MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, IS IT A DISTRACTOR TO OR, IN OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS?

BY

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25 February 1997
The drawdown period of United States military forces has not resulted in a corresponding decrease in mission requirements. In this extended post cold war period, an ever increasing (but not new) set of missions; humanitarian relief, disaster assistance, peacekeeping, and other activities have emerged to consume the promised "peace dividend". For a number of reasons critics both within and outside the Department of Defense, feel that the use of military power in these operations is inappropriate. The author disagrees, these operations are components of the National Security and Military strategies. The rise of regional instabilities will provide increasing opportunities for involvement in these operations. The nation cannot undertake a National Security Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" without continued participation in humanitarian assistance operations. This paper will demonstrate how the military's participation is supportive of the National Security Strategy and the historical tradition of military participation.
Additionally, the paper will examine the risks that critics have raised with regard to military involvement in these activities.
The recent period of drawdown of US military forces, has been combined with an increase in the requirements for the use of those forces throughout the spectrum of operations on the planet. An oft cited and published statistic heard and read at the US Army War College is “Missions are up 300% since the drawdown”.

The defeat of communism has removed a focal point for our defense energies and resources. In this extended post cold war period, an ever increasing (but not new) set of missions such as; humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and other activities associated with the concept of “nation building” have emerged and seemingly conspired, to consume the often promised, but not fulfilled “peace dividend”.

Critics feel participation by the nation’s military in these operations is inappropriate. Use of military power in pursuit of the United States’ National Security Strategy should not be expended in these operations. The recent confirmation hearing for then Secretary of Defense designate Cohen reinforced the apprehension felt with the nation’s military undertaking these missions.

The author disagrees with that criticism. Humanitarian assistance operations are components of both the National Security and National Military Strategies of the United States. Regional instabilities throughout the world will provide increasing rather than fewer opportunities. The nation cannot articulate nor undertake, a National Security Strategy of “Engagement and Enlargement” without participation in these operations.
This strategic research project will: demonstrate how the military's participation in humanitarian affairs operations is supportive of the National Security and Military Strategies; show that these operations adhere to the strategic thought model of ends-ways and means; review the history of these operations which shows that they have been "traditional" as opposed to "nontraditional missions" for the military and; examine the risks that participation presents for the strategic leader.

This project is being written during a period when Congress and the Department of Defense are conducting the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to evaluate the roles and missions of the nation's military. Out of this review will come future force structure, resourcing and training decisions. The military has been effective in supporting humanitarian assistance operations and will continue to do so. A proactive, realistic engagement of these missions and an understanding of the impact that these undertakings will have on; the future structure, resourcing and training of the Army. It is definitely preferable to ignoring them, in the hope that they will go away.
STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS:

“Our nation can only address this era’s dangers and opportunities if we remain engaged in global affairs” (Extract from; A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement) ¹

How does the military become involved in these humanitarian assistance operations? What motivates a nation to compel itself to expend military resources in this manner? Is it pity for the sufferer? a sense of “Noblesse Oblige” by the wealthy nations of the West? a method for democratic nations to revisit the dark side of their histories from the colonial era, in an effort to expand their influence and dominion?

To answer these questions, a review of the documents which articulate the legal and strategic framework for the policies of the National Command Authority, is an appropriate starting point.

The legal foundation for military participation is found in Title 10 of the United States Code. In chapter 20 of Title 10, military participation is specifically authorized for: Humanitarian assistance; and Civil Military Cooperation. ² The code further authorizes the providing of this assistance by the military when the activities will promote:

(A) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out
(B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. ³
Additionally: "Such activities shall serve the basic economic and social needs of the people and country concerned." 4

The current US National Security Strategy is entitled: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. In this document, the Clinton Administration articulates the vision which will drive the nation's policy decisions as it utilizes the power and influence of the United States in the global arena.

