BAND OF BROTHERS:
THE 2D MARINE DIVISION AND THE TIGER
BRIGADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

An Analysis of the Impact of Organizational Culture on Tactical Joint Warfare

A Monograph
by

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First Term AY 94-95

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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

**Title and Subtitle:** Band of Brothers: The 2nd Marine Division and the Tiger Brigade in the Persian Gulf War. An Analysis of the Impact of Organizational Culture on Tactical Joint Warfare

**Author(s):** Major Carey A. Tucker, USMC

**Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es):**

Advanced Military Studies Program
Fort Leavenworth KS 66027

**Funding Numbers:**

**Performing Organization Report Number:**

**Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es):**

**Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number:**

**Distribution/Availability Statement:**

Approved for Public Release
Distribution: Unlimited.

**Abstract (Maximum 200 words):** See p ii

**Subject Terms:** Desert Storm, 2nd Marine Division, Tiger Brigade, Joint, Tactical Joint Warfare, Persian Gulf War.

**Security Classification of Report:** Unclassified

**Security Classification of This Page:** Unclassified

**Security Classification of Abstract:** Unclassified

**Number of Pages:** 57

**Price Code:**

NSN 7540-01-280-5500
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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Title of Monograph: Band of Brothers: The 2d Marine Division and the Tiger Brigade in the Persian Gulf War

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Accepted this 17th day of December 1994
ABSTRACT


This monograph is an analysis of the impact of organizational culture on tactical joint warfare. The merger of the Tiger Brigade with 2d Marine Division during the Persian Gulf War serves as a laboratory for this analysis. The author researched after action reports, the papers of authors who have written on the Persian Gulf War and interviewed commanders and key staff of both units to determine whether differences in service culture reduced the combat effectiveness of either unit. This research is analyzed using a recently developed organizational theory that postulates that the human element is the most important and least understood factor in determining whether a merger between two organizations with different cultures will succeed or fail.

This study concludes that the merger of the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division was very successful. The key elements to that success were the relationship between the commanders, the effectiveness of liaison officers, the willingness of both units to learn from and understand the culture of the other and the amount of time available before actual combat to reduce cultural barriers.
DEDICATION

Colonel John Sylvester commanded the Tiger Brigade during the Persian Gulf War. In the Fall of 1994 Sylvester, now a Brigadier General, gave a lecture to the students of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College about his experiences with the 2d Marine Division. In the margin of one of his slides BG Sylvester has handwritten, in bold block letters, the phrase “BAND OF BROTHERS.”

That simple phrase, used by Marines and Soldiers alike to define the qualities of esprit, cohesion and comradeship found in well-lead combat units, is best understood in its full context.

He which hath no stomach to this fight
Let him depart; his passport shall be made.
We would not die in that man’s company
That fears his fellowship to die with us.
He that outlives this day, and comes safe home,
Will stand a tip-toe when this day is named,
And say, these wounds I had on Crispen’s day
Old men forget, yet all shall be forgot,
But he’ll remember with advantages
What feats he did that day: then shall our
names...
Be in their flowing cups freshly remember’d.
This story shall the good man tell his son;
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered,—
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile
This day shall gentle his condition:
And Gentlemen...now a-bed
Shall thinks themselves accursed they were not
here
And hold their manhoods cheap while any
speaks
that fought with us...”

- King Henry V

This paper is dedicated to the officers of the 2d Marine Division and Tiger Brigade who spoke candidly of their experiences with each other during the Persian Gulf War.

and

To the Soldiers and Marines of both units who, in January and February 1991, fought as brothers.
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INTRODUCTION

“It is evident to me that there will be more Tiger Brigades with Marine Divisions in the future. The best way to make it work is to spend some time learning about each other.”

-LTC Norman Greczyn USA
Executive Officer, Tiger Brigade

On 10 January 1991 the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Tiger Brigade) reported to the operational control of the 2d Marine Division. The Tiger Brigade provided the lightly armored Marine division with the mobility and heavy combat power necessary to conduct offensive mechanized warfare in the vast expanses of the desert. On 23 March 1991 the Tiger Brigade returned to the operational control of Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT). During those two months, as the official histories tell us, this unique blend of Army armor and Marine infantry melded into a tight organization which conducted extraordinarily successful combat operations.²

Outside those official histories however, is an untold story: a story about the merging of two distinct organizational cultures; a story about how, in the crucible of combat, the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division displayed a remarkable willingness to adapt and to learn in order to resolve the misunderstandings, misperceptions, and biases that occur when two cultures collide. This monograph will tell part of that story, and in that telling uncover some aspects of the human factor in joint warfare.

The willingness to adapt and to learn—to understand—took time. For some officers that willingness came in days; some required weeks or months. Some officers never displayed that willingness; their after action comments are riddled with criticisms levied against the way the other Service thinks about warfighting. Those officers will carry those criticisms in their minds and to their peers, their perceptions becoming reality the next time Army armored units fight alongside Marines.

There will be a next time. Army units and Marines have fought together throughout our history, but the merging of Army armor with a Marine division during Desert Storm was a first. Though unique in its time, that merger is a harbinger of a new approach to joint warfare. As the U.S. military moves to a force projection posture, the Marine Corps is focusing on the “enabling force” mission and the Army has established the Army Prepositioning Afloat (APA) program. This complementary combination provides a theater commander with the flexibility to sequence rapidly a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
and an Army armored brigade into a theater in order to establish the conditions for a further build-up of combat power. Both concepts are relatively recent additions to the Joint Force Commander’s "toolbox."³

The Commandant of the Marine Corps defines an "enabling force" as a force that will "allow the National Command Authority to initially respond to a crisis with credible capabilities while our heavier contingency forces are deployed and made ready for deployment."⁴ Its purpose is defined by General Carl Mundy:

If we need to introduce heavy decisive combat forces ashore into a theater for an extensive land campaign the Army will be the force of choice. It is in the difficult, dangerous process of getting large, equipment intensive forces into a theater—enabling their entry—that the Navy-Marine Corps team is of the greatest use.⁵

The Marine Corps envisions using amphibious forces and Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) to seize and secure ports and airfields and expand those lodgments in order to establish the conditions for the rapid and secure arrival of follow on forces. In an immature theater, the first "heavy" combat power will likely come off of APA ships.

The APA consists of a balanced heavy brigade reinforced with logistics and combat support assets. The purpose of the APA program is to "provide a heavier ground-based force capable of sustained operations inland at extended distances from the theater army logistics base."⁶ The APA is not intended as a replacement for the MPF, but in a hostile environment where U.S. forces have to fight to get ashore, fight to expand lodgments, and then fight to protect those lodgments, the rapid deployment inherent to the APA combined with the capabilities of the MAGTF provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with a unique synergism during the dangerous and critical early weeks of mobilization and deployment. Each force brings to the battle its own unique capabilities and limitations; each force’s strength complements the other’s weakness.

In that type of scenario, those two organizations, an Army armor brigade and a MAGTF, fighting together under a common commander, may not have time to resolve organizational cultural differences before being committed to combat. Those differences, amplified by misunderstandings, service bias, and ignorance, can result in what Eliot Cohen and John Gooch have labeled "military misfortune." The simpler term for it is failure. The experiences of the Tiger Brigade and the 2d Marine Division in the
Persian Gulf War provide a laboratory from which we can identify, in advance, those cultural issues likely to cause barriers between Marine units and Army armor.

The intent of this monograph is to identify those barriers; to illustrate how those barriers were successfully overcome by the Tiger Brigade and the 2d Marine Division; to attempt to identify why those barriers exist, and to provide a foundation to allow Army and Marine officers to adapt rapidly to and learn about the way the other Service thinks about warfighting—and why that Service thinks that way.

It is not the intent of this monograph to determine whose culture is right or wrong. Culture reflects an organization's roles, missions, structure, history, and doctrine. How a Service thinks about warfighting is the essence of the character of that organization. Army armor units and Marines think differently, and that is how it should be. This monograph will not search for a commonality of thought; it will search for a common understanding of how each organization thinks about warfighting. To reach that understanding, we must first understand the dynamics of organizational culture.

Organizational culture is difficult to define. The term is used to describe the intangible qualities of an organization, qualities which the outsider finds difficult to discern and the insider finds difficult to describe. Using the strict sociological/anthropological definition, culture is the “internalization of a set of values, feelings, attitudes, and expectations which provide meaning, order and stability to members lives and influence their behavior.” In an organization, that internalization results in convictions and assumptions which are often manifested in an unconscious “taken for granted” manner as a key determinant of individual and group behavior. In their book *Mergers and Acquisitions: The Human Factor*, Sue Cartwright and Cary Cooper describe the effects of culture on the organization:

Culture is a powerful, enduring, and pervasive influence on human behavior. Through the socialization process within a culture, individuals learn the norms and expectations of membership, the right and wrong way of doing things, acceptable and unacceptable forms of behavior, language, etc. It is through culture that [organizations] maintain regularity and order... Culture [is] a paradigm by which we can understand an organization. Culture is therefore something an organization is rather than has.
Organizational culture, once internalized, forms a nearly invisible framework that provides stability, comfort, and worth to the individual. Cartwright and Cooper define six ways in which that cultural framework manifests itself:

1. The way in which people interact, their terms of address and the language and technical jargon they use...the way in which they dress [and] the importance attached to wearing corporate symbols of identity.
2. The norms which govern the way in which work is organized and conducted, e.g. reporting arrangements, preference for written or verbal forms of communication.
3. The organizational self-image and the dominant value it espouses e.g: the importance it places on particular organizational functions.
4. The way in which an organization treats its employees.
5. The rules for playing the organizational game.
6. The climate as conveyed by its physical layout and general atmosphere.\(^1\)

In the day to day operations of an organization, culture is taken for granted and only assumes importance when it is threatened or disturbed. The merger of two organizations greatly disturbs the cultural peace. Minor issues and differences become major points of contention between members of the merging organizations. Individuals, peering at the other organization from within their own cultural framework analyze, judge, and often find wanting the values and culture of that organization. This clash of cultures, if it creates misunderstandings, misperceptions, and a perceived unstable working environment, has a detrimental effect on performance and morale. \(^1\)

The parallels between the management theory of organizational culture and the requirements of joint warfare are evident. Each Service possesses a distinct organizational culture. In this era of joint warfare and force projection, those cultures will merge with increasing regularity in circumstances of imminent crisis. Whether those mergers result in synergistic compatibility or hostile tolerance will depend a great deal on the willingness of the people involved to adapt and to learn from the other organization. A study of the successful merger of the Tiger Brigade with the 2d Marine Division, analyzed within the framework of a merger of two distinct organizational cultures, provides a window from which to study this human element of joint warfare.

Cartwright and Cooper determined that the most reliable and valuable means of discerning the culture of an organization, and the impact of merger on that culture, were interviews with the key
members of an organization. Research for this paper follows that model. Interviews are supplemented by after action comments, official histories, and the papers of several authors who have written on the Persian Gulf War.

A great deal of the research and thus content of this paper deals with perceptions, judgments, and at times, fairly stark opinion. The purpose of this work is to promote understanding. To read it with a defensive attitude, condemning the perceptions, attitudes, and values of those who have contributed is not only counterproductive, but will also blind the reader to the achievements of the 2d Marine Division and the Tiger Brigade. Culture is something an organization is, and in the case of the Tiger Brigade and the 2d Marine Division, that culture forms the strength and heart of two outstanding units. It should not be changed. To judge either organization through the prism of Service bias, prejudice, or organizational values---in other words, to judge the other organization from an intellectual prison whose walls are defined by a particular Service culture---is to "denigrate what some very brave men did in February 1991."

