Naval Cooperation After Korean Unification

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

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

Center for Naval Analyses
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Workshop Rapporteurs: Christopher Yung (CNA), Chang Su Kim (KIDA), Sung Hwan Wie (KIDA), and Jae-Wook Lee (KIDA)

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Foreword

In December 1995, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) held their second co-sponsored workshop, at CNA in the Washington, DC, area, to examine the prospects for U.S.–Korean naval relations in the year 2010. Specialists in naval affairs, the Korean Peninsula, and Asian defense issues were invited to present papers. The workshop was well attended by naval representatives from both countries. Although discussions were not for attribution, papers presented at the conference are available from either KIDA or CNA.

The purpose of the conference was a candid exchange of views on the likely scope, nature, and significance of U.S.–Korean cooperation in the year 2010. Participants examined the likely threat environment of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) in 2010, the likely naval missions for the U.S. Navy and the ROK Navy, and the specific areas of likely cooperation between the two navies by 2010. In the course of the discussions that followed the presentations, participants discussed the likely future U.S. and Korean force structures and strategies, and the contributions of multilateral frameworks to the naval relationship.

The sponsoring institutions gratefully acknowledge the valuable support provided by the CNA and KIDA staffs in preparing for the conference in Washington, and in preparing this report. They extend special thanks to those naval representatives, many of whom traveled long distances (mostly from locations in the Asia-Pacific) to attend this workshop at CNA.

Introduction and Summary

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) held a workshop in Washington, DC, from December 4 to 6, 1995, to examine the prospects for U.S.–Korean naval relations in the year 2010. For purposes of analysis, the participants assumed the possibility of Korean unification over the next ten to 15 years. The purpose of the workshop was to investigate potential threats in the region in 2010, identify the naval missions these threats imply, identify non-threat-related missions, and project the capabilities required to perform those missions.

Ten papers (five U.S. and five Korean) were presented on these topics; they were followed by comments and related discussion. The presentations stimulated candid discussion from presenters and guests alike. Appendices A through D contain lists of participants and observers. Appendix E outlines the conference agenda.

Overview of Conference

The workshop began with overviews of the security environment of Asia in the year 2010, from the Korean and the American perspectives. Their purpose was to provide context for later discussions of U.S. and Korean naval missions. The participants assumed that the Korean Peninsula had already been unified, and that Korea was in an economic position to restructure and reorient its forces. Participants discussing future roles and missions of the USN assumed that the current U.S. national security strategy of "engagement" and "forward presence" would carry over into the 21st century. They also assumed that the U.S. Navy's strategy of *Forward...From the Sea*, with its focus on littoral warfare, would be even more central to American naval planning and operations in 2010 than it is today. Those discussing the future roles and missions of a unified Korean Navy assumed that it could take on the usual missions of a modern trading country's navy, and become responsible for unilateral defense of the Peninsula (if necessary). Participants and observers noted that extensive cooperation between the two navies by 2010 was one of the best means to provide comprehensive maritime defense for the Korean Peninsula and to ensure regional stability and security for the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusions

The conference participants reaffirmed the generally held view that, after unification, Korea would assume a more regional outlook. No participant or observer argued that Korea would become "isolationist" or "neutral." Similarly, the participants did not think that Korea would align itself with a major power in East Asia other than the United States. Nor did they believe that a unified Korea could rely entirely on a multinational security arrangement (although several thought that multilateral security arrangements could play a role in the future defense of the Korean Peninsula). Although participants believed that Korea's future regional security would involve continued cooperation with the United States, it was not clear what form such cooperation would take.

Assuming that a unified Korea would have interests within the region, not only on the Peninsula, participants agreed that the Korean force structure would be likely to look far different in 2010 than at present. They implied that the navy of a unified Korea would likely have a greater share of the defense budget than the ROK Navy has today, and that this navy would also be much more capable of providing for the unilateral (if necessary) defense of the Korean Peninsula. This means that, in addition to its coastal missions, the unified Korean Navy would be responsible for appropriate defense of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), presence and prestige missions, peacetime deterrence, and operations to detect and prevent violation of law at sea.

As for the U.S. Navy, the presentations and follow-up discussions argued that the recent shifts in USN strategy from open ocean toward the littorals would persist into the 21st century. The participants also believed that emerging technologies in information warfare, and new ship-related technologies (e.g., the "arsenal ship") would help shape USN missions by 2010. Participants also held that by 2010 the USN would be more inclined to work in coalitions with other navies in the region, would still influence events ashore through power projection, and would find its role in peacetime operations (e.g., humanitarian, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), and disaster relief) as important as ever.

U.S. and Korean participants came to similar conclusions on the nature, scope, and framework of future cooperation between the U.S. and unified Korean navies. Both believed that the ability of the two navies to communicate with one another is of significant importance if they are to cooperate in a post-unification environment, and that the Korean Navy's capabilities must improve if it is to operate with the United States and other regional actors in coalition operations. Korean and American participants recommended that the U.S. Navy have access to Korean naval facilities, and all the participants agreed that the future Korean Navy could complement U.S. naval forces in shallow-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine warfare capabilities, as examples. Finally, Korean and American presenters and discussants all saw some value in exploring a trilateral naval relationship between the United States, Korea, and Japan. The participants agreed that a follow-on workshop between the two institutions could include a Japanese research institute to discuss the prospects and problems of U.S.–Korean–Japanese naval relations.

Participants considered the second CNA–KIDA workshop successful. Candid discussions between CNA and KIDA participants, and those with representatives from both navies, could serve as guidelines for the navies in achieving effective cooperation in a post-unification Korea of 2010.

The Asian Security Environment in 2010

Participants who were asked to prepare papers for the CNA–KIDA conference worked under the assumption that the Korean Peninsula will be unified by 2010, that the unification process will be gradual, and that the economic costs likely to follow unification of Korea will be manageable. This being said, the presenters and discussants laid out what they believed to be the threat environment of Asia in 2010.

The Significance of China

Both Korean and American participants and observers noted the strategic significance of a China that was economically strong and likely to grow stronger by 2010. Some participants pointed out that China is expanding significantly and could surpass the United States in sheer size of economy by the early decades of the 21st century. In this light, China could influence events in Northeast Asia in general and on the Korean Peninsula in particular, assuming China were unwilling to allow North Korea to collapse and assuming it were unwilling to permit South Korean forces to set foot in North Korean territory. Furthermore, some participants argued that while China might not object to a U.S.–Korea alliance, it is unlikely to remain complacent about U.S. forces stationed in Korea after unification, and might press for U.S. forces to leave the Peninsula.

