




THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



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


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**THE CHAIRMANSHIP
OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Ronald H. Cole, Lorna S. Jaffe,
Walter S. Poole, Willard J. Webb



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FOREWORD

This study of the chairmanship traces the evolution of the position from its World War II origins through the first post-Cold War chairmanship. It sketches the careers of my predecessors from Omar Bradley through Colin Powell and those of the first two Vice Chairmen. In doing so, the book shows how each dealt with a wide variety of political, diplomatic, and military challenges. Its brief accounts of the histories of "The Tank," the Chairman's flag, the Joint Chiefs of Staff badge, and the designation of an official residence for the Chairman provide additional information about the Office of the Chairman. I think that all who are interested in the institutional development of the US military will find the book instructive.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

Soon after their first formal meeting in early 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the need for a senior officer to preside over their activities and maintain daily contact with the President. Appointed Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy in July 1942, Admiral William D. Leahy remained in that position until his retirement in 1949. In the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, Congress created the post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue the duties performed by Admiral Leahy. Since then, the role and responsibilities of the Chairman have increased greatly. *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* describes the creation and evolution of the Chairman's position and presents brief biographical sketches of the men who have occupied it.

This book follows an earlier work, *The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* by Willard J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole. That volume has been revised and augmented with additional material by Dr. Cole, Lorna S. Jaffe, and Walter S. Poole. Frank N. Schubert also contributed to the project. Penny Norman and Helga Echols typed the manuscript, and Ms. Norman prepared the volume for publication.

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Washington, DC
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DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
Director for Joint History

CONTENTS

The Role of the Chairman

Coalescence of the Joint Chiefs during World War II	3
Postwar Reorganization and a Temporary Chairman	6
Establishment of the Position of Chairman	7
The New Chairman	8
The President's Advocate	10
An Expanding Role during the 1960s	14
Problems and Frustrations during the 1970s	21
Proposals for Change in the 1980s	25
A New Law and Enhanced Authority	30

The Chairmen

Omar Nelson Bradley	43
Arthur William Radford	51
Nathan Farragut Twining	59
Lyman Louis Lemnitzer	67
Maxwell Davenport Taylor	77
Earle Gilmore Wheeler	87
Thomas Hinman Moorer	95
George Scratchley Brown	105
David Charles Jones	113
John William Vessey, Jr.	123
William James Crowe, Jr.	131
Colin Luther Powell	141

The Vice Chairmen

Robert Tralles Herres 155
David Elmer Jeremiah 165

The JCS Conference Room: “The Tank” 177

The Flag of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 183

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge 189

Quarters Six: The Chairman’s Residence 195

Appendices

1. Extracts of Public Law 81-216, 10 August 1949, National Security
Act Amendments of 1949 203

2. Extracts of Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986, Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 205

3. Chronological Listing of Presidents of the United States, Secretaries
of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 211

Notes 217

PHOTOGRAPHS

Dedication of Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff Corridor at the Pentagon, 17 July 1991	2
Admiral William D. Leahy presides over the World War II Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1944	5
Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson swears in General Omar N. Bradley as the first Chairman, 16 August 1949	9
Admiral Arthur W. Radford emerges from the JCS area, 1954	11
General Nathan F. Twining with his JCS colleagues, 1957	13
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer with his JCS colleagues, 1961	15
General Maxwell D. Taylor with his four predecessors, 1 October 1962	17
General Maxwell D. Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1963	19
General Earle G. Wheeler at a press conference in Saigon, 1969	20
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer with President Richard M. Nixon aboard the USS <i>Saratoga</i> , 1969	21
General George S. Brown with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 1976	23
General George S. Brown with General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, USAF, 1974	24
General David C. Jones presides over a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the unified and specified commanders, 22 January 1982	26
General David C. Jones and General John W. Vessey, Jr., 1982	27
General John W. Vessey, Jr., with President Ronald Reagan in the Secretary of Defense's office, 1984	28

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., briefs President Ronald Reagan at the White House, 1987	32
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987	33
General Colin L. Powell with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991	34
President William J. Clinton and General Colin L. Powell at General Powell's retirement ceremony, 30 September 1993	35
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger swears in General Robert T. Herres as the first Vice Chairman, 6 February 1987	36
A meeting in "The Tank" during Operation DESERT STORM, January 1991 ..	37
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley	42
Lieutenant General Bradley with General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Major General J. Lawton Collins in France, July 1944	44
Lieutenant General Bradley pauses to autograph a GI's helmet, 1945	45
President Harry S Truman promotes General Bradley to five-star rank, 22 September 1950	46
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN	50
Rear Admiral Radford on the bridge of the USS <i>Yorktown</i> , October 1944	52
Rear Admiral Radford being passed to his flagship, the USS <i>Saratoga</i> , in a breeches buoy, November 1944	53
Admiral Radford with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Paul Ely, March 1954	54
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF	58
Brigadier General Twining following his rescue in the Coral Sea, February 1943	60
Major General Twining in Italy with Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz and Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, 1944	61
General Twining makes a statement to the press before his trip to the Soviet Union, July 1956	62
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	66

Brigadier General Lemnitzer with Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark and General Sir Harold Alexander at Anzio, Italy, January 1944	68
Major General Lemnitzer with General Matthew B. Ridgway and General James A. Van Fleet in Korea, January 1952	70
General Lemnitzer in South Vietnam with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, General Paul D. Harkins, and Major General Nguyen Khanh, May 1962	71
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	76
Lieutenant General Taylor in Korea, February 1953	78
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy swears in General Taylor as Chairman, 1 October 1962	80
General Taylor in South Vietnam, 1963	81
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA	86
Colonel Wheeler inspects an honor guard in Trieste, November 1951	88
General Wheeler and General Creighton W. Abrams in South Vietnam, October 1969	90
General Wheeler and his family with President Richard M. Nixon following a ceremony at the White House, 9 July 1970	91
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN	94
Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Moorer with his PBY crew, 1940	96
Admiral Moorer, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, greets Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, June 1965	97
Admiral Moorer in South Vietnam, August 1969	98
General George S. Brown, USAF	104
General Brown in the cockpit of a UH-1 helicopter in South Vietnam, October 1968	106
General Brown visits US Marines during an exercise in Puerto Rico, February 1975	107
General Brown with Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, November 1975	108

General David C. Jones, USAF	112
Captain Jones following award of the Distinguished Flying Cross, October 1950	114
General Jones greets President Gerald R. Ford, 1975	115
General Jones with General John W. Vessey, Jr., 1982	117
General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA	122
Sergeant Vessey in World War II	124
General Vessey and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger at a congressional hearing, February 1983	125
General Vessey briefs President Ronald Reagan at the White House, 1985 ...	127
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN	130
Midshipman Crowe, 1946	132
Admiral Crowe as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, 1981 .	134
Admiral Crowe welcomes Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, to the Pentagon, 8 July 1988	135
Admiral Crowe conducts a press briefing, June 1989	136
General Colin L. Powell, USA	140
ROTC Cadet Sergeant First Class Powell, 1957	142
Lieutenant Colonel Powell in South Korea	143
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney swears in General Powell as Chairman, 3 October 1989	144
General Powell briefs the press during Operation DESERT STORM, January 1991	145
General Robert T. Herres, USAF	154
Midshipman Herres, 1951.	156
Lieutenant Colonel Herres, 1967	157

General Herres briefs President Ronald Reagan at the White House, 1987	159
Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN	164
Ensign Jeremiah	166
Commander Jeremiah, 1970	167
Rear Admiral Jeremiah commands Task Force 60, 1986	168
Admiral Jeremiah in Somalia, 1992	170
The JCS Conference Room, 1995	176
The Combined Chiefs of Staff in the original JCS Conference Room, 1942	178
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the restored JCS Conference Room at the Department of the Interior, 1992	178
The Flag of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	182
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge	188
Quarters Six, Fort Myer, Virginia	194
The sun room at Quarters Six	196
The dining room at Quarters Six	197
The living room at Quarters Six	197
The view of the Washington Mall from Quarters Six	198

**THE ROLE OF
THE CHAIRMAN**



General Colin L. Powell and four of his predecessors join Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to dedicate the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff Corridor at the Pentagon, 17 July 1991. Cutting the ribbon with General Powell is Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. *Left to right* behind them are Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; General John W. Vessey, Jr.; General David C. Jones; Mrs. Moorer; and Mrs. Powell.

THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dates from 1949; its antecedents trace back to the World War II experience of the Joint Chiefs. From the enactment of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 that created the position and the designation of General Omar N. Bradley as the first Chairman on 16 August of that year through the retirement of General Colin L. Powell on 30 September 1993, twelve officers served in the position. The years during which these men occupied the office saw a gradual but steady growth in the prestige, influence, and authority of the Chairman.

Coalescence of the Joint Chiefs during World War II

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) came into being in February 1942. Their creation was not the result of a specific decision or plan. Rather, they coalesced in response to a need. Initially, no thought was given to the need for any sort of presiding officer or chairman.

Following the Pearl Harbor attack and the entry of the United States into World War II in December 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill met with their military advisers in Washington to plan a coordinated effort against the Axis powers. At that time, the two allied leaders established the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to carry out the strategic direction of the US-British war effort. British representation for the new organization consisted of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,

composed of the heads of the British armed services, who had met as a body for almost twenty years. Since the United States had no comparable group, the US officers whose positions and duties matched those of members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee formed the US portion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the initial military discussions. These US representatives were never formally designated by the President or any other authority. They held their first formal meeting as the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 February 1942. Thereafter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff not only served as the US half of the Combined Chiefs of Staff but also assumed responsibility for the planning and strategic direction of the US war effort. Subsequently, an organization and procedures evolved to support the Joint Chiefs in carrying out their responsibilities.

Initial membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of four officers. General George C. Marshall, as Chief of Staff, represented the Army, while Navy representation was shared between Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet. General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, USA, Chief of the Army Air Forces, served as the fourth member.* He sat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the counterpart to the Chief of the Air Staff in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Since the Royal Air Force had been a separate service since 1923, its chief was a member of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.)¹

Soon the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt the need for an impartial presiding officer, free of service responsibilities, to guide their deliberations. They quickly recognized the necessity

* When sitting as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Arnold spoke only for the air forces of the Army and was always subordinate to General Marshall.

for someone to act as their spokesman with the President as well. All the Chiefs sought almost daily contact with the President; yet both he and the Chiefs found it difficult to arrange busy schedules to accommodate their meetings. By the end of February 1942, General Marshall had suggested to President Roosevelt the appointment of a chairman for the Joint Chiefs, someone to be the chief of staff of the military services. But the President resisted the idea.²

Then, during March, Admiral Stark departed for a new command in London, and the positions of Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, US Fleet, were combined under Admiral King. With the JCS membership reduced to three, General Marshall grew concerned over Admiral King's likely reaction to the Army's having two representatives to the Navy's one. Marshall again raised the possibility of a chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the President appoint a naval officer. Specifically, he proposed Admiral William D. Leahy, a former Chief of Naval Operations and currently the US Ambassador to the French Government at Vichy.³

The President and Leahy enjoyed a long association dating back to the Navy Department in 1913, when Lieutenant Commander Leahy had worked closely with Assistant Secretary Roosevelt.

Admiral Leahy returned to Washington during June, and President Roosevelt called him to the White House. The President asked Leahy to serve as a special military adviser and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In subsequent talks they discussed Leahy's duties and decided upon the title of "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy."

Admiral Leahy reported for duty on 20 July 1942, and the President publicly announced the appointment the following



Admiral William D. Leahy presides over the World War II Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1944. *Left to right:* General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army; Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief; and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations.

day. The Admiral moved into an office at the White House and met with the President every morning. He briefed Roosevelt on the military situation, presented the JCS papers and recommendations that required decision, and received the President's guidance for the Chiefs. Leahy also became the fourth member and presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴

His role was best summed up in his own words: "The most important function of the Chief of Staff was the maintaining of daily liaison between the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was my job to pass on to the

Joint Chiefs the basic thinking of the President on all war plans and strategy. In turn I brought back from the Joint Chiefs a consensus of their thinking."⁵ Like the Joint Chiefs themselves, Admiral Leahy operated throughout the war without any formal directive or terms of reference. Roosevelt avoided issuing formal guidance in order to preserve the flexibility of both Admiral Leahy and the Chiefs to extend their activities as needed.

Admiral Leahy quickly developed a close relationship with President Roosevelt. He traveled with the President and had his own compartment in the President's private

railroad car. Communications facilities were provided to allow Leahy constant contact with his office in Washington. The Admiral became one of Roosevelt's closest advisers and, gradually, his role grew beyond the realm of military affairs. This development led General Marshall to comment later that Leahy became "more the Chief of Staff of the President and less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff as time went on."⁶

Nevertheless, Leahy's relationship with and easy access to Roosevelt greatly eased the burdens of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war. Even so, he did remain the Chief of Staff to the President and his representative to the Joint Chiefs rather than functioning as chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the JCS representative to the President.

Postwar Reorganization and a Temporary Chairman

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued without change after the end of World War II. The question of postwar organization of the armed forces, however, became the subject of intense and sometimes acrimonious debate. The result was the "unification" law. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Military Establishment under a Secretary of Defense, gave legal sanction to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and established the US Air Force as a separate service.⁷

With respect to the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Act set out their responsibilities; authorized a Joint Staff; and spelled out the membership to include the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, "if there be one."⁸ The qualifying language concerning the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief reflected an understanding between congressional leaders and

the White House that Admiral Leahy would continue to hold the office as long as President Harry S Truman desired but no successor to Leahy would be appointed.

The National Security Act entered into force on 26 July 1947, and President Truman named James V. Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense. In attempting to organize and bring the new National Military Establishment under his control, Forrestal soon encountered a number of problems, including relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not reach agreement on a national defense strategy or the associated questions of force levels and service budgets. This experience led Secretary Forrestal in his first annual report to call for the designation of a "responsible head" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one to whom he and the President could look for the best staff assistance on those matters for which the Joint Chiefs were responsible. Forrestal obviously believed that the position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief no longer met his needs or those of the Chiefs, and since Admiral Leahy was in declining health and often absent, Forrestal called for abolition of the position.⁹

Forrestal's proposal required legislative changes in the National Security Act. As a temporary measure pending such a change, he considered asking General Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve for a short period as presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Eisenhower had recently retired as Army Chief of Staff and was serving as president of Columbia University.) Forrestal raised the possibility with President Truman in November 1948.¹⁰

The President agreed and on 11 February 1949 announced that General Eisenhower would serve temporarily as principal military adviser and consultant to him and the Secretary of Defense and act as presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹¹ Eisenhower had,

in fact, begun meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late January. These meetings continued intermittently from February through June. In all, Eisenhower, as temporary chairman, presided over twenty-four meetings and continued all the while as president of Columbia University, traveling to Washington for short visits especially to meet with the Chiefs.¹² In these sessions, he and the Chiefs considered the troublesome matters of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1951 budget and development of strategic plans. But Eisenhower's tour, which was abbreviated by illness, left major problems unresolved.¹³

While Eisenhower served as temporary chairman, examination of a more permanent solution to the problem proceeded. During 1948 the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, headed by former President Herbert Hoover, had considered defense organization. The Hoover Commission formed a separate committee to review national security organization, and it recommended authority for the Secretary of Defense to appoint a chairman from among the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expedite their business.¹⁴

The parent Hoover Commission accepted this finding and in a report to Congress on 15 February 1949 called for a JCS chairman appointed by the President, though not from the members of the Joint Chiefs, to preside over the Chiefs.¹⁵

Establishment of the Position of Chairman

Subsequently, on 5 March 1949 President Truman called on Congress to enact changes to the National Security Act to achieve a more effective defense. He wanted the National Military Establishment converted into an executive department, known as the Department of Defense (DOD), with adequate

authority and military and civilian staff assistance for the Secretary of Defense to fulfill his increased responsibility as head of the new department. In addition, Truman asked Congress to provide for a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take precedence over all other military personnel, be the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and perform such other duties as the President or Secretary might prescribe.¹⁶

Another factor contributed to the growing pressure for a chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Because of illness, Admiral Leahy asked to be relieved of his duties as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, and President Truman accepted his resignation effective 21 March 1949.¹⁷ Thereupon, the position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief lapsed.¹⁸

A few days before Leahy's resignation, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Millard Tydings of Maryland, introduced a bill to implement the President's proposal to revise the National Security Act. Included was provision for a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as requested by Truman.¹⁹

The Senate committee held lengthy hearings on this bill. Forrestal testified on the opening day, just before his resignation as Secretary of Defense. In his opinion, there needed to be a military person to whom the President and the Secretary of Defense could look for "the organization and evaluation of military judgment." The men who currently comprised the Joint Chiefs were each directing a particular service, Forrestal explained, and problems common to all must be organized and directed and the deliberations of the Chiefs focused by "someone who has a full-time preoccupation with that duty."²⁰

The Chiefs appeared as a body before the committee a few days later. They supported creation of the position of chairman but asked

for several changes in the proposed bill. They wanted a specific prohibition against the chairman's exercising command over the members of the Joint Chiefs or the services. They sought "to prevent having a single chief of staff" and to ensure that the services retained command over their own forces. Further, they wished it clearly stated that the chairman would serve as their principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as chairman and not as an individual.²¹

The committee did revise the bill to prohibit the chairman from exercising command over the Joint Chiefs or the services but left the provision naming the chairman the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense unchanged.²² The Senate adopted this version, but the House did not include it.²³ It fell to a conference committee to reconcile the differences over revision of the National Security Act.

The resulting conference bill contained several changes. It provided for a chairman to be the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but stated that he "shall have no vote." Further, it named the Joint Chiefs rather than the chairman as the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. House conferees had insisted on these changes to preclude the chairman becoming a *de facto* chief of staff over the services. Both the House and Senate accepted the conference bill, and President Truman signed the National Security Act Amendments on 10 August 1949.²⁴

As finally approved, the Chairman's duties included serving as presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs; providing the agenda for JCS meetings and assisting the Joint Chiefs "to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable;" and informing the Secretary of Defense, and the President as appropriate, of issues when the Chiefs could not agree. The

National Security Act Amendments fixed the Chairman's term at two years with provision for reappointment for a second two-year term; in time of war, there would be no limit on the number of reappointments.

The New Chairman

On the following day, 11 August, President Truman nominated General Omar Bradley, Chief of Staff of the Army, to be the first Chairman. (The Hoover Commission's proposed ban upon appointing a Service Chief to be Chairman did not become law.) A distinguished combat leader in World War II, Bradley had been a strong advocate of unification both in the 1947 debate over adoption of the National Security Act and in the considerations to amend the act. Senate consent followed quickly, and General Bradley was sworn in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 August 1949.²⁵

Almost immediately, General Bradley faced a major challenge to the role and authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the preceding eighteen months, JCS debate over the allocation of the military budget and the associated issue of strategic concepts had become increasingly difficult. The Air Force was dedicated to strategic (atomic) bombing while the Navy was equally attached to the role of carrier forces. The Air Force planned to build a new, improved strategic bomber, the B-36. The Navy wanted a new "super" carrier, USS *United States*, to handle larger planes that could carry atomic weapons and give the Navy a role in strategic warfare. The issue reached a climax on 23 April 1949, when the new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, canceled construction of the USS *United States* for budgetary reasons. Senior naval officers viewed this act as confirmation of the anti-Navy bias of the administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their anger and dismay



Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson swears in General Omar N. Bradley as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 August 1949.

boiled over in what became known as "the revolt of the admirals."

The resulting uproar led the House Armed Services Committee to investigate. Navy and Marine Corps officers used the investigation as a platform to voice their anger and dissatisfaction. They criticized recent strategic and budget decisions and castigated the strategy of reliance on strategic bombing. They also implied that consideration was being given to elimination of the Marine Corps. They attributed these decisions to misapplication of the JCS system and, by inference, challenged the entire unification effort.²⁶

General Bradley, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified on 20 October. He

made a strong statement in support of unity and cooperation among the services. The armed forces, he said, belonged to the people and the people had decided:

we will have unification...we will have civilian control of the armed forces. In this I heartily agree.

Unwavering acceptance on the part of all leaders will strengthen the will, the spirit, and the morale of all members of the armed forces, and consequently, make stronger our entire national defense.

General Bradley rebutted the Navy charges and went on to pledge his firm belief in a strong Navy and the need for naval air

and Marine forces. "As long as I have been a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as long as my membership continues," he assured the committee, "every decision in which I have participated was and will be made without bias toward any service or any person." He called upon all in the Department of Defense to work together. "Each of the three services," he continued, "has much to offer the other two, and each has much to learn."²⁷

The controversy subsided. President Truman replaced the Chief of Naval Operations, and the House Armed Services Committee indicated its approval of the concept of unification and, by implication, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the issue of service cooperation soon faded.

General Bradley lived up to his pledge to be a fair and impartial Chairman. In fact, he developed a reputation for "meticulous neutrality" in guiding the discussions of the Chiefs. One observer, General Maxwell D. Taylor, who would himself later become Chairman, related how as an Army deputy chief of staff he occasionally sat in JCS meetings when Bradley served as Chairman and could not tell whether Bradley was for or against some issues. "He simply steered the debate and the argumentation," Taylor said.²⁸

The Korean War brought an expansion of General Bradley's role as Chairman. He developed a special relationship with President Truman, becoming not only the Chiefs' representative to the President but also Truman's trusted military adviser. In the turbulent initial days of the conflict, Bradley briefed Truman every morning at the White House on the military situation and presented the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. Later, as the danger of a US expulsion from Korea passed, Bradley met with the President on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.²⁹ The Bradley-Truman relationship began the practice of the President and the Secretary of Defense

looking to the Chairman as the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (When Eisenhower became President in January 1953, Bradley met with him on a weekly basis.)³⁰

During the Korean War, Bradley also began to accompany the Secretary of Defense to National Security Council (NSC) meetings.³¹ He thus established the precedent that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although not a statutory member, attends the NSC meetings.

General Bradley completed his first term as Chairman in August 1951 and was reappointed for a second term. The previous September, Congress had passed special legislation promoting Bradley to five-star rank, emphasizing that the promotion resulted from Bradley's "many distinguished services" to his country and "not because of the position he holds as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."³² On 22 September 1950 Bradley became a General of the Army, the only Chairman to achieve five-star rank.

The President's Advocate

When General Bradley completed his second term as Chairman in August 1953, President Eisenhower chose Admiral Arthur W. Radford to succeed him. Admiral Radford, as Commander in Chief, Pacific, had accompanied Eisenhower on a trip to Japan and Korea in December 1952 and had favorably impressed the President-elect.³³

President Eisenhower and Admiral Radford quickly developed a warm relationship. At an early meeting with Radford, Eisenhower indicated his desire for a weekly meeting with the Chairman. Radford responded with surprise, not realizing the President would want to see him so frequently. "Well, Raddy," Eisenhower replied, "if you don't mind, I'd like to continue the arrangement I've had with Brad, a meeting with you at 9:30



Admiral Arthur W. Radford emerges from the JCS area, 1954.

every Monday morning when we're both in the city." These weekly sessions continued until Eisenhower suffered a heart attack; thereafter, Radford saw the President less frequently. Throughout his tour Radford had an understanding with Eisenhower that he could call him, day or night, if Radford thought it necessary. Admiral Radford also established a close relationship with Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and had a similar understanding about seeing the Secretary whenever he believed it necessary.³⁴

Shortly before Radford became Chairman, the position had acquired some new authority. During the presidential campaign the previous year, Eisenhower had called for a study of defense organization. Once in office, he kept his pledge and appointed a high-level committee for that purpose. Based on the committee's report, on 30 April 1953 the President proposed a reorganization of the Department of Defense. With regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he wanted the Chairman to manage the work of the Joint Staff and its Director. He also recommended that selection of members of the Joint Staff be subject to the approval of the Chairman. He hoped the latter step would ensure the selection of officers who could rise above service partisanship to focus on national planning and strategy. President Eisenhower chose to accomplish these changes by means of a reorganization plan that could be implemented by executive order unless formally opposed by Congress. Accordingly, he submitted his plan on 30 April. Congress had sixty days to reject the plan, and when it did not do so, the plan took effect on 30 June 1953.³⁵

Admiral Radford was a strong Chairman, but he did not continue the Bradley tradition of an impartial presiding officer. Rather, he served as a major advocate of the Eisenhower administration policy of relying primarily upon the threat of massive nuclear

retaliation. Combative and outspoken, he exerted great pressure on the Chiefs to reach consensus. He did not want to send disagreements, or "splits" as they were known, to the Secretary of Defense. Splits, he feared, would eventually leak and cause embarrassment. Admiral Radford's role was characterized by some as "a sort of party whip."³⁶

Admiral Radford did not succeed in eliminating splits, and a fair number did go forward to the Secretary of Defense during his tenure. Major areas of disagreement concerned force structure and strategic planning. Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff had adopted a strategic planning system in 1952 that included short-, mid-, and long-range plans, during the Radford period they could never agree on a mid-range plan. It was in 1958, after the Admiral's retirement, that they sent the first one, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, to the Secretary of Defense.

Admiral Radford's advocacy of the administration's "New Look" policies naturally led Eisenhower and Wilson to look to him for military advice, thereby reinforcing the practice of the Chairman's serving as the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs. Although the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 prohibited the Chairman from voting, this restriction was meaningless, since majority views did not necessarily prevail. Radford began sending his own views in a separate memorandum to the Secretary of Defense along with the formal position of the Joint Chiefs when there was a split.³⁷

On 15 August 1957 President Eisenhower chose General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, to succeed Admiral Radford as the third Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Less partisan than his predecessor, General Twining eased the acrimonious JCS relations that had typified the Radford tenure but gave up none of the prominence that Radford had gained for the position. As Chairman, General Twining



General Nathan F. Twining with his JCS colleagues, 1957. *Left to right:* General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, USA; General Twining; Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; and General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant, USMC.

distanced himself from the Air Force on several crucial issues and impressed the President as being broad-gauged in his views.³⁸

By the late 1950s revolutionary advances in the technology of warfare and accompanying cost increases convinced President Eisenhower of the need for a more efficient

and cost-effective defense organization.³⁹ On 3 April 1958 Eisenhower forwarded reorganization proposals to Congress. "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever," he said, and "strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified." He called for the organization of all combat forces into

unified commands, "singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service," and for clear command channels to these commands. Eisenhower judged the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept "essentially sound" and wanted no change in the composition or functions of the Chiefs. He did ask for removal of the statutory limit on the size of the Joint Staff, which had been set at 210 in the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, and requested added authority for the Chairman to assign duties to the Joint Staff and to select the Director of the Joint Staff with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. He also asked for removal of the prohibition against allowing the Chairman to vote.⁴⁰

In the ensuing congressional hearings, General Twining explained that the changes affecting his position would bring more efficient management. "Did any of you," he asked the members of the House Armed Services Committee, "ever try to manage an activity without having the authority to assign work to it?" Such was his position as Chairman. Technically, under current law, he continued, he would have to call a meeting of the Chiefs every time the Secretary of Defense asked him to have the Joint Staff look into a matter. Moreover, since the Director of the Joint Staff acted as "a sort of chief of staff" to the Chairman, it was essential to have harmonious relations between the Chairman and the Director. This was the rationale for having the Chairman, instead of the Chiefs, select the Director. On the other hand, General Twining considered removal of the prohibition against the Chairman's voting to be meaningless. "Every knowledgeable person is aware," he said, "that we do not vote in Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberation. If we did vote, the majority view could stifle any minority dissenting views. Therefore we do not vote and we do not intend to start voting."

