their military presence in bordering nations.

Around 350 of our servicemen are in Hanoi, which is several times the number of diplomats. They and their families occupy the capital's entire Lang microdistrict. In general the soldiers perform their typical jobs. Some of them familiarize the Vietnamese with the equipment and teach strategy, while others twiddle their thumbs. A year ago they included 30 generals. Is that not a few too many of the people in the striped pants? It is difficult to say. The center for communication with Moscow is serviced by five times as many men as the same system at the embassy, including first-term soldiers brought in from the other end of the earth. "This is in case of a future reduction," one of the military men said in a conciliatory vein. The young ones will be the first to be sent back. The older ones will report in and remain here." It took the reunification of Germany to get information on our troops in the GDR reported to the world, announcing figures which the world had long known. It took an unexpectedly determined move by the nation's president to remove the secrecy imposed on our military brigade in Cuba. To remove it, once again, for our own citizens. Why does our military department not set a precedent and, in the spirit of the times, tell us where our troops are still serving abroad, how many of them are there, and why? Nothing of the kind is happening. Is it a state secret?
I have profound doubts that this will happen, because our state's main institution inside Vietnam, the Soviet Embassy, is only extremely vaguely informed on the plans and affairs of our military. The embassy only learned the exact size of our contingent at the naval base at Camranh Bay following... an All-Union referendum.

Nor do the military diplomats plague us with other information about themselves. Col Gen Kovtunov's visit was the most recent and most graphic example of the unfettering. I know that many diplomats opposed that visit, failing to see in it any significance with respect to state interests. "Just what is the purpose?" one of them asked me. "Let us say it is determined that the level is too low. What then? Is he going to increase the numbers? Nonsense."

The colonel general flew in, however. With his wife and personal entourage, of course. On his own aircraft, naturally. And it goes without saying, "on a secret mission."

But these were just highlights. After he "familiarized himself with the level," the general planned to fly from Hanoi to Phnom Penh. Think about that. On 23 October a history-making agreement was signed in Paris, which states in black and white that as of this moment "all foreign forces, advisers and military personnel... are being withdrawn from Cambodia and are not to be returned there." But on the 25th (according to the schedule) the Soviet commander of Far East forces was secretly going there. There was absolutely nothing for the general to do in Phnom Penh. Our remaining military advisers were hurriedly packing their suitcases. The last of them would depart on 13 November, putting an end to 13 years of cooperation with the Phnom Penh regime. I do not know, but perhaps the general simply wanted to take a farewell walk through Phnom Penh, to take a last look at its shops, renowned for their consumer goods and abundance of gold. I am far from convinced, however, that it would have been possible to explain to the UN administration in Cambodia that our generals could be flying on their personal aircraft in an atmosphere of secrecy to the bazaar and not to organize combat operations in a Cambodia which had agreed to peace. Thank God, the general's Phnom Penh visit was canceled at the last minute through the efforts of the diplomats, with a telegram from Moscow.

But just who pays these salaries? That is the point. It seems that if the matter is kept obscured and classified, the weight of the military department can be used without going into detailed explanations to get two or three items of military assistance included in the budget. This was the way it was right up until last year. Even today, when the budget is a complete shambles, we have continued to deliver military equipment here and to support our military specialists at our own expense, spending 300-400 million in rubles and dollars on this annually. What reasonable strategic considerations, what interests of the state justify this? If such a thing is possible, it would be extremely interesting to hear what the military have to say.

In order to explain their position, however, I will have to reveal yet another state secret (or whatever kind of secret it is). "Why do you say free of charge?!" the military ask meaningfully. Let me extrapolate their thoughts. Under a secret agreement, in exchange for military aid provided gratis, our country is granted the free use of Camranh Bay and the peninsula in southern Vietnam for military purposes. The picture of our military presence would be incomplete without an account of the naval base at Camranh Bay. Our next article will be about it.
Rutskoy on Defense Complex, Conversion
924A0374A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 52, Dec 91 p 9

[Article by RSFSR Vice President A. Rutskoy: "Problems of Conversion of Enterprises and Organizations of the Russian Defense Complex Will Be Resolved"]

[Text] The experience of implementing the defense industry conversion shows that it is a complex, multi-level process that affects the interests of a large number of enterprises and organizations engaged in development and production of defense-related output, and of the hundreds of thousands of specialists who work there.

In 1991, more than 460 enterprises of the Russian defense complex and about 200 scientific research and experimental design organizations were involved in the conversion process.

At the same time, the extent of the 1991 cuts in the production and development of arms and military hardware—as compared with the pre-conversion 1988—was much greater than had been envisaged in earlier decisions. The production of arms was reduced by 29 percent instead of the planned 19.5 percent, and the reductions in arms development reached 22 percent instead of 14 percent. Especially considerable cuts took place in the production of combat aircraft (1.9 times), strategic missiles (2.4 times), tanks (3.2 times), infantry combat vehicles (4.9 times), and ammunition (1.8 times). An entire class of medium and shorter range missiles were taken out of production.

| Reducions in Production and Development of Arms and Military Hardware From 1988 to 1991 |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Arms Production                  | 29 percent                       |
| Arms Development                 | 22 percent                       |
| Production of Combat Aircraft    | 1.9 times                        |
| Production of Strategic Missiles | 2.4 times                        |
| Production of Tanks              | 3.2 times                        |

In accordance with the adopted direction of the conversion process, as the defense complex capacities and scientific and technological potential are freed from military orders, they are used mostly to expand production of high-technology products in the most important branches of the republic economy, including modern civil aviation technology and civil marine vessels for various purposes; space technologies to provide communications, navigation, environmental monitoring, and civilian communications devices; and the production of promising materials and high-purity alloys.

