


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**THE IMAGE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP:
TO BE OR NOT TO BE A HERO**

**A Monograph
by**

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Based upon the analysis of the case studies, the monograph concludes that a cultivated image is not necessary to effective leadership, but can be a key element. This conclusion is drawn provisionally. Definitive answers await further research.

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THE IMAGE OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP: TO BE OR NOT TO BE A HERO
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This monograph examines the advisability of purposefully cultivating a leadership image. Five historical case studies, Colonel Thomas E. Lawrence, General Douglas MacArthur, General George S. Patton, Jr., Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., and General Curtis E. LeMay, are evaluated with respect to criteria denoting effective use of leadership images. These criteria are based on the heroic image of military leadership. This heroic image is divided into five constituent criteria labelled kinship, prescription, sanction, action, and example. The case studies are also evaluated based on relevant behavioral science theory and social science research.

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INTRODUCTION

Military leaders throughout history have cultivated images. Indeed, these images have often evolved into myths - perpetuated by the individuals, their followers, and their enemies. In fact, it might be said that a leader lives inevitably within an image or myth - partially the result of rumors and exaggeration, partially the creation of others, and partially his own creation. The myth is inevitable because rumors and exaggeration have a life of their own. And, the perceptions of followers often outweigh actual facts.

The images of leadership can be as simple as an exaggerated perception of the leader's competence, or as complex as that created by General George S. Patton, Jr. with his swagger, sirens, and ivory-handled revolver.¹ The leader must recognize the image for what it is because it can have a profound and powerful impact on the attitudes and actions of followers. The leader also has to choose whether to participate in making and perpetuating the image.

Military history is replete with examples of the effective use of leadership images - and with examples of the destructive effects of those images. As mentioned above, Patton is perhaps the most obvious example of a leader who actively participated in the creation of his own image.² On the other hand, an example of a leader taking advantage of an image created by others can be seen in General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. It was almost inevitable that during the Gulf War the press would seize upon his

outspoken personality and imposing physical presence and create a larger-than-life image. Schwarzkopf immediately took advantage of this image in dealing with the press and his troops, and in building credibility with the American public.³

The question of image has meaning even to those leaders who will never be quite as well-known as the people cited above. Effective leadership requires understanding of the perceptions of followers - and those perceptions often take on a life of their own as myths and images which have varying relationships with reality. To ignore the power of image is to risk being less effective, at the least. To understand the image attached to oneself is to take advantage of an effective leadership tool. To actively cultivate an image is to grasp a sword with two points - one holds the potential for greatness and the other the potential for self-destruction.

The question of whether or not a leader should purposefully cultivate an image is the subject of this study. After establishing criteria regarding the effective use of image, five historical case studies will be evaluated based on those criteria - Colonel Thomas E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), General Douglas MacArthur, General George S. Patton, Jr., Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., and General Curtis E. LeMay. The comparison of theory with historical practice will provide a foundation for an appropriate conclusion regarding the advisability of cultivating a leadership image.

It is important to define the concept of "image" as it will be used in this study. The Random House College Dictionary defines "image" as "3. a mental representation; idea; conception. 4. form; appearance; semblance. 6. a symbol; emblem."⁴ Henry Nash Smith, in his study of the American West, defines a myth or symbol as "an intellectual construction that fuses concept and emotion into an image."⁵ Marshall Sanger in his study of the image of generalship in the United States quotes a definition of image as "a mental picture, true or false in various degrees, which is implicated in ideas, values, feelings, and prejudices."⁶ In ascribing an image to an individual in this study, the operative idea is that they are somehow assuming an appearance, playing a role, representing an idea, or serving as a symbol; and that their image has some emotional content for followers.

Although some people may attach a negative connotation to the mere idea of image, let alone the concept of manipulating one's image, most should agree that image is an inevitable component of one's persona. As Sanger has noted

We live in an age in which the image that is presented of a public figure assumes a life of its own; may, in fact, seem more important than the reality of the individual that it mirrors... public figures themselves have realized that to be successful they must present an attractive or interesting picture... it is an age in which images and symbols are consciously manipulated as instruments of power.⁷

Even though the concept of cultivating an image may have negative connotations, one must acknowledge image as a

useful, if not essential component of leadership. Garry Wills in his work Certain Trumpets: The Call of Leaders says "much of leadership is the projection of an image that will appeal to followers." However, to be more enamored of the image than of organizational goals or of followers is to cultivate failure. Also, the requirements of leadership vary with the situation and the goal, thus the style or image must also vary - within a consistent set of limits.⁸

Images can be created by others. When created by others, they can be formal (position-related) or informal (peer-group related). Images are also often symbolic of institutions. These types of images are particularly important to the relationship between leaders and subordinates.⁹

Sociologists have long recognized the impact of image and role playing on the leader-follower relationship. Their studies have indicated that all individuals develop a repertoire of roles from which they select, either consciously or subconsciously, to respond to given social situations. Acquiescence in playing a situationally imposed role (as opposed to refusing it) stems from a sense of social responsibility, sympathy for the feelings of others, or considerations of the long-term consequences of the situation. Discomfort and error arise when an individual is faced with a new situation and an existing or improvised role does not fit, or when a situation dictates a particular role for which one is unprepared.¹⁰

These observations contain a number of significant implications regarding leadership images. First, if a leader's repertoire of roles is purely subconscious, he is far more likely to find himself in a situation of discomfort and error when faced with something new. Since military leaders are often, purposefully, placed in new situations, those who do not consciously recognize an organizational requirement for role playing are likely to be less successful than those who do. Also, since institutional images are important to leader-subordinate interaction, the leader should at least acknowledge to himself situational and institutional role expectations, even if he chooses to ignore them.

Second, refusal to play a role dictated by a situation can be perceived by followers as inappropriate, inconsiderate, or damaging to the organization - even if they do not recognize or acknowledge the source of those perceptions.

Finally, these observations imply there is no need for role assumption when alone. Indeed, there may be an inherent danger of self-delusion if the role is continued beyond the needs of the situation. A most perceptive writer of fiction on this subject has noted

Greatness...depends in part upon the myth-making imagination of humankind. The person who experiences greatness must have a feeling for the myth he is in. He must have a strong sense of the sardonic....Without this quality, even occasional greatness will destroy a man.¹¹

There are specific institutional requirements regarding the images of military leadership. Consequently, the possibility exists for the reality of military leaders' lives and personalities to be veiled in shadows. The image can dominate the perception. Most high-ranking military leaders would seem to be aware of their images and role - perhaps even seeing a necessity to play a role. The institutional expectations regarding these roles are given such that followers may interpret actions as role-playing whether they are in fact or not, thus a leader can be "forced...into becoming an image."¹²

John Keegan in his book The Mask of Command addresses the question of institutional images of military leadership by categorizing a number of traits and actions. The military as an institution insists upon certain imperatives of leadership which do not change. These imperatives have evolved over time from the image of heroic leadership.¹³

Heroic leadership is important to society, in general. Groups interpret heroes (as created by myths, legends, and rumors) and ascribe to them those characteristics and actions which are necessary to fulfill the group needs of the moment. Heroes (and villains) are symbolic constructs which serve as interpretations of social institutions and social events. They are the embodiment of forces and circumstances acting on the group; the focus of events and actions.¹⁴

Heroic leadership is even more important to a military society. Keegan describes heroic leadership as dependent on

both external and internal factors. Exceptional heroic leaders are "theaters" of themselves. They must reveal what followers expect and must conceal that which followers cannot know. In other words, they must cultivate an image. For Keegan, the military heroic image embodies what he terms "the imperatives of command." These are kinship, prescription, sanction, action, and example.¹⁵

When faced with the life and death circumstances of combat, the military group requires of the leader these heroic imperatives - to focus events and actions, to symbolize the military institution, and to represent the external forces acting on the group. These requirements have entered the military culture and are at work in the minds of both leaders and followers even in peacetime, and even in those units which are unlikely to be in harm's way.