Some in Congress feared that further strengthening of the chairmanship might lead to "a man on horseback" and an all-powerful general staff, based on the Prussian model. General Twining did his best to dispel such fears. "Civilian control is clearly delineated," he said, and, as a corporate body, the Joint Chiefs would retain "their present important powers." Numerous checks and balances would continue in force. "No one who understands what the Prussian experience was," the general assured the congressmen, "could believe that the current proposal could lead to that."⁴¹

Congress approved the President's proposals, and the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 entered into force on 6 August 1958. It authorized the Joint Staff to perform such duties as the Joint Chiefs or the Chairman prescribed, allowed the Chairman "in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff" to select the Director of the Joint Staff, and removed the restriction against the Chairman's voting. But, despite General Twining's assurances regarding a Prussian general staff, Congress included the following caveat: "The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority."⁴²

An Expanding Role during the 1960s

When General Twining retired after three years, President Eisenhower named General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the Army Chief of Staff, to be Chairman. Lemnitzer took up his new duties on 1 October 1960. He had been Chairman for less than four months when John F. Kennedy became President. Preferring a flexible, informal style of leadership, Kennedy entered office suspicious of the formal NSC apparatus of the Eisenhower administration, including the JCS system.



General Lyman L. Lemnitzer with his JCS colleagues, 1961. *Left to right:* Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations; General George H. Decker, Chief of Staff, USA; General Lemnitzer; General Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, USAF; and General David M. Shoup, Commandant, USMC.

The Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco and what Kennedy saw as the failure of the Joint Chiefs to speak out strongly in interdepartmental deliberations about the risks of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation led the new President temporarily to lose confidence in the Chiefs.

To set out exactly what he expected of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 55 to General Lemnitzer on 28 June 1961. He regarded the JCS as his "principal military advisor," responsible for both initiating advice to him and responding to requests for advice. He wanted their view

"direct and unfiltered." While he looked to the Chiefs to present the military factors "without reserve or hesitation," he also expected them to be "more than military men" and to help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation.⁴³

In further reaction to the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy recalled a former Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, to active duty at the White House as his military representative. The President asked Taylor to advise and assist him on military matters but stated that Taylor was not being interposed between the President and the Joint Chiefs. Even so, the new arrangement proved

awkward for both Taylor and the Chiefs. Fortunately, Taylor and Lemnitzer worked out arrangements to avoid competition and friction between the Military Representative and the Chiefs.⁴⁴

The issuance of NSAM 55 and the arrival of General Taylor at the White House helped to overcome President Kennedy's lack of confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they soon developed a better relationship with the President. As the Chiefs gained experience working with the new administration, General Lemnitzer recognized the need for timely JCS responses to requests for military advice and for improved staff capabilities to meet the requirements of the President and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. To these ends, Lemnitzer established the Chairman's Special Studies Group to prepare broad studies and comparative analyses and designated an assistant to advise the Chiefs on counterinsurgency and special operations, an area of particular concern to President Kennedy.⁴⁵


In the fall of 1962 President Kennedy named General Lemnitzer to be the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In a farewell speech before leaving for Europe, General Lemnitzer reviewed his role as Chairman. The interrelationship of the personalities of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, he observed, played an important role in the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He hastened to add that he had enjoyed "a very close personal and working relationship" with the Secretary as well as with the President. He reported that his views and those of the Chiefs had received a careful hearing by both the Secretary and the President, even if they had not always been adopted. It was only reasonable, he continued, that their advice was not heeded in every instance, for few decisions in Washington were purely military. Political, international, economic, and psychological factors must be weighed as

well. General Lemnitzer concluded with a plea not to change the JCS system. The fact that the Chiefs did not always agree, he said, was not a weakness to be avoided but a strength that provided reasoned alternatives on complex military issues for decision by the civilian authorities.⁴⁶

President Kennedy asked General Taylor to be the new Chairman. Kennedy and Taylor had formed a warm friendship while Taylor served at the White House, and the friendship continued after Taylor became Chairman on 1 October 1962. The President relied on General Taylor for military advice, and Taylor became the representative of the Chiefs in dealing with the President. Before departing the White House for the Pentagon, General Taylor discussed his role as Chairman with the President and expressed the wish to retain as much of their closeness as possible. Kennedy agreed and invited Taylor to telephone him directly whenever necessary, a privilege Taylor never used.⁴⁷

The close relationship of President Kennedy and Chairman Taylor was quickly evident. During the Cuban missile crisis of late October and November 1962, General Taylor participated in the NSC Executive Committee (EXCOMM), the select group of advisers Kennedy relied upon throughout the crisis. The EXCOMM met daily with the President at the White House. There General Taylor sat next to the Secretary of Defense and joined freely in the long debates over appropriate US actions. Although the President did not accept Taylor's recommendation for air strikes, he did later describe Taylor and Taylor's role as "absolutely first class."⁴⁸

General Taylor prepared carefully for the EXCOMM meetings. He discussed issues with the Chiefs so that he could present the JCS views at the White House. When the President made decisions affecting the military at these meetings, General Taylor immediately



General Maxwell D. Taylor, with his four predecessors, when he was sworn in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 1962. *Left to right: General Bradley, Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Lemnitzer, and General Taylor.*

called the Pentagon to have the Director of the Joint Staff inform the Chiefs. After each meeting, General Taylor met with the Chiefs to brief them and set in motion necessary actions to implement the President's decisions. The President relied upon Taylor to see that his policies were executed.⁴⁹

When Taylor retired as Army Chief of Staff in 1959, he had criticized the JCS system and called for its replacement with a single

chief of staff and advisory committee for policy matters.⁵⁰ During the Senate confirmation hearing on his nomination as Chairman, he was questioned about reorganization of the Joint Chiefs. Taylor was quick to assure the Senators of a change of mind during the intervening three years. He returned not as a crusader for change, he said, but, rather, he wanted to see how the present system worked with a new team in a new atmosphere.⁵¹

Taylor had also criticized both Admiral Radford and General Twining as Chairmen. He had objected to their role as advocates for the defense and foreign policies of the administration. Here, too, he had changed his mind. "With the opportunity to observe the problems of the President at closer range," he said,

I have come to understand the importance of an intimate, easy relationship, born of friendship and mutual regard, between the President and the Chiefs. It is particularly important in the case of the Chairman, who works more closely with the President and the Secretary of Defense than do the Service Chiefs. The Chairman should be a true believer in the foreign policy and military strategy of the administration which he serves or, at least, feel that he and his colleagues are assured an attentive hearing on those matters for which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility.⁵²

In one criticism, however, General Taylor did not change his mind. As Army Chief of Staff, he had resented efforts by the Chairman to impose consensus on the Chiefs or to obtain it by compromise. Upon becoming Chairman, Taylor told Secretary McNamara that he would respect the individual views of the Chiefs; he felt any dissent should be reported to the Secretary and even the President without trying to circumvent the issue by "non-committal or ambiguous statements." Taylor kept this pledge, and the number of splits reaching the Secretary of Defense increased substantially while Taylor was Chairman.⁵³

Lyndon B. Johnson, who succeeded to the presidency in November 1963, following the assassination of John Kennedy, shared his predecessor's preference for informal advisory groups rather than a formalized NSC system. It was only natural, therefore, that he turned to General Taylor, instead of the Joint Chiefs as a body, for military advice. Taylor and the Chiefs

did seek and obtain an early meeting with Johnson. On that occasion, General Taylor called the President's attention to NSAM 55 and stressed the importance he and the Chiefs attached to that guidance. The new President retained the directive without change.⁵⁴

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, became Chairman in July 1964. Although he and Johnson had had little contact prior to this appointment, the President soon was addressing Wheeler by his nickname (except that he called Wheeler "Buz" instead of "Bus"). As US involvement in Vietnam grew, General Wheeler went more and more frequently to the White House. He was included in the small group that advised the President on key decisions in the war. General Wheeler later explained Johnson's reliance on him as a matter of convenience. It was simply easier for him to represent the Chiefs than to assemble five busy men on short notice. The Chiefs were not unhappy with the procedure, Wheeler told an interviewer near the end of his term, and were satisfied to rely on him as their representative to the President. Wheeler consulted the Chiefs before meetings with the President, and afterwards reported to them "practically verbatim" what had occurred.⁵⁵

President Johnson's use of small, informal groups of advisers evolved into the "Tuesday Lunch," a group initially consisting of his national security assistant and the Secretaries of State and Defense, who met to discuss important policy issues over lunch. In time, General Wheeler became a regular attendee at the Tuesday luncheons. Discussions were not limited to military issues and ranged across the full spectrum of presidential interests. General Wheeler, of course, was looked to on military questions. But, he said, "Mr. Johnson didn't confine me to commenting on military affairs at all."⁵⁶

During the summer of 1967, General Wheeler suffered a slight heart attack. He



General Maxwell D. Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the National Military Command Center, 1963.

offered his resignation so that the President could name a new Chairman, but Johnson would not hear of it. "Now Buz," he said, "I don't want anyone else as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . . You have never given me a bad piece of advice." At Johnson's request, special legislation in mid-1968 extended Wheeler for another year beyond the statutory four-year limit of his term.⁵⁷ It must be said, though, that Wheeler was out of sympathy with a range of administration policies, particularly the level and scope of the US effort in Vietnam.

Although General Wheeler carried on in the Taylor tradition as spokesman and representative of the Joint Chiefs, he differed with the Taylor approach on splits. By 1965, after there had been a major turnover in the membership of the Joint Chiefs from the Kennedy era, Wheeler and the Chiefs decided that their advice might be more influential with the Secretary of Defense and the President if it was an agreed position. Accordingly, they began a conscious effort to resolve their disagreements rather than sending them to the Secretary of Defense for decision, and the number of



General Earle G. Wheeler at a press conference in Saigon, 1969.

JCS splits dropped sharply.⁵⁸ Unanimity did not, however, bring a noticeable increase in JCS influence.

When Richard M. Nixon became President in January 1969, General Wheeler continued in his role as principal military adviser. President Nixon reinstated a structured NSC apparatus, relying on the NSC for advice on major decisions and establishing a number of subsidiary bodies. General Wheeler represented the Joint Chiefs at NSC meetings, and he or his representative

participated in all the other NSC groups.⁵⁹ He was also included in the small informal meetings at the White House when President Nixon considered Vietnam issues. Nixon requested Congress to extend Wheeler as Chairman for yet another year.⁶⁰

General Wheeler retired on 2 July 1970 after an unprecedented six years as Chairman. The last two years of that tour were increasingly frustrating for him. Public opposition to the war in Vietnam mounted, and presidential decisions to halt the bombing of



Admiral Thomas H. Moorer with President Richard M. Nixon aboard the USS *Saratoga*, 1969.

North Vietnam and to withdraw US combat forces contradicted Wheeler's advice. Shortly after retiring, Wheeler lamented to his old friend and JCS colleague, former Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson: "Frankly, Johnny, I feel that I have been a colossal failure."⁶¹ Nonetheless, Earle Wheeler, together with Maxwell Taylor, firmly established the prominent role of the Chairman and the practice of the Chairman serving as spokesman and representative of the Chiefs with the Secretary of Defense and the President and

within the NSC system. Every Chairman since has maintained that role.

Problems and Frustrations during the 1970s

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer succeeded General Wheeler. The new Chairman had spent most of the 1960s commanding first the Pacific and then the Atlantic Fleet and was more the straightforward commander and less the consensus-seeker than his predecessor.

Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Adviser, called Moorer "a canny bureaucratic infighter" and said that "what his views lacked in elegance they made up in explicitness."⁶²

During his nomination hearing Admiral Moorer expounded on the JCS system and the role of the Chairman. He noted the gradual evolution in the authority and influence of the Chairman since the position had been created in 1949 and commented on the wisdom of this trend. Yet, he believed there should be limits to the evolution. The JCS system, he said, was designed to permit "the expression of individual views of each Chief on matters of national importance." The Chairman, he continued, should not be reticent in expressing his views on issues before the Chiefs, but he must also prepare the agenda and manage the Joint Staff in a way that encouraged full consideration of opposing views. The "melding of different service views into strategic guidance and policy," he concluded, "are [*sic*] not evils to be abolished but... healthy values to be preserved."⁶³

As the spokesman and representative of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Moorer attended NSC meetings and sat on both the Senior Review Group (SRG), the mini-National Security Council of the Nixon administration, and the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), the administration's crisis management body. He held the same views as President Nixon and Henry Kissinger on many issues. In periods of crisis, such as the Lam Son 719 operation into Laos in March 1971 and the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, they were in direct telephone contact with him several times a day to get the latest operational information and to relay directions. In response, Admiral Moorer took action in the name of the Chiefs and informed them afterwards. It was, he said, "the only practical way" when you were dealing "in real time."⁶⁴

When Admiral Moorer retired on 1 July 1974, after a four-year term, General George S. Brown, USAF, became Chairman. His nearly four years as Chairman in the mid-1970s proved a particularly difficult period for the United States and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Five weeks after General Brown assumed his new position, Richard Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford became President. With no transition and little preparation, General Brown and the Chiefs had to learn quickly to deal with a new President.

Eight months later, at the end of April 1975, South Vietnam surrendered to North Vietnam. This event marked the failure of a twenty-five-year US effort to maintain a free and independent South Vietnam. Public and congressional frustration with the outcome of the Vietnam War and the military was reflected in tighter defense budgets throughout the Brown period.

In addition, General Brown had a penchant for public remarks that embarrassed both him and the administration. In a speech in October 1974, he referred to the undue influence of Jews and the Israeli lobby in the United States. Although he subsequently apologized for the remarks, a public outcry ensued, and President Ford publicly admonished the Chairman.⁶⁵ Two years later during a press interview, General Brown made comments that seemed disparaging of Britain, Israel, and Iran. He later expanded and explained his remarks to claim that he intended no criticism,⁶⁶ but his reputation as a Chairman who spoke first and considered the consequences later was not as easily corrected.

Jimmy Carter succeeded Gerald Ford as President in January 1977; he was the third President General Brown served as Chairman in less than three years. Moreover, Brown served three Secretaries of Defense in the same period—James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, and Harold Brown. These frequent




General George S. Brown with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 1976.

changes in leaders and sometimes in policies further complicated General Brown's task. He did, however, maintain the authority and influence of the Chairman. He served as spokesman and representative of the Joint Chiefs, and he attended NSC meetings and participated in the principal NSC groups in both the Ford and Carter administrations. General Brown became ill early in 1978 and was absent much of the time during his last months as Chairman. He retired on 20 June

1978, ten days short of completing four full years as Chairman.

General David C. Jones, USAF, became the next Chairman. He was just finishing four years as Air Force Chief of Staff and brought considerable experience as a JCS member to his new job. At his nomination hearing, General Jones said he believed that the Chairman had a responsibility to take the lead within the Chiefs to assure adequate attention to all national security issues.⁶⁷ But, over the



next four years, he would come to a much more expansive view of what the Chairman's role should be.

During his first term, General Jones supported ratification of the SALT II agreement. He also oversaw planning for the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt. As a consequence, when President Carter nominated him for a second term as Chairman in May 1980, the renomination sparked criticism in Congress. With a presidential election campaign approaching and defense policy a major issue, some senators thought Jones was too closely identified with the Carter administration and its defense policies.

Press stories soon circulated that, to avoid a fight over confirmation for a second term, General Jones had privately agreed to resign if Carter was not reelected. Jones flatly denied any such deal. In a statement on 4 June 1980, he said that by law the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff served at the pleasure of the President and any arrangement with members of Congress to resign in the future would be inconsistent with the statute. He went on to add:

The integrity of the Chairman's office is an overriding consideration and I consider it totally inappropriate for senior military officers to adopt the tradition of political appointees of offering resignations whenever an Administration changes.⁶⁸

In his reconfirmation hearing General Jones defended his support of the Carter administration. Citing the cherished American principle of civilian control of the military, he believed it absolutely essential that discipline among senior military officers, especially in

Washington, be as firm as that among commanders in the field. When a commander issued an order, he must have confidence the order would be carried out; the Commander in Chief must have that same confidence. General Jones considered that he had a critical responsibility to make the strongest possible case for his views on national defense to the Secretary of Defense and the President in deliberative sessions. Once he had made that case and once a decision was rendered, he continued, "I have a clear obligation, by law and by personal conviction, to carry out that order even if I would have decided otherwise." The Senate confirmed Jones for a second term, which began on 21 June 1980.⁶⁹ General Jones continued as Chairman when Ronald Reagan became President in January 1981.

Proposals for Change in the 1980s

By 1981 over six years of experience as a JCS member had convinced General Jones of the need for fundamental change in the JCS system. He reviewed all earlier proposals for JCS reform and in February 1982, four months before his term ended, set out his proposals. He found persistent shortcomings in the system—diffused authority and responsibility, military advice that was neither timely nor useful, service domination of the joint system, and Service Chiefs who faced a built-in conflict of interest in their dual role as JCS member and service leader. As a remedy, General Jones proposed increased authority for the Chairman. Specifically, he would make the Chairman, rather than the corporate Chiefs, the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; give the Chairman oversight of the unified and specified commands; provide the Chairman a four-star deputy; and have the Joint Staff work for the


General George S. Brown with General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, USAF, 1974.



General David C. Jones presides over a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the unified and specified commanders, 22 January 1982. *Left to right:* General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA, US Forces Korea; General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, USA; General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, US European Command; Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations; General Donn A. Starry, USA, US Readiness Command; Admiral Robert L. J. Long, USN, Pacific Command; General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant, USMC; General James V. Hartinger, USAF, Aerospace Defense Command; General Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff, USAF; Admiral Harry D. Train II, USN, Atlantic Command; General Jones; General James R. Allen, USAF, Military Airlift Command; General Bennie L. Davis, USAF, Strategic Air Command; and Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, USA, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

Chairman rather than the JCS. Further, General Jones wanted to limit service staff involvement in the joint process by requiring the Joint Staff to support JCS members on joint matters. Finally, he hoped to broaden the training, experience, and rewards for joint duty in an effort to bring better people into joint assignments and thus improve the quality of joint planning and advice.⁷⁰

The House Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings on reorganization proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the House of Representatives passed a bill that incorporated the principal elements of General Jones's plan.⁷¹ But the Senate and the Reagan administration opposed any change and no further action resulted.



John Ficara—Newsweek

General David C. Jones and General John W. Vessey, Jr., in the Chairman's office, May 1982.

With General Jones's retirement in June 1982, President Reagan named General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, as Chairman. After reviewing various recommendations for reform, Vessey and the Service Chiefs found themselves in agreement with most of them but concluded that many of the changes could be made without legislation. As a result of their actions, the quality of the Joint Staff improved as did its capacity for analyzing budgetary and programmatic issues. The Chiefs also proposed putting the Chairman directly in the chain of command, but Congress rejected this proposal. They also pointed out to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger that there were more military officers assigned to the "civilian" Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff than to the Joint

Staff. However, not much progress was made in resolving this imbalance.

General Vessey and the Service Chiefs moved on other fronts to strengthen the joint system. A Joint Requirements Management Board was established. With the approval of Secretary Weinberger, Vessey acted as spokesman for the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified and specified commands for operations and requirements. Shortly after taking office, General Vessey ordered a review of the major CINC contingency plans aimed at refining JCS oversight of these fundamental products of the joint system. Vessey met with the CINCs in Washington on a regular basis and ensured that they became regularly involved in the Defense Resource Board's programming and budgeting activities.



General John W. Vessey, Jr., with President Ronald Reagan in Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's office, 1984. *Left to right:* Major General Colin L. Powell, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; Secretary Weinberger; General Vessey; William H. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense; President Reagan.

To improve JCS continuity, General Vessey gained agreement to end a procedure that frequently had resulted in several Service Chiefs serving as acting Chairman in the space of a week. At Vessey's suggestion, the Chiefs agreed that each Service Chief would be designated to serve as acting Chairman for a three-month period on a rotational basis. General Vessey in turn, kept the Chief designated to act for him abreast of his activities. The JCS believed that this new procedure

made General Jones's proposal for a Vice Chairman unnecessary.

General Vessey quickly formed a close relationship with Secretary Weinberger and persuaded President Reagan to meet with the Joint Chiefs on a quarterly basis. While he was extremely sensitive to his responsibilities for maintaining civilian control of the military, Secretary Weinberger realized the need for decentralized execution of the President's policies and decisions. Accordingly, Weinberger

gave Vessey authority to direct operations on his behalf. Vessey, in turn, exercised this authority within the context of the joint system.⁷²

Together, these changes led to a more united and forceful Joint Chiefs of Staff and further enhanced the position of the Chairman as their representative. Still, situations arose that demonstrated weaknesses in the joint system. The US military intervention in Grenada in late October 1983 succeeded but raised troubling questions about interoperability and cooperation among the services. At nearly the same time as the Grenada action, the deaths of 241 US Marines in a terrorist bombing of a Marine barracks in Lebanon brought criticism of a cumbersome military chain of command.

The events in Grenada and Lebanon fueled continuing public criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During 1983 the House of Representatives passed a bill to reorganize the JCS and strengthen the position of the Chairman,⁷³ and in the fall of 1984 the Senate adopted similar legislation.⁷⁴ The new law made the Chairman the spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements, allowed him to determine when issues under JCS consideration would be decided, and authorized him (rather than the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff) to select officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The law also increased the tour length for Joint Staff assignments and required appropriate consideration of Joint Staff assignment performance in the promotion and assignment policies of the services.⁷⁵

The 1984 law did little more than recognize existing practices and did not satisfy JCS critics. Several influential journals and "think tanks" joined the call for JCS reform.⁷⁶ During the spring of 1985, the House Armed Services Committee began consideration of a much stronger bill that would make the Chairman, instead of the corporate Chiefs, the principal military adviser to the President,

the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council; place the Chairman in the chain of command; designate the Chairman to supervise the CINCs; have the Joint Staff work for the Chairman alone; and provide for a deputy chairman.⁷⁷

In an effort to forestall the growing criticism, in June 1985 President Reagan appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission on defense management to examine progress already made in improving the management, organization, and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense and propose further changes if needed. The objectives the President listed for the commission included review of JCS responsibilities. He named David Packard, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, to head the commission.⁷⁸

With the reorganization issue still unresolved, General Vessey retired from active service on 30 September 1985, and Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, succeeded him. Commanding the US Pacific Command when selected to be Chairman, Admiral Crowe had not served as a Service Chief. Consequently, he brought to the chairmanship the perspective of a CINC, rather than a JCS member.

Just two weeks after Admiral Crowe became Chairman, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a lengthy report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*. Several years in preparation, the report was extremely critical of the JCS. Among some ninety-one specific recommendations was a call for abolition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its replacement with a joint military advisory council composed of a chairman and a four-star officer from each service. These officers would be on final tours before retirement; they would have no service responsibilities and would be free to devote their entire attention to the task of advising the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Such a council, the

authors of the report hoped, would give the President better military advice—advice free of service parochialism.⁷⁹

Subsequently, in November 1985, the House of Representatives passed the JCS reorganization bill that its Armed Services Committee had considered the previous spring.⁸⁰ Then, the Senate Armed Services Committee began hearings on the basis of its recently released report. Admiral Crowe, the new Chairman, appeared before the committee on 12 December. Acknowledging his limited experience as a JCS member, he nonetheless set out his view of the JCS system as the best mechanism the nation had for coordinating preparations for war and for formulating advice for the Secretary of Defense and the President. Even though he opposed replacing the Chiefs with a new body of military advisers, he differed with the position of his predecessor on JCS reform. Admiral Crowe favored designating the Chairman, instead of the corporate Chiefs, as the principal military adviser so that there would be no question about his right to express his own views on military issues. He also supported giving the Chairman sole control of the Joint Staff and inserting him in the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. Based on his recent experience as a CINC, Crowe also wanted the authority of the CINCs strengthened. In subsequent testimony, Admiral Crowe supported the creation of a deputy chairman.⁸¹

Pressure for JCS reform mounted. In February 1986 the Packard Commission called for revision of the law to accomplish various changes in military organization, including all of Admiral Crowe's recommendations.⁸² Taking care to preserve his good relations with the Chiefs, Crowe worked behind the scenes to encourage support for the reforms that would increase the Chairman's authority, and he changed some JCS procedures in advance of

the anticipated legislation.⁸³ In April, President Reagan endorsed the Packard Commission's findings and ordered implementation of all the recommendations that did not require legislation.⁸⁴ The conclusion came in September when both the House and Senate passed reform legislation.⁸⁵ President Reagan signed the legislation on 1 October 1986.⁸⁶

A New Law and Enhanced Authority

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act** of 1 October 1986 climaxed a four-and-one-half-year process that had begun with the proposals of General Jones in February 1982. The result was the first major reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in almost thirty years and the most significant change to the joint system since the National Security Act of 1947. The new act greatly enhanced the authority of the Chairman, established the position of Vice Chairman, bestowed wide new powers on the CINCs, and provided for actions and procedures to increase the prestige of and rewards for joint duty in an attempt to improve the functioning of the joint system and the quality of joint military advice.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act designated the Chairman, in place of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out this responsibility, the Chairman would consult with the Chiefs and the CINCs and would present a range of military advice and opinions as he considered appropriate. The other

** The act was named for Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Nichols, the chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

JCS members continued as military advisers, submitting their advice when they disagreed with the Chairman or when it was requested by the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense.

The 1986 act also changed the provisions for the Chairman's term of office. Now he would serve a term of two years beginning on 1 October of odd-numbered years and might be reappointed for two additional terms, for a total of six years, except in time of war when there would be no limit on reappointment. The act prescribed that candidates to be Chairman must have served as Vice Chairman, Service Chief, or CINC although the President could waive this requirement. The act retained the language of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, which specified that the Chairman would outrank all other officers of the armed forces but would not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs or any of the armed forces. Further, the act authorized the Chairman to convene meetings of the Joint Chiefs and, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, to preside over the Joint Chiefs, provide the agenda for these meetings, assist the Chiefs in carrying out their business as promptly as practicable, and determine when issues under consideration should be decided. The act also placed the Joint Staff under the direction and control of the Chairman instead of the corporate Chiefs.

The new act assigned the functions previously the responsibility of the corporate Joint Chiefs to the Chairman and gave him additional duties. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman was now charged in broad terms with assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense in the strategic direction of the armed forces; strategic and contingency planning; advice to the Secretary of Defense on military require-

ments, programs, and budgets; and development of the joint doctrine, training, and education of the armed forces. His responsibilities also included providing US representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations and other duties as prescribed by law or directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. In his role as military adviser to the National Security Council, the Chairman was authorized, subject to the direction of the President, to attend NSC meetings. Finally, the 1986 act defined the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs. The President might, however, direct that communications between himself or the Secretary of Defense and the CINCS be transmitted through the Chairman and might designate the Chairman to assist him and the Secretary "in performing their command function." While all combatant forces were assigned to the various CINCs, the services retained responsibility for training, organizing, and equipping them.

