1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 2. REPORT DATE | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
--- | --- | ---

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Planning the Peace: Operation ECLIPSE and the Occupation of Germany

6. AUTHOR(S)
Max Kenneth O McCredy, USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
School of Advanced Military Studies
ATTN: ADML-SCV
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66029-6990
(913) 586-3682 DSN 720-7352

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Victory/End State
War Termination
ECLIPSE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Unclassified

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
72

16. PRICE CODE

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED B

19951107 085

DISTRIBUTION CODE
S

DTIC SELECTED
NOV 09 1995
| Block 1 | **Agency Use Only (Leave blank)** |
| Block 2 | **Report Date**: Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year. |
| Block 3 | **Type of Report and Dates Covered**: State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88). |
| Block 4 | **Title and Subtitle**: A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses. |
| Block 5 | **Funding Numbers**: To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:  
  - C - Contract  
  - G - Grant  
  - PE - Program  
  - PR - Project  
  - TA - Task  
  - WU - Work Unit  
  - Element  
  - Accession No. |
| Block 6 | **Author(s)**: Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s). |
| Block 7 | **Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)**: Self-explanatory. |
| Block 8 | **Performing Organization Report Number**: Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report. |
| Block 9 | **Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)**: Self-explanatory. |
| Block 10 | **Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number**: (If known) |
| Block 11 | **Supplementary Notes**: Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report. |
| Block 12a | **Distribution/Availability Statement**: Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).  
  - DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."
  - DOE - See authorities.
  - NTIS - Leave blank. |
| Block 12b | **Distribution Code**:  
  - DOD - Leave blank.  
  - DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.  
  - NASA - Leave blank.  
  - NTIS - Leave blank. |
| Block 13 | **Abstract**: Include a brief (Maximum 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report. |
| Block 14 | **Subject Terms**: Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report. |
| Block 15 | **Number of Pages**: Enter the total number of pages. |
| Block 16 | **Price Code**: Enter appropriate price code (NTIS only). |
| Blocks 17 - 19 | **Security Classifications**: Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page. |
| Block 20 | **Limitation of Abstract**: This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited. |
ABSTRACT

PLANNING THE PEACE: OPERATION ECLIPSE AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY by MAJ Kenneth O. McCreedy, USA,

This monograph uses the perspective provided by OPERATION ECLIPSE, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) plan for the occupation of Germany, to examine current doctrine on war termination and postconflict operations. It argues that ECLIPSE demonstrates the value of investing staff resources early in a conflict to plan the transition from war to peace. Among the benefits derived from such an investment are synchronization of the terminal military operations with initial peace operations; anticipation of resource requirements; and clarification of the political end state.

This monograph argues, based on the perspective of ECLIPSE, that political leaders are unlikely to issue a clear statement of end state because of internal political divisions, requirements for coalition unity, and the changing nature of the war itself. During World War II, the National Command Authority arrived at a vision of end state through an evolutionary process and transmitted it incrementally to planners. The planners, through the questions they asked of their superiors and the discussions engendered by drafts of their plan, assisted in the process of defining the desired end state by the end of the war.

The monograph also seeks to demonstrate that it may be erroneous to treat postconflict operations as sequential to the terminal military campaign. War termination and postconflict operations will likely be executed concurrently with military operations and should form an integral part of the campaign plan.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1  

Chapter 1  
Initial Postconflict Planning for Germany ......................................................... 6  

Chapter 2  
Strategic Planning Guidance: Evolution of an End State .................................. 13  

Chapter 3  
Postconflict Planning: Operation ECLIPSE .................................................... 20  

Chapter 4  
Transition from War to Peace: “ECLIPSE Conditions” ................................... 28  

Chapter 5  
Conducting Postconflict Planning: the ECLIPSE Experience .......................... 32  

Chapter 6  
Postconflict Doctrine: The ECLIPSE Perspective ............................................ 38  

Endnotes .................................................................................................................. 44  

Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 65
PLANNING THE PEACE: OPERATION ECLIPSE AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

Introduction

Too often, war is studied and conducted as though it is an end in itself. Military histories often make this error, omitting an assessment of whether the victors proved as adept at waging peace as they were at waging war. In contrast, military theorists have observed that victory ultimately is not defined in military terms, but rather is determined by the resulting peace. The insights of the great Prussian thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, remain fundamental to this understanding: “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”

In Clausewitz’ rational world, the desired end of war for those engaged in it is a favorable peace, one in which the benefits attained exceed the costs incurred. Similarly, B.H. Liddell Hart, a twentieth century British war theorist, concluded that “The object in war is to attain a better peace...Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.” He warned that “If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.” Statesmen, he asserted, thus bear responsibility “never to lose sight of the post-war prospect in chasing the ‘mirage of victory.’”

Despite Clausewitz’ and Liddell Hart’s prescriptions, rationality does not always prevail in the affairs of man. Irrational elements often intrude in the calculus of war and peace. The most prominent example in modern
times of the irrational side of war is World War I, where planning for military victory—“winning the war”—overwhelmed all other considerations. As a result, the costs came to far exceed any possible benefit. Like gamblers trying one more toss of the dice, both sides tried to recoup their losses with progressively larger wagers of lives and treasure. The inability of belligerents to weigh means and ends was not unique to World War I. As American political scientist Fred Iklé observed, “governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation’s interests that lie beyond it, precisely because fighting a war is an effort of such magnitude.”³ The military is especially prone to this peculiar myopia because it usually defines itself in terms of its ability to wage war.⁴

Since 1993, Army and Joint doctrine have begun to incorporate the notion that the armed forces’ role in winning the peace does not end with an enemy’s defeat or capitulation. Rather, it continues to play a part in implementing and securing the peace. Accordingly, both Army and Joint doctrine identify one of the stages of force projection operations as war termination and postconflict operations. War termination operations are those actions undertaken to transition from war to peace.⁵ According to Army Lieutenant Colonel James Reed, “war termination is more appropriately viewed as a process,” one which begins at “the point at which one side seems clearly destined to achieve its policy objectives at the expense of its adversary,” and which ends with the cessation of hostilities.⁶ Postconflict operations are “those operations other than war which are conducted in the period following conflict termination.”⁷

Despite its recognition of a war termination and postconflict stage of force projection operations, doctrinal references to the subject are scattered and vague. One leaves a survey of the subject with the general
impression that such operations should be anticipated and planned, that a clear statement of end state from the National Command Authority is a prerequisite for such planning, and that postconflict operations belong in the genre of military operations other than war. These ideas remain largely undeveloped. Nowhere in the literature does a coherent discussion of the practical dimensions of planning the peace appear. Doctrine does not address what considerations and staff organizations are suited to develop the plan or who has responsibility at what level for postconflict planning.

War termination and postconflict operations clearly reside in the realm of emerging doctrine, an area which would benefit from the perspective of history. Historians Richard Neustadt and Ernest R. May, authors of *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, argue that “Better decision-making involves drawing on history to frame sharper questions.” This monograph rests on a conviction that the historical experience of planning postconflict operations for Germany in World War II yields the questions that doctrine ought properly answer.

The U.S. military has typically begun planning the peace in the closing days of war or after fighting has ended: postconflict planning was literally that. During World War II, America first conducted planning for war termination and postconflict operations well prior to the end of hostilities. This occurred in the European theater under the leadership of a British officer, Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), the organizational predecessor of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAЕF). He was motivated by concern that a sudden collapse of German resistance would find the Allies unprepared. Over the following year this planning evolved into Operation ECLIPSE, the plan for the military occupation of Nazi Germany.
ECLIPSE provides a historical context for current doctrine to examine planning procedures, organizations, and issues relating to war termination and postconflict planning. ECLIPSE is especially relevant to today’s military in that it occurred within both the joint and combined environment which doctrine asserts will characterize future U.S. military operations. ECLIPSE and the resulting occupation of Germany also established precedents for conduct of postconflict operations which continue to influence doctrine and planning for postconflict operations. The scale of the operation and the resources available to implement it are unlikely to ever be available again, but that does not detract from the perspective it offers for planning postconflict operations. ECLIPSE’s value as a case study may also be limited by the completeness of the victory sought and gained. Nonetheless, ECLIPSE has the capacity to raise understanding about the process of planning the peace.

In examining the ECLIPSE experience, this monograph seeks perspective for arriving at doctrine to govern planning joint/combined postconflict operations today. Doctrine is the product of the collective knowledge and wisdom of the armed forces. It is not designed to shackle imagination and creativity, but to liberate it by codifying shared experiences, acting as a plumb line for organizational balance. Through it, soldiers do not waste energy relearning lessons already purchased with blood and sweat; they are strengthened by a common language, a common perspective which retains the flexibility to embrace individual expressions of the military art. Doctrine is meaningless apart from the vision and will of the commander. ECLIPSE offers testimony to the power of vision. In the midst of a war in which the decision still hung very much in the balance, while planning the most complex military undertaking in history, the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Eisenhower demonstrated the confidence, courage, and foresight to devote valuable, overburdened staff resources to planning the peace. The experience of those who prepared ECLIPSE with the challenge of drafting a postconflict operations plan offers a practical perspective which is directly relevant to today's emerging doctrine.

Chapter 1 -- Initial Postconflict Planning for Germany

Current joint operations doctrine recommends that postconflict planning "begin as early as possible, and preferably before the conflict begins." While this is no doubt sound advice, many barriers to its implementation exist. Enormous problems arise in wartime which often lead to a temptation to slight, postpone, or neglect postconflict planning. When dealing with the immense challenges of war mobilization and prosecution, national survival may be at stake; therefore, operational planning usually assumes priority over postconflict planning. Early initiation of postconflict planning means that already overburdened staff resources must be dedicated to a problem that lacks immediacy. Even if such an effort is made, there is often a tendency to compartmentalize postconflict from operational planning, resulting in unintegrated and perhaps contradictory efforts. The initiation of postconflict planning in World War II prior to development of ECLIPSE offers insights into the practical problems encountered in this process.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the United States and Britain committed themselves to a cross-channel attack in 1943. Accordingly, they established a combined headquarters in London under
Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan to begin planning operations. His designation, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) served as the name for the organization until it was absorbed into Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in January 1944. The Combined Chiefs of Staff charged COSSAC with three tasks. First, to plan deception operations designed to reduce pressure on the Soviets by pinning the maximum number of German divisions in the west. From these plans eventually emerged Operations SOLITUDE and FORTRESS. The second assigned task was to plan the invasion of Europe; this effort established the basis for Operation OVERLORD. Finally, the Combined Chiefs directed COSSAC to consider plans for an immediate return to the continent in case German resistance unexpectedly ended. Morgan therefore initiated planning on 22 May 1943 for Operation RANKIN, the predecessor of ECLIPSE.

RANKIN planning assumed a sudden German collapse. The sudden end of World War I inspired Morgan. He judged that ""the sum total of all the various factors now operating cannot be far from that of the factors which caused the collapse in 1918.""13 Planners worked under severe handicaps. Most significantly, they received no planning or policy guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff because, at the highest levels, governments were still debating and formulating policy. No agreement existed within Washington, let alone between Washington and London and Moscow as to what the postwar world should look like.14 Another problem facing planners was a fundamental lack of consensus within the Roosevelt administration over the proper role of the armed forces in civil affairs.15 The lack of a support staff represented still another difficulty for planners: no civil affairs structure yet existed in either the U.S. or British military on which to draw.16 Finally, the planners were probing largely uncharted territory: there were no
precedents for successful postconf lict operations on the scale which they were contemplating. A frustrated Morgan noted in July 1943 that "'no progress whatever'" had been made on RANKIN. He directed that the effort be given a higher priority. As a result, planners produced a draft in time for the Quebec Conference in August 1943.

