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THE DEEP BATTLE: NO LONGER "WHO'S IN CHARGE?" BUT..."WHAT NOW?"

BY

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ABSTRACT

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Recent agreements between the Army and the Air Force have resolved long-standing issues on who commands and controls the Surface Component Commander’s (SCC) deep battle. This paper investigates critical failings in the current organization and doctrine for conducting the SCC’s deep battle. It then proposes a possible structure and functions of a doctrinal cell at echelons above corps that would plan and direct this important battle.
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INTRODUCTION

There are many “battles” within the joint battlefield framework, some based on geographic areas, others on operational warfighting constructs. Loosely interpreted, the levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical) and specific combat operations (to include maneuver, interdiction and fires) can be used to define “battles.” Service responsibility on the joint battlefield can be confusing; each service brings unique capabilities, organizations and doctrine to the fight. It is the responsibility of joint doctrine to accurately portray how each services’ organizations are used to efficiently utilize all capabilities.

Service and joint doctrine are not always in concert. The Army separates the battlefield in terms of deep, close and rear operations. FM 100-5 states “deep operations are those directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle” (close operations being those fought by forces in “immediate contact”). Deep operations attack “enemy formations at depth to delay, divert or reduce enemy capabilities and hasten enemy defeat.” Joint doctrine does not specifically define “deep” operations, but uses the concept of “simultaneity and depth” in describing the operational art. Commanders achieve depth on the battlefield in both time and space. Joint doctrine defines interdiction as “an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.” The Army’s concept of deep operations is generally consistent with the joint definition of interdiction operations. Both imply operations that are separated from the “immediate” battle in time and space, and delay or attrit the enemy before he joins the close battle. While interdiction operations occur across the three levels
of war and throughout the physical battlefield, for the purposes of this paper, I will use the term interchangeably with the Army’s definition of deep operations.

Most often, we define battles by geographical or physical areas. JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, describes the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) dividing his Joint Operations Area (JOA) into geographic Areas of Operation (AO) for subordinate land and naval component commanders. "AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces." The JFACC (Joint Force Air Component Commander) is not normally assigned a geographic area, but has missions that support the JFC and the other component commanders throughout the JOA.

Employment of air assets in most geographic regions of the battlefield has been a relatively easy issue. The surface component commander’s (SCC) close battle (fought by subordinate corps or divisions) and the JFC’s interdiction battle are usually dominated by the Army and Air Force, respectively.

Doctrine for the employment of close air support (CAS), fires in support of ground forces in contact, does not cause a problem between the two services. The JFC apportions a percentage of air assets to close air support and the JFACC allocates the sorties. Organizational elements are in place to coordinate these allocations. The Theater Air Control System (TACS) has Army and Air Force sections at the lowest tactical levels to plan and execute the ground commander’s intent.

Likewise, that portion of the JFC’s interdiction battle outside the SCC’s AO has not been a point of contention between the services. Joint doctrine establishes the JFACC as
the supported commander for air interdiction, the targets are outside the SCC’s AO and, until recently, the SCC did not have the weapons systems to influence that part of the battle.

However, the SCC’s deep battle (the Army’s deep operations or the joint combat operation of interdiction within surface boundaries) has been the source of great controversy. It is fought in the area beyond subordinate elements’ AOs yet within the SCC’s boundaries. It is the one area in the conceptual battlefield where all four services’ capabilities and interests intersect, and it is the focus of this paper.

This paper will briefly recount important past differences between the Army and Air Force that may explain today’s absence of joint targeting doctrine for the SCC’s deep battle. It will investigate the specific failings in both Army and joint doctrine in prescribing the functions required to plan and execute the deep battle. The paper then examines the existing Army organization used to command and control the deep battle and its adequacy in conducting these operations. Finally, it proposes the functions and structure for a deep battle cell at SCC level, similar to ones being resourced “out of hide” today by corps and division commanders. The proposed deep battle cell is critical to the success of the one battle that involves the most diverse units and systems on the battlefield and has a significant impact on all other operations: the surface component commander’s deep battle.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Recent agreements by senior Army and Air Force leaders at the December 1996 Joint Warfighter Conference have resolved many of the long-standing command and control issues surrounding the SCC interdiction battle. The Army quotes joint doctrine (specifically JP 3-0) in establishing that the SCC is the supported commander for all operations within his Area of Operation (AO). As such, the SCC is doctrinally responsible for synchronizing all maneuver, fires and interdiction within his boundaries. Additionally, the Army felt that JFACC control of this battle violated the principle of unity of command and resulted in slow planning and attack of targets. The Air Force’s position has been that joint doctrine names the JFACC as the supported commander for air interdiction operations. The Air Force also believed that it provided the preponderance of attack assets used by the SCC in the prosecution of his interdiction fight and was the logical choice to control the battle. For a more in-depth discussion of both services’ past positions see LTC Skattum’s Deep Battle: Who’s in Charge?, April, 1996.