Other participants pointed out that China's main national security concern in 2010, or by the time of Korean unification, would still be Japan; therefore, it would probably not object to a small U.S. presence in Korea if it saw the U.S.–Japan alliance, and this presence, as reducing the possibility of greater Japanese remilitarization. These participants also pointed out that China's major concern with the Korean Peninsula is the stability of its borders with Korea (because China has a large number of ethnic Koreans living in its northeast). If South Korean absorption of North Korea, or simply the North Korean collapse, did not result in problems on or about the Sino-Korean border, China would not react negatively to the unification of Korea.

Finally, some participants believed that the perception of rapid Chinese expansion was exaggerated. They argued that the Chinese

economy and military have far to go before China could feasibly threaten U.S. interests and those of its allies in Asia. They pointed to Chinese statements that the U.S.–ROK alliance promoted stability in Asia, and argued that China is likely to expand economic relations with Korea well into the 21st century and even after Korean unification.

Perceptions of Russia's Future Role in Asia

The Korean and American participants had slightly different perceptions of Russia's status by 2010. The American participants did not believe that Russia would have the military capabilities or the intention to threaten a unified Korea by 2010. Instead, one American participant argued that Russia's impact on the security and stability of Northeast Asia would be related more to its disagreements with neighbors over the environment and maritime fisheries. These disagreements could apply to the adjoining territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of Russia, Japan, and a unified Korea.

A Potential Hot Spot

Both U.S. and Korean presenters cited Manchuria as the area of potential troubles between China and a unified Korea. The Korean presenter further cited the tri-state region where China, Russia, and Korea border as having potential for economic disputes and for economic cooperation. This area is considered to be a special economic zone, with an abundance of natural resources. One Korean participant acknowledged that Russian military capabilities are, at present, lacking; nevertheless, he pointed out that in 15 years, after stabilizing its domestic politics and getting its economy back on line, Russia could eventually oppose a unified Korea. He added that a rebel or breakaway regional government in the Russian Far East could also be a threat to a unified Korea.

Future U.S.–Japan Relations

The Korean and American participants had significantly different views on what the U.S.–Japan alliance would be like in 2010. American participants opined that Japan would not alter its current approach to defense; that is, it would not alter its policy forbidding

the possession of nuclear weapons, dramatically increase its level of defense spending, or acquire offensive capabilities. U.S. participants argued that Japanese defense spending has recently been reduced, while Japanese promises to increase host nation support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan are still valid. American participants argued that Japan's defense policies would be based on the assumption that the U.S.–Japan alliance would still be in place by 2010. The American presenter acknowledged that the Japanese would be uneasy about a unified Korea but believe it is inevitable. Japan's major concerns regarding a unified Korea are the very real possibilities of chaos on the Peninsula and the possession of nuclear weapons by a unified Korea. Finally, the presenter noted that if the U.S.–Japan alliance is still stable in 2010, as we expect, Japan is likely to increase its cooperation with Korea. Ship visits and officer exchanges already foreshadow such future cooperation.

The Korean participants called the assumption that the U.S.–Japan alliance would remain strong in 2010, a significant flaw in American strategic planning for Asia. Some Japanese, they pointed out, are having doubts about the usefulness of the U.S.–Japan alliance. The Koreans added that Korea had a long and troubled relationship with Japan, and that Koreans have cause to be skeptical of the longevity of a U.S.–Japan alliance to 2010. They argued that despite Japan's miraculous economic performance during the Cold War, Japan is embarrassed about its past. This embarrassment has prevented the Japanese from dealing openly and honestly with its Northeast Asian neighbors. The Korean presenter argued that until Japan comes to terms with this embarrassment, Korea would be cautious about trusting Japan.

The Importance of the United States to Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

One Korean participant pointed out that U.S. behavior could itself threaten the Asia-Pacific region. If the United States withdraws from this part of the world, the participant argued, some of the countries of the region could rush to fill the power vacuum; arms races could ensue, destabilizing the region. He agreed with former Assistant

Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye's position that the United States was simply "bound to lead" the Asia-Pacific region.

Options for a Unified Korea

Concerning the impact Korean unification will have on Northeast Asian security, one participant asserted that a unified Korea has four options:

- Hedge against the shortfalls of strategic independence by forming a bilateral alliance with another state.
- Expand political and economic relations with China and/or sign a treaty of non-interference and non-aggression.
- Declare itself neutral or "non-aligned," arm itself with strong conventional forces, and possibly develop nuclear weapons.
- Pursue a multinational, collective security and global approach to Korean national security.

Most elements of these options could be combined, except for Korea's acquiring an independent nuclear capability and "going it alone."

One Korean participant offered an opinion that the fourth option would be the most likely, but would have some elements of the others. This would mean that Korea would participate in a U.S.-led multinational coalition, expand its economic and political relations with each of the countries of the region, be neutral in regard to a future China–Japan confrontation, and be capable of unilaterally defending the Peninsula if necessary.

American participants agreed that the best strategic option for a unified Korea would be to participate in a multilateral security arrangement presumably led by the United States. This participation would coincide with a broadening Korean military, political, and economic relationship with Japan and China.

United States Navy Missions, 2010

One participant initiated the discussion on U.S. Navy missions in 2010 with the statement that he did not believe the United States would become "isolationist" again. The U.S. Navy has been in Asian waters for over 150 years, on continuous patrol. "Isolationism" was the foreign policy of only one American administration—the Harding Administration. Another participant added that current U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region are fostering peace and security, maintaining commercial access to the region, ensuring freedom of navigation, and preventing the rise of a hegemonic power or coalition. He said that these interests reflected the U.S. commitment to stay engaged and involved in the Asia-Pacific region. He added that assuming U.S. participation and involvement continues in Asia, the USN's likely missions will remain the naval missions of sea control, power projection, and support for missions ashore.