The stated objective of the plan submitted to Churchill and Roosevelt for review was, "to occupy, as rapidly as possible, appropriate areas from which we can take steps to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender imposed by the Allied governments on Germany; and in addition, to carry out the rehabilitation of the liberated countries." RANKIN sought to estimate the number of divisions which would be necessary to carry out the occupation of identified strategic areas. It also designated spheres of responsibility—the British in the Netherlands, Denmark, the Ruhr, and northwest Germany; the Americans in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Rhine Valley south of Dusseldorf. The primary task of occupation forces would be disarmament of German troops. However, the plan also foresaw the need to establish military government in the occupied areas "'in order to preserve law and order, and to insure that the Force Commander's instruction in regard to security, disarmament, etc., are carried out.'" RANKIN also contained an explicit plea for guidance: "An early decision will be required as to the policy to be pursued; and a Civil Affairs staff must be appointed to make detailed plans, in accordance with this policy, for the establishment of military government and the rehabilitation of the country.'" At the Quebec Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt reviewed the draft and directed "continuation of the planning effort." As planning progressed, RANKIN was divided into three "cases," or possible contingencies under which it would be implemented. Case A would
apply in the event of a rapid collapse of Germany which would allow an early execution of OVERLORD. Case B forecast a contraction of German forces into pre-war borders. Case C was designed to address unconditional surrender. Planners viewed RANKIN-C as the most likely scenario and it received the bulk of their efforts. They produced a first draft on 15 October 1943 and finalized it two weeks later.24

RANKIN-C advanced the original RANKIN plan by providing for a systematic occupation of all of Germany, not just occupation of designated strategic areas. The plan envisaged three successive stages which would follow the German surrender. The first entailed seizure of air bases in France to support future operations. The second stage involved occupation of the Siegfried Line. In the final phase, Allied forces would occupy designated areas of Germany, including Berlin in order to establish “control at the earliest possible moment over the industrial, political, and communications centers of Germany.” Planners calculated that the operation would require twenty-five divisions. While the first two stages specifically designated American and British zones of operation, the final stage sidestepped the issue to avoid controversy.25 Once COSSAC distributed RANKIN-C to subordinate commands as a planning directive and they in turn produced plans to execute the operation, it was put on the shelf for contingency use.26

RANKIN-C was essentially a plan for an unopposed movement into Germany. It did not delve into the resulting complexities and did not look beyond disarmament of the German armed forces. The plan failed to address what to do with German military forces once they were disarmed, how to treat German police and paramilitary forces, and what procedures would be implemented for repatriation of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons. Perhaps the most glaring omission was the absence of any specific
provisions for conduct of military government. Some of this is attributable to the primitive state of planning, but most reflected the utter lack of guidance from policymakers. Planners were plainly reluctant to risk offending political leaders by exceeding the bounds of strict military necessity.

RANKIN was significant in that it initiated a process of thinking and planning for postconflict operations which would continue through the rest of the war. Those who participated gained a greater appreciation for the complexities and requirements involved in the operation. Planning sections and staffs emerged to undertake the work of planning the peace.

Between January and June there was a steady expansion of thinking about the peace. Major General C.A. West, Deputy G-3, COSSAC, observed in January: "We cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential that we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems." Specifically, he called for studies on armistice terms, sanctions, disarmament, displaced persons, prisoners of war, martial law, disposal of captured war material, and coordination of movement and transportation. Other key staff officers prepared similar lists, reflecting a growing appreciation of the complexity of the occupation. As D-Day approached, planning gradually shifted from preparations for a sudden German collapse to considerations of a peace secured by a terminal military campaign. In this environment, there was an explosion of staff activity focused on postwar planning. By April, seventy-two staff studies were underway on postconflict subjects.

As a result of these efforts and the successful landing at Normandy, in July 1944 work began in SHAEF on a new postwar operations plan, code-named TALISMAN. This operation would begin after the Germans surrendered
and all organized resistance ended. It sought to disarm German forces in the West, occupy strategic areas in Germany, and establish conditions under which “United Nations agencies can assist in the relief and rehabilitation” of liberated countries. The specific postconflict tasks identified by TALISMAN were disarmament, disposal of war material, control of surrendered German military personnel, care of Allied prisoners of war, enforcement of military regulations, and denazification through conduct of counterintelligence operations. A subsequent draft submitted for review by General Eisenhower and senior commanders, added other tasks, reflecting growing appreciation of the magnitude of the operation. TALISMAN, while broader in focus than RANKIN-C, still conceived of military occupation as only a brief interlude prior to a transition to civil control.

In August 1944, SHAEF distributed the TALISMAN Outline Plan to major subordinate commands as a planning directive. This version of the plan went into greater detail than its predecessor, assigning specific missions to specific units and detailing force movement and positioning. Most importantly, it broadened implementation conditions so that TALISMAN could be initiated either in the wake of a formal German surrender or at the discretion of the Supreme Allied Commander upon surrender of a significant portion of German forces. TALISMAN retained the three-staged operation identified in RANKIN-C, although the force levels adjudged to be necessary now climbed to thirty-nine and two-thirds divisions.

On 21 October 1944, SHAEF issued a second TALISMAN Outline Plan to delineate the zones of responsibility decided upon by the U.S. and Great Britain at the Second Quebec Conference in September. The U.S. agreed to a zone in southern Germany in return for British acceptance in principle of a postwar policy based on policies advocated by Secretary of the Treasury
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. The new plan also replaced RANKIN's three-stages with two phases. The primary phase was made up of the tasks which would be accomplished as part of the initial occupation of Germany. The secondary phase would entail consolidation of Allied control and redeployment of forces into the designated national zones of occupation. On 30 October 1944, SHAEF received information causing them to believe the TALISMAN codeword had been compromised. Accordingly, planning continued under a new codeword: ECLIPSE.

Postconflict planning began in COSSAC in May 1943. At that time, the Allies were struggling to win the Battle of the Atlantic; while the corner had been turned in March, that was not apparent in May. Tunisia fell to the Allies early in May, and preparations were underway for the HUSKY invasion of Sicily which would come in July. On the eastern front, Soviet and German Armies lay poised for the great battles around the Kursk salient which would also occur in July. With the outcome of the war still very much undecided, the Allies nevertheless began planning the peace, however tentatively, with the RANKIN plan. TALISMAN grew out of staff work done concurrently with the successful execution of the D-Day invasion. The breadth of vision displayed at SHAEF was remarkable: a significant investment of scarce staff resources was made early in the conflict. As a result, SHAEF formulated contingency plans for a sudden enemy collapse, created organizations to plan and conduct postconflict operations, and thought about the peace and the military's role in it. Early postconflict planning also sharpened the questions military commanders asked of their political leaders and assisted in defining the desired end state. This proved to be an evolutionary process that would continue through the first year of occupation.
Chapter 2 — Strategic Planning Guidance: Evolution of an End-State

War claims the lion’s share of a government’s attention and resources. Its demands are immediate, involving life and death, victory and defeat. Peace may be only a dimly perceived destination, lacking immediacy, low on the list of priorities. Nonetheless, inadequate preparation for the peace may jeopardize the victory gained by arms. As B.H. Liddell Hart observed, “History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object.” According to both the American political tradition and classic military theory, “the object” for which the war is waged is determined by the political leadership of the nation. However, political objectives for the peace often do not extend past an immediate desire to achieve battlefield success: a vision of what comes after victory is often slow to emerge. This is in part attributable to the nature of the American political process which rests on consensus building: a consensus to embark upon war may be difficult enough to achieve; consensus on postwar goals is even more problematic. A discernible end state may develop only incrementally.

The requirement to build consensus among the members of a coalition to fight the war further complicates the problem of establishing and articulating postwar goals. Each of the members of an alliance will pursue their own interests and each may form radically different visions of the peace. The potential divisiveness of postwar questions often leads to postponement of decisions about the political end state.
Finally, the nature of the war itself can change the end state. A war may begin with relatively modest objectives. As losses mount, as enmity deepens, belligerents may broaden their war aims. Military victories may stir ambition and expand the range of possibilities of what may be attained in the peace, as Thucydides' description of the Athenians conduct of the Peloponnesian War illustrates. A dramatic defeat may also change the nature of the peace which is thereafter sought as nations attempt to salvage their "honor." The British treatment of the Zulus in the wake of Isandhlwana offers a case in point, as does, perhaps the war the United States waged against Japan following Pearl Harbor.

Domestic politics, coalition politics, and the war itself may combine singly or collectively to delay, deny, or change end state. For this reason, military planners may expect that strategic guidance for the peace may range from vague to non-existent. Once received, the end state remains subject to change at any point.

Despite the difficulties associated with gaining a clearly articulated end state, the most fundamental doctrinal prescription for postconflict operations is a repeated assertion that "The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA [National Command Authority] before US Armed Forces are committed to an action." Such a statement of end state by the nation's political leaders establishes "the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments." The experience of ECLIPSE planners indicates that current doctrine is correct in suggesting that a clear statement of end state is needed by military planners, but it also indicates that the doctrine may be naive in asserting that such a clear statement will be readily forthcoming.
Political guidance for the conduct of postwar planning during World War II evolved slower than the military plans it was supposed to guide. Historians chronicling postwar planning reported: “There is hardly another matter that rests fresher in the memories of officers prominently connected with planning the occupation than the uncertainties besetting their work on the side of political policy.” General Morgan, in presenting the first RANKIN plan, pointed out “the essential difficulty in planning operations before the clear establishment of the political policy whence those operations derive their necessity.” The only guidance which emerged from the first Quebec Conference was permission from Roosevelt and Churchill to continue planning along the lines established in RANKIN.

On 12 February 1944, General Eisenhower received the famous directive to “enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of GERMANY and the destruction of her armed forces.” Following these stirring instructions, however, in a paragraph entitled “Relationship with Allied Governments—the Re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories with the Administration of Enemy Territories,” the directive lamely concluded: “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.” Plainly, the end state had yet to be defined.

The first formal guidance on occupation policy that SHAEF received was the “Directive for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender” from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 28 April 1944 (known as CCS/551). CCS/551 vested in the Supreme Commander authority and responsibility for governing occupied Germany. It also established basic principles for the occupation which were very useful for planners working on TALISMAN.
More significant than what it addressed was what CCS/551 did not address, notably demilitarization, disarmament, denazification, and the establishment of democratic government. Presumably, these were subjects which would be dealt with after the surrender. Because the directive applied specifically only to the pre-surrender period, it raised significant questions as to what the military role was to be in the postwar occupation. General Sir Frederick Morgan recommended that "'We should...take steps to determine whether in fact the Supreme Commander is to be responsible for the primary occupation of western Germany, or whether some other authority is to have this responsibility.'" Major General Harold R. Bull, the SHAEF G-3, reflected his frustration with the guidance: "'While not desirable, it appears to me to be almost mandatory that we definitely defer consideration of the controversial political problems which may well not be subject to solution until the urgency of the situation forces action on the three governments concerned.'"