Admiral Crowe set about implementing those portions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act affecting the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not an easy task. With a Secretary of Defense and three Service Chiefs who were opposed to aspects of the new law, he had to tread carefully. In initial guidance for the Joint Staff, Crowe stated his intention to use the full extent of his new authority. Yet he did not want to offend the Service Chiefs unnecessarily. He continued a collegial approach in seeking consensus and relied on the Service Chiefs for their unique perspectives and experiences. But he did not hesitate to put items on the JCS agenda and bring them to decision or to forward his own advice when the Chiefs could not agree. He could now go to the Secretary of Defense and the President with full authority, attaching dissenting positions of the Chiefs as appropriate.⁸⁷



Ronald Reagan Library

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., briefs President Ronald Reagan at the White House, October 1987. *Left to right:* Admiral Crowe; Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense; President Reagan.

Admiral Crowe moved to assume control of the Joint Staff. He alone was now responsible for its direction and no one could task it without his approval. He expanded the Joint Staff to include new directorates to assist him in the areas of interoperability, joint doctrine, and resource and budget matters. As a former unified commander, Admiral Crowe welcomed the added authority given the

CINCs—both the increased authority over their components and their enhanced role in budget and resource areas. He consulted closely and often with the CINCs and brought them to Washington regularly to participate in budget deliberations. He also took advantage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to enhance the quality of the Joint Staff, which had suffered in the competition with the service staffs



Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987. *Left to right:* General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commandant, USMC; Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, Chief of Naval Operations; General Larry D. Welch, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff, USA; Admiral Crowe; and General Robert T. Herres, USAF, Vice Chairman.

for the most talented officers. In 1987, during Operation EARNEST WILL, the first US operation after the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, he used the Chairman's enhanced authority to create a joint task force to conduct the operation.

Admiral Crowe's successor, General Colin L. Powell, USA, was the first Chairman to serve his entire tenure under Goldwater-Nichols. While Crowe had deliberately moved gradually in making the transition from being first among equals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell came to the position determined to make full use of the Chairman's expanded

authority. Having served as Secretary Weinberger's Military Assistant and President Reagan's National Security Adviser, he brought to the chairmanship a broad national security perspective. Moreover, he already had a close working relationship with President George Bush, with whom he had worked at the White House when Powell was National Security Adviser and Bush was Vice President. His relationship with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney also dated to this period, when Cheney had been House minority whip. The increased authority which Goldwater-Nichols gave the Chairman, General Powell's previous




General Colin L. Powell with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991. *Left to right:* General Carl E. Mundy, Commandant, USMC; General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, USA; General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff, USAF; Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations; General Powell; Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman.

experience, and his relationship with the President and the Secretary gave him more latitude than most of his predecessors. The successful operation in Panama in 1989 and the victory over Iraq in 1991 further enhanced the Chairman's stature.

In dealing with both the Joint Staff and the JCS, General Powell cut through bureaucratic layers that he thought delayed and diluted advice. He abolished the Chairman's

Staff Group, which his predecessors had used to review Joint Staff papers before they reached the Chairman, and instead worked directly with the Joint Staff directorates. Formal meetings in "The Tank" became infrequent and consisted mainly of informational briefings. General Powell preferred to meet more informally with the Chiefs in his office, where they were less constrained by prepared service staff positions. During Operation



President William J. Clinton and General Colin L. Powell review the honor guard at General Powell's retirement ceremony, Fort Myer, Virginia, 30 September 1993.

DESERT STORM, for example, he met almost daily with the Chiefs in his office rather than in "The Tank."

In 1989 and 1990 when the Chiefs did not support his efforts to change strategy and force structure as the Cold War ended, General Powell convinced the Secretary and the President to endorse his position. Secretary Cheney then directed the Service Chiefs to implement the changes. General Powell also

led the efforts to expand the responsibilities of the Atlantic Command. Despite service opposition to some of his ideas, he fashioned it into a joint command designed to enhance the services' ability to fight as a team.⁸⁸

As a result of General Powell's active exercise of the authority which the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the Chairman, the role of the Chairman expanded and the Chairman's influence increased considerably during his



Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger swears in General Robert T. Herres as the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 February 1987.

tenure. When he retired on 30 September 1993, the position of the Chairman was the strongest in its forty-four-year history.

Contributing to the increased power of the chairmanship was the new position of Vice Chairman. Goldwater-Nichols designated the Vice Chairman as the second-ranking officer in the US Armed Forces. In place of the previous practice of rotating the chairmanship among the Service Chiefs in the

absence of the Chairman, the law specified that the Vice Chairman would serve as Acting Chairman. While Goldwater-Nichols authorized the Vice Chairman to participate in all JCS meetings, it prohibited his voting unless he was acting as Chairman. This restriction was mainly symbolic, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff rarely formally voted. Nevertheless, it meant that the Vice Chairman was not a full member of the JCS.



A meeting in "The Tank" with President George Bush during Operation DESERT STORM, January 1991. *Left to right:* Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense; President Bush; General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Robert T. Herres, USAF, became the first Vice Chairman on 6 February 1987. He and Admiral Crowe worked out a list of the Vice Chairman's specific duties, which Secretary Weinberger approved. During Herres's tenure, the Vice Chairman's principal responsibilities lay in the area of requirements. He also served as the Chairman's representative on the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council. General Herres defined his role as not only substituting for

the Chairman but also extending the Chairman's influence.⁸⁹ Initially, he had to contend with the concern of some Service Chiefs that he was usurping some of their functions, but well before his retirement on 28 February 1990 the position of Vice Chairman had become an established institution.

The scope of the Vice Chairman's activities and the extent of his influence expanded during the tenure of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN, who became Vice Chairman


on 1 March 1990. Like General Herres, Admiral Jeremiah had principal responsibility for requirements and represented the Chairman in the interagency policy-making process. But rather than retaining the formal delineation of duties which had guided General Herres, General Powell and Admiral Jeremiah agreed that Jeremiah would support Powell across the whole range of the Chairman's responsibilities.⁹⁰

At Powell's urging and with the Service Chiefs' support, the Bush administration in 1991 sought legislation to make the Vice Chairman a full member of the JCS. The Senate passed such a bill unanimously, but the House approved a version that would have prohibited the Vice Chairman from informing Congress and the President when he differed with the Chairman. With the House and Senate deadlocked, General Powell worked to break the impasse. To a leading opponent of the Senate bill he wrote, "The most junior officer in the Armed Forces of the United States is entitled to express disagreement through channels to the next higher authority. How can we, in good conscience, deny that privilege to the second highest military officer in the Armed Forces as

a consequence of being elevated to membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff?"⁹¹ General Powell's argument was persuasive. Public Law 102-484, signed by President Bush on 23 October 1992, made the Vice Chairman a full JCS member without restrictions.

Originally, the Chairman served as presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He conveyed the advice of the Chiefs to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense and coordinated the activities of the JCS. Over the years, strategic requirements, the actions of individual Chairmen, and legislation brought a slow, steady increase in the prominence and responsibility of the position. The Chairman became the representative and spokesman of the Chiefs; Presidents and Secretaries of Defense turned to him for military advice. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 officially recognized this change. From being first among equals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman had become the principal military adviser to the President and other civilian leaders charged with the security of the United States.

THE CHAIRMEN



OMAR NELSON BRADLEY

16 August 1949 — 15 August 1953

Omar Bradley was born in the farming village of Clark, Missouri, on 12 February 1893. His parents were poor, his boyhood austere. The US Military Academy appealed to Bradley as a means to an education without financial burden for his family. He received an appointment and graduated in 1915, ranking forty-fourth out of 164. His classmates included Dwight D. Eisenhower, James A. Van Fleet, and fifty-six other future generals from "the class the stars fell on."

During World War I Bradley served with an infantry regiment which, to his chagrin, never left the United States. Most of his interwar assignments were spent as either student or teacher at military schools. In 1941, while Commandant of the Infantry School, Bradley became the first man in his class to reach the rank of brigadier general. During 1942 to 1943, he successively commanded the 82d and 28th Infantry Divisions.

In March 1943, at General Eisenhower's request, Major General Bradley arrived in North Africa. There he joined II Corps as Deputy Commander under Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. Bradley took command of II Corps for the final advance to Tunis and during the thirty-eight day Sicilian campaign served as a corps commander in Patton's Seventh Army. Based upon Bradley's exceptional qualities as a combat leader and his gift for getting along with the allies, Eisenhower chose him to be Army Group Commander for Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of France. During June and July 1944 Lieutenant General Bradley led the US First Army as it fought through the hedgerows of Normandy. On 1 August, just after the breakout

Omar N. Bradley
General of the Army



Lieutenant General Bradley, *center*, with General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Major General J. Lawton Collins in France, July 1944.

at St. Lo, he took command of the 12th Army Group. When the European war came to an end in May 1945, Bradley (now a full general) commanded forty-three divisions and 1.3 million men, the largest body of American soldiers ever to serve under a US field commander. His modest demeanor and solicitude for his troops earned him the nickname "the GI's General."

With the coming of peace, President Harry S Truman named General Bradley to be

Administrator of the Bureau of Veterans' Affairs; he began work in August 1945. Bradley returned to the Army on 7 February 1948, when he succeeded General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff. Three months later, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal asked Bradley to become his "principal military adviser." Bradley was disinclined to leave his Army post after so short a time, and the Secretary of the Army felt that he could not spare Bradley. But when Eisenhower, whom Forrestal had



Lieutenant General Bradley pauses to autograph a GI's helmet in Germany, 1945.


appointed instead, later declined the newly created position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley accepted.

He became the first Chairman on 16 August 1949. During his tenure, the United States began to create a collective security strategy with its allies. After the outbreak of the Korean War, it began to rebuild its military forces, which had been rapidly reduced at the end of World War II. Bradley played a central role in these efforts.

Upon becoming Chairman, Bradley had to deal immediately with the so-called "revolt of the admirals." Navy officers, fearing their service would have no role in a major war and resenting the cancellation of plans for a "super" carrier, assailed the concept of strategic bombing with nuclear weapons. The Air Force's B-36 bomber became their particular

target. General Bradley, who as Chief of Staff had been willing to reduce Army divisions in order to strengthen strategic air power, had no patience with what he saw as Navy parochialism. During congressional hearings, he delivered a much publicized call for service cooperation: "This is no time for 'fancy Dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team—whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt in the line—must be all-American." Under new leadership, the Navy began taking a more conciliatory approach.

The Korean War dominated Bradley's tenure as Chairman. He wholeheartedly supported President Truman's decision to resist the North Korean attack and quickly became a key adviser to Truman. During the war's



President Harry S Truman promotes General Bradley to five-star rank, 22 September 1950.

first weeks, Bradley went daily to the White House to brief the President and present the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs.

Despite the Korean War, Bradley saw the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to US security and Western Europe as the free world's greatest asset. Consequently, he opposed

expansion of the Korean conflict to include China. Such a war, he said, would be "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." He opposed proposals by the US commander in the Far East, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, for bombing and blockading

China. President Truman concurred. When General MacArthur persisted in public criticisms of this policy decision, the Joint Chiefs reluctantly agreed that the President should relieve MacArthur. Truman promptly did so and, at the recommendation of Bradley and the Chiefs, named General Matthew B. Ridgway as the new commander in the Far East.

The war in Korea and the fear of further communist aggression triggered a major rearmament effort. Between June 1950 and December 1952 the armed forces grew from 1.45 to 3.51 million men. General Bradley refereed an interservice debate over the nature of this expansion. Working closely with Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, Bradley won JCS approval of a plan that emphasized Air Force expansion.

To deter aggression in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) set

about creating an integrated military structure. General Bradley played a key role in establishing this structure. He spent much time negotiating with his British and French counterparts over the organization of NATO's Atlantic and Mediterranean commands.

Omar Bradley was promoted to the rank of General of the Army on 22 September 1950. He was the only Chairman to attain five-star rank. His tenure as Chairman ended on 15 August 1953, three weeks after the Korean armistice. As a five-star general, however, he did not retire.

After leaving the chairmanship, Bradley joined the Bulova Watch Company, subsequently becoming chairman of the board. In March 1968 he was one of the "wise men" who reviewed Vietnam policy for President Lyndon B. Johnson. Bradley died in New York on 8 April 1981.

Omar Nelson Bradley

General of the Army

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT		12 Jun 15
1LT		13 Oct 16
CPT.		22 Aug 17
MAJ.	27 Jul 18.	19 Nov 20
CPT (postwar reduction)		04 Nov 22
MAJ		27 Jun 24
LTC.		22 Jul 36
COL		13 Nov 43
BG	24 Feb 41	31 May 44
MG	18 Feb 42	16 Sep 44
LTG.	09 Jun 43	
GEN	29 Mar 45.	31 Jan 49
Gen of the Army		22 Sep 50

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Troop duty with 14th Infantry Regiment in the West (incl Mexican border)	1915	1919
Professor, ROTC, South Dakota State College	1919	1920
Instructor, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1920	1924
Student, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.	1924	1925
Infantry Unit Commander, 19th and 27th Infantry Regiments, HI.	1925	1927
National Guard and Reserve Affairs, Hawaiian Department	1927	1928
Student, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1928	1929
Instructor, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA	1929	1933
Student, Army War College, Washington, DC	1933	1934
Instructor, Plans and Training Office, US Military Academy, West Point, NY.	1934	1938
War Department General Staff: Chief, Operations Branch, G-1, and Assistant Secretary, General Staff, Washington, DC	1938	1941
Commandant, Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA	1941	1942

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Commanding General, 82d Infantry Division, Camp Claiborne, LA	1942	1942
Commanding General, 28th Infantry Division, Camp Livingston, LA, and Camp Gordon Johnson, FL	1942	1943
Commanding General, II Corps, North Africa and Sicily	1943	1943
Commanding General, Field Forces, European Theater of Operations	1943	1943
Commanding General, First US Army and First US Army Group, later Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, European Theater of Operations	1944	1945
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Veterans Administration, Washington, DC.	1945	1947
Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC.	1948	1949
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1949	1953

Principal US Military Decorations

Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Bronze Star



ARTHUR WILLIAM RADFORD

15 August 1953 — 15 August 1957

Arthur Radford was born in Chicago, Illinois, on 27 February 1896. After growing up in Illinois and Iowa, he entered the US Naval Academy in 1912. Following graduation in 1916, he served during World War I on the battleship USS *South Carolina* in the Atlantic Fleet. Radford realized a boyhood dream to fly when he entered Navy flight training in 1920. He earned his wings the following year. For the next twenty years, he alternated among assignments with the fleet, naval air stations, and the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics in Washington, rising from lieutenant to captain.

Shortly before the United States entered World War II, Radford became Chief of the Navy's Aviation Training Division. Here he oversaw the expansion of the training program to meet the greatly increased requirements for Navy pilots during the early stages of the war. Promoted to rear admiral, he commanded a carrier division in the Pacific during 1943. After a brief assignment at the Navy Department, he returned to the Pacific in November 1944 to command another carrier division. For the remainder of the war, he directed carrier attacks against Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Tokyo.

After a series of staff and command assignments in the immediate post-war period, Radford, now a vice admiral, became Vice Chief of Naval Operations in January 1948. In April 1949, as that tour was ending, the "revolt of the admirals" erupted in Washington. Senior naval officers objected strenuously to the Secretary of Defense's cancellation of a new "super" carrier. The Navy wanted the new carrier, which could carry larger planes, to establish its role in strategic nuclear warfare. The ensuing controversy led to a congressional

Admiral Arthur W. Radford
United States Navy



Rear Admiral Radford, *right*, on the bridge of the USS *Yorktown*, October 1944.

investigation, and Admiral Radford was called to testify. He supported the Navy's position and, in discussing future operations, argued that the threat of an atomic blitz would neither deter nor win a war. In retrospect, Radford's argument appears ironic, since, as Chairman, he would become a champion of "massive retaliation."

Upon being promoted to admiral in April 1949, Radford returned to the Pacific as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC). Forces under his command provided air and naval gunfire support to UN forces in the Korean War. Radford's command also sent US military advisers to assist the French in Indochina in the war against the Communist Viet Minh.

Impressed with Radford's performance as CINCPAC, President Eisenhower appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford assumed his duties on 15 August 1953. During Radford's tenure, President Eisenhower adopted the "New Look," a national security policy that emphasized Air Force and Navy forces over Army ground forces and provided for massive atomic retaliation in the event of general war. Radford vigorously supported the new policy and convinced a majority of his reluctant JCS colleagues to accept it as well.

In one controversial initiative related to the "New Look" and force planning, Admiral Radford did not succeed. During 1956 Radford proposed to the Chiefs drastic cuts in



Rear Admiral Radford being passed to his flagship, the USS *Saratoga*, in a breeches buoy, November 1944.

Army forces as a means of staying within the President's stringent fiscal ceiling. Units overseas would be reduced to small atomic-armed task forces, and the Marines, with atomic weapons, would have responsibility for limited war operations. When this proposal leaked to the press, the reaction in Congress and among the NATO allies resulted in no further action being taken.

Under Radford's leadership, plans drawn up by the JCS resulted in the establishment of a new unified Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954. The Joint Chiefs also undertook planning with the Canadian military for a North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), which was established in 1957.



Admiral Radford, *right*, with President Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Paul Ely, Chief of the French Armed Forces Staff, during a meeting in Washington to discuss the Indochina crisis, March 1954.

While Radford was Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealt with a series of regional crises around the world, and Admiral Radford was always quick to advocate a strong US response. In late March 1954, when the French faced defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Radford on his own initiative convened a JCS meeting to consider a massive air strike in Vietnam. All the other JCS members opposed the idea, and President Eisenhower was unwilling to intervene unless important political conditions were met. They never were.

In the Formosa Straits crisis in early 1955, when the Chinese Communists seemed ready to attack the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu and then assault Formosa, Admiral Radford concluded that the situation could not be stabilized "without the Chinese Communists getting a bloody nose." He favored a pre-emptive attack unless they ceased their buildup. If war came, Radford argued before the National Security Council, all the advantages would rest with the United States. President Eisenhower,

however, chose a more restrained, flexible approach, and the Chinese Communists backed away from military threats.

When President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, triggering the Suez Crisis of 1956, Admiral Radford led a united JCS in recommending military action. Nasser must be stopped, they said, by military intervention if necessary. President Eisenhower disagreed and later took strong action to stop the invasion of Egypt launched by Britain, France, and Israel.

Admiral Radford retired from military service on 15 August 1957 but remained

active in national security matters. President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy continued to call on him for advice, and during the next several years he conducted studies for the government. He strongly supported President Eisenhower's call for reorganizing the Department of Defense in 1958 and urged Congress to strengthen the authority of the Chairman. In retirement, he served as a consultant for the Bankers' Trust Company and as a director of several other firms. Admiral Radford died at the Bethesda Naval Medical Center on 17 August 1973.

Arthur William Radford

Admiral, USN

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
ENS.		03 Jun 16
LTJG	01 Jul 17.	03 Jun 19
LT.	01 Jan 18	01 Jul 20
LCDR		17 Feb 27
CDR		01 Jul 36
CAPT.		01 Jan 42
RADM	21 Jul 43.	07 Aug 47
VADM	25 May 46	
ADM.		07 Apr 49

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
USS <i>South Carolina</i>	1916.	1918
Aide on Staff, Division ONE, Battleship Force ONE, Atlantic Fleet	1918.	1919
Aide on Staff and Flag Lieutenant, Division ONE, Pacific Fleet	1919.	1920
Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL	1920.	1921
Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, DC.	1921.	1923
Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet	1923.	1925
VO Squadron ONE, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet.	1925.	1927
Naval Air Station, San Diego, CA.	1927.	1929
Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet (additional duty commanding Alaskan Aerial Survey Detachment)	1929.	1929
USS <i>Saratoga</i>	1929.	1930
Commanding Officer, VF Squadron ONE-B, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet	1930.	1931
Aide and Flag Secretary, Aircraft, Battle Force, US Fleet	1931.	1932
Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, DC.	1932.	1935
Navigation Officer, USS <i>Wright</i>	1935.	1936
Staff, Aircraft, Battle Force.	1936.	1937
Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Seattle, WA	1937	1940


Assignments

Dates

	From	To
Executive Officer, USS <i>Yorktown</i>	1940	1941
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, DC	1941	1941
TENTH Naval District (establishment Naval Air Station, Trinidad, BWI and duty as Commanding Officer)	1941	1941
Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, DC	1941	1943
Carrier Division TWO	1943	1943
Commander, Carrier Division ELEVEN	1943	1943
Chief of Staff and Aide, Aircraft, Pacific Fleet	1943	1944
Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, Navy Department (additional duty alternate member Special Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Reorganization of National Defense).	1944	1944
Commander, Carrier Division SIX, US Pacific Fleet	1944	1945
Commanding Officer, Fleet Air, Seattle, WA	1945	1945
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)	1946	1947
Commander, SECOND Task Fleet	1947	1947
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, DC	1948	1949
Commander in Chief, Pacific and High Commissioner, Trust Territory of Pacific Islands	1949	1953
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1953	1957

Principal US Military Decorations

Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 gold stars)
Legion of Merit (with gold star)



NATHAN FARRAGUT TWINING

15 August 1957 — 30 September 1960

Nathan Twining was born in Monroe, Wisconsin, on 11 October 1897. His family later moved to Oregon, where he joined the National Guard in 1916 and saw service along the Mexican border. Rising to first sergeant in the Guard, Twining won appointment to the US Military Academy in 1917. As the result of an accelerated wartime program, he graduated just over a year later in November 1918.

After initial infantry assignments, Twining attended flight school and transferred to the Army Air Service in 1926. During the next several years, he was a flying instructor and then served with pursuit and attack groups stationed around the country and in Hawaii and with the Army Mail Service. After he completed the Air Corps Tactical School and the Army Command and General Staff School, he was Air Corps Technical Supervisor at the San Antonio Air Depot. Staff assignments with the Office of the Chief of the Army Air Corps in the years 1940 to 1942 rounded out his experience and brought promotion from major to brigadier general.

General Twining began his World War II combat experience in July 1942 as Chief of Staff of the US Army Air Forces in the South Pacific area. In January 1943 he assumed command of the Thirteenth Air Force and in February was promoted to major general. While flying a B-17, Twining crashlanded in the Coral Sea. He and his crew floated in rubber life rafts in shark-infested waters for six days and five nights before being rescued. In July 1943 he became Commander of Aircraft, Solomon Islands, one of the first combined air commands in US history, with tactical control of all Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied Air Forces in the South Pacific.

General Nathan F. Twining
United States Air Force



Brigadier General Twining, following his rescue after six days and five nights adrift in a rubber raft in the Coral Sea, February 1943.

In late 1943 Twining was transferred to the Mediterranean theater, where he assumed command of the Fifteenth Air Force and the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Forces. His Allied command not only supported operations in Italy and southern France but also conducted bombing raids against Germany, Austria, and Romania. With the surrender of Germany, Twining returned to the Pacific. Now a lieutenant general, he commanded the Twentieth Air Force. Forces under his command launched B-29 attacks against the Japanese home islands, and planes under his command dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

After World War II, Twining commanded the Air Materiel Command at Wright Field in Ohio. With the creation of the US Air Force in 1947, he took command of the newly established Alaskan Command. In 1950 he joined the Air Staff. After serving briefly as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, he received his fourth star and assumed duties as Vice Chief of Staff.

In 1953 General Twining became Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In that position, he worked diligently for the development of aircraft, missiles, and weapons for his service. In 1956 President Dwight Eisenhower selected him to lead a delegation of technical experts



Major General Twining, *center*, in Italy with Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, *left*, and Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, *right*, 1944.

invited to inspect Soviet air facilities. This was the first visit by US officers to the Soviet Union since World War II.

General Twining became the third Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1957. Just ten days after he took office, the Soviet Union announced the successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile and, less than two months later, placed the first artificial earth satellite, *Sputnik*, in orbit. It appeared that the Soviet Union had or would soon have the capability to launch missile attacks against the United States. General Twining endorsed steps to strengthen and protect strategic retaliatory forces but saw no

reason for the large accelerated buildup favored by the Air Force. Twining was confident that the Strategic Air Command was superior to its Soviet counterpart. He opposed any major change in US strategy and, like his predecessor Admiral Arthur Radford, remained a firm advocate of the Eisenhower policy of main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons.

Three crises occurred while Twining was Chairman. The first one began on 14 July 1958, when a coup toppled the pro-Western government in Iraq. The president of neighboring Lebanon, concerned about maintaining his regime, appealed for US assistance. Radical



General Twining makes a statement to the press before his trip to the Soviet Union, July 1956.

Arab nationalism, encouraged by the USSR, appeared to threaten Western interests. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs, Twining told President Eisenhower that he saw "no alternative but to go in." The President promptly decided to act. Marines began landing at Beirut on 15 July, followed by Army troops. With the arrival of approximately 14,000 US personnel, enough stability existed for Lebanese factions to work out a political

compromise and for US forces to withdraw by the end of October.

Another crisis soon followed in the Far East when the Chinese Communists began bombardment of the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the Chinese mainland. With the eruption of this crisis during August 1958, General Twining and the Chiefs quickly agreed that the United States should not permit the loss of the islands to the

communists. They recommended the use of whatever force was necessary, including atomic weapons. General Twining forcefully presented their recommendations to the President. Eisenhower agreed that a show of force was needed but took great care to keep his military options open. He ordered the Seventh Fleet, plus two carriers from the Mediterranean, to the Formosa Strait and provided convoy protection in international waters for Chinese Nationalist supply ships bound for the offshore islands. The show of force, combined with various political initiatives, worked. The bombardment ceased and the crisis passed.

The third crisis came in November 1958, when the USSR announced its intention to transfer its access and occupation functions in East Germany to the East German government unless West Berlin became a demilitarized "free city" within six months. President Eisenhower responded with a firm but low-key approach. Twining told the President that the JCS feared that the United States would "go half way" in meeting Soviet provocations and "then quit." They believed that the United States had to be ready to risk general war. Some Service Chiefs favored a major

mobilization, but Twining told the Chief Executive that he saw no need to go that far. President Eisenhower, however, held resolutely to his low-key approach, and the Soviets backed away from their deadline.

During 1959 and 1960 General Twining played a central role in working out new procedures for coordinating nuclear strike plans. The advent of land-based missiles and *Polaris* submarines to complement the bomber fleet created major complications in target assignments, command, and control. Twining collaborated with Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to create the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff and the Single Integrated Operational Plan, arrangements which lasted throughout the Cold War.