Three "Central Goals" are articulated to define the end state which the nation desires in furthering the national security of the United States:

1. To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad.
2. To bolster America's economic revitalization.
3. To promote democracy abroad 5

The first of these goals directly relates to the involvement of the military in support of the National Security Strategy. The document further details conditions that will mandate military action to include humanitarian assistance activities. Specifically:

We, therefore, will send American troops abroad only when our interests and values are sufficiently at stake. When we do so, it will be with clear objectives to which we are firmly committed and which - when combat is likely - we have the means to achieve decisively. These requirements are as pertinent for humanitarian and other non-traditional interventions today as they were for previous generations during prolonged world wars" 6 (bold type added for emphasis)

A close examination of this strategy reveals that if the nation perceives it to be in the national security interests, US forces can be inserted, forcibly, if required, into areas
of the world requiring humanitarian assistance. This strategy tacitly accepts the situation where some theaters for humanitarian assistance will not allow or encourage a permissive entry of US forces. Also, that military activities in support of humanitarian assistance are likened to the campaigns fought in the two World Wars of this century.

Using the National Security Strategy as a foundation, the National Military Strategy is then derived by the Defense Department. The most recent document is entitled: National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement. It details two National Military Objectives and three components in support of those objectives. (see table below):

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Military Objectives</th>
<th>Components</th>
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<tr>
<td>Promoting Stability</td>
<td>Peacetime engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thwarting Aggression</td>
<td>Deterrence and Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>Fighting and Winning Our Nation's Wars</td>
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This military strategy directly and unambiguously, links attainment of the military objectives with both; peacetime engagement activities; deterrence and conflict prevention. With regard to participation in humanitarian assistance operations the document states.

Our Armed Forces stand ready to participate in humanitarian and disaster relief operations at home and abroad. The US military can offer unique capabilities in terms of logistics, communications and security (bold type added for emphasis).
From this review, the following conclusions can be drawn; military participation in humanitarian assistance missions has a legal foundation in Title 10 and is part of the National Security and Military Strategies. In fact they are consistent and can serve as a useful start point for agencies of the executive branch of government to consistently plan, conduct and coordinate humanitarian assistance operations during the interagency process.

**IS IT REALLY STRATEGIC?:**

In the study of the strategic art at the US Army War College students are required to examine the development, application and implementation of strategy in accordance with a three part model. These parts of a strategy are called the ends, ways and means.

**“Ends”** are the ultimate objectives of a strategy, the “end state”. It is the attainment of that condition which will determine the success or failure of the strategy. It answers the question **“Where are we going?”**

**“Ways”** are the courses of action which will be used to attain the “ends”. It attempts to answer the question **“How will we get where we are going?”**

**“Means”** are the resources which will be used to in accordance with the “ways” to achieve the “ends”. This addresses the question **“What will take us there?”**

Before undertaking an assessment as to the efficacy of military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations. The National Security and Military Strategies referenced earlier must be analyzed in this context of ends, ways and means. Do these
documents meet this standard of truly being strategic?, or merely being called “strategic”?

The three previously detailed “Central Goals” contained in the National Security Strategy meet the criteria of “ends” as defined above. They provide direction and outline an end state or vision to focus the efforts of the administration. The National Military Strategy provides more specific “ends” and “ways’ to accomplish the administrations’ “Central Goals”. (see matrix below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Security Strategy</th>
<th>National Military Objectives</th>
<th>Components (WAYS)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>(ENDS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Enhancement</td>
<td>Promoting Stability</td>
<td>Peacetime engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolster America’s Economic Revitalization</td>
<td>Thwarting Aggression</td>
<td>Deterrence and Conflict Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote Democracy Abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fighting and Winning Our Nation’s Wars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ends and ways are addressed. Resources are not specifically detailed, other than a general reference in the text and quoted previously. “Our Armed forces stand ready to participate in humanitarian and other disaster relief operations at home and abroad”. A realistic demonstration of the acceptance of these strategic missions is the placing of “means” (resources) against them. This review of the National Security and Military Strategies reveals a doctrinal adherence to the Army War College conceptual approach in the development of strategy and a viable application of the strategic art.
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Use of the Army for noncombatant, domestic missions may be viewed as a radical departure from tradition, a closer examination of American history provides many positive examples of its participating in domestic actions. The Army has served the domestic needs of the Republic since its formation, quietly and efficiently, often because it was the only agency available with the expertise and resources to accomplish the mission.9