The Combined Chefs of Staff responded to these concerns on 19 June 1944 with a cable to Eisenhower. In this message, they envisioned three stages of occupation similar to those laid down in the RANKIN Plan. In stage one, bases would be established for air operations in France and the Low Countries. During stage two, troops would occupy a "barrier zone" to prevent German forces from returning home. Stage three involved "'the occupation of strategic areas for enforcing surrender terms and establishing a firm control.'" Based on this last stage, SHAEF planners perceived an implied role for the Supreme Commander in the postwar period. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Major General Bedell Smith, summarized the command's new understanding on 20 June 1944: "'It is assumed that the Supreme Commander must be prepared to initiate the occupation and control
of west Germany immediately after the cessation of hostilities,...and
furthermore that his responsibilities may be extended to cover an
indeterminate period thereafter.'" Nevertheless, General Bull was
resolved to keep planning narrowly focused on what were clearly military
areas of responsibility. He wrote on 30 June 1944:

I strongly feel that the lack of coordination in the Supreme
Headquarters staff on posthostilities planning beyond purely
military requirements will continue in spite of our desires until
political directives are received or improvised. I cannot get
enthusiastic over attempts to improvise with all the lost effort
of busy staffs based on such guesses. My thought is that work
on (1) governing the German people, (2) perfecting their
economic future, (3) controlling their educational system, etc.,
is not part of the Supreme Headquarters staff function now.48

Sharing these sentiments, Eisenhower cabled the War Department in August
requesting assistance in converting CCS/551 into a posthostilities directive.
The British opposed any such action, preferring to leave formulation of such
a policy to the Allied Control Council which they were championing. Opinion
was also divided in Washington. On 2 September, a Cabinet Committee
composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury convened to develop
German policy. Based on the deliberations of this committee and the
agreements reached at the second Quebec Conference on 4 October 1944, the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff issued clearer guidance to General Eisenhower, in
his capacity as the commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, to govern American
occupation policy.49

The draft version of what later would be called JCS 1067, called for
implementing the Morgenthau Plan's harsh approach to postwar policy.50 By
its provisions, the U.S. would occupy Germany and treat it as a defeated
enemy. Fraternization between soldiers and Germans was forbidden. Under
JCS 1067, occupation forces would exercise limited control over the German economy and constrain distribution of goods and foodstuffs to that level necessary to prevent disease and unrest. American troops would oversee the thorough extirpation of Nazism and militarism.

According to General Lucius Clay, “there was no doubt that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of occupation.” Eisenhower, according to biographer Stephen Ambrose, supported this approach: “His hatred of the Germans was wide-ranging and ran very deep. He definitely wanted them punished, humiliated, made to pay. He blamed the Germans for starting the war and for prolonging it.” JCS 1067, according to Clay, represented “the document which was to be our policy guide in administering the American Zone of Occupation and in negotiating with the other members of quadripartite government.” Most important, it “gave the military government staffs their long-awaited basic statement of policy for the posthostilities period.”

By late 1944, it was clear to SHAEF that the Allies intended to occupy Germany and initially impose a military government. Eisenhower, anticipating the mission, sought to bring in a competent person to assist him in discharging his responsibilities as Military Governor. In March 1945, he wrote the Army’s G-1, Brehon Somervell: “I have heard a rumor that Lucius Clay may become available for assignment to a theater. If it should develop that this is so, I have a very urgent need for him....My idea is that he would be the Herbert Hoover of this war and would have the job of handling civil affairs in Germany.” Clay was dispatched to Europe and ultimately became the Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation. Revealingly, before Clay left Washington to become Eisenhower’s Deputy Military
Governor, he spent a week in meeting with, among others, the President, Secretary of War Stimson, and General Marshall: he did not consult the State Department. He recalled: "As I look back I find it amazing that I did not visit the State Department or talk with any of its officials....No one at that time advised me of the role of the State Department in occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out."\(^{57}\) It was left to military planners to devise the forms of the peace.

At the Yalta Conference in January 1945, the Soviets, British, and Americans agreed to a postwar policy. They proclaimed it their "inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world." To do so, they intended to oversee a complete disarmament of Germany, supervise the demilitarization of German industry, and prosecute war criminals. They also proclaimed their intention to extract reparations\(^{58}\). Thus, by the winter of 1945, a fairly clear vision of the peace, the end state, had emerged. In part, this was due to the prodding of military planners whose draft plans had served as a vehicle for discussion by political leaders. SHAEF was free to develop and finalize its postconflict plan with this new guidance.
In identifying a stage in force projection which includes war termination and postconflict operations, current doctrine acknowledges that planning for military operations should proceed through the period of active hostilities to embrace the transition from war to peace and the establishment of conditions for achieving postwar aims. It further recognizes that initially, at least, the military is likely to be the only entity available to restore and maintain order, reestablish basic services, and eliminate threats to the new regime. Finally, it implies a requirement to plan for the desired peace.

The components of such a plan are hinted at in the doctrine, but not in a coherent fashion. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, recommends that, as part of their strategic concept, combatant commanders consider “postconflict objectives and measures.” This planning for postconflict operations “should begin as early as possible, and preferably before the conflict begins.”

Beyond establishing a requirement for postconflict operations planning, doctrine also seeks to anticipate the types of activities which may occur in this stage. For the joint force commander, according to Joint Publication 3-0, postconflict operations translate into activities such as “mine sweeping and clearing operations, prisoner of war operations, demobilization of friendly insurgent forces, and various kinds of assistance operations. It may even be necessary to establish a temporary government.” *FM 100-5, Operations*, describes similar tasks which are likely to be performed during postconflict operations. These include restoration of order, reestablishment of damaged or destroyed
infrastructure, preparation of forces for deployment, and establishment of conditions for transitioning to civilian administration, whether indigenous, U.S., or United Nations. Left out, surprisingly, are two missions specifically assigned the Army by Title 10, United States Code: occupation and military government.

While doctrine recommends postconflict planning and Joint Publication 3–0 and FM 100-5 provide a glimpse of the tasks which might be addressed in a war termination and postconflict operations plan, guidance in how to formulate such a plan is conspicuously absent from Joint Test Publication 5–0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. The only coherent doctrinal presentation of postconflict planning considerations appears in Joint Test Publication 3–57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations.

ECLIPSE offers a historical perspective of the factors that shaped postconflict operations planning under the conditions which prevailed in Europe in 1944-1945. The elements which formed the SHAEF plan and implementing plans of subordinate army groups provide a useful outline of postconflict planning considerations.

SHAEF published the ECLIPSE Outline Plan on 10 November 1944. It began with different criteria than earlier plans for initiating war termination and postconflict operations. The operation still would begin upon German surrender. However, ECLIPSE specified two forms which "surrender" might take. One occurred "When a GERMAN Government and/or GERMAN High Command formally signs the Instrument of Surrender." The second pertained "when the major portion of the GERMAN forces opposing us has capitulated or been overpowered." In the latter instance, one planners judged more likely, the Supreme Commander would decide "when 'OVERLORD'
gives place to ‘ECLIPSE’ and an arbitrary date for the change over will be fixed.” ECLIPSE was thus consciously a sequential plan, the continuation of OVERLORD. In establishing several situations which could cause implementation of ECLIPSE, planners were toying with a more sophisticated vision of war termination, but they ultimately failed to appreciate the transitional nature of the termination period. OVERLORD would not cleanly “give place” to ECLIPSE: the process was much more complex.

The ECLIPSE plan consisted of two phases. The primary phase called for Allied forces to move rapidly “to secure especially important strategic areas deep inside GERMANY.” The primary phase, the plan stated, was “really the consummation of ‘OVERLORD.’” Thus ECLIPSE and OVERLORD overlapped, the end of one corresponding with the beginning of the other. Here planners recognized the complexity of arriving at a clear demarcation between war and peace. In the primary phase, war and peace would uneasily coexist, creating potential for confusion of objectives and responsibilities which were troublesome. The military chain of command continued to exercise control in its assigned areas of operation after V-E Day even as military government units sought to establish an occupation infrastructure. As a result, administrative boundaries did not conform to tactical boundaries and German civilians were confused about who was in charge.

In the secondary phase of the plan, the Allies proposed to solidify their control of occupied areas and achieve the objectives established for the operation: disarmament of German forces, enforcement of surrender terms, establishment of law and order, and redistribution of Allied forces into designated national zones of occupation. In addition, ECLIPSE called for prompt relief and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons. Once resistance ended, plans called for the 21 Army Group (U.K.) to
assume responsibility for the designated British zone of occupation in the north, and the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups (U.S.) for the American zone of occupation. The army groups were to establish four military districts in each zone to set the conditions for transition to Tripartite Control. The Supreme Commander would preside over Berlin as a separate district. The plan also anticipated a requirement for redeployment of “surplus US and British forces not required for occupational duties in GERMANY” from ports in France.71

The ECLIPSE Outline Plan provided specific tasks to the various subordinate commands of the Allied Expeditionary Force.72 These included designating geographic objectives, zones of responsibility, and missions to disarm German military and paramilitary forces and safeguard German war materiel. ECLIPSE also directed the army groups to “complete establishment of Military Government throughout the sector.”73 This specific guidance emerged directly after the first Allied occupation of German soil. On 12 September 1944, U.S. forces entered the small village of Roetgen, Germany, effectively initiating postconf Met operations. General Eisenhower announced the establishment of military government in the theater under his direction.74 How long this government would last remained unstated by either policymakers or the ECLIPSE plan.75

The eventual details of ECLIPSE were presented in nineteen separate memoranda; these served as guides for the occupation. Eight of these accompanied the ECLIPSE Outline Plan; SHAEF published the rest later. The wide variety of issues addressed by the memoranda included surrender procedures,76 labor policies,77 procedures for handling Allied prisoners of war and United Nations displaced civilians,78 mechanisms for disarming the German armed forces,79 and guidance for establishing military government.80
Together, these memoranda represented invaluable practical guidance to subordinate units, and in some cases acted as a convenient standard operating procedure for combat leaders executing new types of missions.\textsuperscript{51}

Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups developed supporting plans to implement ECLIPSE.\textsuperscript{82} Because Sixth Army Group was designated for rapid dissolution after Germany's defeat, its plan largely focused on transfer of responsibilities to Twelfth Army Group. Accordingly, Twelfth Army Group's plans for ECLIPSE offers the best example of how subordinates translated the postconflict missions assigned them in the SHAEF plan.

Twelfth Army Group ultimately prepared and issued three drafts of its ECLIPSE plan: one in January, one in February, and the last in April 1945. The cover memorandum which accompanied the second draft of the operations plan (OPLAN) informed subordinate commands that "While this plan is called a draft, it constitutes for the time being an approved planning directive," and ordered them to prepare their own plans to execute ECLIPSE.\textsuperscript{83} Furthermore, should the Germans surrender or resistance suddenly collapse, "the current plan will be put in effect by appropriate directives from this headquarters."\textsuperscript{84}

Twelfth Army Group phased its ECLIPSE plan in the same way as SHAEF's. During the primary phase, the plan oriented units on geographic objectives and called for them to advance in "highly mobile columns composed of armor and motorized infantry...on narrow fronts by the most direct routes to their Primary Objectives, fanning out only sufficiently to secure Lines of Communication."\textsuperscript{85} For instance, the Twelfth Army Group ECLIPSE plan assigned First Army the Cologne–Bonn area and a portion of the Ruhr, while focusing Third Army on Koblenz, Frankfurt–Wiesbaden–Mainz, and Kassel. Planners additionally detailed coordination measures with the
British to reposition forces into national zones of occupation. During the primary phase, Twelfth Army Group also planned to open a line of communication to Berlin (if airborne forces occupied it) and move the 2d Armored Division into Berlin to act as an occupation force (this was a specified task from the SHAEF plan). Other missions were of a more general nature in accordance with the SHAEF Outline Plan. These included disarming the German armed forces in zone while safeguarding war materiel, instituting military government in occupied areas, providing care for Allied prisoners of war and displaced citizens, and taking "offensive action by land and/or air against sporadic resistance." 