Keegan's formulation of the imperatives of command depends upon specific ideas and definitions. Kinship involves the delicate balance between distance and accessibility in the relationship between leader and followers. A commander must maintain a certain emotional distance between himself and his subordinates - primarily because over-familiarity can breed contempt for both the commander's person and orders, but also because the commander must order soldiers into danger. By the same token, accessibility is a requirement because too much distance also becomes a hindrance to the exercise of command. Accessibility can be achieved in three ways. Inward access implies that people are welcomed into and

comfortable in the commander's presence. Outward access implies that the commander is comfortable in the presence of the troops. Finally, the commander's staff may serve as a conduit for the relationship between the commander and his men. (The commander must therefore be skillful at selecting individuals to fill this role.) The commander successfully establishes kinship by maintaining the necessary degree of distance while at the same time achieving the necessary accessibility.¹⁶

Keegan describes the imperative of prescription as the need to communicate beyond the intellectual to the emotional level. This is necessary in order to bind together the hopes, fears, and ambitions of leader and followers, and goes beyond merely talking to the realm of oratory. The gifts of the actor are important in achieving this level of communication.¹⁷

The imperative of sanction is the power to punish (and reward) - and the willingness to do so. Sometimes fear of the enemy cannot be overcome solely by kinship and prescription - fear of the commander must be added. But, punishment should remain implicit and never become arbitrary. If the leader becomes an enemy, the mystery, and the power that accompanies it, disappears.¹⁸

Military leadership or command is exercised only through the imperative of action. Knowing and seeing are prerequisites to action, and this resolves itself into the dilemma of modern command - where should the commander be? The heroic model says forward in order to see; modern

technology suggests he be in the rear at the hub of communications in order to know. The successful commander balances these requirements.¹⁹

The heroic model also dictates the commander go forward because of what Keegan calls "the best and greatest of imperatives" - that of example. The sharing of risk is the ultimate imperative when the risk is that of one's life. Yet, the risk must be balanced with the necessity of preserving the commander in order that he may fulfill his role of leader which can be necessary to the group's survival. The heroic ethic derives from Greek mythology and the example of Alexander, but has been compromised by the need to control the battle, which is the modern leader's role.²⁰

In order to analyze this role, these five imperatives will be used as criteria in evaluating the leadership images of the individuals chosen for the case studies. Each image will be broken down into these five constituents, and each part will then be analyzed, primarily through anecdotal evidence, to determine whether the individual fulfilled the imperative or not.

CASE STUDIES

Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence

Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence is perhaps the most unusual, as well as the most unorthodox, of the individuals selected for this study. Lawrence was an obscure academic

who parlayed his expertise in Middle Eastern studies into a significant role with the British Army in World War I. His official position was as British liaison and advisor to Sherif Feisal.²¹ He became much more.

Lawrence's case is unusual in that there are two images. There is the image which seized public imagination after the war - "Lawrence of Arabia"²² - and there is the image Lawrence cultivated during the war in order to fulfill his responsibilities.

Lawrence's image as a military leader arose from his recognition that he was handicapped by his status as an outsider. Because he was not an Arab, his advice and leadership had to be subtle and indirect. He recognized that cultural differences were the cause of significant difficulties between the Arabs and other British advisors who had often served long periods of time in colonial postings.²³ By adopting the image he did, he avoided the negative image of a "British colonialist," while at the same time successfully guiding the Arab revolt along a path supportive of British military objectives.

That he did, in fact, deliberately cultivate an image is attested to by the "Twenty Seven Articles" he wrote for other British advisors and by numerous comments and actions both during the war and after.²⁴ Lawrence based these ideas on his knowledge of Arab culture. His actions indicate he understood the sociological implications of group leadership, as well as the institutional imperatives of military leadership.

Lawrence met the imperative of kinship. He began this process by wearing Arab dress, and the fine robes given him by Feisal marked him as a leader. Lawrence advised the wear of Arab dress in the "Twenty Seven Articles" not as a disguise but as a means of assimilation. He warned that the price of assimilation was the need to play the part as if on a stage, 24 hours a day.²⁵

In playing his part, Lawrence cultivated the accessibility of a sherif. He emphasized this idea in the "Twenty Seven Articles" by the advice to "hide your own mind and person" behind the sherif.²⁶ He also recommended advisors become a natural presence at the Arab leader's side. Lawrence maintained inward and outward accessibility by assuming Arab ways in adjudicating disputes and administering justice during the long treks across the desert.

In contrast, Lawrence did not fulfill the imperative of prescription - at least not directly. He could not engage in oratory to reach his men emotionally because that action would have usurped the position of Sherif Feisal. He had to establish an emotional bond by other means. His embrace of Arab culture and the ideals of the Arab revolt, and willingness to be judged by Arab standards all served to do so. His method is best illustrated by Lawrence's actions when one of his men became missing from a caravan in the desert. Lawrence assumed the responsibility of returning along their track to look for him. He reasoned that if he sent someone else, his men would understand because he was a

foreigner, but that was the exact reason he had to go. In presuming to assume their ways and lead them, he could no longer claim the rights of the foreigner.²⁷

The third imperative, sanction, was also met by Lawrence's actions. His willingness to punish is graphically illustrated by his personal execution of a confessed murderer. He took the action in order to maintain the peace between two tribes who were habitual enemies, but whom he needed together to conduct a raid. His willingness to reward is illustrated by his allowing the Arabs to collect the spoils of their raids and his distribution of British gold as further reward.²⁸

Lawrence also recognized the imperative of action. In order to fulfill his responsibilities as adviser, he had to go forward to ascertain the needs of the Arab forces. In doing so, he faced the same choice as other military leaders - whether to go forward to see or stay in the rear to maintain contact with higher headquarters. By traveling with the tribes, he was often out of contact with his British superiors.²⁹ His course in meeting the imperative of action was also dictated by his need to meet the imperative of example.

He realized sherifs were accorded power by virtue of accomplishment. If he wanted to share that power, he had to go forward into action. He told one of his biographers "no man could be their leader except he ate the ranks' food, wore their clothes, lived level with them, and yet appeared better in himself."³⁰ He faced almost constant action from

1917 to the capture of Damascus in September 1918. He was not merely a participant, but recognized even in the heat of battle the impact of his actions on his image. A typical incident which he relates involves injuries he received while blowing up a train. The injuries, while ultimately not serious, caused his retreat to be slowed to the point of putting himself in danger. Rather than admit to his followers he was hurt, he pretended to a leisurely study of the Turk positions.³¹

By his own testimony and that of his biographers, and judging by the results, Lawrence's use of image was a resounding success. He effectively transformed himself into a leader who would be accepted and respected by the Arabs, and who could effectively guide their efforts in support of overall British policy. Lawrence's actions indicate he clearly understood not only the imperatives of military leadership, but also the nature of the group he aspired to lead. His status as an outsider caused his position to be particularly delicate, and his success was not without cost. The psychological stress of leading in a different culture was profound - a fact which Lawrence commented upon on more than one occasion.³²

General Douglas MacArthur

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur presents a problem in an analysis of this sort because of the sheer breadth and scope of his service. In a career which spanned 61 years (1903-1964), he held positions ranging from second lieutenant of engineers to five-star general and virtual dictator of Japan. Consequently, no attempt will be made to analyze his entire career. Instead, this analysis will focus on his image during World War I and World War II. During World War I we see the genesis of his use of image, and World War II shows its fruition.

