The Special Forces Group (Airborne)  
An Alternative Headquarters For  
Conducting Operations Other  
Than War  
A Monograph  
by  
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ABSTRACT

THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE): AN ALTERNATIVE HEADQUARTERS FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by MAJ Clinton D. Esarey, USA, 56 pages.

This monograph considers the suitability of a Special Forces Group (Airborne) headquarters to command and control Army maneuver and support forces across the breadth of operations other than war. The monograph accepts that the light infantry division headquarters embodies the Army's current doctrinal minimum-essential standards to command and control Army forces in operations other than war. Therefore, a comparative analysis of the doctrinal capabilities of a light infantry division and a Special Forces group headquarters leads to an informed and reasonable decision regarding suitability.

The analysis begins with a comparison of low intensity conflict and operations other than war as it pertains to environmental characteristics and operational activities. This comparison of current doctrinal concepts reveals the critical factors for military success in operations other than war. These factors are the criteria for subsequent comparative analysis. The next step determines the doctrinal capabilities of both headquarters to conduct operations other than war. The monograph compares the doctrinal and organizational capabilities of both headquarters against the criteria to determine the suitability of each headquarters to execute operations other than war. The monograph ultimately compares the preceding analysis of the Special Forces Group (Airborne) headquarters against that of the light infantry division headquarters to reach a final decision.

This monograph concludes that a Special Forces Group (Airborne) is a suitable headquarters to command and control Army maneuver and support forces across the breadth of operations other than war.
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Chapter I

Introduction

For well over a decade, the US Army has used a separate doctrine for the employment of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). However, the Army's new FM 100-5 Operations, "as the authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, material acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training" does not acknowledge LIC. Yet, it does establish the concept of operations other than war (OOTW).

The absence of LIC from the Army's keystone manual and the debut of operations other than war immediately brings into question the relationship between the two terms. Additionally, it places the applicability and relevance of the Army's current LIC doctrine into question. Specifically, it raises questions regarding the command relationships between conventional forces and SOF when they employ together in operations other than war.

FM 71-100, Division Operations (1990) identifies the relationship between conventional forces and SOF as either: 1) SOF placed in support of the conventional effort, or 2) SOF conducting a separate but parallel effort under the theater's special operations command (SOC). FM 7-98, Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (1992) states that conventional force commanders "can request direct support of SOF." Only in current SOF doctrine, specifically FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (1991), is there any recognition that Army SOF "may receive OPCON or attachment of a conventional maneuver unit."
in specific circumstances. This apparent deviation demonstrates that the Army needs to clarify the command relationships between conventional forces and SOF when they employ together in operations other than war.

Background

**FM 100-5, Operations** (1993) states that Army forces are employed in operations other than war to "promote regional stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain US influence and access abroad, provide humane assistance to distressed areas, protect US interests, and assist US civil authorities." **FM 100-5** challenges the Army to provide assistance, advice and security in operations other than war.

These operations are not, however, inherently peaceful. Operations other than war occur in peacetime and during conflict which is "characterized by hostilities." A headquarters will likely face a fluid situation where forces fulfill varying advisory, assistance, security and combat roles in an environment of fluctuating hostility. Currently, Army doctrine prescribes three separate and distinct command structures that command Army forces in a LIC and/or operations other than war environment.

**FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict** (1990) uses a Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Force or FIDAF to provide a friendly "government a wide range of advice and assistance on counterinsurgency activities and techniques." A FIDAF is task organized for each particular mission and can consist of conventional and special operations units. Just the title alone, however, suggests that a FIDAF orients towards one
category of LIC operations and does not apply to peacetime contingencies, combating terrorism or peacekeeping operations. Also, **FM 100-20**'s discussion of the FIDAF mission does not include security and combat roles.

**FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict** (1992) states that "a JTF (joint task force) is always established for the operation, but a command and control element from the division normally deploys to coordinate with the other services and to provide support to the deployed brigade. This allows the brigade to focus on the control of its assigned/attached forces."\(^9\) This brigade would be task organized and consist of "light, heavy, SOF, or a combination thereof."\(^{11}\) This description of brigade task force operations in LIC is the same command relationship specified in **FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures** (1993) for operations other than war.\(^{12}\) This brigade task force structure is appropriate for security and combat operations; however, neither manual mentions an advisory and training assistance role.

The third headquarters, designated by Army doctrine to command Army forces in a LIC environment, is an Army Special Operations Task Force or ARSOTF. **FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations** (1990) states that "the ARSOTF headquarters performs functions similar to those of a conventional combined arms brigade headquarters."\(^{13}\) One of the doctrinally described ARSOTF places Special Forces (SF), rangers, special operations aviation, psychological operations, civil affairs, signal assets, and other combat service and combat service support forces under a
Special Forces group. It is important to note that the description of an ARSOTF does not include conventional maneuver forces.

Also, this command structure "plans, conducts, and supports special operations in all operational environments." However, the characteristics of special operations and special operations forces as described in Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations limits the utility of this structure across the breadth of LIC.

Assuming at this point that the LIC and operations other than war environments are the same, then the Army would have to employ at least two of the described command structures on a single operation to fulfill all the requirements ascribed by the current FM 100-5. This does not appear to be an efficient situation.

**Purpose of the Study**

With the doctrinal debut of operations other than war, the Army will undoubtedly evaluate and address within emerging doctrine the environmental characteristics, imperatives for success, and the capabilities of conventional forces and Special Forces operating in operations other than war. It seems that during this process the Army should review the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of having three distinct command structures for LIC and operations other than war. It also appears that the Army may need to consider the development of a command structure that can command and control Army forces conducting advisory and training assistance activities, and security and
combat operations under constricted Rules of Engagement (ROE) in operations other than war. This study considers one such structure.

Research Question

Is a Special Forces Group (Airborne) a suitable headquarters to command and control Army maneuver and support forces across the breadth of operations other than war?

Significance of the Study

The Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden, studied the state of global conflict for the four years from 1989 to 1992. This period encompassed both the bipolar competition between the United States and the USSR, and at least part of the transition period to multipolarity following the dissolution of the USSR. It was a period when the hopes for a peaceful new world order clashed with the realities of ethnic, religious and nationalistic fervor.

"A total of 82 armed conflicts were recorded for the four years. The conflicts were fought in 60 locations, involving at least 64 governments. More than one third of all UN member governments were directly involved in at least one armed conflict in this period. Over 150 opposition organizations were engaged militarily."\(^{16}\) The study defined only 35 of the 82 conflicts as war. The other 47 were minor or intermediate conflicts.