As a final introductory comment this study focuses on an Army armored Brigade and a Marine Division fighting a war in a desert environment. While much of what is written will apply to other combat environments, the organizational cultures are probably unique to U.S. Army armor Brigades and Marine Divisions. The reader should be careful not to draw conclusions that generalize beyond those parameters.
THE EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

"Synergy results when the elements of the joint force are so effectively employed that their total military impact exceeds the sum of their individual contributions."13
- Joint Pub 1

"While the motives for mergers may be many and various, the objective is to make 2+2 equal more than 4."14
- Mergers and Acquisitions: the Human Factor

The failure in the 1980's of mergers which, by all the standard quantitative terms of business, should have been successful caused management theorists to look to the role of organizational culture as a cause for those failures. Decision makers would normally seek a merger, defined as the "joining or gradual blending of two previously discrete entities,"15 to increase the strategic and financial strength of a corporation. Decisions to merge were consequently focused on an analysis of financial and strategic data; compatibility of management styles and corporate cultures were practically ignored. When such mergers failed, despite a good strategic and financial fit, management theorists began to look outside the quantifiable elements of business to the human elements. Their studies discovered that human factors, particularly the collision of organizational cultures that result from a merger, constituted a primary cause of merger failure.16

Sue Cartwright and Cary Cooper, in their book Mergers and Acquisitions: The Human Factor, compiled and then synthesized a number of major studies by management theorists on the effect of mergers on organizational culture. Their findings are germane to the human element of joint warfare, where decisions to merge the capabilities of different Services are based primarily on strategic and financial considerations. This section will explain their theory and provide the reader with a framework with which to analyze the cultural dynamics affecting the merger of the Tiger Brigade with the 2d Marine Division.

A decision to merge, whether in business or the military, will be driven primarily by strategic and financial considerations. Compatibility of organizational culture and management styles will have little, if any, impact on the decision. That compatibility however, will be the primary determinant of the success or failure of the merger. The decision makers who initiate the merger are often remote from the merger process, so it is the middle manager who, de facto, becomes responsible for making the merger
work. The merger of two organizations in which the employees hold very different cultural values and expectations will result in failure unless those middle managers work to ensure a smooth integration of organizational cultures. Cartwright and Cooper found that the ability and willingness of middle managers to integrate the two companies was the most important factor in merger success. Poor integration and the subsequent cultural collision caused mergers to fail. To ensure successful integration, those ultimately responsible for making the merger successful must understand the dynamics and importance of organizational culture.¹⁷

Factors hindering integration are present from the outset of a merger. A decision to merge for strategic and financial reasons, made by leaders who are separate from and unconcerned about the human elements of the merger, presents the middle manager and employee with a fait accompli. Having no say in the decision, both are expected to make the merger work. This difficulty is further complicated by a lack of knowledge about the acquired or acquiring organization. Presented with the responsibility for integration, members of both organizations soon realize that "nobody knows less about the [acquired] organization then the acquiring management [and vice-versa]....At the time the decision is made to merge, knowing or appreciating the culture of the other organization is often considered unnecessary,"¹⁸ If that "appreciation" does not begin immediately, then the merger will either fail or never reach its full potential.

Too often the importance of understanding the culture of the other organization is not realized until the resulting cultural clash is irreversible. Members of both organizations realize quickly that they do not share the same perceptions and cultural values. Change is met with resistance, minor difficulties become magnified, and the merger starts down the road to failure.

Cartwright and Cooper’s analysis determined that the key to merger success is the way in which the transitional process is managed. The transitional process is only the first step in achieving a successful merger, but it is by far the most important—setting the groundwork for the willingness to adapt, to learn, and to compromise, which must follow.¹⁹

Even when the transition process is well managed mergers often encounter difficulty from that most human of qualities: conflict between managers. Mergers are about power, perceptions, differing
cultures, and different definitions of the situation. Managers, ensconced and comfortable in the cultural womb of their organization, are often unwilling or unable to relinquish the tenets of their culture and its perceptions. Relationships between managers are a well recognized source of merger problems. To reach beyond the inherent power struggle requires leadership, trust, and clarity of vision.

The successful integration of senior leadership is not enough, however, if the rest of the employees are uncertain and contentious. Employees need not participate directly in the execution of a merger to feel its impact, “for it produces a psychological ripple throughout the organization.” That “ripple” will sabotage a merger if the managerial leadership fails to properly present to employees the direction of change, the acceptability of change, and the need to understand, rather than judge, the culture of the other organization.

Regardless of the competence of managers in preempting transitional difficulties, both in themselves and in their employees, some form of cultural shock will occur. This shock generates emotional responses in the employees of the acquired organization, responses identified by Cartwright and Cooper as moving through nine stages.

1. Denial, the ‘it won’t happen to me syndrome.’
2. Fear--- ‘When will it happen?’ ‘What will happen to me?’
3. Anger--- ‘We’ve been sold out.’
4. Sadness, grieving for what’s past.
5. Acceptance, positive approach starts to develop.
6. Relief, things are better than expected.
7. Interest, increased feeling of security.
8. Liking, recognition of new opportunities.
9. Enjoyment, ‘it really is working out well.’

All nine stages occur in varying degrees in all merger activity. The leadership challenge is to get to stage 5 as rapidly as possible while preventing employee response from cycling continuously through stages 1-4. It is a difficult challenge to meet. Employees, from the announcement of a merger, through the pre-merger stage, and into the initial stages of the merger, begin to scrutinize closely the culture of the other organization. Since little is known of the other organization, these assessments are “based on rumour, secondhand reporting and implicit theories [derived] from inference rather than first-hand knowledge or direct experience.” Leaders who enter the transitional phase unprepared are often defeated
by these preconceived opinions and judgments. The different types of organizational culture, and the
effect of merging those different types, must be understood well before rumors of merger start swirling
through the workspace.

Management theorists generally recognize four main types of organizational culture: power
(further subdivided into patriarchal and autocratic), role, task achievement, and personnel support. Both
the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army are predominately patriarchal power cultures possessing the
follow characteristics:

1. Centralization of power is the most important feature.
2. Highly identified and charismatic leader.
3. Emphasis is on individual rather than group decision making.
4. Individual members are motivated by a sense of personal loyalty to
   their leader or fear of punishment.
5. Overladen with tradition.
6. Leader is perceived as a ‘champion’ or ‘protector.’
7. Exercise of power is considered legitimate, benevolent, and therefore
   understood.
8. Psychological contract is similar to that between parent and child.
9. Although the organization retains a parental prerogative to scold or
   reward, they often adopt an extremely responsible and protective attitude
toward their employees.24

Identification of “culture type” is the first step in evaluating the potential compatibility of two
merging organizations. This identification requires an objective evaluation of the other culture, and it is
through this evaluation that we take the first step towards understanding the culture of the other
organization. The merger process in management theory has been likened to a marriage, with the
compatibility of the partners being essential to the success of the merger. The same ingredients essential
to a good marriage—communication, compromise, a willingness to learn about one’s partner, and a
sincere desire to make the marriage work—are the same ingredients essential to a “good merger.” Just as
a marriage between persons of similar personality are often contentious, mergers between organizations
with similar cultures are not guaranteed success. This is particularly true for mergers between power
cultures, which, in all of the studies contained in Cartwright and Cooper’s analysis, had the highest
failure rate.25
This is perhaps inevitable. Power cultures are characterized by centralized power, tradition, and strong employee loyalty to the organization and its leadership. The attitude of the leadership has a tremendous impact on the attitude of the employees. These leaders, emerging from a culture which has shaped their perceptions, attitudes, decision making, and means of doing business, are often reluctant to accept change. This reluctance is not borne of stubborn truculence. It is, rather, the result of a sincere belief that their way is the right way. To change or usurp that way of doing business, is, in their minds, to jeopardize the success of the merger. In a curious bit of irony, the more a leader desires a merger to succeed, the more vehemently he will resist any challenge to his organizational culture. The success of the merger, in the mind of the leader, depends on his organization’s way of doing business. Consequently, a lot of energy is expended attempting to get the other organization to see the light. That organization is just as vehemently resisting these overtures while simultaneously trying to convince the other organization of the error of their ways. This jockeying for cultural supremacy results in a vicious cycle in which nothing of substance is accomplished. There are two possible outcomes if the cycle is not overcome. The first outcome is merger failure. Or, the merger will continue with the subordinate partner using subterfuge, selective obedience, and manipulation of employee attitudes to maintain an autonomous culture within his organization that continuously resists integration and merger. While both these scenarios seem to result from an almost childish stubbornness, it is critical to remember that failure to integrate is a consequence of a sincere belief by both sides that the ultimate success of the merger depends on the adoption of their point of view. To dismiss the reality of this dynamic when contemplating merger is to ensure failure. It must be recognized and overcome. The next issue to attack to ensure cultural compatibility then becomes an understanding of the type and implicit terms of the “marriage” contract.26

This “marriage” contract takes one of three possible forms: traditional, open, or collaborative. The collaborative type, the most difficult to achieve, is the only type that has proven successful in a merger between power cultures. A collaborative marriage assumes the following characteristics:

1. A high degree of respect between the parties and a genuine recognition that the integration of operations and exchange of technology or expertise will ultimately be of mutual benefit.
2. A combination of different but complementary forces, wherein both parties have a contribution to make.
3. The essence of the collaborative marriage is shared learning...collaborative marriages seek to positively build on and integrate the two to create a 'best of both worlds' culture.

4. Collaborative marriages are not without problems. In particular, because they are so rare, or perceived to be, the vast majority of organizational members are slow to recognize a collaborative marriage and automatically assume and respond as if it is a traditional type. Successful integration then becomes dependent upon the ability and speed with which senior management acts to diffuse any feelings of threat which exist between the two merging workforces and move to facilitate meaningful cooperation between the two.²⁷

Success in a collaborative marriage is dependent upon the ability of two cultures to work together and integrate. This integration requires compromise. This is not, however, a compromise of technique, doctrine, or even culture. The compromise is found in the willingness to engage in shared learning, to admit that certain aspects of the other culture are attractive, to accept the terms of the explicit or implied contract, and, most importantly, in the willingness of the leadership to look outside the boundaries of their own culture and create an atmosphere of acceptance, trust, and enthusiasm. The compromise is, in essence, the willingness first to understand the culture of the other organization and then accept it.

Joint warfare is a form of merger. If we substitute brigade and division commanders and their senior staff for "middle managers," and substitute Soldiers and Marines for "employees," then Cartwright and Cooper's theory provides a map to guide the successful merger of Service cultures in the joint arena. The 2d Marine Division and Tiger Brigade achieved a collaborative "marriage" and, in that achievement, laid the foundation for their success. There is no indication in the author's research that the tenets of this theory were known to either organization. But if the purpose of theory is to explain reality, then the 2d Marine Division and Tiger Brigade provide a practical model for testing the theory at the tactical level of joint warfare. Their sense of direction may have been intuitive, but it was true to the course.
THE ROAD TO WAR

"I prepared the Brigade six months for NTC—[we] practiced and practiced. [We] could take an order and turn it very, very quickly." 28

-COL John Sylvester
CO, Tiger Brigade

"The first thing I did when we got back was to call General Steele and tell him that he deserves the lion's share of the credit in getting this Division ready for war." 29

-Col. Ronald Richard
G-3, 2d Marine Division

The Department of Defense’s final report to Congress attributed a large part of the U.S. military’s tactical successes in the Gulf War to the realistic training conducted at the Service training centers. 30 The U.S. Army’s National Training Center (NTC) and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Marine-Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) provide realistic combat training within the framework of each Service’s doctrine, equipment, and mission. The impact of this training plays an important part in this study for three reasons. First, the tactical success of the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division provides a microcosm study of the benefits of the emphasis on quality training in the 1980’s. Secondly, the differences in the type of training conducted at both Centers highlights cultural differences in each Service’s approach to warfighting. And third, the influence of both Centers combined with some coincidences of timing and assignment to greatly affect the talent, training and thought processes of the leadership in both organizations.

The Marine Corps, since at least the Vietnam War, has focused its ground operations and training on company and battalion size units. After the Gulf War the Marine Corps began to emphasize MEF level training, but prior to 1990 regimental-size exercises were rare. Division size exercises, other than static command post exercises (CPX), were rarer still. The Marine Corps deployment cycle and the pace of operations forced commanders to focus on the training of battalion and smaller units. Regiments, battalions, and companies developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s), tactics, and command and control procedures that were independent of each other and completed with minimal influence from a higher headquarters.