"Cooperative Engagement," Littoral Operations, and Sea Control

Another participant pointed out that because the United States wants to stay actively involved in the Asia-Pacific, "cooperative engagement" remains a centerpiece of theater military strategy. He described "engagement" as a comprehensive approach that aggressively employs the available military resources (forces, assets, funds, and programs) for reassurance in peacetime, deterrence in crisis, and unilateral or multilateral victory in conflict. "Reassurance in peacetime" involves such activities as military exercises with other countries, port visits, humanitarian assistance, and search-and-rescue exercises. Success in conflict would be assisted by forward basing, maintaining close alliances with friendly nations, and continuing to ensure availability of adequate crisis response capabilities.

Another participant pointed out that if "cooperative engagement" represents the current U.S. effort to remain actively involved in the Asia-Pacific region, we can expect increased importance for combined operations and exercises, NEOs, and humanitarian operations. Another participant thought there would be greater emphasis on littoral operations as argued by such recent U.S. Navy publications as

Forward...From the Sea.[1] To him, this suggested that USN missions might, by 2010, emphasize theater ballistic missile defense and power projection over traditional sea control missions. Another participant added that the future emphasis on littoral warfare will mean that the Navy will worry more about shallow-water ASW, mine warfare, and logistic support of land operations.

Another participant disagreed, saying that sea control will remain important even in 2010. Maritime traffic, he claimed, would quadruple by 2010; access to oil and the safety of trade routes would remain very important, although no identifiable national government would have much interest in disrupting SLOCs. Other types of problems, such as congestion, piracy, pollution, and disagreements over environmental issues, could emerge, however, and could require use of warships for regulatory purposes.

One participant thought that the types of missions the USN performs in Asia will, in part, be reactions to the strategies of possible adversaries in pursuit of national interests. To give an example, another participant cited China's likely strategies: He observed that China is unlikely to attempt to challenge the United States by "mirror imaging" U.S. capabilities. China would not build U.S.-style carrier battle groups and meet the USN on the high seas. Instead, he argued, China would probably devise "anti-navy" capabilities to cripple or destroy U.S. naval forces in China's maritime areas of interest. Improved overhead surveillance and advances in targeting would help China immensely in this regard.

Impact of Technology on Missions

A presenter pointed out that USN missions would be shaped not only by U.S. policy, but also by trends in technology. He foresaw significant advances in reconnaissance and C^2 (command and control) by 2015. These could permit the U.S. forces to strike moving

[1] The 1992 paper *From the Sea* defined the strategic concept intended to change the U.S. naval priorities from operations on the sea toward power projection and employment of naval forces to influence events in the world's littoral regions. *Forward...From the Sea,* published in 1994, updates and expands the 1992 paper to include the importance of naval forces to the U.S. strategy of forward presence.

targets as accurately as they could strike fixed targets in the 1980s. Advances in strike technology would improve the effectiveness of Navy and other service power projection in Asia and elsewhere. The presenter added that information warfare would be a central mission by 2010. If we define information warfare as the ability to paralyze command systems before they become weapon targets, this could be a mission for the U.S. Navy. New ship technologies would also shape U.S. Navy missions by 2010. The so-called "arsenal ship," which could fire missiles and other ordnance at land targets, could give U.S. naval forces greater effectiveness when operating in the littorals, and improved shipboard air defenses could allow naval commanders to deploy more aircraft for power projection instead of air defense.

The Perceived Future Force Structure of the U.S. Navy in Asia

U.S. naval missions, a Korean participant commented, would also be shaped by what many Asian countries perceive as an inevitable decline of U.S. naval force levels in Asia. It is likely that by 2010 U.S. naval forces will be much smaller than they are today. The Korean participant argued that no matter how technically advanced future U.S. naval assets are, an inevitable mission for the USN in Asia would be as a "force of integration." Because U.S. naval forces would be smaller, their effectiveness would increase if they operated in coalitions for some agreed-upon mission. If the Korean and U.S. navies operated together, each would be more effective than it would be operating alone.

The Continued Importance of U.S. Forward Bases

Finally, the participants agreed on the validity of the USN's mission of forward-basing forces in East Asia to promote stability in the region and to reassure allies and friends. Nevertheless, they predicted that the unification of Korea would prompt the withdrawal of most of the U.S. ground forces in Korea because there would be no obvious reason for their remaining in either their present location or their present numbers. It would therefore be important for Korea to provide the U.S. Navy access to one or more Korean naval facility as a less intrusive but visible continuing military link to the United States. This

action would pre-empt the domestic political pressure likely to be placed on the Japanese government were Japan to become the only developed country in Asia with U.S. forces based on its soil. It would be best, participants argued, if U.S. forces are also based elsewhere in Asia so that Japan is not perceived as the only place with U.S. bases.

Unified Korean Navy Missions, 2010

The participants agreed that once the Peninsula is unified, the best way to look at future Korean naval planning would be as a hedge against possible threats in the region. This suggested that the ROKN would increase in size, scope, and function, although exactly how this reorientation would come about required elaboration.

Potential ROKN Missions

One American participant said that regardless of other requirements of a unified Korean Navy, coastal missions are certain to continue. Korea will still require defense of its coastlines; regulatory missions to enforce fishery agreements, EEZ demarcations, and international environmental laws; missions related to coastal island welfare; and maritime safety missions.

The American participant argued for the continued existence of a Korean Marine Corps. He was skeptical about the usefulness of an independent marine corps operating outside Korea to advance Korean national interests; however, he believed that because of the rough terrain of the Peninsula, Korea needs to have a body of troops that can move rapidly by water instead of by land to defend the Peninsula itself. He also said that the use of Korean Marines in some multinational coalition overseas was possible.

The same participant also concluded that there is a tension between prestige missions and other important naval missions. As one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Korea is justified in sending warships for port calls and to "show the flag." He added, however, that there is also a temptation for newly emerging economic powers to build and buy impressive platforms such as aircraft carriers, at the expense of less visible investments necessary to develop a modern force (e.g., C^4I (command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence), including surveillance and reconnaissance, interoperability, or training and retaining of a professional and technically qualified cadre of sailors).

Finally, he argued that although sea control and protection of SLOCs are missions for a future unified Korean Navy, Korean naval planners preparing for these missions would be confronted by many questions. Where would the threats to the SLOCs come from? What adversary would the unified Korean Navy be defending against? How big should the Korean Navy be to accomplish this mission, and what should it include? Would unilateral development of significant and modern sea control and SLOC protection capabilities concern Korea's neighbors? He noted that Korean platform deployments would be analogous to the 1994 appearance of the Japanese Kongo-class DDG in the East Sea, which caused concern in both Korea and China. He said that although the Japanese meant no harm with this exercise, its consequences show what can occur when countries in this part of the world take unfamiliar unilateral action that displays or deploys new capabilities. In short, he concluded that a Korean Navy operating alone would have difficulty identifying and preparing for SLOC defense and sea control missions.