Utilization of the military in support of noncombat missions is a part of our history. The decision in 1804 by President Thomas Jefferson, to utilize Army officers Lewis and Clark to detail the extent of the Louisiana Purchase, 10 provides an early example of military involvement in "nontraditional" missions. Nor, is this an isolated incident. From construction of the Cumberland Road in 1818,11 to maintenance of the nation's waterways today. The Corps of Engineers has been and is, an integral part in planning, building and maintaining the national infrastructure. During the period 1867-1877, the Army administered the affairs of the Alaskan Region, operating as a military government.12 Formation and operation of the nation's first weather service (1870-1891) was a duty of the Army Signal Corps.13 During the Great Depression and New Deal periods (1933-19410 the Army executed the mission of establishing and operating the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Over 1300 work camps, containing over 300,000 men conducted reforestation and other reclamation projects under the supervision of 9300 Army Reservists throughout the country.14

These types of missions are neither isolated nor in danger of being categorized as "ancient history", having little relevance in today's environment.
In Fiscal Year 1990 alone, National Guard units responded to 292 state emergencies, assisting local communities.  

As the United States retreated from isolationist tendencies and became more involved on a global scale in the post World War II environment, these “nontraditional” domestic missions replicated themselves throughout the globe. The rebuilding of a destroyed Europe under the auspices of the Marshall Plan, the occupation and democratization of Japan under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur were but two of the early harbingers of this expanded US role. Others soon followed, the Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) was an example of an extended US involvement in a “nonpermissive” environment, where the Soviet Union actively discouraged participation.

As the National Guard has found itself in the decade of the 1990’s, engaged in a host of state emergencies, the active and reserve components of the US military likewise deployed to a host of humanitarian relief efforts overseas. A brief list, some which are still ongoing includes; Somalia, support to the Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq, Bangladesh, Haiti, Guantanamo Bay Cuba, Rwanda, and the demining operations in the former Yugoslavia.

Each of these is unique, some were permissive operational environments (non hostile) such as Bangladesh and ultimately Haiti. But the predominance were not and, are not “risk free” operational environments, as evidenced by the casualties sustained there. Nor, is there any evidence of this trend being reversed in the future. The military receives these missions because of a successful record, over time, of undertaking and accomplishing them.
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS DEFINED

“Military humanitarianism is not an oxymoron” 16

“The devil is in the details”
(an oft repeated admonition to young officers)

Thus far, this paper has reviewed the strategic context, validity, and historical underpinnings of military involvement in humanitarian assistance operations. The above quote, however, expresses the conflict and resulting frustration that attends this involvement by the military. How do the military forces of a nation, primarily configured for combat, meet this apparently competing requirement? If “military humanitarianism” is not an oxymoron, then what is it?

This requires an examination of how the military defines, categorizes and doctrinally addresses the participation in these operations. For the “devils” which can complicate these operations will be located in those details.

At the joint operations level, Joint Publication 3-07 (Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War) defines humanitarian assistance as:

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.17 (bold type added for emphasis)

This definition reveals missions broad in scope (human disease, natural or manmade disasters etc...) yet, limited in duration and oriented on multilateral
approaches in conjunction with other agencies/nations, rather than unilateral intervention.

The challenge for the services is to extrapolate from this strategic guidance and the legal requirements of Title 10 of the US Code, a workable doctrine to execute these responsibilities. From this doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures will be derived to enable subordinate commanders to attain the strategic vision.

Using the Army as an example, ARMY VISION 2010 is published as a "conceptual template" to allow the maximum, efficient and effective contribution of the army in this and other joint warfighting efforts. It begins by categorizing army missions into seven areas:

- Defending or Liberating Territory
- Punitive Intrusion
- Conflict Containment
- Leverage
- Reassurance
- Core Security
- Humanitarian

It is critical, however, to highlight the fact that each of these missions is not conducted in isolation. For example, the mission to restore democracy in Haiti, began as a punitive intrusion, the actual act of the US deployment was then a demonstration of leverage. With the abdication of the government in Haiti in favor of President Aristide, our mission then transformed into one of reassurance and humanitarian assistance. There are no absolute missions, no boundaries between types of mission. The missions for the army, outlined in the army vision, will be ever transitioning. Soldiers deployed for combat will, upon conflict
termination, find themselves engaged in other missions to include humanitarian activities. Nor, is it expected that these activities can be delegated to units with certain capabilities, allowing them to focus energy on these types of missions, while other units with different capabilities, focus on other types of missions.