Leaders in the 2d Marine Division, conducting this training in the cramped confines of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, learned to fight small units in small places—a skill necessary to and in perfect
accord with the mission requirements of the Marine Corps, but a skill gained at the expense of expertise in large unit operations. Major General (MajGen) Orlo K. Steele, assuming command of the 2d Marine Division in 1987, recognized this gap in training and immediately took steps to correct it.31

His tools were the "Combined Arms Exercise 89 (CAO-89)," conducted in October of 1988, and the "Carolina TEWT's (Tactical Exercises Without Troops)," conducted in the summer of 1989. Both exercises concentrated on the tactical employment of mechanized and armor forces, and both were conducted outside the limiting boundaries of Camp Lejeune. During CAO-89 the Division maneuvered the 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (2d LAI) and the 2d Tank Battalion from Camp Lejeune into Virginia. The "Carolina TEWT's" consisted of a series of exercises conducted throughout the state of North Carolina during the summer of 1989. The commanders and headquarters of the Division, infantry regiments, and artillery regiment participated. The training emphasized maneuver of the diverse elements of a Marine division over large distances. Command, control and communication issues, movement issues, tempo of operations, and the capabilities of Marine Corps mechanized units were all topics of discussion between the senior commanders of the Division in the informal atmosphere of the Carolina TEWTs.32

These exercises had a tremendous impact on the Division's commanders and senior staff.

Colonel James K. VanRiper, Chief of Staff of the 2d Marine Division during the Gulf War comments:

Steele...got the Division to think bigger, to think in terms of large distances, of operating out of comm range for 3-5 hours with a Regiment operating on mission-type orders. Most Regimental Commanders at ODS (Operation Desert Storm) were comfortable and familiar with that environment. When we got to the desert we superimposed Camp Lejeune on the ops (operations) map and commented on the size and how lucky we were that Steele opened up our thought process.33

Colonel Ronald Richard echoes VanRiper's statement:

The large CPX and TEWTs allowed the Division to come to grips with command and control issues at division level and make mistakes. Commanders got to know each other—learned to understand and anticipate each other. In no small degree it certainly helped in a situation with no spin up time.34
MajGen. Steele’s legacy carried through to the Gulf War. Colonel VanRiper, Steele’s Chief of Staff, maintained that position through the war. Colonel Ronald Richard commanded the 10th Marine Artillery Regiment during CAO-89 and the North Carolina TEWTs; he served as the Division G-3 during the Gulf War. Brigadier General (BGen) Russell Sutton commanded the 6th Marine Regiment through both exercises and was assigned as the Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Marine Division in January 1991. Steele’s Assistant Division Commander was Brigadier General William Keys. Promoted to Major General in March 1989, Keys assumed command of the Division in September of that year. Fifteen months later he took it to war.35

Sutton and Richard also brought to the Division a unique breadth of experience in Marine Corps mechanized desert warfare. Richard helped activate the 27th Marine Regiment in 1981 and was subsequently assigned as the regimental Executive Officer. The 27th Marines, stationed at Twenty-Nine Palms, functioned as a test unit to validate the force package for the MPS program. As Richard recalls his mission, he was to “go in the desert and train in mechanized warfare and desert operations.”36 The purpose of this effort was to develop doctrine for Marine Corps mechanized operations.

BGen Sutton, as commander of the 6th Marine Regiment, served as the regimental commander during four Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) conducted at the MCAGCC in 1989 and 1990. As a point of comparison, this would equate to a Brigade commander and his staff participating in four NTC rotations in two years. In 1989, at the direction of MajGen. Steele, Sutton took the 2d Tank and 2d LAI Battalions to the MCAGCC for a CAX. This exercise marked the first time Marine armor and mechanized units had trained at a CAX in battalion size units.37

This combined tank/LAI CAX was indicative of a change in the way the Marine Corps employed its mechanized units. Marines have historically used armor as an infantry support weapon. The tank battalions in each Marine division functioned as force providers, assigning one company to each infantry regiment. The regiments would normally assign one tank platoon to each infantry battalion. With the advent of MPS and the Light Infantry Vehicle, and the introduction of M1A1’s into Marine tank battalions, the Marine Corps began to rethink its employment of armor. In the mid-1980’s the Marine
Corps began organizing and training its armor units to fight as tank battalions. By the summer of 1990 this practice was well established.

In August 1990 the Tiger Brigade was "undergoing a grueling series of exercises called 'Hell's Forge' in preparation for an NTC rotation." These exercises, encompassing CPX's, gunnery, and maneuver were, designed to prepare the Brigade for the intense, realistic training at NTC. The NTC rotation is, short of war, considered to be the ultimate test of an armor unit's capabilities. Preparation for that test becomes the focus of brigade training and division resources well before a unit embarks to Fort Irwin. The Tiger Brigade gained invaluable training in fighting armor in a the desert environment as it prepared for NTC. This training carried over to the performance of the Brigade in Desert Storm. Major (MAJ) Steve Lawrence, S-2 of the Brigade, commented that the Brigade staff had "been shook up. NTC was a super buildup for the Brigade and resulted in a very well trained staff." Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Norman Greczyn assumed his duties as the Brigade Executive Officer two months after the Brigade had deployed to Saudi Arabia. He observed that training conducted in preparation for the NTC resulted in a "well trained Brigade, [training for NTC] had a very favorable impact. In my personal assessment the Brigade was better trained than the two Brigades from the 1st Cav (1st Cavalry Division) because of the NTC rampup."

As the 2d Marine Division and Tiger Brigade prepared for war circumstances of timing, training focus, and personnel assignment influenced how each unit thought about armor/mechanized warfare in the desert. Those circumstances, combined with experience gained during preparation for and training at the NTC and the MCAGCC, formed the basis for each organization's approach to the tactical challenges of the Gulf War. An analysis of the differences between the training conducted at the NTC and MCAGCC highlights cultural differences in the norms which govern the way in which work is organized and conducted, and the importance each unit places on particular organizational functions.

The NTC trains Army mechanized and armor brigades to conduct operations against an enemy whose doctrine and equipment is modeled on the Soviets. The training is oriented on using the firepower, shock, and mobility inherent to the M1A1 tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and self-propelled artillery to overwhelm an enemy with the coordinated violence and maneuver inherent to those weapons.
While live-fire training is a rigorous and important part of the curriculum, it is secondary to the ability of a unit to plan and execute in the fast-paced environment of the force-on-force training. Commanders and their staffs are trained to develop and execute plans that take advantage of the tempo, mobility, and protection available to the armor or mechanized unit. Armor is considered the decisive arm, but training is focused on the application of the combined effects of mech, armor, and artillery to achieve a decision.

The CAX, conducted at the MCAGCC, trains Marine infantry battalions to conduct operations against an enemy whose doctrine and equipment is also modeled on the Soviets. The infantry battalion is normally task organized into a mechanized company (mounted in LVTP-7’s), a truck company, and an air-assault company. The battalion is under the control of a regimental headquarters and is normally reinforced with an artillery battalion, an artillery battery acting as a naval gunfire ship, a squadron of AV8B’s or F-18’s, and a composite helicopter squadron which includes AH-1W and UH-1 gunships. The training focus is on fire support coordination—the application of artillery, naval gunfire, close air support, and close-in-fire-support (CIFS) from gunships to achieve the conditions for maneuver and destruction of the enemy. There is no force-on-force training. Company live-fire exercises are oriented on the coordination of maneuver with fire support. Commanders and their staffs are trained to develop and execute plans combining the intricate coordination of multiple supporting arms with the diverse maneuver capabilities of the battalion. The combined effects of multiple supporting arms is considered decisive, but training is focused on the combined application of air, artillery, naval gunfire, and gunships in coordination with maneuver to achieve decision.

BGen Sutton provides a succinct reason for the difference in training focus between the two organizations:

The Marines have limited armor firepower and artillery, our major enhancement is air. We’re outgunned by most third world countries in artillery. In an M1A1 against other armored forces you feel invincible, especially at night. The best thing you can do to protect yourself is to move and fight. We do that with our air arm, so we have to think differently. A big equipment difference equals different tactics.41
Army armor units are large, mounted mechanized forces. The tank sets the tempo of these organizations. Unit attack speeds in Army armor organizations are much faster than unit attack speeds in the Marine Corps. The capabilities of the M1A1, Bradley, and self-propelled artillery provide the protection necessary for maneuver. Tactical advantage is gained through the speed, armored protection, and firepower capabilities of those weapon systems.

These capabilities are limited or nonexistent in the Marine Corps. The protection necessary for maneuver comes from the Marine’s fire support capability. In a desert environment, against an entrenched and armored enemy, the Marine Corps will fight at a much more deliberate pace, using large concentrations of air, naval gunfire, artillery, and gunships to reduce the enemy to a manageable level in order to attack with relatively light regiments. Consequently, a Marine infantry unit, fighting a Soviet-style force, is going to attack much slower. Unit attack speeds will average 10-12 miles per hour, the tempo limited by the speed with which fire support from multiple agencies can be coordinated. To attack faster would risk driving underneath the supporting arms or entail a decision to fight without them.

The use of armor highlights another organizational difference between Army armor and Marine infantry units. An Army armor unit, planning a deliberate attack, will normally designate an armor element as the main effort. That armor, pushing forward, sets the tempo of operations. The Marine Corps, with a limited armor capability, normally places its available armor in reserve. The speed of the lead infantry units determines the tempo of operations.

As the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division prepared for war, both organizations had different norms which governed the way in which their work of warfighting was organized and conducted. The Tiger Brigade was organized to fight high-tempo armored warfare in accordance with the norms established by the training at the NTC. The Marine Corps was organized to fight with infantry forces, organized with diverse maneuver capabilities and closely integrated with multiple supporting arms, in accordance with the norms established by the training at the MCAGCC. Each organization placed a particular emphasis on a specific organizational function. The Brigade emphasized the tempo of armor operations. The Division emphasized the importance of supporting arms. Neither method is right or
wrong. Both methods reflect the capabilities of each organization. In organizing to fight within those
capabilities, both units established elements of a culture that each took for granted.

In December 1990, in the form of a message from ARCENT to CENTCOM, those cultural
differences came to the forefront in a manner that highlighted cultural ignorance and complicated the
transition and integration process. The message reads:

Reference A calls for 1st Bde, 2d AD (Tiger Brigade) to be chopped OPCON to
USMARCENT. USARCENT is concerned that doctrinal differences between
Army and Marines regarding tactical employment of maneuver elements
preclude an OPCON chop. Request that Tiger Bde be chopped TACON to
USMARCENT.43
"That message reinforces how woefully ignorant those officers were regarding that concern--just ignorance on their part of U.S. Marine Corps execution. The last time a large Army unit was assigned to Marines we had Smith versus Smith in WWII--they still can't get that out of their heads. I was dismayed that a MACOM in the Army would put that message out." \(^{44}\)

Col. Ronald Richard USMC
G-3, 2d Marine Division

"I came in with mixed emotions. I was concerned with how the Brigade would be used. I had read East of Chosin. I worried about how we would be treated." \(^{45}\)

COL John Sylvester USA
CO, Tiger Brigade

Colonel Sylvester did not request a change in command relationships between the Tiger Brigade and the 2d Marine Division; he was in fact not even aware that the message had been sent. He did however, share some of the concerns addressed in the message. \(^{46}\) This section will discuss those issues later, but the message, and the response it generated in the 2d Marine Division, serves as a good starting point to address the wider issues of misperception, bias, and ignorance occurring in both units once the decision was made to assign the Tiger Brigade to the 2d Marine Division. This section will also address how those difficulties were overcome, and overcome quickly, once the two units actually merged. Much of what happened will be described using the words of the participants, but it is worthwhile to first explore the significance of "Smith versus Smith" and East of Chosin.

The officers interviewed frequently referred to both topics. The perceptions generated by history die hard in organizations that draw strength from tradition. The influence that incidents occurring 40-50 years ago generated in the attitudes of officers from both units lends a certain urgency to an attempt to understand Service cultures. Faced with the unknown there is a tendency to fall back on what is known. Although the view was taken from different perspectives, the circumstances surrounding the attachment of the Brigade to the Division looked eerily familiar to the officers of both organizations.

