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OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP:
A CASE STUDY OF TWO EXTREMES
DURING OPERATION WATCHTOWER

by

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# Operational Leadership: A Case Study of Two Extremes During Operation Watchtower

Amid the fog and friction of war, operational leadership is an essential element of success. Never was this better demonstrated than in the South Pacific theater during World War II's Operation Watchtower (the American occupation of Guadalcanal and Tulagi), where an unforeseen change of command altered the course of history. Successful military theater commanders possess common traits that facilitate their operational leadership role. These traits include the intellectual ability and imagination to analyze situations, and to envision a future end state and the steps required to achieve it; communication skill to clearly articulate the vision to subordinates; enthusiasm and confidence to inspire subordinates beyond their known capabilities; boldness and audacity to take calculated risks decisively; good judgment to make the right decisions; and, when the going gets tough, strength of character and will to maintain the vision, stay the course, rekindle enthusiasm and keep hope alive. With the success of America's first major offensive operation against Japan in jeopardy, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas, faced the soul-searching decision to relieve a subordinate commander. He replaced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, with Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, USN. Admiral Halsey's immediate positive impact on morale and readiness, coupled with his bold audacity, turned the tide and achieved victory in less than a month. Admiral Halsey proved to be the right leader in the right place at the right time.
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INTRODUCTION

Having the right leader in the right place at the right time has always been critical to victory.¹
-- David E. Price

Amid the fog and friction of war, operational leadership is an essential element of success. Never was this better demonstrated than in the South Pacific theater during World War II's Operation Watchtower (the American occupation of Guadalcanal and Tulagi), where an unforeseen change of command altered the course of history.

Military theater commanders are tasked to accomplish national strategic objectives. While all successful commanders are unique, they possess common key traits that facilitate their operational leadership role. These traits include the intellectual ability and imagination to analyze situations of broad scope, in both time and space, and to envision a future end state as well as the steps required to achieve it. These steps constitute the road map to operational success. Once the vision has been established, successful commanders communicate that vision to subordinates so clearly that it becomes their vision. In addition, they transfer to subordinates their own enthusiasm and confidence in their ability to achieve the vision, leaving no doubt that following the road map will lead to victory. Successful commanders trust subordinates to carry out commander's intent and allow them freedom of action. They exercise good judgment and possess the boldness and audacity to take calculated risks decisively. And, finally, when the going gets tough, successful commanders manifest the strength of character and will to maintain the vision, stay the course, rekindle enthusiasm, and keep hope alive.²

Theater commanders make myriad operational decisions to include command organization and relationships, theater structure, and subordinate commanders and
their missions. One of the most poignant and soul-searching decisions a commander can be faced with is the issue of whether to relieve a subordinate commander.\(^3\)

This study will examine that issue as it relates to the operational leadership of three World War II theater commanders during Operation Watchtower in 1942: Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, United States Navy (USN), Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPOA) and Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), and his subordinates Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, USN, the first Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force (ComSoPac) and Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, USN, the second ComSoPac. At a critical point when the success of the first offensive operation against Japan in the Pacific was in jeopardy, Admiral Nimitz made the operational decision that he believed would tip the balance in America's favor: to replace Admiral Ghormley with Admiral Halsey as ComSoPac. Admiral Halsey's immediate, positive impact on morale and readiness turned the operation around in less than a month, demonstrating the crucial role of operational leadership in war.\(^4\)

**OPERATION WATCHTOWER**

In January 1942, the Japanese seized Rabaul on New Britain to serve as a major port and air base from which to conduct further maritime offensives. Occupation of the Solomon, New Hebrides, Fiji and Samoan Islands would effectively sever the sea lines of communication between the United States (Hawaii) and Australia (including New Zealand). Japan's offensive plans included construction of a major seaplane base at Tulagi principally due to its anchorage and strategic location.\(^5\)