In the specific matter of Humanitarian assistance missions, the army vision statement further delineates these missions into four categories which require combinations of Army capabilities and types of forces as shown below.

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<tr>
<th>HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS</th>
<th>REQUIRED CAPABILITIES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Disaster relief</td>
<td>Light/Special Operations Forces (SOF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Evacuation</td>
<td>Heavy/Light/SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Protection</td>
<td>Heavy/Light/SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation, Exchanges and Training</td>
<td>Heavy/Light/SOF</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

So, in the broadest sense of ARMY VISION 2010, humanitarian assistance missions can involve the full spectrum of Army forces. It is not possible for the nation to be engaged everywhere. How then, can the nation clarify its intent to engage forces in support of these operations?

Such a dilemma is not new and our history does provide a recent lesson. In the first Reagan administration (1981-1984), American military forces became engaged in Grenada and Lebanon. Additionally, the installation of a non-democratic government in Nicaragua resulted in increased US military assistance to the Central American region. Debates surfaced, both in the public arena and in
the privacy of the inner circles of Reagan administration regarding the circumstances that should compel commitment of America’s military forces.  

Frustrated with this policy vagueness, then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger developed six “tests” to assist the National Command Authority in determining when to commit American forces. On 28 November, 1984 Weinberger presented his six guidelines at the National Press Club. They were:

1. Commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake
2. If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win
3. Go in only with clear political and military objectives
4. Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still
5. Only take on the commitments that can gain the support of the American people and the Congress
6. Commit US forces only as a last resort

Retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell commenting on these guidelines wrote; “In the future, when it became my responsibility to advise Presidents on committing our forces to combat, Weinberger’s rules turned out to be a practical guide. However, at the time, I was concerned that the Weinberger tests were too explicit”

Such an explicit expression, however, removes ambiguity. Once articulated and accepted, it can provide planners and implementers of policy a baseline to move from. As an anecdotal footnote, Weinberger’s “tests” have stood the test of time, still being used in seminar discussions today with regard to the “proper” commitment and application of military power, twelve years after their public debut.
The Weinberger doctrine proves to be a precedent with regard to the involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance operations. Ten years later American forces found themselves engaged in Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Operation Restore Hope, where two Congressional Medals of Honor had been bestowed on soldiers who deployed to Somalia. Military personnel were deployed in support of the Haitian and Cuban refugee crisis in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Weinberger’s doctrine, helpful in clarifying the applications of military power to combat, in the cold war era, seemed insufficient in the resolution of when to apply this power to humanitarian assistance operations. Thus, an evolution of the Weinberger doctrine was needed. In November 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry articulated four conditions, under which the commitment of military forces in humanitarian assistance operations was appropriate with regard to US involvement in Rwanda:

1. If we face a natural or man-made catastrophe that dwarfs the ability of the normal relief agencies to respond.
2. If the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the effort.
3. If the response requires resources unique to the military.
4. If there is a minimal risk to the lives of American troops. 

The Secretary also added; “Rwanda met all these conditions. But ordinarily the Department of Defense will not be involved in humanitarian operations because of the need to focus on its warfighting mission. **We field an Army, not the Salvation Army**” (Bold type added for emphasis)
RISKS:

"Our force is there to defend American vital interests, and important interests, and not overindulge ourselves in employing them to humanitarian and other types of operations" 25

(Confirmation Testimony, Secretary of Defense, Designate, William Cohen, 26 Jan 1997)

Secretary Cohen’s testimony articulates the challenge of humanitarian assistance operations for the military. For despite having the strategic, legal and doctrinal foundations to conduct these operations, there are risks to be assessed when engaged in them in order to guard against this “overindulgence” This section will address the risks engagement can bring.