On 24 June 1944, in the midst of the Battle for Saipan, Marine Lieutenant General (LtGen.) H.M. Smith, commander of the V Amphibious Corps, relieved Army Major General (MG) Ralph Smith, commander of the 27th Division. The causes given for the relief were MG Smith's perceived lack of aggressiveness, incompetence, and uninspired leadership. The action stirred a storm of protest and indignation from the Army. Incrimination, accusations, and counter-accusation flew between Army and
Marine commanders at all levels. The competence and integrity of both Services were challenged as the controversy played out in the press, the halls of the Pentagon, and the battlefields of the Pacific. The Army commissioned a board of inquiry to investigate the incident. This board concluded that LtGen Smith was waging a personal vendetta against the Army in general and MG Smith in particular, that Marine officers were not competent to command large units, and that Marine commanders were wasteful of lives. The board recommended that Army units not be placed under Marine command in the future. The Marine Corps countered that MG Smith’s relief was justified, that corps commanders in Europe relieved division commanders for less cause, and that the relief of MG Smith had hit too close to home for the Army—an intolerable reminder of the poor performance of Army units when measured against Marines.

The controversy has reverberated through later battles and later wars. This issue, too emotional to resolve, still evokes arguments between Soldier and Marine. Historians have difficulty writing about it without taking sides. In December of 1990, “Smith versus Smith” was on the minds of some of the officers in the 2d Marine Division. 47

Roy Appleman’s book East of Chosin tells the story of the Army’s Task Force (TF) Faith, assigned to protect the eastern flank of the 1st Marine Division during operations around the Chosin Reservoir in November 1950. TF Faith was destroyed in a heroic but futile attempt to withstand the onslaught of two Chinese divisions. In his search to answer the question “Could Task Force Faith Have Been Saved?” Appleman, while not blaming the Marines entirely, reaches some explicit and implied conclusions that places some of the blame for the TF Faith’s fate squarely on the shoulders of the 1st Marine Division.

His first conclusion is that the 1st Marine Division did not render all possible aid to TF Faith. Preoccupied with their own troubles, the Marines, although not as hard pressed as the Army units to the east, ignored TF Faith’s predicament. His second conclusion is that the actions of TF Faith “provided the narrow margin that enabled the 1st Marine Division to hold Hagaru-ri, and this in turn made possible the ...fighting escape to the south.” 48 His third conclusion concerns the order to withdraw the 31st Tank Company and the 31st Rear CP (both are Army units) from their forward positions on the east side of the reservoir to the perimeter being established at Hagaru-ri. This withdrawal, ordered on the 30th of
November, “in effect signed the death warrant for TF Faith.”

On 1 December TF Faith entered its death throes “within a stones throw” of the position where the 16 tanks and 326 men of the Tank Company and Rear CP had been established in defensive positions 24 hours earlier. Appleman implies that the 1st Marine Division, concerned about the vulnerability of Hagaru-ri, abandoned TF Faith to its fate and ordered the withdrawal of the 31st Tank Company and 31st Rear CP in order to bolster the meager defenses around Hagaru-ri. Appleman’s arguments are compelling. His conclusions, explicit and implied, were on the minds of some of the officers in the Tiger Brigade in December 1990.

MAJ Steve Lawrence, S-2 of the Tiger Brigade, recounts his feelings after learning that the Brigade was being assigned to the 2d Marine Division:

There was a lot of pride in the Tiger Brigade and the 2d Armored Division. We had a ‘dumped on feeling’ after being shunted to the 1st Cav and then to I MEF. The Brigade attitude was ‘why us?’ We had the perception that the big fight was out west and the Brigade was going to miss the show to fight a secondary effort.

I didn’t know much about the Marines before going OPCON to the 2d Marine Division. My knowledge of the Marine Corps was based on reading about them in World War II, Inchon and Chosin. The perception in the Tiger Brigade was that the Marines used ‘attrition tactics’ and were very willing to take casualties. This perception had a pretty negative effect on morale.

I remember a lot of ‘pointed sticks’ jokes about the Marines—that was the armor perspective of Marine infantry. I didn’t know how much the Marines had as far as combat power.

MAJ Mike Obermeyer, S-3 of the Tiger Brigade, relates the following:

I had never worked with Marines. My opinion of the Marine mentality—-they are really good at opening a beachhead and moving 20 kilometers, then they are out of their area of expertise. Marines can’t fight ‘deep.’

I was concerned about the actual linkup and how we were going to be used. I was concerned about being chopped out piecemeal. Looking back, that was more a fear on the Brigade’s part than an actual need to talk Division out of piecemealing us out.

LTC Norman Greczyn, the Tiger Brigade Executive Officer, arrived in theater about the time the Brigade realized they were going to fight with the Marines. His perception of what was to come:

I had no experience with Marine units, although I had known Marines at CGSC (Army Command and General Staff College) and at the advance courses. I wanted to go with the 1st Cav. The Brigade had not trained with the Cav as much as the other Brigades, so we were the logical choice to go to the Marines. I was initially disappointed, then got excited about it—somewhat new.

My perception was that the Marines would not understand AirLand Battle---as far as the tenets. I wasn’t concerned about the theory, just the tactics and techniques.
I had a preconception that the Marines would use the Brigade as a battering ram; as a 'straight punch' no maneuver, no looking for flanks, a simple frontal attack. That was my perception of the Division's mission.  

Colonel Sylvester, in addition to his comments which open this chapter, believed that the “focus of the Corps was on the beachhead and initial lodgment ashore--[with a] heavy reliance on Naval Gunfire. [I] got that from Vietnam.”

These men, typical of the rest of the Brigade’s officers, had limited experience with Marine units.

Their knowledge of the Marine Corps was limited to their readings of Marine actions in World War II and the Korean War. Colonel Sylvester’s perceptions are based on those readings and his observations in Vietnam.

Focused on the knowledge necessary to succeed in their chosen career, comfortably successful in the culture of their own organization, these men had no reason to seek an understanding of the Marine Corps. Suddenly, in December of 1990, the Marine Corps became a very important part of their lives. Faced with an inevitable merger they began to make assessments based on “rumour, second hand reporting, and implicit theories derived from inference rather than first-hand knowledge or direct experience,” and began to experience the first four emotional responses identified by Cartwright and Cooper. Reactions in the 2d Marine Division followed a somewhat different pattern.

Captain (Capt) Steve Linder was the Division Liaison Officer (LNO) to the Tiger Brigade:

I had been to Army schools and worked with them at JTF Panama. I knew they were very specific—liked to time things out. The Army is very concerned about things the Marines perceive as minor: precise terminology, the structure and rigidity of their thought process, things like that. Their schools teach them to think very lockstep: \( X + Y = Z \), so \( Z \) must be the product. We [Marines] think they’re very rigid, but they are very deliberate; programmed to solve problems in a particular manner. They’re very prescriptive. The Army likes to be in the box, [they are] very uncomfortable outside the box. This might be unfair, but there is a tendency in the Army to develop a checkbox mentality.

I didn’t see this too much in the Tiger Brigade though.

Colonel VanRiper formed his perceptions while serving at the Joint War Plans Division at Headquarters Marine Corps:

I thought the Army and Marines were the sharpest officers there, but in my exposure it seemed the Army was very concerned about doing analysis, formal
wargaming. They were very absorbed in process unlike the Marines who tended to rely on experience and judgment.

There are too many uncertainties in war to focus on process. The Army is focused on corps and theater level; they deal on a much larger scale where the Marines focus on battalion and regiment. The Army likes centralized control and is very process oriented.

Sylvester seemed very comfortable with informality though. He was free thinking, free-flowing, very attuned to the Marine 'style.' He could make decisions and plan 'on the fly.'

Colonel Richard believed the Army operated with a:

very cookbook philosophy. 1,2,3 will get me 4. The Army is very methodical, very precise. They like everything to be in sync. But you have to do that with large armored formations. Still, you have to be able to respond to anything.

MajGen Keys, like Sylvester, carried some perceptions from Vietnam:

I had not had much experience with the Army other than when I was an advisor in Vietnam and I made several assaults with them. I have a lot of respect for the Army; they train and school their officers better than we do. [Their] schools do teach a checklist mentality, but the [Tiger] Brigade adapted very quickly. Sylvester could move that Brigade around in 15 minutes, then look at me and say 'so that's what you guys mean by mission type orders.'

Many of the officers in the 2d Marine Division had direct experience working with the Army. However, the perceptions derived from that experience, except for MajGen Keys, were formed in the schoolhouse or on senior-level staffs. Army schools teach “process” to ensure the uniformity of thought and action necessary in an organization as large and diverse as the U.S. Army. On high level staffs, that “process” is probably an appropriate application of knowledge learned in the schoolhouse. Marine comments that the Tiger Brigade and COL Sylvester were not limited by “process” indicate that perhaps that mentality does not extend to the battlefield.

The Marines were more familiar with the Army than the Brigade was with the Marines. A number of the Division’s officers were graduates of the Army CGSC or had attended Army Basic or Advance Courses. Both Sutton and VanRiper commented on the close working relationship between the 2d Marine Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps in the years prior to the Gulf War. Sutton stated that the “Division, through major efforts with the XVIII Airborne Corps, had made a substantial investment in understanding how the Army fights.”
BGen Sutton also perceived that there might exist a “misperception in the Army that the Marine Corps still used World War II tactics. COL Sylvester would be concerned the Division understood his Brigade.” On 26 December 1990, as the commanders and staffs of both units prepared for their first meeting, that is exactly what was on COL Sylvester’s mind.

This raises again the issue of operational (OPCON) vice tactical control (TACON) and the ARCENT message. There is a significant difference between the two. OPCON gave MajGen. Keys the authority to use the elements of the Tiger Brigade in any way he deemed necessary, to include assigning its Battalions to Marine Regiments. Under a TACON relationship, MajGen. Keys did not have the authority to change the organizational structure of the Brigade. Behind that message, and in the back of COL Sylvester’s mind, was the precedent of 50 years of Marine doctrine using armor as an infantry support weapon. Before the meeting Sylvester compiled a “smart book” to leave behind with the Division as an “education tool” and walked into the briefing prepared to have to convince Keys to fight his Brigade as a unit.

What happened next established the conditions for the successful merger of the Tiger Brigade and the 2d Marine Division. MajGen. Keys recalls his first meeting with Sylvester:

I never intended to parcel him out. I told him the first day I wouldn’t split him up. Sylvester came to me with his briefing book and I told him I would fight him as a Brigade, would never have split them up. I told him that I came with two Regiments and you’re my third.

COL Sylvester relates his reaction:

Keys allayed my fears immediately. The first day he told me ‘you’re one of my Regimental commanders and everybody here will treat you like one.’ The way Keys embraced us right from the get go really helped our relationship.

Col. VanRiper gathered the staffs of both units together before the briefing and “gave a little talk. He said that the Army and Marine Corps had fought together in every war since World War I and had always been successful. That’s a proud tradition he said, and we’re going to continue it. That made all of us feel pretty good.” BGen Sutton remembers that after the briefings “there was a quick realization that we were going to work together well.”
This open and willing acceptance of the other unit was not confined to the 2d Marine Division. Maj. Doug Jones, team leader for the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) detachment assigned to the Tiger Brigade, initially had some misgivings about working with an Army unit:

I have worked with many, many Army units. I was initially assigned to the 82d (Airborne Division) during Desert Shield. They were atrocious to work with. I then went to work with the Brits and then the Arabs. Both treated us very well because they appreciated what we were bringing them. Then they assigned me to the Tiger Brigade. We were pretty upset about going to the Brigade after working with the 82d, very concerned about how they would treat us. But after meeting Sylvester there was no more concern. The Brigade was a very good unit, very professional. Sylvester made the difference.