The study concluded that "the sharp increase in low-intensity conflicts in 1992 may point in an important direction for the future."\(^{17}\) The study went on to say that the low numbers of war in comparison to the overall volume of conflict
demonstrate that "the international community has at least some capacity to contain conflicts."\textsuperscript{18}

The Army provides the United States government with much of its capacity to contain conflicts. \textit{FM 100-5} states, "Use of Army forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of conflict."\textsuperscript{19} It also states, "Their physical presence, coupled with their potential use, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate the achievement of strategic objectives."\textsuperscript{20}

With the volume of low-intensity conflict on the increase, the Army's capability to contain that conflict appears to be more important than ever. Therefore, it becomes incumbent on the Army to ensure that it can successfully execute operations other than war while ensuring that employed forces have an effective and efficient command structure.

\textit{Scope}

This monograph does not attempt to compare the qualities of individual soldiers. There is a great deal of truth in \textit{FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict}'s assertion that,

No matter what parameters have been established for the use of force, a disciplined unit, with soldiers proficient at individual skills who are operating under a clear expression of the commander's intent, can perform successfully at the tactical level in this environment.\textsuperscript{21}

What is under consideration is the capabilities of a commander and his headquarters to command and control such soldiers in operations other than war and have mission success. British Army Brigadier Frank Kitson discusses this point in his
book *Low Intensity Conflict*. His basis for these comments is the result of his first hand experience in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising in 1952, in Malaya during the emergency from 1954-1960, with peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and as the commander of the 39 Airportable Brigade of the British Army in Northern Ireland.

It is true that units converted in an emergency often appear to put up a good performance after only a few weeks training in techniques appropriate to the particular situation, but although this reflects great credit on the intelligence and enthusiasm of the officers, and the versatility of the soldiers, it does not mean that the task is being done as well as it should be with particular reference to the long term implications. This fact is often overlooked because the unit concerned is unaware of what it should be achieving, and because senior officers themselves are sometimes unaware of it as well.\(^22\)

**Delimitation**

1. Although Low intensity conflict and operations other than war encompass combating terrorism, this monograph will not consider it.\(^23\)

2. *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* excludes SOF from consideration in peacekeeping; however, this study will weigh SF employed in peacekeeping activities.\(^24\)

**Methodology**

Analysis to determine the suitability of a Special Forces group headquarters to command and control maneuver and support forces in operations other than war consists of five steps. The first step is to determine the critical factors that one must consider to accomplish successful operations other than war.

Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh wrote in their book, *Low Intensity Warfare*, that LIC encompasses "first, an environment in
which conflict occurs and, second, a series of diverse civil-military activities and operations which are conducted in that environment." Likewise, _FM 100-5_ (1993) describes operations other than war in terms of the environment and the activities. A comparison of low intensity conflict and operations other than war as it pertains to environmental characteristics and operational activities reveals the critical factors for military success in operations other than war. The monograph uses these critical factors as criteria in later analysis.

The second step is to determine the doctrinal capabilities of Army forces to conduct operations other than war. The command and control structures undergoing analysis are those of a light infantry division (LIDHQ) and Special Forces group (SFGHQ).

For the purposes of this monograph, the LIDHQ is a divisional command and control element with a subordinate brigade task force headquarters. _FM 71-100, Division Operations_ states, "Normally, the most appropriate force in the US divisional structure to conduct combat operations in LIC is the light infantry division." Therefore, the monograph uses the capabilities and characteristics of the light infantry division and brigade to flesh out the JTF-division headquarters element-brigade task force command and control structure described in _FM 7-98_ and _FM 71-100-2_. The monograph assumes that this fairly represents other US divisional structures' capabilities to flesh out this structure.

_FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations_ states that the SF group commander, assisted by his battle staff, exercises
command and control through a Special Forces operational base (SFOB) which combines the functions of a conventional force command post (CP) and unit logistical trains into a single entity. This SFOB organizes by function and uses the group's organic headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and support company as its nucleus. The monograph uses this structure, symbolized by the acronym SFGHQ, as the second command structure under study.

Next, the monograph compares the doctrinal and organizational capabilities of the LIDHQ and SFGHQ against the criteria (critical factors for military success) to determine the suitability of each headquarters to execute operations other than war.

The last step determines the suitability of SFGHQ to command and control maneuver and support forces in operations other than war. The preface of FM 7-98 states that the manual provides tactical-level guidance to brigade commanders and their staffs for the conduct of combined arms operations within each category of LIC. It also states that FM 7-98 "serves as a primary reference for both resident and nonresident LIC instruction presented to precommissioned, commissioned, and noncommissioned officers." As such, the manual embodies the Army's doctrinal minimal-essential standards, represented here by the LIDHQ, to command and control Army forces in operations other than war. The monograph compares the preceding analysis of the SFGHQ against that of the LIDHQ. In this case, a comparative analysis leads to an informed and reasonable decision regarding suitability.
Chapter II  
COTW: A Foundation

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate and compare low intensity conflict and operations other than war. This chapter reviews LIC and operations other than war in the context of the characteristics of the environment and the operational activities. An analysis of this review produces the critical factors necessary for military success in operations other than war. The monograph uses these factors later as the criteria required for the comparative analysis of the two headquarters.

The Environment

Low Intensity Conflict encompasses a myriad of ideas and concepts from the past thirty years. The term LIC has represented a national military strategy; a level of force and violence within a spectrum of conflict; a category of operations on that spectrum; an environment of volatile political, economic, and social unrest; and military operations conducted in that environment.

In 1992, the RAND corporation conducted a study of military operations short of war and non-combat operations for the US Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. In that study Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert Leicht developed the following definition to eliminate the confusion surrounding the term LIC. This definition embodies the outline of this monograph's subsequent environmental analysis of LIC and operations other than war.

When used either about the environment or to a given conflict within that environment, the term LIC describes a situation in which political, social, and economic considerations may be more important to
victory than military combat. Within such an environment, adversaries vie for political legitimacy and popular support and are, moreover, often indistinguishable or inseparable from the general populace. The utility of military force is thus limited and its application can be more counterproductive than productive. Any actions taken under such sensitive political conditions will have to take into account the nature and interests of the population.31

In a conventional war, the defeat of the enemy's armed forces precedes the achievement of political objectives. The RAND study states, "In LIC, the political element is dominant. Instead of achieving political objectives only after a military victory, political objectives are achieved through a continuing parallel process."32

This process includes the balanced and integrated application of coercive force, economic enrichment, co-optive informational and psychological measures, and participatory political engagement.33 These elements of national power are usually managed at the highest levels of government, and usually involve a unique joint and/or combined, interagency command structure.34

Another characteristic of this type of environment is that a politico-military group usually opposes a nation state.35 This politico-military group has both political and military means. It strives to achieve a political, ideological, religious, economic or military goal that may result in a complete change in government or a change in a government policy.