RISKS:

SCOPE: Despite the guidance found in Joint Publication 3-07 (Joint Doctrine for MOOTW), the history of US experience reveals that humanitarian assistance is not a “low cost” undertaking. During the Berlin Airlift, US pilots alone, flew 277,000 missions, bringing over 2 million tons of supplies for an extended period (in excess of one year, 1948-1949) 26. More recent endeavors validate that this experience is not unique. Operation Provide Comfort, brought 7,000 tons of supplies to relieve the suffering of over 1.5 Million Kurdish refugees. Operation Sea Angel, in support of the damages sustained as a result of typhoons in Bangladesh, Navy and Marine Corps personnel brought food, water and medical relief to over 1.7 million people. 27 These operations are resource intensive and are not inexpensive endeavors.
PERMISSIVE VS NONPERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENTS: Former Secretary of Defense Perry, in outlining his four conditions, listed as the fourth "minimal risk to the lives of American troops". The world has not proven so accommodating. As previously stated, Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq) and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) are two examples of theaters of operation where entry was "nonpermissive". Forces were engaged in both fighting and providing humanitarian assistance. This was due to the fact that host nation forces were involved in combat, combat which in fact had caused the need for the humanitarian relief. In contrast, Operation Sea Angel (Bangladesh) was an example of "permissive" entry. Forces were invited in and not at risk from combat.

What will the US response be when a humanitarian crisis is but one dimension of a complex contingency? Future Army missions will be transitory. Possibly moving through a mission continuum of; defending territory, core security, culminating in humanitarian support, all in a single operation. To minimize US involvement by limiting the force projected in these environments can increase rather than diminish the risk to US forces. Witness the decision by former Secretary of Defense Aspin to deny deployment of armored vehicles to troops in Somalia, during Operation Restore Hope. Which some feel contributed to the death of the army rangers in October 1994.

There will be instances where we will posses a military that meets the first three conditions for involvement in humanitarian assistance affairs outlined by
Secretary Perry. The fourth condition cannot be guaranteed. To rigidly adhere to this condition brings with it the risk of noninvolvement in instances when Secretary Perry's first three conditions are met and only the US can make a positive timely impact.

DOCTRINAL ALIGNMENT AND TRAINING: As previously discussed, ARMY VISION 2010 states that any force (heavy/light/SOF) can be required to use its capabilities in humanitarian assistance operations. Training of units is conducted in accordance with our doctrine. An examination of the Principles of War and the Principles of Military Operations Other Than War in Army Field Manual 100-5 (Operations) reveals these principles to be not completely synchronized.
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<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLES OF WAR</th>
<th>PRINCIPLES OF MOOTW</th>
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<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
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<td>SECURITY</td>
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<td>UNITY OF COMMAND</td>
<td>UNITY OF EFFORT</td>
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<td>OFFENSIVE</td>
<td>RESTRAINT *</td>
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<td>MASS</td>
<td>PERSEVERANCE *</td>
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<td>MANEUVER</td>
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<td>ECONOMY OF FORCE</td>
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<td>SURPRISE</td>
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<td>SIMPLICITY</td>
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* DENOTES MOOTW PRINCIPLES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

As the military participates in more of these operations, these inconsistent and unfamiliar principles pose a challenge for those charged with training soldiers and units, both in the training base and at the unit level. How will training and proficiency be assessed in these unfamiliar principles in units oriented on the application of combat skills, such as an M1 Tank crewman or an artilleryman? Some missions and training are consistent; water purification, medical treatment, preventive medicine and even engineer skills can deploy on these operations and in fact improve their proficiency.
Clarification of this doctrinal disconnect must be resolved at the Training and Doctrine Command level, prior to each unit attempting to adhoc a resolution on their own. If the nation will mandate the projection of forces for these missions, then evolution of our doctrinal field manuals must continue.

EROSION OF COMBAT SKILLS: Recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO), conducted an examination, at the request of Congress, on the effect that involvement in Peace operations had on military units’ training, equipment and other factors. (Note, the GAO report made no distinction between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations). The report’s overall findings with regard to erosion of combat skills were:

Skills Atrophy: While many military skills were complimentary in these deployments (most notably Combat Service Support/ CSS and Special Operations forces /SOF). The skills at the greatest risk of atrophy are certain combat skills. Most notably, Artillery, Air Defense Artillery and Antiarmor skills appeared to quickly degrade due to lack of opportunities to utilize or train on them while deployed.