To meet this challenge, on 2 July 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the Joint Directive for Offensive Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area which included three
major operations: Task One was the seizure of Tulagi, the Santa Cruz Islands, and areas adjacent (Operation Watchtower); Tasks Two and Three included the occupation of the rest of the Solomons, Rabaul, New Guinea and the New Britain-New Ireland area. Because Operation Watchtower involved only Navy and Marine forces, it was slated for assignment to a Navy commander reporting to Admiral Nimitz. After completion of Task One, General Douglas MacArthur would assume overall command for Tasks Two and Three. In order to facilitate command relationships, the boundary between the South Pacific Area and General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area was shifted west to longitude 159° East, effectively moving Tulagi and Guadalcanal from the Southwest into the South Pacific Area. (See Figure 1 on page 4.) Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley was designated ComSoPac and assigned the responsibility for Operation Watchtower.
THE PACIFIC AREAS
as designated April 1, 1942
Dotted line shows original boundary before August 1, 1942

Figure 1
VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT L. GHORMLEY, USN

Without energy and health, it is often very difficult to be optimistic. -- Fundamentals of Naval Leadership

Fifty-eight years old, Admiral Ghormley was a 1906 graduate of the Naval Academy. Though a physically imposing man, he was rather quiet and reserved. Highly intellectual with a pleasant personality, he had a natural talent for diplomacy. As it proved, however, he was not a dynamic leader. Refusing to delegate authority, he became so entrenched in paperwork and detail that he could not spare a day to visit Guadalcanal. His sense of duty drove him to work countless hours in ComSoPac's cramped, ill-ventilated, unairconditioned quarters, refusing exercise or recreation. During this time he also suffered severely from abscessed teeth.

Admiral Ghormley's service career included sea duty aboard destroyers and battleships. His most recent assignments were as Chief of the War Plans Division (1938-39) and Special Naval Observer in London (1940-42). On 19 June 1942, Vice Admiral Ghormley assumed duties as ComSoPac. Six days later, he received orders to prepare to invade Tulagi and adjacent islands on 1 August.

Admiral Ghormley felt preparation time and operational assets were inadequate and flew to Melbourne on 8 July to confer with General MacArthur. General MacArthur was against the plan outlined in the joint directive because it conflicted with his own. Both officers thought the operation should be delayed until more air assets were available. Apparently feeding off one another's objections, they sent a joint message to the Chiefs challenging the strategy, doubting the operation's potential for success, and recommending postponement. The message was received by the Joint Chiefs with
decided distaste. They wanted an action plan, not further debate. They did, however, agree to delay the invasion of Tulagi and Guadalcanal one week, until 7 August.\footnote{15}

From the outset, Admiral Ghormley appeared undecided over ComSoPac’s primary mission. The standing mission was to defend the sea lines of communication between the United States and Australia. Upon assuming command, he received the new mission of Operation Watchtower. He presumed this mission to be secondary in priority and conducted himself accordingly, although it is not clearly apparent how one can be accomplished without the other. In August, he was tasked to seize Ndeni and establish an airfield. While pleading for resources, he rapidly became overwhelmed with tasking.\footnote{16}

Admiral Ghormley first established ComSoPac headquarters in Auckland, New Zealand and in early August moved to the tender \textit{USS Argonne} in Noumea, New Caledonia to place himself in the “operating area”.\footnote{17} He was immediately faced with seemingly insurmountable problems. His new command had an inexperienced communications division that suffered the results of bad connectivity and propagation—dispatches were delayed for hours or days and he was unable to communicate at critical times. With the exception of one Marine officer, his staff lacked amphibious operations experience. His sole intelligence information came from antiquated charts and maps, aerial photos and reports from pilots, and the reporting of a handful of coast watchers on Guadalcanal. Logistics was a nightmare. Shipping space from the west coast was scarce. Cargo jammed aboard in San Francisco had to be unloaded, sorted and stored upon delivery to the South Pacific. This required deepwater ports equipped with cranes, warehouses, and labor. Only Auckland possessed these attributes and lay
5,680 miles from San Francisco and 1,825 miles from Guadalcanal. Admiral Ghormley must have felt that he was being tasked to “launch an invasion with inadequate forces and to supply and reinforce his beachhead with non-existent troops, ferried in non-existent transports, and covered with a non-existent air force.”