During the secondary phase, the Twelfth Army Group planned to complete the occupation of Germany and the disarmament of the German armed forces. They also intended to conduct an orderly withdrawal of First Army forces from the assigned British zone of occupation while assuming control of U.S. enclaves at Bremen and Bremerhaven. Additionally, the plan called for the Army Group to "complete the establishment of Military Government on a basis of Military Districts" and organize the U.S. Zone of Occupation. Finally, during this phase Twelfth Army Group would "assume command of Sixth Army Group area and forces when that headquarters is withdrawn." 

As in most military plans, annexes prepared by each staff section contained the details required to conduct the operation. The G1 Annex addressed Prisoner of War issues (Allied and German), internees, and war criminals. It directed subordinate armies to plan to establish staging and reception camps for liberated Allied POWs and internment camps for war criminals, persons appearing on counterintelligence black lists, and security
suspects. The annex also laid out in great detail the procedures and required paperwork for accounting for and discharging German POWs.89

The G2 Annex provided an estimate of the enemy situation, including an assessment of the reaction of the German people to the occupation. The plan addressed exploitation of priority intelligence targets such as V2 sites, research laboratories, and archives by special task forces attached to the armies for that purpose. It also provided guidance for conduct of counterintelligence and interrogation of prisoner of war operations. Finally, it directed each army and military district to establish a captured documents center manned by personnel from the G2 section.90

The G–4 Annex directed the individual armies to disarm German ground, air, and naval forces in their areas of responsibility and turn over the captured equipment to the Advanced Section, Communications Zone (COMMZ) for storage or disposal. Under ECLIPSE, the COMMZ operated and maintained lines of communication in Germany and continued to provide administrative and logistics support to the Twelfth Army Group, but its area of responsibility lay outside Germany.91

The G5 Annex established Twelfth Army Group policy for military government and civil affairs. The plan directed army commanders to aid displaced persons by establishing collection and transit points, providing basic medical care and food, and supervising and assisting repatriation.92 Military Government detachments, acting under the supervision of army commanders, were responsible for enforcing the terms of surrender, restoring law and order, providing for the needs of displaced persons, apprehending war criminals, eliminating Nazism and the party hierarchy, protecting United Nation’s property, and preserving or establishing “suitable
Civil administration to the extent required to accomplish the above objectives.  

Just before V-E Day, the Twelfth Army Group issued Annex 3, the Engineer Plan. It directed combat engineers to destroy German fortifications and minefields, either with their own assets or using German work crews. The annex also anticipated a requirement for engineers to reconstruct water and sewage systems, but limited this effort "to the extent necessary to prevent or ameliorate epidemic conditions." Finally, the annex tasked engineers with construction of troop quarters and housing for displaced persons.

Twelfth Army Group's ECLIPSE OPLAN also established objectives for psychological warfare operations in its area of operations. Information Control Units (ICU) from the Army Group would inform the German public about the regulations in effect to enforce compliance with the terms of surrender. The annex also charged the ICUs with establishing a news and information service to combat rumors and false reports and assisting military government detachments preserve law and order. Finally, the plan directed ICUs to educate American troops as to the standards of conduct expected of them in their relations with the German people and the theater policy of nonfraternization.

The ECLIPSE model for a postconflict operations plan offers a number of elements relevant for any type of postconflict mission. First, it established the criteria for initiating postconflict operations. Next, it provided an estimate of the enemy situation which would prevail at war's end. It then portrayed the desired political end state and identified the related military objectives. Finally, it developed a concept of operations. In ECLIPSE's case, this centered mistakenly on combat operations with
supporting civil military operations. This reflected the primary focus of planners accustomed to thinking in these terms. The combat operations central to the plan—seizure of key strategic areas—occurred as part of OVERLORD and were largely irrelevant to ECLIPSE. Instead, the ostensibly supporting civil-military provisions of the plan were preeminent in the operations which occurred. This flaw in the plan reflects its sequential relationship with OVERLORD. Planners erred in not providing a mechanism whereby ECLIPSE could be initiated concurrently with OVERLORD. In failing to do so, they hampered a smooth transition from war to peace.

Chapter 4 — Transition from War to Peace: “ECLIPSE Conditions”

Both Army and Joint doctrine refer to a transitional period from war to peace. Joint Publication 3-0 describes a “transition from combat operations to postconflict operations.”96 However, it then proceeds to limit postconflict activities to the period “from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member.”97 In doing so, it ignores the transition which begins prior to the cessation of fighting. Similarly, Army doctrine traces the origin of postconflict operations to the point “When a cessation of hostilities or a truce is called.” Although it goes on to note that “this transition can occur even if residual combat operations are still underway in parts of the theater of operations,” it fails to recognize that there may not be a clear delineation between war and peace.98 Indeed, the ECLIPSE experience indicates that postconflict activities may begin before hostilities end. War termination is a process which bridges war
and peace. Planners should recognize and address the requirements of this process, anticipate the shape it may take, and formulate procedures and mechanisms to ensure a smooth transition. They also should consider whether separate conflict and postconflict plans are necessary: these may not be sequential operations, but concurrent.

One of the major problems that Allied commanders faced in the west as they began to breach the Siegfried Line and make inroads into Nazi Germany was the mixture of OVERLORD operations with operations prescribed for ECLIPSE. The strategic areas identified in the ECLIPSE plan for seizure in the primary phase were already falling into Allied hands by April 1944. ECLIPSE was not the neat “continuation” or “culmination” of OVERLORD which planners had conceived. Instead, the terminal operation of the war overlapped the initial operation of the peace. The process of war termination had begun.

Under ECLIPSE, General Eisenhower had responsibility for deciding when to declare “A-Day” to initiate the operation. However, the plan established no criteria for this decision. The intelligence estimate which informed the ECLIPSE plan had proved fairly accurate by April 1945. Instead of a formal surrender, there were “Piecemeal surrenders by local commanders or groups of commanders” as resistance slowly dissolved. The German people seemed “physically and spiritually exhausted,” and offered virtually no opposition to Allied occupation. Subsequent intelligence estimates had built up the possibility of a Nazi effort to preserve itself by retreating to the mountains and building an underground movement. SHAEF strengthened counterintelligence operations to foil SS efforts to establish a resistance and diverted combat forces to isolate the Bavarian Alps, site of a rumored Nazi stronghold. Still, conditions which justifying proclamation
of A-Day seemed remote: the German Army continued to resist, and Hitler's government remained in control.

In March, the SHAEF staff entertained a suggestion that ECLIPSE be implemented progressively as German territory was occupied. Eisenhower also began to consider the problem. He wrote a letter to President Roosevelt through General Marshall on March 31, 1945, reporting "The further this campaign progresses, the more probable it appears that there will never be a clean cut military surrender of the forces on the Western Front." 101 He directed his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that "There exists a possibility that ECLIPSE conditions may be encountered as early as April 1945." 102

The SHAEF staff wrestled with similar views. The ECLIPSE "Airlift Plan," issued on 4 April 1945, captured the notion that "conditions" defined operations, observing "It may be...necessary to implement certain 'ECLIPSE' Air Lift tasks before 'A' Day...; it is also possible that 'ECLIPSE' conditions may occur in some parts of GERMANY while 'OVERLORD' conditions prevail elsewhere." 103 The staff was beginning to understand that OVERLORD and ECLIPSE were concurrent rather than sequential operations.

In recognition of the need to clarify war termination and postconflict issues, SHAEF, on 12 April 1945, authorized army group commanders to selectively implement ECLIPSE. Eisenhower's cable to the Combined Chiefs provided the mechanism: commanders could declare "ECLIPSE conditions" as prevailing in all or part of their area of operations and begin implementing provisions of the ECLIPSE plan, especially those related to treatment of displaced persons, disarmament of German armed forces, and establishment of military government. 104
Twelfth Army Group issued its third draft operation plan for ECLIPSE on 12 April, immediately after receiving permission to implement the plan where “ECLIPSE conditions” existed. General Bradley told subordinate commanders that “During the remaining phases of Operation ‘OVERLORD,’ all areas of Germany behind the rear boundaries of the attacking Armies will be considered as occupied areas, and in these areas ‘ECLIPSE’ policies and procedures which pertain to the control and disbandment of the German Armed Forces, will be fully effective.” Therefore, he wrote, the operations plan was more than an approved planning directive, it also was “a directive with regard to policies and procedures to be followed in the occupation, organization, and government of portions of Germany which come under our control during the remaining phases of Operation OVERLORD.” This order effectively implemented ECLIPSE.

The Twelfth Army directive confirmed the actions already taken by many commanders. For Patton’s Third Army, in “the German areas progressively overrun by Allied Forces and behind the rear Corps areas, Operation ECLIPSE was tacitly assumed to have begun.” ECLIPSE provided the only practical guidance for conducting such operations. Under its provisions, military government detachments already had begun functioning. Allied armies liberated and evacuated prisoners of war, initiating the disarmament process. At the same time, troops provided assistance to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons they encountered. Advancing forces also dealt with a flood of surrendering German troops. A declaration of ECLIPSE conditions authorized commanders to call on resources that eased the burden of conducting these type operations. As the military provisions of the primary phase of ECLIPSE became less likely, e.g., an
airborne assault on Berlin, the civil-military operations at the heart of the secondary phase predominated.\textsuperscript{108}

Through the artificial mechanism of a declaration of “ECLIPSE Conditions,” Allied commanders and planners recognized the need to provide for the transition from war to peace. In part, the problem stemmed from the initial decision to prepare separate plans for the terminal military operation and postconflict operations. It also reflected a flaw in planning that established a point in time—“A” Day—- for commencement of postconflict operations. Current doctrine replicates this error. War termination and postconflict operations are part of a process of transitioning from war to peace; units invariably conduct these operations concurrently with the terminal phase of military operations, not sequentially.

Chapter 5 — Conducting Postconflict Planning: the ECLIPSE Experience

Current doctrine does not address where postconflict planning occurs. Frequently, commanders have relegated postconflict planning to a civil-military operations staff section (G-5). Yet the transitional dynamic between war and peace means that postconflict operations cannot be cleanly separated from combat operations which are planned by the G-3. Planning should integrate the expertise of all staff sections and provide mechanisms for a coordinated effort. The experience of ECLIPSE planners offers perspective today for forming joint and combined staff organizations to prepare postconflict operations.

As Allied forces broke out of Normandy and began the liberation of France, interest in postconflict planning expanded at both the strategic and
operational levels. The number of different planning cells in Washington and Europe multiplied by the time work began on Operation ECLIPSE.