Army commanders interviewed for the report estimated that 3-6 months would be required to restore combat effectiveness. Their assessment being that in addition to the individual skills, maneuver, collective and synchronization skills would require the greatest training attention. Upon revisiting these units after redeployment to their home stations, the GAO found this assessment to be accurate. After a four month deployment to Haiti, the Commanding General of the
10th Mountain Division reported the Division at C1 (Combat Ready) in May 1995, 90 days after their return. The 25th Infantry Division Commanding General found an “intensive” six week training cycle required to bring battalions back to the C1 level. When deployed to Haiti both the 10th and 25th Infantry Divisions established regular rotations to an in-theater training facility, constructed on the site of a Haitian firing range. Every two to three weeks, those infantry personnel engaged in static security missions (ie: guard duty) were rotated to the training complex for two to three day training periods to maintain proficiency on combat skills.

Recovery Periods: The report also found that recovery periods varied based on the type of unit. Marine Corps units were found not to suffer the degree of skills atrophy experienced by Army personnel because of the shorter duration of their deployments in these operations.

Army units, however, found that the combination of personnel turbulence (ie reassignments, training at service schools etc...), return of equipment from the deployed theater (30-45 days and longer) and maintenance of equipment upon redeployment (ranging from 30 days for light forces to six months for heavy forces) combined to make returning to full combat readiness (C1), a six month process.
CONCLUSION:

I do not underestimate the cost or complexity of launching a peaceful revolution for progress in the Third World. But we have the economic resources. We have the skilled manpower and the brainpower. Our national interest requires it. There is only one nagging question. British strategist Sir Robert Thompson once wrote, "National strength equals manpower plus applied resources times will.". Do we have the will to undertake such a bold initiative? Americans don’t like to play a role on the world stage.... We must not turn away from our responsibilities in the world. If we refuse to play a major role, the rest of the free world will be at the mercy of totalitarian aggressors.” (Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams, 1985) 38

Though twelve years have passed since Nixon’s words were written. They sum up the challenge the nation faces in a world absent a unifying threat. The threats today will increase and with them the opportunities for American military involvement in these regions which will require humanitarian assistance. This increase will draw its growth from three sources: failure of democratic experiments; long standing ethnic and tribal conflicts; and the collapse of autocratic regimes. 39

For the United States to engage and enlarge democracy and bolster our economic revitalization will require a military capable of operating in this environment. Yet, the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff best expresses the military’s apprehensions “We have the capability like almost no one else to help with tragedies of the magnitude we are witnessing in Rwanda. My fear is we’re becoming mesmerized by OOTW (Operations Other Than War) and we’ll take our mind off what we’re all about, which is to fight and win our nation’s wars” 40
The roots of a resolution to this challenge can be found in two locations. First, the Army must look to the Reserve Components to pick up an extended portion of these missions, especially since larger portions of our CSS structure have been placed in the reserve components. Second, the nation must continue the practices recently used in the latest humanitarian emergency involving Rwanda and Zaire. We refused to rush in unilaterally, rather we both patiently assisted in the assembly of a multilateral force and directed the theater CINC (EUCOM) to dispatch an assessment team to determine the best force mix to meet the requirements. As a result, the parties involved desisted in their hostilities and Non Governmental Organizations were allowed to continue their relief missions.

Finally, it is important to note that at no time has the military refused the imposition of such a mission. The Army cannot be everywhere and do everything, until we determine our “breaking point” the nation will continue to expect us to undertake these missions. We historically have done them and done them well.
ENDNOTES

3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 THE WHITE HOUSE, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement p i
6 ibid., p iii
8 ibid., p 9
9 Strategic Studies Institute, Alternative Missions for the Army (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, US Army War College 17 July 1992), p 1
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13 ibid., p 3
14 ibid., p 4
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24 ibid.
26 Summers, p 165
27 ibid.
28 Powell, p 586
30 General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Peace Operations, Effect of Training, Equipment and Other Factors, report prepared by Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis. 18 October 1995. report # 260148. p 1
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33 ibid., p 34
34 ibid.
35 ibid., p 33
36 ibid., p 6
37 ibid., p 34
39 Summers, p 164
40 ibid, p 166
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