The results of the December conference provide a clearer picture of the joint battlefield. Both services agreed that the SCC is the supported commander within his AO. Further, they agreed that joint doctrine should change to state that all fires “forward of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and inside the SCC’s area of operations will be coordinated with all affected commanders to the maximum extent possible. If not practical because of time sensitivity ... then all affected commanders will be informed with the commander executing the mission accepting the operational risk.” The differences
between the services may have precluded the development of required joint targeting
document for the SCC’s deep battle. Until the question of “who’s in charge?” was resolved,
either service could step forward to fill the void in joint doctrine for this area on the
battlefield. These agreements break the logjam on some contentious issues and clear the
way for further progress in joint fighting doctrine. Understanding past disagreements may
help set the stage in describing the work that now must be accomplished to codify joint
document for the SCC’s deep battle.

Misunderstanding of the FSCL’s purpose has provided the fuel for the disagreement
on who is responsible for the deep battle. In many field units the FSCL is commonly
referred to as the Fire Support Consternation Line (emphasis added). To the Army
document writers responsible for drafting JP 3-09, Joint Doctrine for Fire Support
(Preliminary Coordination), the FSCL is a permissive fire support coordination measure
established by the ground commander that allows for the expeditious attack, by all assets,
of targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. It serves to “prearrange” deconfliction of
targets beyond the FSCL. “It does not divide an AO.”8 However, it appears the Air Force
had interpreted the FSCL as a “line of demarcation” between the close and deep battles.
Several articles appearing in Air Force and joint publications, to include the JFACC Primer
published by the Department of the Air Force, indicate that Air Force leaders saw the air
interdiction battle beginning at the FSCL.9 Mr. Wayne Williamson, an analyst at the Air
Force Doctrine Center, concluded that “deep operations in theater warfare refer to those
battle operations beyond ... a line called the FSCL” and that “joint doctrine allows the
JFACC to be assigned operational authority to integrate ....all Services in the deep battle.”
He goes on to characterize everything short of the FSCL as the close battle (with the land component commander responsible) and states that the FSCL should be "located at the juncture ... dividing the preponderance of firepower possessed by the air and land ... forces". Air Force Major Carl Pivarsky, in his article "Dangerous Doctrine", generally makes the same arguments: that the FSCL "defines a land ... commander's tactical fight" and that he should control fires short of the FSCL while the JFACC should be "the maneuver commander beyond the FSCL." He, too, felt the commander holding the most attack assets and control structure in an area should be responsible for the fight. Thus, it seems the popular position within the Air Force was that the JFACC was responsible for controlling the battle beyond the FSCL.

Operation Desert Storm provides perfect examples of how these disagreements were manifested during actual combat operations. The command and control structure was unique: CINCCENT retained the LCC (Land Component Commander) duties yet had 3d Army (ARCENT) as an intermediate headquarters commanding the 18th Airborne and VII Corps. Many accounts describe the two corps commanders, Generals Luck and Franks, as displeased with the air support for their deep battle. The 72 hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) process proved impractical when trying to attack repositioning forces before the ground war. It was equally unresponsive during the fast paced offensive operations. The symptoms of the problem were seen in the Air Force striking targets of opportunity in front of U.S. forces instead of the planned targets nominated by the Army and aircraft being diverted from the Corps' deep battles by personnel in the JFACC's headquarters. The actual problem was the ground force commanders did not control assets that were allocated
to their battle and thus were not synchronizing the fires and interdiction within their AOs as joint doctrine prescribes.