Other priority directions of the conversion are determined by the need to strengthen the social orientation of the economy, including an increase in the production of high-quality consumer goods, modern medical technology, technologies and equipment for the processing branches of the agroindustrial complex, light industry, retail trade and public catering, and environmental equipment and instrumentation.

In the difficult conditions of crisis phenomena in 1990, it was still possible to maintain the trend toward increasing production for civilian use in the defense complex. The 1990 results show that the increase in the volume of non-food consumer goods in comparison with 1989 (in comparable prices) grew by almost 28 percent. More than 60 new items were put into serial production (10 brands of new generation television sets, seven new brands of tape recorders, refrigerators, multipurpose food processors, and so on.)

Compared with 1989 the production of color television sets was increased by 13 percent; tape recorders by 12 percent; video cassette recorders 3.6 times; washing machines by 22 percent; bicycles by 11 percent; and household sewing machines by 12.6 percent.

In 1990, the production of technological machinery for light industry grew—as calculated in rubles in comparison with 1989—by 14 percent; for processing industries of the agroindustrial complex by 31.5 percent; and medical equipment by 29.4 percent.

Acceleration of the disintegration processes in the economy in 1991 sharply worsened the volume indicators for production of consumer goods by defense industry enterprises. While the plan is overfulfilled in terms of value, the population will receive 240,000 fewer television sets, 110,000 fewer refrigerators, and 310,000 fewer radios than in 1990.

The sharp reduction in military production has put many defense industry enterprises in a difficult financial situation. Enterprises also have to incur additional expenses related to procurement of material resources and component parts at contract prices, while prices for finished military products in 1991 are set at a fixed level.

The financial situation of enterprises is negatively affected by an increase in uncompleted production and excess material and technical values that are the result of deciding to cut military production without advance notification to the enterprises.

So far, another problem that has not been resolved is how to transfer to the national economy the scientific and technical achievements of defense enterprises, many of which exceed world levels.

In preparation for 1992, Russian executive power organs need to take into account the negative experience of the former Union structures and to carefully analyze the economic condition of enterprises engaged in military production in the environment of a sharp reduction of deliveries of such equipment. The economics of a defense enterprise is the same for both military and civilian production. Therefore, the economic indicators
of an enterprise’s defense-related division directly affects its ability to develop civilian production and to provide incentives for employees of the enterprise as a whole. Moreover, the revenue part of the local budget of the city and the region where the enterprise is located depends on the effectiveness of defense enterprises’ operations.

Still unresolved are a number of important conversion-related legal and organizational issues. This applies first and foremost to the Law on Conversion which is being developed in the republic Supreme Soviet.

The Law on Defense Industry Conversion should regulate the rights and obligations of enterprises undergoing conversion, provide for social protection of employees, determine the responsibility of, and the relationship between, state administration organs on the republic and local level in the conversion process of military sector enterprises.

In the environment of economic reform and a transition to market relations, enterprises undergoing conversion should be immediately given the right to independently decide on matters of using capacities freed from military production, including creating on their basis small, lease-hold, and joint-stock enterprises, as well as joint ventures with foreign partners. The state may regulate their activities only by economic methods.

The experience of conversion shows that process needs to be realized in a planned manner, without undue haste; enterprises should be provided with initial information on defense cuts in advance.

In connection with deliberations at the state level on the issues of further reductions of military expenditures and reduced production of arms and military hardware, it is necessary to carefully consider possible options in defense industry conversion in order to make the most effective use of the freed production and scientific-technical potential to meet the needs of the national economy and of the republic’s population.

To that end, it is necessary to consider, on an inter-state level, the military doctrine of defense sufficiency and to adopt a decision on necessary military expenditures. Guided by this decision, levels of procurement and development of arms and military hardware by class and type needs to be determined. These needs of the Armed Forces and other users of arms and military hardware should be made known in advance to enterprises and organizations involved in military production.

After that, with the participation of regional organs, enterprises, and organizations, a state conversion program for the defense industry of Russia and regional conversion programs should be developed.

In doing that, it is necessary to carefully analyze and expand the priority directions of using freed capacities and scientific-technical potential freed from military orders, including using this potential in priority programs for Russia’s revival.

The conversion program should include a wide range of directions related to solving the problems of agricultural processing, the housing industry, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, the baby food industry, consumer goods, transportation and means of conveyance, and information and communications systems.

In order to implement the state conversion program, the necessary resources should be found both in the state budget—from savings resulting from cuts in military expenditures—and through the creation of a special conversion fund.