At the strategic level, the President created a Cabinet Committee on Germany composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury on 1 September 1944 to formulate postwar policy. In this forum, Secretary of War Stimson debated Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau over the harsh provisions for the peace advocated by the latter. When Morgenthau succeeded in gaining official acceptance of his views at the Second Quebec Conference on 17 September, the War Department drafted guidance for theater postwar planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued this guidance, JCS 1067, on 24 September 1944. Its immediate purpose served, the Cabinet Committee on Germany became inactive by November. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) supplanted its mission. SWNCC, a working group made up of assistant secretaries, served as the conduit for communications between Washington and the American delegation to the European Advisory Committee in London, providing "an important source for policy decisions on occupation affairs." The Allies established the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in December 1943 as the result of an understanding reached at the Moscow Conference. It consisted of representatives of the Soviet, British and American governments. The Moscow agreement charged the commission with studying problems and making "recommendations to the three governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities." Although the EAC fell short of being capable of developing Allied occupation policy, it nevertheless made significant contributions to postwar planning. The Commission reached agreement on key issues which formed the basis for the tripartite Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945 which
announced the victorious Allies’ postwar policy for Germany. Among other significant actions, the group formulated the terms of surrender for Germany (which were ratified by their respective governments on 21 September 1944) and codified the zones of occupation (ratified 6 February 1945) after the Yalta Conference. Based in London, the Commission offered a significant resource for SHAEF planners, giving them unique access and insight into the political deliberations which would inevitably shape military planning requirements.113

At the operational level of planning, a similar proliferation of planning organizations occurred. Within SHAEF, the staff elements most directly involved in postconflict planning were the G-3 and G-5. COSSAC established the Posthostilities Planning Subsection (PPS) of the Plans Division, G-3, in January 1944. General Morgan desired it to focus on operations “during the interval expected to elapse between the end of hostilities and the institution by the Allies of civil administration of the occupied areas.”114 The subsection served as a liaison element with other postconflict planning agencies, carrying forward the work initiated by RANKIN-C. The G-3 tasked the PPS on 13 July 1944 to prepare a handbook to guide commanders in conducting occupation operations. SHAEF published the resulting Handbook Governing Policy and Procedures for the Military Occupation in Germany in December 1944.115 SHAEF widely distributed the manual among tactical commanders and it proved quite useful according to many who used it.116 PPS also took the lead in developing the ECLIPSE plan, coordinating with other staff sections for their contributions.

The other key staff element for postconflict planning was G-5. In February 1944, SHAEF reorganized and redesignated the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) of COSSAC into the G-5 Section. The Chief of Staff
charged the new staff section with advising "the Supreme Commander on matters of civil affairs policy, issue civil affairs policy directives and outline plans, review detailed plans, and exercise general supervision over the execution of plans and policies." Until early 1945, the G-5 focus tended to be on civil affairs and military government operations solely as they related to supporting combat operations. Within its Operations Section, however, the G-5 established separate civil affairs sections for each country in the area of operations to prepare plans for occupation or liberation, as appropriate. The German Country Unit (GCU), formed in March 1944, was the principal postwar planning organization in G-5. It was staffed with one hundred fifty British and American officers who brought a combined outlook to their postconf Met deliberations. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing Germany at national, regional, and local levels. This served as a mechanism for training military government personnel for the specific tasks which they would have to perform. According to Harold Zink, the official historian for the U.S. High Commissioner of Germany, the German Country Unit "actually succeeded in drafting a series of plans which had a considerable bearing on the actual occupation of Germany." The GCU devoted considerable effort to writing a handbook on military government to distribute to military government officers assigned to Germany. The handbook aroused a storm of controversy when proponents of a harsh peace delivered a draft to their sympathizers in Washington. The Country Unit, in the absence of an official policy, had prescribed a middle course in its treatment of Germany, one "designed to liquidate war industries but also to get German economy back on its feet to the extent necessary to feed and otherwise support the German population."
guidance ran counter to the Morgenthau Plan. In the storm that followed, SHAEF delayed publication of the handbook. Nevertheless, in the absence of any other information, many military government detachments carried copies of early drafts of the handbook with them into Europe after D-Day.\textsuperscript{119}

Separate British and American organizations replaced the German Country Unit when the Allies committed themselves to national zones of occupation rather than a combined occupation. In August 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed establishment of the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) (USGCC) in the European Theater of Operations U.S. Army (ETOUSA). USGCC was manned initially by one hundred fifty officers and two hundred fifty enlisted men. This grew by the spring of 1945 to an establishment of two hundred fifty officers and over four hundred enlisted soldiers. After V-E Day, when the organization became responsible for actual administration of occupied Germany, over two thousand officers and four thousand enlisted men were assigned to USGCC.\textsuperscript{120} Building on the work of the German Country Unit, by February 1945 the USGCC had prepared plans to assume control of the German government, dismantle the Nazi Party, and operate the German transportation system.\textsuperscript{121}

The postconflict planning efforts of the USGCC were independent of the corresponding work by the SHAEF G-3 and G-5 embodied in ECLIPSE. In March 1945, the USGCC met with its SHAEF counterparts to sort out the duplication of effort.\textsuperscript{122} As a result of this discussion, on 29 April 1945, ETOUSA issued guidance that "the Theater staff was specifically charged with the execution, implementation, and supervision within the U.S. Zone of U.S. and Allied Control Authority policies." In the fall of 1945, USGCC became the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS), which
served as the staff for the American Military Governor. Only then was the organizational dispute over who would control the occupation settled.\textsuperscript{123}

The bureaucratic in-fighting had caused the chief of the Posthostilities Planning Subsection, Colonel T.N. Grazebrook, to write a memorandum to the SHAEF G-3 in mid-October 1944. He observed: "It is evident for a number of reasons that high-level and long-term planning for the future control of Germany is far from complete." Within SHAEF, he noted, "planning for the occupation has so far been carried out separately by divisions, each in regard to their own particular functions." He proposed the appointment of a senior officer "to carry out this task and whose sole duty it should be to consider the problems of the occupational period, and to insure that none have been overlooked."\textsuperscript{124} This led Eisenhower on 8 November 1944 to direct General Morgan, then serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, to coordinate postconflict planning. He also assigned the Posthostilities Planning Subsection of G-3 to act as Morgan's personal staff for this purpose.\textsuperscript{125} Subsequently, on 1 March 1945, a coordinating committee made up of representatives from all staff sections convened under Colonel C.R. Kutz of G-3 Operations. This group met bi-weekly to review reports on the status of posthostilities planning by all concerned general staff sections and address resulting issues.\textsuperscript{126} These meetings served as an effective mechanism within SHAEF to keep all involved parties working in relative concert for the balance of the war.

The organizational structure for planning the peace was strictly ad hoc at both the national and operational levels, diffusing responsibility among numerous agencies in both Washington and London. As a result, duplicative efforts and bureaucratic battles wasted resources and time. These disruptive conflicts reflected the larger debate which simultaneously
shaped Allied, American, and theater postconflict planning and policy. Planning bodies and processes used to prepare RANKIN and TALISMAN expanded for ECLIPSE, but little changed fundamentally. Planning involved all staff elements. The detailed military government planning done by the German Country Unit and USGCC formed the basis for short term ECLIPSE planning for the occupation. More importantly, as the United States settled into occupation duties and confronted the need to deal with a prostrate Germany, this work provided a framework for a long-term policy.

Notably absent from military planning processes were non-military agencies. Current doctrine suggests that “planning and conducting postconflict activities require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of governmental agencies, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners.”127 ECLIPSE planning was strictly military—a joint and combined effort—but not interagency. Perhaps as a result, no practical alternative to military occupation existed for several years. Despite the Army’s desire soon after V-E Day to relinquish responsibility to civilian agencies, no preparations occurred to make that possible. As it turned out, a long-term commitment of U.S. forces to Europe was politically sustainable with the emergence of the Cold War threat. Under other circumstances in the future, that might not be the case.

Chapter 6 -- Postconflict Doctrine: The ECLIPSE Perspective

On 8 May 1945, Germany surrendered to the Allies, concluding World War II in Europe. Scenes of utter devastation greeted the occupiers. German
industry lay in ruins. Housing was in short supply in the bombed-out cities. The specter of famine loomed over the coming winter. In one of the great population upheavals of all time, over six million displaced persons from all over Europe suddenly were freed to make their way to their homelands; untold millions of German refugees, fleeing the Russians, streamed west to seek new homes; and Allied troops disarmed, scrutinized for possible involvement in war crimes and then released over five million German military and paramilitary personnel to return to where they had enlisted. Occupation forces found a cowed, cooperative German people who were largely unreceptive to efforts by Nazi die-hards to inspire a resistance movement.

The greatest achievement of ECLIPSE may have been the accuracy with which this situation was anticipated. Few tasks came as a surprise to the units which occupied Germany, although the scale of population movement dwarfed all estimates. Within three months, Allied armed forces had taken significant steps to stabilize the situation in Germany. They disarmed and demobilized the once formidable German armed forces. United Nations soldiers also cared for and repatriated over four million displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war to their homelands. Counterintelligence personnel quashed a feeble attempt to establish a resistance. Occupation forces provided vital assistance to restore basic services to many cities. Military government detachments, augmented by combat troops, created working local governments and police forces, while administering military courts. Finally, hundreds of thousands of American troops redeployed to the Pacific or left for home. ECLIPSE anticipated and considered postconflict problems and emplaced organizational and procedural solutions to meet the initial challenges of the peace. This postconflict planning effort required a
significant commitment in staff resources by far-sighted commanders, diverting attention and effort from more pressing immediate needs arising from military operations.

The process of formulating the ECLIPSE plan and its predecessors served another valuable purpose: it raised questions for commanders about end state which shaped the guidance they sought and received from the political leadership. In this way, end state was subjected to the constant review advocated by political scientist John Fishel in *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm.* Even the work done by the German Country Unit under invalid assumptions about the desired end state ultimately was useful, as the conditions which underlay those assumptions appeared to change the end state by late 1945.

The ECLIPSE perspective challenges current doctrinal emphasis on knowing the political end state as a prerequisite for planning postconflict operations. While this may be desirable, it is unlikely that such guidance will be either unequivocal or immediately forthcoming. The ECLIPSE experience indicates that many factors are likely to intervene to make political leaders reluctant, unable, or unwilling to clearly define postconflict goals early in a conflict. Such factors as the demands of conducting the war, internal political divisions, and coalition unity may preclude definitive statements of a postwar vision. Indeed, as Woodrow Wilson's enunciation of the Fourteen Points indicates, a premature statement of end state can create immense problems within an alliance during postconflict peace negotiations.

ECLIPSE was less successful in providing for the transition from war to peace. It was inadequately synchronized with OVERLORD: the last phase of OVERLORD was, in reality, the primary phase of ECLIPSE, but no
mechanism had been built into either plan to deal with this situation. SHAEF planned and executed OVERLORD and ECLIPSE as sequential, not concurrent, operations. Because of this, SHAEF created and applied the concept of "ECLIPSE Conditions" to the transitional phase of operations. While this proved an acceptable solution, it failed to address another question that needed to be answered in the transition from war to peace: when would the administrator supplant the warrior, and what were the mechanisms for this transition? As a result, confusion of chain of command and purpose slowed the process of establishing a functioning indigenous political administration during the first several months of the occupation.

Current doctrine could profit from the ECLIPSE perspective to expand and correct its treatment of war termination and postconflict operations. In merely recognizing the need to address these subjects, doctrine has advanced a great distance since 1993. Nevertheless, its treatment of the issues, responsibilities, and procedures of war termination and postconflict operations are nascent. Based on the ECLIPSE perspective, current doctrine ought to incorporate the following propositions.

1) Postconflict planning demands a significant investment of scarce staff resources early in the war in order to sufficiently anticipate and meet the requirements of the peace. This investment requires command emphasis to ensure the long-term view is balanced against short-term requirements. Timely commitment of staff resources to postconflict planning makes available trained forces to perform anticipated tasks within a well-developed structure.