Following major surgery, General Twining elected to retire on 30 September 1960, midway through his second term, before a new administration took office. During the next decade he worked as vice chairman of the publishing firm Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. In 1966 the firm published Twining's views on the state of national defense under the title *Neither Liberty nor Safety*. General Twining died on 29 March 1982 at Wilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

Nathan Farragut Twining

General, USAF

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT	01 Nov 18	
1LT	01 Jan 20	20 Nov 23
CPT.	20 Apr 35	01 Sep 35
MAJ	07 Oct 38	01 Jul 40
LTC	22 Jul 41.	12 Nov 42
COL	01 Feb 42	
BG	17 Jun 42	10 Jul 46
MG	05 Feb 43	19 Feb 48
LTG.	05 Jun 45	
GEN	10 Oct 50	

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Assigned duty, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1918	1919
Tour of Observation, France, Belgium, Italy and Germany	1919	1919
Student, Basic Course, Infantry School; then Commanding Officer, 'C' and later 'B' Companies, 29th Infantry, Camp Benning, GA	1919	1922
Aide-de-Camp to BG B. A. Poore, Camp Travis, TX, Fort Logan, CO, and later Fort Sam Houston, TX	1922	1923
Student, Air Service Primary and later Advanced Flying School, Brooks and Kelly Fields, TX.	1923	1924
Instructor, Air Corps Primary Flying School, Brooks Field, TX, and later March Field, CA	1924	1930
Adjutant and Commanding Officer, 18th Pursuit Group and later Commanding Officer, 26th Attack Squadron, Schofield Barracks, HI	1930	1932
Pilot and Operations Officer, 8th Attack Squadron; then Pilot and Commanding Officer, 90th Attack Squadron; then Pilot and Mess Officer, 60th Services Squadron, Fort Crockett, TX	1932	1934
Engineering Officer, Central Zone, Chicago, IL.	1934	1934
Post and Group Adjutant and later Commanding Officer, 3d Attack Group, 3d Attack Wing, Headquarters Detachment; then Assistant Operations Officer, 3d Wing, Barksdale Field, LA.	1934	1935

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Student, Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, AL	1935	1936
Student, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1936	1937
Air Corps Technical Supervisor, San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field, TX	1937	1940
Assistant Chief and later Chief, Technical Inspection Section, Office, Chief of Air Corps; then Assistant Executive Officer, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force, Washington, DC.	1940	1942
Chief of Staff, US Army Air Forces; then Commanding General, Thirteenth Air Force, South Pacific	1942	1943
Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force, Mediterranean Theater	1943	1945
Temporary Duty with Headquarters, Army Air Force (Liaison and Planning, Headquarters US Army Strategic Air Force), Washington, DC	1945	1945
Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Pacific .	1945	1945
Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, OH.	1945	1947
Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command, Fort Richardson, AK	1947	1950
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel); then Vice Chief of Staff; then temporarily assumed duties of Chief of Staff; then resumed duties as Vice Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Washington, DC	1950	1953
Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Washington, DC.	1953	1957
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. . .	1957	1960

Principal US Military Decorations

- Army Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
- Navy Distinguished Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
- Distinguished Flying Cross
- Bronze Star
- Air Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
- Commendation Ribbon



LYMAN LOUIS LEMNITZER

1 October 1960 — 30 September 1962

Lyman Lemnitzer was born on 29 August 1899 in Honesdale, a small town in northeastern Pennsylvania. At his older brother's urging, he entered the US Military Academy, graduating in 1920. Over the next twenty years he served with coast artillery units, taught at West Point and the Coast Artillery School, and attended the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College.

In 1941, as the Army began to expand, Major Lemnitzer was transferred from an antiaircraft artillery brigade at Camp Stewart, Georgia, to the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. There and in subsequent assignments with General Headquarters, US Army, and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, he participated in the planning for the mobilization and training of the rapidly expanding wartime Army and for the projected Allied landings in North Africa. Promotions came rapidly, and by June 1942 Lemnitzer was a brigadier general.

Two months later he went to England as Commanding General of the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. Because of his familiarity with the plans for the upcoming North African operation, he was soon assigned to General Dwight Eisenhower's Allied Force Headquarters as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, responsible for final preparations for Operation TORCH, the upcoming North African invasion. In October 1942 Lemnitzer accompanied General Mark Clark as second in command on a secret submarine mission to Algeria to meet with friendly French to enlist their assistance with the invasion. Lemnitzer won the Legion of Merit for his participation in this mission.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
United States Army



Brigadier General Lemnitzer, *center*, with Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, *left*, and General Sir Harold Alexander, *right*, at Anzio, Italy, January 1944.

In January 1943 Lemnitzer became Deputy Chief of Staff to Clark in Morocco, where he worked to organize the US Fifth Army. After resuming active command of his brigade, he led it through the Tunisian campaign and the early landing phases of the Sicily campaign.

Thereafter, Lemnitzer served as Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff to British General (later Field Marshal) Sir Harold Alexander, who was Commander in Chief, 15th Army Group and later Supreme Allied Com-

mander, Mediterranean. Lemnitzer, who was promoted to major general in 1944, also served as Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the (US) Mediterranean Theater of Operations. In March 1945 he travelled incognito to Switzerland, where he met with German representatives and began discussions that resulted in the unconditional surrender of German forces in Italy and southern Austria.

After the war, Lemnitzer was the senior Army member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He then

served for two years as Deputy Commandant of the National War College. Concurrently, he headed the US delegation to the meetings of the Military Committee of the Five Brussels Pact Powers in London, which led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Late in 1949 Lemnitzer became the first Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he was instrumental in setting up the US Military Assistance Program.

From December 1951 until July 1952, Lemnitzer commanded the 7th Infantry Division, leading it in the Korean War battles of Heartbreak Ridge and the Punch Bowl. Promoted to lieutenant general in August 1952, he became the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. In 1955 he assumed command of US Army Forces, Far East, and the Eighth US Army. Shortly thereafter, having received his fourth star, he became Commander in Chief of the United Nations and Far East Command and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. In July 1957 he became Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and two years later its Chief of Staff. Appointed by President Eisenhower, Lemnitzer became the fourth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1960.

Soon after John F. Kennedy became President in 1961, the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation caused him to question the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A brigade of anti-communist exiles, trained and directed by the CIA, landed in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs but was quickly overwhelmed by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's forces. President Kennedy believed that the Joint Chiefs had served him poorly by failing to review the CIA's plan thoroughly and express their own reservations forthrightly. The President directed that, henceforth, the Joint Chiefs must be "more than military men" and supply "dynamic and imaginative leadership" in Cold War operations.

General Lemnitzer considered the President's criticisms unfair. The Chiefs, he maintained, had never awarded the plan their "approval;" they simply had rendered an "appraisal" that, given surprise plus air supremacy, the brigade could establish itself ashore. Yet, without consulting the Joint Chiefs, President Kennedy had changed the landing site and cancelled a strike by the exiles' aircraft. Nevertheless, this military setback early in the Kennedy presidency damaged Lemnitzer's relationship with the new President.

In the other crises which came in quick succession in 1961, General Lemnitzer's recommendations for forceful responses met with mixed success. Friendly regimes in Southeast Asia were foundering. In Laos, by late April the communist Pathet Lao had advanced so rapidly that US-backed forces there seemed about to disintegrate. General Lemnitzer urged intervention by SEATO forces, not by the United States alone. Lemnitzer also favored a deployment of US combat forces to bolster the government of South Vietnam, which was struggling with a growing communist insurgency. President Kennedy decided against military intervention in Laos and, instead of deploying combat forces to South Vietnam, gradually increased the number of American advisers there.

When the USSR threatened to end the Western powers' access rights to Berlin, General Lemnitzer favored a major expansion of conventional forces to demonstrate US determination and allow a wide range of responses. The President agreed to an expansion but on a smaller scale. On 13 August 1961, when the communists began building a wall around West Berlin, the administration was so taken by surprise that Lemnitzer thought "everyone appeared to be hopeless, helpless, and harmless." He proposed that a 1600-man battle group be sent down the



Major General Lemnitzer, *right*, with General Matthew B. Ridgway, *left*, and General James A. Van Fleet, *center*, in Korea, January 1952.

Helmstedt-to-Berlin autobahn. Many of the President's civilian advisers assailed the proposal as needlessly provocative. President Kennedy, however, ruled in Lemnitzer's favor; the battle group reached Berlin without

trouble. During autumn, as the overall US buildup proceeded, the Soviets backed away from a confrontation over Berlin.

When Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara proposed putting the combat-



General Lemnitzer, *third from right*, in South Vietnam with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; General Paul D. Harkins, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Major General Nguyen Khanh, Army, Republic of Vietnam, May 1962.

ready forces of the US Strategic Army Corps and the Air Force Tactical Air Command under a unified commander, the Chiefs were divided in their response. Lemnitzer, however, supported the McNamara initiative, and in 1961 the US Strike Command was created.

In response to Secretary McNamara's introduction of a new planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS), General Lemnitzer in June 1962 established his own

Special Studies Group to conduct analyses for the Joint Chiefs. This group played an increasingly important role in defining JCS positions.

There was a basic difference between Lemnitzer and the President over how best to respond to the anticipated increase in communist-sponsored "wars of national liberation." Kennedy had great confidence in the efficacy of special forces and other counterinsurgency capabilities. Lemnitzer believed that,

historically, regular forces had played a key role in defeating insurgencies. Believing that Lemnitzer was not sufficiently innovative to pursue the type of warfare most appropriate for the Third World, Kennedy did not appoint Lemnitzer to a second term as Chairman. Instead, the President nominated General Lemnitzer to the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), where regular forces still played a paramount role.

General Lemnitzer's tenure as Chairman ended on 30 September 1962. He became

Commander in Chief of the US European Command (CINCEUR) on 1 November 1962 and SACEUR on 1 January 1963. He served as SACEUR until his retirement on 1 July 1969.

In retirement, Lemnitzer served in 1975 on the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States and from 1976 to 1978 on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In 1987 President Ronald Reagan presented him the Medal of Freedom. General Lemnitzer died on 12 November 1988 in Washington, DC.

Lyman Louis Lemnitzer

General, USA

Promotions

	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT.		02 Jul 20
1LT.		09 Jun 25
CPT		01 Aug 35
MAJ		01 Jul 40
LTC	11 Dec 41	02 Jul 43
COL	11 Jun 42	
BG	25 Jun 42	24 Jan 48
MG	27 May 44	29 Apr 52
LTG.	01 Aug 52	
GEN	25 Mar 55	

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Student, Coast Artillery School, Fort Monroe, VA	1920	1921
10th and 59th Coastal Artillery Regiments	1921	1926
Instructor, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1926	1930
Student, Coast Artillery School, Fort Monroe, VA	1930	1931
Troop and Staff Officer, 60th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment	1931	1934
Instructor, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1934	1935
Student, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1935	1936
Instructor, Coast Artillery School, Fort Monroe, VA	1936	1939
Student, Army War College, Washington, DC	1939	1940
Battalion Commander and S-3, 70th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment	1940	1940
Executive Officer and S-3, 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade	1940	1941
Office of Assistant G-3, and then Assistant G-3, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, DC	1941	1942
Chief of Plans Division, Army Ground Forces, Washington, DC	1942	1942

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Commanding General, 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Norfolk, VA and England (European Theater of Operations)	1942	1942
Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Allied Force Headquarters (European Theater of Operations: England and North Africa) and Commanding General, 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade	1942	1943
Deputy Chief of Staff, Fifth US Army, Commanding General, 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (North Africa), and Antiaircraft Artillery Commander, Seventh Army (North Africa and Sicily)	1943	1944
Deputy Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group (later Allied Armies in Italy), and later Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean	1944	1945
Chief of Staff, Allied Forces Headquarters (Italy) and Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, US Army (MTOUSA)	1945	1945
Army Member of Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1945	1947
Deputy Commandant, National War College, Washington, DC	1947	1949
Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.	1949	1950
Commanding General, 11th Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY	1950	1951
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Far East Command (FECOM), Korea	1951	1952
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, Office, Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC.	1952	1955
Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East and Eighth Army.	1955	1955
Commander in Chief, Far East and United Nations Command	1955	1957
Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC	1957	1959
Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC.	1959	1960
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1960	1962
Commander in Chief, US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1963)	1962	1969

Principal US Military Decorations

Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)

Silver Star

Legion of Merit (Degree of Officer)

Legion of Merit



MAXWELL DAVENPORT TAYLOR

1 October 1962 — 1 July 1964

Maxwell Taylor was born on 26 August 1901 in the small Missouri town of Keytesville, near Kansas City. After attending Northeast High School and Kansas City Junior College, he entered the US Military Academy, graduating fourth in his class in 1922.

Commissioned as an Army engineer, Taylor transferred in 1926 to the field artillery and served one year with the 10th Field Artillery. Thereafter, most of his assignments before World War II made use of his fluency in foreign languages. He taught French and Spanish at West Point. Then in the 1930s he was attached to the US Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, and served as Assistant Military Attaché in Peking, China. In June 1940 Taylor was sent on a special hemispheric defense mission to Latin America. In December 1940 he returned to an artillery assignment as Commander of the 12th Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

When the United States entered World War II, Major Taylor was serving in the Office of the Secretary of the War Department General Staff. Promoted to colonel in June 1942, he was assigned as Chief of Staff to Brigadier General Matthew Ridgway at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. Taylor helped Ridgway transform the 82d Infantry Division into the Army's first airborne division.

Following promotion to brigadier general in December 1942, Taylor took command of the 82d Division Artillery, which saw combat in Sicily and Italy from July 1943 through early 1944. On 7 September 1943 he participated in a daring secret mission behind enemy lines to Rome just twenty-four hours before the scheduled invasion of Italy. His judgment that the risks of

General Maxwell D. Taylor
United States Army



Lieutenant General Taylor in Korea, February 1953.

an airborne landing near Rome were too great resulted in cancellation of the planned air drop. In March 1944 Taylor assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division. He was promoted to major general in June. Taylor parachuted with the division into Normandy on D-Day and commanded it during the

airborne invasion of Holland and in the Ardennes and Central European campaigns.

In September 1945 Major General Taylor became the Superintendent of West Point. After four years at the Academy, he filled successive assignments as Chief of Staff of the European Command; the first US commander

in Berlin; and, on the Army Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and, after promotion to lieutenant general in August 1951, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

On 11 February 1953 Lieutenant General Taylor assumed command of the Eighth US Army. Under his command, the Eighth Army engaged in the Korean War's last round of bitter fighting. Taylor received his fourth star on 23 June 1953. After the 27 July 1953 armistice, he presided over several massive exchanges of prisoners, helped expand the Republic of Korea's army, and administered the US military assistance program for the Republic of Korea. In November 1954 he assumed command of all US ground forces in Korea, Japan, and Okinawa and, in April 1955, of the US Far East Command and the United Nations Command in Korea.

Appointed Chief of Staff of the Army on 30 June 1955, Taylor served in that position for four years. During his tenure he advocated less reliance on the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation to a Soviet attack and more dependence on flexible response. Taylor's fight against cutbacks in Army strength put him at odds with his old commander, President Dwight Eisenhower. To make the best use of reduced forces, Taylor decided to substitute firepower for manpower. Under his supervision, the Army replaced the old triangular organization of the infantry division with three regiments with a "pentomic" organization of five small, self-contained battle groups able to disperse or concentrate rapidly on the atomic battlefield and capitalize on the US advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. While Taylor was Chief of Staff, the Army also enforced court-ordered school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 and, together with the US Marines, protected the government of Lebanon during 1958.

After retiring from active duty in July 1959, General Taylor criticized US strategic planning and joint organization in *The Uncertain Trumpet*, published in 1960. This book influenced President John F. Kennedy's decision to adopt the strategy of flexible response. Taylor then pursued a civilian career, first as chairman of the board of the Mexican Light and Power Company and later as president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York.

In 1961, at President Kennedy's request, General Taylor returned to public service. In April the President asked him to lead a group to investigate the Bay of Pigs debacle, which had badly shaken the President's confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kennedy then recalled Taylor to active duty as his Military Representative at the White House. It was in this capacity that General Taylor first became involved in the expanding US military effort in Southeast Asia. In late 1961, after visiting Saigon, Taylor recommended sending 5,000 to 8,000 US support troops to help South Vietnam resist the growing Viet Cong insurgency.

Impressed with Taylor's advice and ability, President Kennedy appointed him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1962. Just two weeks after Taylor became Chairman, the United States obtained the first definite evidence that the Soviet Union was secretly establishing missile sites and developing an offensive nuclear capability in Cuba. General Taylor was a member of the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council, the small group of officials that the President summoned to advise him on a daily basis during the Cuban missile crisis. Speaking on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Taylor recommended air strikes against Cuba, naval quarantine of the island, and preparation for an invasion. President Kennedy on 22 October directed a naval quarantine of Cuba, alerted a force of some 250,000 men for a



Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy swears in General Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 1962. President John F. Kennedy looks on.

possible invasion, and called upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles, but he reserved air strikes as a last resort. The Soviet Union removed the missiles in mid-November, and the crisis passed.

On arms control, General Taylor reversed his longstanding opposition to a nuclear test ban and convinced the Chiefs to do likewise. They had opposed such a treaty as an invitation for the Soviet Union to carry on test-

ing secretly in order to achieve nuclear supremacy. During August 1963, in what Taylor later described as his greatest "diplomatic" triumph, he persuaded his colleagues that a limited test ban was compatible with national security. Following endorsement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senate approved the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union on 24 September 1963.



General Taylor in South Vietnam, 1963.

While General Taylor was Chairman, the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam increasingly occupied the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A coup in Saigon, resulting in the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in early November 1963, unleashed further political instability in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese patrons exploited the turmoil by intensifying attacks in the countryside and against US military advisers in South Vietnam. In March 1964 the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draw up plans for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. Following

trips to Saigon in the spring of 1964, General Taylor and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara urged continued support of the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort, short of US ground combat involvement. They did recommend planning for air strikes and possible commando raids against North Vietnam, a course that was not followed until after Taylor's retirement.

On 1 July 1964 President Johnson named Taylor the US Ambassador to South Vietnam, and General Taylor retired from military service for a second time. In Saigon, Ambassador Taylor witnessed both the introduction of US ground combat troops into South

Vietnam and the launching of a US air campaign against North Vietnam, actions that had been actively considered while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After resigning as ambassador in mid-1965, Taylor served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and as a special adviser to President Johnson. He was president of the Institute for Defense Analyses

from 1966 to 1969. Throughout his retirement General Taylor wrote and lectured widely on defense and national security matters. His major works include *Responsibility and Response* (1967), *Swords and Plowshares* (1972), *Changing Dynamics of National Security* (1974), and *Precarious Security* (1976). General Taylor died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center on 19 April 1987.

Maxwell Davenport Taylor

General, USA

Promotions

	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT		13 Jun 22
1LT		09 Mar 27
CPT		21 Aug 35
MAJ		09 Jul 40
LTC	01 Jan 42	13 Jun 45
COL	24 Jun 42	
BG	11 Dec 42	24 Jan 48
MG	21 Jun 44	08 Mar 52
LTG	01 Aug 51	
GEN	23 Jun 53	

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Student, Engineer School, Fort Humphreys, VA, and Officer, 17th Engineers, Camp Meade, MD	1922	1923
3d Engineers, Schofield Barracks, HI	1923	1926
6th Engineers, Camp Lewis, WA; transferred to 10th Field Artillery	1926	1927
Student of French language, Paris, France; then Instructor, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1927	1932
Student, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK	1932	1933
Student, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1933	1935
Student of Japanese language, US Embassy, Tokyo, Japan; Assistant Military Attaché, Peking, China (1937)	1935	1939
Student, Army War College, Washington, DC	1939	1940
Member, War Plans Division, on Hemisphere Defense Mission to Latin America	1940	1940
Commander, 12th Artillery Battalion, Fort Sam Houston, TX	1940	1941
Office of Secretary, General Staff, War Department, Washington, DC	1941	1942
Chief of Staff, 82d Airborne Division, Camp Claiborne, LA; then Division Artillery Commander, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC	1942	1943

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Division Artillery Commander, 82d Airborne Division, Sicily and Italy	1943	1944
Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, Normandy, Western and Central Europe	1944	1945
Superintendent, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1945	1949
Chief of Staff, European Command, Heidelberg, Germany	1949	1949
US Commander, Berlin	1949	1951
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Administration, Department of the Army, Washington, DC	1951	1953
Commanding General, Eighth Army, Korea, Army Forces, Far East	1953	1954
Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East and Eighth US Army, Far East Command.	1954	1955
Commander in Chief, Far East Command	1955	1955
Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC	1955	1959
Retired from active service, 30 June 1959		
Recalled to active duty, 01 July 1961		
Military Representative of the President, Washington, DC	1961	1962
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1962	1964

Principal US Military Decorations

- Distinguished Service Cross
- Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
- Silver Star (with oak leaf cluster)
- Legion of Merit
- Bronze Star
- Purple Heart



EARLE GILMORE WHEELER


3 July 1964 — 2 July 1970

Earle Wheeler was born in Washington, DC, on 13 January 1908. After attending Eastern High School, he joined the DC National Guard at the age of sixteen and rose to the rank of sergeant. He then entered the US Military Academy in 1928. After graduating in 1932, Wheeler spent the next twelve years as an infantry officer, serving from company to division level. He also taught mathematics at West Point and graduated from the Command and General Staff College. In 1942 he commanded an infantry battalion.

During World War II Wheeler rose to colonel. As Chief of Staff of the 63d Infantry Division, he went overseas with the division in December 1944. Wheeler participated in campaigns that halted the German drive in Alsace-Lorraine, breached the Siegfried Line, seized Heidelberg, and crossed the Danube. He was selected to lead an assault regiment against Hitler's mountain fortress in the Bavarian Alps but missed his opportunity for combat command when Germany surrendered as the operation was about to begin.

After the war, Wheeler served in a variety of command and staff assignments. He commanded the 351st Infantry Regiment in Italy in 1951 and 1952. He was then assigned to Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples, Italy, first as Readiness Officer and then as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. On his return to the United States in 1955, Wheeler joined the Army Staff as Director of Plans in the Office of the Operations Deputy. He was promoted to major general in December 1955 and in 1957 became Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. While serving in that position, he was chosen to head a joint committee to study ways to make interservice planning and decision making more effective.

General Earle G. Wheeler
United States Army



Colonel Wheeler inspects an honor guard in Trieste, November 1951.

From 1958 until 1960 Wheeler commanded the 2d Armored Division and III Corps in Texas. Promoted to lieutenant general, Wheeler returned to the Pentagon in 1960 as Director of the Joint Staff. In March 1962 the Army promoted him to general and he was assigned as Deputy Commander in Chief of the European Command.

After only seven months Wheeler returned to Washington in October 1962 as Chief of Staff of the Army. In addition to developing the Army's air assault division and improving the overseas reinforcement system, he helped persuade the other Service

Chiefs to support the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union. During Wheeler's twenty-one months in office, Army troops were deployed for possible use during both the Cuban missile crisis and civil rights disturbances in Mississippi and Alabama. Following a visit to South Vietnam in late 1962, Wheeler argued for augmenting US support troops and advisers to help the Saigon government deal more effectively with the Viet Cong insurgency.

General Wheeler became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 July 1964. During the next four years he was a regular attendee

at President Lyndon Johnson's Tuesday luncheons of senior policy advisers and at other high-level national security conferences. Wheeler's influence, however, was overshadowed by that of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. As Chairman, General Wheeler worked with marked success to eliminate dissents or "splits" in JCS recommendations, which, he believed, only invited interference by McNamara. But Wheeler's approach did not succeed. Unanimity did not translate into greater JCS influence, and McNamara determined military policies to a degree that none of his predecessors had approached.

The Vietnam War consumed much of Wheeler's time and energy during the six years he served as Chairman. Initially, Wheeler and the Chiefs believed that US air power—without ground troops or the risk of a land war with China—could assist South Vietnam in defeating communist aggression. Throughout late 1964 and early 1965, Wheeler presented the President and his civilian advisers JCS recommendations for retaliatory air strikes and then for a sustained air campaign against North Vietnam. In February 1965 President Johnson approved a bombing campaign, though not on the scale recommended by the Chiefs. By the time the air operations got under way the following month, the situation in South Vietnam had worsened. Wheeler and his JCS colleagues no longer thought an air campaign alone would suffice and recommended the commitment of ground forces. Although Johnson approved ground force deployments, they were not of the magnitude preferred by the Chiefs.

From 1965 through early 1968, Wheeler led the Chiefs in recommending an expanded air campaign against North Vietnam and increased deployment of ground troops to South Vietnam. Johnson listened carefully to Wheeler and approved gradually expanded bombing and larger force deployments, but

always at slower and smaller rates than those advocated by the Chiefs. Such "gradualism," Wheeler and his colleagues argued, failed to punish the enemy sufficiently to force him to end the war in Vietnam.

The Tet offensive of January 1968 marked a turning point in Wheeler's and the Joint Chiefs' influence on the conduct of the war. Although the offensive was costly for the enemy, it proved a psychological victory. The magnitude of the surprise attack greatly increased opposition to the war in the United States. As a consequence, President Johnson disregarded JCS advice and proceeded to limit the bombing of North Vietnam, place a hold on further troop increases in South Vietnam, and call for negotiations to end the fighting. Wheeler continued to attend all high-level White House meetings on Vietnam and to consider himself a personal friend of Johnson. But no longer did his recommendations and advice on the war carry the clout with the President that they once had. In July 1968, however, Johnson sought and received congressional approval to extend Wheeler's chairmanship for an additional year.

Though preoccupied with the war, President Johnson planned to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for strategic arms limitations. In July 1968 Wheeler established the position of Assistant to the Chairman for Strategic Arms Negotiations. Toward the end of General Wheeler's tenure as Chairman, President Richard Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, authorized a support staff for the position, and this office became the focal point for military support to the US delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

In 1969 President Nixon secured another year's extension of Wheeler's tenure as Chairman. Determined to end US involvement in the war, Nixon adopted a policy of Vietnamization, the gradual withdrawal of US



General Wheeler and General Creighton W. Abrams in South Vietnam, October 1969.

forces and buildup of South Vietnamese combat capabilities, while also negotiating with the North Vietnamese. Nixon sought the advice of Wheeler and the Chiefs but often did not heed it. Political necessity compelled larger and faster US withdrawals than Wheeler and his colleagues thought prudent.

General Wheeler retired on 2 July 1970 after an unprecedented six years in office.

Those who knew him best detected his great frustration over his failure to win civilian approval of the strategy that he believed would win the war in Vietnam. The stress of these six years led to several heart attacks that greatly weakened Wheeler's health. He died on 18 December 1975 in Frederick, Maryland.



General Wheeler and his family with President Richard M. Nixon following a ceremony at the White House, where Wheeler received the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, 9 July 1970.