However, Admiral Ghormley’s command structure compounded his difficulties. Though placed in “strategic command” of Operation Watchtower, he delegated Officer in Tactical Command responsibilities to the Expeditionary Force Commander (Task Force (TF) 61), Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, embarked in USS Saratoga. Other key personnel assignments included: Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, SoPac Amphibious Force Commander (TF 62); Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift, United States Marine Corps (USMC), Landing Forces Commander (TF 62.8); and Rear Admiral John S. McCain, SoPac Land-based Air Force Commander (TF 63). (See Figure 2 below.) In this organization, when Admiral Turner needed an air search, he had to ask Admiral Fletcher to request that Admiral Ghormley task Admiral McCain.
Admiral Fletcher brought his own emotional baggage with him. A veteran of the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway, he had previously lost two carriers (USS Lexington and USS Yorktown) and was not about to lose any more. Apparently lacking operational confidence, prior to leaving Pearl Harbor for the South Pacific, he expressed to Admiral Turner his certainty that the operation would fail. Setting the stage, Admiral Fletcher “had no previous experience in amphibious operations, the forces he would command had never worked together before, Ghormley had issued him no instructions, and he had submitted no plan to Ghormley for approval.” A disastrous pre-operation conference in late July was followed by an equally unsuccessful rehearsal in the Fijis. The conference aboard Saratoga was the first time the operation’s major commanders met together. Admiral Fletcher began by dropping a “bombshell”: to minimize risk to his carriers, he would provide covering protection for only 48 hours. Admiral Turner stated he would need at least four days to unload troops and cargo. Admiral Fletcher would not change his plan unless directed to do so by Admiral Ghormley. However, in a telling error in judgment, Admiral Ghormley had neglected to attend this critical meeting, deciding that he did not have time to travel. Instead, he sent his Chief of Staff who had no delegated authority to act on his behalf and, consequently, did little more than take notes. Radio silence imposed for the operation made any thought of a direct appeal to Admiral Ghormley a moot point.

The invasions on Tulagi and Guadalcanal began early on the morning of 7 August. On 8 August, Admiral Fletcher sailed off as planned and on 9 August the United States suffered its worst naval defeat in history at the Battle of Savo Island, having five cruisers and four destroyers sunk, 1,023 men killed and 709 men wounded.
Late that afternoon, Admiral Turner sailed for Noumea because of a lack of air cover, effectively marooning General Vandegrift and the First Marine Division. Though the Marines had a toehold on Guadalcanal, the Japanese were reinforcing the island daily and the operation's success was in grave jeopardy.  

FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER W. NIMITZ, USN

Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory.  

-- George S. Patton

Fifty-seven years old, Admiral Nimitz was fit and trim with sunny blue eyes, a fair complexion, and silvering hair. His virtues included humility, diplomacy, tact, patience, courage and wisdom. According to his 1905 Naval Academy classbook, he was calm, steady and had a knack for getting right to the bottom of things. He was never ruffled and rarely raised his voice. A good listener whose forte was getting people to work together, he had an uncanny ability to “pick the right man for the right job.” Admiral Nimitz’ leadership style was such that he met every ship that arrived at Pearl Harbor and required each ship’s captain to call on him. He believed in delegating authority and spent his efforts on those responsibilities that only CinCPAO could accomplish. He made broad operational decisions, hand-picked his immediate subordinates, attended strategic and theater-level meetings, and participated in ceremonies to bestow awards and speak with his sailors.  