Keys made it clear to his officers that the Brigade was to be treated “like a Marine unit, they will have everything they need” after which the “Division adopted those guys.” The positive and encouraging attitudes displayed by the commanders of both units preempted a negative emotional response to the merger in the staffs of both units. Over the next few days, as the staff planned together, cultural barriers began to melt. MAJ Lawrence recalls that:

After working together, in a very short time, the Brigade and Division S-2’s ‘fell in love.’ I realized Marines don’t attempt to fight attrition warfare. I expected those guys to be different, but after working together I found they were just like me.

The Brigade [was worried] about ‘getting swarmed’ by infantry. We discovered that the Marines were worried about tanks and the Army was worried about infantry. We started talking about this and developed a ‘you take care of us and we’ll take care of you’ attitude. Teamwork, built on taking care of each other.

Those comments are echoed by LTC Greczyn who was “pleasantly surprised that Marines can plan and fight as well as the Army,” and by MAJ Obermeyer who commented that it was “really a surprise that we had no problems working out” planning issues.

The commanders and staffs of both units were firmly in the 5th stage of emotional response to a merger and moving toward the 9th. Some members of the Brigade, however, were cycling through stages 1-4. The Tiger Brigade officially “chopped” to the 2d Marine Division at 2100 on 10 January 1991. On the 19th COL Sylvester called a morning meeting and told his troops “to quit badmouthing the Marines. There was some intense frustration in the Brigade. COL Sylvester had a pretty strong conversation with
his troops to stop the negativity about the Marines.” The talk had the intended effect, but some difficulty still lingered. Maj. Jones, commented that late in the war there was still “a lot of ‘fucking Marines’ this and ‘fucking Marines’ that.”

And in the minds of COL Sylvester and his senior staff, one problem caused some nagging concern up until G-Day.

The issue first came to the author’s attention in an unsolicited comment during the interview with MAJ Obermeyer:

One thing had me very disappointed. I had this ideology about Marines being very disciplined. Prior to the breech they were very undisciplined and had a lackadaisical approach. They became very disciplined once the war started: then on the other side their shit came off again. By that I mean uniformity in wearing of the uniform. Coming from the outside and observing that, I think the unit is not very disciplined. Once the operation started I was very impressed, but it had us a little concerned.

LTC Greczyn shared the same concern:

I noticed a lack of personal discipline in the 2d Division. A lot of guys in the Brigade commented on it. Saluting and professional courtesy were very good; what struck us most was the uniform—not wearing shirts, a hodgepodge of t-shirts. That was not our perception of Marines. I detected no other discipline problems than the uniform. Combat discipline was very good, and once the war started the Marines fought well. But the uniform thing stands out still.

COL Sylvester also saw something other than what he expected:

I never saw a Marine in the airport who didn’t look ‘strack.’ From the get go the Marine discipline to stay in uniform wasn’t there. I asked the (Division) Sergeant Major about it, and he said ‘It’s not important to us. You’ll see a change when they go to fight.’ And he was right; it did change. But before the war I was concerned about that. I thought it was a basic indicator of indiscipline that would translate to the fighting piece.

BGen. Sutton, when asked to comment on the above stated:

Commanders set the standard until we got to Kibrit (the Division’s tactical assembly area just south of the Kuwait border) then Keys stated that helmets, flaks, and uniforms would be buttoned up. I don’t recall any uniform discipline problems, and I got around a lot. That may be their perception. If it is, they’re worried about spurious things. I saw every battalion every week and did not have to talk to anybody about appearance. It wasn’t a concern.
MajGen Keys was a little more blunt: “[Marines] put shit on when they have to put it on and don’t when they don’t have to. I didn’t think it was that consequential. Army teaches you have to have it buttoned and that’s OK.”

No issue studied in this paper provides a starker difference in culture than this one. It is easy to get wrapped up in an emotional response on both sides, but the arguments would all be a priori: the Army was convinced that Marine personal discipline was poor; the Marines were convinced the issue was “spurious.” Neither side could convince the other differently since both sides would take for granted that their perspective was correct.

It provides an interesting point of comparison to measure the Brigade’s response against a Marine’s perception of Army discipline in garrison. Soldiers participating in beard growing contests over holiday breaks, wearing dress uniforms with jackets unbuttoned and ties undone while bicycling, salutes that resemble waves, and smoking while walking—to a Marine all of these things are indicators of poor discipline. A Marine assumes these are indicators that will translate to the “fighting piece.”

In both cases, judgments made through a cultural prism lead to incorrect assumptions. There are four points to bring away from this discussion. First, Marines must understand that Army units may perceive this aspect of their culture as an indicator of poor discipline. Second, the Army must understand that their perception is wrong and leaders should take steps to correct that misperception. Third, switch the words “Marine” and “Army” in points one and two, and the same thing applies to Marines observing their Army counterparts in garrison. Finally, we must remember that culture is something an organization is and be wary of the judgments we make about other cultures that are colored by those aspects of our culture which we take for granted.
THE COMMANDERS

"If you didn’t have a Sylvester there you may have faced a very difficult problem. Keys wouldn’t have used a bureaucrat." -Col. VanRiper USMC
Chief of Staff, 2d Marine Division

The positive relationship that developed between MajGen. Keys and COL Sylvester was key to the success of the merger between the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division. This relationship had a tremendous impact on the staffs of both units. Officers were not asked about the relationship between commanders during the interview, yet every officer spoke with spontaneous, emphatic enthusiasm about the chemistry between Keys and Sylvester. This fortuitous accident of personality was the key element in eliminating cultural barriers between the two units.

A genuine respect existed between the two men that went beyond mere professionalism. The Division, expecting a process-oriented automaton, found in Sylvester an officer who was “very attuned to the Marine style.” The Brigade, perhaps expecting a “Howling Mad Smith,” found an officer who was “a professional with an open mind who wants to learn how you work.” The chemistry between the two is described by Col. VanRiper. His comments are typical of others interviewed:

Keys had an intuitive sense of understanding the battlefield, a natural ability to conceive it all, to visualize and conceptualize the battle. Sylvester was much more demonstrative and outgoing than Keys, but there was an intuitive understanding between them. Keys and Sylvester thought about the battlefield the same way.

There may be a tendency to make too much of this. Keys hand-picked as Regimental commanders men he had known and fought with throughout his career. He had extraordinary confidence in both of them. Sylvester had a professional responsibility to Keys as a subordinate commander. The relationship is striking, however, for precisely those reasons. Sylvester gained the extraordinary confidence of Keys in a short period of time, and Sylvester went beyond the limits of professional responsibility in his willingness to work with the Division. Both men were willing to listen to each other, both men were willing to learn from each other, and both ensured their staffs did the same.
MajGen. Keys, in describing his relationship with Sylvester stated:

From the get go there were no problems personality-wise. Sylvester asked me a lot of questions. I asked him a lot of questions. He would tell me if he thought something was wrong. He smoothed out a lot of problems with his personality. 86

COL Sylvester was more succinct, saying he “would go to war any place at any time with Keys.” 87

The specter of “Smith vs Smith” was not hanging over the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division. It easily could have. There are still commanders in both Services with enough cultural bias to have expended a great deal of energy in stubborn, intramural conflicts over menial issues. In the desert of Saudi Arabia in 1991, these two worked it out.

It is unrealistic to expect a commander’s personality to be a criterion when assigning future “Tiger Brigades” to Marine divisions. It is also possible, given the changing nature of joint warfare, that there are more Sylvesters and Keys out there than not. As we study the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division as a model for tactical joint warfare we should hope that is true; the most important element in the success of the Brigade and Division was the relationship between Keys and Sylvester.
THE PLAN

"You won't see Marine officers arguing over the difference between 'seize' and 'secure' like the Army does... [I]t caused some uneasiness, made some in the Brigade uncomfortable. During the war they'd say, 'Hey, the Marines were supposed to have seized that objective but they're only securing it.'" 88

-Capt. Steve Linder
LNO to the Tiger Brigade

"Sometimes it seemed the Division was making stuff up as it went along—wrestling with how to fight such a large organization." 89

-MAJ Steve Lawrence USA
S-2, Tiger Brigade

The commanders and staffs of both units agree that organizational differences presented few problems during the planning process. Those officers also emphatically believe that they experienced few problems because there was a lot of time available for planning. All those interviewed commented that less time together before G-Day would have severely complicated planning.

The Division, in planning how to employ the Tiger Brigade, "was not scratching their heads going 'Oh my God, what are we going to do with armor?'." 90 They were, however, somewhat surprised by how much armor showed up. Col. VanRiper commented that the size of the Brigade was "mind-boggling," 91 and there is agreement among the Marine officers that they had some difficulty conceptualizing the time-space requirements for the Brigade. Issues such as how large an area the Brigade needed for an assembly area, maneuver space requirements, unit attack speeds, the requirement to "overcome inertia (they were hard to get going, but once you got them going they were hard to stop)," 92 and systems capabilities all required a period of education before Marine planners were comfortable with moving and fighting the Brigade. A number of factors contributed to that education process.

First, COL Sylvester's "smart book" provided the Marines with a detailed primer on all aspects of armor brigade warfare. Prepared by his staff, the book provided information on weapon systems, tactics, terrain management, logistic requirements, and operational readiness rates as well as Sylvester's assessment of the Brigade's strengths and weaknesses. This tool proved invaluable to the Division staff. 93

Second, the Commanding Officer of the 2d Tank Battalion, LtCol. Cesare Cardi, made a concerted effort to educate MajGen. Keys and his staff on armor requirements. A Marine tanker by trade, LtCol. Cardi had attended the Army Armor Basic and Advance Courses. He was able to bridge the gap
between the Division and Brigade with regards to armor requirements and employment. MajGen. Keys thought very highly of Cardi and respected and listened to his opinions. COL Sylvester also held Cardi in high regard. As planning progressed both Sylvester and Cardi combined their experience and skills to help weave Brigade and Division armor capabilities into the plan.\textsuperscript{94}

Third, the Division had, in Col. Richard, a G-3 who intuitively thought “in terms of quick movement over large distances with large forces.”\textsuperscript{95} Richard, because of his experiences with the 27th Marines and MajGen Steele, and because of a natural ability to conceptualize the complexities of large-scale war, was very comfortable planning to destroy Iraqi divisions with an armor-mechanized Marine division reinforced with an Army armor brigade.

It is important to make a distinction between understanding how to plan for the tactical employment of armor and not understanding the extent of the Brigade’s time-space requirements. The Division knew how to plan for and fight armor units. Richard, when he made his comment about not “scratching his head,” was emphasizing to the author that Marines are trained and capable of employing armor. MajGen Keys, realizing in November of 1990 that he was going to fight in the desert, “read everything [he] could about armor employment in general and found it’s not that much different except you have more power and come in faster.”\textsuperscript{96} That employment, however, will have a distinctly Marine flavor to it: fire support requirements and the pace of infantry will still drive the tempo. What was not understood were the specifics of the weapons capabilities, exactly how large an Army armor brigade was, how much space it took up, and how fast it moves.

COL Sylvester recognized the distinction and also understood that his Brigade was fighting with a Marine Division. That recognition, and Sylvester’s willingness to teach the Division about an armor brigade without arrogantly prescribing that his “organization’s way of doing business is the only right way,” contributed immeasurably to the success of this merger.

Conversely, the Brigade was allowed to conduct its internal planning (and execution) without hindrance from the Division. There were no requirements levied on the Brigade to conform to Marine doctrine, tactics, techniques or procedures. Although the Brigade would fight within a plan conceived by Marines, they were allowed to fight their piece in a distinctly Army way. The result was what COL
Sylvester called an “absolutely classical use of an Army armored brigade with Marines.” Cartwright and Cooper would describe it as characteristic of a successful collaborative merger.

The Division planning process was less structured than the Brigade was accustomed to. Marine planning was very much driven by the unit commanders and one or two key officers from the Division staff. The Brigade relied on a process that was more staff-driven. Both LTC Obermeyer and LTC Greczyn commented that the “Marine’s don’t wargame as much as the Brigade and don’t use synchronization.” The Marines describe themselves as doing quite a bit of wargaming, but in a manner different than the Army standard. Col. VanRiper describes a typical session:

Our (2d Marine Division) ‘wargames’ were more like bull sessions. They were very informal—a bunch of Generals and Colonels drawing in the sand with sticks and boots. I think the Brigade was a bit taken aback by the informality.