MacArthur was imbued with his own sense of destiny, greatness, and being set apart from the ordinary. His World War II staff and various biographers helped create and perpetuate the myths which surrounded him. But, MacArthur was the primary author of his image. He acted consciously, aware of his role and how to play it. At one point in his career, he told an aide he was expected to be a "glorious Apollo, Roland, and George Washington, all in one."³³ He was the master of the dramatic gesture; dramatization was the keynote of his self-promotion. His mastery of rhetoric was essential to this. Sanger's description is most apt: "Douglas MacArthur starring as Douglas MacArthur."³⁴

MacArthur's deliberate use of image began shortly after he arrived in France as a colonel, Chief of Staff of the 42d (Rainbow) Division. When the division entered the trench lines in February 1918, MacArthur removed the metal stiffener from his cap, giving it a "slouched" look, donned

a brightly colored turtleneck and a knit muffler, ensured his puttees were shined, and went forth carrying a riding crop - without pistol, helmet, or gas mask. When queried by headquarters about this strange attire, he replied he had a propensity to contract tonsillitis and therefore needed to protect his throat. In his memoirs he explained further that the helmet hurt his head, the gas mask got in the way of his movements, he did not need a weapon because personal combat was not his mission, and he carried the riding crop out of habit. He did not explain where he picked up the riding crop habit since he had never been in the cavalry.³⁵

During World War II MacArthur's manipulation of his image continued. The floppy hat with extra gold braid was a fixture. He gave up the riding crop, but sometimes carried a cane instead. A pipe (often corn cob) became a permanent addition - equally useful for smoking or gesturing. In Australia, his trips to and from work became a public spectacle. He was swept to and fro in a big, black limousine - his demeanor silent, grim, and dramatic - protected by soldiers with automatic weapons. The aura was accentuated by his refusal to accept all but the rare social invitation.³⁶

His primary means of influencing his image was through press conferences and press releases. The press releases were tightly censored and carefully written. Of the 142 releases issued by MacArthur's headquarters from 8 December 1941 to 11 March 1942, 109 mentioned only one person by name - Douglas MacArthur. Other individuals or units were seldom

cited. The releases were written in vivid prose, but were frequently inaccurate. They were well-received by those who did not know better. MacArthur's public relations officer claimed MacArthur wrote or edited a majority of them.³⁷

MacArthur's press conferences were melodramatic, completely polished, impromptu speeches, complete with florid gestures, ringing metaphors, and violent pacing - delivered in a voice which varied from a whisper to a shout.³⁸

During these performances he often took great liberties with the truth, and this caused trouble on more than one occasion. For example, his press releases regarding the campaign on Papua announced victory before the fighting was over (a habit he continued until the end of the war). They referred to MacArthur personally leading the fighting when he actually visited the front only once, early in the campaign. He did not mention the Australian forces who carried a significant portion of the fighting - which caused the Australian high command to lodge a protest. And, he cited the low number of Allied casualties when in fact his casualties were greater than those suffered at Guadalcanal both in total and proportionally. D. Clayton James points to MacArthur himself as the primary author of these fictions.³⁹

In evaluating MacArthur's use of image, it becomes clear that it evolved over time. This is understandable since he also changed rank and position over time. An image

appropriate for leading troops in the trenches may not serve as well when one is a theater commander.

It is also clear MacArthur understood the institutional requirements of military leadership. He showed he was well aware of the imperative of kinship. His attitude and demeanor were sufficient to maintain a sense of distance between himself and his subordinates. During World War I, he was more successful at establishing accessibility to balance his aloofness than during World War II. He established outward accessibility by going forward with the troops, often operating outside the normal bounds of his position as chief of staff. He kept the rest of the staff so busy they seldom visited the soldiers, but he carefully planned and supervised their work so he could do so.⁴⁰

On the other hand, during World War II, he probably erred by being too aloof. He assumed the mask of the "warrior and aristocrat"⁴¹ and emphasized the mystique of his person and position. Although he visited the troops often, he was not outwardly accessible. He went to the front in order to be seen, not to make himself accessible to the soldiers. In his position of high command, it would have been appropriate for him to use his staff as a tool to facilitate accessibility. In this case, however, his staff served to isolate him further. His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland was the primary culprit in MacArthur's isolation, often keeping even high-ranking subordinates away.⁴² His staff officers also did

not often make separate visits to the front, which would have furthered the bonds of kinship.

MacArthur fulfilled the imperative of kinship, although not completely in World War II, and his gift of rhetoric served him well in meeting the imperative of prescription. He was able to touch both superiors and subordinates on an emotional level. Two examples will serve to illustrate this point.

After he had assumed brigade command during World War I, his unit was assigned the mission of seizing some important heights. Several other units had failed in the attempt, and the position was critical to the success of an overall Allied offensive. MacArthur told his commander that if his brigade did not take the hill, his own name would be at the top of the casualty list, and he made sure his men knew of his statement.⁴³ From the vantage of hindsight, the guarantee appears melodramatic and overblown - but his men took the hill.

Even after he had assumed a more distant role in World War II, he proved he could still reach his troops on an emotional level when he wanted. At one point, he had to temporarily suspend the rotation of troops back to the US. He personally signed hundreds of letters explaining the decision and ordered them posted on every company bulletin board of every air and ground unit in the theater. The letters bypassed the normal chain of command. The communication was personal, direct - soldier to soldier. His troops appreciated his effort to communicate directly

with them. As a result, they accepted the decision as necessary to the war effort and there was no drop in morale.⁴⁴

Keegan's third imperative, that of sanction, is not significant to MacArthur's cultivated image. He did, however, fulfill the imperative. He had the power of sanction and reward by virtue of rank and position, and used it when appropriate.

MacArthur fulfilled the imperative of action in World War I, but not in World War II. As a division chief of staff in World War I, he often went forward to gain information important to the formulation of operations plans. In this respect, he served as a conduit of information between lower and higher headquarters. In contrast, his trips to the front in World War II were made in order to be seen, not to see. His judgments and decisions regarding the course of the combat were usually made based on the information on his situation maps and presented to him in staff briefings.⁴⁵

MacArthur's manipulation of his image with respect to the imperative of example was pronounced, especially during World War I. Indeed, at least one author goes so far as to say that MacArthur's bravery was excessive and premeditated. As noted above, while division chief of staff he arranged his duties so he could go forward with the troops quite often. After he assumed command of a brigade (31 July 1918), his natural position was at the front. The Rainbow Division commander noted that MacArthur's men were devoted

to him, and between February and October 1918 he was awarded seven Silver Stars, two Purple Hearts, two Distinguished Service Crosses, and various foreign awards as testimony to his bravery.⁴⁶

MacArthur's use of example was much less pronounced during World War II, for a number of reasons. His position as a theater commander did not allow it, nor require it. Also, he had passed 60 years of age by the time the US entered the war and even though he refused to show it outwardly, his years surely must have affected him to some degree. In fact, his image suffered a disastrous setback in this regard at the beginning of the war.