**JOINT DOCTRINE**

Joint doctrine is woefully inadequate in prescribing the required organizations and methodology necessary to conduct the targeting functions for the SCC’s interdiction fight. Despite recent advances in Army service doctrine, joint doctrine publications do not illustrate how the SCC synchronizes, directs and controls his deep battle. Also, the staff elements to control this battle are not fully defined or resourced. Army liaison detachments at the JFACC’s headquarters address only half the problem; there is still no doctrinal element at the SCC’s headquarters to synchronize and direct the interdiction battle and ensure it complements the scheme of maneuver.

Current joint doctrine for targeting is not specific as to the different areas of the battlefield framework and only describes the tasks in a cursory manner. While the Army has long maintained it is responsible for the conduct of the interdiction battle within the SCC’s AO, only recently has Army doctrine evolved to address this fight and it has not been incorporated into joint publications.

Joint publications in this area are primarily a description of Air Force targeting methodology. The Army and Marines use the Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess (D³A) methodology while joint doctrine uses a six stage process (closely mirroring Air Force targeting doctrine) that includes the commander’s intent, target development,
weaponing, force application, execution planning/force execution, and combat assessment. The functions and the outputs are generally consistent. However, joint doctrine is narrowly focused on the JFACC's targeting responsibilities which is essentially limited to the JFC's interdiction battle. It includes the mechanics of the JFACC's apportionment, allocation and tasking processes. It does not address the SCC's targeting responsibilities and processes. The SCC's interdiction fight will probably involve more than just JFACC assets that are allocated in the ATO. It may involve planning naval gunfire in direct support of the SCC, tasking national intelligence collection assets to perform DETECT and ASSESS functions and planning Special Operations Forces (SOF) assets (through the Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander, a separate component commander) for a variety of missions. It possibly could involve maneuver units striking deep to shape the battlefield for subsequent operations.

Review of pertinent joint doctrine publications reveals a description of how the JFACC assists the JFC in his apportionment and allocation of air assets to meet competing missions. Joint Pubs 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations (Final Coordination); 3-09; and 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, all talk to how the component commanders influence the JFC's targeting priorities through the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). They go on to detail how the components submit their target nominations through the JFACC for inclusion into the ATO. Considering the JFC's apportionment plan (devised and recommended by the JFACC), component targets may or may not make the ATO "cut list." The Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), an Army section, collocated with the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) at the JFACC's
headquarters, represents the SCC in this nomination process. What the current doctrine
does not address is how the SCC requests or tasks the myriad of assets that could be
expected to join the battle but are not assigned in the ATO process.

It is not enough to pass off the ATO process as a substitute for the comprehensive
targeting requirements of the deep battle. The ATO process is often not agile enough to
reallocate air forces to meet fluid battlefield conditions or changing operational objectives.
Land force commanders risk losing those assets allocated to them if the targets nominated
72 hours earlier are gone at time of execution. JP 3-0 states: "air apportionment assists
JFCs to ensure the weight of the JFACC air effort is consistent with campaign phases and
objectives." It may be impossible for a land forces commander to accurately predict
changes in the operational phases or he may be presented with opportunities to exploit
enemy vulnerabilities by immediately moving to decisive combat. In these instances, the
SCC must make timely adjustments to airpower planned in the ATO. Joint doctrine should
address how the SCC reorients airpower on targets when target priorities or location
change.

Emerging joint doctrine addresses only the attack of "time-sensitive" targets, not
the elements or methods required to plan and conduct interdiction operations within the
SCC’s boundaries. The Air-Land-Sea Applications (ALSA) Center is currently writing the
manual for attack of "time-sensitive" targets that will be incorporated into the new Joint
Pub 3-60, Targeting, for which the Air Force has the lead. Today’s focus on developing
document for the engagement of "time-sensitive" targets is understandable; this is the issue
that caused the major "rub" between the two services and was resolved at the Joint Warfighters Conference. Joint doctrine writers are striking while the iron is hot.

However, we still need to address how, and through what organizations, the SCC will direct the other services in planning his deep battle. How the SCC synchronizes and employs the many assets from all services remains to be incorporated into the doctrine.

ARMY DOCTRINE

Army doctrine on targeting this battle has just recently been developed and has not been included in joint doctrine. Army doctrine, principally found in FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Targeting, speaks primarily to tasks done within the Army Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs). It suggests the formation of an ad-hoc cell to coordinate the deep battle, but, to date, the Army has only resourced the BCDs inside the JFACC’s HQs.