COL Sylvester observed that “all discussion on courses of action was done with the commanders present. Planning should be interactive between staff officers and commanders. This was not done, but there were a lot of day-long wargaming sessions between commanders and key staff officers.”

These “bull sessions,” serving as a clearing house for ideas and problems, were primarily a commander’s forum. During these sessions commanders short-circuited difficulties, made decisions, and resolved problems between themselves. The final operations plan was a product of this style of wargaming. The staff remained on the periphery, welcome to comment at any point but not running the show.

Soldiers and Marines alike commented on the difference between each Service’s approach to planning. MAJ Lawrence observed that:

My perception was that the Marine Corps was more leadership oriented in the sense that commanders have a great deal of influence on staff decisions. In the Army the staff has more influence. The commander listens to the staff, and they develop an initial plan without direct or indirect influence from him.

Col. VanRiper had the impression that the “Brigade staff in a way operated like a German General Staff; the staff was ‘all important’.”
Although observed through a cultural prism and therefore a bit extreme, all of these observations are essentially accurate. The Marine Corps is less formal in its planning process than the Army. Commanders in the Marine Corps expect to drive the planning process—in the Army that work is done by a staff. To understand that difference one must look to the mission of each Service in 1990.

The Marine Corps was focused on fighting with small units against diverse threats on short notice. Marine doctrine teaches commanders and staff to rapidly produce plans. These plans are then executed against an enemy about which little is known. Marine commanders tend to decide on the broad outlines of one or two courses of action in concert with their S-3's and then give those courses of action to a staff to flesh out. The resulting plans are usually uncomplicated. Since little is known about the enemy, plans seldom extend beyond the initial engagement. What happens next depends on what happens during that first contact.

The Army armor community was focused on fighting in corps size operations against the Soviets in Central Europe. The enemy, his doctrine, and the terrain were all known quantities. The Army planning process was developed to coordinate and integrate the complex instruments of large-scale warfare fought on familiar terrain against a sophisticated and known enemy.

COL Sylvester, who was an integral part of the “bull sessions,” had no difficulty adapting to the way the Division did business. Some Marine officers interviewed felt that the Brigade staff was uncomfortable with the Marine system. The Brigade officers, allowed to orchestrate the Brigade fight using the Army planning process, spoke of no difficulty. Any problems were ironed out by LNOs or translated into the Army system by Sylvester. All concerned agree that the different planning styles presented minimal difficulty so long as there was a willingness to communicate, to explain and to accommodate differences on both sides. The only time a significant problem presented itself was the day the Division decided that a deliberate breech looked an awful lot like an amphibious landing.

Marine Corps’ doctrine and experience had not prepared Division planners for the complexities inherent to conducting a deliberate breech of the scale required to breech Iraqi defenses. Col. Richard, striving to develop a concept that would be understandable to the Division, decided that the “assault...would be conducted in the same manner as an amphibious assault, except that the assault would be
made in wheeled and tracked vehicles across the desert floor and not by landing craft. The complexities of the operation were immediately cast into terms the Division understood. A "beachhead line" became a "breechhead line," units were organized into "waves" and "serials," and a "breech approach sequence" was developed to guide units into and through the breach. This focus on amphibious assault introduced the entire lexicon of amphibious operations into planning discussions. Operating in a familiar environment, the Division planners proceeded apace using terminology and tactics that all Marines take for granted. To the officers of the Brigade, those planners may as well have been speaking a foreign language.

Capt. Linder, the Division LNO to the Tiger Brigade, stated that Marine terminology proved "extremely frustrating to the Brigade." Acronyms caused particular difficulty as terms like "AAV," "CSSD," "LAV" and myriad others flowed off the tongues of Marines who assumed those listening knew what they were talking about. This problem appears to have been one-sided—the Marines seemed to have experienced little difficulty understanding Army terms. The number of Marine graduates of Army schools in the Division, the exposure to the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the fact that the Division was not attempting to make sense of a plan prepared by a higher headquarters of a different Service, all contributed to a firmer understanding of Army acronyms and terms than was experienced by the Brigade attempting to decipher Marine-specific language.

The Brigade was also frustrated by their perception that Marines were imprecise in their use of terms. Taught to use precise terminology, Army officers derive purpose and guidance from the specific use of a term. They assume that planners use specific terms for specific reasons. Terms such as "seize" and "secure" have different meanings that denote different requirements.

Marines, taught to focus on the purpose of an action, believe that precision in the use of terminology can hamper initiative in the execution of that action. Terms such as "seize" and "secure" will be used interchangeably, and Marines will ignore precise definitions to concentrate on the purpose as defined in the intent or mission statement.

This dichotomy caused some "expectations to be different as to what would occur based on words." Language, and its use, is probably the one aspect of organizational culture most taken for
granted. In a tactical merger of different Services, both sides must understand this point and, from the beginning, take pains to explain acronyms, to explain terminology unique to their Service, and to explain the precision with which terms are used. The Marine Corps, as it looks to fighting as a MEF, is becoming a bit more precise in its use of terms. But it will probably never reach (nor want to) the level of precision used in the Army. This difference must be understood, accepted, and accommodated. The key element to achieving that understanding will be the Liaison Officer (LNO).106

If personality was the most important factor in the success of the merger between the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division, then the effectiveness of the LNOs was a close second. In this area, the Tiger Brigade did better than the Division. The Brigade provided one Major and two Captains to the Division as LNOs. Led by Major Danny McQueen, the Brigade LNOs “were critical to the planning cell in the Division...[enabling] both staffs to bridge the gap in tactics and doctrine.”107 Officers in both units praised their efforts. The professionalism, knowledge, and competence of the Brigade LNOs, particularly Major McQueen, sustained communication and minimized misunderstanding between the Brigade and Division.108

The Division provided a Captain to the Brigade. Although thought “very competent” by the Brigade, Captain Linder did not have adequate experience with division-size Marine operations to satisfy all of the Brigade’s demands for advice, guidance, or answers. Captain Linder recognized the problem, stating that “the Division did not do liaison well, we need to improve that. I felt inadequate to the task; we should have included an FSSG (Force Service Support Group) and ACE (Air Combat Element) representative.”109 Linder’s point is that the LNO team must include officers knowledgeable in all aspects of the Service and unit they represent. It was unrealistic to expect a Marine Captain to possess a knowledge of logistics, division-level planning, fire support, and aviation “adequate to the task.”

COL Sylvester was also frustrated by the lack of a liaison with his flank units. This problem was particularly acute with the 2d LAI Battalion which was assigned a security mission on the Brigade’s left flank. COL Sylvester, anticipating the possibility of having to conduct complicated tactical operations such as a linkup or passage of lines with a unit the Brigade had never worked with, was very uncomfortable not having that unit represented in his command post.110
When asked to account for the success of this merger, every officer interviewed commented on the importance of sending “the best LNOs you can find” to the other organization. The quality, experience, and competence of LNOs, unlike personality, is an aspect of tactical joint warfare that commanders can control. The importance of establishing effective liaison at every echelon cannot be overstated. LNOs will be even more critical when planning time is precious. Establishing effective liaison should be a top priority the next time a “Tiger Brigade” fights with a Marine division.
COMBAT

"We (1 MEF) were the supporting effort. We fought in accordance with [LtGen] Boomer’s intent: grab the Iraqis, keep them in Kuwait, keep them from going west. If we could, we wanted to keep them from going into Kuwait City."  

-MajGen. Keys USMC
Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.

"Boomer’s intent was very clear to me. The whole MEF operation was a supporting attack designed to keep the attention of the Iraqis, kill as many as we could and continue an inexorable, not rapid, attack as possible to hold the enemy in the east."  

-COL Sylvester USA
CO, Tiger Brigade

This narrative will not discuss the combat operation in detail. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze two aspects of the operation, tempo and night-fighting, and perhaps correct some misperceptions derived from both.

The 2d Marine Division attacked into Kuwait at 0530 on the 24th of February. By mid-morning on the 25th the Division was positioned on the far side of the minefield and prepared to attack north. 2d LAI Battalion guarded the Division left flank and the other maneuver units of the Division were arrayed as specified in the operations plan: the Tiger Brigade on the left, 6th Marines in the center, 8th Marines on the right, and the 2d Tank Battalion in reserve. The operations plan, which only covered the breech, establishment of the breechhead line, and initial positioning of forces, had served its purpose. It was the last order published by the Division. Keys conducted operations for the remainder of the war using mission type orders passed verbally to his commanders. The long days of wargaming, during which the commanders had developed a feel for how each other thought and acted, were about to pay off.

MajGen. Keys always intended to use the Tiger Brigade as his exploitation force. Keys intentionally positioned the “Tiger Brigade, with its heavy armored strength...on the Division’s left flank, which was the most exposed to an enemy armored counterattack. Also, this position would allow the Brigade to move rapidly to block any retreat of Iraqi forces to the west." On the left flank the Brigade had ample space to maneuver and was positioned to respond to any number of contingencies in which its speed and firepower would be decisive.

The tempo of Brigade operations was limited by the tempo of the Marine Regiments. Trained, equipped and able to move much faster than the Marines, the officers of the Brigade felt somewhat frustrated by what they perceived as a slow operational tempo. This frustration is understandable—every
unit wants to fight like it is trained. Sylvester, Greczyn and Obermeyer understood that the tempo of operations was driven, first by Lt.Gen. Boomer’s intent, and second by the capabilities of the rest of the Division. For them this was not a frustration borne of emotion and ignorance, but rather a frustration of circumstances not allowing the Brigade to fight like armored brigades are trained to fight. COL Sylvester’s response, when asked if the Brigade was used in accordance with its capabilities, is essentially the same response given by LTC Greczyn and MAJ Obermeyer:

Yes, the Division used us to our capabilities. I wanted that left flank. Now, the Division did not fully exploit our capabilities. But, we were used ideally, in concert with the Division and MEF commanders’ mission and intent. It was an absolutely classical use of an Army armored brigade with Marines.116

Sylvester, in his comment that the Division “did not fully exploit our capabilities” is making the distinction between what the Brigade is capable of doing, and what the mission requires them to do. Some officers in the Brigade did not make that distinction.

The Brigade S-3 plans officer, CPT Perry, vents some frustration in his after-action comments:

The initial plan (referring to the breech) was executed in pure textbook form. However, those characteristics of armor warfare (attacking deep, using speed and shock effect) never materialized. The Marine Corps lack of planning in depth and its slow methodical rate of attack hindered the Tiger Brigade’s ability to conduct a classic maneuver exploitation.117

CPT Perry recommends that since an “armor brigade is best suited to bold independent actions deep in the enemy rear,”118 in the future Army armor should be allowed to exploit deep along a narrow front while light forces provide security for the armor brigade’s lines of communication. Planning for the use of armor should focus on developing opportunities for “swift, bold, deep and decisive action.”119

Young officers are, and should be, the most fervent guardians of Service culture. CPT Perry’s comments reflect what his culture has inculcated into him as the right way to do business. His comments are typical, though, of many others found in Tiger Brigade after action reports. The contrast between Sylvester’s comment and Perry’s provides a learning point. Those officers who felt as Sylvester and others did understood Boomer’s intent: every statement they make concerning Brigade employment carries the caveat that the Brigade was employed in a manner that suited the intent and the mission. The “Perry School” was either not aware of that intent or did not understand it.120
This type of frustration was not limited to junior officers. LTC Johnson, Commanding Officer of the 1-67 Armor Battalion, stated that:

The Brigade was slowed down by the USMC... [T]heir tactics [were from] WWII-artillery barrage, slow advance with tanks leading the LVTP-7's, tanks stopping 500 meters in front of the objective, behind them the infantry would dismount and walk 800 meters to secure the objective. This set-piece leapfrogging maneuver continued for 3-4 days. 122

LTC Johnson observed an organization executing an operation in accordance with the cultural norms it has established. As discussed in Chapter 3 (“The Road to War”), these norms are different from what an Army armor unit takes for granted. LTC Johnson, as he makes a judgment on the suitability of those norms, is taking for granted that the way his organization does business is the right way. There can be no right or wrong method. Culture is something an organization is. The “simultaneous application of complementary capabilities” 123 in joint warfare will demand that officers understand, accept, and accommodate the organizational culture of the other Service. Officers must also understand the overall intent. CENTCOM’s operational plan precluded a rapid tactical advance by the Marines—such an advance would have endangered the overall operational concept. To pass judgment on another Service culture without understanding it has a dangerous precedent in tactical joint warfare—the only future it holds is the history of “Smith vs Smith” repeating itself.