FM 100-5 (1993) does not prescribe a specific threat; however, it does state, "Determined opponents may resort to fighting or other aggressive acts in an attempt to defeat our
purposes and promote theirs."36 Because the US and other external parties and states have private interests, they routinely extend material and political support to either of the competing sides.37

A politico-military group's conflict with the government is for recognized political legitimacy.38 "Legitimacy is the willing acceptance by a people of the right of their government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions."39 It is the overriding concern of all direct participants in a conflict.40

FM 100-5 does not discuss the opposition's need to acquire legitimacy; however, it does emphasize the need for US forces to "sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government."41

To acquire legitimacy, a politico-military group will attempt to exploit existing or perceived governmental weakness, such as failure to maintain law and order, nationalistic feeling for an autonomous country, overreaction to civil disturbances, the gaining of revenge for ethnic grievances, or fundamental social and political revolutionary aims. The apparent or perceived inability or unwillingness of a government to address the elevated issue boosts the legitimacy of the politico-military group.

Both the government and the politico-military group need to obtain support from the indigenous population. They can obtain this through coercion or co-option.42 Typically, it is a combination using the coercive elements to provide security while supporting elements try to restore or elevate the populace's standard of living.43
Politico-military groups seek to force a government into an overreaction in the hope of demonstrating government weakness, thereby decreasing its legitimacy over the population. From the government's perspective, a key to gaining and maintaining legitimacy is a carefully developed balance between maximizing physical security and protecting the freedoms that distinguish a democratic society. This results in the imposition of broad and comprehensive limits upon both the use of force and the imposition of laws curbing individual liberties. The Army promulgates these limits as restrictive and detailed rules of engagement (ROE)\(^4\).

The last characteristic of this environment deals with persistent pursuit of objectives. FM 100-5 points out, "Quick, efficient action by US forces that resolves an immediate issue without considering the long-term consequences and goals may promote instability. In operations other than war, victory comes more subtly than in war."\(^4\) In this environment, commanders and staff must consider and evaluate the effect of short duration, contingency operations and protracted engagements on long-term objectives.\(^4\)

**Activities**

Before the 1970's, the Army's keystone doctrine encompassed and governed Army peacetime operations. "It is only since the mid-1970s that they have been relegated to supporting doctrine."\(^4\) Now, the current FM 100-5 has re-incorporated a peacetime mission for the US Army, and because of their relevance to such a mission, the Army has integrated military operations short of war and non-combat operations into the text. FM 100-5's delineation of...
operations other than war includes, but is not limited to the following activities.

- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Arms Control
- Support to Domestic Civil Authorities
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
- Security Assistance
- Nation Assistance
- Support to Counterdrug Operations
- Combating Terrorism
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Peace Enforcement
- Show of Force
- Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies
- Attacks and Raids

These or similar activities lie in Army LIC doctrine; however, this doctrine has constrained the doctrinal consideration of non-conventional operations to the context of four categories. The current FM 100-20 lists these categories as:

- Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Combating Terrorism
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Peacekeeping Contingency Operations

The RAND study rightfully questions the relevance and usefulness of these categories. It states, "Yet the categories themselves serve no useful purpose; they span non-combat to combat operations and have little in common that would logically suggest their relationship within the LIC rubric." FM 100-5 (1993) neither mentions nor implements any type of categorization of the operations other than war activities.

With the advent of operations other than war, FM 100-5 debuts three new activities and elevates one to stand alone status. Arms control, nation assistance, and peace enforcement were not part of FM 100-20 (1990)'s LIC vocabulary. Army support to counterdrug operations is a separate activity under operations.
other than war. It encompasses the counterdrug operations that fell under LIC's Support to US Civil Authorities.\textsuperscript{50}

The most substantive difference between low intensity conflict and operations other than war has to do with scope. Low intensity conflict, like operations other than war, occurs below the threshold for conventional war. However, operations other than war includes a peacetime mission for the Army; LIC does not.

Operations other than war encompasses both peace and conflict. Therefore, it includes peace—"that period when the United States influences world events through actions that routinely occur between nations."\textsuperscript{51} Yet, low intensity conflict occurs "above the routine, peaceful competition among states."\textsuperscript{52}

Consequently, the LIC definition encompasses conflict but excludes those operations conducted during a period of peace. This has led to confusion in the past when Army forces were allegedly employed in accordance with LIC doctrine on peacetime operations. The new \textbf{FM 100-5} neutralizes this doctrinal dilemma. With the concept of operations other than war, the Army acknowledges that its peacetime operations are doctrinal Army missions.

\textbf{Evaluation}

This analysis has shown that the environment and subordinate operations of low intensity conflict are compatible with those of operations other than war. Analysis revealed that textual discussions on the two environments constantly adhered to the same principles: political dominance, an integrated and unified effort, transitory situations, legitimacy, restricted use of force and perseverance. Next, the activities of operations other than
war encompass the essence of the operations executed in low intensity conflict. Both concepts embrace the use of military forces below the threshold of conventional war.

**Critical Factors**

Analysis of the environment and activities of operations other than war reveals the critical military factors that are necessary to consider when selecting a command structure that can command and control Army forces in operations other than war. This monograph uses these factors as the criteria in the comparative analysis leading to the resolution of the research question.

The first factor is that the commander and staff in charge of an operation other than war must be competent to continuously evaluate the unique aspects of the operation. The premier aspect is political dominance. As was pointed out in a "National Security Program Discussion Paper", "To win in this environment, one must understand the political nuances better than those individuals fighting a conventional war." Therefore, the successful commander of a military force in this environment will presumably shape his operations because of socio-political and economic aspects as well as conventional firepower and maneuver ones.

Michael Barbero described the other aspects in "Peacemaking: The Brother of Peacekeeping or a Combat Operation?". He wrote that the commander of a peacekeeping unit "needs a deep understanding and sensitivity to the history, and present condition of the dispute. This requires a political, historical,
social, and cultural depth of understanding not usually demanded of commanders in other situations.\textsuperscript{55}

The "National Security Program Discussion Paper" discusses two things that are necessary to develop professional LIC commanders which equally apply here: "education and experience. Education should be provided both from the usual military schools and specialized study of LIC. Experience can be gained only in limited on-the-job circumstances where the commander has the necessary qualifications to appreciate his experiences."\textsuperscript{56}

Brigadier Kitson points out that "Study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been recognized as being an important step towards the understanding of conventional war, and it is no less relevant when applied to subversion and insurgency."\textsuperscript{57} He went on to say, "Some officers have of course become aware of what is involved as a result of their experiences over a period of time, but that is a very different thing from being taught about it in advance and thereby being in a position to adapt the idea to the circumstances of a particular situation from the start."\textsuperscript{58}

The second factor that the command structure needs is the capability of interpreting, clarifying, and disseminating rules of engagement. The "National Security Program Discussion Paper" points out, "Military players must recognize from the beginning that conventional military tactics have a secondary application in most LIC situations because security of the populace, rather than control of land area or destruction of the enemy, is dominant."\textsuperscript{59} Therefore, the commander and his staff must continuously manage
explicit rules of engagement that promote negotiation and mediation as well as constrain the employment of large tactical formations, firepower, and the use of force.

