ORGANIZING ANARCHY:
Planning for Refugee Support Operations

A Monograph
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**Organizing Anarchy: Planning for Refugee Support Operations**

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by MAJ Charles S. Kellar, USA, 59 pages.

Refugee support operations have significantly impacted the international community in recent years. Internationally sponsored humanitarian aid is almost always required to ease refugee suffering and misery. Historical evidence indicates that the use of military forces to assist governmental and non-governmental agencies in administering refugee support missions is increasingly becoming the norm. Additionally, the National Security Strategy of the United States outlines refugee support as a "priority mission". As a consequence, military leaders must be prepared to plan and execute refugee support operations.

This monograph proposes that the analysis of previously conducted refugee support operations will reveal a set of planning considerations relevant to future refugee support missions. These considerations can be organized within the operational function framework as defined in Joint Publication 5-00.1, Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning. The planning design elements include command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, support and protection. Operation Provide Comfort and Operation New Life form the historical database for the analysis.

This study concludes that the proposed planning considerations are valid for use in future refugee support operations. Development of a "new" planning framework for each RSO is unnecessary. Furthermore, the monograph recommends including the proposed design elements in doctrine. Additionally, the monograph identifies the primacy of unity of effort and cultural analysis during refugee support planning. Institutional school training and unit training are recommended methods to achieve the required level of training in these non-standard areas.
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ABSTRACT

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Introduction

Poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair abound, joining to produce 17 million refugees, 20 million displaced persons and massive migrations of peoples within and beyond national borders. These are both sources and consequences of conflict that require the ceaseless attention and the highest priority of the United Nations.1

Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s observations, published in his 1992 report to the United Nations titled An Agenda for Peace, are an accurate description of the first half of the 1990s. In the years following his remarks, the international community conducted over 15 refugee support operations (RSOs) in such diverse regions of the world as Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Cuba, Panama, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan.2 The seemingly enduring nature of this type of operation indicates that the causes of population movement (war, persecution, famine, impoverishment) continue to plague the peoples of the world.

The impact of refugee support on the international community is significant. In nearly all cases, some type of international humanitarian aid is required to eliminate or reduce the associated suffering and misery. Military capabilities and responsiveness often provide the most effective means to deal with the scope and urgency related to a crisis. Furthermore, the majority of refugee crises occur in the less developed countries of the world, many of which are considered important to international interests and receive substantial US economic aid.3 As a consequence, US military forces may be directed to conduct refugee support operations to abate the anarchy related to these unpredictable population movements.

Support of refugee operations is not a new mission for the US military. During the nineteenth century, United States Army forces relocated American Indians under the auspices of the Indian Removal Act of 1830.4 These actions marked the first use of military forces in a
refugee support role. Subsequent operations included providing support to refugees of the Philippine Insurrection, World War II refugees, political refugees from Hungary in 1956, Dominican Republic citizens during Operation Power Pack in 1965 and Czech refugees in 1968. More recent operations include assisting Vietnamese refugees from the War in Southeast Asia, Cuban and Haitian boatlift refugees and Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) provides further impetus for the commitment of US military forces to the execution of future RSOs. The NSS describes refugee flows as "transnational phenomena" that have security implications for American policy. The repatriation of refugees is a "priority mission" that requires joint cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Refugee Council (IRC). The use of military forces as an instrument of national power to support the accomplishment of these goals is a clear and logical extension of this policy. History and current political policy provide a clear message for US military leadership: be prepared to plan and execute refugee support operations.

Recent operations involving refugees from Iraq, Cuba, Haiti and Rwanda underscore the difficulties facing commanders during future support missions. Documentation of the lessons learned during previous RSOs is nearly non-existent while the application of these lessons is equally poor. The cultural, demographic, geographic and political differences inherent in each mission seem to create the impression among military leadership that each RSO is a one-time mission that has little application for future operations. As a result, lessons learned during previous missions are rarely applied beforehand, forcing units to re-learn them during subsequent RSOs.
This monograph proposes that analysis of previous RSOs will reveal a set of planning considerations relevant to future refugee support missions. The operational functions, as defined in Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning*, form a suitable framework for these considerations. However, the non-combatant nature of an RSO requires a modification to the basic design of each function.

The first section of the monograph develops the fundamental environmental conditions encompassing a refugee support mission. It describes the objective and intent of a refugee support operation while developing a contextual understanding of the political, military, interagency, and refugee populace characteristics that bound an RSO. The second section proposes a planning framework for use during refugee support operations. The proposal outlines the design elements planners must consider during the development of a refugee support mission operational plan. Section three uses the framework to examine past RSO’s. Each operation is analyzed by first describing its background, then applying the methodology to the case study. These findings will determine the proposal’s merit for adoption as a planning tool to use during future missions. The paper will conclude with an assessment of the doctrine and training implications for future RSOs.

**Environment**

Refugee support operations are conducted in challenging, oftentimes confusing, environments. Many factors mold the strategic and operational refugee support environment. Of particular importance is the level of control possible during an RSO. The structure of the RSO conditions inherited by the military may limit the efficacy of some planning design elements. For
conditions inherited by the military may limit the efficacy of some planning design elements. For example, the RSO in Rwanda reflects these types of uncontrollable variables. However, the formulation of effective RSO plans requires the comprehension and appreciation of the multi-dimensional nature of this type of environment. The various environmental factors that interact to influence refugee support missions are political, diplomatic, organizational, military and cultural in nature. Analysis of the RSO environment begins by developing an understanding of who refugees are and what the fundamental intent for an RSO is.

**Who is a Refugee?**

The highly politicized nature of refugee support requires the use of concise, distinct definitions. The Department of Defense (DOD) and United Nations documents form the base definitions used by military planners. Joint Pub 1-02, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines refugees as "civilians who, by reason of real or imagined danger, have left home to seek safety across an international boundary." The United Nation’s definition of a refugee is

... any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

Either definition may be binding upon US military forces depending upon the participation status of the US (uni-lateral or multi-lateral UN sponsored). However, the key element in both definitions is the concept of fear and a perception of the threat of physical violence towards the individual. These elements serve as the catalyst for refugee flight.
Intent for Refugee Operations

The objective of an RSO is twofold: provide interim humanitarian aid, assistance and protection to the refugee population while developing and determining the final disposition of the refugees. Governmental intent towards the refugee population is developed based on the second part of this objective. While provision of humanitarian aid is a challenging element of this objective, development of a long-term, durable solution to the refugee’s plight is an essential component for governmental participation in an RSO. Governmental direction is provided through the formation of an Interagency Working Group (IWG). Formed at the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA), the IWG incorporates appropriate cabinet level representation with other applicable agency representatives. This group determines US intent concerning the refugee population. It also explores diplomatic alternatives available for resolving the political impasse while developing refugee population disposition options.

Historically the categories of disposition options available include voluntary or forcible repatriation, third-country resettlement and local integration. The availability of these options is heavily dependent upon the diplomatic and political atmosphere surrounding the root causes of the refugee’s flight. The international community’s ability to resolve the source of conflict that created the refugee flow will largely determine which disposition options are available. Other organizations (e.g., the UN, NGOs and PVOs) also contribute to the negotiation of disposition options.

Repatriation of the refugee population is the most desirable goal from the US perspective. The NSS underscores this basic intent, while US actions during previous RSOs reflect this desired end state. It is an optimal solution that minimizes the stress and emotional strain on refugees
while developing a temporary solution to the root causes of conflict. For example, during Operation Provide Comfort, the repatriation of Kurdish refugees followed the establishment of a secure zone in Northern Iraq. Other examples of refugee repatriations include Cuban, Haitian and Vietnamese refugees.

The second disposition option available for refugees is third-country resettlement. Procedurally, this method involves submitting an application for a change in citizenship and country residence. The varying citizenship requirements and the extensive demands for international coordination often make this option the most difficult and time consuming. Despite these hindrances, the United States, Canada and Australia have been the principal countries that accept resettled refugees. Examples include refugees from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 that were offered US citizenship and refugees from Vietnam in 1975 that were granted US, Canadian, and French citizenship.