The functions and composition of the BCDs have evolved over the past several years. Previously known as Battlefield Coordination Elements (BCEs), they just recently became doctrinal elements in October 1994 when the 1st BCD stood up at Ft. Bragg, NC. Their duties and organization were just published in FM 100-13 Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), September 1996. Currently, there are four BCDs: 1st BCD at Ft Bragg; 2d BCD, a reserve unit in Alabama that supports PACOM; 1st Detachment EUSA (Korea) and a TDA organization in Germany that supports 7th Army training events. They are allocated on a basis of one BCD per Army Service Component Commander (ASCC).
Great progress has been made in providing this interface between the Army and Air Force at the JFACC’s HQs. Yet much remains to be done. The staffing between BCDs varies greatly and the Manning is even more inconsistent. Additionally, Army doctrine still falls short in several critical areas. It lacks an explanation of how the BCD deconflicts targets of opportunity and how it coordinates other assets that are not included in the ATO process. It also lacks a methodology for coordinating Army support of the JFACC’s “functional” mission (ex: “attack all SCUD missiles as acquired”) targets that may appear throughout the battlefield (deep, close and rear). In fact, most joint pubs mention the BCD’s function only as an afterthought. JP 3-56.1 briefly describe BCE (old term) functions (primarily liaison type duties) in a paragraph in one of the appendices. Given the nature of its duties and its primary purpose of interfacing with the other services it is not enough to describe BCD tasks in service doctrine; the critical functions must be more thoroughly described in joint pubs.

The Army has also made progress in proposing cells within Army headquarters to plan and direct the deep battle. The cells are not yet resourced organizations and their duties and functions are still evolving in field units. FM 6-20-10 is primarily written for corps and below level operations. Because the SCC’s deep battle will require greater integration of joint systems, the Army must identify the agencies and methods it will use to request and coordinate those assets. The SCC will be required to request assets held by other component commanders through the JFC. After allocation, he will be required to coordinate those assets at the mission unit level. Whether the Army standardizes the organization and doctrine for a new cell or conducts the deep battle with its existing
structure, it must spell out how it determines the SCC’s target priorities, what targets will be attacked, how they will be acquired, what systems will be used to attack the targets and then how the battlefield damage assessment (BDA) will be performed.

Army doctrine to support the deep battle has improved over the past few years, and can continue to improve in the future. The BCDs must be manned to perform the duties listed in FM 100-13, TTP must be developed for target deconfliction and attack of “functional targets, and a more complete description of BCD functions needs to be included in joint doctrine. The Army must then develop the organizational structure that will support the SCC as he requests and directs joint and coalition forces in his deep battle.

ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS

The Army does not currently have the organizations in place at echelons above corps (EAC) to effectively plan, synchronize and direct the SCC’s deep battle. FM 6-20-10 suggests the need for a Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) at Corps and below levels. In fact, most corps and divisions pull resources from standing sections to form a DOCC, or similarly named deep battle cell.

The Deep Fires Cell (DFC) in V Corps acts as a DOCC and operates under the direction of the V Corps Artillery Commander. It employs full time representatives from “the Air Liaison Officer (ALO), the G3 air, air defense element (ADE), artillery unit liaison officers (LNOs), corps targeting section, special operations command and control (SOCCE)
and corps aviation attack units. Other G2, G3, fire support and electronic warfare (EW) representatives are included, as required.

III Corps has established a very similar organization from existing staff sections under the direction of a Corps targeting team. The team consists of the corps artillery commander, G3, the aviation brigade commander and the G2, headed by the corps commander. The III Corps Deep Operations battle rhythm is a 24 hour recurring process that receives the commander’s guidance for operations 72 hours in the future, develops the deep battle concept for the next 48 hours and ensures upcoming deep operations are synchronized.

Most divisions also form ad-hoc DOCCs to coordinate their deep battle. 4th Infantry Division (Mech) has actually taken the DOCC one step further and formally divided the cell into two teams, a targeting team and an execution team. The targeting team is fully meshed into corps targeting operations discussed earlier, while the execution team is a smaller cell of operators who effect “final coordination, refinement and rehearsals.”