Because this environment is inherently transitive, units must be capable of adapting and reconciling their operating methods and ROE through the transitions. "Clearly, the ability to decide when to make these changes is predicated on accurate and timely intelligence," which leads to the third factor.

The command structure must have the capability to process and analyze information, and disseminate and store intelligence. Given the politico-military nature of the environment, this intelligence "can be placed into two categories: military and political intelligence." This intelligence needs to address the threat, the friendly government and forces being supported, and the populace.

Given the nature of the intelligence required, the means to acquire the necessary information and ways to manage it require special consideration. Experience has shown that human intelligence (HUMINT) is the most effective while high-technology means have a lesser role. Also, this type of information requires specially trained and experienced technicians that can transform information into useful HUMINT products. These technicians require a considerable amount of regional expertise and language capability to recognize both what they need and what they have to develop accurate and timely intelligence.

The situation may require the commander and his staff to provide advice and intelligence training assistance. They might
have to provide individuals to reinforce the indigenous intelligence apparatus, and under certain circumstances, may even find it necessary to move into an area and establish an intelligence apparatus from scratch if none exists.  

The fourth factor that the command structure must be capable of is planning, executing, directing, commanding and controlling the employment of conventional, special operations, and paramilitary forces from the US and other nations. This structure must be capable of doing this in a supporting role under the control of a civilian agency. This of course raises some interesting requirements. 

For OCONUS deployments, "All persons involved must be well-schooled in integrated operations of the US 'country team' and each member of the US military contingent must recognize the vital support he or she provides to the other agencies." This applies equally to stateside civil-military relationships.

Next, the operation will require a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures. Brigadier Kitson points out, "Although an army officer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civilian authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons."  

Lastly, operations conducted outside the US would most likely require cross-cultural communications skills. The "National Security Program Discussion Paper" stresses, "Successful US integration into the advisory and training role to a supported nation or entity will require US personnel who have extensive
education in the cultural and socio-political background of the host nation.\textsuperscript{66}

The command structure must be capable of communicating to higher, lower and adjacent military and civilian elements—the fifth critical factor. It must be capable of identifying and surmounting the problems associated with equipment capability and compatibility, formats and reporting procedures, and doctrinal differences. Key to success in this area is the exchange of liaison officers. This of course levies additional requirements for cross-cultural communications. The liaison officers will be more effective if they are language qualified\textsuperscript{67} and culturally conscious.\textsuperscript{68}

Finally, as the sixth critical factor, this headquarters must be capable of coordinating and conducting integrated civic action, psychological, and public affairs operations that gain influence over both enemy forces and the indigenous population. These are "methods by which the government can build up its control of the population and frustrate the enemy's efforts at doing so."\textsuperscript{69} "These operations, if carefully planned and skillfully executed, promote a sense of loyalty to the government and motivate people to cooperate with the government..."\textsuperscript{70}

Summary

This chapter has described and compared the characteristics of the environment and the operational activities of low intensity conflict and operations other than war. It determined that low intensity conflict and operations other than war are compatible in those two areas.
Second, the analysis resulted in the discovery of six critical factors necessary for military success in operations other than war.

- The capability to evaluate continuously and effectively a given operations other than war situation.
- The capability to interpret, clarify, and disseminate rules of engagement.
- The capability to process and analyze information into useful intelligence.
- The capability to plan, direct, command and control the employment of conventional, special operations and paramilitary forces from the US and other nations.
- The capability of communicating effectively to higher, lower and adjacent military and civilian elements.
- The capability to coordinate and conduct integrated civil affairs, PSYOPS and public affairs operations.

In the following chapter, the monograph uncovers the doctrinal and organizational capabilities of the LIDHQ and SFGHQ to address these critical factors. This eventually leads to a comparative analysis that determines the suitability of a SFGHQ to command and control Army forces during operations other than war.
Chapter III

The US Army and OOTW

The US Army has a wide variety of forces; however, it emphasizes two types for employment in operations other than war: SOF and light infantry forces. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger unequivocally stated in 1986, "The particular skill and supporting capabilities which the military offers to the prosecution of low intensity conflict are chiefly to be found in our Special Operations Forces."\textsuperscript{71} Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh state in \textit{Low Intensity Warfare} that the light infantry divisions are highly trained, elite units, with special skills and equipment for fighting low-level conflicts.\textsuperscript{72} As previously discussed, this monograph narrows the focus down further and specifically considers a LIDHQ and a SFGRHQ employed as the command and control headquarters of Army maneuver and support forces conducting operations other than war.

The purpose of this chapter is to present a description of both headquarters when employed in operations other than war, and to present specific facts regarding this employment in the context of the criteria established in the previous chapter. This establishes the foundation for the analysis that leads to the resolution of the research question.

Characteristics of a LIDHQ

In operations other than war, a LIDHQ normally operates independently as part of a Joint Task Force. "If the division is designated as an Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters, it must be augmented by corps and the Army service component command."\textsuperscript{73}
This augmentation would include logistics planners, a communications package and MI brigade IEW assets.

EM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (1993) states, "For large-scale, short-notice peacetime activities, an assistant division commander (ADC) and a tailored division assault CP may be deployed. The assault CP, configured for the particular mission, may have G1 to G5, ADSO, ADE, SJA, CA, provost marshal office (PMO), PAO, and PSYOP representatives, as well as LOs from USG agencies and the host nation." 74

During conflict activities, the division would also employ an assault CP. 75 In this case, the assault command post "serves as the division C2 link early in the deployment between division forces on the ground, in the air, and at home station and the higher corps or JTF headquarters." 76 With either case, the presence of a divisional element would allow the brigade headquarters to focus on the execution of tactical operations.

The division assault CP, using the division TAC CP as its foundation, 77 consists of the commander, an assistant division commander, a chief of staff, five primary staff sections (G1-G5), an Air Force air liaison element and, as required, a special staff element. 78

As part of this LIDHQ, the employed brigade headquarters operates TAC, MAIN, and REAR CPs. "The CP functions are generally grouped into those related to the commander's conduct of the battle, preparation for the battle, and sustainment of the operation." 79
The brigade staff is functionally similar to the division's albeit more limited. The brigade headquarters consists of the commander, executive officer, four primary staff sections (S1-S4), an Air Force element (weather team and TACP liaison officer) and a special staff.