Locally integrating the refugees into refugee settlements is the final option available. This method is clearly the least desirable as it provides minimal long-term relief for refugees while continuing to place demands for refugee support on the international community. States that originally offered refugees sanctuary must subsequently extend their offer of "temporary asylum" because the root cause of the refugee's flight has not been resolved. However, each situation's political conditions may dictate this option as the only near-term solution available. Refugee support operations conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Cambodia illustrate this option. The political instability within Rwanda combined with the sheer magnitude of the refugee population (over 1,000,000) caused the Rwandan refugees to remain in the internationally sponsored border camps in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. Similarly, Cambodian refugees remain in Thai border
camps due to the security risk the Khmer Rouge poses within Cambodia. In both cases, the inability of the international community to broker permanent political solutions have resulted in enduring RSOs.

Developing a clear understanding of the governmental intent for an RSO is a critical element for military planners. Equally important is development of an appreciation for the environment within which RSOs are conducted.

**Political**

The political nature of refugee operations is ambiguous and highly charged. The multitude of participants, many of which are not diplomatically recognized bodies (the refugees, factional groups, NGOs, PVOs), combine to form a diverse set of objectives and intents. An Interagency Working Group consisting of members from each participating agency develops guidance for RSO support agencies. The IWG merges the available information and determines the level and method of participation for US agencies and military forces. Each agency perceives the IWG’s final guidance in a slightly different way. Department of State (DOS) public statements can create further compound existing misperceptions among supporting agencies. Public announcements often prioritize the provision of immediate aid to curb refugee suffering over a clearly developed long-term intent for the refugees. The end result for military units is policy guidance that fluctuates sporadically throughout an RSO. Appreciation of the political ambiguity experienced during RSOs is critical for RSO participants.

Refugee support operations are normally conducted as a combined effort under the auspices of the United Nations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the lead agency within the UN. Although not directly controlled by the UN general assembly,
the UNHCR serves as the UN’s executor during the organization and application of aid and support to refugees. The UNHCR is “on the ground” earlier than any other agency and will customarily remain until the refugee crisis is completely resolved. Establishing an intimate working relationship with the UNHCR is crucial to the overall success of a RSO. A close linkage enables an easy transition to UNHCR control once the US end state is accomplished. It also ensures that UNHCR standards, a prerequisite for transition, are adhered to throughout the execution of the mission.

**Governmental Agencies**

High levels of governmental interagency participation characterize RSOs. Government agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), DOS and DOD all perform critical functions during the execution of RSOs. While the DOD can provide immediate transportation and logistical support, it cannot supply the broad resource-based monetary and contracting support available within some governmental and non-governmental agencies. The OFDA, a subordinate element of USAID, establishes linkage between NGOs and the military and governmental agencies. It interacts with “on the ground” NGOs to provide the required levels of aid and supplies. Consequently, there are no military-pure solutions. Extensive interagency coordination and cooperation is a requirement to execute an RSO.

Interagency coordination is a non-standard process that heightens the difficulties military planners face. The core problem facing interagency planners is the existence of confusing lines of authority and inadequate coordination procedures. Each agency has its own command structure and agenda. The lack of a standing interagency planning group serves to dilute the RSO task.
force's unity of effort. Military staffs have historically served as coordinators between agencies in an attempt to eliminate the cross-purposes within the organization. Further compounding these difficulties is the fact that non-governmental organizational support is normally interlinked with the UNHCR. Appendix One outlines a sample of the myriad of US governmental agencies, NGOs and PVOs involved in RSOs. It also provides a brief description of their mandate during an RSO.

**Military Forces**

Military forces provide the immediate organizational and logistical support structure required for an RSO despite the fact that the DOD is not the lead agency. Assets from the joint community are tasked to form a combined or joint task force (CTF, JTF) to execute the RSO mission. Military command and control and transportation assets are the most valuable during the conduct of RSOs

Selection of the military forces to participate in a RSO is a challenging task. Few military units are trained or experienced in RSOs tasks and responsibilities. Army Civil Affairs (CA) units are the only units that include refugee support activities as part of their doctrine. Included under the auspices of populace and resources control, CA doctrine focuses on the control of displaced persons within a combat zone. A direct correlation of some of these tasks is possible. However, with only one active duty CA battalion in the force structure, adequate numbers of RSO trained soldiers do not exist. Consequently, conventional units will be required to conduct future RSOs. Cultural orientations and training are required for them to function effectively.

Another option available to military leadership is the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in support of RSOs. Special operations units are ideally suited to function as an initial
assessment force for this type of mission due to the focused cultural and language training they undergo. This training enables SOF soldiers to establish a sense of creditability and dependability with the refugee population. Early insertion of SOF forces possessing these capabilities also contributes to establishing the RSO task force’s legitimacy.

Special operations forces also possess a significant experience base of interagency coordination skills. The normal SOF security assistance mission establishes working relationships with governmental agencies that can significantly enhance the RSO task forces’ efficiency. Early insertion of SOF elements into the RSO area of operations (AO) is a key consideration for the RSO commander.

Lastly, SOF units are extremely deployable assets. Structured into small units, they are capable of reacting more quickly than conventional units, providing the commander a potent, versatile force. Deployment of SOF units likewise requires fewer transport assets than conventional units. However, the finite number of SOF units is a constraint that planners must consider.

Refugee Populations

Refugee culture has tremendous implications for the RSO task force. The demographic aspects, social structure and cultural idiosyncrasies of the refugee population will significantly impact the prosecution of an RSO. Refugees are a non-homogeneous group reflecting differences in political beliefs, economic wealth, religious beliefs, social station, ethnicity and race. Identification and assessment of these characteristics is a critical step for the RSO task force. Properly assessing the refugee population allows focused cultural training for military forces as well as properly oriented logistical support.
Refugees are often used as a foreign policy tool to attain political or economic advantage. Sending states use refugees to assert political control, destabilize neighboring states, as bargaining chips or as a national resource for international aid. For example, during the Mariel Boatlift in 1980, Fidel Castro expelled criminals under the guise of being refugees ostensibly to politically embarrass the US. For many years, foreign currency remittances from refugees to family members in Vietnam comprised a large portion of that country’s hard currency earnings. Similarly, throughout the Cold War, West Germany exchanged hard currency for East German refugees.

The effect of these strategies is that refugees arrive in a position of need based on traumatic circumstances. Generally, refugees are confused, frightened and uninformed. Refugee actions/reactions are emotionally based and exhibit signs of high levels of anxiety. Their response to outside actions is often based on previously developed perceptions and not on logical analysis. A particularly significant consideration is that refugees are usually unsure of what to expect from American military forces. This uncertainty is often based upon a broader fear of military force in general which may have developed in their country of origin. Consequently, what appear as small incidents to the supporting task force can have major implications on the refugee population. Development of an appreciation for the refugee’s viewpoint is a substantial planning responsibility for RSO task forces.
Proposed Planning Considerations

Analysis of previously conducted refugee support missions suggests that common planning considerations for RSOs exist. The operational functions used in operational planning provide an effective structure to organize the significant planning elements required in a RSO. Joint Publication 5-00.1 identifies the operational functions as command and control (C2), intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, support and protection. For reference, Appendix Two contains the combat oriented definition of each function. However, the non-combatant nature of refugee support missions requires planners to adopt a different contextual viewpoint when approaching RSOs. A description of this contextual shift for each operational function follows.