During the ensuing discussion, a Korean participant said that while he did not believe that every country needs to be responsible for every SLOC of concern to it, Korea should at least be able to protect the SLOCs immediately around the Peninsula. As its capabilities increase, the Korean Navy should assume responsibility for SLOC protection further out.

This Korean participant noted that the future missions of a unified Korean Navy would involve peacetime deterrence, naval diplomacy to enhance national prestige, operations to gain and maintain control of seas during wartime, projection of power ashore from the sea, and operations to detect and prevent violation of law at sea. Ultimately, he argued, the role of the unified Korean Navy should be to assume the maritime defense of the entire Korean Peninsula, while the United States concentrates on the region as a whole.

Another Korean participant cautioned, however, that if the United States could no longer play its traditional role of arbiter for the Asia-Pacific region, this could bring on a rapid and destabilizing arms race and outright military clash between nations in the region,

particularly China and Japan. Should such a conflict begin, the Korean Navy must be responsible for protecting Korea's maritime interests while it goes on. He said that a unified Korean Navy must be able to conduct operations unilaterally, to gain and maintain control of the sea, and to project power ashore during wartime.

Potential Korean Navy Capabilities

The same participant added that action is needed now to make improvements to the ROKN so that it will be able to perform the kinds of missions mentioned above by 2010. The ROKN needs ships, submarines, and naval aircraft (sea-based and land-based) that can operate over long distances. He called for equipping the ROKN with Aegis-type ships and participating in any U.S.-led theater missile defense (TMD) projects, and advocated improving Korea's amphibious and power projection capabilities through shipboard surface-to-ground missiles, naval strike capability, acquisition of Marine Air Brigade size transport craft (e.g., LHA or LPH), and special forces (SEALs).

He said that if China were to acquire a VSTOL carrier, Japan would certainly follow suit. In this situation, Korea itself would have to consider obtaining a VSTOL carrier of its own. This Korean carrier should not cause alarm within Asia. It would not be "offense oriented" but instead would be closer to a multi-purpose ship. It would carry helicopters, provide for its own air defense, and deploy vertically launched aircraft. Korea's possession of such a vessel following Japanese or Chinese acquisition of similar platforms could be justified by contingencies in which the United States would not necessarily respond on Korea's behalf. The participant gave a possible conflict with Japan over the Tok Do Islands as one example.

Another participant noted that technological change was occurring quite rapidly. Because the implications of changes flowing from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) are unclear, both Korean and American navies need to ensure that the Korean Navy is buying the right equipment to cooperate with the USN well into the 21st century.

Some American participants thought that a unified Korean Navy responsible for defending the Peninsula would need early warning

capabilities. This implied a number of different options for Korea. They noted that P-3s currently give the Korean Navy early warning. However, early warning could also imply long-distance naval and air patrols far from the Peninsula, and acquisition of reconnaissance satellites. Korean planners, therefore, are advised to specify what they mean by "early warning."

In response, Korean participants said that reconnaissance and open ocean surveillance would be a high priority for a unified Korean Navy. The intelligence requirements for a unified Korean Navy would be substantial; no one should underestimate the importance of knowing what's going on around them. As a consequence, a unified Korean Navy either would rely on the United States to help with this requirement or would have to invest heavily in space and satellite reconnaissance. Also, to man the navy for a unified Korea, more technicians need to be educated, trained, and retained. Korean participants further claimed that since littoral warfare would become important by 2010, the Korean Navy's acquisition of a land-attack missile such as the Tomahawk could support the U.S. military in coalition operations.

Future Challenges for Korea's Defense Bureaucracy and Military

Despite the conference's working assumptions that Korea would unify gradually and that the Peninsula would have the economic strength and political will to reorganize the Korean armed forces, some participants cautioned that a sweeping reorganization would face a number of difficulties. One U.S. participant cautioned against the assumption that in a post-unification Korea, the ROK Navy, long considered subordinate to the ROK Army, would suddenly have an abundance of resources. Another participant agreed, and noted that the ROKA would be very reluctant to give up resources and its place as the recognized first budgetary priority among the three services. One participant noted that if U.S. military history is any guide, the Korean services have a poor chance of working out budgetary differences reasonably and fairly. Another participant cautioned that the unified Korean Army would certainly not be irrelevant in a post-unification Peninsula. After unification, he said, the Korean Army would have to

move north to positions in what will then be the former North Korea. The unified Korean Army will also have a larger frontier to defend.

Other participants disagreed, pointing out that a post-unification Korea would face a new strategic environment. The threat would no longer be land-based, but sea- and air-based. Korean politicians, planners, and the various services would recognize this shift and make the necessary budgetary adjustments. Naval missions would certainly increase, and therefore would require more resources. An American participant pointed out that at present the ROKN receives only about 18 to 20 percent of the defense budget. If we assume that after unification, the ROKN received some 30 percent share of the budget, this increase would be significant. The Korean defense budget by 2010 could equal U.S. $50 billion.[2]

[2] One Korean participant disagreed, saying that the projected figure of U.S. $50 billion for an ROKN budget was far too large.

U.S.–Korean Naval Cooperation, 2010: the Korean View

The participants seemed to agree that beyond defense of the Peninsula, a unified Korean Navy's involvement in sea control, SLOC protection, and overall warfighting capability should take place within the framework of some regime for multilateral security cooperation. Korean participants emphasized the need for some regional naval equilibrium as a precursor to SLOC protection and sea control/regulation through multilateral security arrangements. American participants suggested that the various navies of Asia could contribute niche capabilities to a U.S.-led multilateral framework, without specifying what these might be.

Korean presenters noted that there is currently no multilateral framework (political system, economic structure, military doctrine) that can effectively tie East Asian countries together. The network of bilateral military ties between the United States and a number of countries in the region (most notably the Republic of Korea and Japan) may not be adequate for the security requirements of the 21st century. These would include counter-proliferation, prevention of environmental degradation and pollution, and the protection of natural resources and food supplies. Dealing with these problems would require worldwide—or at the very least, region-wide—cooperation. This suggests that the countries of East Asia should establish some multilateral security framework to provide for security, thus more broadly defined.