**Characteristics of a Special Forces Group**

A Special Forces Group consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, a group support company, and three Special Forces battalions. The group headquarters consists of the group commander, a deputy commander, an executive officer, five primary staff sections (S1-S5), an Air Force element (weather team and AFSOF liaison officer) and a robust special staff. The group support company includes a Military Intelligence (MI) detachment, a service detachment, and a signal detachment.

According to *FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*, "SF units use the standard Army staff organization and military decision-making process described in *FM 101-5*. However, their C2 facilities differ significantly from those found in conventional military organizations."

Each Special Forces group normally organizes itself into a Special Forces operational base (SFOB). A SFOB consists of an Operations Center (OPCEN), Signal Center (SIGCEN) and a Support Center (SPTCEN.)

The OPCEN "directs and controls SF operations in a designated operational area. It performs the function of a conventional unit's TOC (tactical operations center)." The OPCEN consists of the S2 Section, MI Detachment, S3 Section, S5
Section, Liaison Section, NBC Element, Engineer Section, Signal Section and PSYOP Element.

"The mission of the SIGCEN is to install, operate, and maintain secure, reliable, long-range communications between the base and its higher, adjacent, subordinate, supporting, and supported headquarters. The SIGCEN is organized into a photographic section, signal center operations which encompasses all of the communications nets, and an electronic maintenance section."  

The SPTCEN consists of the S1 Section, S4 Section, S3 Training, Base Security Force, Budget Office, and the Support Company (-). It provides CSS to the base and its deployed SF teams similarly to a conventional unit trains.  

Evaluating the Situation

In Special Operations in US Strategy, the editors commented in 1984, "The Vietnam involvement stimulated military preoccupation with the 'conventional' environment of European Wars." A student attending the US Army's Command and General Staff College as recently as 1992-93 could easily corroborate such a statement, possibly with one caveat — the addition of the Gulf War exercise scenario. In either case, traditional command and staff education in the US Army focuses on conventional warfighting while operations other than war receive less deliberation.

The consequence of such disproportionate coverage "is that perceptions of military capability and of the imperatives of political-military policy appear to have become closely wedded to a 'conventional' mind-set, where issues appear clearer and
military capability and policy seem to have a more understandable goal. This leads to an assessment of operations other than war through conventional "lenses" by the majority of non-SOF officers.

Operations other than war require an assessment using a different set of lenses. Edward Luttwak's study, Strategic Utility of US Light Divisions, A Systematic Evaluation, clearly expresses this thought. "What counts is the ability to understand, and manipulate, the external environment, including the human milieu."

Luttwak's study also points out that this ability is not an inherent capability of the LIDHQ; rather, the LIDHQ partially acquires it with the expansion of the LIDHQ's G-2 section. "Within the HHC detachment's expanded G-2 section, a country study unit would be formed to reconstruct the evolution of the conflict from the beginning in all its aspects, political, social, ethnic, and economic as well as purely military." Unfortunately, this augmentation does not mitigate the conventional mind-set and lenses of the remainder of the LIDHQ leadership.

Conversely, Special Forces are trained for and employed on missions that are "principally politico-military in nature" and "often require detailed knowledge of the culture(s) and language(s) of the country where employed." Accordingly, each Special Forces group "is dedicated to a particular region and assigned to a geographic unified command." In discussing the value of area orientation, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations points out that it "includes the capability to
execute all foreseeable operations in the full range of the area's environmental conditions."

David Gates points out in *Light Divisions in Europe*, "Supposedly, these {Light Divisions} were configured primarily for low-intensity operations. But their principal design parameters were really factors relating to cost and size rather than tactical utility." The reason for being of the Light Division arises precisely from the need to transcend the deployability and operational limitations of the heavier standard formations." As the most rapidly and strategically deployable Army division, the LIDHQ's first priority is to get there fast. Once deployed, the primary mission of a LIDHQ is "to close with and destroy the enemy as well as to control land areas, including population and resources."

As such, the LIDHQ "focuses and trains for combat operations." The LIDHQ relies on its inherent organizational versatility to conduct operations other than war; rather than, special preparation, cultural training, or orientation in politico-military affairs and operations. Unfortunately, by the doctrinal definition, versatility only "implies a capacity." This suggests actions consequential to necessity, rather than actions resulting from design. In other words, the LIDHQ is versatile enough to try its hand at operations other than war; although, it was not specifically designed to conduct them.

The *Strategic Utility of US Light Divisions, A Systematic Evaluation* identifies some of the LIDHQ design flaws. Luttwak points out that a LIDHQ would require "language and local-culture
courses, including 'sensitivity' training"\textsuperscript{100} before employment. Furthermore, he points out, "Light Division officers at all levels will want to familiarize themselves with the 'training' and 'militia support' organizational formats."\textsuperscript{101} The result is that the LIDHQ requires mission essential training to become capable of assessing the operational environment and activities of operations other than war. To paraphrase "Between Peace and War: Comprehending Low Intensity Conflict", although the LIDHQ frequently functions in operations other than war, the Army does not formally designate it as different from other conventional headquarters that do not.\textsuperscript{102}

**ROE and the Limited Use of Force**

In operations other than war, it is important to recall how easily any military force, and especially a foreign one, can be "set up" to inflict damage on innocent civilians in the course of conducting operations. Therefore, there is a positive need for a very deliberate, low-key response even to blatant attacks.\textsuperscript{103} All US Army forces deployed to a foreign country should act, should regard itself, and should be seen by others including US domestic opinion, the local government, the local military forces and the indigenous population, as a role-model of combat competence, discipline and restraint.\textsuperscript{104}

In its discussion of disciplined operations, the current FM 100-5 states, "The Army operates with applicable rules of engagement (ROE), conducting warfare in compliance with international laws and within the conditions specified by the higher commander. Army forces apply the combat power necessary to
ensure victory through appropriate and disciplined use of force."\textsuperscript{105} This manual goes on to say, "Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander's intent, and law-of-land warfare."\textsuperscript{106} Also, "ROE may change over the duration of a campaign."\textsuperscript{107}

Let us assume that the government has adequately described its policy, and the Army has properly indoctrinated its soldiers in applicable law and the Geneva and Hague Conventions.\textsuperscript{108} This leaves the LIDHQ and SFGHQ with the responsibility of correctly assessing the given operations other than war activity and its operational environment before it can interpret, clarify and disseminate an appropriate commander's intent and ROE.

This of course leads back to the previous section concerning the capability of either headquarters to assess the operational environment and activities of operations other than war. There, the analysis concluded that the LIDHQ required augmentation and mission essential training to become capable of assessing the operational environment and applicable operations other than war activity while the SFGHQ was organically capable of conducting that assessment. At any given moment, this places the LIDHQ at a disadvantage in managing ROE in operations other than war.