Cartwright and Cooper state that “culture shock” will always be stronger in the acquired organization. The Brigade, a superb unit trained to fight in the high tempo environment of modern armored warfare, was required by mission and assignment to fight at an operational tempo its culture perceived as slow and methodical. Their frustrations are understandable. The Brigade, employed within the context of the overall plan, was essential to I MEF and Division operations. Its unique capabilities, executed within the framework of mission and intent, were key to the success of the Division and the MEF. To have employed them in a “classic maneuver exploitation” would have violated the intent, endangered the mission, and would not have been a “simultaneous application of complementary capabilities.”
The night-attack issue is a subset of the tempo issue. A number of Brigade officers commented that the Marines “generally halt at night.”\textsuperscript{123} The Brigade, trained and equipped to fight armored warfare at night, was surprised that the Division did not press the fight through hours of darkness. LTC Obermeyer thought the Division “weak at best at night fighting”\textsuperscript{124} and assumed that Marine Corps doctrinally did not fight at night. All of the Brigade officers attributed this perceived weakness to the Division’s lack of night-vision capability. They are partly right. COL Sylvester corrects them in his summation of the issue:

The night-attack business is an equipment issue, not a mentality. The Division would dig in and wait for daylight except for dismounted operations. Now Holcomb, he fought his ass off at night at Khafji. That is one fighting son-of-a-bitch.\textsuperscript{125}

LtCol. Holcomb commanded 2d LAI Battalion, a unit equipped with thermal imaging devices. Sylvester also captures the distinction that the Marines fought dismounted operations at night, a distinction LTC Obermeyer missed when he limited the definition of night-fighting to fighting with armor at night. Division officers all recognized the equipment difficulty, but characterized as ludicrous the suggestion that Marines cannot fight at night.

The Marine regiments had approximately 150 AN/PVS-4’s each. The assault amphibian vehicle does not have a night vision capability. One-half of the TOW systems in the Division did not have thermal-imaging devices. The 2d Tank Battalion was equipped with M1A1’s, but the 8th Tank Battalion fought with M-60’s. Compared to the Brigade, which averaged two night vision goggles per vehicle and was equipped with M1A1’s and Bradley’s, the Division had a paucity of night-fighting equipment.\textsuperscript{126}

Marines train to fight dismounted operations at night without night vision equipment and acquitted themselves very well in the Gulf War in this area. But this was an armor-mechanized war fought in a desert environment, and the Marines realized their limitations. MajGen Keys, who commented that the Marines do not “have near the capability of the Army fighting at night. I never knew we (the U.S. military) had that kind of stuff,”\textsuperscript{127} limited night operations for two reasons. First, the Division, as a supporting attack, was limited by its success. Seizing MEF and CENTCOM objectives much sooner than
anticipated, the Division was required by both headquarters to halt at specific points. Second, given the nature of the enemy and his limited night vision capability, MajGen Keys decided it was not necessary to risk attacking at night. Keys also used his halts at night to keep the Iraqi's in his zone rather than forcing a pursuit that may of upset CENTCOM's main effort to the west.128

The officers in both units understood Keys' reasoning, and a number of them commented that his decision prevented the unnecessary loss of Soldiers and Marines. The Marine Corps will likely never have the night vision capability the Army does. Culture affects this point also: the Marines must always weigh equipment desires against its budget and the requirements of its expeditionary mission. In the case of night-vision equipment, the Marine Corps "reviewed and categorized this as a NOTED item."129

Both of these issues might have received different play in a different combat environment. In closed terrain the tempo of infantry might have waited on the limitations of armor. Night vision equipment, limited to line of sight, might have depended on the acute senses of infantrymen trained to fight without it. If so, the commanders involved can take a lesson from the Brigade and the Division: organization and capabilities are going to reflect culture. If we understand the culture then we can employ the complementary capabilities of both organizations to achieve success. To persist in making judgments about those cultures—to insist on the sanctity of our Service's way of doing business—will only cause frivolous and meaningless friction.
CONCLUSION

"Well, I think the most important thing that the Army learned is that the Marines are a pretty damn capable organization. If you give them a mission they'll do it and do it well." -MAJ Mike Obermeyer USA.
S-3, Tiger Brigade.

"Everyone of those guys from the Brigade were good people. Not a damn thing separated us from them except the organization they associated with. I'm proud to have been with them." -Capt. Steve Linder USMC
LNO to Tiger Brigade

Cartwright and Cooper believe the keys to merger success are found in the relationship between managers and in the skill with which the transition process is managed. In collaborative mergers between power cultures, success depends upon the ability of two cultures to work together and integrate—a process that requires compromise. This compromise involves a willingness to engage in shared learning, to admit that certain aspects of the other culture are attractive, to accept the explicit and implied terms of the contract, and, most importantly, it requires leaders who will look outside the boundaries of their own culture and create an atmosphere of acceptance, trust and enthusiasm.

In Cartwright and Cooper's theory the characteristics of a collaborative “marriage” include a high degree of respect between both parties, a combination of different but complementary capabilities employed to the mutual benefit of both organizations, shared learning that integrates both parties into a “best of both worlds” culture, and the ability and speed with which leaders act to diffuse any feelings of threat within their organization.

Many of the similarities between this theory and the experiences of the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division are self-evident from the issues analyzed in previous chapters. The apprehension experienced by both units prior to the merger, the effect of the relationship between Keys and Sylvester, the integration of the complementary capabilities of the Brigade and Division (guided by intent and mission) into an operations plan, and the actions taken by both commanders to diffuse any feelings of threat within their organizations, have all been discussed in some detail. What has not yet been covered is the characteristic Cartwright and Cooper describe as “the essence” of a collaborative merger: the shared learning that occurred in both organizations.
There was remarkable consistency to the answers given by the officers of both organizations when asked what was learned from the other unit. What the Division learned from the Brigade is best summed up by BGen Sutton:

I think we learned how capable the Army is with its night-vision equipment, the Bradley and M1A1 as fighting vehicles, and the capabilities and limitations of an armored brigade.\textsuperscript{133}

Col. VanRiper added that the Division learned “how agile, fast and powerful an armored brigade is,”\textsuperscript{134} and MajGen Keys was “very impressed by the individual soldier—they were very proficient.”\textsuperscript{135} A number of Marines commented on the thoroughness and organization of the Brigade’s planning process. These comments indicate the trend of lessons learned from the Brigade: the speed, capabilities, and size of an armor brigade, an appreciation for the Army planning process, and a great respect for the competence of the individual Soldier.

LTC Greczyn relates what the Brigade learned from the Division:

I was amazed at the capabilities of their fire support systems, particularly close air support, the capabilities of the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), and how well the towed artillery could unlimber and shoot. I was very impressed with the LAV...I’d give my eyeteeth for a wheeled recon vehicle that can do what the LAV can do. And I was pleasantly surprised to find that the Marines can plan and warfight as well as the Army.\textsuperscript{136}

The Brigade officers were very impressed by the esprit and cohesion demonstrated by the Marines, and a number commented on the value of the Division’s informal wargaming sessions. LTC Greczyn also commented that the Marine Corps is “exceptionally skilled at dismounted infantry operations—clearing trench lines and bunkers, fighting in urban terrain, and patrolling; skills I think, that have been neglected in the Army’s mechanized infantry.”\textsuperscript{137} These comments establish the trend for lessons learned from the Division: the capabilities of Marine fire support, an appreciation for the Marine planning system, the esprit and cohesion of Marine units, and the competence of the individual Marine.

This shared learning generated a great deal of mutual respect between both organizations and a recognition in both that each unit possessed skills and expertise that complemented the other. There are two aspects of this shared learning that are of particular interest. First, both units came to appreciate and
understand the organizational function that is of particular importance to the other: the Marines were impressed by the speed, protection, agility and firepower of armor-mechanized brigades; the Army was impressed by the fire support capabilities and dismounted infantry skills of the Marines. Second, each unit found something to admire in that which it initially feared. The Marines came to appreciate the Brigade’s planning system and its mental agility in responding to rapidly changing situations where once it feared process-oriented automatons. The Brigade came to appreciate the Division’s warfighting and dismounted infantry skills where once it feared attrition-oriented frontal attacks.

Most importantly, these points demonstrate a willingness to learn and to compromise. The willingness to learn is demonstrated by the willingness to be taught about the other organization. The willingness to compromise is demonstrated by the shared learning, the acknowledgment that aspects of the other unit’s culture are attractive, and the willingness to look outside the boundaries of their own culture and appreciate and understand the culture of the other organization. In their own words, the officers of both units attribute their success to shared learning and compromise.

Col. VanRiper, when asked to account for the success of the integration of the Tiger Brigade into the Division remarked that “the Brigade and Division had a very cooperative effort, everybody was willing to work together despite differences. We never saw the integration of the Brigade as a problem. The time available and the personalities made it work.” BGen Sutton believes that “the wargaming was the key. Not necessarily for the product, but because we learned from each other and eventually came to understand each other.” But COL Sylvester captured best the feelings of every officer interviewed:

Why did it work? It worked because we had time. It worked because there was a mutual trust between commanders. It worked because both forces were capable of doing their tasks, albeit in dissimilar fashion. And it worked because we wanted to make it work.

There runs through the tone of every interview a remarkable sense of respect for the men of the other organization, and it is this respect that illustrates the importance of the human factor in tactical joint warfare. Respect for the men of an organization precedes understanding of the culture of an organization and, in the tactical realm of joint warfare, understanding of Service culture provides the foundation of esprit and cohesion in two units who are forced to merge. This unit bonding is not a naturally occurring
process—it must be cultivated and nurtured. The barriers existing between both cultures must be
destroyed. Like any form of bias or prejudice, those barriers are destroyed through the understanding that
comes from exposure to the culture of the other organization. That understanding takes time and requires
a willingness on both sides to learn from each other, to accept the culture of the other, and to
accommodate differences. In the future, that time may not be available prior to commitment to combat.
For those future commanders of “Tiger Brigades” and Marine divisions the following conclusions from
this analysis may provide a blueprint for the successful merger of Army armored brigades with Marine
divisions.

Culture is something an organization is. The characteristics of both cultures identified in this
monograph are not likely to change. Attempts to impose the culture of one Service onto the other will
result in resistance, inefficiency, and a loss of effectiveness. BGen Sutton was emphasizing this point
when he stated:

If I did this again, as soon as possible I would get a briefing on
organization, equipment, capabilities, and limitations and give the same. I would
discuss in detail [both unit’s] warfighting philosophy and how that philosophy
has evolved from mission and equipment. I would force communication and
make sure everybody’s talking. That is extremely important. 141

COL Sylvester’s briefing book satisfied part of this requirement. The initial meeting between Sylvester
and Keys completed it. The first and largest hurdle was crossed during their first conversation.

The most critical factor in the success of a tactical merger is the relationship between the
commanders of both units. Their willingness to learn and to understand sets the tone for both
organizations. This factor is a wild card. Personalities, in this human element of joint warfare, determine
success or failure.

The second most critical factor in the success of a tactical merger is the competence, experience,
and quality of LNOs. LNOs must have the experience to explain all facets of the unit they represent.
Liaison should be established to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.