In addition to promoting a favorable and stable strategic environment in Asia, a multilateral security framework would address the strategic objectives of just about all the major players in Northeast Asia. A properly constructed framework would:

- Permit the United States to take the initiative in assuming the role of security coordinator of the region.
- Allow Russia to maintain some degree of influence in the region.

- Satisfy Japan's requirement of maintaining strong deterrence against a rapidly emerging China.

- Provide a stable framework for China's economic growth and political stability.

Korean Attitudes Toward U.S. Access to Korean Facilities

A Korean participant noted that because the U.S. Navy is already well established in Japan, it does not need another facility in the region. Such a need would obviously arise if Japan did not want to keep U.S. naval forces. In such a case, Korea could be an alternate location. He added that the mere existence of an alternate site to Japan, might pressure Japan to keep U.S. forces stationed there. Furthermore, he noted that the success of U.S. post-unification access to Korean naval facilities depends largely on the reorientation of the U.S.–Korean alliance toward a "regional alliance"—one whose purpose is primarily to provide peace, security, and stability to the region as a whole, and away from a peninsular alliance—whose purpose is to deter and defend against North Korea.

Prerequisites for Naval Cooperation

A lack of ROKN capabilities is one of the problems in getting from the current military cooperation framework to one of multilateral security cooperation. Current Korean naval capabilities would severely constrain Korea's participation in coalition operations with the United States and other countries of the region, just as they now inhibit full bilateral cooperation. Therefore, an important first step toward Korea's full participation in a multilateral security system is improving Korean naval capabilities.

Another obstacle to overcome, Korean participants noted, would be U.S. unwillingness to operate with other nations on an equal footing. Up to now, the USN has considered itself to be the best in the world. As a consequence, it has tended to disregard the benefits of cooperation with smaller navies. As the U.S. defense budget declines, the USN can no longer unilaterally maintain peace and stability in Asia. The

Korean participant added that this means USN cooperation with allied navies will no longer be a luxury, but will become a necessity.

Finally, Korean participants admitted that the Korean Navy could have problems in the future if there is no clear understanding of what its expected missions are. Some participants suggested that the development of the ROKN's own White Paper, its own *Forward...From the Sea (Peninsula)*, would therefore be an important contribution to future Korean naval cooperation with other navies.

Korean participants noted several other prerequisites for effective naval cooperation between a unified Korean Navy and the USN:

- First, the Korean and American navies need to establish procedures for interoperability. This would entail thinking about the types of command and control systems the two navies would have going into the 21st century. It also would require consideration of future military and naval doctrine for both navies, and compatible signals, training and education requirements, and weapon systems.

- Second, weapon and communications interoperability could be increased if there were greater cooperation in defense industrial production and technology development. The ROK has produced various kinds of weapons, and its shipbuilding industry is one of the best in the world. Conceivably, the United States and the ROK could engage in defense industrial co-development and production.

- Third, it is important for the U.S. government to create a favorable environment for technology transfer to Korea. Equipping the Korean Navy with U.S. weapon systems would certainly lead to greater interoperability.

- Fourth, it will be important to define the roles and missions for each navy in post-unification cooperation.

- Finally, developing a clear command relationship and providing for proper equipment and procedures to communicate between the navies are important steps in promoting cooperation between the U.S. Navy and a unified Korean Navy. The Korean participants noted

that the current command relationship between the U.S. military and the ROK military would not be appropriate in the post-unification era. Korea would increasingly want to be involved in decision-making about command, control, and communication, as well as information dissemination.

Specific Areas of Cooperation

Korean presenters noted that cooperative activities between the U.S. and Korean navies could be broken down and listed under the following categories: security assistance; operational exercises; facility access; political-military interactions; personnel and professional education exchanges; cooperation in command, control, and communications; and research and development.

Elaborating on what the two sides could do to promote cooperation in these fields, a Korean participant repeated an earlier statement that security assistance cooperation between the U.S. and Korean navies could be enhanced if Korea continues to purchase U.S.-produced weapon and platform systems or if Korea co-produces defense assets with the United States. He also envisioned the United States and Korea cooperating to provide security assistance to some third, as yet unidentified, country, whose force improvements were in the interests of both the United States and a unified Korea.

Korean participants thought that combined exercises, whether bilateral or multilateral, were useful for the ROK Navy. In particular, they stated that Korea expects and wants the RIMPAC exercises[3] to continue. As for ROK Navy contributions to U.S. missions, its contributions to ASW, mining, counter-mining operations, shallow-water submarine operations, and amphibious operations during exercises should be encouraged.

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[3] The "Rim of the Pacific" or "RIMPAC" exercise is primarily a naval exercise (although other branches of the U.S. military have participated) to test how well multinational naval forces can work together under realistic operational conditions. The exercise is held every two years, under the overall coordination of Commander, U.S. Third Fleet. The ROK Navy participated for the first time in RIMPAC 90.

The Korean participants said that such activities as navy-to-navy staff policy talks and informal discussions and seminars contribute to mutual understanding and cooperation. With the current command relationship in place, political-military interactions are good. However, if the Korean Peninsula unifies and the U.S.–Korean alliance is restructured to match the more "region-oriented" defense policy of a unified Korea, political-military interactions will increase in importance. Unfortunately, diminution or changes in the command relationship could have the effect of reducing the frequency of bilateral contacts, unless both sides work to avoid this problem.

The current system of personnel and professional educational exchanges between the two countries is also good, and is likely to continue into the 21st century, a Korean participant said. Korea could enhance cooperation in this area by extending exchange opportunities for U.S. military personnel to attend naval educational institutes in the Rebublic of Korea. For its part, the United States could continue its current practice of giving Koreans access to U.S. professional and educational institutes.

Finally, the Korean participants said that combined research and development is another good way to maintain the defense relationship. Although R&D is primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) rather than the ROK Navy, the Navy can initiate co-development and co-production of naval systems. The participant cited the United States–Japan FSX (experimental fighter aircraft) program as a good analogy.

U.S.–Unified Korea Navy Cooperation, 2010: the U.S. View

U.S. participants were cautiously optimistic that the U.S.–Korean naval and military relationship would continue after unification. They said that our relationship continued after the Korean War, after the Cold War, and after the dramatic changes that have occurred in the post-Cold War period, despite ups and downs. This is because Korea and the United States retain common vital interests, a point recently repeated publicly by Defense Minister Rhee.