There also remains the issue of the limited use of force. \textit{Strategic Utility of US Light Divisions, A Systematic Evaluation} considers the position that the employment of an entire light division into an operational area provides deterrence; therefore, there would be less of a need for and application of force.\textsuperscript{109} Paraphrasing David Gates' thoughts in \textit{Light Divisions in Europe},
one must examine the notion of a large-scale force employment and
*FM 100-5*'s concept of measured responses which seem inherently
contradictory. Also, it is not clear where the commitment for an
entire light infantry division will arise in any circumstance
other than war. This does not begin to address the
environmental issue of political dominance in the context of the
United States government's and public's mercurial temperament
towards major force deployments.

**Intelligence**

"Intelligence is fundamental to effective planning,
security, and deception," according to the current *FM 100-5*.
"Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander
to gather and analyze information on the environment of operations
and the enemy." *FM 100-5* goes on to state that "the commander must
understand the capabilities and real limitations" of his
intelligence system. Towards such an end, the monograph reviews
and analyzes the intelligence structures and capabilities of the
LIDHQ and SFGHQ.

The previous discussion of the LIDHQ structure pointed out
that *FM 71-100-2* uses a divisional element -- brigade task force
structure to command and control Army forces in operations other
than war. The nucleus of this LIDHQ is the division assault CP
and the brigade task force headquarters TAC and MAIN CPs. One can
get a sensing of the intelligence capability of this structure by
reviewing the information found in *FM 71-100-2*, the TOE Handbook
77004L-CTH, Commander's TOE Handbook: Headquarters and

The Assault CP G2 operations element outlined in FM 71-100-2 consists of 10 personnel, 3 officers and 7 enlisted soldiers. The Brigade HHC's intelligence force structure consists of 7 personnel, 2 officers and 5 enlisted soldiers.

Figure 1. LIDHQ Intelligence Force Structure

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This aggregate of 5 officers and 12 enlisted soldiers provides a modest intelligence analysis capability overall including nominal capabilities in tactical surveillance, ground surveillance radar and counterintelligence. This structure has no organizational capability in the areas of signal and aerial intelligence.

With regards to its capabilities in an operations other than war environment, Edward Luttwak states, "This detachment will require greatly expanded G-2 and country-liaison sections, augmented with officers with relevant area, language and CI [Counterintelligence] expertise drawn preferably from other units within the division itself, from other Light Divisions, and then from the Army at large. Introductory language courses would be instituted as soon as possible for all officers and men in the division that could possibly serve in-country then or in the future."

The impact of the doctrinal LIDHQ structure as delineated in FM 71-100-2 is the absence of 75% of the division G2's personnel. As a result, one must question the ability of this reduced intelligence structure to convert routinely "reported intelligence and information from sources into all-source intelligence using a basic production process." Furthermore, one must question the structure's ability to analyze and integrate interrogation, counterintelligence (CI), and aerial surveillance information into intelligence for inclusion in the all-source database. Both of these functions are normally conducted by the
G2's All Source Production Section which comes with the employment of the division's MAIN CP G2 section.\textsuperscript{119}

In review, the LIDHQ has a paltry intelligence force structure that has no doctrinal requirement for routine area orientation. On the basis of this, clearly the LIDHQ has a very limited capability to process and analyze information, and disseminate and store military and political intelligence required during operations other than war. Conversely, the SFGHQ has a significantly greater intelligence capability than the LIDHQ.

In conjunction with the group's S2 element, the group's MI detachment provides integrated, area oriented, all-source intelligence collection, management, analysis, production, and dissemination. It also provides electronic warfare (IEW), counterintelligence and interrogation support for the group.\textsuperscript{120}

The organic intelligence force structure of the SFGHQ consists of 8 officers and 34 enlisted personnel integrated into the Special Forces operational base's operations center.

The SFGHQ's intelligence structure has an organic capability nearly twice that of the LIDHQ. Furthermore, the SFGHQ has 20 more officers and enlisted soldiers than the LIDHQ covering counterintelligence, signals intelligence and aerial intelligence. The SFGHQ also has an organic interrogation capability consisting of 8 noncommissioned officers. The only LIDHQ intelligence capability not provided in the SFGHQ is a single noncommissioned officer, the Ground Surveillance Radar section chief.
### Figure 2. SFGHQ Intelligence Force Structure

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**Planning, Directing, Commanding & Controlling**

In operations other than war, a LIDHQ and a SFGHQ must be capable of planning, directing, commanding and controlling the following.

- US conventional and special operations forces.
- Conventional, special operations and paramilitary forces of other nations.
- Military forces in support of a civilian agency.
The doctrinal mission of LIDHQ is "to provide command, control, and supervision of the tactical operations of the division and attached units." This would include the operational control or attachment of light, heavy, and SOF.

The doctrinal mission of a SFGHQ is "to plan, conduct, and support SO (special operations) in any operational environment in peace, conflict, and war." A SFGHQ may receive operational control or attachment of conventional maneuver and support forces particularly when the SFGHQ is the senior Army headquarters.

Therefore, Army doctrine addresses this first requirement. This doctrine acknowledges the inherent capability of both the LIDHQ and the SFGHQ to plan, direct, command and control US conventional and special operations forces.

In its discussion of command and control of joint and combined operations, FM 71-100 (1990) fails to identify any ability or utility where a divisional headquarters would plan, direct, command and control combined operations. FM 71-100-2 (1993) only mentions the subordinate divisional brigades's ability to train host nation self-defense forces during postconflict operations.

A SFGHQ can plan, direct, command and control conventional, special operations and paramilitary forces of other nations. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991, 10th SFG(A) commanded the Combined Task Force-Alpha that included the 40 Commando of 3 Brigade, United Kingdom's Royal Marines, a Luxembourger Army platoon, and Field Ambulance elements of the Canadian Army. Furthermore, FM 31-20 states, "The primary mission of SF in FID
{Foreign Internal Defense} is to organize, train, advise, and assist HN (host nation) military and paramilitary forces.\textsuperscript{128} The group's area orientation and language capability enhance this capability.

The LIDHQ's divisional element provides the command and control interface with civilian agencies -- either US or host nation.\textsuperscript{129} The SFGHQ can do likewise.

For example, it could interface with the US defense representative who acts as the communications link with a host nation, the chief of US diplomatic mission, the regional CINC and other interested agencies.\textsuperscript{130} "The key factor in making this work is the experience and training that Special Forces commanders have in working in combined, multi-agency environments."\textsuperscript{131}

Communications

The issue of LIDHQ and SFGHQ communications revolves around two key issues. The first is the ability to communicate to higher, lower, and adjacent military and civilian elements. The second is the use of liaison officers.