Each of the ad-hoc DOCCs is unique; however, they were formed because commanders recognized a need for an element to control this important battle. In the absence of doctrine and resources, field units have created functional sections from current staff organizations. Many of the representatives for corps and division DOCCs are pulled from G2, G3 and the fire support element (FSE). Corps artillery commanders and division Fire Support Coordinators (FSCOORDs), or Division Artillery commanders, are key leaders in these organizations. EAC organizations do not have a senior FSCOORD or FSE to provide the leadership and nucleus for ad-hoc DOCCs. During joint exercises, personnel
have been pulled from subordinate units to form the DOCC at SCC level (18th Airborne Corps and II Marine Expeditionary Force provided DOCC members during a recent UNIFIED ENDEAVOR exercise with all the problems expected of a makeshift joint staff section thrown together from different services and commands).²³

Only FM 100-7, Decisive Force, talks to the same type organization at EAC level. The Army is currently in the preliminary stages of developing an action plan and concept for a DOCC at EAC, with fielding as early as 1999.²⁴

The BCD is a liaison element. Its principal purpose is to interpret the land battle for the other services in the JAOC and represent the SCC in the ATO process, not to plan or direct the SCC’s deep battle.²⁵ The deep battle’s scope is far greater than the BCD can handle. Not only does it include the synchronization of other component assets that the BCD can help coordinate; but, it also involves the orchestration in time and space of all organic and attached units. The BCD’s austere structure and its location at the JAOC prevents it from performing all the functions required in directing the deep battle.

There is a need for a doctrinal element at the SCC level to plan and direct the deep battle. Normally, the SCC will sub-divide his AO (as the JFC did) and assign geographic areas to subordinate commands. The AOs assigned to subordinate commands are drawn to allow the commander to accomplish specific missions and give the unit a large enough area to maneuver in achieving the missions. Again, these subordinate command AOs will probably not encompass the entire SCC AO. The areas outside subordinate commands’ AOs yet still within the SCC’s AO is the SCC’s responsibility.
It falls on his staff to coordinate and conduct operations within that area. Currently, those functions required for conducting that battle are spread across the six different elements within his TOC. The current operations cell ensures the deep battle is synchronized with today's battle and monitors availability of assets tasked for future plans. The intelligence cell develops the intelligence collection plan and continues to update intelligence data throughout the battle. The plans cell formulates the plans and necessary orders for the future battle. The fire support cell manages all lethal and non-lethal fire support assets in the deep, close and rear battles. Given the importance of the deep battle and the responsibility the SCC has in its conduct, a dedicated cell to direct the battle would make sense. The current battle is being fought by subordinate commands who have responsibility for that battle with the SCC monitoring and influencing the action through mission changes or allocation of resources, where needed. As now organized, the SCC must fight the battle with the same structure and personnel who are tracking the current battle. No doctrinal organization such as the corps and division DOCCs described above exists at the surface component commander level.

The need for a cell to control the deep fight continues to grow rapidly. More weapons systems are being fielded by all services to play in the land battle. US Navy doctrine, as expressed in Forward ... From the Sea, has the Navy concentrating on littoral areas. This is being manifested in the development of medium range precision strike weapons designed to support land forces. The Navy is developing its version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) (conveniently named NTACMS) to be fielded on the new arsenal ship. The NTACMS will have a range of 160 nautical miles (NM) and is being
fielded to support committed land forces. The Enhanced Range Guided Missile (ERGM) will give land warriors another deep battle tool out to 75 NM. The FASTHAWK and Land Attack Standard Missile are two more systems being developed and fielded on naval platforms that the SCC will be able to employ in his deep battle.\(^27\)

Obviously, the Air Force has always “played” in this battle. They’ll be more involved in the future. The Air Force has been designated as the proponent for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) operations in joint operations. The PREDATOR and future UAV variants give the SCC a vastly improved ability to perform the DETECT and ASSESS functions of targeting. Emerging technologies are allowing combat developers to envision armed UAVs that will be capable of loitering in a target area. They will then either track the target or destroy it upon command of the attacker.\(^28\) New sensor fuzed weapons (SFW) capable of attacking multiple targets at stand-off ranges can be effectively used against the large mechanized forces that would typically be included in the SCC’s deep battle.

The Army is also getting more involved in developing deep battle attack systems. The block II ATACMS (scheduled for fielding in 2001) will reach out to 140 kilometers (kms) with Brilliant Anti-Tank (BAT) munitions.\(^29\) Commanders will continue to use MLRS in the deep battle especially after the extended range system (out to 45 kms) is fielded. These indirect fire weapons coupled with current assets such as the Apache attack helicopter and the new Comanche give the SCC significant direct support weapons for use in “his” battle.