Command and Control

Command and control operations during an RSO focus on maintaining unity of effort for the mission. This task differs significantly from the unity of command principle normally associated with military pure operations. Unity of command requires a single entity with distinct lines of authority enabling him to direct all RSO participants towards a unified purpose. The wide variety of groups and agencies supporting an RSO limits the appointment of such an authority during RSOs. Consequently, unity of effort requires gaining and maintaining consensus among these disparate groups. This task has proven to be a primary function for military units. The military possesses extensive insight regarding complex cooperation from it’s combined and joint operations experiences. It uses these skills to accommodate and minimize the perceptual differences generated among relief agencies during RSO plan formulation and execution. Strengths in coordination and compromise further enhance the military leadership’s ability to
perform this critical task. Unequaled capabilities in computer, communication, and transportation equipment also contribute to maintaining unity among RSO participants.

Securing refugee engagement (when possible or appropriate) further enhances the unity of effort of an operation. Refugee involvement through work programs or a camp government significantly contributes to the mission’s purpose. Identification of highly skilled or educated refugees provides the RSO task force additional assets to accomplish its mission. Linguists, carpenters, or engineers can provide significant contributions to camp operation. Establishing or supporting an existing refugee government builds a feedback loop for camp administrators while also providing refugees a self-policing mechanism.

Information management, a subordinate element of the command and control function, must be closely considered when developing RSO plans. Developing and managing accurate, correct information provides the RSO task force legitimacy in the eyes of the refugees as well as outside actors (e.g., government agencies, NGOs, the media, other countries, other belligerents). Accurate information also provides the command freedom of action when conducting support operations.

The two key players managing this function are the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and the PSYOP detachment. The PAO is the information manager for the external release of information to organizations. The critical importance of information management requires that the PAO be assigned from the operation’s lead agency. This assignment allows PAO guidance to flow unfiltered from the agency PAO to the RSO task force PAO. The far-reaching political ramifications of these types of missions require the development of an aggressive public affairs strategy. The strategy must anticipate and plan for the inevitable media coverage that
accompanies refugee support operations. Equally important, it must address how the media can support the RSO’s unity of effort.

Internally, the PSYOP detachment injects command generated information into the refugee population to reduce divisive pressures and preclude alienating the refugees. Information programs that are developed specifically to prepare refugees for an upcoming change (movement, withdrawal of forces) will further stabilize the population. Additionally, aggressive use of PSYOP programs will provide assessments of refugee feelings, attitudes and concerns. Establishing loudspeaker systems, radio stations and newspapers provide the command effective means to distribute up-to-date information while squelching rumors and misinformation.

Effective control of administrative information concerning the refugee population significantly aids in refugee control. In and out-processing procedures are a highly visible element of refugee camp operations and as such, must be well planned and coordinated. Refugee expectations during processing tend to out pace the RSO task force’s capabilities. Processing always proceeds more slowly than refugees expect. RSO operators and administrators must brief refugees up front, always telling them the truth about camp conditions and procedures.

Development of a refugee data base is critical for expediting camp operations. If possible, the RSO task force should develop it during refugee inprocessing. The Deployed Mass Population Identification and Tracking System (DMPITS) is a recent development that will significantly enhance capability in this critical area. DMPITS tracks refugees by associating a multitude of data (e.g., age, sex, marital status, birth date, tent and bunk assignment, special skills, etc.) with scanned fingerprints. Use of this system or a similar tool is a necessity for an RSO.
Intelligence

The intelligence function is key to the commander’s decision making ability concerning the refugee population. Analysis of the refugee population reveals the dimensional characteristics that cause refugee actions or inaction. Determination of the refugees point of origin, reasons for flight, basic needs and perception of the RSO task force provide an in-depth understanding of the refugee. Once these attributes are determined, the intelligence function must then collect information to keep the commander abreast of the refugee population and it’s core concerns. Use of informants within the refugee population is the principle collection source. However, government agency personnel, NGO personnel, camp administrators, cooks and civilian contractors all can provide information concerning the refugees.

Initial population analysis begins with an examination of the refugee’s cultural dimensions. Field Manual 100-23-2, Humanitarian Operations (Final Draft), notes that cultural diversity poses unique challenges for RSO task forces. Race, religion, ethnicity, social status, economic worth and political beliefs combine to form the complexion of the refugee population. The resultant mix is a non-homogeneous group who have varied needs and requirements.

The concept of center of gravity (COG) is effective in conducting further analysis of the refugee populace. Refugee populations tend to informally organize into three primary groups: stable members, fence sitters, and trouble makers. Identification of each subgroup’s COG provides camp leaders a tool to target and influence group members. Similarly, development of effective PSYOP campaigns depends upon this type of analysis.
Movement and Maneuver

Similar to conventional operations, the planning emphasis for the movement and maneuver function focuses on determining the correct arrangement of forces that will attain a decisive impact on the operation. However, during RSOs the emphasis shifts from combat maneuver and fires assets to support services and functions. Ensuring the unimpeded flow of supplies and support services to the refugees is a top priority during RSOs. Consequently, planning tasks include determining zones, regions and areas that must be secured to provide RSO task force elements' freedom of movement. Maintaining freedom of action provides the RSO task force the ability to influence the refugee’s quality of life, the second element of the movement and maneuver function.

Planning for and providing the correct services and facilities significantly improves the refugees' quality of life. Intelligence analysis contributes to this process by identifying refugee needs and requirements. Planners must then properly sequence and distribute task force capabilities (military, agency and NGO) to decisively impact the conditions affecting the refugees. Basic RSO services must include provisions for medical and dental care, living quarters, food, clothing and a stable environment. Additional services and functions that enhance refugee quality of life include a family reunification system, a mail system, a nursery, a camp locator system (for refugee use) and a money exchange. Sustaining the refugee’s quality of life by providing the correct services and functions will also contribute to a well-controlled refugee population.
Fires

Historical analysis indicates that the use of operational fires does not apply to refugee support operations. Case study data did not support derivation of planning considerations for this operational function.

Support

Logistical planning considerations for an RSO focus on the non-combatant nature of the mission. Military supply and health service systems are not versatile enough to support the diversity found in refugee groups. Refugee populations are composed of large numbers of females, young children and elderly citizens. Lack of culturally acceptable meals, civilian clothes, pediatric medical officers, religious ceremony items, baby formula, and general medical officers can create disillusionment in the refugee population.

Planners must anticipate these requirements and identify government agencies or international support organizations that can provide relief. Shortages of these key refugee items should be treated in the same manner shortages of critical resources (ammunition, fuel, repair parts) are during combat operations. Many US government agencies possess significant funding resources as well as nearly instantaneous contracting capability. The RSO task force must identify and harness these resources to be effective.

Despite the primary focus on refugee supply, planners must also incorporate the requirement to resupply the military forces deployed in support of the RSO. Planning must minimize the competing demands on logistical lift assets that will inevitably occur during the operation. Early identification of key supply items and priorities provides logistical operators the
necessary guidance to effectively sequence resupply operations.

Protection

A key element contributing to RSO success is the level of security established for military personnel and refugees. This concept is supported doctrinally as well. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, describes security as an equivalent to a principle of war while FM 100-23, Peace Operations, similarly highlights the importance of force protection during peace operations. Considerations include providing protection from external as well as internal threats to the RSO task force personnel, refugees and relief workers. Protection measures must also address sanctuary for the refugees from belligerent forces external to the refugee support camps. Development of Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement and Rules of Interaction contribute towards the required level of security. Aggressive information collection efforts also contribute to establishing the secure environment required.

Guaranteeing the safety and protection of each refugee within the refugee population itself is of equal importance. Refugee segregation based on gender and family status provides a modicum of protection to the weaker members of the population. However, the most desirable method to attain internal security is self regulation of trouble-makers by the refugee population itself. Refugee government and participation in camp administration are tools that contribute towards this goal. The COG analysis technique discussed earlier is another effective method to focus informational programs targeted to influence refugee actions.
Historical Analysis of
Refugee Support Operations

This section analyzes historical and current refugee support operations to substantiate the proposed planning considerations. Two RSO case studies were selected to provide different environments and conditions to analyze the design elements of the planning proposal. Each case study begins with a brief synopsis of the operation outlining the circumstances that created the refugee movement, the major support participants and the United States’ role in the operation. The proposal’s suitability is determined through an analysis of the operation using the proposed planning considerations.