The LIDHQ requires the support of the division's signal battalion for intra-division communications. With the assistance of the battalion, the LIDHQ still has limited organic communications capability for vertical linkage. "The division communications system is linked to corps and higher by the services and facilities provided by the corps signal brigade."\textsuperscript{132}

Likewise, the SFGHQ uses organic signal assets to provide communications to subordinate elements. However, the Special Forces group has a significant satellite communications capability
at every command echelon. This organic capability allows the SFGHQ to establish satellite communications from commencement of operations with any element equipped with satellite communications such as theater CINC headquarters, CONUS military headquarters, and State Department and other federal installations. The TOE Handbook 77004L-CTH does not presently authorize nor identify future programmed acquisition for satellite communications equipment in the headquarters and headquarters company of a light infantry division.

With regards to the use of liaison officers, FM 71-100-2 states; "The liaison officer (LO) represents the commander at the headquarters of another unit for effective coordination and promoting cooperation between the units. The selection criteria for liaison officers should include knowledge of the unit's situation, ability to communicate effectively (language capability, as required), and other special criteria that will enhance effective liaison." EM 71-100-2 also acknowledges, "Many first lieutenants and junior captains are assigned as liaison officers on brigade and division staffs" and that "these officers are given few opportunities to act as LO's and they know little about the job." Like the rest of the LIDHQ staff, the LIDHQ liaison officers would require language and local-culture training to function efficiently with host nation nonmilitary agencies and military organizations.

FM 31-20 states, "By TOE, the SF group is not authorized any liaison officers. Without MTOE or TDA augmentation, the group
commander must use personnel from uncommitted detachments."  
Without augmentation, SFGHQ liaison officers would most likely be senior SF captains or SF warrant officers. These officers would also be inexperienced and know little of LO duties; however, they would be versed in operations other than war activities, area oriented and fluent in requisite languages.

Civil Affairs, PSYOPS & Public Affairs

FM 100-5 (1993) clearly delineates the contribution of civil affairs (CA), PSYOPS and public affairs to operations other than war. "CA forces are used to reduce civilian interference and to gain popular understanding, support, and compliance with measures required to accomplish the mission."  
"PSYOPS forces are employed to influence favorable the attitudes and behaviors of specific foreign audiences and reduce the will, capacity, or influence of hostile forces to wage war or otherwise threaten US interests." Public affairs are "indispensable to operations."  

In spite of this doctrinal emphasis, the LIDHQ has no organic Psychological Operations staff officer. Furthermore, FM 71-100-2 omits the division's G5, the principal staff officer for all CA matters, and the public affairs officer from its discussion of the assault CP which is the divisional portion of the LIDHQ. 
The brigade does not have a Psychological Operations staff officer, a principal staff officer for CA matters nor a public affairs officer.

According to FM 31-20, the SFGHQ does include the group's S5 as "the principal staff officer for all CA matters" and the group's PSYOPS staff officer, assigned to the S3 element.
Furthermore, the group has no authorized Public Affairs Officer; however, the S1 doctrinally performs that special staff officer duty.\textsuperscript{141}

**Conclusion**

This chapter presented the capabilities of both the LIDHQ and the SFHQ to address the six critical factors previously established for military success in operations other than war. The final chapter compares these headquarters' abilities to command and control Army maneuver and support forces across the breadth of operations other than war.
Chapter IV

Conclusion

The purpose of this monograph was to examine the suitability of a Special Forces Group to command and control Army maneuver and support forces across the breadth of operations other than war. Leading to this point, the monograph established six critical factors necessary for success in operations other than war. It also reviewed the capabilities of the LIDHQ and SFGHQ to address these factors. This now leads to a comparative analysis of these capabilities and ultimately to a decision regarding the research question.

First, a Special Forces group's experience in dealing with the operations other than war environment and its regional focus provides it with a significant advantage in dealing with any operations other than war activity. Routine, regional training and real-world missions provide the group with a breadth of understanding and experience regarding the political dominance and unique civil-military flavor of operations other than war. Additionally, regional orientation provides a depth of understanding regarding the political, historical, social and cultural aspects of a given regional situation.

Both aspects allow the Special Forces group to assess the situation, adapt and develop a particular activity towards a long term solution. A LIDHQ does not have an organic ability to properly assess operations other than war; therefore, it risks early failure as it tries to organize for the situation and conduct operations. This difference highlights Brigadier Kitson's
remarks regarding the ability to react over time vice being ready to adapt to a situation from the outset.

Second, the SFGHQ's assessment advantage carries over to the issue of rules of engagement and limited use of force. The SFGHQ's enhanced capabilities to assess operations other than war permits it to better evaluate and define appropriate rules of engagement. Additionally, the group's low signature, when compared to that of a light infantry division's, makes it a more politically acceptable force to employ.

Next, the group's capability to process and analyze political and military information into useful and timely intelligence is significantly greater than that of the LIDHQ. The group's on-going experience in the region provides it with the necessary understanding to request, acquire, identify and analyze information necessary to keep the commander informed of the politico-military situation. Furthermore, the group's intelligence force structure has greater breadth and depth than that of the LIDHQ. This gives it a greater capability to process and analyze information from multiple means into useful and timely all-source intelligence.

Fourth, current doctrine recognizes and recent operations demonstrate that a SFGHQ can plan, direct, command and control the employment of conventional maneuver and support forces during operations other than war. Additionally, a SFGHQ has vast experience in dealing with country teams, indigenous civil-military structures, and other nongovernment agencies. Finally, it has the training and experience in integrating all
elements of national power into a unified response in conjunction with civil authorities. This response routinely encompasses planning and preparation for advisory and training assistance, and security and combat operations.

Fifth, the LIDHQ's capability to communicate relies on communication augmentation. The SFGHQ can implement straightway a satellite communications architecture for any operations other than war activity. Additionally, the routine cross-cultural training and experience of SFGHQ personnel are a significant communications advantage in a combined or coalition situation.

Lastly, the SFGHQ's inclusion of its organic civil affairs and psychological operations officers into its operations center greatly facilitates successful resolution of operations other than war. The absence of the division's civil affairs officer and its lack of a psychological operations officer in the doctrinal LIDHQ organization is a significant shortfall when dealing with the operations other than war environment. Unfortunately, both structures fail to adequately address their relationship with the media and the dissemination of information to the public.