2) In order to insure synchronization of effort and consonance of intent, war termination and postconflict planning should form an element of the campaign plan/operational plan. If separate
terminal military operation plans and postconflict plans are formulated, there is a natural tendency to treat them as sequential operations, as was the case with OVERLORD and ECLIPSE. War termination is defined by a transitional period in which war and peace coexist. Thus, postconflict operations may be inaugurated during the closing phases of the terminal operation. Doctrine should anticipate this transition and prescribe procedures to mitigate confusion. One mechanism serving this function is a war termination and postconflict annex for terminal campaign plans and operations orders. Where current doctrine falls short is in failing to address war termination and postconflict operations as an integral feature of operational planning.

3) Effective war termination and postconflict plans require the participation of all staff sections. Planning the peace will involve each staff element. If the G-3 has preponderant influence over the plan, it will ignore essential civil-military considerations. If the G-5 conceives the plan in isolation from the G-3, it will not be integrated with the operations plan. The G-1 should consider enemy prisoner of war handling, processing, and discharge; reception and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war; internment of enemy civilians wanted for war crimes; and medical support for displaced persons, prisoners of war, and civilians. The G-2 must provide an accurate estimate of postconflict conditions; establish collection requirements to exploit captured equipment, documents, and enemy personnel; and plan for conduct of counterintelligence operations. The G-3 has to plan to ensure force protection; support stability operations; assign areas of responsibility to occupation forces; control redeployment of troops; train personnel to conduct postconflict operations; and provide command and control for postconflict operations. The G-4 should plan to logistically
support not only U.S. forces, but Allied forces, displaced persons, enemy prisoners of war; provide emergency supplies of staples to civilian populations; transport redeploying troops; establish depots for captured enemy war materiel; dispose of surplus/dangerous munitions. The G-5 will plan and coordinate the full range of civil affairs operations.

4) **A clear statement of end state from the NCA aids planning, but is neither imperative or likely.** Definition of end state is likely to be an evolutionary process, subject to the fortunes of war, internal politics, and coalition diplomacy. Planning for the peace cannot wait for a clear statement of the end state. In the process of planning postconflict operations, the military can contribute to the process of crystallizing the political vision of end state.

5) **Postconflict operations are, by definition, an operation other than war (OOTW).** They combine humanitarian operations, arms control, security assistance, nation assistance, combatting terrorism, and peace enforcement in a unique way that merits its own discussion in OOTW doctrine.\(^{133}\)

Fred Iklé entitled his book *Every War Must End.* This is a truism which military planners should recognize from the outset of fighting. Only by thoroughly thinking through the requirements for the peace can planners ensure that the armed forces are able to contribute to the true object of war: achievement of the political end state. An expansion of current doctrine on postconflict operations can assist in this process.
ENDNOTES


3Fred Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 2. Harold Zink, former chief historian for the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, arrived at similar conclusions: “Despite their professions of interest and their promises to furnish policy guidance, presidents, prime ministers, and other top political officials find it difficult, if not impossible, to consider what comes after the fighting during actual conflict....the very nature of a major conflict seems to make it impossible for top political officials...to give serious consideration to postwar problems.” The United States and Germany, 1944-1955 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), 20.

4The Army’s FM 100-5 states that “the primary purpose of the Army is deterrence; but, should deterrence fail, the Army’s purpose is to win the nation’s wars by fighting as part of a joint force of the United States.” FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1993), vi.

5The initial draft of FM 101-5-1 defines conflict termination erroneously, I believe, as “That point in time at which a conflict ends and a period of postconflict activities begins.” It is not a point in time. Rather, it encompasses a period of time when war and peace may well overlap. FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, Initial Draft (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 1994), 1-62.


7FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms, Initial Draft, 1-181.

For example, during postconflict planning for a war in Panama, General Frederick Woerner gave guidance to his staff to look to the occupation of Germany as a model. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1992), 8.

1.6 million U.S. troops were in Germany at war's end in sixty-one divisions. A total of 7,799 officers and men were assigned to the European Civil Affairs Division. This total was augmented by significant number of other personnel transferred to military government duty as the scope of the mission became understood. See Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 243.

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-6.

For example, the plan for Operation JUST CAUSE did not address postconflict issues. Planning for combat operations began in the USSOUTHCOM J3, then was transferred to the XVIII Airborne Corps G3. Postconflict planning was done exclusively in the USSOUTHCOM J5. The two operations were not coordinated. See John Fishel, Fog of Peace.


The British were ahead of the other Allies in considering the problem. The Foreign Office circulated a memorandum in July 1943 which asserted that "Any Armistice or Declaration (of surrender) would presumably provide for occupation, whether total or partial, of the countries concerned." "Aide Memoire Handed to the United States and Soviet Ambassadors on the 2d July 1943;" quoted in Planning for the Occupation, 16.

From approximately April to December 1943, a battle raged at the highest levels of government in Washington over the propriety of military government. Ideologically, most of Roosevelt's New Dealers and the President himself were profoundly opposed to even the appearance of either imperialism or militarism. Marshall told General Hilldring, the first chief of the Civil Affairs Division, that the State Department and other civilian agencies "were very unhappy about the fact that the Army, and not they,
were going to have this problem in the wake of battle...to put in order the areas we had liberated, we had conquered.” He also stated that only the bad experience Eisenhower had in North Africa in the wake of TORCH with all the civilian agencies competing for resources had convinced FDR that military government would be necessary. “The President himself,” General Hildring remembered Marshall saying, ‘had come to this conclusion without any pressures at all by the War Department because General Marshall didn’t want this job at all, but that nobody else in the cabinet, except perhaps Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox, had any sympathy with the President’s decision, and that some cabinet members, notably Mr. Ickes and to some extent Mr. Morgenthau and...others, like Mr. Hopkins...had great doubts about the wisdom of giving to soldiers the amount of political power and influence to be exerted by [the division] in the years ahead.” Hildring interview, 30 March 1959, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 457-458. See also Ziemke, Occupation, 10-13; Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), 12-13.

16 The War Department established the School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia in 1942, modelled after a similar school set up by the British in 1941. As requirements for military government personnel expanded, a three month training program was set up utilizing facilities at major college campuses around the country. Training for these personnel continued after they shipped overseas at specialized facilities in England. See Zink, American Military Government in Germany, 6-7.

17 History of COSSAC, 22-23; quoted in Planning for the Occupation, 11. The idea of unconditional surrender raised here was to be a controversial one among the Allies. At the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in October 1943 and again at Teheran, all three Allies subscribed to the principle, although Stalin continued to press for a definition of the term. Diane Shaver Clemens argues in Yalta, that the British and American handling of the Italian surrender demonstrated to the Russians that “unconditional surrender” could be conditional. Clemens, Yalta, 31,-32, 141-144.

18 COSSAC (43) 40 (Final), 13 August 1943, subj: “Operation RANKIN,” para 5; quoted in Planning for the Occupation, 12.

19 The plan settled on twenty-four divisions: two for Denmark, five for northwest Germany (Bremen, Hamburg, and Kiel), six for the Ruhr, and eleven
for the Rhine Valley. COSSAC, 13 August 1943; quoted in Planning for the Occupation, 13.

Planning for the Occupation, 14. As late as May 1944, Roosevelt continued to maneuver to shift the American zone to the more industrially significant north. The primacy of British maritime interests in the North Sea, and later the positioning of British ground forces on the continent militated against any change. See Clemens, Yalta, 36. See also Stephen Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), 387 and Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I tell My Friends, 267-268 for an account of Eisenhower’s meeting in January 1944 with FDR in which this subject was discussed. At the Second Quebec Conference, FDR officially agreed to accept a zone in the south in return for American enclaves at Bremen and Bremerhaven in the north. See Pogue, Marshall, 464-465.

COSSAC, 13 August 1943, para 98; quoted in Planning for the Occupation, 15.

A civil affairs staff was even then being organized. In Washington, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall directed the formation of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff on 1 March 1943. This initiative stemmed largely from Marshall’s experiences with occupation duty in the Philippines in 1902 and in Europe after World War I. See Pogue, Marshall, 455-457. In July 1943, the CCS established the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. A month later, COSSAC created the Civil Affairs Division (CAD), consisting of thirty-four officers to conduct civil affairs planning for both the liberation of occupied countries and the occupation of Germany. In February 1944, CAD was reorganized and redesignated the G-5 Division, SHAEF. The G-5 Division consisted of six sections: fiscal, legal, supply, economics, civil affairs operations, and staff duties. Civil Affairs, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt, Germany, 1947; reprinted as Training Packet No. 51, Provost Marshal General’s School, n.d.), 1-6.

Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (Headquarters, United States Army, Europe: Historical Division, 1953), 189.

Planning for the Occupation, 12, 18.

Ibid., 19-20.
On 30 October, the draft was issued as a planning directive to the U.S. First Army Group and the British Twenty-First Army Group. Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation*, 189. The U.S. First Army Group and Ninth Air Force submitted supporting plans for RANKIN-C on 30 November 1943. According to this planning, the 1st Infantry Division would land at Le Havre in Stage I. From there, the rest of the First Army would move successively to the Rhine and then into Germany. The Americans would constitute another army to liberate France. In January, the 1st Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions submitted their plans for amphibious and airborne seizure respectively of Le Havre. *Planning for the Occupation*, 22-24.

*Planning for the Occupation*, 21.


*Planning for the Occupation*, 60-61.

These included establishment of law and order, control of German media and transportation, repatriation of non-German members of the armed forces, and "control" (not "care" or "repatriation") of displaced persons. The role of military government was also expanded from temporary caretaking prior to transition to civilian control "to include the control of the German central government to the extent necessary to prevent any action contrary to the interests of the Supreme Commander." PS/SHAEF (44) 19 (Final), 13 August 1944, subj: "Operation TALISMAN Outline Plan;" quoted in *Ibid.*, 64-65.


Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1950), 11. The Morgenthau Plan called for imposition of a Carthaginian Peace to turn Germany into an agrarian society by stripping away or destroying its industrial base. The statement initialled by Roosevelt and Churchill at the second Quebec Conference read: ""The program

35Planning for the Occupation, 69.

36Liddel Hart wrote: "In retrospect, the Admiralty recorded that 'the Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first twenty days of March, 1943.' Moreover, the Naval Staff was brought to the point of wondering whether convoy could continue to be regarded, and used, as an effective system of defence." History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), 388.


38Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, III-2.

39Ibid., III-3.

40Planning for the Occupation, 33.

41Ltr of transmittal accompanying COSSAC (43) 40 (Final), 13 August 1943, subj "Operation RANKIN" to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet; quoted in Ibid., 32.

42Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force from Combined Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1944, in N-15823, "Summary of Directives," archival collection, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Eisenhower discussed postwar planning prior to
assuming Supreme Command in Europe. In January 1944, he visited Washington and met with Roosevelt and proposed that rather than separate national zones, Germany be jointly administered by the Soviets, British, and Americans. FDR, according to Eisenhower, “made light of my fears,” and indicated that he supported the notion of zones of responsibility, although he favored the U.S. taking northwest Germany rather than the British. The idea of national zones of occupation was integrated into TALISMAN and ECLIPSE planning. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease, 267-268; Ambrose, Supreme Commander, 387; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 228.