In a post-unification period of U.S.–Korean relations, one U.S. participant said that the challenge to U.S. and Korean defense planners will be to tailor our alliance to satisfy those broad interests that both sides share. For instance, he said that because of differences of geography, Korean strategists would value a military relationship that emphasized defense of the Peninsula and deterrence of threats over compellance or presence, prestige, and Operations Other Than War (OOTW). U.S. planners and policy makers, on the other hand, might focus on the latter, while not dismissing the continuing importance of defending the Peninsula and deterring threats to peace and stability. However, budgetary restrictions will make it difficult for the United States to satisfy all of these objectives in Asia unilaterally. It therefore makes sense for the U.S. military to work closely with the militaries of other countries as U.S. forces decline in size. This, U.S. participants implied, means developing a strategy for who should do what—i.e., a solid role-sharing scheme.

Some Prerequisites for U.S.–Korean Naval Cooperation

One U.S. participant identified several paths that the current bilateral naval relationship could take by 2010. Although he (and other U.S. participants) shared the Korean representatives' belief that any Korean Navy would have to increase its capabilities to become an operationally useful coalition partner in 2010, he suggested that the first step toward effective cooperation is to achieve interoperability. The primary concern for both U.S. and Korean naval

planners should be the ability to communicate with one another over the course of the next ten to 15 years. Although weapons interoperability was needed, he commented, if the two sides cannot communicate with one another, they cannot tell each other "when to shoot." Another participant agreed that communication is key. He added that "communication" means a wide range of issues from Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), to data, intelligence, and publication sharing, to the ability to speak directly with one another.

U.S. and Korean Contributions to a Cooperative Relationship

One U.S. presenter suggested some possible cooperative U.S. and Korean missions by 2010. He said that by 2010 the U.S. Navy could perform the following missions as part of a cooperative scheme with a unified Korea:

- Strategic deterrence, to prevent other Northeast Asian countries—China and Japan—from developing (further, in the case of China) nuclear weapons.
- Strategic sea lift, to support Korean and American interest in transporting large quantities of materiel overseas.
- Continued U.S. sea control, to underscore common interest in maintaining freedom of navigation.
- Forward presence (in Korea), to help provide forces reacting to crises and participate in coalition operations, and thereby foster stability and security within Asia and outside.

Korean contributions to the security relationship would involve:

- Development of a unified Korean naval capability for operations beyond coastal or brown water, to assist the USN in combined or perhaps coalition operations.
- Cooperation of the Korean shipbuilding industry with U.S. defense technology development.

- Continued host nation support for U.S. forces in Korea.

These contributions would be expensive, but would be less expensive for Korea than providing comprehensive defense of the Korean Peninsula unilaterally.

U.S. participants echoed some of the KIDA representatives' views on Korean contribution to a future regional alliance or security arrangement. They agreed that Korea could certainly contribute in the areas of shallow-water ASW, mine warfare and mine counter-measures, and amphibious operations. The U.S. participants said that although they recognized the importance of a unified Korean Navy's SLOC mission, Korean defense planners might consider concentrating on those SLOCs close to the Peninsula. Besides the concerns of Korea's neighbors, these U.S. participants pointed out, a unified Korean Navy's attempt at SLOC protection far from the Korean Peninsula was also likely to be cost-prohibitive. Finally, these participants suggested that the Korean Navy publish a doctrinal statement on current and future Korean naval objectives and plans, to help the U.S. Navy understand Korean naval plans and resource decisions.

Areas of Successful U.S.–Korean Naval Cooperation

In a number of other areas, the U.S. representatives said that the ROK Navy is heading in the right direction for effective cooperation. They cited the examples of the development of the KDX,[4] the P-3 program with the United States, the development of Korean diesel submarines, and coastal defense development. Other U.S. participants pointed out that personnel exchanges, including cross-deck training, have proven extremely useful, and should help with developing cooperative relationships well into the 21st century. Still others complimented the Korean military on its progress in becoming more joint. Because future U.S. operations will be more joint in nature, it would serve both sides well if Korean military operations involved more interservice cooperation. Korean participants pointed to the

[4] The KDX is the Republic of Korea's indigenously designed and produced destroyer. The U.S. Navy has cooperated with the ROKN in the development of the KDX.

recent appointment of someone outside of the army as Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff—an air force general who later became the Minister of National Defense. This event suggested that Korea was making significant progress toward jointness.

Possible Areas of Improvement

U.S. participants agreed with Korean presentations that suggested more U.S. work is needed to prepare for naval cooperation in the 21st century. One participant noted that the current emphasis on wartime readiness provides little preparation for a strong peacetime relationship with Korea. He added in illustration that although the USN conducts a good number of exercises with the ROKN, these exercises are overwhelmingly "wartime" in focus. He said that in preparation for a U.S. peacetime presence in a unified Korea, one would expect to see more exercises of the RIMPAC or CARAT[5] type, or exercises stressing humanitarian operations, disaster relief, and NEOs.

Concerning port visits, this U.S. participant noted that in 1994 the ROK ranked seventh in the region as a destination for Seventh Fleet port visits. The participant argued that the U.S. Navy's interests would be best served by spending more time in the area around the Korean Peninsula. This would not be easy, he added, because Seventh Fleet is expected to make many port visits in many locations in Asia. Difficulties were compounded by prospects for ship reductions in the Pacific, by PERSTEMPO[6] requirements (which involve a six-months-out, 12-months-back rotation for Navy personnel) and by quality-of-life requirements. Navy crews prefer liberty in Hong Kong and Singapore to

[5] CARAT stands for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercise. It is a series of rolling bilateral exercises with the members of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) excluding Vietnam. It was designed to group most U.S. exercises with Southeast Asian countries into one deployment, so as to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. resources. The first CARAT exercise took place in the spring of 1995, and CARAT 96 is scheduled to take place from April to July 1996.

[6] "PERSTEMPO" is defined as the percentage of time in a given annual period that an individual supports operations and training away from his/her barracks, home base, or station for a period of time greater than 24 hours, to include unaccompanied duty assignments and temporary additional duty.

liberty in Chinhae and Pusan. Regardless of such obstacles, this participant argued that if the U.S. Navy is to maintain a cooperative relationship with the ROK Navy, it has to change some of its deployment patterns, its PERSTEMPO requirements, and the types of exercises it conducts.