In implementing the conversion, it is necessary to preserve the existing scientific-technical potential of the defense complex research institutes and design bureaus, and scientific organizations specializing in fundamental and exploratory scientific research.

Utilization and reprocessing of decommissioned armaments and military equipment acquires special significance in the process of conversion by utilizing to a greater degree the production capacities and labor resources of the defense sector of the economy during the transition period.

The conversion program for the production potential of the Russian defense complex may be coordinated with similar programs of other sovereign states—members of the former Soviet Union.

The process of conversion in Russia is also oriented toward the participation of foreign companies and investors in this process based on the mutual interests of the parties to the agreement.

For this purpose, a committee of conversion has been created under the RSFSR president; its task will be the realization of the president’s decisions on the issue of defense cuts and conversion of the defense industry.

The committee will coordinate the work of state administration organs, ministries, agencies, territorial organs, and enterprises and organizations on issues related to an effective conversion of the production capacities and scientific-technical potential of the defense complex to civilian production and the manufacture of consumer goods needed by the national economy and the Russian population.

The committee will be guided in its work by the national interest and by the social needs of the republic’s population and will rely on economic methods of production regulation that ensure the coordination of the interests of the state, regions, and enterprises and organizations.
Officers to Arbitrate Economic Disputes

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Vorobyev, chief arbitrator of the Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin; place and date not given: “Arbitration Board—At Work”]

[Text] As already reported, Lieutenant General V. Vorobyev has been appointed chief arbitrator of the Armed Forces. Because of this our correspondent asked him to answer a couple of questions.

[Altunin] Vasilyi Vasilyevich, has such a position ever existed in the Armed Forces before?

[Vorobyev] Yes, it has existed since 1950. But now it seems to be taking on new meaning: With the transition to the market economy the significance of arbitration and, correspondingly, that of the chief arbitrator is increasing sharply. Our main task is to protect the rights and interests of military units, institutions, military training installations, enterprises, and organizations when resolving economic disputes, thus ensuring strict observance of laws and contractual commitments.

[Altunin] What is the structure of military arbitration board and who has jurisdiction over it?

[Vorobyev] It consists of the arbitration boards of the military districts, navies, and the chief arbitrator. And it is under the direct jurisdiction of the commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces. Additionally, it is guided by the normative documents of the High Arbitration Court of the RSFSR.

[Altunin] How is the practical activity of the arbitration board reflected?

[Vorobyev] In the consideration of disputes it is granted the right to apply property sanctions against military units. It conducts preventive work, that is, in conjunction with the main and central administrations in the center and in the districts, it studies situations of conflict, develops measures for preventing violations of the law in economic activity, and participates in the propaganda work for economic legislation. The arbitration board sends to the higher organs of military administration reports on shortcomings that have been revealed, proposals on how to eliminate them, and also reports on charges against guilty parties and reimbursement for material damages.

[Altunin] Can you give facts?

[Vorobyev] Of course. By a decision of our arbitration board in 1990, 563,000 rubles [R] were collected from construction enterprises and organizations of just one of the main administrations for failure to meet contractual commitments, including R435,000 for violation of the deadlines for completion of construction and delay in eliminating defects within the established guaranteed deadlines and R128,000 for shortages in the deliveries of construction materials and the delivery of poor-quality products. During 11 months of this year R193,000 were collected from them.

Some of the clients have had to pay for delaying the transfer of planning estimate documentation to the contractors: the Turkestan Military District—R264,000, the Transcaucasia Military District—R182,000, and the North Caucasus—R130,000.

Fairly frequently damage is caused by officials dispatching property. Thus one of the troop units of the Volga-Ural Military District sent some substantial property to another unit with gross violations: The property was not sent in the proper packaging—14 boxes were not completely sealed, they were partially broken, and one of them contained only a half set of the goods. We collected R45,900 from the sender.

At the present time shortages and losses of property are increasing in the units and institutions. The main reason is the shortage of the majority of kinds of products, property, and food. Certain dishonest officials take advantage of this. It was for this reason that there was a great shortage at the 139th military timber industry combine (chief—Lieutenant Colonel V. Malinich).

A large amount of damage is caused by fires. Thus the post exchange where Ye. Karamulin is in charge blamed the military unit for the last fire and demanded a significant amount of money. But when, at our suggestion, the military procurator investigated, the guilty parties turned out to be two workers of the store that burned, and the people's court demanded damages from them.

[Altunin] Are you satisfied with the work of the arbitration board?

[Vorobyev] There is no justification for that so far. They are still doing a poor job of preventive work and they do not take the proper actions against violators of contractual discipline. During the past three years no consideration has been given to disputes about the failure to fulfill contractual commitments for capital construction by the arbitration boards of the Kiev Military District, the Black Sea Fleet, and others. Certain districts have not applied property sanctions against construction clients for unjustified delay of planning estimate documentation.

[Altunin] As the chief arbitrator, do you consider private suits?

[Vorobyev] No, they are not included in my duties.

[Altunin] If a person comes to you with a complaint about an incorrect decision on the arbitration board, is your decision then subject to review?

[Vorobyev] No, it is final.
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