As the Japanese invasion progressed and MacArthur's troops were pressed back onto the Bataan peninsula, his image became that of "Dugout Doug." Once MacArthur had transferred his headquarters to the island of Corregidor, he inexplicably failed to visit the men fighting on Bataan, except for two brief trips. This fact, coupled with the perception that the ration allowance for troops on Corregidor was several times higher than for troops on Bataan, and their gradual realization that promised relief was not coming, led the troops (or at least a vocal minority) to label him a coward.⁴⁷

James attributes this to a natural tendency of the men to seek a scapegoat as they began to lose hope, and notes that it is difficult to get credible data on how the majority felt. Petillo attributes his failure to visit Bataan to embarrassment over his inability to save the men

from their fate. Both these observations may be true, but MacArthur was aware of the disparaging remarks of the men, and for one so conscious of the importance of image, it is puzzling why he did nothing to counter their perceptions.⁴⁸

MacArthur's actions on Corregidor stand in stark contrast. He would often shun the protective tunnels carved in the island during the worst air raids and artillery attacks. He endured the bombs and shells without flinching (still without a helmet), and voiced the fatalistic attitude that death would not come before his time. He made a point of visiting the men in their defensive positions. They appreciated his efforts and admired his courage.⁴⁹

During the long island-by-island offensive toward Japan, MacArthur took action to rehabilitate his image. As mentioned above, his primary vehicle for doing so was the press, but he did attempt to recapture the imagination of the troops by visiting them at the front. He developed the habit of accompanying the invasion force to the point of the next attack. He would often go ashore while the troops were still consolidating positions rather close to the beaches. For example, at Los Negros he went ashore only eight hours after the first wave had landed, exposing himself to sniper, artillery, and rifle fire. (He told his staff to wear helmets, but he, of course, did not.) The troops reacted positively to his appearance. This became his set pattern for the remainder of the war. James interprets this as an effort to recapture his World War I image and rid himself of "Dugout Doug" - an effort which he labels as successful.⁵⁰

Taken as a whole, MacArthur's use of image can be judged a tarnished success. His World War I image was successful. He fulfilled Keegan's five imperatives of command, and earned the respect and affection of his superiors and subordinates. His use of image in World War II was also, for the most part, effective, but there are several drawbacks to his approach.

MacArthur was deeply conscious of his image and place in the drama of the war. He was determined to play the Olympian role in the drama. But, as Sanger points out, "American tradition is egalitarian, not remote; humble, not grand; warm and open, not aloof."⁵¹ The more thoughtful observers during the war looked at the self-serving press releases, the conspicuous displays of "gallantry" which on several occasions served to get members of his entourage wounded, and the haughty demeanor and saw nothing but a man trapped in his own image - with nothing behind the mask. Perhaps those of his troops who were not "MacArthur men" intuitively sensed the hollowness of his actions.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

General George S. Patton, Jr. was perhaps the quintessential practitioner of the art of image-making. He is worthy of this judgment because once he had decided early in life to be a soldier, he remade himself into the image of soldiers which he held in his mind. His biographer Martin Blumenson said it best: "By force of will and against his

inner disposition, he created himself in the image to which he aspired."⁵²

Patton based his image on his study of ancient hero-warriors and his romanticized view of his own ancestors. He definitely believed that history was the product of great men making it, and he felt it was his destiny to be one of them. In order to fulfill that destiny, he not only had to be the master of events, his expertise had to be noticed and acclaimed. He worked all his life to polish the necessary mannerisms, which he regarded as "profanity, aristocratic bearing, a fierce scowl, and ruthlessness."⁵³

He claimed that "Soldiers, all men in fact, are natural hero worshippers...The influence one man can have on thousands is a never-ending source of wonder."⁵⁴ And, because he recognized his ability to influence thousands, he worked ceaselessly to enhance his image.

In spite of his constant role-playing, those who knew him well saw behind the mask. General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that one of his chosen roles was as the most hard-hearted leader in the Army, but the truth was just the opposite. He accused Patton of being kind to a fault, especially when his friends were involved. Patton cheerfully admitted his role-playing when caught in the act. Once during World War II, he saw a group of men repairing a tank. He left his jeep and crawled into the mud under the tank with the mechanics. When he emerged 30 minutes later his aide asked him what was wrong with the tank. He replied

he did not know, but was sure the word would spread that he had repaired it.⁵⁵

In assessing his performance in light of Keegan's command imperatives, Patton was successful in his use of image, albeit at a price. In his quest for kinship, he chose to focus his image on accessibility rather than distance, although he maintained a distance appropriate to his rank and position.

When training his division in 1940-41, he seemed to be everywhere. He was constantly making corrections, demonstrating techniques, and praising good performance. The men responded positively to his presence because he was genuinely and completely engaged in the process, not just superficially interested. During the war he visited the front constantly, and ordered at least one staff officer from every staff element to visit every day. He led in person and expected subordinate leaders to do likewise. He roused the courage and fighting spirit of his men through profane, blood-thirsty speeches.⁵⁶

He was gifted with the ability to reach the soldiers emotionally - perhaps because even though he spent so much effort to control them, his own emotions were so close to the surface. He himself said, "My claim to greatness hangs on an ability to lead and inspire [men]."⁵⁷ Through training, discipline, and praise he built pride and esprit. His methods were harsh at times, and the men did not enjoy them, but they were drawn to him, nonetheless.⁵⁸ He thus fulfilled the imperative of prescription.

Patton used the power of sanction as a deliberate tool in his cultivation of image. Since he felt discipline and attention to detail were the keys to victory, he did not hesitate to use punishment to enforce that discipline. After the American defeat at Kasserine Pass in 1942, he was given command of the corps involved, with eleven days to prepare for the next operation. He visited every battalion in the four divisions of the corps and instituted an immediate crackdown on personal appearance, saluting, speed limits, vehicle maintenance, etc. He often personally extracted fines from offenders. He regarded these actions as the fastest method of informing the troops he was different than the previous commander, and that from then on, everything else was going to be different, too - including victory instead of defeat.⁵⁹

He was also unstinting in praise when the men earned it. He did not issue false accolades. After the corps attack following the discipline crackdown, he sent a message praising the troops' conduct and two of the division commanders (but not the other two). In spite of his own high visibility with the press, he invariably sent messages congratulating his men after victories and giving them the credit.⁶⁰ The soldiers accepted the sanctions he imposed and the praise he dispensed because they knew it was based on his personal observations.