Earle Gilmore Wheeler

General, USA

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT		10 Jun 32
1LT		01 Aug 35
CPT.	09 Sep 40	10 Jun 42
MAJ	01 Feb 42	
LTC.	11 Nov 42	
COL	26 Jun 43	
LTC (postwar reduction)	01 Jul 47.	01 Jul 48
COL	07 Sep 50	06 Oct 53
BG	08 Nov 52.	13 May 60
MG	21 Dec 55	30 Jun 61
LTG.	21 Apr 60	
GEN	01 Mar 62	


Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
29th Infantry, Fort Benning, GA	1932	1936
Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA	1936	1937
15th Infantry Regiment, Tientsin, China, and Fort Lewis, WA	1937	1940
Instructor, US Military Academy, West Point, NY	1940	1941
Aide-de-Camp to Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, Fort Sam Houston and Camp Bowie, TX	1941	1941
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1941	1942
Battalion Commander, 141st Infantry Regiment, Camp Blanding, FL	1942	1942
G-3, 99th Infantry Division; Chief of Staff, 63rd Infantry Division, Camp Van Dorn, MS	1942	1944
Chief of Staff, 63d Infantry Division, European Theater of Operations	1944	1945
Instructor, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK	1945	1946
Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Western Base Section, France	1946	1947

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
G-3, Headquarters, US Constabulary, Heidelberg, Germany	1947	1949
Student, National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, DC	1949	1950
Member, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1950	1951
Commanding Officer, 351st Infantry Regiment, Trieste; then Deputy Commanding General, US Troops, Trieste	1951	1952
Readiness Officer, then Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (NATO), Naples, Italy.	1952	1955
Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, US Army, Washington, DC	1955	1957
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Washington, DC	1957	1958
Commanding General, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX	1958	1959
Commanding General, III Corps and 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, TX.	1959	1960
Director, Joint Staff, Washington, DC	1960	1962
Deputy Commander in Chief, US European Command, Camp des Loges, France.	1962	1962
Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC.	1962	1964
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. . .	1964	1970

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star (with oak leaf cluster)
Army Commendation Medal (with oak leaf cluster)



THOMAS HINMAN MOORER


2 July 1970 — 1 July 1974

Thomas Moorer was born in Mt. Willing, Alabama, on 9 February 1912. After he graduated as valedictorian from Cloverdale High School in nearby Montgomery in 1927, his interest in technology and a “natural attraction” to military service led Moorer to enter the US Naval Academy. He graduated in 1933. After completing training as an aviator at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in 1936, he flew with fighter squadrons based on the carriers *Langley*, *Lexington*, and *Enterprise*.

Lieutenant Moorer was serving with a patrol squadron at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, when the Japanese attacked in December 1941. His unit subsequently participated in the Dutch East Indies campaign of early 1942, during which he flew numerous combat missions. He received a Purple Heart after being shot down and wounded off the coast of Australia in February 1942 and then surviving an attack on the rescue ship, which was sunk the same day. Three months later, he braved Japanese air superiority to fly supplies into and evacuate wounded out of the island of Timor. For this action, he received the Distinguished Flying Cross for valor. He was promoted to lieutenant commander in October 1942.

In 1943 and 1944 Moorer commanded Bombing Squadron 132, which conducted anti-submarine warfare against the Germans off the coasts of Florida, Cuba, and North Africa. He was promoted to commander in April 1944, soon after becoming the gunnery and tactical officer on the staff of the Air Commander of the Atlantic Fleet.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
United States Navy



Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Moorer, *third from left*, with his PBY crew, Ford Island, Hawaii, 1940.

After the war Moorer was assigned to the Strategic Bombing Survey in Japan. Before his promotion to captain in January 1952, his assignments included serving as Project Officer for the development of the Sidewinder missile and in air operations at sea. After graduating from the Naval War College in 1953, he served on the staff of the Air Commander of the Atlantic Fleet and then as Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air.

In 1956 he assumed command of his first ship, the USS *Salisbury Sound* (AV-13), a seaplane tender that sailed extensively in the Far East.

Captain Moorer joined the Navy Staff as a strategic planner in 1957. In 1958 he became Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for War Gaming Matters and was promoted to rear admiral. After a year at sea in command of Carrier Division SIX, Moorer returned to the Navy Staff in 1960 to direct the Long Range



Admiral Moorer, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, greets Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey at the US Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, June 1965.

Objectives Group. In 1962 he was promoted to vice admiral and assumed command of the Seventh Fleet.

In June 1964 Moorer received his fourth star and became Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two months after he assumed command, the United States became involved in a war in Vietnam. In August the destroyer USS *Maddox* was attacked while on patrol in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of Vietnam, and Pacific Fleet planes took part in a retaliatory strike against North Vietnam. Admiral

Moorer left the Pacific Fleet on 30 March 1965, just two weeks after its air forces joined in ROLLING THUNDER, the US air campaign against North Vietnam. He remarked that he felt "like a fire chief that leaves a roaring fire just when he gets the hoses hooked up and is ready to turn on the water."

On 30 April 1965 Moorer assumed command of NATO's Allied Command, Atlantic; the US Atlantic Command; and the Atlantic Fleet. He was the only officer in the Navy's history to command both the Pacific and



Admiral Moyer in South Vietnam, August 1969.

Atlantic Fleets. As CINCLANT, Moyer successfully concluded the US operation in the Dominican Republic. As Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, he initiated a major revision in NATO maritime strategy, developing the concept of a standing naval force for the Allied Command, Atlantic.

On 1 August 1967 Admiral Moyer became Chief of Naval Operations. For the

next three years he guided the Navy during the height of the Vietnam War, a period characterized by growing antipathy at home toward US military involvement in Southeast Asia and the beginning of Soviet naval challenges to US maritime dominance. Moyer marshalled available resources to counter the expansion of large Soviet task forces into the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Indian

Ocean. Despite fiscal constraints and the needs of the Vietnam War, he was particularly successful in modernizing US submarines to assure their continued technical superiority.

On 2 July 1970 Admiral Moorer became the seventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was the first naval officer to hold the post since Admiral Radford. As Chairman, Moorer often found his and the Chiefs' advice disregarded by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Nevertheless, he believed that the Chairman's position was sufficiently strong and that the joint system worked well; he saw no need to revamp JCS organization. According to Moorer, personalities, not organization charts, made all the difference.

In December 1971 the Secretary of Defense revised the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), the systems and procedures that linked the President and the field commanders. The chain for communicating commands continued to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs to the unified and specified commanders. For emergency and crisis situations, however, the Secretary specified a shortened chain through the Chairman representing the Chiefs. This change merely reflected the existing situation. In many Vietnam actions during his first eighteen months in office, Admiral Moorer had dealt directly with field commanders on operational issues. During the September 1970 Middle East crisis in which the regime of Jordan's pro-Western King Hussein was threatened, Moorer had acted for the Chiefs because time was critical and had informed them later.

When Moorer took office, the process of Vietnamization, whereby the Vietnamese assumed progressively greater responsibility for combat operations and US forces withdrew, had been under way for over a year. Although he and the Chiefs accepted the con-

cept of Vietnamization, they disagreed with the President and top civilian advisers over the pace of the US withdrawals. The Joint Chiefs favored smaller and slower US reductions to allow the South Vietnamese more time to adjust to their expanding combat role.

Moorer was particularly perturbed over the rules of engagement in Southeast Asia and the restraints placed on US military action there. He repeatedly recommended the mining of Haiphong harbor and heavy bombing around the Hanoi area. He and the Chiefs believed that increased naval and air pressure on North Vietnam would lead to a peace settlement, but their advice was rejected and US forces withdrew at a rate that the Joint Chiefs deemed "too much too soon." From nearly 415,000 troops in South Vietnam in 1970, troop strength declined to 25,000 by the end of 1972. In late 1972, President Richard Nixon directed naval and air bombardment of previously prohibited targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area, and on 27 January 1973 the North Vietnamese agreed to an accord. Moorer felt vindicated, since the military measures that he had long advocated had worked.

As JCS representative in the various NSC committees, Moorer was deeply involved in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). In May 1972 President Nixon went to Moscow for the final and climactic round of SALT. The afternoon and evening of 25 May witnessed tense exchanges of messages as the President sought JCS acceptance of the final terms negotiated in Moscow. Moorer recommended rejecting them to make the Soviets give more ground, but Nixon pressed strongly for JCS concurrence. Moorer then presided over a hastily arranged JCS conference from which a statement of their "accord" with the agreement finally emerged. Afterward, Moorer joked that he had gone through the entire dictionary to find this acceptable word.

Admiral Moorer also was concerned about declining conventional force levels. He saw force recommendations by the Joint Chiefs reduced by the President and then again by Congress and worried that conventional capabilities were being cut below the danger point. Repeatedly, during high-level meetings he warned that an essential element in any strategic equation was the communist threat, which was real and rising, and that the United States should enhance its ability to respond conventionally to that threat.

In October 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli forces in occupied territory that Israel had won from them during the 1967 Six Day War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supervised a large airlift of arms to Israel directed by President Nixon. Admiral Moorer

worried about whether the Arabs would turn to the Soviet Union and thereby imperil US access to Middle East oil. In fact, Israel won such successes against Egypt that the Soviet Union did threaten to intervene. At a midnight meeting in the White House, Moorer said bluntly that the Middle East would be the worst place to fight a war with the Soviet Union. He supported the administration's decisions, however, to deter Moscow by ordering a worldwide alert, stopping Israel's advance, and then restoring ties with the Arab states.

Admiral Moorer retired as Chairman on 1 July 1974. In retirement, he served as a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and on several corporate boards.

Thomas Hinman Moorer

Admiral, USN

Promotions

	Temporary	Permanent
ENS.		01 Jun 33
LTJG		01 Jun 36
LT.		23 Nov 40
LCDR		01 Oct 42
CDR		27 Apr 44
CAPT.		01 Jan 52
RADM		01 Aug 58
VADM		05 Oct 62
ADM		26 Jun 64

Assignments

	From	To
USS <i>Salt Lake City</i>	1933	1933
Navy Yard, New York, NY; CFO USS <i>New Orleans</i>	1933	1935
Student, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL.	1935	1936
Fighter Squadron ONE-B	1936	1937
Fighter Squadron SIX	1937	1939
Patrol Squadron 22.	1939	1942
Patrol Squadron 101	1942	1942
Transition Training Squadron, Atlantic Fleet	1942	1943
Commanding Officer, Bombing Squadron 132	1943	1944
Gunnery and Tactical Officer, Staff, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet	1944	1945
Member of Strategic Bombing Survey (Japan), Staff, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.	1945	1946
Executive Officer, Naval Aviation Ordnance Test Station, Chincoteague, VA	1946	1948
Operations Officer, USS <i>Midway</i>	1948	1949
Operations Officer, Carrier Division FOUR.	1949	1950
Experimental Officer, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokern, CA	1950	1951
Student, Naval War College, Newport, RI	1952	1953
Plans Officer, Staff, Commander Air Force, Atlantic Fleet	1953	1955
Aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, Washington, DC	1955	1956

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Commanding Officer, USS <i>Salisbury Sound</i>	1956	1957
Assistant Director, Strategic Plans Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1957	1958
Joint Operations Analysis Group, Washington, DC	1958	1958
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (War Gaming Matters), Washington, DC	1958	1959
Commander, Carrier Division SIX	1959	1960
Director, Long Range Objectives Group, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1960	1962
Commander, SEVENTH Fleet	1962	1964
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet.	1964	1965
Commander in Chief, Atlantic and Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic	1965	1967
Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1967	1970
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1970	1974

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 4 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Silver Star
Legion of Merit
Distinguished Flying Cross
Purple Heart



GEORGE SCRATCHLEY BROWN

1 July 1974 — 20 June 1978

George Brown was born in Montclair, New Jersey, on 17 August 1918. His father was a West Point graduate and career cavalry officer. After high school in Leavenworth, Kansas, Brown attended the University of Missouri. He then followed in his father's footsteps and entered the US Military Academy, where he excelled as a cadet captain, regimental adjutant, and polo player.

Following his 1941 graduation and primary and advanced flight training, Brown served as a bomber pilot in Europe during World War II. He participated in the famous low-level bombing raid against the oil refineries in Ploesti, Romania, in August 1943. When the lead plane and ten others of his forty-plane group were lost, Major Brown led the surviving planes back to base. He received the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism. Promotions came rapidly during World War II, and in October 1944 Brown attained the rank of colonel.

After the war, Colonel Brown served in a variety of command and staff billets. During the last year of the Korean War, he was Director of Operations of the Fifth Air Force in Seoul, Korea. After graduating from the National War College in 1957, Brown served as Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and then Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to brigadier general in August 1959 and served as Military Assistant to Secretaries of Defense Thomas Gates and Robert McNamara. Promoted to major general in April 1963, he commanded the Eastern Transport Air Force, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, from 1963 to 1964 and

General George S. Brown
United States Air Force



General Brown in the cockpit of a UH-1 helicopter in South Vietnam, October 1968.

Joint Task Force II, a JCS all-service weapons testing unit at Sandia Base, New Mexico, from 1964 to 1966. After promotion to lieutenant general in August 1966, Brown became Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two years later he received his fourth star.

From 1968 to 1970 General Brown served as Commander of the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam and Deputy Commander for Air Operations, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). Responsible for all US air operations in South Vietnam, which he coordinated with those of the South Vietnamese air force, Brown advised the MACV Commander on all matters pertaining to tactical air support. He returned to the

United States in 1970 and became Commander of Air Force Systems Command, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland.

On 1 August 1973 General Brown became the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In that position, he campaigned to upgrade the strategic bomber program. Brown pushed to replace the aging B-52s with B-1s, swing-wing aircraft that could carry the latest electronic equipment and twice the payload of the B-52s and penetrate deeper into Soviet territory.

Appointed by President Richard Nixon, General Brown became the eighth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 July 1974. He was the first Air Force officer since General Twining to fill the position. As Chairman,




General Brown visits US Marines during an exercise in Puerto Rico, February 1975.

Brown served under three Presidents during a period of limited budgets and constrained force structure.

A few months after becoming Chairman, General Brown made off-the-cuff remarks that led to a public rebuke by President Gerald R. Ford. In October 1974 during a question-and-answer session following a speech he had delivered at Duke University Law School, Brown suggested that Israel had undue influence over US national security policy and referred to the power of Jews and their money in the United States. When a public uproar followed, Brown apologized for his remarks. Nevertheless, in an interview published two years later, he made

similar comments as well as intemperate remarks about Britain and Iran. Despite this episode, President Ford and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld endorsed Brown's continuing as Chairman, and he served under President Jimmy Carter as well.

Strategic arms limitation talks took up much of General Brown's time as Chairman. He and the Chiefs stressed the need to maintain "essential equivalence," which meant finding a formula by which the US lead in missile re-entry vehicles would offset Soviet superiority in missile throw-weight. The Vladivostok accords of November 1974 established broad limits for both sides. Complex negotiations followed, centering on



General Brown with Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, November 1975.

trading ceilings on US cruise missiles for ceilings on Soviet Backfire bombers. These negotiations were nearing completion when General Brown retired.

After the US withdrawal from Vietnam, the South Vietnamese military was not successful in holding its own against the North Vietnamese forces. General Brown led the Joint Chiefs in urging US air and naval deployments to the area around South Vietnam to signal US support for the Saigon government. But public and congressional opposition to any further involvement in Vietnam precluded approval of any military action. Then in early March 1975, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive that quickly overran the South Vietnamese forces and climaxed with the fall of Saigon on 30 April.

General Brown participated in decision making over the US response to two con-

frontations in the Far East that were widely perceived as testing US will in the aftermath of the communist takeover of South Vietnam. On 12 May 1975, less than two weeks after the fall of Saigon, sailors of Cambodia's radical communist regime seized the US merchant ship *SS Mayaguez* on the high seas in the Gulf of Thailand. While jets from the carrier *USS Coral Sea* sank three Cambodian naval vessels and attacked a Cambodian air base, US Marines retook the ship and stormed Koh Tang Island, where they believed the crew was being held. This operation, which brought release of the crew, found wide support in the United States.

In August 1976, when North Korean guards killed two US officers and wounded several US and South Korean enlisted men trying to trim a tree in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) dividing the two Koreas, President

Ford, at the strong urging of General Brown and the Chiefs, reinforced US forces in and around South Korea. Meanwhile, a large party of US and South Korean soldiers entered the DMZ and cut down the tree, which was obscuring surveillance of the zone.

General Brown played a crucial role in the success of the 1977 negotiations to transfer ownership of the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama. His willingness to

make concessions to Panama, softening the US position, made it possible to reach an agreement, and his support for the agreement was instrumental in securing the treaty's ratification by the Senate in April 1978.

Stricken with cancer, General Brown retired from active duty on 20 June 1978, ten days before the expiration of his second term as Chairman. Less than six months later, on 5 December 1978, he died.

George Scratchley Brown

General, USAF


Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT		11 Jun 41
1LT	18 Jun 42	12 Jun 44
CPT.	20 Oct 42	
MAJ	13 Feb 43	03 Sep 48
LTC.	27 Aug 43.	12 Apr 51
COL	01 Oct 44	24 Apr 56
BG	01 Aug 59.	30 Jan 62
MG	01 Apr 63.	27 Feb 64
LTG.	01 Aug 66	
GEN	01 Aug 68	

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Student, Primary and Advanced Flying Schools, Pine Bluff, AR, and Kelly Field, TX	1941	1942
Pilot, B-24 Transportation Training, 344th Bombardment Squadron, Barksdale Field, LA	1942	1942
Pilot, B-24; Flight Commander, later Commander, 329th Bombardment Squadron, 93d Bombardment Group, Barksdale Field, LA; Fort Myers Army Air Base, FL; Grenier Field, NH; England, and later Libya	1942	1943
Air Executive Officer, 93d Bombardment Group, Libya, later England	1943	1944
Assistant Operations Officer, 2d Bombardment Division, England	1944	1945
Assistant to Air Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters, Army Air Force Training Command, Fort Worth, TX, later Barksdale Field, LA	1945	1946
Assistant to Air Chief of Staff, Operations, Air Defense Command (ADC), Mitchel Field, NY.	1946	1948
Assistant Deputy Chief for Operations, ADC (later Continental Air Command), Mitchel Air Force Base, NY	1948	1950

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Commander, 62d Troop Carrier Group, McChord Air Force Base, WA.	1950	1951
Commander, 56th Fighter Interceptor Wing, Air Defense Command; later Commander, 4708th Defense Wing, Selfridge Air Force Base, MI	1951	1952
Assistant Director and later Director of Operations, Fifth Air Force, Korea	1952	1953
Commander, 3525th Pilot Training Wing, Williams Air Force Base, AZ	1953	1956
Student, National War College, Washington, DC. . .	1956	1957
Executive Assistant to Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Washington, DC	1957	1959
Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	1959	1959
Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	1959	1963
Commander, Eastern Transport Air Force, McGuire Air Force Base, NJ.	1963	1964
Commander, Joint Task Force II, Sandia Base, NM. .	1964	1966
Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1966	1968
Commander, Seventh Air Force and Deputy Commander for Air Operations, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.	1968	1970
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, Andrews Air Force Base, MD.	1970	1973
Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Washington, DC.	1973	1974
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. . .	1974	1978

Principal US Military Decorations

- Distinguished Service Cross
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
- Silver Star
- Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
- Distinguished Flying Cross (with oak leaf cluster)
- Bronze Star
- Air Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal



DAVID CHARLES JONES


21 June 1978 — 18 June 1982

David Jones was born on 9 July 1921 in Aberdeen, South Dakota. He grew up in Minot, North Dakota, where he often rode his bicycle to a nearby airfield and dreamed of becoming a combat pilot. After graduating from the local high school, he attended the University of North Dakota and Minot State College. Jones left college in April 1942, volunteering for the US Army Air Corps. An aviation cadet, he earned his commission and pilot wings in 1943.

After serving as a flying instructor in New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas, Lieutenant Jones was assigned to the 3d Emergency Rescue Squadron of the Fifth Air Force in Japan in 1945. He began as a unit pilot, flying Catalina flying boats, and rose to command the squadron. He was promoted to captain in April 1946. From 1948 to 1949 Jones was a unit instructor and then Assistant Operations and Training Officer with the 2236th Air Force Reserve Training Center, Godman Field, Kentucky. During this period, he also attended the Air Tactical School at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida; the Atomic Energy Course at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi; and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Course at Sandia Base, New Mexico.

Assigned to the 19th Bombardment Squadron at March Air Force Base, California, in January 1950, Jones was promoted to major in February 1951. During his three and one-half years with the 19th, he rose to aircraft commander, then operations officer, and finally commander of the squadron. He flew more than three hundred hours on combat missions over North Korea when the squadron was one of the first bombardment units committed to the

General David C. Jones
United States Air Force



Captain Jones following award of the Distinguished Flying Cross, October 1950.

Korean War. In May 1953 Jones transitioned from bombers to tankers, taking command of the 22d Air Refueling Squadron at March. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in June 1953, he remained at March but returned to bombers the following year as Commander of the 33d Bombardment Squadron.

Jones served at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command (SAC), Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, during SAC's buildup. Assigned in September 1954, he was an operations planner in the Bomber Mission Branch until January 1955, when the SAC Commander in Chief, General Curtis LeMay, selected him as

his aide. Promoted in April 1957, Colonel Jones became Director of Materiel and later Deputy Commander for Maintenance of SAC's 93d Bombardment Wing at Castle Air Force Base, California.

After graduating from the National War College in 1960, Jones was assigned to the Air Staff's Operations Directorate for four years. As Chief of the Manned Systems Branch, he worked on the B-70 bomber project. He next served as Deputy Chief and then Chief of the Strategic Division. After F-100 and F-4 training, he assumed command of the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base,



General Jones, as Air Force Chief of Staff, greets President Gerald R. Ford, 1975. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements look on.

Florida, at its activation in 1965 and brought it to operationally ready status.

Jones then served in key staff assignments with US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). In October 1965 he became USAFE Inspector General, responsible for inspecting units at over ninety installations in ten countries. He was promoted to brigadier general in December 1965. In January 1967 he became USAFE Chief of Staff and in June Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. He received his second star in November 1967.

In February 1969, Jones was assigned to Headquarters, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Airfield, Republic of Vietnam, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. He became Vice Commander in June. Promoted to lieutenant general, he returned to SAC in August 1969 as Commander of the Second Air Force, headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.

In April 1971 Jones returned to USAFE as Vice Commander in Chief. He assumed command of USAFE and Fourth Allied Tactical

Air Force in August and was promoted to general in September. In his NATO capacity as Commander of Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, General Jones directed an international planning team that integrated Central Region air forces into a more cohesive organization. Central to this effort was his creation of a small operational and planning headquarters, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe.

After a career which had included operational and command positions in bomber, tanker, training, and tactical fighter units as well as headquarters staff positions, General Jones became Chief of Staff of the Air Force in July 1974. In that position, he advocated the development of high-technology weapons systems, reorganized the Air Force command structure, and substantially reduced headquarters staffs. Appointed by President Richard M. Nixon, General Jones subsequently developed a close working relationship with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and President Jimmy Carter. In April 1978 Carter nominated him to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


The nomination was controversial. Critics in the military and Congress argued that Jones should have fought to reverse the President's 1977 decision to cancel the B-1 bomber. General Jones, however, believed that the Air Force's earlier efforts to prove the error of President John F. Kennedy's decision to cancel the B-70 had been detrimental to the long-term interests of the service. Although Jones was a strong advocate of the B-1, he maintained that it was wrong to try to overturn the decision of the Commander in Chief.

General Jones became the ninth Chairman on 21 June 1978. He was the only Chairman who was not a college or service academy graduate. Jones served four years under two Presidents. With the four years that he had served as Air Force Chief of Staff, his tenure on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was longer

than that of any other member in JCS history. He presided over the Joint Chiefs of Staff during a period of increasing Soviet military power and the emergence of militant Islam as a threat to pro-Western regimes in the Persian Gulf region. His tenure as Chairman saw increased funding for defense in response to the Soviet threat and continuing JCS advocacy of strategic force modernization despite progress on strategic arms control.

Jones accompanied President Carter to Vienna in June 1979 for the final stage of the SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union. While the Joint Chiefs had reservations about aspects of the completed agreement, Jones's congressional testimony reflected their view that the limitations it imposed did not themselves pose a danger to the United States. He cautioned, however, that maintenance of strategic parity within these limits required ongoing strategic modernization and warned that there was a risk that SALT II could become "a tranquilizer to the American people." On balance, the Joint Chiefs judged the agreement to be "adequately verifiable" and recommended its ratification. However, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 doomed already slim prospects for Senate approval, and President Carter withdrew the agreement.

When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raised fears that Soviet forces there might move into neighboring Iran, where an anti-Western militant Islamic regime had taken power in early 1979, President Carter created a rapid deployment force (RDF) for Southwest Asia to counter any such attempt in the region. Subsequently, at the Secretary of Defense's direction, General Jones oversaw planning for the transformation of the RDF into a regional unified command. Planning for what in 1983 became the US Central Command was essentially completed during his chairmanship.



General Jones with General John W. Vessey, Jr., 1982.

After Iran refused to release US Embassy personnel taken hostage during the November 1979 seizure of the embassy by followers of Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, President Carter in early 1980 directed the JCS

to plan a rescue effort. General Jones oversaw the planning, which was accomplished in secrecy outside the existing command structure; the result was a proposal for a multi-service mission involving Air Force transports,

Army commandos, and Navy helicopters piloted by Marines. The President approved the mission after General Jones informed him that the JCS believed that the plan was militarily feasible and had a good chance of succeeding. When mechanical problems and weather conditions caused failures or crashes of several aircraft, the mission was aborted. Congressional and Defense Department investigations found that lack of joint training and joint command and control at the tactical level had contributed to the failure. In response, the Joint Chiefs in August 1980 established a counterterrorist joint task force as a field operating agency to conduct extensive training in joint planning and command and control.

General Jones bore the brunt of criticism for the failure of the hostage rescue mission. When President Carter nominated him for a second term, congressional opponents attacked Jones both for the failure of the raid and for his support of the administration's defense and foreign policies. However, on 19 June 1980 the Senate voted overwhelmingly to confirm him. After Ronald Reagan's victory in

the November 1980 presidential election, critics of Jones launched a campaign to persuade Reagan to dismiss the Chairman. But President Reagan decided to retain Jones.

General Jones had become increasingly dissatisfied with the operation of the joint system. During his last year as Chairman, he conducted an extensive review of the system's structural problems. This resulted in a proposal for changes to the National Security Act to improve the quality and timeliness of military advice and the combined readiness and effectiveness of the nation's combat forces. His central recommendation was that the Chairman, rather than the corporate JCS, should be the principal military adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense. His proposal for JCS reform prompted the most active debate on defense organizational issues since the 1950s. After his retirement on 18 June 1982, General Jones continued to be an active participant in this debate. He saw his ideas come to fruition with the 1986 passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

David Charles Jones

General, USAF

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT		06 Feb 43
1LT	28 Feb 44	06 Feb 46
CPT.	11 Apr 46	25 Oct 48
MAJ	05 Feb 51	23 Jan 52
LTC.	01 Jun 53	01 Jul 59
COL	23 Apr 57	22 Dec 60
BG	01 Dec 65	10 Feb 66
MG	01 Nov 67.	24 Jan 69
LTG.	01 Aug 69	
GEN	01 Sep 71	

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Aviation Cadet, Roswell, NM; Advanced Flying Instructor, Roswell, NM; Yuma, AZ; Pecos, TX; and Hobbs, NM	1942	1945
Pilot; Operations and Training Officer; Commander, 3d Emergency Rescue Squadron, Fifth Air Force, Japan	1945	1948
Unit Instructor, 2235th Air Force Rescue Training Center, Godman Field, KY	1948	1949
Student, Air Tactical School, Tyndall Air Force Base, FL	1949	1949
Student, Atomic Energy Course, Keesler Air Force Base, MS	1949	1949
Assistant Operations and Training Officer, Godman Field, KY	1949	1949
Student, Special Weapons Course, Sandia Base, NM	1949	1950
Pilot and Operations Officer; Commander, 19th Bombardment Squadron, March Air Force Base, CA, and Okinawa	1950	1953
Commander, 22d Air Refueling Squadron, March Air Force Base, CA.	1953	1954
Commander, 33d Bombardment Squadron, March Air Force Base, CA.	1954	1954

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Operations Planner, Bomber Mission Branch, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE	1954	1954
Aide to Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE	1955	1957
Director of Materiel; Deputy Commander for Maintenance, 93d Bombardment Wing, Castle Air Force Base, CA	1957	1959
Student, National War College, Washington, DC.	1959	1960
Chief, Manned Systems Branch; Deputy Chief and then Chief, Strategic Division, Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, Headquarters, US Air Force, Washington, DC	1960	1964
Student, USAF Operations Training Course, Luke and Davis-Monthan Air Force Bases, AZ.	1964	1965
Commander, 33d Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, FL	1965	1965
Inspector General, Chief of Staff, and Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations, Headquarters, US Air Forces Europe, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany	1965	1969
Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations and Vice Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam	1969	1969
Commander, Second Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, LA	1969	1971
Vice Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany	1971	1971
Commander in Chief, US Air Forces, Europe, Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany (Ramstein Air Base, Germany after March 1973) and Commander, Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces, Ramstein Air Base, Germany	1971	1974
Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Washington, DC.	1974	1978
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1978	1982

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)

Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)

Legion of Merit

Distinguished Flying Cross

Bronze Star

Air Medal (with oak leaf cluster)

Air Force Commendation Medal



JOHN WILLIAM VESSEY, JR.