The text of CCS/551 is published in Holborn, American Military Government, 134-143. TALISMAN stated that the Allies intended to impose military government, not a civilian political administration, on Germany. The military government, however, would rule indirectly, working through local officials. It would proscribe political activity and suspend civil courts. Occupation forces would seize German food stocks and distribute them as needed to prevent disease and unrest. “Planning for the Occupation,” 44-46. Ziemke apparently overlooked this April directive from the CCS in his history of the occupation of Germany. He castigated the Chiefs for failing to provide adequate guidance on occupation, and accused them of merely offering up a rehash of RANKIN. See Ziemke, Occupation, 100.


Ltr, SHAEF, Office of the AC of S, G-3, 7 June 1944, subj: “Posthostilities Responsibilities and Planning” to Chief, Posthostilities Planning Subsection; quoted in ibid., 51.

Cable W-53045 (FACS 41), 19 June 1944, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF for Eisenhower; quoted in ibid., 52.

Ltr, HQ, ETOUSA, 20 June 1944, subj: “Posthostilities Planning” to JCS transmitting memo by SCAEF, 19 June 1944, subj: “Short-Term Posthostilities Responsibilities and Planning;” quoted in ibid., 53.

Ltr, SHAEF, G-3 (Ops) Division, 30 June 1944, subj: “Posthostilities Planning,” to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3; quoted in ibid., 57. Bull's concerns were justified. In August 1944, President Roosevelt directed Ambassador Winant in the European Advisory Council to discontinue
postconflict planning in that body because "I dislike making plans for a country which we do not yet occupy." Quoted in Clemens, Yalta, 38.

49Ziemke, Occupation, 101-104; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 190.

50The history of JCS 1067 ("Directive to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)"") is long and complex. It was initially dispatched to Eisenhower on 24 September 1944. While it applied only to American postconflict planning, it contributed to the development of ECLIPSE planning which would soon commence. JCS 1067 was presented to the European Advisory Committee in January 1945 as the American proposal for a combined policy for Germany. The directive underwent a number of revisions and was ultimately issued to Eisenhower as Commander, U.S. Forces Europe on 14 May 1945 as JCS 1067/8. Ziemke, Occupation, 101-102, 208-214. The text of JCS 1067/8 is printed in Holborn, American Military Government, 157-172.

51Clay, Decision, 19.

52Ambrose, Eisenhower, 421.

53Clay, Decision, 10.


55In late October 1944, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy provided further insight for Eisenhower on evolving postconflict policy in Washington. The War Department, McCloy told him, was recommending "that the government of Germany should be instituted on a military basis...[with] single, undivided responsibility in the military commander." That commander would be Eisenhower. McCloy went on to state that he intended
to suggest the appointment of Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of the
Army, to act as a civilian advisor to assist Eisenhower to administer the
peace. Ambrose, Supreme Commander, 602.

56Eisenhower to Somervell, March 14, 1945, in The Papers of Dwight

57Clay, Decision, 6. Interestingly, once the war was won, the Army
was anxious to terminate military government as rapidly as possible. Lucius
Clay reported that “At one of our regular monthly meetings with the Army
district commander he [Eisenhower] made it clear that it was his purpose to
support the development of a Military Government organization which could
be transferred to civilian control on twenty-four hours notice.” Clay,
Decision, 56. Historian John Gimbel concluded that “the Army resisted the
State Department’s attempt to define the Army’s function in Germany to
include broad political and financial responsibilities, and it refused flatly to
accept such responsibilities unless ordered to do so by the President. When
Truman assigned it even broader functions than originally feared, the Army
maneuvered speedily and effectively to get out of the occupation business
altogether. It sought means, methods, and arguments to accomplish the early
transfer of its political, financial, and administrative responsibilities in
Germany to the Department of State.” John Gimbel, The Origins of the
expands on this issue in “Governing the American Zone of Germany,” in
Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls, 92-93.

58Tripartite Agreements of the Yalta Conference, in Diane Shaver
Clemons, Yalta, Appendix A, 295-296.

59See Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Winning the Peace: Postconflict
Operations,” Student Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of
Advanced Military Studies, First Term, AY 94-95). Joint Publication 3-0
observes: “The military’s presence and its ability to operate in crisis
environments and under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in
operations normally governed by other agencies.” Postconflict operations
might well fall under this category. Doctrine for Joint Operations
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 September 1993), V-6.

60Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, III-6 and V-6.

61Ibid., IV-29.

52
In asserting the Army's unique capability to conduct war termination and postconflict operations, FM 100-5 indicates other missions which might arise in this stage. These include prisoner of war handling, refugee control, combat engineer support to clear minefields and destroy fortifications, provision of medical aid, and rendering humanitarian assistance. FM 100-5, Operations, 3-11.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," 25 September 1987, 14. Specifically, the code states that the Army has responsibility "To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority." Interestingly, the Navy and Marine Corps are charged with being prepared to establish military government, but no mention is made of providing occupation forces.

According to this manual, planners ought first consider "the military mission and U.S. policy objectives." Next, the postconflict plan should address the "kind and degree of submission of the defeated hostile area or government," while anticipating the "extent of devastation and the potential of the defeated government to regain its place in the family of nations." This is turn will determine "the complexity of stability and reconstitution efforts required to counteract local violence and promote nation assistance programs." It may also require the U.S. to identify indigenous leaders capable of taking the nation in a direction consistent with U.S. interests. Additionally, the desires of allied governments may be influential. Finally, planners may have to contend with diplomatic agreements for "political or territorial subdivision" of the defeated enemy. Joint Test Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1991), V-3.

ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, 10 November 1944, Section I, "Introduction and Objects." 'A' Day would be used to designate the date established by the Supreme Commander for implementation of ECLIPSE.

This subject will be explored fully in Chapter 4.

Ibid., paragraph 22a. These strategic areas were identified as Berlin, Hamburg-Kiel, Nuremberg-Regensburg-Munich, and the Ruhr-Saar valleys. Berlin and Kiel were listed as potential targets for airborne operations. Ibid., paragraphs 26-28.
68 Ibid., paragraph 22a.

69 "Operation ‘ECLIPSE,’" the outline plan stated "is the military continuation of Operation ‘OVERLORD’ and the system of command and control of naval, ground and air forces will, with certain special exceptions mentioned below, remain as currently in force on ‘A’ Day, until command in Germany is handed over to Tripartite control." Ibid., paragraph 73. For a discussion of the conflicts which occurred, see Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 30; and Ziemke, Occupation, 320-321.

70 The official history of the first year of the occupation noted: "There was a noticeable difference in the way in which tactical units and military government units tackled the problem of control of German territory. Tactical commanders deployed their troops for possible defensive or offensive use, with combat operations as their chief concern. Military government units, on the other hand, had been trained for occupation on the basis of existing political divisions and organizations of the German Reich." As a result, "The tactical disposition of troops seldom coincide with the administrative subdivisions of military government authority. The boundaries overlapped to such a great degree that confusion developed in both the military government and the tactical organization and a great deal of confusion was created in the minds of the German people. Both the purely military and governmental commanders became uncertain of the bounds of their proper authority and frequently were obliged to make decisions by instinct rather than by regulation. The multiplicity of commands and the issuance of orders by almost all of these commands caused repeated duplications of effort." The First Year of the Occupation, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945, (Frankfurt, Germany, 1947; reprinted as Special Text 41-10-63, Provost Marshal General’s School, 1953), 122-123. See also Carl J. Friedrich, "Organizational Evolution in Germany, 1945-1947," in Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government, 199-200.

71 The plan specifically designated Marseilles and a "French port of the northwest coast" as sea ports of embarkation. ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, Paragraphs 67 to 70.

72 Specifically addressed were the Twenty-First Army Group/Second Tactical Air Force; Twelfth Army Group/Ninth Air Force; Sixth Army Group/First Tactical Air Force; Communications Zone; Allied Naval
Commander, Expeditionary Forces; First Allied Airborne Army; and the District Commander, Berlin.

73ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section VI, task 6.

74Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory...A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1957), 42-44. See also Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 5, and Ziemke, Occupation, 133.

75ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section VI, tasks of the Supreme Commander.

76The first memorandum contained the “Instrument of Surrender” or instructions to surrendering German forces to implement the terms agreed to by the Allies. These were general in nature, directing disarmament of all German armed forces, activity of German military personnel, and safeguarding material, records, equipment, and facilities. It also mandated German cooperation and assistance in removing obstacles to land, sea, and air movement. Appendices to the memorandum contained special orders to the commanders of German ground, naval, and air forces. These each identified specific information which would be required by the Allies, instructions for dissemination to subordinate units, and admonitions to cooperate and protect facilities and equipment. Appendix H provided for sanctions against violations of the terms of surrender. These included military measures, judicial and police measures, and “repressive” measures such as destruction of property and hostages. Only the Supreme Commander could authorize “repressive measures. The one exception was “the system of enforcing civilian or military persons to accompany military parties into buildings or areas suspected of being mined or booby trapped, or on trains and other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by sabotage, may be adopted at the discretion of the local commander.” Memorandum Number 1, “Instrument of Surrender; Orders to German Military Authorities to Supplement Instrument; Sanctions in Event of Delinquency,” 25 November 1944 in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

77Memorandum 5 established rules governing labor in the postconflict period. Army Group commanders were informed that they should use German labor to the maximum extent available and required, including disarmed German military and paramilitary personnel. Memorandum Number 5, “Labor,” 2 March 1945 (revised 28 April 1945), in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.
Memorandum 8 assigned Army Group Commanders “responsibility for the safety, recovery, care, maintenance, administration, and evacuation of all United Nations Prisoners of War in their respective zones of operation.” The SHAEF G1 was designated as the Supreme Commanders executive agent on prisoner of war matters. He would attached personnel to the Army Groups to assist in their task. The memo also outlined policies and procedures which would be followed in dealing with these liberated prisoners. Memorandum Number 8, “The Care and Evacuation of Prisoners of War in Greater Germany under ‘ECLIPSE’ Conditions,” 25 March 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memorandum 14 addressed control of displaced persons. Commanders were reminded that “In Germany, the liberation, care and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons is a major allied objective. All available resources at the disposal of military commanders will be employed to accomplish it, as a direct military responsibility.” The memo directed commanders to establish assembly centers to control movement of displaced persons and establish border controls. Care would be taken to separate German refugees from the Allied displaced persons. The ECLIPSE memo estimated that there would be 3,685,000 DPs in the American and British zone, with another 3,405,000 in the Russian zone and 995,000 in Austria. “The care of these people and their ultimate disposition is an international problem of the first magnitude, affecting in varying degrees the governments of nineteen countries.” Sixty percent of the total were believed to be of eastern or southern origin and thus “likely to be a long term military commitment.” Memorandum Number 14, “Control of Displaced Persons,” ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. The estimates were fairly accurate. By October 1945, 2.3 million DPs had been repatriated from the American zone. Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 75.