In conclusion, a Special Forces group, represented here by SFGHQ, is capable of commanding and controlling Army maneuver and support forces. It is also capable of conducting advisory and training assistance, and security and combat operations across the breadth of operations other than war. The comparative analysis demonstrated that the SFGHQ's attributes give it a greater or equivalent capability than the LIDHQ to address the critical factors for success in operations other than war. These
capabilities make the SFGHQ a suitable headquarters to command and control Army maneuver and support forces across the breadth of operations other than war.
The Foreword of FM 100-20 states that it "represents the combined efforts of the Army and Air Force to develop comprehensive military doctrine and guidance to support the US government's activities in an environment of low intensity conflict." US Army, FM 100-20/ AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990).


"This situation is most likely to occur—
*In a counterinsurgency environment when an ARSOF supported indigenous combat force needs added combat power for a specific combined arms operation.
*When the ARSOF needs a conventional reaction or reinforcement force for its SO (Special Operations.)
*In link-up or post link-up combat operations during the combat employment phase of an insurgency.
*During contingency operations when the ARSOTF (Army Special Operations Task Force) headquarters is the senior Army headquarters in the operational area.
US Army, FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 4-42.

FM 100-5, 13-1.

Ibid., 13-0.

Ibid., 2-0.

FM 100-20, A-7.

FM 7-98, 6-5.

Ibid., 6-6.


"An ARSOTF is organized around the nucleus of an SF group or battalion or a ranger regiment or battalion. It includes a mix of SF, ranger, and SO aviation; supporting SO PSYOP, CA, and signal assets; and other CS and CSS assets as required." Ibid., 5-2.
15 Ibid., 1-2.


17 Ibid., 332.

18 Ibid., 333.

19 FM 100-5, 2-0.

20 Ibid., 2-1.

21 FM 7-98, 1-1.


23 The employment of antiterrorism measures are an inherent responsibility of every commander; therefore, it does not lend itself as a discriminator for inclusion in this monograph. Secondly, within the US, counterterrorism (CT) is the responsibility of law enforcement and the US Department of Justice. For terrorist incidents abroad, DOD has SOF that are "specifically organized, trained, equipped, and tasked to perform CT as a primary mission." CT missions would be performed by "other SOF or selected conventional US Armed Forces under extremely urgent and in extremis circumstances." The potential for the last point to occur is considered insufficient to warrant consideration of combating terrorism in this monograph. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), II-12.

24 Within a LIC environment, SF "are generally unsuitable for peacekeeping operations because SOF political sensitivity makes them unacceptable to the foreign powers concerned." This is a spurious argument. That every military unit in a peacekeeping scenario must have the consent of all parties is not germane to the issue under consideration and should not be considered acceptable basis for exclusion. FM 100-25, 2-8.


26 "A brigade task force, internally operating as part of a JTF, normally consists of light, heavy, SOF, or a combination thereof....Whether employed as a subordinate element of a division or as a separate task force, the brigade must be configured to operate as an independent or semi-independent force." FM 7-98, 6-6.

27 FM 71-100, B-4.

28 FM 31-20, 5-7.
29 FM 7-98, Preface.

30 Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert C. Leicht, The New World Order and Army Doctrine (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992), iii, NTIS, R-4201-A.

31 Ibid., 17.

32 Ibid., 20.


34 FM 100-5, 13-1.

35 National Security Fellows, 19.

36 FM 100-5, 13-2.


38 Ibid., 6.


40 Ibid., I-26.

41 FM 100-5, 13-4.

42 National Security Fellows, 21.

43 Ibid., 22.

44 FM 100-5, 13-4.


46 Joint Pub 3-07, I-27.

47 Taw, 6.

48 Ibid., 18.

49 Ibid., 18.

50 FM 100-20, 5-8.

51 FM 100-5, Glossary-7.

52 FM 100-20, Glossary-5.

53 National Security Fellows, 22.

54 Ibid., 69.
55 Michael D. Barbero, "Peacemaking: Brother of Peacekeeping or a Combat Operation" (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Department of the Army, 1989), 9.

56 National Security Fellows, 132.

57 Kitson, 165.

58 Ibid., 198.

59 National Security Fellows, 73.

60 Barbero, 30.

61 Ibid., 32.


63 Kitson, 73.

64 National Security Fellows, 72.

65 Kitson, 7.

66 National Security Fellows, 72.

67 Ibid., 136.

68 James J. Realini, "Special Forces Doctrine for Counternarcotics Operations" (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Department of the Army, 1991), 30.

69 Kitson, 79.


71 Klare, 81.

72 Ibid., 98.

73 FM 71-100-2, 6-1.

74 Ibid., 6-7.

75 Ibid., 6-17.

76 Ibid., 2-80.

77 Ibid., 2-82.

78 Ibid., 2-82 through 2-87.

79 Ibid., 3-3.

80 FM 31-20, 4-2.

81 FM 100-25, 7-1.
82 FM 31-20, 4-5 through 4-7.
83 FM 100-25, 7-10.
84 FM 31-20, 6-5.
85 Ibid., 6-12.
86 Ibid., 6-10.
88 Ibid., 273.
89 Ibid., 274.
91 Ibid., 55.
92 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), I-4 through I-5.
93 Klare, 85.
94 Joint Pub 3-05, I-6.
96 Luttwak, 2.
97 FM 71-100-2, 1-1.
98 Ibid., 6-1.
99 Ibid., v.
100 Luttwak, 74.
101 Ibid., 74.
102 National Security Fellows, 50.
103 Luttwak, 57.
104 Ibid., 58.
105 FM 100-5, 2-3.
106 Ibid., 2-4.
107 Ibid., 2-4.
108 Ibid., 2-3.
109 Luttwak, 53.
110 Gates, 28.
111 FM 100-5, 2-12.
112 Ibid., 2-12.
113 FM 71-100-2, 2-85.

114 *US Army, TOE 77042L, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Light Infantry Division Brigade* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990), paragraph 01 and 02.

115 Luttwak, 54.


117 FM 71-100-2, 2-58.
118 Ibid., 2-55.
119 Ibid., 2-58.
120 FM 31-20, 6-6 through 6-7.
121 TOE Handbook 77004L-CTH, 11.
122 FM 7-98, 6-6.
123 FM 31-20, 4-1.
124 Ibid., 5-21.
125 FM 71-100, 3-18.
126 FM 71-100-2, 6-15.

127 LTC Hayward S. Florer, a 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) participant in the operation, provided the information regarding the Luxembourger Army platoon. *Headquarters, United States European Command, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (U), After Action Report* (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), 23.

128 FM 31-20, 10-2.
129 FM 71-100-2, 6-2.
130 FM 31-20, 5-14.
131 Realini, 38.

132 FM 71-100-2, 2-22.

133 FM 31-20, 5-22 through 5-23.

134 FM 71-100-2, 2-15.

135 Ibid., 2-17.

136 FM 31-20, 6-9.

137 FM 100-5, 2-21.

138 Ibid., 2-21.

139 Ibid., 2-21.

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