At one strategic meeting with Admiral King in San Francisco, 7-9 September, Operation Watchtower and ComSoPac were major topics. Admiral King began to question whether Admiral Ghormley was up to the job. Comments on the employment of forces by ComSoPac read like a laundry list of complaints: “calculated risks”
(presumably the lack thereof), “operations not closely knit,” “refueling accomplished at inopportune times,” and “delay in setting up Task Force 64” (accomplished on 7 September and according to Admiral King “about a month too late”).²⁹ (Task Force 64 was a cruiser force tasked to search and destroy Japanese ships and landing craft.)³⁰ Admiral King questioned Admiral Ghormley’s physical readiness and speculated on whether he should be replaced. Admiral Nimitz said he would check on Admiral Ghormley’s last physical examination and get back to Admiral King.³¹ Any doubts that Admirals King and Nimitz harbored about Admiral Ghormley’s ability to continue to lead the fight were reinforced two days later. On 11 September, Admiral Ghormley concluded in his commander’s running estimate that he could no longer support Guadalcanal and the island could not be held. He enumerated deficiencies in troops, transports, destroyers, cruisers, and carriers. He stated that he had not abandoned hope and was “considering” sending the 7th Marines as reinforcements.³²

This evaluation prompted Admiral Nimitz to visit the South Pacific to see conditions for himself. On 28 September, Admiral Nimitz met with ComSoPac in Noumea. Admiral Ghormley and his staff briefed a pessimistic picture, stating they doubted the Marines could continue to withstand repeated Japanese attacks. Their inability to answer Admiral Nimitz’ probing questions underscored the fact that neither ComSoPac nor any of his staff had visited Guadalcanal to gain firsthand information.³³

During this meeting, Admiral Ghormley’s Chief of Staff interrupted to deliver a priority message. Admiral Ghormley read the message and said, “My God, what are we going to do about this?” Just then, a Communications Watch Officer delivered another message. After reading the second message, he said, “My God, what are we going to do about this?” Pushing both messages aside, it was not clear whether Admiral
Ghormley ever did anything about either of them. This exhibition in Admiral Nimitz’ presence left an impression of indecisiveness and despair.34

Conversely, at Guadalcanal, Admiral Nimitz was met by an enthusiastic and confidently optimistic General Vandegrift and staff. Given more support, General Vandegrift was convinced the island could be held. Admiral Nimitz deduced that pessimism seemed to increase in direct proportion to the distance from combat.35

Returning to ComSoPac headquarters on 2 October, Admiral Nimitz held another meeting, where he flatly told Admiral Ghormley to make a trip to Guadalcanal. He offered to send Admiral Ghormley a more experienced Communications Officer, but Admiral Ghormley refused to replace his own man. Then Admiral Ghormley informed Admiral Nimitz that he had received a dispatch in August from Admiral King, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, requesting a plan and schedule for future operations against the Japanese in the area around Rabaul. Admiral Ghormley had not responded to the request because the results of present operations would affect any schedule.

Apparently, Admiral Ghormley did not understand that the Joint Chiefs were well aware of the situation on Guadalcanal and wanted his input to compare with General MacArthur’s. This failure to reply was a serious breach of command.36

Upon returning to Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz sent Admiral Ghormley a letter urging him to visit Guadalcanal and to take such calculated risks as were required to continue to attrite the Japanese forces.37 On 15 October, Admiral Nimitz received a message from ComSoPac which stated, “My forces [are] totally inadequate to meet [the] situation.”38 That night Admiral Nimitz called senior members of his staff together to discuss the command situation in the South Pacific. He opened with a brief lecture on the unacceptability of pessimism and asked each officer to present his opinion of
whether Admiral Ghormley was tough enough to meet the challenge and, more importantly, if he could “inspire his subordinates to heroic measures beyond their known capacities.”

He then polled each officer in turn on whether it was time to relieve Admiral Ghormley. Every officer said, “Yes.” The next morning he requested, and promptly received, approval from Admiral King.

To Admiral Ghormley, he radioed: “After carefully weighing all factors, have decided that talents and previous experience of Halsey can best be applied to the situation by having him take over duties of ComSoPac as soon as practicable after his arrival Noumea 18th your date.”

Later, when Admiral Ghormley visited Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz explained his decision: “Bob, I had to pick from the whole Navy the man best fitted to handle the situation. Were you that man?” “No,” Admiral Ghormley said. “If you put it that way, I guess I wasn’t.”

To Mrs. Nimitz, he wrote: “Today I have replaced Ghormley with Halsey. It was a sore mental struggle and the decision was not reached until after hours of anguished consideration. Reason (private): Ghormley was too immersed in detail and not sufficiently bold and aggressive at the right times. I feel better now that it has been done. . . . The interests of the nation transcend private interests.”

VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY, USN

Each follower must feel some linkage with the leader. The inspiration that comes from proper leadership can harness the will of individuals to undertake tasks that may appear impossible.”

Fifty-nine years old, Admiral Halsey was a 1904 Naval Academy graduate. Of average height, he was broad-shouldered and barrel-chested. He had a wide mouth turned down at the corners and extremely bushy eyebrows, giving him a “grizzled
sea-dog look. Supremely self-confident, he was an inspirational leader with a commanding presence. He displayed a certain indifference to detail which resembled carelessness and caused Secretary of the Navy Knox, among others, to doubt his administrative ability. His reputation as an aggressive fighter and a bold leader, however, was never in question. Admiral Halsey elicited intense loyalty from his subordinates, especially the enlisted men. His enthusiasm and optimism were infectious and his flamboyant exhortations bouyed the spirits of his men and the American public. Admiral Halsey had one of the greatest characteristics of a real leader, in that he caught the imagination of those who served under him.

At the time of his appointment as ComSoPac, Admiral Halsey was the Navy's senior carrier battle group commander. As commander of the USS Enterprise battle group (TF 16), he had led America's first victory against the Japanese by attacking the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on 1 February 1942 and launched Jimmy Doolittle's strategic bomber raid on Tokyo on 18 April. He was action-oriented, loved to fight and was at his best under desperate conditions. Admiral Nimitz said of Admiral Halsey, "He has that rare combination of intellectual capacity and military audacity, and can calculate to a cat's whisker the risk involved."

Having just reported to Pearl Harbor for duty from medical leave in the states, Admiral Halsey attended an award ceremony aboard Saratoga on 12 September. Admiral Nimitz stepped up to the microphone and said, "Boys, I've got a surprise for you. Bill Halsey's back!" The sailors cheered resoundingly and, though the decision would not be made for another month, Admiral Nimitz knew in his heart that this was the man to lead the fight in the South Pacific.
Arriving in Noumea on 18 October as part of a South Pacific familiarization tour, Admiral Halsey was handed a secret message from CinCPAO: “YOU WILL TAKE COMMAND OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES IMMEDIATELY.” Admiral Halsey exploded, “Jesus Christ and General Jackson! This is the hottest potato they ever handed me!” He was astonished, because he had no idea the appointment was coming; apprehensive, because he had never worked with combined troops and knew the situation was desperate; and regretful, because of his forty-year friendship with Admiral Ghormley which began when they played football together at the Naval Academy.  

That afternoon ComSoPac sent a message to all area commands: “VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY HAS THIS DATE RELIEVED VICE ADMIRAL ROBERT L. GHORMLEY AS COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE AND SOUTH PACIFIC AREA.” The sailors in the fleet and the Marines on Guadalcanal reacted with wild enthusiasm. Admiral Halsey’s flamboyant reputation, his record of early victories, and his fighting spirit imbued the troops with renewed confidence. Lieutenant Commander Roger Kent, an Air Combat Information Officer on Guadalcanal, described the reaction: “I’ll never forget it! One minute we were too limp with malaria to crawl out of our foxholes; the next, we were running around whooping like kids. . . . If morale had been enough, we’d have won the war right there.”

Admiral Halsey’s presence at the helm was felt immediately. Within days of assuming command, he met with General Vandegrift who confidently proclaimed that, given more active support, his men could hold Guadalcanal. Admiral Halsey promised to give him everything he had. On 24 October, Admiral Halsey received major assistance: President Roosevelt issued a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs “to make
sure that every possible weapon gets in that area to hold Guadalcanal." Admiral Halsey's first decision was to cancel the Ndeni operation and redirect the troops to Guadalcanal. He moved the main fleet base from Auckland to Noumea and moved his staff ashore to more comfortable quarters and working conditions. Like Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey believed in delegating. He called his staff in and instructed, "There's a lot to be done. Look around, see what it is, and do it."