Operation New Life

Background

The US Government initiated Operation New Life (ONL) in April of 1975 due to the fall of South Vietnam at the conclusion of the Vietnam War. Fearing North Vietnamese retribution, over 135,000 South Vietnamese refugees fled the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon seeking safe havens. Originally, US governmental intent was to accept no more than 20,000 refugees from South Vietnam. Processing of this number of refugees would be accomplished through normal immigration procedures at the American Embassy in Saigon.

However, in late April, as South Vietnam resistance began to collapse, the number of refugees increased dramatically. Direction and guidance for the operation became fragmentary and incomplete due to the chaotic situation on the ground in Saigon. The US ambassador’s liberal interpretation of the 20,000 cap as applying only to heads of households further
complicated the situation. In effect, this interpretation increased the total number of refugees by a factor of eight. Embassy personnel were unable to control the large numbers of refugees as the final collapse of South Vietnamese resistance neared. The civil-military operations control cell established under state department control was simply unable to keep up with the mass influx of refugees seeking asylum.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was designated as the federal agency in control of the refugee relocation. The US Government formed an Interagency Task Force (IATF) to develop policy and guidance for the RSO. Members of the IATF consisted of senior officers from the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Housing, HEW, Justice, Labor, Interior and Transportation and USAID, US Information Agency, OMB and CIA. The intent developed for refugee disposition was third country relocation; in most refugee cases, to the United States. Consequently, the majority of refugees were transported to safe havens within United States’ territory until US citizenship could be arranged.

Interim refugee centers were established in Guam, Philippines and Wake island during the initial phase of ONL. On Guam alone, twelve separate camps were constructed. The largest of these camps was the Orote Point Camp in Guam. The refugee processing center located at Orote Point processed nearly 80% of the refugee population. Army and Naval military forces combined to construct and administer the refugee camps while governmental agencies (e.g., INS, HEWS, USPS) screened and classified the refugee populace.

Following reception and processing at the interim sites, refugees were transported to resettlement camps in the United States. Refugee centers were established at four locations within the United States: Fort Chaffee, AR; Fort Indiantown Gap, PA; Eglin Air Force Base,
FL; and Camp Pendleton, CA. United States military forces from all services were tasked to establish and administer the refugee centers. The mission of each center was to support the refugees while appropriate sponsors were located to facilitate the refugee’s assimilation into American society. Volunteer agencies (VOLAGs) served as the primary source for locating sponsor families for the refugees. Integration of the VOLAGs into camp operations was an important element for mission accomplishment.

Refugee support operations were consolidated by the Fall of 1975. Three refugee centers were closed while the remaining refugees were centralized into Fort Chaffee’s operation. The final group of refugees received disposition instructions in late Fall of 1975 and the refugee center at Fort Chaffee was closed in December.

Command and Control

The lack of unity of effort among RSO supporting agencies adversely affected the initial refugee support operations at the Orote Point camp. Guidance received from the IATF for the organization and function of the civilian agencies was vague and unclear. The camp commander was forced to negotiate with each support agency to determine the type and level of support its representatives were willing to provide. Definitive guidance from the IATF clarifying each agency’s responsibilities was not published until nineteen days after the camp began operations. The military’s lack of familiarity with the GOs and IOs supporting the RSO further complicated civil-military coordination. The arrival of company team from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion improved the civil-military coordination within the camp. Unit expertise in refugee support served as a unifying guide for the Orote Point task force operations. However, the magnitude of the refugee population often overwhelmed its capabilities.
The Eglin refugee camp experienced similar problems. Unclear lines of responsibility between civilian and military leaders resulted in confused civil-military coordination. Few participants in the RSO possessed any refugee support experience. This was especially true among the VOLAGs whose personnel generally resided in the local Florida area. Despite the use of a volunteer coordination center to coordinate the efforts of the camp operations, the lack of clear lines of responsibility created an additional problem for military leadership. The VOLAGs supporting the camp developed competitive attitudes refusing at times to coordinate their actions. This disjointed approach created the impression among refugees that the camp administration had a low sense of urgency for their plight, resulting in the creation of a restless populace.

Refugee participation in camp functions enhanced RSO operations throughout ONL. Refugee governments were quickly formed in each camp to assist the military forces in controlling camp activities. Informal leaders emerged from the refugee populace in the Orote Point camp. Volunteers included lawyers, doctors, former senators, military officers and public officials. A mayor, governing council and camp area leaders were elected from the volunteers. Within the camp, the refugee government’s primary functions were to provide feedback to the civil-military chain of command, recruit volunteer labor and provide assistance to the civilian VOLAGs. After action reports noted that the availability of specially skilled refugees form a tremendous labor source for camp administrators. Refugee members made significant contributions towards the camps' security, sanitation and morale problems. Military forces were simply not staffed to address the magnitude of these problems.
The lack of standardized processing procedures contributed to inefficient refugee processing throughout ONL. Each refugee center developed its own inprocessing procedures independently. The lack of centralized control resulted in camps receiving refugees without the accompanying demographic data that had been collected at the previous camp. Missing data contributed to extended processing times, difficult inter-camp transfer procedures and desynchronized camp administration efforts to internally segregate refugees.

**Intelligence**

The appreciation of Vietnamese culture acquired by the US military impacted refugee support operations significantly throughout the execution of ONL. The military had developed a high level of cultural awareness during two decades of “in country” experience. Clear understandings of cultural, social and religious norms assisted military leaders supervising the Vietnamese. The small number of cultural incidents recorded during ONL indicates that a high level of cultural awareness facilitates RSOs.

**Movement and Maneuver**

The organization and construction of the ONL camps had a direct bearing on the quality of refugee life. Trial and error determined that the optimal size for a refugee camp was 4,000-5,000; larger camps were organized into modules of this size. Refugee camps of this size optimized administrative and management procedures for the camp administrators. It was also discovered that further subdivision into 600-700 person sections provided optimal oversight and C2 of the refugees. The services and systems supporting the refugees were then organized around these modules.
The initial missions assigned to infantry battalions supporting the Point Orote camp reflect this linkage to refugee quality of life. The myriad of functions the infantry provided included:

- refugee messing
- refugee billeting
- camp security
- refugee school system
- camp utility repair
- refugee supply
- civilian agency coordination
- baby care system
- medical support
- camp locator service
- recreational activities
- sanitation systems

Establishing effective services required cross training of infantry soldiers in supply, civil-military coordination, facility engineering and baby center skills.

Camp operations throughout ONL identified the critical services necessary to ensure a high quality of life for the refugees. Development of a camp locator system was identified as an essential element for camp operations. It was further noted that the system must be operational when refugees begin to arrive. Numerous examples of processing difficulties cited an inability to track the location of refugees within the overall population. Although the rapid influx of refugees exacerbated this problem, accurate population control is directly linked to facility construction and camp supply operations.

Establishing a family reunification center during ONL was essential due to the chaotic departure of the refugees from South Vietnam. Locating missing family members was a top priority for everyone involved in the operation, requiring dedication of scarce RSO assets. The Red Cross provided specialized assistance in the operation of this function.

Other life support services established during ONL operations included: mail service, refugee locators (for refugee use), nurseries, money exchanges, sewing centers, baby care centers. Recreational, educational and entertainment services were often of equal importance to the refugee. Nightly movies were shown by PSYOP projection teams to groups of over 2000
refugees. Other activities occupying refugee idle time included religious services, beach areas and PA systems broadcasting music. Inclusion of these activities kept refugees occupied and contributed to camp stability.