This habit of personal observation can be traced to his first battle in World War I. Patton was faced with the dilemma inherent in the imperative of action - whether to go

forward or remain with his communications in the rear. This dilemma was made even more acute because he could only coordinate the actions of his tanks by remaining on foot. After weighing the pros and cons, he chose to go forward. He decided it was more important to make corrections, provide drive, and uphold morale by being with the men than it was to remain in communications with higher headquarters. His primary purpose in going forward was to see and assess the situation. This was to be his hallmark throughout his career. He constantly and deliberately projected an image of energy and drive. He had an uncanny ability to arrive at a critical point when an attack was about to stall, and by his personal impetus regain the momentum.⁶¹

Because he chose to be forward, and because he was a participant when he got there, Patton also met the imperative of example. The record is filled with examples of his use of example to inspire his men to greater effort, and not just at the front. During World War I when his tanks became stalled in anti-tank ditches, he went forward under fire to help dig them out. Between the wars during training with a new type of gun, several men were injured and one killed when the weapon misfired. He fired the next three rounds himself. When unloading operations in North Africa slowed because of disorganization and enemy fire, he stayed on the beach for eighteen hours until the chaos abated.⁶² In Sicily, he crossed a bridge under fire - an act he termed "purely a motion on my part"⁶³ to show the troops he was not afraid to be shot at. His wartime aide,

Colonel Charles R. Codman felt that "Ninety percent of the personal risks he takes are carefully calculated for their exemplary effect on his command, all of his command, from G.I. to divisional and corps commanders."⁶⁴

Since the heroic image serves as the foundation for Keegan's imperatives, and Patton chose to shape his image around his perception of the warrior-hero, it would seem logical the two would closely coincide - and so they do. Patton more than meets all of Keegan's imperatives.

Patton's aggressive pursuit of his role did, however, lead to trouble on more than one occasion, and was achieved at a high cost to himself and those around him. His actions were often indicative of contradictory themes and inner tensions. He portrayed an image he thought was demanded by his profession, but which was in conflict with his inner nature. This tension often led to positive military action and negative public relations.⁶⁵

His bombastic statements sometimes did not sit well with the troops, who responded to his nickname of "Old Blood and Guts" with "His guts, our blood." His actions also were often not appropriate for a senior officer who had political and diplomatic responsibilities as well as military.⁶⁶

Concerned about hiding his softer inclinations (which were pronounced) as inappropriate to a warrior, Patton caused himself great psychological distress. Blumenson attributes the slapping incidents in Sicily to this stress. Visiting the wounded was such a stressful chore to him because of his fear of breaking down. In Sicily he lost

control of himself in the other direction - rage and anger.⁶⁷ In reality, his use of image indicates the tremendous pitfalls and potential costs of losing oneself in a role.

Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.

The use of image by Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. stands in sharp contrast to the three individuals profiled above. He stands in contrast because there is no evidence to suggest he deliberately cultivated an image. Even so, he has been remembered as "Bull" Halsey - an image he acknowledged and used, but did not invent.

Halsey fit the stereotype of "an old sea dog" remarkably well. With his fierce scowl and weathered face, and his ability to dress down a subordinate when the occasion warranted, he looked and acted like a sea captain should. But this was no mere act, he was the epitome of a naval officer.⁶⁸

After the Pearl Harbor attack when the US was sorely in need of heroes and positive images, Halsey supplied both. With his offensive spirit and bold risk taking, he was the first to strike back at the Japanese. He was obviously comfortable with reporters. His "salty" language, unremitting ferocity directed at the Japanese, and self-deprecating attitude made him the perfect press-created hero - "Bull Halsey." He enjoyed being "Bull" at the time, but on the first page of his autobiography dismissed the name as a creation of the newspapers.⁶⁹

Halsey liked people, and they liked him. His natural gregariousness and ability to put others at ease was his greatest strength - he fulfilled Keegan's kinship imperative with ease. He was known for his accessibility, and because he was the antithesis of the aloof commander, his men regarded him with genuine affection as well as respect. He readily socialized with his staff, but maintained the distance necessary to his rank and position. He enforced discipline appropriately, but also called ordinary seamen by their first names if he knew them.⁷⁰

As the commander of a carrier division before the war, he experimented with tactics and conducted extensive training exercises. His entire staff and all subordinate commanders were encouraged to participate in the design of these events. He recognized and used good ideas from even the most junior members.⁷¹

This productive relationship with his staff continued during the war years. Many of them stayed with him throughout the war and this longevity resulted in a close, family-like atmosphere. Halsey had no hesitation in showing his anger when upset, but he still showed respect for all opinions. The resulting easy give and take made his staff most effective.⁷²

The sense of kinship with Halsey extended far beyond the immediate confines of his staff. When he assumed command of the South Pacific area of operations, the hard-pressed Marines on Guadalcanal openly celebrated. When he returned to duty after a three-month medical leave, the

sailors of the fleet cheered him until his eyes filled with tears.⁷³

Because of the sense of kinship he developed, it was easy for Halsey to communicate with his men on an emotional level. He was an emotional man, and showed it on more than one occasion. When awarded a medal after leading raids on the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, he told his men "I am so damned proud of you I could cry" - and almost did.⁷⁴

His aggressive spirit served as a tonic at the beginning of the war when fear, defeat, and discouragement were running rampant. His recipe for winning the war, "Kill Japs, kill Japs, and keep on killing Japs,"⁷⁵ was the perfect antidote for these attitudes.

One of his subordinate ship captains effectively captured the bond between Halsey and his men. "He had the ability to make each one of us feel that we were part of his team...he'd send a message to an individual ship, 'That was a great job you did...' You got the feeling that you knew him and he knew you. He developed a great esprit."⁷⁶

While Halsey fulfilled the imperatives of kinship and prescription, the remainder are somewhat problematical when assessing his image. He did not use the power of sanction as an element of image. Rather, like most high-ranking military leaders, he used the power of reward and punishment in the natural performance of his duties. Thus, he fulfilled the imperative.

Furthermore, Keegan's imperatives of action and example are met almost by default by naval leaders. Since a naval

leader carries his communications with him on board ship, he is not faced with the decision of going forward to assess the action or staying behind to maintain contact with higher headquarters. He can do both at once. Similarly, if example is defined as sharing hardship and risk, an admiral on board ship automatically meets the imperative.

Admiral Halsey not only set an example for the sailors under his command, but did so for the ground forces as well. As Commander, South Pacific he personally visited the Marines on Guadalcanal in November 1942 at the height of the crisis over that island. He stayed over night, endured the shelling, and was able to visit some of the men and assess the situation. He took this action, however, not for reasons of image. In fact, when traveling about the island in a jeep, his staff asked him to stand and wave so the Marines would recognize him. He refused, saying it smacked of exhibitionism.⁷⁷

There is no evidence to suggest that Halsey deliberately cultivated his image as "Bull," or any other image. Nevertheless, he did meet Keegan's imperatives. He was a successful leader and commander without having deliberately cultivated an image. His natural personality was closely compatible with the image created by others. He, therefore, did not suffer the psychological stresses noted in the previous case studies. His case would indicate it is possible to fulfill the institutional imperatives of military leadership without deliberately cultivating an image.

General Curtis E. LeMay

General Curtis E. LeMay's image, like Admiral Halsey's, was perpetuated by others. Unlike Halsey, however, LeMay chose not to use this image, which was not entirely compatible with his personality. LeMay was aware of his image, was aware that it was not particularly flattering, but took no great pains to correct the perceptions of others. He seemed to think that those who knew him, knew better - and did not care what those who did not know him thought.