All of these evolving systems will increase the demands and complexity of the SCC’s deep battle. It is definitely the area on the battlefield where all services’ capabilities,
both intelligence and strike, overlap. Being in the SCC’s AO and his responsibility to fight
that piece of the battle, he needs a dedicated team to assist him. Without such a team, there
is no organization that pulls all the coordination requirements together to fight the SCC’s
depth battle. Representation at the JTCB, coordination with the BCD, liaison with the
tasked mission units and subordinate organic and attached units all suffer for the lack of a
single agency coordinating the depth battle.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army and Air Force now agree on the broad construct for the depth battle. Both
agree that the SCC is the supported commander for all operations, to include interdiction,
within his AO. Regardless of where the SCC places the FSCL, he must orchestrate all
operations on both sides of the line. The doctrine for attack of “time-sensitive” targets is
currently being developed and will answer the major issue of past disagreements.
However, there is a glaring need for an element at the SCC level to plan and execute the
depth battle, not merely to coordinate fires on fleeting targets of opportunity. Currently,
there is no single element that ensures the SCC’s depth battle supports or is synchronized
with subordinate units’ scheme of maneuver.

There is also a corresponding void in joint doctrine that explains how the SCC plans
and executes this fight. The Army needs to propose the broad functions and duties of
relevant organizations and the targeting process.
Although the Army has not resourced the DOCC as a doctrinal element, FM 100-7 describes the general purpose of a DOCC at EAC. It states the “primary mission of the DOCC is to provide centralized coordination and management of ARFOR deep operations.” FM 100-7 goes on to say the planning and execution duties are split 80% and 20% respectively and lists a few vague tasks under each. The doctrine needs to be more specific in describing its duties and functions. A more specific framework for the DOCC follows.

The DOCC should be capable of performing both planning and execution functions in the SCC’s deep battle. There are two general cases that dictate the EAC DOCC’s level of involvement in the deep battle. The first occurs when the SCC divides his entire AO between his subordinate units. In this case the DOCC’s primary function would be one of coordination. However, in the case where the SCC retains a geographic area for his own deep battle, his DOCC would be active in both the planning and execution of the fight. The DOCC’s planning function entails primarily targeting, synchronization and coordination tasks.

The DOCC would serve as the SCC’s targeting team. It would recommend high value and high payoff target priorities to the SCC, then establish priorities and desired mission effects for each target. Next, it would ascertain the intelligence collection assets required and allocate attack assets against specific targets. Finally, it would task subordinate units for collection and attack assets. If required, the DOCC would request additional collection and delivery assets through the JFC and other components to track and attack targets beyond organic weapons’ capabilities.
The DOCC would synchronize all operations and assets involved in the deep battle in time and space. Orchestrating this deep battle will prove much more difficult and complex than at any other level of command. It will integrate joint forces from other components and possibly assets of coalition forces. The DOCC will have to synchronize continuous deep operations that support the current and planned schemes of maneuver.

The deep cell will also be heavily engaged in coordinating deep battle operations with outside agencies, and organic and attached units (JTCB, BCD, Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), other components and subordinate units). It must review, resolve and submit subordinate command target nominations for inclusion in the ATO. It will recommend required fire support coordination measures and coordinate them with higher and lower commands, and other components through the BCD. It must also perform clearance of fires for targets planned within the SCC’s AO.

In addition to its role in planning deep operations, the DOCC would be more actively engaged in the execution of the deep battle than envisioned by FM 100-7. The DOCC’s battle execution function can be divided into two general areas: maintaining situational awareness and battle management tasks.

The SCC’s deep battle will be critically important to the success of other operations. Accurate situational awareness of the battle will be essential. Subordinate commands will plan and execute their deep and close battles in concert with the SCC’s deep fight. The JFC’s interdiction operations will likely include targets in the SCC’s AO and may involve his forces. Other components and coalition forces will be operating in the SCC’s AO. This adds a significant responsibility, and challenge, in maintaining an accurate picture of the
battlefield. The DOCC must keep the current operations cells in the SCC’s headquarters, and higher and lower commands appraised of the deep battle status. It must aid the BCD in its function of interpreting the ground action for the other components. Likewise, it will receive and disseminate updates from the BCD on the status and action of other component forces.