18 June 1982 — 30 September 1985

John Vessey, Jr., was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 29 June 1922. In May 1939, thirteen months before he graduated from Roosevelt High School, he enlisted in the Minnesota National Guard as a motorcycle rider. His unit was activated in February 1941.

During World War II, Vessey served with the 34th Infantry Division. The experience of early American setbacks in North Africa left Vessey with a life-long appreciation of the need for realistic combat training, modern equipment, physical fitness, and air-ground cooperation. When Major General Omar Bradley, Commander of II Corps in North Africa, launched the US drive on Bizerte in April 1943, he gave the 34th the most difficult obstacle: the well-defended Hill 609. In the first clear-cut US Army victory of the campaign, the 34th Division took its objective, opening the way for the US advance on Bizerte. Vessey, who had been a first sergeant since 1 September 1942, later described being a first sergeant in combat as the "toughest job" he had. He was with the 34th when it entered the Anzio beachhead in Italy in May 1944; there he received a battlefield commission as a second lieutenant, serving as a forward observer.

After the war, most of Vessey's service continued to be in field artillery assignments. In the 1950s he served with the 4th Infantry Division in Germany and the Eighth US Army in the Republic of Korea. During this period he also attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

General John W. Vessey, Jr.
United States Army



Sergeant Vessey in World War II.

By the time Vessey became a lieutenant colonel, he had earned enough credits through night school and correspondence courses for a bachelor of science degree, which he received from the University of Maryland in 1963. In 1965 he received a master of science from George Washington University. From 1963 to 1965 Vessey commanded the 2d Battalion, 73d Field Artillery in the 3d Armored Division; then he spent a year as a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

During the Vietnam War, Vessey served for a year as Executive Officer of the 25th Infantry Division Artillery in Vietnam. In

March 1967, when acting as Commander of the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery, he was given the mission of establishing a fire support base at Suoi Tre during Operation JUNCTION CITY. Located deep in enemy-controlled territory, Vessey and his men oriented the fire-base's defenses on the enemy's likely avenues of approach and rehearsed counterattack plans. During the attack by a reinforced regiment, the base was partially overrun. Vessey and his men fired their howitzers directly into the enemy ranks. Although greatly outnumbered, the defenders, aided by gunships and artillery, killed four hundred of their assailants while successfully defending the



General Vessey and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger at a congressional hearing, February 1983.

firebase. Lieutenant Colonel Vessey received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the battle.

From Vietnam, he went to Germany, to serve first as Commander of the 3d Armored Division Artillery from October 1967 until March 1969 and then as Division Chief of Staff

for a year. He was promoted to colonel in November 1967. Vessey went back to Southeast Asia in December 1970 to head the US Army Support Command, Thailand. In January 1972 he went into Laos to coordinate all US military operations in support of the war in Laos. Vessey worked with the US ambassador,

the CIA station chief, and an assortment of military contingents. When the Laotian cease-fire came in February 1973, the Royal Lao government controlled all major cities and the vast majority of the population.

Upon his return to the United States, Vessey became Director of Operations in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Promoted to major general in August 1974, he assumed command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado. Promoted to lieutenant general in September 1975, he became the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

Vessey received his fourth star in November 1976. From 1976 to 1979 he served in the Republic of Korea as Commanding General of the Eighth US Army; Commander of US Forces, Korea; and Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. In 1978 he became the first Commander in Chief of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command. His tour was marked by increased tension caused by evidence of a North Korean buildup and by President Jimmy Carter's 1977 announcement that US ground forces would be withdrawn. Vessey worked to assuage South Korean concerns and change the President's decision. After Carter's 1979 visit, withdrawal plans were suspended and then cancelled.

From July 1979 until June 1982 General Vessey served as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. On 18 June 1982 he became the tenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the last World War II combat veteran to serve in the position. General Vessey was the only Chairman who had been neither a Service Chief nor a commander of a unified or specified command. He served as Chairman during a period of unprecedented growth in peacetime defense spending and an expanded US


military presence worldwide intended to counter growing Soviet military power.

Vessey and the Service Chiefs believed that their overriding task lay in convincing Soviet leaders that their quest for military superiority and geostrategic advantage was fruitless. In Europe, they pushed the controversial but successful deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles to offset the Soviet SS-20 missiles. In Southwest Asia, highly visible US military activities underscored the US commitment to defend its vital interests in the region. In Central America, training and intelligence were provided to support counterinsurgency efforts.

Believing that it was a mistake to commit a superpower's forces to a peacekeeping mission, Vessey and the Joint Chiefs in 1982 and 1983 advised against deployment of a Marine contingent to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force intended to restore peace among warring factions there. Their advice was not taken, and on 23 October 1983 a terrorist attack on the Marine headquarters building in Beirut killed 241 Marines. In late February 1984 President Reagan withdrew the contingent from Lebanon.

Vessey stressed the need for improvement of war plans and, for the first time, JCS members along with commanders of unified and specified commands personally participated in war games. Realizing the need to strengthen the joint system, Vessey and the Service Chiefs improved Joint Staff operations by adding a capability for budgetary analysis and by improving the quality of its personnel, changes that did not require legislation.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger understood the importance of decentralization; he authorized Vessey to direct military operations on the Secretary's behalf. The 1983 Grenada operation, for example, was planned by Atlantic Command, reviewed by the JCS, and approved by Secretary Weinberger and



General Vessey briefs President Ronald Reagan at the White House, 1985. *Left to right:* Donald Regan, White House Chief of Staff; Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense; President Reagan; Vice President George Bush; Robert McFarlane, Assistant for National Security Affairs; and General Vessey

the President—all in four days. Vessey oversaw execution of the operation that rescued US citizens and brought a pro-US government into power.

During Vessey's tenure there was increased emphasis on space as a theater of operations. In early 1983 the Joint Chiefs mentioned to the President that defense against nuclear-armed missiles might be technically feasible in the next century. To their surprise, Reagan seized upon the concept and on 23 March 1983 announced his vision of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Realizing the enormous military advantages to be gained from operations in space and to support SDI, the JCS

recommended the establishment of a unified command for space. US Space Command was activated on 23 September 1985.

General Vessey retired on 30 September 1985, several months before the expiration of his second term as Chairman. He was the last four-star World War II combat veteran on active duty and, with forty-six years of service, had served the longest of anyone then in the Army. In retirement, he served President Reagan and his successors, Presidents George Bush and William J. Clinton, as a special emissary to Vietnam on the question of American service personnel missing from the Vietnam War.

John William Vessey, Jr.

General, USA

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT	06 May 44	
1LT	01 Apr 46	13 Jun 51
CPT	04 Jan 51.	29 Oct 54
MAJ	14 May 58	26 Jan 62
LTC	07 Jan 63.	02 Jan 69
COL	28 Nov 67.	12 Mar 73
BG	01 Apr 71	23 Dec 74
MG	01 Aug 74.	23 Aug 76
LTG.	01 Sep 75	
GEN	01 Nov 76	

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
National Guard enlisted service	1939	1941
34th Division Artillery, Camp Claiborne, LA, Northern Ireland, North Africa, and Italy as S/Sgt, 1st Sgt, and then battlefield commission to 2Lt (Communications Officer/Forward Observer/Air Observer).	1941	1945
US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK	1945	1949
Student, Field Artillery Officers Advanced Course, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK	1949	1950
Battery Officer; then Battery Commander, 18th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, OK	1950	1951
Assistant S-3 and Liaison Officer; then Headquarters Battery Commander; then Assistant S-3 and Liaison Officer, 4th Infantry Division Artillery, US Army, Europe.	1951	1954
Student, Artillery Officer Advanced Course, Artillery and Guided Missile School, Fort Sill, OK.	1954	1955
Battery Commander, Artillery and Guided Missile School Officer Candidate School	1955	1956
Gunnery Instructor, Artillery and Guided Missile School, Fort Sill, OK	1956	1957
Student, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1957	1958
Artillery Section, Eighth US Army with duty station CINCPAC Coordination Center, Philippines	1958	1958
Chief, Operations Branch, Artillery Section, Eighth US Army, Korea	1958	1959

Assignment Officer, then Executive Officer,
 Artillery Officers Division, Office of Deputy
 Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, DC. . . 1959 1963
 Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA. . . 1963 1963
 Commander, 2d Battalion, 73d Artillery,
 3d Armored Division, US Army, Europe 1963 1965
 Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
 Washington, DC 1965 1966
 Executive Officer, 25th Infantry Division Artillery,
 Vietnam 1966 1967
 Commander, 3d Armored Division Artillery,
 US Army, Europe. 1967 1969
 Chief of Staff, 3d Armored Division,
 US Army, Europe. 1969 1970
 Student, US Army Primary Helicopter School,
 Fort Wolters, TX; later US Army Aviation
 School, Fort Rucker, AL 1970 1970
 Commanding General, US Army Support
 Command, Thailand 1970 1971
 Deputy Chief, JUSMAGTHAI (Chief MAAG, Laos). 1972 1973
 Director of Operations, Office Deputy Chief of Staff
 for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC 1973 1974
 Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division
 (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO. 1974 1975
 Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
 US Army, Washington, DC 1975 1976
 Commanding General, Eighth US Army; and
 Commander in Chief, US Forces, Korea; and
 Commander in Chief, United Nations Command;
 and (1978) Commander in Chief, Republic of
 Korea-United States Combined Forces
 Command, Korea. 1976 1979
 Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC 1979 1982
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC. . . 1982 1985

Principal US Military Decorations

Distinguished Service Cross
 Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
 Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
 Navy Distinguished Service Medal
 Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
 Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
 Bronze Star (with oak leaf cluster)
 Air Medal (with 4 oak leaf clusters)
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Army Commendation Medal (with "V" device)
 Purple Heart



WILLIAM JAMES CROWE, JR.

1 October 1985 — 30 September 1989

William Crowe was born on 2 January 1925 in La Grange, Kentucky, and grew up in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. After graduating from Classen High School, he attended the University of Oklahoma. Inspired in part by his father's experiences in the Navy during World War I, Crowe entered the US Naval Academy, graduating in 1946 with the class of 1947.

His initial sea tour was aboard the USS *Carmick* (DMS-33). After completing submarine school in 1948, he qualified in submarines in March 1950 in the diesel submarine USS *Flying Fish* (SS-29). Almost all of his sea assignments over the next decade were on diesel submarines. In 1951 and 1952 Crowe served as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander of the US Atlantic Fleet's Submarine Force at New London, Connecticut.

After promotion to lieutenant in 1952 and another submarine tour, he served from 1954 to 1955 as Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President. During this tour he attended George Washington University Law School at night. Crowe's assignment in Washington kindled an interest in the study of government, and he began to rethink his Navy career path. Enrolling in the only full-time graduate program then available in the Navy, he received a master's in personnel administration from Stanford University in 1956.

From Stanford, Crowe returned to sea as Executive Officer of the USS *Wahoo* (SS-565) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Promoted to lieutenant commander in January 1958, he became personal aide to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations the following autumn. This appointment introduced him to the Navy's role in international politics and set his career direction.

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
United States Navy



Midshipman Crowe, 1946.

In 1960 Crowe received his first command: the Navy's newest diesel submarine, the USS *Trout* (SS-566), based in Charleston, South Carolina. Promoted to commander in 1962, he was selected that year as one of the Navy's first candidates for a doctorate in the social sciences. Even the possibility of joining the prestigious nuclear submarine program did not dissuade him from his decision to pursue graduate studies. Crowe received a master's and a doctorate in politics from Princeton University.

After he received his Ph.D. in 1965, he returned to submarine duty as Chief of Staff

to the Commander of Submarine Squadron THREE in San Diego, California. At the end of 1966 he was promoted to Commander of Division 31, which concentrated on anti-submarine operations. In 1967 he left San Diego to return to the Plans and Policy Deputy's Office, where he headed the East Asia and Pacific Branch of the Politico-Military Policy Division and was promoted to captain in July 1967. After the North Korean capture of the USS *Pueblo* in January 1968, he acted as the Navy's liaison with the State Department. His office drafted the repatriation plan for the captured crew, and, at the direction of Chief

of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Thomas Moorer, Crowe conducted the investigation of the crew's treatment during captivity.

In 1970, at the age of 44, Crowe volunteered for service in Vietnam. He served first as an adviser and then as Senior Adviser to the Vietnamese Riverine Force in the Mekong Delta. He returned to Washington in 1971 as Director of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations and Deputy to the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations in the Interior Department, an appointment which recognized his policy experience but seemed likely to sidetrack his career. However, the head of the 1973 rear admiral selection board argued that Crowe's experience as an advocate should outweigh his relative lack of sea duty. This coincided with a push by CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt for the promotion of officers with wider ranges of experience, and Crowe was promoted in July 1973.

Rear Admiral Crowe returned to the Pentagon, where he served as Deputy Director of the Strategic Plans, Policy and Nuclear Systems Division in the CNO's Office and then as Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In June 1976 he assumed command of the Middle East Force, based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.

Promoted to Vice Admiral in August 1977, he was appointed the Navy's Plans, Policy and Operations Deputy. After receiving his fourth star, Admiral Crowe became Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe in May 1980 and assumed the additional responsibility of Commander in Chief of US Naval Forces, Europe in January 1983.

In July 1983 he became Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command. When President Ronald Reagan stopped in Hawaii en route to China in the spring of 1984, he was so impressed with Crowe's briefing on the mili-

tary situation in the Far East that he reportedly told Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that if another Chairman was needed, he had found him. When General Vessey decided to retire, Reagan named Crowe to replace him.

Admiral Crowe became the eleventh Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1985. He was the first since Admiral Radford to come directly from the helm of a unified command. On 1 October 1986 he became the first Chairman to serve under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which transferred considerable authority from the corporate JCS to the Chairman. After the law came into force, Crowe made the transition from being first among equals on the corporate body to being the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council.

Admiral Crowe came to the chairmanship at a time of increasing international terrorism. When Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* a week after he was sworn in, US efforts to obtain custody of the hijackers were frustrated. Then, in December Americans were among those killed during terrorist assaults on the Rome and Vienna airports. In addition, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, a principal sponsor of terrorism, had proclaimed a "Line of Death" one hundred miles off Libya's shore—well beyond its internationally recognized territorial waters.

On Crowe's recommendation, the United States responded by adopting new rules of engagement; US units were allowed to respond to apparent threats rather than waiting until they were fired upon. This change led to the sinking of two Libyan patrol boats during a March 1986 Sixth Fleet exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. A week later, when terrorists bombed a West Berlin discotheque frequented



Admiral Crowe, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, at a briefing during a NATO exercise, 1981.

by American soldiers, the United States attributed the attack to Qaddafi, and the Reagan administration decided to retaliate.

In deliberations over the US response, Crowe argued that the focus should be on Qaddafi's military capability. Although the decision to launch a night air strike that included command and control and terrorist targets resulted in an operation that was neither as focused nor as massive as Crowe had recommended, the 26 April raid on Libya led to an immediate reduction in the Libyan military presence in the Gulf of Sidra and in Libya's terrorist activities.

In October 1986 at a meeting with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reyk-

javik, Iceland, President Reagan, without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed the elimination of all intercontinental ballistic missiles in ten years. Gorbachev accepted the proposal, but the summit adjourned without an agreement. On the President's return to Washington, the administration did not discuss the proposals with the Joint Chiefs. Nevertheless, Admiral Crowe thought that he had to bring the issue before the Chiefs. They agreed that the President's proposal was "completely unacceptable" from the point of view of US national security.

With only lukewarm support from Secretary Weinberger, who believed that the zero-ballistic-missile (ZBM) proposal would not be




Admiral Crowe welcomes Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, to "The Tank," the JCS Conference Room in the Pentagon, 8 July 1988.

pursued, Crowe initiated discussion of the subject in a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). He informed the President that the Joint Chiefs believed that it would be ill-advised to proceed with the ZBM proposal. The concept was, in fact, not pursued, and Admiral Crowe believed that his speaking out at the meeting bolstered his relationship with the other members of the NSPG.

During Crowe's tenure as Chairman there was heightened tension in the Persian Gulf region as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. In 1987 he was actively involved in the planning for Operation EARNEST WILL, the US reflag-

ging and convoying of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf to protect them from Iranian attack. Using the increased authority that Goldwater-Nichols gave the Chairman to design command and control arrangements, Crowe created a joint task force to conduct the operation. In July 1988, when the USS *Vincennes* mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian airliner, Crowe, supported by Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, urged immediate public disclosure of the shutdown. When the Secretary of State and the President agreed, Crowe was given the responsibility of making the announcement.



Admiral Crowe conducts a press briefing, June 1989.

With the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, Admiral Crowe initiated a historic dialogue with his Soviet counterpart. When Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev was in Washington in December 1987 for the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Crowe invited him to the Pentagon, where Akhromeyev met with the Chairman and the other JCS members in "The Tank." A private Crowe-Akhromeyev meeting led to an agreement designed to prevent accidental armed conflict between US and Soviet armed forces and to a formal program of military-to-military dialogue between the services of the two countries. In the summer of 1988 Akhromeyev and the Soviet Service Vice Chiefs visited the United States at Crowe's

invitation. When Crowe and the US Service Vice Chiefs returned the visit in June 1989, he and Akhromeyev's successor, General Mikhail Moiseyev, signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities and a military-to-military contacts agreement. Crowe's initiatives did much to hasten the thaw in the Cold War.

Admiral Crowe retired on 30 September 1989. After retiring, he served as counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, and was a professor of geopolitics at the University of Oklahoma. President William J. Clinton appointed him Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1993. In May 1994 he became US Ambassador to the Court of St. James.

William James Crowe, Jr.

Admiral, USN

Promotions

	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
ENS.		05 Jun 46
LTJG		05 Jun 49
LT.		01 Jun 52
LCDR		01 Jan 58
CDR		01 Jul 62
CAPT.		01 Jul 67
RADM	25 Jul 73.	01 Jun 74
VADM	23 Aug 77	
ADM.	30 May 80	

Assignments


	Dates	
	From	To
USS <i>Carmick</i>	1946	1946
Naval Mine Warfare School, Yorktown, VA	1946	1946
USS <i>Carmick</i>	1947	1948
Naval Submarine School, Submarine Base, New London, CT.	1948	1948
USS <i>Flying Fish</i>	1948	1951
Staff, Commander Submarine Force, US Atlantic Fleet	1951	1952
USS <i>Clamagore</i>	1952	1954
Naval Administrative Unit, Potomac River Naval Command	1954	1955
Student, Stanford University	1955	1956
Executive Officer, USS <i>Wahoo</i>	1956	1958
Head, New Development/Special Weapons Branch, Personnel Research Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC	1958	1959
Aide to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy), Washington, DC	1959	1960
Commanding Officer, USS <i>Trout</i>	1960	1962
Student, Princeton University	1962	1965
Staff, Commander Submarine Squadron THREE.	1965	1966
Commander, Submarine Division 31.	1966	1967
Head, East Asia and Pacific Branch, Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1967	1970

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Senior Adviser, Amphibious Task Force 211 and Commander, Task Force 210; Senior Adviser, Deputy Commander, Tran Hung Dao, Binh Thuy, from 6 Apr 1971 to 20 Aug 1971, US Naval Forces, Vietnam and Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	1970	1971
Director, Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations and Deputy to President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Department of Interior, Washington, DC	1971	1973
Deputy Director, Strategic Plans, Policy and Nuclear Systems Division, Office of Chief Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1973	1974
Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Washington, DC	1974	1976
Commander, Middle East Force	1976	1977
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations and Senior Navy Member, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee, Washington, DC	1977	1980
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe	1980	1983
Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (redesignated US Pacific Command on 11 October 1983)	1983	1985
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1985	1989

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 oak leaf clusters)
Bronze Star (with combat "V")
Air Medal



COLIN LUTHER POWELL

1 October 1989 — 30 September 1993

Colin Luther Powell, the son of Jamaican immigrants, was born on 5 April 1937 in the Harlem section of New York City. He grew up in the South Bronx, where he graduated from Morris High School. At sixteen he entered the City College of New York. Attracted by the panache of the Pershing Rifles drill team, he joined the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). There he found a sense of direction. He became company commander of the Pershing Rifles, attained ROTC's highest rank of cadet colonel, and was named a "distinguished military graduate." When he graduated in 1958 with a bachelor of science in geology, Powell was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Regular Army.

During the next decade Powell mastered infantry tactics and unit leadership. After completing Infantry Officer Basic, Ranger, and Airborne schools, he joined the 3d Armored Division in West Germany as a platoon leader. He then transferred to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to command a company of the 5th Infantry Division and in 1962 was promoted to captain.

From December 1962 to November 1963 Powell was assigned to Vietnam, where he served as an adviser to a South Vietnamese infantry battalion. Wounded during this tour, he received a Purple Heart. On his return, he completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia; was promoted to major in 1966; and the following year became an instructor at the Infantry School. In 1968 he graduated from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, second in a class of 1,244.

General Colin L. Powell
United States Army



ROTC Cadet Sergeant First Class Powell, 1957.

In June 1968 Major Powell returned to Vietnam, serving first as a battalion executive officer and then as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G-3), and later deputy G-3 with the 23d Infantry Division (Americal). During this tour he received the Soldier's Medal for repeatedly returning to a burning helicopter to rescue others despite being injured himself.

Powell spent 1969 to 1973 in Washington, DC. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1970, he received a master's in business administration from George Washington University in 1971. In 1971 and 1972 he worked as an operations research analyst in the Planning,

Programming and Analysis Directorate in the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Selected in 1972 as one of seventeen White House Fellows from among 1,500 applicants, he was assigned to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as Special Assistant to the Deputy Director.

Lieutenant Colonel Powell returned to a troop assignment in September 1973 as Commander of the 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, guarding the Demilitarized Zone in the Republic of Korea. His next assignment, from 1974 to 1975, was as an operations research systems analyst in



Lieutenant Colonel Powell as a battalion commander in South Korea.

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. During 1975 and 1976 he was a student at the National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. Promoted to colonel in 1976, Powell assumed command of the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in April of that year.

Colonel Powell returned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in July 1977 as Executive to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. After promotion to brigadier general in 1979 he continued in OSD as Senior Military Assistant

to the Deputy Secretary until June 1981, when he became Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado. In August 1982 General Powell became the Deputy Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

In July 1983 he returned to the Pentagon as Senior Military Assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Promoted to major general the following month, Powell continued as Weinberger's assistant until June 1986, when he assumed command of V



Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney swears in General Powell as the twelfth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 October 1989.

Corps in Europe. He was promoted to lieutenant general in July.

Six months later, President Ronald Reagan summoned him to become the Deputy National Security Adviser under Frank Carlucci, for whom Powell had worked at OMB and in OSD. When Carlucci became Secretary of Defense, General Powell replaced him as National Security Adviser. He served in this position from December 1987 until the end of the Reagan presidency in January 1989. During this time he organized and coordinated

several summit meetings between President Reagan and other world leaders.

In April 1989 Powell received his fourth star and became Commander in Chief of Forces Command (CINCFOR), Fort McPherson, Georgia, responsible for the general reserve of US-based Army forces. Within months of his appointment as CINCFOR, President George Bush selected General Powell to be the twelfth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Powell became Chairman on 1 October 1989, he was the first African-



General Powell briefs the press during Operation DESERT STORM, 1991.

American, the first ROTC graduate, and, at 52, the youngest officer to serve in the position.

General Powell's tenure as Chairman coincided with the end of the Cold War; his chairmanship saw more change in the world than that of any of his predecessors. Powell was the principal architect of the reorientation of US strategy and the reduction of the armed forces in response to the changed strategic environment. He directed the most significant change in national military strategy since the late 1940s, devising a strategy which focused

on regional and humanitarian crises rather than on the Soviet Union. Powell's concept of a "base force" sufficient to maintain the United States' superpower status won Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's and President Bush's support for a twenty-five percent reduction in the size of the armed forces.

The first Chairman to serve his whole tenure under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense reforms, Powell devoted considerable energy to promoting joint culture in order to enhance the services' ability to

fight together as a team. He guided the development of doctrine for joint warfare and was the driving force behind the expansion of the Atlantic Command's responsibilities, which transformed it from a principally naval headquarters into one with responsibility for ground and air forces based in the continental United States as well as East Coast naval forces. When the new US Atlantic Command (USACOM) came into existence on 1 October 1993, the day after Powell's retirement, it was a joint command designed to meet the military requirements of the post-Cold War world.

During Powell's chairmanship, the US Armed Forces made over two dozen operational deployments. An attempted coup against the Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega on 3 October 1989 almost postponed Powell's welcoming ceremony at the Pentagon. Over the next two months, the Chairman worked with the Commander in Chief of US Southern Command to develop a contingency plan that would provide a large force should President Bush decide to intervene in Panama. After Panama declared a state of war with the United States and Panamanian soldiers killed an American officer and manhandled another officer and his wife, President Bush ordered the deployment of approximately 14,000 troops to Panama in late December. They joined almost 13,000 troops already there to execute Operation JUST CAUSE, which resulted in the defeat of the Panamanian forces and the downfall of Noriega.

General Powell played a central role in the preparation for and conduct of the Persian Gulf War. In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, President Bush ordered the deployment of some 250,000 US troops to Saudi Arabia in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Powell advised keeping all options open, exerting diplomatic and economic pressure while building up sufficient

forces in the region to assure quick victory if the United States and its coalition partners concluded that military action was necessary. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not withdraw his forces from Kuwait, Powell endorsed the President's decision to launch an offensive—Operation DESERT STORM—in January 1991. After it became clear in late February that the coalition forces had achieved an overwhelming victory, he supported the President's decision to suspend hostilities. The Persian Gulf victory boosted the military's standing with the American public, and General Powell became a well-known and popular figure. For his leadership during the war, he received a Congressional Gold Medal, struck in his honor, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

In addition to the combat operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf, US forces participated in a number of rescue and relief operations during Powell's chairmanship, including humanitarian relief operations to provide assistance to famine victims in Somalia and to victims of ethnic warfare in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993. While supporting limited use of US forces to contain the crisis in the Balkans and to assist the United Nations forces on the ground there, General Powell was reluctant to commit US forces to intervene directly in the war and thus become one of the belligerents. He forcefully argued against the commitment of US ground troops in either a peacemaking or combat role. In internal debates in the Bush and Clinton administrations and in published articles, he advocated the use of US forces in combat only when there were clear political objectives and the political willingness to commit sufficient resources to achieve these objectives. Although there was a perception of an uneasy relationship between the military and the new Clinton administration, especially over the issue of homosexuals in the military,

General Powell enjoyed a close working relationship with President William J. Clinton.