LeMay blamed his image as a gruff, unfeeling, disobedient stereotype of a military officer on the press, and to a degree he was correct. But this image was also a result of his relationship with his subordinates. At the beginning of World War II, he was coping with the daunting shift from peace to war. In less than two years he had been changed (seemingly overnight) from a lieutenant known as a fine pilot and outstanding navigator to a major commanding a bombardment group - a leader of men. He did not think he was ready, and he knew they were not. His natural solution was to work and train until they were. With only three B-17s assigned, he instituted a twenty four hour a day, seven days a week training program in the middle of the Utah desert. His men labeled him inhuman. Because he was not a great communicator, he could not make them understand he was trying to save their lives. In fact, he did not even try - trusting that sooner or later they would realize it. They

did, but by then the "Iron Ass" reputation was well on its way to being set in concrete.⁷⁸

The hard-nosed image was further exacerbated when LeMay contracted Bell's palsy in October 1942. This condition causes paralysis of one side of the face (in LeMay's case the right side) and is not treatable - the patient either recovers on his own or not. LeMay achieved a partial recovery, but could never again smile with the right side of his face. Not given to smiling much anyway, he soon acquired the reputation of never smiling.⁷⁹

The only image LeMay ever confessed to cultivating was that of fearlessness. He believed it was his responsibility as a group commander to portray no fear, and his men did believe it. He later confessed to being as afraid as anyone else.⁸⁰

LeMay is the only individual of the five who did not meet all of Keegan's imperatives. In fact, in some ways, his actions were the opposite of the imperatives.

He only partially met the imperative of kinship because he was excessively distant from his men. There did, eventually, develop a sense of kinship between LeMay and his men in World War II. But it was a long time developing and only occurred after the men got beyond his reputation and reticence and saw that his methods were driven by accomplishing the mission at least cost to them.

His biographer attributes his aloofness, at least in part, to feelings of inferiority. His natural reticence was exacerbated by his unsureness of his right to command. As a

result, he tried to build identity and teamwork among his crews focused on the squadrons, groups, and wings rather than himself - an effort only partially successful.⁸¹

As the tempo of the bombing campaign rose, LeMay was faced with mounting losses among his crews. He could not stand the thought that something he did or failed to do contributed to those losses. So he instituted no rank, no holds barred group debriefing sessions after every mission. The men were allowed to criticize anyone and anything, including LeMay. These sessions assuaged LeMay's conscience, allowed him to comb the organization for good ideas, allowed the men to feel part of the decision-making process, and as a side benefit, made him inwardly accessible.⁸²

Later in his career as Commander in Chief, SAC (1948-57), he again was inwardly accessible to a certain degree. His reputation for toughness accompanied him and his actions bore it out. He would push his SAC crews to their absolute limits, using wartime methods because he believed SAC was on a wartime footing at all times. He intimidated individual briefers with his unblinking silences, and no one wanted to be reprimanded by him. Yet, upon closer association, they often found kindness, compassion, and plain decency under the exterior. He genuinely cared for his troops and in return for their efforts, he emphasized improvements in their quality of life, instituting a spot promotion program and building improved barracks and family housing on SAC bases. His men did respond with a certain wary affection.⁸³

LeMay was not outwardly accessible - rather just the opposite. He gave the impression he was extremely uncomfortable in the presence of anyone other than his closest friends and staff.⁸⁴ Again, the reality may have been different, but he did nothing to counter the perception. It would have been appropriate for him to use his staff to bridge this gap. He could then have met the imperative of kinship without changing his reticent personality.

Because of his lack of oratorical skills, and because of his unwillingness to reveal his own emotions, LeMay did not meet the imperative of prescription. He did, at least on some level, make an emotional connection with his men, but his subordinates found it difficult to explain his attraction as a leader.

At times, however, he acted in a manner directly opposite to this imperative. For example, in preparation for switching from daylight, high altitude precision bombing of Japan to night, low-level incendiary attacks, he told no one of the impending decision. He ordered a radar training mission against a Japanese-held island near Saipan - at 50 feet altitude, simply to find out if the men would obey. When he ordered the actual incendiary raids at 5-8000 feet, without gunners, guns, or ammunition, his subordinate commanders and staff were skeptical, the crews gasped in surprise when briefed, but successfully carried out the mission.⁸⁵ He made no effort to explain his decision, but

trusted the men would see his reasoning when the missions were successful.

The remainder of Keegan's imperatives were met by LeMay. He met the imperative of sanction by appropriately exercising the authority of his rank and position. Although, in at least one instance, he was reluctant to relieve an incompetent squadron commander because the man had previously outranked him.⁸⁶

LeMay met the imperative of action by instructing his pilots in formation flying, and teaching his navigators and bombardiers as well. He flew several missions as a gunner so he would understand their problems. After actual combat missions he would make the gunners go to target practice and the pilots fly practice formations if their performance did not meet standards. He responded to complaints by saying, "I don't mind being called tough. In this racket, it's the tough guys who lead the survivors."⁸⁷ He flew with his men to gain information on their proficiency and tactical problems.

He also met the imperative of example by flying combat missions. When he changed bombing tactics by flying straight and level over the target (a practice thought to be suicidal because of antiaircraft fire), he flew the lead plane in the formation. As he rose in rank, his superiors put more and more restrictions on his combat flying. He insisted on learning to fly the B-29 on his way to the Pacific theater and led several raids on Japan after his arrival. But once he was briefed on the atomic bomb, he was

prohibited from combat missions for fear he would be shot down and captured. As commander of SAC, he insisted that all his commanders be tactically competent flyers so they would know the demands on their men.⁸⁸

LeMay's case suggests that neither an image nor the imperatives are necessary for effective leadership. His image was more a matter of things he did not do, rather than what he did. His straightforward manner and blunt (if not tactless) approach led to his fearsome reputation, but the people close to him saw a different side - even though they had to search it out.

His subordinates found it difficult to explain his attraction as a leader. His straightforwardness, honesty, and sincerity seemed to have been the key ingredients. They appreciated his expertise and hard work and were confident his decisions were well thought out. They were always pleasantly surprised at his quiet, soft-spoken demeanor in contrast to his reputation. He showed confidence in them, and they wanted to show they had earned it.⁸⁹

He did not seem to care what his image was or what others thought of him. He remarked that images seemed to arise of their own volition, regardless of who one really was. He made it clear he felt that "faking" things served no purpose. Facing reality, being real, was the only way to deal with problems.⁹⁰ This was the root of his unwillingness to try to modify his image or deliberately cultivate a different one.

But perhaps he should have. A leader who is remote and inaccessible is not fulfilling Keegan's command imperatives. This may not preclude success, but that success may come in spite of, rather than because of this failure. LeMay was so remote and uncaring of his image that his relationship with his subordinates suffered. His unwillingness to explain himself and his methods made it difficult for them to understand where he was leading them. They eventually understood, but it would have been easier on both them and him if he had at least made the effort. If Patton went so far against his inner disposition that it hurt him, perhaps we should say LeMay was so true to his that it hurt him. He was still a successful leader, but he might have been even more successful if he had adjusted his style, his image, as appropriate to the situation. His decision to discount the power of image ultimately impaired his leadership.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

There are interesting implications raised by analysis of these case studies. All five of these individuals are regarded by historians as successful military officers. Closer examination, however, reveals their successes were achieved with differing degrees of leadership effectiveness.

Lawrence fulfilled four of the five leadership imperatives. Additionally, he understood the danger of self-delusion inherent in image-making and role-playing. He was an effective leader, but at a psychological cost to himself. This psychological cost was caused by the nature

of his mission and his refusal to delude himself. He was forced to serve two masters, with the sure knowledge that he could not completely satisfy both. That this caused much mental anguish we know from his own testimony. He also recognized this anguish was probably unavoidable.