Support

After action reports identified a shortage of specialty medical personnel during operations at the Orote Point camp. The high demand for pediatricians and general medical officers required surgeons and cardiologists to perform in these capacities. Preventive medicine was also noted as a significant problem within the camp. The poor construction of latrines and mess hall sumps by a civilian contractor directly contributed to this problem.

The availability of advanced medical facilities reduced the impact of these problems for refugees located at the Eglin camp. The base hospital, which habitually supports a large civilian population, provided the required specialized medical support. The base medical system smoothly integrated refugee medical demands into its existing procedures.

Anticipation of the refugee’s immediate logistical requirements led to the development of a ditty kit. Issued upon arrival, the kit provided each refugee basic personal hygiene supplies such as soap, toothpaste and shampoo. Use of the ditty kit contributed to the superior sanitation conditions (as compared to the Orote Point camp).

Protection

Planning for the protection of US military personnel was a minimal problem due to a number of contributing factors. The security threat confronting military forces was nearly non-existent. All camps were operated on military installations located within US territory. The
refugee’s were well behaved towards American’s throughout ONL. Self-policing by the refugee
governments was one aspect of this phenomena. However, another more influential factor was
the perception that refugee misbehavior towards an American would eliminate the refugee’s
chances for US citizenship.  

Nonetheless, internal security concerns developed within both camps. The lack of money
combined with the lengthy time spent inside a camp, served as catalysts for crime. Within the
Orote Point camp, joint military-refugee guards patrolled the refugee living areas. Refugees
performed this function due to a shortage of military manpower as well as the need for
interpreters. Combined patrols were highly effective and became recognized as symbols of
assistance within the camp community. A “law and order” committee was established to
facilitate the administration of the refugee discipline. Membership on the committed consisted of
representatives from the Staff Judge Advocate, the camp coordinators’ office, the Naval
Intelligence Service Chief, UNHCR, INS and Office of the Civil Coordinator. The camp
administration also established a segregated holding area for refugees who required temporary
detainment.  

Many of the same observations occurred within the Eglin camp. The refugee government
actively self-policed its populace to eliminate security risks. The highly visible security police
(walking and vehicular patrols) were credited with minimizing the number of security incidents.
Operation Provide Comfort

Background

Kurds and Shiites in northern and southern Iraq attempted to topple Saddam Hussein's regime following the UN forces' convincing Gulf War victory in 1991. Uncoordinated operations between the two factions allowed Saddam Hussein to defeat each group sequentially. After brutally crushing the Shiite rebellion in the south, Hussein turned his attention to the Kurdish problem in the mountains of northern Iraq. Kurdish leaders initially exploited Iraqi military weakness in the region, conducting limited military operations with the Peshmerga, the Kurdish military force. Using helicopters and armored vehicles, the Iraqi Army easily overwhelmed the Kurdish forces, forcing a general Kurdish civilian refugee flight towards Turkey.

United Nations' reports quickly confirmed that nearly half a million Kurds were attempting to escape Hussein's brutal repression. The Turkish government, fearing a Kurdish separatist movement, established roadblocks along the refugee migration routes refusing entry to the refugees. The fleeing refugees congregated into population groups ranging in size from 6,000 to 115,000. These concentrations were located in the mountainous area along the Turkish-Iraqi border.

The lack of shelter, facilities and fresh water quickly created hazardous living conditions for the refugees. Nearly two thousand Kurds, mostly children, died each day due to the suffering caused by exposure, dehydration, hunger and sickness. The highly publicized suffering resulted in passage of UN resolution 688 condemning the Iraqi oppression of the Kurds and requesting worldwide humanitarian aid for the Kurds.

Immediately following passage of the UN resolution, the NCA directed the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to initiate Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). United States
military operations began on 7 April with the air-dropping of relief supplies into the Kurdish refugee concentrations. The deployment of special operating forces quickly followed these initial air supply missions. The SOF units conducted initial assessments of the Kurdish mountain camps while establishing liaison with international organizations already “on the ground”. Early integration of SOF military efforts with NGOs such as Red Crescent, Medicines Sans Frontiers and the International Red Cross proved extremely valuable during later phases of the operation.73

The rapid expansion of the OPC relief effort into a multi-national coalition effort resulted in the formation of a US led combined task force (CTF). The CTF’s mission, which was influenced by the US, focused on the conduct of relief operations.74 Governmental agency and NGO contributions were integrated into CTF operations throughout the mission. Militarily, CTF subordinate elements were organized into a combined air task force (CAF), two joint task forces (JTF-A and B), a civil affairs brigade and the combined support command. Two US Navy task forces also supported the CTF.75

Short term CTF goals focused on eliminating the inhumane conditions confronting the Kurds in the mountain camps. The missions and tasks assigned to JTF-A, which consisted primarily of special operations forces, reflected this goal. Construction of distribution systems for medical supplies, food and water provided immediate relief for the refugees. The implementation of preventive medicine measures promoted the clean up of the camp’s miserable sanitary conditions.

Political and military leaders quickly realized that movement and resettlement of the Kurds back in Northern Iraq was the only feasible long-term solution to the crisis. Resettlement in northern Iraq created a requirement to establish a security zone as a precursor to Kurdish movement. This task, coupled with the transition of OPC refugee support operations to civilian
organizations, comprised the preponderance of JTF-B’s operations. Once the zone was established, JTF-A constructed waystation facilities to prompt and support refugee movement back into Iraq. Refugee resettlement occurred rapidly once these tasks were accomplished.

Command and Control

Military leadership found it difficult to maintain unity of effort during the conduct of OPC. Combined task force leaders recognized the importance of integrating the civilian organization’s immense knowledge-base of disaster relief operations. However, each civilian agency supporting the operation had its own command structure and agenda. In some cases, an organization’s charter limited its freedom to interact with military forces. Civilian agencies for the most part were suspicious of the military’s role and approach to the RSO. The combined result of these factors was a dilution of the CTF’s focus.

The UNHCR attempted to eliminate this deficiency by forming a joint committee to provide the necessary focus and unity. The utility of this solution was hampered by the typical problems confronting committee actions: delays in funding from home offices, delays in acquisition of assets and delays in approval of courses of action. Additionally, the UNHCR permitted the promulgation of sub-committees which “studied” problems at length without bringing them to quick resolution. This delay in implementing decisions further contributed to the miss-application of resources throughout the RSO zone.

As the RSO matured, the military leadership determined that it could strengthen unity of effort within the CTF by functioning as a coordination agent between civilian organizations. Acting in this capacity, the military streamlined CTF operations by synchronizing the myriad of capabilities furnished by task force participants. Agencies or NGOs performing a redundant
capability in one zone were redirected to another area requiring the service. Aid agencies that did not possess organic transportation assets were matched up with CTF transportation capability.

Civil Affairs and SOF units were particularly successful in establishing rapport with the NGOs and civilian organizations. Their actions established creditability with civilian organizations while significantly enhancing the CTF’s efficiency and unity of effort. The level of effectiveness attributed to these types of units caused the head of the DART team to comment that he would insist on their presence in any future operations of this nature.\(^{81}\)

Active engagement of the Kurdish population in RSO activities further contributed to unifying the CTF effort. Kurdish civilians hired as interpreters functioned effectively despite the compensation problems they experienced. After the initial crisis abated, coalition forces discovered that the refugee population contained specially qualified indigenous personnel. Doctors, security personnel, trash collectors, food and water distributors and even a hydrologist were identified and integrated into the refugee support operations.\(^{82}\)

### Intelligence

The CTF used cultural analysis during the initial stages of OPC to develop an understanding of the Kurdish culture. The use of humint resources (SOF) within the Kurdish population provided military forces a comprehensive understanding of the Kurd’s cultural dimensions. The results of these analyses contributed to the adjustment of the type of rations supplied to the refugees. It also contributed towards construction of camps designed with the characteristics of a normal Kurd village.\(^{83}\)
The second element of intelligence planning, COG analysis, was applied during the later stages of OPC. Following the stabilization of the humanitarian crisis in the mountains, the coalition focused its efforts towards resettling Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq. These efforts met with resistance from the Kurds themselves. Further analysis of the refugee population revealed that the Kurds perceived that an unsecure environment existed in the vicinity of their permanent homes. The Kurds desired a level of security commensurate with the camps they currently occupied. The CTF leadership determined that this single factor most influenced the population’s willingness to return home. The initiation of any Kurdish movement towards Northern Iraq required the removal of all Iraqi Army and Secret Police personnel from the security zone. Creation of these conditions in Northern Iraq induced refugee movement back to their homes.