Battle management will be extremely taxing for the DOCC. Its duties will be analogous to the current operations cell fighting today’s close fight. With no subordinate command “owning” the land, the DOCC must actively manage the battle.

It must establish sensor to shooter links. This will become a more critical task as the number of intelligence collectors grows and the services field the multitude of weapons systems described above. Once the links are established, coordination between the sensor and shooter can occur at the lowest operational level.

It must perform dynamic retasking of intelligence collectors and delivery assets, as required. The JFC’s apportionment plan is a quantified description of his commander’s intent. The assets allocated to the surface component commander’s interdiction fight are his to plan and utilize. The fluid nature of the battlefield frequently makes it necessary to redirect assets (both intelligence and shooters) to effectively engage those high payoff targets designated by the SCC. The DOCC would actively manage the dynamic retasking job. It would retask intelligence collectors to track high payoff targets. It would redirect allocated air sorties to current target locations based on current intelligence. It would divert assets allocated to BDA missions (usually UAVs) to maintain a better awareness of the current battlefield. This capability would more efficiently employ assets apportioned by
the JFC through near real time application of fires not anticipated 72 hours prior during the ATO target nomination stage.

The DOCC would coordinate the expeditious attack of time-sensitive targets with responsive fire support systems (most likely organic assets such as MLRS or ATACMS), coordinate necessary clearance of fires and BDA.

The DOCC would deconflict new and updated targets (through the BCD) in the deep battle area, as required. Deconfliction of targets in subordinate command AOs could be effected between the BCD and the subordinate commands. The DOCC would assist in clearing fires beyond the FSCL for both subordinate commands and other components. The DOCC would maintain all friendly locations and recommend changes to fire support coordination measures as required.

FM 100-15 suggests a composition for the Corps DOCC. This provides a good starting point for a proposed EAC DOCC membership. The Corps DOCC includes the FSE, Army aviation liaison officer (AVN), G2, G3, Army airspace command and control element (A²C²), air support operations center (ASOC) and the ADE. The following elements need to be included at the EAC level: SOCCE, EW section, engineer (ENGR), chemical (CML), naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO) and liaison officers from subordinate units.

After the Army has structured and defined the DOCC's function, the organization and procedures must be written into joint targeting doctrine. A broad description of the EAC DOCC structure, purpose and duties will aid other services in understanding how the SCC plans and fights the deep battle. Joint doctrine requires a more complete definition of
BCD functions, to include clearance of fires procedures and procedures for the attack of
time-sensitive missions by other components.

Finally, the Army must explain the targeting methodology used by the SCC and his
DOCC to plan and execute the deep battle. Specific planning functions to be included in
document are: how the commander develops and issues targeting priorities; how he will
synchronize the interdiction fight to support maneuver operations; how he receives and
resolves subordinate commands’ targets and nominates targets for inclusion in the ATO;
and, how he will request other detection, delivery and assessment assets from other
components and tasks organic and attached units for assets.

The senior leaders of the Army and Air Force have removed the major obstacles to
solving battlefield responsibilities. The Army must now act to resource the necessary staff
elements required by ground commanders to fight the deep battle. It is clearly evident the
BCD is not designed or intended to direct the SCC’s command and control of his deep
battle. The SCC needs a more robust organization focused on his targeting and deep battle
execution tasks.

Both services must continue in the same spirit of cooperation to develop a coherent
document that efficiently synchronizes all joint assets to meet the supported commander’s
objectives. Current joint doctrine is limited to how the JFC, with the assistance of the
JFACC, accomplishes his targeting functions of establishing target priorities and allocating
air assets. The SCC’s deep battle is a different fight, with different players. The void in
joint targeting doctrine for the SCC’s fight must be filled so that all services are on a
common grid and direction.
ENDNOTES


2 The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations (Final Coordination), (Washington: The Joint Staff, 26 November 1996), v.


5 Ibid., IV-11.


8 The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-09, Fire Support for Joint Operations (Preliminary Coordination), (Washington: The Joint Staff, 10 January 1997), A-2 through A-6.


15 JP 3-0, III-27.


18 MAJ Laskie interview, 29 January 1997.


25 FM 100-13, 1-1 through 1-5.


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