One of Admiral Halsey's first orders was for Navy and Marine officers to remove their ties. While it was Admiral Halsey's way of ensuring his staff looked alike (because Army officers were not required to wear ties with their tropical uniform), it gave the mental image of a brawler stripping off his tie to enjoin the fight. Truly concerned about the interference of interservice rivalry, Admiral Halsey called his subordinate commanders together and said,

"Gentlemen, we are the South Pacific Fighting Force. I don't want anybody even to be thinking in terms of Army, Navy, or Marines. Every man must understand this, and every man will understand it, if I have to take off his uniform and issue coveralls with 'South Pacific Fighting Force' printed on the seat of his pants."

Within three weeks of assuming command, Admiral Halsey visited Guadalcanal. At a press conference on the island, he outlined his attrition strategy for winning the war: "Kill Japs, kill Japs, and keep on killing Japs!" This became the battle cry of the South Pacific and was painted in letters three feet high over the boat landing at Tulagi. Admiral Halsey also visited the hospital at Efate whereupon the word spread that the troops now had a boss who cared. By 7 December, Guadalcanal was in American hands. General Vandegrift turned over command to the Army and began to move out. In less than six weeks, the tide had turned and the American offensive continued.
CONCLUSION

Given the very character of leadership, it is likely to remain a subject whose only truth is in its accomplishments. -- Sam O. Sarkesian

Simply put, Admiral Ghormley's operational leadership weaknesses were Admiral Halsey's strengths. Admiral Ghormley exhibited a lack of imagination and vision in his failure to establish clear mission objectives and commander's intent. He compounded this omission by not discussing operational plans with Admiral Fletcher. Doubting the operation's chances of success from the beginning, Admiral Ghormley lacked enthusiasm and confidence and became increasingly pessimistic. Declining to delegate authority, he assumed a tremendous workload that kept him buried in administrative paperwork. Immersed in detail, Admiral Ghormley never saw the big picture. Though urged repeatedly by Admiral Nimitz, he never set foot on Guadalcanal. Admiral Nimitz specifically noted Admiral Ghormley's reticence to take calculated risks and his insufficient boldness and aggressiveness. His indecisiveness was underscored by his despair over the priority messages that interrupted his conference with Admiral Nimitz. Finally, Admiral Ghormley exhibited poor judgment in not attending the pre-invasion commanders' meeting, not empowering his Chief of Staff to act on his behalf, not answering the Joint Chiefs' message regarding future operations, and not visiting Guadalcanal. But, to an optimist such as Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Ghormley's fatal flaw was his infectious pessimism.

Just as infectious and far from a flaw was Admiral Halsey's enthusiastic optimism and confidence. He quickly envisioned victory through a strategy of attrition of enemy forces and articulated it so effectively that it became the battle cry of the South Pacific. Every man knew the mission: "Kill Japs, kill Japs, and keep on killing Japs!" Through the practice of removing neckties and orders to his subordinate commanders
demanding unity of effort, he visibly brought his officers together and communicated teamwork throughout the force. Admiral Halsey delegated authority and took upon himself those responsibilities commensurate to his position. This gave him the time and distance necessary to maintain a big picture outlook. Upon his arrival in Noumea, Admiral Halsey required first-hand knowledge of the situation. After this briefing, he quickly cancelled the Ndeni operation, calculating that supplying Guadalcanal with badly needed troops was of more consequence to the overall objective. Believing a leader must be visible to motivate and inspire subordinates, Admiral Halsey visited Guadalcanal and the hospital at Efate within three weeks of assuming command. Most indicative of Admiral Halsey's superior operational leadership was the accomplishment of the mission, giving credence to the cliche "you can't argue with success."

While Admiral Nimitz anguished over his decision to relieve Admiral Ghormley, it is certain he preferred having someone who closely mirrored his own leadership style--someone who instinctively knew the vital importance of visiting Guadalcanal rather than someone who failed to do so even when directed. He preferred a leader who shared his vision of a series of island victories to push back the Japanese advance in the South Pacific--a series of victories that had to begin with Guadalcanal. He preferred a visible leader who was active rather than invisible and reactive. In short, he preferred a leader who could lead--he preferred Bill Halsey.