Movement and Maneuver

Coalition forces were supplied along lines of communications which originated in Turkey. While the initial movement of supplies encountered few obstacles, later convoys experienced border detentions originating from Turkish custom laws. Restrictions imposed by the host nation limited the CTFs freedom of movement and resulted in delayed deliveries of supplies and equipment. The lack of early and constant coordination contributed to the development of this problem.

Improving the Kurd’s quality of life occurred throughout OPC. Organization of Kurdish refugee populations into culturally familiar communities enhanced the coalition’s ability to provide services. Camps organized into Zozans (neighborhoods) and Bajeers (2500 person community) with community administration in the center provided an excellent structure to arrange camp
services around. Kurdish leaders executed a decentralized food distribution system under the supervision of SOF soldiers. Refugee medical care was administered in a similar manner. Special services such as a family reunification center served larger areas, but were made accessible to all refugees throughout the zone.

Support

Logistical support for OPC began without an accurate assessment of the refugee population’s cultural needs. Delivery of large quantities of prepackaged military rations, while an efficient solution to the immediate problem of starvation, was not an acceptable solution to the refugees. Special forces teams conducted assessments within the camps and attempted to influence the ration supply system, but were initially unsuccessful. Adjustments in food deliveries to include bulk quantities of corn and potatoes were similarly rejected by the Kurds as “horse and beggar food.” Eventually, bulk foodstuffs such as flour, sugar, rice, cooking oil and chick peas were locally procured and provided to the Kurds. This approach not only satisfied the refugee’s cultural desires, but it also released a substantial amount of scarce CTF transportation assets.

Medical support for the Kurds experienced a comparable problem. Military and civilian medical agencies agreed during early planning sessions to limit medical aid to a level commensurate to that which the Kurds could sustain upon CTF departure. Upon arrival, medical personnel from all organizations lost sight of this agreement and provided more advanced medical treatment. These actions violated the existing mandate for the CTF resulting in increased refugee tensions upon departure. Failure to stay within the established mandate also poses the risk of jeopardizing the coalition’s creditability upon withdrawal. Additional medical support during OPC focused on development of an effective refugee camp preventive medicine program.
The infection-reinfection cycle of the sanitation related sicknesses ravaging the refugee population was broken by eliminating the poor sanitary conditions and reestablishing sources of potable water. Medical kits provided by the World Health Organization were a critical asset in combating the diseases caused by poor preventive medicine. The OPC Lessons Learned Report evaluated these kits as “the only realistic way to provide medication in a refugee situation”. Designed for the civilian populace, each kit contains medication capable of sustaining 30,000 personnel one month or 10,000 personnel for three months. The medical kits also contain non-standard equipment (such as pediatric sets) which are not included in equivalent military medical kits. The World Health Organization kits also contain oral rehydration salts which were used during OPC in lieu of intravenous solutions to eliminate the dehydration associated with primitive sanitary conditions.

Protection

Protection planning initially focused on establishing security for the SOF units deployed into the RSO zone. Special operations personnel then centered protection efforts on integrating available Kurdish security forces into their security plans. Indigenous Kurds provided active security throughout the camp region while also supplying SOF leadership with an excellent source of intelligence.

Internal conflict between refugees failed to develop for a variety of reasons. The Kurd’s traditionally respect groups demonstrating strength. Their appraisal of the combined task force’s power resulted in the emergence of a high level of respect for CTF forces. Consequently, Kurds felt very secure while afforded coalition protection. Inter-Kurd threats were considered so insignificant by CTF participants that none were documented. Additionally, the active
participation of the Kurd’s refugee government helped limit the occurrence of internal disputes through self-policing actions.

Proposal Evaluation

The examination of historical refugee support operations indicates support for the proposed planning considerations. Analysis in this section evaluates the utility of the proposed planning considerations by comparing case study findings.

The similarities between OPC and ONL documentation highlight the importance of the RSO command and control planning considerations. Evidence from both studies indicates the significance of achieving effective unity of effort, refugee population engagement and information management. Each case demonstrated the implications of ineffective interagency planning and coordination. Vague guidance combined with multiple lines of authority to weaken task force endeavors in both examples. The development of consensus among task force agencies and groups was a key accomplishment during each operation. Military leadership contributed significantly by functioning as liaison cells to gain and maintain the necessary level of unity of effort between RSO participants. Operations New Life and Provide Comfort clearly demonstrated the potential for military forces to perform as coordination agencies during RSOs. Planners should anticipate this requirement during future RSOs and construct their plan appropriately.

Population engagement further enhanced the development of unified effort. Each RSO task force utilized a refugee government to disseminate information, enhance security and
distribute supplies. Specially skilled refugees were also used to augment or supplement RSO capabilities. This was particularly evident during OPC where Kurdish interpreters and security forces made distinguished contributions to CTF operations.

The extensive use of information management, the final command and control planning consideration, was cited in both case studies. Initial camp operations were degraded due to the failure to develop standard administrative information management procedures. Development of a similar system during OPC was not necessary due to the organization of the indigenous population. Kurdish governments provided the bulk of administrative control for CTF forces. However, construction of a military supervised administrative system would have proven extremely difficult due to the mature nature and scope of the refugee concentrations. Family reunification services and medical support services were requirements that demanded accurate administrative control of refugee administrative information. Both operations demonstrated the importance of using PSYOP detachments to control internal information release to the refugees. Neither operation experienced significant problems with the external release of information. However, current operations in Panama and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba emphasize the importance of developing an aggressive public affairs strategy.95

Operation Provide Comfort and Operation New Life demonstrated the importance of population analysis as a key intelligence planning concept during RSOs. Refugee cultures were examined during both operations. Operation New Life provided an example of the positive impact a culturally aware RSO task force will have on refugee support operations. Operation Provide Comfort exemplified the type of errors that a task force can commit if a comprehensive cultural analysis is not conducted before and during an RSO.
Both operations applied center of gravity analysis as a technique of population analysis. Psychological operations campaigns based on analysis results targeted specific groups within the refugee population. Focused messages assisted in shaping refugee reactions to task force actions. For example, the CTF analysis of refugee motivations during OPC identified the requirement to cleanse the security zone of Iraqi secret police. Identifying the factors motivating refugees will prove significant during any future RSO.

The differences between each operation highlighted the planning emphasis for the movement and maneuver function. Because Operation New Life was conducted largely within the continental United States, planning for the maintenance of lines of communication was less of a challenge than during OPC. Movement of refugees and supplies occurred on secure, sustainable lines of communication. In contrast, lines of communication for OPC were difficult and tenuous to establish. Constant planning was conducted to sustain the flow of supplies and equipment into Northern Iraq. Combined task force elements later established a security zone to facilitate the movement of refugees during the operation. Establishing secure lines of communication, zones and sectors to ensure the freedom of movement for RSO forces is an important planning consideration.

Planning for and organizing refugee support services was an important task during both operations. Specialized functions such as baby care, mail, camp locator and family reunification were cited as critical elements for the conduct of effective operations in both ONL and OPC. Provisions that enhanced the refugees' quality of life proved key in satisfying the requirements of the refugee populations. Current operations in Guantanamo further highlight the importance of considering the refugees' quality of life. Units deploying to Cuba consider the refugees' quality of
life as their center of gravity. Refugee complaints have centered on improvements in this area while US forces have developed a quality of life kit for use during RSOs.