Another participant argued that to induce policy and operational changes that will improve the naval relationship, the best approach is to concentrate on incentives to maintain that relationship through 2010. For Korea, the opportunity to work with and learn from the USN is one obvious incentive. For the United States, the participant suggested the following: taking domestic political pressure off Japan by homeporting some naval assets in Korea, taking advantage of the multiplier effect of coalition operations with the Korean Navy and other navies of East Asia, and maintaining influence within Korean naval/military and political circles through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The participant argued that we should keep these incentives in mind when formulating future U.S.–Korea policy and naval policy, and when conducting military operations affecting the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusions

Areas of Agreement

In the three days of discussing U.S.–Korean Naval Relations in 2010, Korean and U.S. participants covered a wide range of topics. Over the course of that time, there were some slight disagreements among the participants; however, the workshop was characterized by a high degree of agreement on most points under discussion. The KIDA and CNA representatives agreed on the following points:

- Unification implies a more regional outlook for the ROK. No participant or observer argued that Korea would become "isolationist" or "neutral" after unification.

- A unified Korea would not align itself with a major East Asian power other than the United States. Korea's future strategic options include participating in a U.S.-led multinational arrangement to promote stability and security in Asia, to react to crises, and to conduct NEO, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations.

- Unification would inspire change in the ROK force structure, with the Korean Navy getting a larger share of the Korean defense budget. Korean military missions would also be more maritime in nature, with the ROKN having missions beyond the maritime defense of the Peninsula, although it was unclear exactly what these missions should be.

- U.S. Navy missions by 2010 would still include most of the current naval missions (e.g., sea control, power projection, strategic sea lift). They would shift somewhat to littoral, combined, and joint operations (e.g., TMD missions and OOTW cooperation), and be influenced by emerging technologies (e.g., the "arsenal ship," improved ability to strike mobile targets from the sea) and the possible need to confront "anti-Navy forces" in Northeast Asia.

- Enhancing the Korean Navy's capabilities is a pre-requisite for effective future U.S.–Korean naval cooperation. A more capable Korean Navy could conduct a wider range of combined exercises and

operations with any combination of naval forces the United States is likely to lead. U.S. participants, however, emphasized the importance of dealing with communications interoperability before considering weapons interoperability.

- U.S. access to Korean naval facilities, either for combined U.S.–Korean naval cooperation or as part of some future coalition framework arrangment, is a good idea. The American participants believed that U.S. access to Korean facilities will help the USN to stay forward, relieve political pressure on Japan as the otherwise only regional country with U.S. forces still deployed on its soil, and alleviate budgetary pressures on the United States.

- The Korean Navy will have much to offer either to a U.S.–Korean bilateral alliance in 2010 or to a U.S.-led multinational arrangement in Northeast Asia by 2010. In particular, Korea can contribute shallow-water ASW, mine warfare, mine countermeasures, amphibious forces, and shipbuilding or other types of R&D cooperation with the United States.

Areas of Disagreement

Despite reaching a consensus on a wide range of topics, slight disagreements remained:

- Some Korean participants believed that the U.S. faith in the longevity of the U.S.–Japan alliance might be mistaken, and therefore might turn out to be a faulty planning factor. They argued that the growing military power of China might pressure Japan to follow a path less dependent on that of the United States.

- Although U.S. participants thought it appropriate for Korea to be responsible for protecting Korean SLOCs and maintaining sea control in areas around the Korean Peninsula, they argued the following: it is difficult to determine what specific threats to the SLOCs are present and thus, what means of protection are warranted; keeping the SLOCs open and regulating the seas in Northeast Asia is of universal concern; Korean protection of SLOCs at a great distance from the Korean Peninsula might be cost-prohibitive; and

protection of Korean SLOCs and a sea control capability could mean a wide range of different Korean defense equipment, locations, and policies, some of which would be misperceived by the countries of the region.

- Korean participants acknowledged U.S. concerns over the likely Korean mission of SLOC protection and sea control; however, they maintained the following: Korea must be prepared to handle contingencies the United States would not be willing to address (e.g., a Tok Do Island conflict); maritime stability in Northeast Asia could no longer depend on U.S. dominance, but rather would depend on the emergence of an equilibrium in sea control capabilities among the countries of the region; and Korean naval improvements should not concern Korea's neighbors, because they would take place within some U.S.-led multinational security arrangement—one that would include those neighbors.

Enhancing the Relationship

The following were recommendations for strengthening the current naval relationship to ensure a solid foundation for the naval relations of 2010:

- Increase emphasis on USN peacetime presence in Korea over strictly wartime bilateral cooperation. Such change in emphasis would be expressed by the types of exercises conducted with the ROK and the number of ship visits of the USN to ports in Korea. These changes, in turn, would likely require changes in PERSTEMPO requirements and deployment patterns.[7]

- Continue to encourage Korean naval planners to develop a Korean naval doctrinal statement similar to the U.S. Navy's *...From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea.*

[7] It is very unlikely that a recommendation to change PERSTEMPO would be implemented by the Navy in the foreseeable future. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy are committed to the current personnel operations tempo. This involves a six-months-out, 12-months-back rotation for U.S. Navy personnel.

- Continue to develop and improve the Korean Navy's acquisition process. The more formal, routinized, rational, and familiar it is, the easier it will be for USN and U.S. military assistance managers to provide the weapons, platforms, manuals, and other assets necessary for Korean naval development.

- Broaden the military relationship to include other Northeast Asian countries, including (and especially) Japan. A U.S.–Korea–Japan trilateral relationship will promote stability and security. It could open the way to a broader multilateral security arrangement that includes China and Russia, and could foster confidence between Korea and Japan.

Next Steps

The workshop ended with ad referendum agreement on further work to promote U.S.–Korean naval relations. Two proposals emerged:

- Plan a trilateral workshop on naval cooperation, involving CNA, KIDA, and a third research institution from Japan.

- Undertake a joint study on future role sharing and interoperability issues between the Korean and U.S. navies.

Participants considered the second CNA–KIDA Workshop successful. Candid discussions among CNA and KIDA presenters, and with representatives from both navies, should help in developing guidelines for future cooperation between the USN and ROKN.