And while Admiral Halsey's actions at Leyte Gulf have provided the centerpiece for naval controversy in World War II, it cannot be denied that Guadalcanal was his finest hour. Let it be remembered that when this nation needed a victory to turn the tide in the South Pacific, Admiral Bill Halsey was the right leader in the right place at the right time.64
NOTES


12 Richard B. Frank, 334; Potter, Nimitz, 222; Larrabee, 260.

13 Richard B. Frank, 14.

14 Ibid., 36; Potter, Nimitz, 45; Coggins, 24.


17 Richard B. Frank, 55-56.

18 Ibid., 136.

19 Coggins, 105.

20 Ibid., 25.

21 Richard B. Frank, 52; Larrabee, 272.

22 Coggins, 26; Larrabee, 264.

23 Larrabee, 264.

24 Coggins, 26; Richard B. Frank, 54; Larrabee, 265.


28 Potter, Nimitz, 21; Larrabee, 387-389.


30 Coggins, 89.

31 Richard B. Frank, 216; Potter, Nimitz, 187; Merrill, 47-48; Potter, Bull Halsey, 154; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King to Commander Walter M. Whitehill, United States Navy, 15 July 1950, signed letter, Thomas Buell Research Source Collection on Ernest J. King, U.S. Naval War College Archives, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI.

32 Richard B. Frank, 227.

33 Green, 62; Larrabee, 294; Hoyt, 155; Driskill, 174.
34 Larrabee, 295; Benis M. Frank, 44; Merrill, 49.
35 Larrabee, 294-295; Green, 62; Driskill, 175.
36 Hoyt, 153-154, 158.
37 Ibid., 162.
38 Richard B. Frank, 333.
39 Potter, Nimitz, 196.
40 Ibid., Nimitz, 196-197; Benis M. Frank, 46; Potter, Bull Halsey, 159; Merrill, 50-51.
41 Green, 66; Potter, Bull Halsey, 159.
42 Hoyt, 204; Merrill, 52.
43 Potter, Nimitz, 197.
45 Richard B. Frank, 335.
47 Layton, 144; Kemp Tolley, “Reminiscences of Rear Admiral Kemp Tolley, United States Navy (Retired),” Vol. II, interview by John T. Mason, Jr., 9 April 1976 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1984), 661; Smedberg, 236; Merrill, 64.
49 Potter, Bull Halsey, 42-47, 56-62; Duncan, 200, Hoyt, 164.
50 Potter, Nimitz, 206.
51 Merrill, 48; Halsey, 108; Potter, Bull Halsey, 155.
52 Griffith, 163; Halsey, 109-111; Potter, Nimitz, 198; Larrabee, 294; Hoyt, 163; Potter, Bull Halsey, 160; Merrill, 51; Driskill, 176.
54 Halsey, 116; Larrabee, 294; Griffith, 163; Potter, Nimitz, 198; Benis M. Frank, 46; Layton, 144; Werstein, 139; Potter, Bull Halsey, 160.
55 Smedberg, 135; Coggins, 106; Shaw, 35; Halsey, 117; Benis M. Frank, 51; Larrabee, 295; Potter, Nimitz, 199; Griffith, 164; Hoyt, 170; Potter, Bull Halsey, 162; Merrill, 53.
56 Potter, Nimitz, 203; Merrill, 54; Potter, Bull Halsey, 167.

58 Richard B. Frank, 335; Halsey, 139; Potter, *Bull Halsey*, 186.

59 Halsey, 139; Potter, *Bull Halsey*, 186.

60 Potter, *Nimitz*, 203.

61 Ibid., *Nimitz*, 203; Smedberg, 236; Layton, 144; Werstein, 139; Larrabee, 294; Benis M. Frank, 47; Merrill, 57; Potter, *Bull Halsey*, 169.

62 Shaw, 46.

63 Sarkesian, 246.

64 Richard B. Frank, 336, 605; Fife, 302; Layton, 144.