The adjustment of logistical support due to the non-combatant nature of an RSO occurred in both OPC and ONL. Each operation confirmed the demand for specialized medical capabilities focused on females and children. Aggressive preventive medicine programs were cited as crucial during early refugee support activities. The World Health Organization medical kits identified during OPC provides an excellent solution to these types of problems. Operation New Life demonstrated the utility of planning for the issue of a ditty kit to arriving refugees. Its use eliminated many of the serious preventive medicine problems that confront RSOs.

Lastly, protection function planning considerations were exhibited during both operations. Primary planning focused on protection of military and civilian personnel supporting the RSO. Once this initial level of security was established, planning focused on the internal protection of refugees. Both operations manifested refugee governments that self-policed camp populations. Refugees also contributed to task force security operations during both operations.

In summary, the historical analysis advocates adopting the proposal as a guide to focus RSO planning efforts. Creation of an RSO-unique planning structure is not required. However, incorporation of lessons learned from previous RSOs is needed to provide planners a comprehensive start point for mission analysis. Inclusion of these considerations into a formalized doctrine will eliminate many of the pitfalls that have confronted previous planners. Development of doctrine will also provide a focus for unit refugee support training plans.
Doctrine and Training Implications

The following analysis addresses the sufficiency of existing doctrine to support the execution of refugee support missions. Potential implications for training are also identified with appropriate recommendations for identified shortfalls.

Doctrine

Current US military doctrine (both joint and service component) is inadequate for refugee support operations. Neither joint nor service component doctrinal sources provide planners with adequate planning guidance. Joint Publication 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs, provides broad statements of responsibility while focusing primarily on the strategic considerations. Naval and Air Force doctrine does not address refugee support operations while Marine doctrine contains only cursory references to this type of operation. Army Civil Affairs doctrine, principally Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, discusses refugee support as part of a larger population resource control mission. Field Manual 41-10 focuses on the problem of displaced persons (DP) during combat operations. Its guidance focuses on the mechanics of camp construction, DP movement on the battlefield and military coordination of DP operations.

Utilization of this doctrine during RSOs requires the adaptation of combat theater displaced person or enemy prisoner of war doctrine to fit refugee mission parameters. Extrapolating RSO planning principles in this manner is an inadequate doctrinal solution, particularly for non-CA trained units. This is especially true in a smaller Army where the demand for versatility is high. Publication of doctrinal procedures provides units a solid knowledge base to begin mission planning.
The lack of doctrinal guidance has resulted in units deploying survey assessment teams early in the planning cycle (2-3 months) to appraise the situation and develop operating and planning principles. While this method is proving effective in support operations such as Guantanamo Bay, it is clearly not sufficient for emergency operations like OPC or ONL.

Publication of a multi-service tactics, techniques and procedures manual such as FM 100-23-2, HA Multi-service Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations, is an important first step towards addressing the complicated interagency coordination procedures. Although still in draft form, it provides RSO planners a more complete and comprehensive doctrinal tool. Task force commanders during ONL could have used this manual to discern agency responsibilities not identified in higher level guidance.

Despite this improvement, key elements of doctrinal planning guidance is still missing. For example, operational planning doctrine must emphasize the criticality of interagency unity of effort and the importance of cultural assessments. Additional considerations include:

- Identification of the services and facilities required to support a refugee populace.
- Describing effective techniques and procedures for attaining population engagement.
- Development of logistical planning data based on population density for various classes of supply to include non-standard types of supply.
- A description of the appropriate contents of a ditty kit or quality of life kit for use during RSOs.

Availability of this type of information would have reduced the number of logistical resupply errors that occurred during OPC. Similarly, ONL planners would not have been surprised at the large demand for baby supplies.

Finally, further development of interagency coordination procedures is required. While
planning guidance or procedures for civil-military interaction at the operational level. Establishing operating principles in the form of interagency doctrine will reduce the inherent tension and ambiguity that exists between governmental agencies. More effective and streamlined operations will result from the integration of the UNHCR and other large NGOs into a standardized planning approach. Improvement of interagency coordination during both OPC and ONL would have significantly enhanced RSO task force capabilities.

Training

Development of negotiation and mediation skills within military forces is a common training requirement for all types of humanitarian assistance operations. During RSOs, these skills are at a premium. Clean, unambiguous solutions for situations confronted during RSOs are not the norm. Conflict and disagreement must be resolved through the use of interpersonal skills at all levels of responsibility. Training programs that enhance the development of these skills are needed within the Army institutional schooling systems. Units and staffs preparing to deploy in support of an RSO require similar training.

Developing personnel adept at dealing with the myriad of government and non-governmental agencies involved in RSOs requires training emphasis in two areas. A potential solution is establishing a training program for GOs and NGOs modeled after the Army’s Training With Industry program. Military personnel assigned to organizations such as the UN, USAID, UNHCR and DOS will develop high levels of expertise and confidence in the internal procedures of these organizations while simultaneously functioning as permanent liaison officers. Civilian members of these organizations could also serve familiarization tours with military units. Service
with an Army Corps or Marine Expeditionary Force will broaden their understanding of the military's role in RSOs.

Conducting combined training exercises with GOs and NGOs is a second method to expand the knowledge base within the military. Providing these organizations the opportunity to train and develop their procedures jointly with the military will likely aid in the development of interagency coordination procedures acceptable to all participants. Lastly, cultural awareness training is a requirement for all members of the RSO task force to include civilian GO and NGO members. Planners must integrate this type of training into the preparation phase for an operation while simultaneously using the results of a preliminary cultural analysis for overall plan development.

**Conclusion**

A number of significant conclusions can be drawn from the analysis conducted in this study. The first and perhaps most important conclusion is that recurring characteristics of refugee support operations support the development of common planning considerations. These design elements should be organized within the operational function framework (less operational fires) and used to plan future operations. Planning considerations identified within each function of the proposal are supported by the historical analysis of OPC and ONL. The occurrence of similar problems or solutions during both case studies emphasized inclusion of each consideration during the development of an RSO plan. Development of a "new" refugee support planning framework is not necessary and should be discouraged.
Secondly, analysis accentuates the primacy of the planning elements of unity of effort and cultural analysis. Case study examination indicated that poor plan design within either of these elements had a widespread effect within the RSO task force. Effective RSO plans require emphasis on these elements of plan design. Integration of each element into the C² and intelligence functions is further complicated by the lack of training and experience in these critical areas. Training programs that develop interagency coordination skills and cultural analysis skills are a necessity in units designated for RSOs.

The third conclusion derived from this study is that the military doctrine forming the knowledge base for RSO execution is inadequate. Despite the publication of a multi-service humanitarian assistance manual, the present understanding of the complexities associated with RSOs is insufficient. A manual oriented solely on refugee support is probably not necessary. However, integration of specific TTPs into existing doctrinal manuals is necessary to strengthen RSO planning abilities.

The existence of significant training challenges inherent to the planning and executing of an RSO forms the final conclusion of this paper. Creation of culturally aware, interagency capable planning staffs is a difficult and time consuming task. Institutional schooling must be used to expand the military’s familiarity with these challenges while combined training exercises contribute to streamlined planning and coordination methodologies. Development of effective interagency coordination tools and procedures will be a byproduct of these training efforts.
Appendix One - Refugee Support Agencies

GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

Department of Defense (DOD)- DOD provides defense equipment, personnel and transportation based on coordination with USAID. Within DOD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) is the primary point of contact.

Department of State (DOS)- The DOS, through the host country Ambassador, leads the governmental efforts of the RSO. The regional bureau of the affected country is a key participant as is the Refugee Programs functional bureau.