When General Powell retired on 30 September 1993, the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been substantially enhanced due to his aggressive exercise of the expanded powers granted the Chairman in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. His tenure as Chairman subsequently became the subject of debate among some scholars and commentators concerned with the role of the military in policy development.

At his retirement General Powell was awarded a second Presidential Medal of Free-

dom, this one with distinction. Later that year, Queen Elizabeth II made him an honorary Knight Commander of the Bath. In retirement, Powell wrote his autobiography and was a frequent public speaker. As a member of the three-man delegation, headed by former President Jimmy Carter, that President Clinton sent to Haiti in September 1994, he played a key role in negotiating the peaceful transfer of power from the military dictatorship to the elected president.

Colin Luther Powell

General, USA

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT	09 Jun 58	30 Jun 58
1LT	30 Dec 59	30 Jun 61
CPT.	02 Jun 62	30 Jun 65
MAJ.	24 May 66.	30 Jun 72
LTC	09 Jul 70.	30 Jun 79
COL	01 Feb 76	
BG	01 Jun 79	22 Jan 82
MG		01 Aug 83
LTG.	01 Jul 86	
GEN	04 Apr 89	

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Student, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Ranger and Airborne Courses, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA	1958	1958
Platoon Leader, Company B, 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 48th Infantry, US Army, Europe	1958	1959
Assistant Adjutant, Combat Command B, 3d Armored Division, US Army, Europe	1959	1959
Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, Company D, 2d Armored Rifle Battalion, 48th Infantry, US Army, Europe	1959	1960
Liaison Officer, later Executive Officer, Company A, 1st Battle Group, 4th Infantry, 2d Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Devens, MA	1960	1961
Commander, Company A, 1st Battle Group, 4th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Devens, MA.	1961	1962
S-1, 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Devens, MA	1962	1962
Student, US Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC	1962	1962
Self Defense Corps Training Center Adviser, 2d Infantry Division, I Corps, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam	1962	1963

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Senior Battalion Adviser, Unit Advisory Branch, later Assistant G-3 (Operations) Adviser, 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam	1963	1963
Test Officer, US Army Infantry Board, Fort Benning, GA.	1963	1964
Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA . . .	1964	1965
Test Officer, Supporting Weapons Test Division, US Army Infantry Board, Fort Benning, GA . . .	1965	1966
Instructor/ Author, Operations Committee, US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA . . .	1966	1967
Student, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1967	1968
Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, US Army, Vietnam	1968	1968
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations) later Deputy G-3 (Operations), Americal Division, US Army, Vietnam	1968	1969
Student, George Washington University, Washington, DC	1969	1971
Operations Research Analyst, Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC	1971	1972
White House Fellow, Office of Management and Budget, The White House, Washington, DC . . .	1972	1973
Commander, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea.	1973	1974
Operations Research Systems Analyst, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower Requirements and Analysis), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC	1974	1975
Student, National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, DC	1975	1976
Commander, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY	1976	1977
Executive to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	1977	1978

Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	1979	1981
Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO	1981	1982
Deputy Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Fort Leavenworth, KS	1982	1983
Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	1983	1986
Commanding General, V Corps, US Army, Europe	1986	1986
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, DC	1987	1987
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, DC	1987	1989
Commander in Chief, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, GA	1989	1989
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	1989	1993

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)
Army Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)
Navy Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Coast Guard Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)
Soldier's Medal
Bronze Star Medal
Purple Heart
Air Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters)

THE VICE CHAIRMEN



ROBERT TRALLES HERRES

6 February 1987 — 28 February 1990


Robert Herres was born on 1 December 1932 in Denver, Colorado. His father had taught Morse Code to Army aviators in World War I, and Herres's older brother graduated from the US Military Academy. Graduating from East High School in Denver, Herres applied for appointments to both West Point and the US Naval Academy, winning appointment to the latter in 1950. During the summer before his final year as a midshipman, he learned to fly seaplanes over the Chesapeake Bay. Enthralled by flying and anxious to begin flight training immediately upon graduation, Herres exercised an option available before the establishment of the Air Force Academy and entered the Air Force as a second lieutenant after graduating from the Naval Academy in 1954. Following flight training, Lieutenant Herres flew F-86 fighters for the next three years.

After earning a master's degree in electrical engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, in 1958, Herres was promoted to captain in 1959 and to major five years later. From 1960 to 1963 he was assigned as an analyst at the US European Command Electronic Intelligence Center, Lindsey Air Station, West Germany, where he developed estimates of the technical capabilities of Soviet bloc forces. After a year in flight operations at Chateauroux Air Station in France, he entered the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. During this period he also earned a master's degree in public administration from George Washington University.

Herres was selected as an astronaut-pilot in the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program in 1966. Promoted in February 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Herres graduated from the Aerospace Research Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base,

General Robert Tralles Herres

United States Air Force



Midshipman Herres aboard the USS *Albany*, 1951.


California, where he flew F-104 Starfighters and a variety of other aircraft. Moving to the MOL program at Los Angeles Air Force Station, California, he served from August 1967 to August 1969 as an aerospace research flight test officer, Chief of the Flight Crew Division, and Assistant to the Deputy Program Director for Test Operations.

He was promoted to colonel in November 1968 and, on cancellation of the MOL program in June 1969, became Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Requirements at the Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base. From 1970 to 1971 Herres attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, where he helped draft a text on the military uses of space.

In 1971 Colonel Herres became Vice Commander of Strategic Air Command's (SAC) 449th Bombardment Wing, Kincheloe

Air Force Base, Michigan, flying B-52 bombers, and was appointed wing commander in February 1973. In April 1973 he left Kincheloe to command the 310th Strategic Wing (Provisional) at U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Air Field, Thailand, where KC-135 tankers under his command flew missions in support of US military operations in Southeast Asia. Six months later, Herres returned to Kincheloe to resume command of the 449th. He remained there until March 1974, when he was designated Director of Command and Control at SAC Headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. In September 1974 he was promoted to brigadier general.

During the next decade General Herres served both in command positions and in staff assignments involving command, control, and communications (C3). In 1975 he became Deputy Commander, Security Assistance



Lieutenant Colonel Herres, *far left*, at the announcement of his selection for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, 1967.

Programs, in the Electronics System Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, where he managed foreign military sales programs. In August 1977 Herres joined the Air Staff as Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Computer Resources. He was promoted to major general in March 1978.

Two command assignments followed. Herres headed the Air Force Communications Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, from

1979 to 1981. From 1981 to 1982 he commanded SAC's Eighth Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. His command included B-52s, FB-111s, KC-135s, and Minuteman and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles. Having received his third star in August 1981, he returned to the Pentagon in 1982.

As Director of Command, Control, and Communications on the Joint Staff from October 1982 to July 1984, General Herres worked

closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey, and the Service Chiefs on programs, plans, and budgets affecting all unified and specified commands and their service components.

In July 1984 Herres was promoted to general and became the Commander in Chief of the US-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and its supporting US organization, the USAF Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM); and Commander of the USAF Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. His skills as a pilot, engineer, technical intelligence analyst, commander, programmer, and manager of strategic command, control, and communications systems uniquely qualified him for these responsibilities.


From Colorado Springs, Herres continued to work with General Vessey on two related projects, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—a program to develop both terrestrial and space-based systems for the defense of North America against attack by Soviet ballistic missiles—and the establishment of a unified command for space. This new command was to assume broad responsibilities for military space systems supporting all three military departments and for both the ballistic missile defense effort and selected missions of the Aerospace Defense Command. The campaign to unify all US military space efforts succeeded on 23 September 1985, when President Ronald Reagan established the US Space Command and selected Herres as its first Commander in Chief (USCINCSpace).

On 6 February 1987 General Herres became the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position established by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. He served for two and one-half years with Admiral William Crowe. In formulating the responsibilities for this new position,

Crowe, Herres, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger agreed that the Vice Chairman would chair the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Nuclear Command and Control System; serve as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB); and represent the Chairman on the Defense Resources Board, the executive committee of the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, and the National Space Council. When the Bush administration established the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council in 1989, the Vice Chairman served as the Chairman's representative on the committee. Admiral Crowe relied on Herres for his technical expertise, particularly in the areas of space and command and control.

As Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, Herres institutionalized the role of the military in setting requirements for major weapons systems. As *Defense Weekly* summarized, he "breathed new life into the JROC... and put the process back in the hands of the military and the Joint Staff." In the JROC, Herres and the Service Vice Chiefs developed procedures for review and evaluation of potential joint military requirements, selected new programs to recommend to the DAB for joint development and acquisition, oversaw cross-service requirements and management issues, and resolved service differences that arose after initiation of joint programs. During Herres's tenure the JROC focused on close air support, space-based surveillance, and antisatellite systems.

Herres served briefly as Vice Chairman with General Colin Powell, who became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 October 1989. During the early months of Powell's chairmanship, Herres worked with his counterparts in the NSC Deputies Committee during the attempted rebel coup



General Herres, as Acting Chairman, briefs the National Security Council at the White House, 1987. *Left to right:* General Herres, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, President Ronald Reagan.

against Philippine President Corazon Aquino in November 1989 and the US intervention in Panama that December.

General Herres chose to retire before the expiration of his second term. After his retirement on 28 February 1990, his public service continued through membership on Vice President Dan Quayle's Space Policy Advisory Board and as a member of the Augustine Committee, which, at the request of President

George Bush, reviewed the future of the US space program. He subsequently chaired the Presidential commission appointed to assess the role of women in the military. In April 1990 Herres became president of the United Services Automobile Association (USAA), a major financial services enterprise headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, and in September 1993 was appointed its chairman and chief executive officer.

Robert Tralles Herres

General, USAF

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
2LT	04 Jun 54	
1LT	04 Jun 55	04 Jun 57
CPT.	29 Apr 59	04 Jun 61
MAJ.	15 Jul 64.	04 Jun 68
LTC.	20 Feb 67	04 Jun 75
COL	01 Nov 69.	01 Oct 77
BG	01 Sep 74	04 Dec 80
MG	01 Mar 78.	01 Jan 83
LTG.	01 Aug 81	
GEN	01 Aug 84	

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Student, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD	1950	1954
Student, Pilot Training, 3560th Student Squadron, Webb Air Force Base, TX	1954	1955
Pilot, later Air Electronics Maintenance Officer, 93d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM	1955	1958
Student, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH	1958	1960
Technical Intelligence Analyst (Electronics Engineer), later Chief, Defensive Capabilities Section, US European Command, Electronic Intelligence Center, Lindsey Air Station, Germany	1960	1963
Assistant Chief, later Chief, Flight Training Branch, 7322d Air Base Wing, Chateauroux Air Station, France	1963	1964
Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.	1964	1965
Instructor, Weapons Employment Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL	1965	1966
Student, Aerospace Research Pilot School, Edwards Air Force Base, CA	1966	1967
Aerospace Research Flight Test Officer; later Chief, Flight Crew Division; and Assistant to the Deputy Program Director for Test Operations, Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program, Los Angeles Air Force Station, CA	1967	1969

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Requirements, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, CA	1969	1970
Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, DC	1970	1971
Vice Commander, later Commander, 449th Bombardment Wing, Kincheloe Air Force Base, MI	1971	1973
Commander, 310th Strategic Wing (Provisional), U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Airfield, Thailand . .	1973	1973
Commander, 449th Bombardment Wing, Kincheloe Air Force Base, MI	1973	1974
Director, Command and Control, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE	1974	1975
Deputy Commander, Security Assistance Programs, Electronic Systems Division, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA	1975	1977
Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications and Computer Resources, and later Director, Command, Control and Communications, Headquarters, US Air Force, Washington, DC . .	1977	1979
Commander, Air Force Communications Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL	1979	1981
Commander, Eighth Air Force, Barksdale Air Force Base, LA	1981	1982
Director, Command, Control and Communication Systems, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1982	1984
Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command and Aerospace Defense Command and Commander, US Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO	1984	1985
Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Space Command, and Commander, US Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO	1985	1987
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1987	1990

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 oak leaf clusters)

Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster)

Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Army Distinguished Service Medal

Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster)

Bronze Star Medal

Meritorious Service Medal

Air Medal

Air Force Commendation Medal



DAVID ELMER JEREMIAH


1 March 1990 — 28 February 1994

David Jeremiah was born on 25 February 1934 in Portland, Oregon. He graduated from Lincoln High School in Portland and earned a bachelor of business administration in 1955 from the University of Oregon, Eugene. Jeremiah entered Naval Officer Candidate School and was commissioned an ensign on 30 March 1956. During the next ten years he served on five destroyers in the US Pacific Fleet and rose to lieutenant commander.

From 1966 to 1968 Lieutenant Commander Jeremiah worked in the Surface Electronic Warfare Systems Section in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Fleet Operations and Readiness. During this period he saw that policy was often made through the financial process; so in 1968 he earned a master of science in financial management from George Washington University. After a tour as Executive Officer of the guided missile destroyer USS *Joseph Strauss*, Commander Jeremiah attended Armed Forces Staff College from August 1970 to January 1971. Four months later he graduated from the program management development course at the Harvard Business School.

Over the next several years, staff assignments alternated with sea duty. In 1971 Jeremiah became an analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. From 1974 to 1976 he commanded the guided missile destroyer USS *Preble*. In 1976 he headed the Programs, Plans, and Development Branch in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). He was promoted to captain in 1977. From 1979 to 1980, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 24. The following two years he served

Admiral David E. Jeremiah
United States Navy



Ensign Jeremiah.

as Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He next served as Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and was promoted to flag rank on 1 October 1983.

From August 1984 to April 1986 Jeremiah, now a rear admiral, commanded Cruiser-Destroyer Group EIGHT and during that period twice saw action in the Mediterranean. As Commander of Task Force 60, embarked in the carrier USS *Saratoga* (CV 60), Jeremiah coordinated naval air efforts in October 1985

that forced down an Egyptian commercial airliner carrying the hijackers of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*. While engaged in freedom of navigation operations in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986, forces under his command destroyed several missile patrol craft and two Libyan surface-to-air missile sites.

Jeremiah left the Mediterranean and, after promotion to vice admiral, served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations as Director of Program Planning from April 1986 to September 1987. On 29 September 1987 the Navy




Commander Jeremiah on board the USS *Joseph Strauss*, 1970.

promoted him to admiral and selected him to be the twenty-third Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet (USCINCPACFLT).

With extensive operational experience, including command in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, and programmatic and fiscal management expertise, Admiral Jeremiah

became the nation's second Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 March 1990. He assumed responsibility in the areas of joint warfighting requirements development, resource allocation, crisis-policy management, nuclear weapons development and security, and oversight of intelligence requirements.



Rear Admiral Jeremiah, as commander of Task Force 60, in the task force command and control room of the USS *Saratoga* during operations off the coast of Libya, 1986.

Jeremiah once observed that, in fulfilling these responsibilities for the Chairman, the job of Vice Chairman was "the broadest in the Department of Defense, certainly the broadest job in military uniform."

Admiral Jeremiah served with General Colin L. Powell for three and one-half years. Their working relationship closely resembled a partnership, with Powell describing Jeremiah as his "alter ego." They decided that the

Vice Chairman should participate fully in the management and direction of the Joint Staff and in providing military advice to the National Command Authorities. Jeremiah dealt with the services on programs and budgets, with the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee in crisis management, and with the Director of Central Intelligence on intelligence requirements and oversight. Powell relied on Jeremiah as a sounding board and source of advice on a wide range of issues. Thus Jeremiah's influence went well beyond his responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and as the Chairman's representative in the interagency policy-making process. In October 1992, with strong backing from Powell, Congress made the Vice Chairman a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Admiral Jeremiah worked as a member of the NSC Deputies Committee to orchestrate the military buildup in Saudi Arabia, preserve a diverse coalition, define US objectives, and oversee operations to liberate Kuwait. For his contributions during the Persian Gulf War, he received the President's Citizens Medal.

During both the Bush and Clinton administrations, when the Deputies Committee debated the use of US forces in regional crises in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, Jeremiah opposed such involvement unless it was part of a comprehensive program to address the roots of the crisis in each country. Nevertheless, in 1992, when international famine relief efforts in Somalia were frustrated by Somali warlords and roving bandits, Admiral Jeremiah supported President George Bush's decision to deploy US forces there in December as part of a relief operation. Operation RESTORE HOPE succeeded in reopening delivery routes and protecting UN food relief convoys.

When a United Nations follow-on force took over the operation in May 1993, it lacked a clear chain of command, agreed objectives, and the supporting economic and political support that Admiral Jeremiah persistently advocated, and forces controlled by Somali warlords, notably Mohammed Farah Aideed, resumed their depredations. In June after gunmen ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, the UN Security Council called for the capture of those responsible for the killings. Together with General Powell, Admiral Jeremiah opposed calls for deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) but reluctantly agreed in August after repeated attacks on US troops.

Three days after Powell retired, attacks on US forces in Somalia led to a change in US policy. As Acting Chairman until General John Shalikashvili became Chairman on 25 October, Admiral Jeremiah was a key participant in setting a new course. On 3 October 1993, after a successful SOF raid in which important subordinates of Aideed were captured, Somali gunmen shot down two US helicopters. When US troops attempted a rescue, a large force of Somalis pinned down the Americans, killing 18 and wounding 84. Public reaction led President Clinton to withdraw SOF forces. He set a specific timetable for withdrawal and, at Jeremiah's urging, directed both ground and sea-based reinforcement of the remaining forces to stabilize the situation.

Wary of deploying US ground combat troops to areas where no US vital interest was at stake, Admiral Jeremiah also argued within the Deputies Committee against ground operations in Haiti and Bosnia. He recommended multinational efforts to reorganize the Haitian security forces, restore the elected president, and provide developmental aid. Despite his warning that adequate diplomatic groundwork was not in place, the USS *Harlan County*, with a US training mission of nearly 200 troops was sent to Haiti in October 1993, only



Admiral Jeremiah meets with the headman and a tribesman in Oddur, Somalia, 1992.

to be prevented from docking at Port-au-Prince by paramilitary gangs loyal to the ruling military junta.

The contingencies in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia; the threat from Iraq and North Korea; international terrorism; and the worldwide activities of the drug cartels presented an array of strategic challenges. At the same time, US public opinion called for a shift of resources to domestic needs. As they restructured defense posture after the Cold War, senior defense officials in both the Bush and Clinton administrations relied upon Admiral Jeremiah's advice to reshape policy on acquisition, force structure, and resource issues, particularly the DOD infrastructure.

As Chairman of the JROC and Vice Chairman of the DAB, Jeremiah faced the basic challenge of choosing weapons and communications systems for the twenty-first century at a time when little money was available to start new projects. He sought to move away from systems that could not be easily adapted to exploit new technologies or that were so highly specialized that they could only be used against a narrow threat or in a unique environment.

Admiral Jeremiah worked with the other members of the JROC to develop a requirements system in which advanced weapons and systems could be produced on a smaller scale and combined with existing systems

to satisfy contingency requirements while maintaining the US lead in defense technology. In Jeremiah's view, this would speed production, reduce costs, and allow the military to exploit new technologies in designing doctrine, tactics, and organizations. Within the JROC, Admiral Jeremiah pushed for several weapons systems he deemed vital to joint warfighting. Among these were joint command and control systems for global and theater contingencies, strategic sealift and the C-17 aircraft for modern strategic lift capability, better means for combat identification of friendly forces, and increased deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles to improve battlefield intelligence for the theater and joint task force commander.

Following heart surgery in November 1993, Admiral Jeremiah continued to serve as General Shalikashvili's Vice Chairman and perform a broad range of national security duties until his retirement on 28 February 1994. On Jeremiah's retirement, General Powell praised him for his major contributions to roles and missions and the joint requirements oversight process. Australia awarded him the first Order of Australia given to a foreign officer. After retiring, Jeremiah became a director of both Litton Industries and Alliant Techsystems and president of Technology Strategies and Alliances, a strategic consulting and investment banking firm based in northern Virginia.

David Elmer Jeremiah

Admiral, USN

Promotions	Dates	
	Temporary	Permanent
ENS.		30 Mar 56
LTJG		30 Sep 57
LT.		01 May 60
LCDR		01 Mar 65
CDR		01 Sep 69
CAPT.		01 Apr 77
COMO	Jul 82	01 Oct 83
RADM	01 Apr 85	01 Sep 86
VADM		01 Jul 86
ADM		01 Oct 87

Assignments	Dates	
	From	To
Naval Recruiting Station and Office of Naval Officer Procurement, Seattle, WA	1956	1956
USS <i>Charles E. Brannon</i>	1956	1959
Released from active duty.	1959	1961
USS <i>McGinty</i>	1961	1962
USS <i>Twining</i>	1962	1964
Fleet Training Center, San Diego, CA	1964	1964
Operations Officer, USS <i>Benjamin Stoddert</i>	1964	1966
Assistant Head, Surface Electronics Warfare Systems Section, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Operations and Readiness, Washington, DC	1966	1968
Executive Officer, USS <i>Joseph Strauss</i>	1968	1970
Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA.	1970	1971
Student, Harvard University	1971	1971
Systems Analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	1971	1974
Naval Destroyer School, Newport, RI	1974	1974
Commander, USS <i>Preble</i>	1974	1976
Head, Program, Plans and Development Branch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1976	1979
Commander, Destroyer Squadron 24	1979	1980


Assignments

	Dates	
	From	To
Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet	1980	1982
Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC	1982	1984
Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group EIGHT.	1984	1986
Director, Navy Program Planning, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC.	1986	1987
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet.	1987	1990
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC	1990	1994

Principal US Military Decorations

Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Navy Distinguished Service Medal (with 3 gold stars)
Army Distinguished Service Medal
Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with gold star)
Meritorious Service Medal (with gold star)
Navy Achievement Medal (with combat "V")

**THE JCS CONFERENCE ROOM:
"THE TANK"**



The JCS Conference Room, 1995

THE JCS CONFERENCE ROOM: "THE TANK"

In early 1942, the new US Joint Chiefs of Staff and US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff organizations moved into the US Public Health Building in Washington, DC, on Constitution Avenue between 19th and 20th Streets, NW. The building was soon redesignated the Combined Chiefs of Staff Building. Here the Joint Chiefs of Staff held their first formal meeting on 9 February 1942 in a conference room on the second floor (restored by the building's later occupant, the Interior Department, in 1992). They continued to use this room throughout World War II.


The conference room, or "presentation" room as it was initially called, soon became known as "The Tank." A popular explanation of the origin of this nickname is that access to the entrance used by staff officers was down a flight of stairs through an arched portal, supposedly giving the impression of entering a tank.

The nickname survived the JCS Conference Room's moves to various locations. In January 1946 "The Tank" moved with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the New War Department Building at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, NW (later the US Department of State Building). In April 1947 the conference room moved with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Pentagon, where it has occupied several locations on the second floor. From April 1947 until October 1949 it was located on corridor 2 in the D ring. The JCS Conference Room then moved to corridor 9 in the C ring. Since August 1957 "The Tank" has been on corridor 9 in the E ring. In addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operations Deputies and the Deputy Operations Deputies meet there.




George C. Marshall Research Library

The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet in the original JCS Conference Room, 23 October 1942.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the JCS by meeting in the restored JCS Conference Room at the Department of the Interior, 10 February 1992.

**THE FLAG OF THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**



The Flag of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE FLAG OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Soon after General Omar N. Bradley took office as the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson asked the Secretary of the Army to prepare designs for a distinguishing flag for the Chairman. The Heraldic Branch of the Army Quartermaster General's Office (later the US Army Institute of Heraldry) drew up two designs, which the Secretary of the Army submitted to Secretary Johnson on 17 November. On 6 December Johnson approved the design preferred by General Bradley and requested that the Secretary of the Army provide the Chairman with such a flag.

The Manufacturing Division of the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot made the flag, and it was delivered to General Bradley on 19 January 1950 and displayed in his office for the first time on 26 January. He also received a flag made of bunting for field use, small boat and automobile flags, and the flag reproduced on aluminum plates for use on aircraft.

The flag of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is of medium blue and white silk (the colors of the flags of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, respectively) divided diagonally from upper hoist to lower fly, blue above and white below. The central design consists of an American eagle with wings spread horizontally.

On the eagle's chest is a shield consisting of thirteen stripes, seven white and six red, representing the thirteen original colonies, with blue in chief (the upper part of the field), representing Congress joining the colonies into unity. The eagle, facing the pike, the point of honor in heraldry, holds three crossed

gold arrows in its talons, representing the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is indicated by four stars, each with one point upward, placed on a diagonal line from upper fly to lower hoist, two to each side of the eagle. The stars on the blue field are white; those on the white field are blue. The placement of the stars on a diagonal line is intended to be representative of all three services. In Army and Air Force flags, stars are placed in a horizontal center line, while in the Navy a vertical center line is used for two stars, an imaginary triangle for three stars, and an imaginary lozenge for four stars.

The eagle and stars of the Chairman's flag are hand-embroidered, and three edges of the flag are trimmed with knotted fringe of

yellow silk. In addition, the flag has a cord and tassels of medium blue and white silk strands attached below the spearhead of the pike. The Chairman's flag is displayed in his office and carried in honors ceremonies when he is present.

In September 1950, when General Bradley was promoted to five-star rank, the Secretary of the Army asked whether an additional flag should be designed for use when the Chairman was a five-star officer. General Bradley did not think an additional flag was needed. He believed that the flag represented the position, not the rank of the individual occupant, and should not be changed to show the rank of the incumbent. The Secretary of Defense acceded to General Bradley's wishes and a five-star Chairman's flag was not designed.

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
IDENTIFICATION BADGE**



The Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IDENTIFICATION BADGE

U ntil 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no unique seal, emblem, or other identification device. From March 1949, personnel serving on a full-time duty status in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and associated boards and staffs were authorized to wear the National Military Establishment Identification Badge (subsequently renamed the Department of Defense Identification Badge). Military personnel assigned to the OJCS wore the DOD Identification Badge until January 1961, when Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates suspended further issuance of the badge.

On 5 February 1962, Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, who was just completing his tour of duty as Director of the Joint Staff, wrote to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower on the matter of the identification badge. Wheeler favored reinstatement of the badge or a similar device for military personnel on the Joint Staff. In December 1962 when Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric reinstated the DOD Identification Badge as the Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge but limited its issuance to individuals assigned to OSD, he informed the Director of the Joint Staff that he did not object to institution of a similar device for Joint Staff personnel.