The acquired organization should be employed as a unit and allowed to conduct internal
planning and execution in accordance with the established tactics, techniques, and procedures of its
Service. Emotional attachment to cultural ways of conducting the business of warfighting cannot override mission and intent. But, those tactics, and techniques, and procedures should be accommodated by the acquiring unit. Commanders and LNOs can bridge differences in terminology, techniques, and planning styles.

Commanders should make a concerted effort to explain the culture of the other Service, emphasize the complementary capabilities of both units, and ensure all understand the mission and intent of the operation and how their unit fits into both. This point should be overcommunicated until it permeates all levels of an organization.

Regardless of the planning style used, commanders and key staff officers should participate in a wargaming process similar to that used by the 2d Marine Division. The most important product of those sessions was the understanding and discussion they generated between the Brigade and Division.

Employ the acquired unit in accordance with its strength.

Understand that language differences exist and make a determined effort to explain the meaning of acronyms, the intended precision with which language is used, and any terms which are unique to a particular Service.

Army armor brigades and Marine divisions should establish working relationships in times of peace. As the events in Kuwait in October 1994 demonstrated, there are going to be more “Tiger Brigades” fighting along side Marine Divisions in the future. We should prepare for that future now. Forced “bussing” to different Service schools, while valuable, only provides a schoolhouse perspective. The understanding, shared learning, and mutual respect necessary to this element of tactical joint warfare should be developed in a training environment, not in the crucible of combat.

The 2d Marine Division and Tiger Brigade are now a footnote to the Gulf War. Yet their accomplishments are of enduring value to future practitioners of tactical joint warfare. In this era of force projection and jointness, the success of the Tiger Brigade and 2d Marine Division provides a model for effectively destroying the barriers of bias, ignorance, and misperception that often plague the attempts of different Services to fight together. Both units learned their lesson hard and well. It should not have to be relearned.
Endnotes

1 Lieutenant Colonel Norman Greczyn USA, interview by author, Telephone, 11 October 1994.


3 Robert A. Chilcoat and David S. Henderson, “Army Prepositioning Afloat,” Joint Forces Quarterly 4 (Spring 1994) 51-57. Carl E. Mundy Jr., “Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare” Joint Forces Quarterly 4 (Spring 1994) 45-50. Amidst the current roles and missions debate, the relationship between the MPF and APA remains a contentious issue in some circles. There are subtle indicators of the debate in both of these articles. Chilcoat and Henderson refer specifically to the APA as a “complementary” force to the MPF. They then proceed to describe a Desert Shield type scenario which starts with the 82d Airborne seizing a port, followed by the MPF which is followed by the APA. These three forces then provide a covering force for the arrival of other forces into theater with the APA armor supplementing the MPF medium and light capability. General Mundy does not use the term “complementary,” but states that “operationally these prepositioning forces can reinforce each other.” In that context, he describes a scenario where Marine amphibious forces seize a port, are reinforced by the MPF and together provide a covering force for the arrival of heavy forces into theater, the first of which will be the APA.


5 Mundy, “Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare.” 49.

6 Chilcoat and Henderson, “Army Prepositioning Afloat,” 54.


8 Ibid., 56-58.

9 Ibid., 54.

10 Ibid., 57.

11 Ibid., 58.

12 Brigadier General Ronald G. Richard USMC, interview by the author, Telephone, 4 October 1994. Throughout this monograph officers will be referred to by the rank held during the Persian Gulf War in the body of the paper, and by their current rank in the notes.

Cartwright and Cooper, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Human Factor 21.

Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 21, 17.

Ibid., 17, 29.

Ibid., 40-41.

Ibid., 27.

Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 38.

Ibid., 35.

Ibid., 78.

Ibid., 60-62. Cartwright and Cooper state that most organizations have characteristics of two cultures. It is in these secondary cultural aspects that the perception of a difference exists—the Army combining a patriarchal power culture with a role culture; the Marine Corps combining a patriarchal power culture with task/achievement culture. The role culture is found in large organizations whose guiding principles are efficiency and specialized divisions of labor. Things are done according to the “corporate bible,” consequently formal procedures and regulations concerning the way in which work is conducted are a central feature of role cultures. This high degree of formalization makes them ponderous in action, slaves to procedure, and slow to change. In task/achievement cultures the emphasis is placed on accomplishing the task at hand. What is achieved is more important than how it is achieved. This culture is characterized by a high degree of flexibility and autonomy. However, those characteristics make control problematic, and in times of crisis task/achievement cultures tend to change to role cultures.

Ibid., 25. 70-71.

Ibid., 72, 78, 80.

Ibid., 73-74. The essence of an open marriage is non-interference; the dominant partner is willingly to allow the merging organization to operate as an autonomous unit and maintain its existing culture. In this type of contract the policy of non-interference will turn sour if the dominant partner cannot resist temptation to ‘change things for their own sake’ or if the dominant partner believes its culture to be superior and will not tolerate any differences in culture within the acquired organization. It is this last point that makes this type of contract inappropriate for mergers between power cultures. Traditional marriages occur when the dominant partner is not satisfied with the performance of the acquired organization and views its role as being to redesign the acquired organization. Success of this type of merger depends upon the willingness of the junior partner to adopt and assimilate the culture of the dominant partner.

The author served in the 2d Marine Division from May 1988 to May 1991. During that time he participated in one regimental size exercise. The comments in this paragraph refer to the training of infantry regiments and divisions. The Marine Corps regularly conducts large unit training with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and, at the time, Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB).

Sutton interview. The Marine Corps trains battalions at a CAX. The normal practice is for a regimental headquarters to be assigned as a higher headquarters for the battalion conducting training. The entire regimental staff participates, but different battalions rotate through each iteration. The regimental headquarters assigned as a higher headquarters for a CAX is responsible for training the battalions that will participate. During his four CAX rotations, BGen Sutton trained and then led 2d LAI, 2d Tanks, and a battalion from the 2d, 6th, and 8th Marine Regiments through the CAX rotation. The author participated in Sutton’s third CAX as the Fire Support Coordinator for 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines.


Major Steve Lawrence USA, interview by author, Telephone, 29 September 1994.

Lieutenant Colonel Cesare Cardi USMC, interview by author, Telephone, 30 September 1994. LiCol Cardi is currently assigned as the Marine Corps representative at the U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox. The author is indebted to him for helping to articulate this analysis of the differences in warfighting style between the Army and Marine Corps.

Harry A. Gailey, Howlin’ Mad Smith vs the Army. (Novato CA.: Presidio Press, 1986) 151-191, 230-249. It is difficult to find an objective account of the controversy. The tone of Gailey’s book is pro-Army. He believes that MG Smith was maligned and that LtGen Smith was not fit for high command. He does, however, address both sides of the issue and offers some objective conclusions. Two of these conclusions, found on page 248, ring true today: “...when Army and Marine units are mixed in a campaign there is always the possibility of problems, unless each unit’s commanders have wide general experience and a sympathy with the officers and men, and the training of their counterparts;” and “Personalities always play a crucial role in command situations...However, every effort should be made to curb such [destructive emotional] tendencies. To select of joint forces a man...with an overpowering attachment to his own branch of service is to introduce a major divisive force at the outset on the highest level of command.”


Ibid., 323.

Ibid., 322.

Ibid., 305-329.

Lawrence interview.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Obermeyer USA, interview by author, Telephone, 3 October 1994.

Greczyn interview.

Sylvester interview.

Cartwright and Cooper, 78.

Major Steve Linder USMC, interview by the author, Telephone, 7 October 1994. Linder was an LAI Platoon Commander during “Operation Just Cause.”

VanRiper interview.

Richard interview.


Sutton interview.

Sutton interview.

Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1993), 4-2. FM 100-5 states that under operational control the commander has “full authority to organize commands and forces and employ them as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.” Under tactical control, commanders are not given “authority to change organizational structure.” Sylvester interview.

Keys interview.
Sylvester interview.

Lawrence interview. Lawrence did not remember who specifically gave this pep talk. He knew it was not a General Officer, that it was a Colonel and that it was not Col. Richard. From Lawrence's description the author believes it was Col. VanRiper. Col. VanRiper recalls talking to the combined staffs but does not remember exactly what he said.

Sutton interview.

Major Doug Jones USMC, interview by author, Telephone, 4 October 1994.

Linder interview.

Richard interview. The Marines also had definite opinions about how the Tiger Brigade was treated by ARCENT. Richard commented that "the Army treated Sylvester like a bastard child," and LtGen Keys commented that the Tiger Brigade was a "bastard Brigade, even in the Army Sylvester was not 'one of the boys.'" (Keys interview).

Lawrence interview.

Greczyn interview.

Obermeyer interview. Obermeyer commented on the number of Army CGSC graduates on the Division staff. The Division Engineer was his classmate at CGSC.

Linder interview.

Jones interview.

Obermeyer interview.

Greczyn interview.

Sylvester interview.

Sutton interview.

Keys interview.

The author observed all of these during his years at CGSC and the Army Military Police Advance Course. This observation is also a frequent topic of conversation among Marines.

VanRiper interview.

VanRiper interview.

Greczyn interview.

VanRiper interview.

Keys interview.

Sylvester interview.
Lawrence interview. Lawrence and others commented that the Marine Corps and Army conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) exactly the same. The Marine Corps adopted the process from the Army and uses the 34 series Field Manuals as intelligence doctrine. There are many Marines, however, who are not comfortable with the IPB process, feeling that, as the foundation for further planning, the IPB is too set-piece.

VanRiper interview.
Sutton interview.
Keys, Sylvester and Sutton interviews.
Keys and Sylvester interviews.
VanRiper interview.
Keys interview.
Sylvester interview.
Obermeyer interview.
VanRiper interview.
Sylvester interview.
Lawrence interview.
VanRiper interview.
Mroczkowski, 28.
Linder interview.
Linder interview.

This monograph is somewhat hostage to the different aspects of language culture. The word “Soldiers,” not normally capitalized, is capitalized throughout this work to prevent readers from perceiving that the author is displaying an organizational bias when he uses the grammatically correct capitalization of “Marine.” Another indicator of different organizational use of language can be found in the abbreviation of rank. The Army abbreviates some ranks differently than the Marine Corps. Examples used in this monograph, reading Army /Marine are: LTG/LtGen, MG/MajGen, BG/BGen, COL/Col, LTC/LtCol, MAJ/Maj, and CPT/Capt. Language so permeates Service culture that even acronyms common to both Services are pronounced differently. The Army pronounces “SEAD” as “seed” while the Marines pronounce it “see-add.” A second example is “FSCL” which the Marines spell out—“F-S-C-L,” and which the Army sometimes pronounces as “phisl” (rhymes with “thistle”).

52
Keys, Sutton and Linder interviews. Major McQueen left the Army in June 1994. The author was unable to locate him.

Linder interview. Linder commented that the ANGLICO unit attached to the Brigade did a superb job educating the Brigade on Marine air and fire support. But the ANGLICO teams were not in the Operations Center. The teams were assigned down to the units and Maj. Jones was normally out front with COL. Sylvester in the "jump CP."

Sylvester and Obermeyer interviews.

Sylvester interview.

Keys interview.

Sylvester interview.

Mroczkowski, 30-59.


Keys and Sylvester interviews.

Sylvester interview.


Ibid.

Ibid.

More examples of the different aspects of this issue can be found in the Scales Papers, the Swain Papers, and the Tait Papers located at the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center Automated Historical Archives in Fort Leavenworth KS. See also the Tait Report located in the Combined Arms Research Library at the U.S. Army CGSC.

Group Scales Papers, SG Unit Histories SSG THR-75, Report, 1st (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, Interview notes. LTC Johnson.

Sylvester interview.

Group Scales Papers, SG Unit Histories SSG THR-75, Interview notes. LTC Johnson and Interview notes. COL Sylvester.
Sylvester interview.

U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS), MCLLS Number 31759-51938 (0093), submitted by 8TH MAR, LTCOL AREY.

Keys interview.

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Bibliography Notes

By order of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned, commonly referred to as the "Tait Report," cannot be used as source material for research. The Group Tait Papers, referenced above, have not been restricted. All research materials used from the Group Tait Papers are unclassified.