The cultural differences between the Arabs and British made it absolutely necessary that he cultivate an image. To effectively assume the image, he had to "live it" psychologically - anything less would have exposed him as a fraud to the Bedouin tribesmen. The price of success was his psychological well-being.

General MacArthur, too, was an effective leader - but that judgment is rendered with a caveat as well. For the most part, he met all five of Keegan's imperatives. But the psychological cost to him was even greater than to Lawrence. He lived his chosen image so completely, there was nothing except the mask. To his closest confidants, he was nothing more than "the general" - even his wife referred to him by his rank. He so completely sacrificed his personality to the role, his own self-delusion was complete.

The price of General Patton's success was similar. Generally regarded as one of America's finest combat leaders ever, he achieved that goal at a tremendous psychological cost to himself and those around him. He was perfectly attuned to Keegan's five imperatives. But the image they forced him to cultivate was so far removed from his natural personality that living it created a constant, wearing psychological stress. The one thing which saved him from

destruction was his recognition that he was living a myth, and his willingness to admit it.

In contrast to Lawrence, MacArthur, and Patton, Halsey and LeMay did not purposefully cultivate images. Yet, they too were effective leaders. Admiral Halsey fulfilled the five imperatives. By doing so, and by recognizing and making use of the image ascribed to him, he was able to effectively cope with new situations and fulfill the needs of his followers, while at the same time maintaining a healthy psychological state.

Finally, General LeMay, although an effective leader, was the least effective of the five in terms of meeting the imperatives and the use of image. Because his repertoire of leadership roles was subconscious, he was uncomfortable and felt inadequate when faced with new situations. Because he refused to play roles appropriate to his situation, his followers perceived his behavior as damaging to the organization. He succeeded in spite of these shortcomings, not because of them.

The case studies, then, would tend to support the assertion that there is a relationship between leadership effectiveness and the use of image. Other research also supports this assertion. Those authors who study leadership as a social science write in terms of leadership style rather than image. Paul Hersey defines leadership style as "the patterns of behavior (words and actions) of the leader as perceived by others."⁹¹ On the other hand, Hersey's contemporary, Fred E. Fiedler makes a distinction between

leader behavior and leadership style. He regards leader behavior as "refer[ring] to the specific acts in which a leader engages while directing or coordinating the work of his group" while "leadership style refers to the underlying needs of the leader that motivate his behavior."⁹²

The Hersey and Fiedler discussions of style are directly analogous to image. Fiedler emphasizes that no one type or style of leadership is successful in all circumstances. He also makes the vital observation that style or image is also dependent on the leader's personality. The implication is obvious - if a leader chooses an image which is incongruent with his personality, he opens himself to a number of potential difficulties. Fiedler asserts, however, that it may be possible to cope with such an image if the leader is willing to attempt to change his personality - a process which may take several years and then not be entirely successful.⁹³ Patton's case would seem to indicate that even a consistent attempt to change one's personality may be unsuccessful and thus, damaging.

Fiedler's research is supported by Hersey's. Hersey also emphasizes the importance of recognizing that the leader is attempting to cope with the perceptions of followers. The style, or image, therefore must vary with the situation or problem being faced, and is highly dependent on the skills and willingness of the followers.⁹⁴

The observations of Hersey and Fiedler provide another perspective on the leadership of the individuals in the case

studies. Lawrence is a prime example of an individual who developed a specific style or image appropriate to the group he was leading. He clearly understood that the perceptions of the Arab tribesmen were the key to his success.

MacArthur employed different leadership styles in World War I and World War II. This difference resulted from his assessment of the groups he was leading and the positions he held. He was, however, not as successful in World War II at adjusting his style appropriately. The varying situations of his subordinates required varying styles of leadership, but he did not assess the circumstances correctly.

Patton, on the other hand, clearly understood the need to vary his style with the situation. He was adept at assessing his subordinates and adopting an appropriate course of action. As noted above, however, his chosen leadership image caused significant stress to himself.

Halsey also understood the need to use a style appropriate to his subordinates and the situation. And, finally, as noted above, LeMay did not adjust his style to differing situations and subordinate competencies. His leadership suffered as a result.

Based on the case studies and the above analysis, one can draw a provisional conclusion regarding the appropriateness of military leaders deliberately cultivating images. A cultivated image is not necessary to effective leadership, but can be a key ingredient in effective leadership. Consequently, in making the decision whether to

cultivate an image, the military leader should keep the following factors in mind.

First, there are pitfalls in the very concept of image versus reality. Daniel Boorstin has noted that

Shakespeare...divided great men into three classes. Those born great, those who achieved greatness, and those who had greatness thrust upon them. It never occurred to him to mention those who hired public relations experts and press secretaries to make themselves look great.⁹⁵

People can confuse celebrities - those who seem great because they are famous - with heroes - those who are famous because they are great. One is a true role model, the other is not.⁹⁶ Because manipulation of the image of military leadership is conducted in a quest for some degree of greatness; because the ideal of military leadership is the heroic image, one should insure against constructing mere celebrity in place of image.

Second, if the leader cannot "live" the image, if it remains superficial, it is better not to cultivate an image at all. Followers are quick to perceive such superficiality as phoniness, and this perception will harm the leader's efforts.

Third, if the chosen image is too far outside the limits of the leader's "natural" personality, the psychological stresses engendered by the effort may be prohibitively high. The leader may become nothing but the mask, or may cause himself and those close to him difficulties which are not worth the effort.

Finally, the military leader must recognize there are certain cultural imperatives inherent in the military institution which arise from the image of the warrior-hero. While these imperatives may be more prescriptive in certain elements of the military than in others, they are always present to some degree. Consequently, while there may be some latitude regarding pursuit of the heroic image, their existence must be taken into account.

The heroic tradition is not so definitive as to leave no other options for military leaders, especially during peacetime, but followers will be acutely aware of the leader who is too much at odds with that image. There will be consequences attached to any incongruities. The leader may decide to manipulate the image to decrease the level of incongruity.

This analysis has provided only the bare beginning of an answer to the question posed at the outset. Indeed, it has raised more questions than it has answered. Definitive answers await further research. A broader population among differing ranks and more numerous case studies would provide better empirical evidence. Behavioral science research of leader images and follower perceptions, specifically with respect to the institutional military heroic image and Keegan's imperatives would also be appropriate.

In the end, we are left with the strong conviction that image can be a powerful leadership tool, but that it is also the sword with two points - equally capable of damaging the one who would wield it.

ENDNOTES

1. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man Behind the Legend (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1985), pp. 13-14, 169-70, 235.
2. Ibid., p. 13.
3. This is my own summation of General Schwarzkopf's use of image.
4. The Random House College Dictionary, rev. ed. (1975), S.v. "image."
5. Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. vii.
6. Cushing Strout, The American Image of the Old World (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. ix, quoted in Marshall Sanger, "The Image of Modern Generalship in the United States, 1940 to 1965: An Examination of the Contemporary Literature" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962), p. 12.
7. Sanger, p. 4.
8. Garry Wills, Certain Trumpets: The Call of Leaders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 274, 38, 267-8, 20, 27-32.
9. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 71-3, 109-10.
10. Richard T. LaPiere, A Theory of Social Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954), pp. 61-4.
11. Frank Herbert, Dune (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1965), p. 126.
12. Sanger, pp. 11-12, 17-18.
13. John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Viking Books, 1987), pp. 312, 314.
14. LaPiere, pp. 263-4, 276.
15. Keegan, pp. 11, 315.
16. Ibid., pp. 315-8.
17. Ibid., pp. 318-21.
18. Ibid., pp. 321-4.