Appendix A:
CNA Participants

Name	Paper presented or role
RADM Larry Vogt USN (Ret.)	Workshop co-chairman
Prof. Paul Bracken Yale University	"U.S. Navy Missions in Asia in the Next Century"
Mr. M. Lyall Breckon CNA	"Threat Environment for a Unified Korea: 2010" (Paper by Mr. Paul Kreisberg)
CDR Charles Dixon USN	"United States–Republic of Korea Naval Cooperation circa 2010: Opportunities and Challenges"
Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld CNA	"Naval Missions for a Unified Korea," and final session co-chairman
Dr. Desmond Wilson CNA	"USN/ROKN Cooperation in the 21st Century: Prospects and Advantages"
Mr. Christopher Yung CNA	Rapporteur

Appendix B:
KIDA Participants

Name	Paper presented or role
Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh KIDA	Workshop co-chairman
RADM Chan-Ho Bae ROKN	"Naval Cooperation Between the ROK & U.S. in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century"
Dr. Chang-Su Kim KIDA	"Threat Environment for a Unified Korea 2010: A Korean Perspective," and rapporteur
CAPT Kye-Ryong Rhoe KIDA	"Missions and Force Requirements of the ROK Navy to the Year 2010: Preparing for a Unified Korea," and final session co-chairman
Dr. Sung-Hwan Wie KIDA	"Future ROKN-USN Cooperation for U.S. Naval Missions in Northeast Asia," and rapporteur
CDR Tae-Ho Won ROKN	"U.S. Navy in Northeast Asia for 2010: Its Contribution to Regional Security"
Mr. Jae-Wook Lee KIDA	Rapporteur

Appendix C:
CNA Guest List

Name	Title
RADM John Sigler CINCPACFLT	N3/N5/N6
RADM John Lyons OPNAV	N31/N52
CAPT Mark Haley USCINCPAC	J-5 (Staff)
CAPT Robert Felt USN	U.S Naval Forces Korea
CAPT William Peterson U.S. Seventh Fleet	N3
CAPT George Murphy OPNAV	N522
LtCol Z. Fearing CINCPACFLT	N3/N5 (Staff)
LCDR Robert Morabito OPNAV	N522 (Staff)
COL James Young U.S. Army (Ret.)	Former Defense Attaché, Seoul
Dr. Henry Kenny CNA	Senior Research Analyst

Appendix D:
KIDA Guest List

Name	Title
RADM Seung-Yul Oh ROKN	Senior Fellow, George Washington University, Washington, DC
CAPT Dong-Il Baek ROKN	Republic of Korean Naval Attaché, Washington, DC
CAPT Chung-Ryun Kim ROKN	Visiting Fellow, National Defense University, Washington, DC
CDR Chung-Kil Lee ROKN	ROK Navy

Appendix E:
CNA–KIDA Workshop Agenda
December 4–6, 1995
Alexandria, VA, USA

December 4, 1995 (Monday)

0900-0930	**Welcoming remarks** *Mr. Robert Murray (President of CNA)* **Opening remarks** *Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh (KIDA Co-Chairman)* **Congratulatory address** *RADM John T. Lyons (Navy Sponsor)*
0930-1200	First Session: **Threat Environment for a Unified Korea 2010** *Chaired by Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh, KIDA, and RADM (Ret.) Larry Vogt*
0930-1000	**Presentation** *Mr. Lyall Breckon, CNA* *(Paper by Paul Kreisberg)*
1000-1030	**Presentation** *Dr. Chang-Su Kim, KIDA*
1030-1100	**Break**
1100-1200	**Discussion** — 1100-1105: Dr. Kim discusses Mr. Kreisberg's paper — 1105-1110: Mr. Breckon discusses Dr. Kim's paper — 1110-1200: General discussion
1200-1330	**Lunch**

1330-1600	Second Session: **U.S. Naval Missions in East Asia, 2010** *Chaired by Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh and RADM (Ret.) Larry Vogt*
1330-1400	**Presentation** *Professor Paul Bracken, Yale University*
1400-1430	**Presentation** *CDR Tae-Ho Won, ROKN*
1430-1500	**Break**
1500-1600	**Discussion** — 1500-1505: CDR Won discusses Prof. Bracken's paper — 1505-1510: Prof. Bracken discusses CDR Won's paper — 1510-1600: General discussion
1600-1700	**Summary of first day's presentations and discussions**

December 5, 1995 (Tuesday)

0900-1130	Third Session: **Naval Missions for a Unified Korea, 2010** *Chaired by Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh and RADM (Ret.) Larry Vogt*
0900-0930	**Presentation** *CAPT Kye-Ryong Rhoe, KIDA*
0930-1000	**Presentation** *Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld, CNA*

1000-1030	**Break**
1030-1130	**Discussion** — 1030-1035: CDR Charles Dixon discusses CAPT Rhoe's paper —1035-1040: CAPT Rhoe discusses Mr. Hirschfeld's paper — 1040-1130: General discussion
1130-1300	**Lunch**
1300-1600	**Fourth Session: USN/ROKN Cooperation in the 21st Century: The ROK View** *Chaired by Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh and RADM (Ret.) Larry Vogt*
1300-1330	**Presentation** *RADM Chan-Ho Bae, ROKN*
1330-1400	**Presentation** *CDR Charles Dixon, USN*
1400-1430	**Break**
1430-1600	**Discussion** — 1430-1435: CDR Dixon discusses CAPT Bae's paper — 1435-1440: CAPT Bae discusses CDR Dixon's paper — 1440-1600: General discussion
1600-1630	**Summary of second day's presentations and discussions**
1900	**Cocktail party & dinner** at the Army-Navy Country Club, Arlington, VA

December 6, 1995 (Wednesday)

0830-1040 Fifth Session: **USN/ROKN Cooperation In the 21st Century: the U.S. View**
Chaired by Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh and RADM (Ret.) Larry Vogt

0830-0900 **Presentation**
Dr. Desmond Wilson, CNA

0900-0930 **Presentation**
Dr. Sung-Hwan Wie, KIDA

0930-1030 **Discussion**

— 0930-0935: Dr. Wie discusses Dr. Wilson's paper

— 0935-0940: Dr. Wilson discusses Dr. Wie's paper

— 0940-1030: General discussion

1030-1040 **Break**

1040-1130 **Discussion of "Where To From Here?" for CNA and KIDA**
Chaired by CAPT Kye-Ryong Rhoe and Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld

1200-1400 **Lunch and discussion**
with Ambassador Linton Brooks, Vice President, Policy, Strategy, and Forces Division, CNA