Memoranda 9 through 11 addressed disarmament of German ground, air, and naval forces respectively. Safeguarding and control of German war materials were tasked to “the Allied Commander in whose area the material is located.” Annexes to the memos delineated specific materials which the Allies would confiscate and identified those materials which the Germans could retain, including ambulances, trucks (one per one hundred soldiers for supply), and horse drawn vehicles, draft animals, and their harnesses. Memorandum Number 9, “Primary Disarmament of the German Land Forces and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material,” 25 November 1944; Memorandum Number 10, “Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing Us and Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material;” and Memorandum Number 11, “Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces, 56
Memoranda 12 and 13 provided instructions on civil affairs operations in liberated countries and military government operations in Germany respectively. Civil affairs guidance was provided on each country. Military government was held to be the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, with the Army Group commanders acting as his agents in their zones of responsibility. He would exercise "supreme legislative, executive and judicial rights of an occupying power, subject to the rules of International Law." The tasks identified for military government were substantial. They were to enforce the terms of surrender, establish and maintain law and order, and apprehend war criminals. Additionally, it had the mission to "care, control, and repatriate" displaced citizens of the United Nations while providing "minimum care necessary to effect control of enemy refugees and displaced persons." Military government was also charged with elimination of Nazism, fascism, and militarism. Military government detachments were empowered to retain "and establish suitable civil administration to the extent required to accomplish the above objectives." Specific procedures for military government were contained in the Military Government Handbook. Units were reminded that "Military government of Germany is a command responsibility. In the initial stages of the advance into Germany military government will be carried out on an ad hoc basis in accordance with the tactical areas of command. As the situation stabilizes it will be possible to establish Military Districts, which will correspond in general with German administrative boundaries."

Memorandum Number 12, "Digest of Civil Affairs Considerations in Liberated Countries," 28 December 1944; and Memorandum Number 13, "Digest for Military Government and Occupation of Germany," 28 December 1944, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

See Planning for the Occupation, 112. The memoranda supplemented information in the Handbook for Military Government in Germany and the Military Occupation Handbook. The ECLIPSE Plan, ECLIPSE Memoranda, and these two handbooks were cited in the Sixth and Twelfth Army Group implementation plans.

Presumably the British Twenty-First Army Group also produced a plan, but the author found no evidence for this in any available source.

84Ibid.
85Ibid., para 2e(1).
86Ibid., paragraphs 9-12.
87Ibid., 10.
88Ibid., 11 and para 2e(2).
89Annex 7, “Allied Prisoners of War, Control and Disbandment of the German Armed Forces, Control of Political Internees and War Criminals,” in Twelfth Army Group, OPLAN ECLIPSE, 2d Draft, 27 Feb 1945.
96Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, III-32. See also Joint Test Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, I-21.
97Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, III-31. FM 100-5 also traces postconflict operations as beginning with “the immediate end of the conflict to the accomplishment of the national strategic goals and objectives.” FM 100-5, Operations, 6-23.


This cable was later sent. It had been changed to read: “It is not impossible that ECLIPSE conditions might eventuate even as early as April 15th.” Eisenhower to Smith, March 28, 1945, *Eisenhower Papers, War Years*, vol. IV, 2553-2554.

Memorandum Number 4, “Airlift Plan,” 4 April 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. Appendix D, “Air Lift Priorities ‘ECLIPSE,’” stated the priorities for the operation as, in order, 1) supporting operational requirements (e.g., airborne operations, emergency resupply, and casualty evacuation); 2) supporting “requirements to complete the defeat of Germany and to further the war against Japan;” 3) support the “relief and maintenance of Allied Prisoners of War;” 4) assist in “control of the German War Machine” by flying in designated specialists to seize and control critical sites and ministries; 5) aid in establishing law and order in Germany; and 6) provide air evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War.

This proposal originated in the G-3 Division. So long as fighting continued unabated, it was deemed inappropriate to designate A-Day, which conveyed a false image that a surrender had occurred. Planners recognized that operational and tactical commanders had, by necessity, begun to
implement ECLIPSE in the areas of Germany already occupied. All that remained was to formalize this procedure. Planning for the Occupation, 109-110.

105 Cover Memorandum, signed “For the Commander” by C.R. Landon, Adjutant General, Twelfth Army Group, Operation Plan, Operation ECLIPSE, Third Draft, 12 April 1945.

106 Mission Accomplished: Third U.S. Army Occupation of Germany, 10. See also Ziemke, Occupation, 248.

107 For instance, theater military government detachments were deployed to their pinpoint locations upon declaration of ECLIPSE conditions. Troops could also be released from reserves to assist in the care and control of displaced persons. “The declaration of 12 April 1945 enabled commanders to direct a portion of their resources to the military government mission without risking their security in the forward areas. It also made possible the detail of officers and men of combat and service units to the assistance of military government detachments.” Civil Affairs, 34.

108 Ziemke, Occupation, 163.

109 Ibid., 102-103.

110 Ibid., 131. It was no accident that the Treasury Department was not included in this committee. Stimson especially was determined to exclude Morgenthau from doing any more damage to postwar plans for Germany.

111 The members of the Commission were: Ambassador John C. Winant, U.S.; Sir William Strang, U.K.; and Ambassador F.T. Gausev, U.S.S.R. In November 1944, the French ambassador to Britain, Rene Massigli, was added to the EAC.

112 Planning for the Occupation, 33.

113 According to the official history of postwar planning, “drafts submitted for consideration in the European Advisory Commission were available to the planners in Supreme Headquarters almost as soon as to members of the Commission. Thus, the military policy-makers knew fairly early what the trends of policy were and could guide themselves accordingly.” Planning for the Occupation, 35. See also Clay, Decision, 13-
14; Frederiksen, *American Military Occupation*, 1; and *First Year of Occupation*, Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945 (Frankfurt: 1947; reprinted as Special Text 41-10-63, Provost Marshal General's School, 1953), 51. Ambassador Winant was disturbed by what he perceived as the impotence of the group. According to Ziemke, "He saw the EAC as the place where many questions pertaining to Germany ought to be decided. The War Department saw it as the place where only certain specified questions would be decided and in the fall of 1944 was inclined to believe that the surrender document (with the addition of the proclamation and general orders, then not completed), the zones protocol, and the control machinery agreement just about constituted an ample output for the EAC." *Occupation*, 131. If the State Department was going to get involved in postwar planning, this would have been an appropriate body. That it did not do so is indicative of the relative weakness of that agency during the war.


115 *Planning for the Occupation*, 70.


117 *Civil Affairs*, 6.

118 Zink, *American Military Government in Germany*, 20. Zink apparently was a member of the German Country Unit at one time (his book, *American Military Government in Germany*, is dedicated to "Brother Officers on the Board of Editors, German Country Unit, SHAEF").


120 Zink, *The United States in Germany*, 24.

121 *First Year of the Occupation*, 52.

122 The USGCC tended to take a moderate view of JCS 1067, choosing to downplay its more Carthaginian elements. G-5, SHAEF (later U.S. Forces
European Theater) generally adhered to the letter of JCS 1067 and prepared for a more retributive peace. The G-5 also continued to take a more narrowly "military" point of view that focused on providing civil-military support to commanders rather than on the future fate of Germany. Participants in the March agreement termed it the "Treaty of Bushy Park" after the site of the conference. Zink concludes: "A great deal of energy was lost in connection with this struggle which was largely personal in character, and for several months it was uncertain which agency could be considered the highest American military government headquarters."


123First Year of the Occupation, 53. When he assumed the position of Deputy Military Governor, General Clay took command of the USGCC. It burgeoned from a small planning staff to an organization with several thousand people to supervise military government operations in the American Zone of Occupation. See Zink, The United States in Germany, 26-29; Zink, American Military Government in Germany, 46. Dale Clark, who was a participant in military government, wrote: "The U.S. Group Control Council had been rendered impotent during the later planning stages, and policies had been adopted that would cripple it during the operational stage. The basis had been set for a paralyzing jurisdictional conflict between American authority in Berlin [site of the Allied Control Council and USGCC] and Frankfurt [headquarters of USFET]. The military government organizational plan incorporated features that tended toward the division of Germany which aggravated economic chaos, political unrest, and international complications.”

124"Memorandum on Planning for the Occupation of Germany," SHAEF G-3 Division (Main), 15 October 1944; quoted in Planning for the Occupation, 82. Other organizations also tried to involve themselves in postconflict planning. In addition to the work at SHAEF, the Communications Zone staff independently prepared its own occupation plan in September 1944, under which it would assume administrative responsibility for the U.S. Zone after the surrender. General Bedell Smith sharply remained the Commander of the COMM-Z that his plan did not correspond with the TALISMAN Plan or the principles then being incorporated in ECLIPSE. Under ECLIPSE, the responsibility of the COMMZ ended at the German border. Planning for the Occupation, 68.

125Ibid., 82; Frederikson, American Military Occupation, 5.
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, 5. At the first meeting of this committee on 9 March 1945, "It was observed that everything then indicated that a clean-cut surrender was unlikely and that the Soviet forces would reach Berlin ahead of the forces from the west. It was also known at this time that France would be assigned an area for occupation. In spite of these changed conditions, it was decided that there was no need to issue a new ECLIPSE Plan. It was, however, thought desirable to consider the formulation of a new definition of ECLIPSE." Planning for the Occupation, 103.

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, V-6.

ECLIPSE Memorandum Number 14, "Control of Displaced Persons," estimated that there would be 3,685,000 displaced persons in the British and American zones, another 3,405,000 in the Russian zone, and 995,000 more in Austria. In reality, the Allied Expeditionary Force encountered over six million DPs in western zones of occupation. Estimates of German prisoners of war were similarly low. By 15 April, the U.S. had captured 1,300,000 German PWs; they were continuing to surrender at a rate of 30,000 per day. Estimates prior to this point had anticipated a total of 900,000 by 30 June. Ziemke, Occupation, 241.

Holborn, American Military Government, 47-50; McCreedy, "Winning the Peace," 7-21.


After V-E Day, "military government was still entirely in tactical channels, from division to corps to army to army group." This meant that "down at least to the regiment and battalion level, tactical commanders had more military government authority than any military government detachment." Ziemke, Occupation, 269, 273. See also Zink, American Military Government in Germany, 20-21. He argued that the training of military government personnel so thoroughly emphasized support to combat operations "that many military government officers considered their work completed within a few weeks or at least a few months after arriving in Germany." While Zink credited planners with realizing the scope of the problem, he concluded that "the rank and file of detachment personnel in the field probably never fully realized the importance of activating political
parties, labor unions, and various cultural groups, reconstructing the German governmental system, reeducating the Germans, and other long-range problems because their training had not dealt more than passingly with such matters."

132James Reed provides a model War Termination Annex for a campaign plan in "Should Deterrence Fail," 47-48.

133Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, III-31, states: "A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member. A variety of operations other than war occur during this period." FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms, 1-181, defines postconflict activity as "Those operations other than war which are conducted in the period following conflict termination." No current mission defined for operations other than war adequately describes the full range of activities involved in postconflict operations. See McCreedy, "Winning the Peace," 45-46.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

War Termination


**Operation Eclipse**

**PRIMARY SOURCES**

Communication Zone, European Theater. "Operational History, Advanced Section, Section IV." Headquarters, Comm Z, European Theater, 11 April 1945.


------------. "G-4 Planning Directives, Series I, #4." Headquarters, ETOUSA, 1 December 1944.


Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). "Civil Affairs Personnel for Germany." SHAEF, 2 August 1944.

-----------. "Operation Eclipse: Appreciation and Outline Plan." SHAEF, 10 November 1944.

-----------. "Post hostilities planning." SHAEF, 5 August 1944.


-----------. Final Report, G-3 Section. Headquarters, Sixth Army Group, May 1945.

-----------. "G-5 Operation Memo #1: Operational and Organizational Plan of Military Government in the Sixth Army Group Area of Germany." Headquarters, Sixth Army Group, 11 October 1944.

-----------. "Outline Plan, Operation Eclipse." Headquarters, Sixth Army Group, 5 February 1945.


-----------. "Operation Plan, Eclipse, 2d and 3d Drafts." Headquarters, 12th Army Group, 27 February 1945.

SECONDARY SOURCES


Doctrine

69