19. Ibid., pp. 325-9.

20. Ibid., pp. 329-38.

21. Upon their decision to support the Arab revolt, the British were faced with deciding who among the various tribal leaders they were to support. Sherif Hussein held a position of primacy by virtue of his rule of Mecca, but he was judged too old to take an active role in campaigning. Among his sons, the British chose Sherif Feisal as the most promising of bringing the nomadic tribes together. Their search for an appropriate Arab leader is detailed by Lawrence in Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), pp. 64-112.

22. T.E. Lawrence as "Lawrence of Arabia" was the creation of Lowell J. Thomas. Thomas was a newspaper, radio, and television reporter who gained fame as a lecturer and author on travel. He first gained recognition with a world-wide touring travelogue (film, slides, and lecture) on Lawrence's exploits in Arabia. Lawrence was virtually unknown outside official British circles before Thomas publicized his story.

Thomas visited the Arab irregulars with whom Lawrence served and was thoroughly impressed by the slight Englishman who dressed like an Arab prince - and with his potential publicity value. He told Lawrence's story to the world. Thomas credited Lawrence with uniting the tribes in revolt and leading the Arab forces to spectacular victories which were of vital importance to the British victory over the Turks. His accounts not only contained errors of fact, but were so overly romanticized and exaggerated as to prove of profound embarrassment to Lawrence. He spent the remainder of his life trying to escape the image created by Thomas. Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia (New York: Atheneum, 1990), pp. 489-90, 493-4, 623-6, 652-4.

23. Wilson, p. 357.

24. Among these articles there are the following prescriptions relevant to the formation of an image. Speak tribal dialects; learn by listening and indirect questions. Deal only with the tribal leader, not subordinates; do not give direct orders. Become above the rest by identifying yourself with the Sherif. The more subtle your manner of giving advice, the greater your influence. Remain on guard always; listen to and watch yourself and others at all times. Wilson, Appendix IV, pp. 960-5. According to Wilson (note #4 p. 1043), the "Twenty Seven Articles" were published in Arab Bulletin No. 60, 20 August 1917. The Arab Bulletin was a secret intelligence journal issued by the British Arab Bureau 1916-1919.

25. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Colonel Lawrence: The Man Behind the Legend (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934), p. 12; Lawrence, p. 126; Wilson, pp. 960-5.

26. Wilson, p. 962.
27. Lawrence, pp. 253-4.
28. Ibid., pp. 181, 321-2, 326.
29. Ibid., pp. 91, 315-7.
30. Liddell Hart, p. 11; Liddell Hart quotes Lawrence without citation.
31. Lawrence, pp. 431-3.
32. Ibid., pp. 29-32, 227, 651-2.
33. Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 20, quoting Capt T.J. Davis. Apollo was the Greek god of beauty, youth, poetry, music, prophecy, and archery. The mention of Roland possibly refers to the Frankish prince and general of the late 8th Century who is the subject of the classic epic poem, The Song of Roland.
34. Sanger, pp. 91-8, 103, 105.
35. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 156 and accompanying note #14 p. 655; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 70; Carol M. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 118-22.
36. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 194-7.
37. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
38. Ibid., pp. 194-7.
39. Ibid., pp. 277-81.
40. James, Vol I, pp. 158-61, 239.
41. James, Vol II, p. 81.
42. Ibid., pp. 13, 195.
43. Petillo, pp. 118-22.
44. James, Vol II, pp. 355-6.
45. James, Vol I, pp. 188-9; James, Vol II, pp. 203-4.
46. Petillo, pp. 118-22; James, Vol I, pp. 158-61, 177-81, 186, 187, 189, 195, 204, 213, 239.

47. James, Vol II, pp. 54-5, 65-8.
48. Ibid., pp. 65-8; Petillo, p. 204.
49. James, Vol II, pp. 72-4.
50. Ibid., pp. 382-6, 618.
51. Sanger, p. 151.
52. Martin Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers: 1885-1940 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), pp. 7-8.
53. Blumenson, Patton, pp. 31, 34.
54. J. R. Green, "Leadership in War and Peace: A Historical Assessment for Today" (Research report, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989), p. 96.
55. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), p. 82; Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., 19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 251.
56. Blumenson, Patton, pp. 150, 217, 222-3; George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), p. 397.
57. Blumenson, Patton, p. 168, quoting Patton's diary.
58. Ibid., pp. 105, 146.
59. Ibid., p. 183.
60. Ibid., pp. 188, 206.
61. Ibid., pp. 109, 146, 183.
62. Ibid., pp. 113-4, 170; Robert H. Patton, The Pattons: A Personal History of an American Family (New York: Crown Publishers, 1994), p. 175.
63. G.S. Patton, p. 187.
64. Charles R. Codman, Drive (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1957), p. 187.
65. Sanger, p. 54-6, 88-9.
66. Ibid., pp. 47-50; Blumenson, Patton, p. 183.
67. Blumenson, Patton, pp. 31, 211.
68. E.B. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 1-2.

69. Ibid., p. 51; William F. Halsey and Joseph Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), p. 1.

70. Potter, pp. 1-2, 111; James M. Merrill, A Sailor's Admiral: A Biography of William F. Halsey (New York: Crowell, 1976), p. 22.

71. Potter, p. 139.

72. Merrill, p. 179.

73. Halsey, pp. 108, 116.

74. Potter, pp. 33, 52.

75. Halsey, p. 123.

76. Potter, p. 191.

77. Ibid., pp. 169-70; Halsey, p. 123.

78. Curtis E. LeMay, Mission With LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 9, 217.

79. Ibid., pp. 220-3.

80. Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay (New York: Crown Publishers, 1986), p. 45.

81. Ibid., pp. 68-9, 95-6.

82. Ibid., pp. 47-50.

83. Ibid., pp. 293-7, 318-21; Carroll L. Zimmerman, Insider at SAC: Operations Analysis Under General LeMay (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1988), p. 128.

84. Zimmerman, pp. 138, 139, 141.

85. Coffey, p. 151-3, 157, 161-2.

86. Ibid., p. 100.

87. Ibid., p. 59.

88. Ibid., pp. 34-8, 96, 148; Zimmerman, p. 131.

89. Coffey, pp. 159-60; Zimmerman, p. 130; Zimmerman includes a chapter of reflections on LeMay by various subordinates. These or similar factors are mentioned by almost all, pp. 126-43.

90. LeMay, pp. 18-9.

91. Paul Hersey, The Situational Leader (New York: Warner Books, 1984), p. 27.

92. Fred E. Fiedler, "Style or Circumstance: The Leadership Enigma," reprinted from Psychology Today, March 1969 in Psychology in Business Management: A Collection of Articles reprinted from Psychology Today (New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., date unknown), p. 2.

93. Ibid., pp. 2, 5.

94. Hersey, pp. 27, 33, 58.

95. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image or What Happened to the American Dream (New York: Atheneum, 1962), p. 45.

96. Ibid., p. 48.

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