Cabinet Level Participants- Other cabinet level agencies may provide support to an RSO. Each agency possesses expertise or capabilities that the task force commander can harness. For example, the Department of Transportation may provide Coast Guard assets in support of the RSO task force.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)- USAID coordinates activities at the cabinet and country team level. OFDA, a subordinate office within USAID, normally is the execution agency for USAID actions on the ground.
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)- OFDA is a subordinate office within USAID. USAID/OFDA has the authority to provide assistance notwithstanding any other provision of the law. This allows OFDA to expedite interventions at the lower levels by using NGOs as the executors of relief operations. OFDA's mandate is to initiate the necessary procurement of supplies, services and transportation while coordinating the assistance effort with operational level NGOs.

Community Relations Services (CRS)- CRS is a civilian agency under the auspices of the Department of Justice. CRS's primary mission is to reduce tension and resolve crisis situations. CRS also specializes in handling matters pertaining to the establishment of refugee camp communities. CRS concentrates on family reunification, unaccompanied minors, education, recreation and resettlement programs.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)- INS is an agency of the Department of Justice and operates under the purview of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Within the provision of the INA and current US government policy, INS reviews cases for application for parole into the US. INS provides information and advice regarding the handling of refugees and the problems typically associated with refugee screening. INS also conducts screening of refugees to help identify known criminals and assist in the management of the population. It also provides information and expertise on a wide range of issues associated with aliens and alien processing.
UNited Nations Agencies

United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA)- UNDHA's mission is to coordinate international humanitarian assistance missions. UNDHA is responsible to maintain contact with disaster management agencies and emergency services and, when necessary, mobilize specialized resources.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)- The UNHCR is responsible for coordinating the response of the UN system to a refugee emergency. It can also provide material resources to refugees when requested by governments.

United Nations World Food Program (UN WFP)- WFP provides general food rations, feeding programs, and supplemental feeding activities to support rehabilitation programs. It is the operationally oriented UN organization.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)- UNICEF is a relief organization oriented on children and pregnant mothers with emphasis on child health, nutrition and water. Activities include social programs, child feeding, potable water, sanitation and direct health intervention.

World Health Organization (WHO)- WHO is focused on long range health care programs. It provides advice and assistance in all aspects of preventive and curative health care.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE)- CARE conducts relief and development programs in the areas of health, nutrition, population management, agriculture and emergency assistance. CAREs particular strengths are in food distribution, emergency transport and general logistics.

Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF)- MSF provides medical assistance to victims of disasters, accidents, and war. Its particular area of expertise is emergency medicine, vaccinations and basic hygiene services. Medical relief teams respond to areas of conflict, refugee camps, national disaster sites, and areas lacking adequate health care facilities.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)- ICRC works for the application of the provision of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and undertakes tasks incumbent upon it under this law. The ICRC is distinct from other Red Cross movements in that it has a protection mandate along with its relief work. It insures legal protection of victims, acting as a neutral, independent humanitarian player.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)- The mandate of this organization is to provide humanitarian relief during disasters. The organization consists of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies that normally operate within the borders of a country.
International Organization for Migration (IOM)- IOM is contracted to support refugee operations by the Department of State. IOM is responsible for finding host countries for displaced persons/refugees. IOM provides linguists and charters airplanes to move refugees.

International Rescue Committee (IRC)- The IRC assists refugees and internal displaced victims of war and civil strife. Services range from emergency relief and assistance programs to refugee resettlement in the US. IRC monitors human services, delivery and refugee processing for US resettlement. IRC can provide emergency medical support, public health and small scale water and sanitation capabilities.

Irish Concern (CONCERN)- Concern receives funding in the execution of its programs from the OFDA. Its primary strength is sanitation and supplementary and therapeutic feeding.

World Relief Organization (WRO)- WRO is a national, not for profit organization that provides health and developmental services for refugees. WRO’s scope of services includes public health, social work, donation distribution, vocational training and adult education programs.
Appendix Two- Definitions of Operational Functions

Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning* includes the operational functions as elements of operational design. These functions provide the joint force commander a framework to analyze missions. Each functional definition highlights key elements that planners should consider during plan development. The definitional summary of each function is derived from JP 5-00.1.

**Command and Control** - The exercise of authority and direction by the joint force commander over apportioned operational forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control is accomplished by arranging personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures to direct, coordinate and control forces in accomplishing the mission.99

**Intelligence** - The collection and analysis of information which will lead to the identification and location of the operational center(s) of gravity (or high payoff targets affecting the centers of gravity) that, if successfully attacked, will achieve the assigned strategic aims. It includes determining when, where, and in what strength the enemy will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations. It also includes providing intelligence support for friendly command, control and communications counter measures.100

**Fires** - The application of firepower to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation. Operational fires are, by their nature, primarily joint/combined activities or functions. They are a separate component of the operational scheme and are coequal with operational maneuver and movement. Planning for operational fires is part of the command
Movement and Maneuver- The disposition of joint and/or combined forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing the operational advantages of position before battle is joined or by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results. It includes the functions of moving or deploying forces for operational advantage within a theater or area of operations and conducting maneuver to operational depths. It also includes functions for enhancing the mobility of friendly forces, degrading the mobility of enemy forces, and controlling a land, sea, subsea, or aerospace area for operational advantage.\textsuperscript{102}

Support- The logistical and other support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations. Operational support includes sustaining the tempo and continuity of operations throughout a campaign or major operation. Functions related to sustainment planning included within the command and control function are setting priorities, establishing stockage levels, managing critical materials and obtaining support from civilian economy.\textsuperscript{103}

Protection- The conservation of the forces' fighting potential for application at the decisive place and time. It includes actions taken to counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver that make the friendly force, systems, and operational formations difficult to locate, strike and destroy. Operational protection includes protecting joint and combined air, space, land and sea forces, bases and lines of communication from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated enemy air, ground, and sea attack and natural occurrences.\textsuperscript{104}
Endnotes

1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, New York, NY, United Nations (January 1992), pg. 7.
3 Boutros Ghali., p. 47.
6 Ibid., p. 20.
7 Garven, p. 14.
10 FM 100-23-2, p. 2-8 thru 2-11.
12 Ibid., p. 430.
13 Ibid., p. 432.
15 Gallagher, p. 431.
17 FM 100-23, p. 2-8 thru 2-10.
18 Ibid., p. D-1 to D-2.
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 AAR comments from OPC, OSH and ONL all indicate that the military gravitated towards these type of functions after a period of time. Development of a more streamlined and efficient command and control mechanism was the primary reason cited for the military functioning in this role.
23 Ibid., p. 27.


Garven, p. 20.


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Garven, p. 58.

LTC Tim Heinemann, Advanced Operational Studies Fellow, Personal interview (25 February 1995).


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Ibid., p. 309.

ONA3, p. 23 and FORSCOM, p. 308.

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George Gonsalves, Jr., *Operation New Life: Camp Orote -- A Study in Refugee Control and Administration, Doctrine and Practice*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 11 May 1976), p. 99. See also FORSCOM, p. 311-312.

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Ibid., p. 4.


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Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., p. 55.
52 FORSCOM, p. 312. See also Gonsalves, p. 85.
53 Gonsalves, p. 59. See also FORSCOM, p. 311.
54 ONA3, p. L4.
55 Ibid.
56 Gonsalves, p. 94-96.
57 Ibid., p. 50.
58 Ibid., p. 17.
59 Ibid. p. 77.
60 ONA3, p. 22 and Gonsalves, p. 46.
61 Gonsalves, p. 77.
62 Ibid., p. 98.
63 Ibid., p. 43-44.
64 Ibid., p. 58.
65 Ibid., p. 61.
66 Ibid., p. 62.
67 Ibid., p. 62.
70 Ibid., p. 247.
71 Ibid., p. 239.
73 Rudd, p. 249.
74 Ibid., p. 244.
76 Ibid.
77 OPC, p. 2-4.
78 OPC, p. 118.
79 Ibid., p. 9-10.
80 OPC, p. 10.
81 OPC, p. 114.
82 OPC, p. 177.
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