After the Personnel Directorate of the Joint Staff recommended adoption of a JCS identification badge, the US Army Institute of Heraldry designed an appropriate device. On 2 April 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge and on 3 April issued JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 142 authorizing award of the


badge to members of the Armed Forces assigned to the OJCS. Subsequently, the criteria were expanded to include military personnel assigned to agencies in direct support of the OJCS and later the Joint Staff. Over the years, the JCS Identification Badge has been used as the seal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff although no official action has ever designated it as such.

The design features, within an oval silver metal wreath of laurel two and one-half inches in height and two inches in width overall, the shield of the United States. The chief (the upper one-third of the shield) in blue enamel and the base (the lower two-thirds of the shield) of thirteen stripes in alternating white and red enamel are superimposed on four gold metal unsheathed swords, two in pale

(vertical) and two in saltire (crossed). The points and pommels of the swords are resting on the wreath; the blades and grips are entwined with a gold metal continuous scroll surrounding the shield with the word "Joint" at the top and the words "Chiefs of Staff" at the bottom, all in blue enamel letters.

The symbolism of the badge includes the laurel for achievement, courage, and victory and the four unsheathed swords for the armed might of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and their combined constant vigilance and readiness in the defense of the United States. Patented on 1 December 1964 (Patent No. Des. 199,678), the JCS Identification Badge appears on the covers of all JCS publications, plans, and official files.

**QUARTERS SIX:
THE CHAIRMAN'S RESIDENCE**



Quarters Six, Fort Myer, Virginia

QUARTERS SIX: THE CHAIRMAN'S RESIDENCE

Quarters Six, the Fort Myer, Virginia, residence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was constructed in 1908, the same year that Orville Wright made the world's first military test flight at Fort Myer. It was built from standard plan 120-H, designed by the Office of the Army's Quartermaster General in Washington, DC.

The 120 plan series, issued in 1898, was based on standard plans designed in the 1870s under Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs. A distinguished engineer officer and an able administrator, Meigs designed many of the public structures in the Washington, DC area. His efforts to improve the efficiency of his department included the introduction of standardized plans for the various types of buildings built for the Army.

The 120 series of plans for family housing was widely used during the major building boom that started at Fort Myer after it became a permanent post in 1896. At that time Fort Myer was not only a bustling Signal Corps center but also a cavalry station. The spurt in construction gathered even more momentum after Secretary of War Elihu Root's reorganization of the expanded Army at the beginning of the twentieth century. The plan variation known as 120-H was issued in 1907 toward the end of this period of expansion. The dwellings built to this plan rose at the heart of Fort Myer. Their brick facades stand on granite block foundations and are representative of officers' quarters built on numerous military posts during this period.

Quarters Six, consisting of three stories and a basement, was originally built as a duplex. It was the largest building among the stately homes of




The sun room.

Officers' Row. Housing two junior officers and their families, the neo-Federal style building had eleven rooms and cost \$19,202 to build. It was among the first homes at Myer to be built with provision for electrical lighting, although installation of indoor plumbing was still three years away.

The design of the house reflects an architectural transition from the complicated and elaborate forms and features of Victorian residential construction to the simpler, more classical character of the Colonial Revival. The decorative wooden porch and the use of stone below the water table are characteristic of the former, while the plain windows and pedimented facade are characteristic of the latter.

In 1960 planning began for conversion of the duplex into a single residence for the


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations had long had official residences, and in June 1960 an official home had been designated for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. There was, however, no specific set of quarters set aside for the Chairman. During congressional consideration of the proposal for official quarters for the Air Force Chief, Senator John Stennis asked if there were plans for permanent quarters for the Chairman. President Dwight D. Eisenhower called the Army Chief of Staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer, whom he had selected to be the next Chairman, to the White House to discuss the matter. As the Chairman, Lemnitzer would have had the prerogative of remaining at Quarters One at Fort Myer, the official



The dining room, with the table set for an official dinner.



The living room.



The view of the Washington Mall from Quarters Six.

residence of the Chief of Staff of the Army, as General Omar Bradley, another former Army Chief, had done during his tenure as Chairman. However, the President wished Quarters One to be available for the new Army Chief of Staff. He asked Lemnitzer to arrange for a permanent residence for the Chairman.

In September 1960 the Army reviewed quarters at Fort Myer that might be suitable for conversion into permanent housing for the Chairman. General Lemnitzer selected Quarters Six, which was a few doors from Quarters One and next door to Quarters Seven, recently designated as the official residence of the Air Force Chief of Staff. The projected cost of converting the duplex to a single dwelling was \$75,000. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker recommended Quarters Six's conversion to Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and both Secretary Gates and President Eisenhower approved the choice.

Renovation of the house began in early 1961. The project included major exterior and

interior changes and new mechanical and electric systems. Among the additions were a sun room and a carport. The final cost of the renovation was \$105,487. As remodeled, the house has 7,365 square feet of living space. General Lemnitzer and his wife moved into Quarters Six in early January 1962 and remained until his service as Chairman ended.

Since then, each Chairman has resided in Quarters Six with his family during his tenure. The first floor is used for official entertaining, while the family quarters are on the second and third floors.

On Grant Avenue on a bluff looking north across the Potomac River, the house faces the flagpole on Whipple Field and has a panoramic view of the monuments along the Washington Mall. As part of Generals' Row, Quarters Six became part of the Fort Myer National Historic District on 28 November 1972.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Extracts of Public Law 81-216, 10 August 1949 National Security Act Amendments of 1949

Section 211 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer thereof but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties, in addition to such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct:

(1) preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the military services of logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) establishment of unified commands in strategic areas;

(4) review of major material and personnel requirements of the military forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans;

(5) formulation of policies for joint training of the military forces;

(6) formulation of policies for coordinating the military education of members of the military forces; and

(7) providing United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

(c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereinafter referred to as the 'Chairman') shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the Regular officers of the armed services to

serve at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and shall be eligible for one reappointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except in time of war hereafter declared by the Congress when there shall be no limitation on the number of such reappointments. The Chairman shall receive the basic pay and basic and personal money allowances prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army, and such special pays and hazardous duty pays to which he may be entitled under other provisions of law.

(d) The Chairman, if in the grade of general, shall be additional to the number of officers in the grade of general provided in the third proviso of section 504(b) of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress) or, if in the rank of admiral, shall be additional to the number of officers having the rank of admiral provided in section 413(a) of such Act. While holding such office he shall take precedence over all other officers of the armed services: *Provided*, That the Chairman shall not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or over any of the military services.

(e) In addition to participating as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of the duties assigned in subsection (b) of this section, the Chairman shall, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, perform the following duties:

- (1) serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- (2) provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as practicable; and
- (3) inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not been reached.

APPENDIX 2

Extracts of Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986

CHAPTER 5 — JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Sec.

- 151. Joint Chiefs of Staff: composition; functions.
 - 152. Chairman: appointment; grade and rank.
 - 153. Chairman: functions.
 - 154. Vice Chairman.
 - 155. Joint Staff.
-

Sec. 151. Joint Chiefs of Staff: composition; functions

(a) **Composition.**—There are in the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the following:

- (1) The Chairman.*
- (2) The Chief of Staff of the Army.
- (3) The Chief of Naval Operations.
- (4) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
- (5) The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

(b) **Function as military advisers.**—(1) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subsections (d) and (e).

* 1992 Amendment (Public Law 102-484, 23 October 1992) added sub-paragraph "(2) The Vice Chairman;" the following sub-paragraphs were re-numbered.

(c) Consultation by Chairman.—(1) In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of—

- (A) the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
- (B) the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(2) Subject to subsection (d), in presenting advice with respect to any matter to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be, of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter.

(d) Advice and opinions of members other than Chairman.—(1) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.

(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) Advice on request.—The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.

(f) Recommendations to Congress.—After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

(g) Meetings of JCS.—(1) The Chairman shall convene regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall—

- (A) preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- (B) provide agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff);
- (C) assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying on their business as promptly as practicable; and
- (D) determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided.

Sec. 152. Chairman: appointment; grade and rank **

(a) Appointment; term of office.—(1) There is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces. The Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years, beginning on October 1 of odd-numbered years. Subject to paragraph (3), an officer serving as Chairman may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(2) In the event of the death, retirement, resignation, or reassignment of the officer serving as Chairman before the end of the term for which the officer was appointed, an officer appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve as Chairman only for the remainder of the original term, but may be reappointed as provided in paragraph (1).

(3) An officer may not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the combined period of service of such officer in such positions exceeds six years. However, the President may extend to eight years the combined period of service an officer may serve in such positions if he determines such action is in the national interest. The limitations of this paragraph do not apply in time of war.

(b) Requirement for appointment.—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer has served as—

(A) the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

(B) the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or the Commandant of the Marine Corps; or

(C) the commander of a unified or specified combatant command.

(2) The President may waive paragraph (1) in case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(c) Grade and Rank.—The Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces. However, he may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.

.....
Sec 153. Chairman: functions

(a) Planning; advice; policy formulation.—Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be responsible for the following:

** 1987 Amendment (Public Law 100-180, 4 December 1982) substituted "grade and rank" for "rank."

(1) **Strategic direction.** Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces.

(2) **Strategic planning.**—(A) Preparing strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

(B) Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

(C) Performing net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries.

(3) **Contingency planning; preparedness.**—(A) Providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

(B) Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

(C) Advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

(D) Establishing and maintaining, after consultation with the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands, a uniform system of evaluating the preparedness of each such command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(4) **Advice on requirements, programs, and budget.**—(A) Advising the Secretary, under section 163(b)(2) of this title, on the priorities of the requirements identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(B) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(C) Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals, within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary, in order to achieve greater conformance with the priorities referred to in clause (B).

(D) Recommending to the Secretary, in accordance with section 166 of this title, a budget proposal for activities of each unified and specified combatant command.

(E) Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the armed forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

(F) Assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

(5) **Doctrine, training, and education.**—(A) Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.

(B) Formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces.

(C) Formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces.

(6) **Other matters.**—(A) providing for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

(B) Performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or the Secretary of Defense.***

.....
Sec. 154. Vice Chairman

(a) **Appointment.**—(1) There is a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the armed forces.

(2) The Chairman and Vice Chairman may not be members of the same armed force. However, the President may waive the restriction in the preceding sentence for a limited period of time in order to provide for the orderly transition of officers appointed to serve in the positions of Chairman and Vice Chairman.

(3) The Vice Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and may be reappointed in the same manner for two additional terms. However, in time of war there is no limit on the number of reappointments.

(b) **Requirement for appointment.**—(1) The President may appoint an officer as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only if the officer—

(A) has the joint specialty under section 661 of this title; and

(B) has served in at least one joint duty assignment . . . as a general or flag officer. ****

(2) **The President may waive paragraph—(1)** in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

*** Additional legislation in 1986 (Public Law 99-433, 1 October 1986) added a section (b) requiring a report on assignment of roles and missions.

**** 1988 Amendment (Public Law 100-456, 29 September 1988) substituted “completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment (as defined in section 664(f) of this title)” for “served in at least one joint duty assignment (as defined under section 668(b) of this title).”

(c) **Duties.**—The Vice Chairman performs such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. *****

(d) **Function as acting Chairman.**—When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

(e) **Succession after Chairman and Vice Chairman.**—When there is a vacancy in the offices of both Chairman and Vice Chairman, or when there is a vacancy in one such office and in the absence or disability of the officer holding the other, the President shall designate a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as and perform the duties of the Chairman until a successor to the Chairman or Vice Chairman is appointed or the absence or disability of the Chairman or Vice Chairman ceases.

(f) **Participation in JCS meetings.**—The Vice Chairman may participate in all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but may not vote on a matter before the Joint Chiefs of Staff except when acting as Chairman. *****

(g) **Grade and rank.**—The Vice Chairman, while so serving, holds the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral and outranks all other officers of the armed forces except the Chairman. The Vice Chairman may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.

.....
Sec. 203. Participation in the National Security Council meetings

Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

(e) The Chairman (or in his absence the Vice Chairman) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may, in his role as principal military adviser to the National Security Council and subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.

***** 1992 Amendment changed this section to read "Duties.—The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense."

***** 1992 Amendment struck this subsection which prohibited the Vice Chairman from voting except when acting as Chairman and redesignated subsection (g) as subsection (f).

APPENDIX 3

Chronological Listing of Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

President	Secretary of Defense	Chairman, JCS
Harry S Truman 12 Apr 45–20 Jan 53	James V. Forrestal 17 Sep 47–27 Mar 49 Louis A. Johnson 28 Mar 49–19 Sep 50 George C. Marshall 21 Sep 50–12 Sep 51 Robert A. Lovett 17 Sep 51–20 Jan 53	Gen. of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA 16 Aug 49–
Dwight D. Eisenhower 20 Jan 53–20 Jan 61	Charles E. Wilson 28 Jan 53–8 Oct 57 Neil H. McElroy 09 Oct 57–01 Dec 59 Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 02 Dec 59–20 Jan 61	Gen. of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA –15 Aug 53 Adm. Arthur W. Radford, USN 15 Aug 53–15 Aug 57 Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF 15 Aug 57–30 Sep 60 Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA 01 Oct 60–
John F. Kennedy 20 Jan 61–22 Nov 63	Robert S. McNamara 21 Jan 61–	Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA –30 Sep 62 Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA 01 Oct 62–

President	Secretary of Defense	Chairman, JCS
Lyndon B. Johnson 22 Nov 63–20 Jan 69	Robert S. McNamara –29 Feb 68 Clark M. Clifford 01 Mar 68–20 Jan 69	Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA –01 Jul 64 Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA 03 Jul 64–
Richard M. Nixon 20 Jan 69–09 Aug 74	Melvin R. Laird 22 Jan 69–29 Jan 73 Elliot L. Richardson 30 Jan 73–24 May 73 James R. Schlesinger 02 Jul 73–	Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, USA –02 Jul 70 Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN 02 Jul 70–01 Jul 74 Gen. George S. Brown, USAF 01 Jul 74–
Gerald R. Ford 09 Aug 74–20 Jan 77	James R. Schlesinger –19 Nov 75 Donald H. Rumsfeld 20 Nov 75–20 Jan 77	Gen. George S. Brown, USAF
Jimmy Carter 20 Jan 77–20 Jan 81	Harold Brown 21 Jan 77–20 Jan 81	Gen. George S. Brown, USAF –20 Jun 78 Gen. David C. Jones, USAF 21 Jun 78–
Ronald W. Reagan 20 Jan 81–20 Jan 89	Caspar W. Weinberger 21 Jan 81–23 Nov 87 Frank C. Carlucci 23 Nov 87–20 Jan 89	Gen. David C. Jones, USAF –18 Jun 82 Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., USA 18 Jun 82–30 Sep 85 Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN 01 Oct 85–
George H. W. Bush 20 Jan 89–20 Jan 93	Dick Cheney 21 Mar 89–20 Jan 93	Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., USN –30 Sep 89 Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA 01 Oct 89–
William J. Clinton 20 Jan 93–	Les Aspin 20 Jan 93–3 Feb 94 William J. Perry 3 Feb 94–	Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA –30 Sep 93 Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA 25 Oct 93*–

* Admiral David E. Jeremiah, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, served as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1 to 24 October 93.

NOTES

¹ For a more detailed account of the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see JCS Hist. Div., *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1987* (1988), pp. 1–4.

² General George C. Marshall as quoted extensively in Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* (1965), pp. 298–300. William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (1950), p. 96.

³ *Marshall*, p. 298.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 298–300. Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 96–99.

⁵ Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 101.

⁶ *Marshall*, p. 300.

⁷ For a more detailed account of the debate over unification and the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, see JCS Hist. Div., *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1987* (1988), pp. 13–21.

⁸ National Security Act of 1947, PL 80-253, 26 Jul 47.

⁹ National Military Establishment, *First Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense* (1948), pp. 3–4.

¹⁰ Ltr, SecDef to Pres Truman, 9 Nov 48, OSD Files.

¹¹ *NY Times*, 12 Feb 49, p. 1.

¹² Notes and Agendas of JCS mtgs, 24 Jan, 18 Feb, 23 Feb, 2 Mar, 3 Mar, 11 Mar, 15 Mar, 13 May, and 25 May 49, JCS Secretariat File, Decisions—JCS, 28 May 47, Dec 49. Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), *The Eisenhower Diaries* (1981), pp. 154, 157–159. GEN Bradley's Desk Calendar, 7–12 Apr 49, Spec. Collections, West Point Library. Memo, GEN Gruenther to GEN Eisenhower, 28 Mar 50, Eisenhower Manuscripts, Eisenhower Library.

¹³ Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (1983), pp. 497–501.

¹⁴ Rpt, Committee on National Security Organization (Eberstadt Task Force) of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 15 Nov 48. Also see Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (1951), pp. 324, 433.

¹⁵ Rpt to Congress on National Security Organization, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 15 Feb 49.

¹⁶ Presidential Message to Congress, 5 Mar 49, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S Truman, 1949* (1964), pp. 163–166.

¹⁷ As a five-star admiral, Admiral Leahy did not retire.

¹⁸ Navy Dept. Orders, SecNav to ADM Leahy, 21 Mar 49, reproduced in Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 484. *NY Times*, 20 Mar 49, p. 8. Upon the resignation of Leahy, Mr. Sidney Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, took over the responsibility of liaison between the White House and the armed services.

¹⁹ Hrgs, *National Security Act Amendments of 1949*, S. Com on Armed Services, 81st Cong, 1st sess, 1949, pp. 1–6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 14–15, 22.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 108–125. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “National Security Act Amendments of 1949,” 25 Mar 49, CCS 040 (11-2-43) sec 6.

²² “National Security Act Amendments of 1949,” S. Rpt 81-306, 81st Cong, 1st sess, 12 May 49.

²³ *Cong. Record*, vol. 95, pt 5, 26 May 49, p. 6879; vol. 95, pt 7, 14 Jul 49, p. 9526.

²⁴ *Cong. Record*, vol. 95, pt 8, 2 Aug 49, pp. 10500–10600. PL 81-216, 10 Aug 49. For the exact language of the National Security Act Amendments establishing the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Appendix 1.

²⁵ DA Gen Orders No. 37, 16 Aug 49. *NY Times*, 12 Aug 49, p. 1.

²⁶ For detailed coverage of the “revolt of the admirals,” see Kenneth W. Condit, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. II, 1947–1949 (1978), pp. 311–343, and Steven L. Rearden, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, vol. I, *The Formative Years, 1947–1950* (1984), pp. 410–422.

²⁷ Hrgs, *The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy*, H. Com on Armed Services, 81st Cong, 1st sess, Oct 49, pp. 535–536.

²⁸ Maxwell D. Taylor, “Reflections on the American Military Establishment,” in Paul R. Schratz (ed.), *Evolution of the American Military Establishment since World War II* (1978), p. 11. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (1959), p. 110.

²⁹ Bradley testimony, Hrgs, *Military Situation in the Far East*, S. Com on Armed Services and S. Com on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong, 1st sess, May 51, p. 1067.

³⁰ Stephen Jurika, Jr., (ed.), *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford* (1980), p. 323.

³¹ Bradley testimony, Hrgs, *Military Situation in the Far East*, S. Com on Armed Services and S. Com on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong, 1st sess, May 51, p. 1067.

³² Private Law 81-957, 18 Sep 50.

³³ Jurika (ed.), *The Memoirs of Admiral Radford*, p. 304.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

³⁵ Presidential Message, 30 Apr 53, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953* (1960), pp. 225–228. JCS Hist. Div., *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1987* (1988), pp. 35–41.

³⁶ Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 110. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (1956), pp. 286–292. Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (1961), pp. 351–353.

³⁷ Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 106. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 351–352.

³⁸ Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 110. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, p. 352. *Washington Post*, 30 Mar 82, p. C6.

³⁹ “State of the Union Message,” 9 Jan 58, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958* (1959), pp. 2–15.

⁴⁰ “Special Message on Reorganization,” 3 Apr 58, *Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1958*, pp. 274–290.

⁴¹ Hrgs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, H. Com on Armed Services, 85th Cong, 2d sess, 1958, pp. 6176–6177.

⁴² 72 Stat. 514.

⁴³ NSAM 55, President to CJCS, 28 Jun 61.

⁴⁴ Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (1972), pp. 196–198.

⁴⁵ CM-735-62 to SecDef, 14 Jun 62. CM-560-62 to JCS, 23 Feb 62.

⁴⁶ Speech, GEN Lemnitzer to Nat'l Security Industrial Assoc., 27 Sep 62, JCS Hist. Div. Files.

⁴⁷ Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, pp. 252, 259.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 266–269. Taylor, "Reflections on the American Military Establishment," in Schratz, *Evolution of the American Military Establishment since World War II*, pp. 17–18. Benjamin C. Bradlee, *Conversations with Kennedy* (1975), p. 122. Kennedy's assessment of the Chiefs as a body was considerably less favorable.

⁴⁹ Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 269.

⁵⁰ Taylor, *Uncertain Trumpet*, pp. 175–176.

⁵¹ Hrgs, *Nomination of GEN Maxwell D. Taylor and GEN Earle G. Wheeler*, S. Com on Armed Services, 87th Cong, 2d sess, 9 Aug 62, pp. 1–21.

⁵² Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, p. 252.

⁵³ *Ibid.* The number of JCS splits rose from 13 during 1962 to 42 in 1963. See "JCS Decision Statistics, 1958–1982," prepared by Action Management Div., JCS Secretariat.

⁵⁴ Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, pp. 20, 304.

⁵⁵ Interview, GEN Earle G. Wheeler with Dorothy P. McSweeney, 21 Aug 69, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* PL 90-342, 15 Jun 68. As provided in the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the Chairman served "for a term of two years and shall be eligible for one reappointment... except in time of war hereafter declared by the Congress when there shall be no limitation on the number of reappointments."

⁵⁸ Interview, GEN Harold K. Johnson, USA (Ret.), former CSA, by Walter Poole, JCS Hist. Div., 21 Mar 79. The number of JCS splits fell from 40 during 1965 to 7 in 1966 and remained in the one-figure range thereafter. See "JCS Decision Statistics, 1958–1982," prepared by Action Management Div., JCS Secretariat.

⁵⁹ Hrgs, *Nomination of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, to Be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*, S. Com on Armed Services, 91st Cong, 2d sess, 5 Jun 70, p. 30.

⁶⁰ PL 91-19, 28 May 69.

⁶¹ Ltr, Wheeler to Johnson, summer 1970, shown to Walter Poole during Johnson Interview, 21 Mar 79.

⁶² Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (1979), p. 36.

⁶³ Hrgs, *Nomination of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, to Be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*, S. Com on Armed Services, 91st Cong, 2d sess, 4–5 Jun 70, p. 30.

⁶⁴ Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (1978), pp. 498, 500, 734, and 939. Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 998, 1003, 1098, and 1179–1180. Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (1982), pp. 458, 514, 534–535, 544, and 586. Hrgs, *Joint Chiefs of Staff Current Defense Decisionmaking Process*, Subcmte on Investigations, H. Com on Armed Services, 85th Cong, 2d sess, 12 Oct 78 (unpublished), pp. 28, 68.

⁶⁵ *NY Times*, 14 Nov 74, p. 1; 15 Nov 74, p. 21.

⁶⁶ *U.S. News and World Report*, 1 Nov 76, pp. 62-64.

⁶⁷ Hrgs, *Nominations of David C. Jones, Thomas B. Hayward, and Lew Allen, Jr.*, S. Com on Armed Services, 95th Cong, 2d sess, 18 and 22 May 78, pp. 5-6, 36.

⁶⁸ *Washington Star*, 4 Jun 80, p. 1. Statement released by GEN Jones, 4 Jun 80, JCS Hist. Div. Files.

⁶⁹ Hrgs, *Nomination of David C. Jones*, S. Com on Armed Services, 95th Cong, 2d sess, 16 Jun 80.

⁷⁰ David C. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," *Directors and Boards*, Feb. 82. (The article also appeared in *Armed Forces Journal International* 119, Mar 83, pp. 62-68, 72.) Hrgs, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Investigations Subcmte, H. Com on Armed Services, 97th Cong, 2d sess, 21 Apr-5 Aug 82, pp. 46-60.

⁷¹ Hrgs, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Investigations Subcmte, H. Com on Armed Services, 97th Cong, 2d sess, 21 Apr-5 Aug 82. *Cong. Record*, vol. 128, 16 Aug 82 (daily ed.), p. H5953.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 955-958. Ltr, SecDef to Pres, "Hearings on JCS Reorganization," 19 Jul 82, JCS Hist. Div. Files.

⁷³ *Cong. Record*, vol. 129, 17 Oct 83 (daily ed.), pp. H8223-H8231.

⁷⁴ *Cong. Record*, vol. 130, 27 Sept 84 (daily ed.), p. S12120.

⁷⁵ PL 98-525, 19 Oct 84.

⁷⁶ Heritage Foundation, *Mandate for Leadership II* (1984), pp. 431-448. Ctr for Strategic and International Studies, *Toward a More Effective Defense* (1985), pp. 11-22.

⁷⁷ Hrgs, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff—1985*, Investigations Subcmte, H. Com on Armed Services, 99th Cong, 1st sess, 1985.

⁷⁸ Presidential Announcement, 17 Jun 85, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1985* (1988), pp. 775-776.

⁷⁹ *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Rpt 99-86, S. Com on Armed Services, 99th Cong, 1st sess, 16 Oct 85.

⁸⁰ *Cong. Record*, vol. 131, 20 Nov 85 (daily ed.), pp. H10389-H10434.

⁸¹ Hrgs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, S. Com on Armed Services, 99th Cong, 1st sess, 1985, pp. 691-699. Hrgs, *Reorganization of the Department of Defense*, Investigations Subcmte, H. Com on Armed Services, 99th Cong, 2d sess, 1986, pp. 317-361.

⁸² President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, "An Interim Report to the President," 26 Feb 86.

⁸³ Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., *The Line of Fire* (1993), pp. 154-156.

⁸⁴ NSDD 219, 1 Apr 86. Unclassified version released by White House Press Office on 2 Apr 86.

⁸⁵ *Cong. Record*, vol. 132, 16 Sep 86 (daily ed.), pp. S12651-S12661, D111; 17 Sep 86 (daily ed.), pp. H7005-H7008, D1124.

⁸⁶ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-433, 1 Oct 86. For the text of the portion of the Act relating to the Chairman, see Appendix 2.

⁸⁷ Crowe, *The Line of Fire*, pp. 160-161; Interview, CAPT Jay Coupe, USN (Ret.), former Asst to CJCS for Public Affairs, by Willard Webb and Ronald Cole, JCS Hist. Div., 10 Nov 88.

⁸⁸ See Lorna Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992* (1993). Ronald Cole, et al, *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (1995), pp. 113-116.

⁸⁹ Interview, Gen Robert T. Herres, VCJCS, by Willard Webb, Walter Poole, and Lorna Jaffe, JCS Hist. Div., 13 Feb 90. CM-424-86 to DJS, 6 Nov 86. CM-660-87 to SecDef, 6 Apr 87. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, "Duties of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff," 15 Apr 87.

⁹⁰ Interview, ADM David E. Jeremiah, former VCJCS, by Lorna Jaffe, Joint History Office, 8 Jun 94.

⁹¹ Ltr, CJCS to Hon. Ike Skelton, 13 Jun 92, papers of GEN Colin L. Powell, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC.