POW/MIA Issues
Volume 1, The Korean War
Paul M. Cole

National Defense Research Institute

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POW/MIA Issues
Volume 1, The Korean War

Paul M. Cole

Prepared for the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

National Defense
Research Institute

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This report consists of three volumes. Volume 1 addresses American prisoners of war (POW) and missing in action cases (MIA) who were not repatriated following the Korean War, with particular emphasis on whether any American servicemen were transferred to USSR territory during the war.

Volume 2 examines three issues: First, it examines whether American servicemen liberated by Soviet forces from Nazi German POW camps in the European theater of operations in World War II were not repatriated. Second, it examines whether American aircrews in the Far East and European theaters were detained in USSR territory. Third, early Cold War incidents are examined to determine whether archive materials indicate that American servicemen and civilians were held alive in USSR territory.

Volume 3, an appendix volume, contains a number of POW rosters, primary source documents, and other lists. It is intended to complement Volumes 1 and 2.

Throughout Volumes 1 and 2, the evolution of U.S. POW/MIA policy is documented as are U.S. government efforts to obtain a full accounting of missing American citizens. This report is documented extensively, in accordance with the guidance from the Department of Defense, so that other researchers may use it as a reference work or as a guide to sources. This report is not intended, however, to be a comprehensive history of World War II, the Cold War, or the Korean War.
This report was prepared as a part of "The POW/MIA Issue in U.S.-North Korean Relations," a project sponsored between October 1991 and April 1993 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Research for this report was conducted within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

This report should be of interest to government officials involved in MIA/POW affairs, casualty resolution officers, family members, and others in and out of government interested in the efforts that have been made by the U.S. government to resolve POW/MIA issues.
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PROJECT BACKGROUND

From October 1991 to April 1993, the Department of Defense sponsored two related projects at RAND. The first project provided funding for a six-month study focusing on American prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issues from the Korean War. A second project expanded the scope and provided additional resources for research into whether American servicemen and civilians were transported to the territory of the Soviet Union or its allies during World War II, the early Cold War, as well as the original subject, the Korean War.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Foremost among the major findings in this report is the conclusion that direct evidence suggests that American servicemen were transferred to the territory of the USSR from the Korean War zone of combat operations. The tentative identity of one individual is presented in Chapter Five as is an estimate that approximately 50 American POW/MIAs were transferred to Soviet territory. The fates of these individuals have not been determined.

The circumstances of loss for the overwhelming majority of American servicemen who did not return from the Korean War can be documented from U.S. sources located, for the most part, in the National Archives. The total number of body not returned (BNR) cases from the Korean War stands at 8,140. The deaths of 5,945 BNR cases were
either witnessed by repatriated Americans or documented in other ways by U.S. forces in Korea. Thus, the total number of BNR cases for whom death cannot be firmly established is 2,195. Of the 2,195, many were killed during combat, though estimates of how many cannot be precise.

To narrow down the number of individuals who might have been transported to the USSR, this report takes two steps. First, the figure of 2,195 BNR without direct evidence of death cases includes hundreds of individuals who were obliterated during combat operations. Estimates, which must be greater than zero, range as high as 3,070.

Second, Soviet and American sources indicate the profile of the individuals of interest to Soviet authorities. A profile of these interests plus interviews with individuals with first-hand knowledge of Soviet actions leads to the conclusion that fewer than one hundred American servicemen, perhaps fewer than fifty, were transported to the territory of the USSR from the Korean War zone of combat operations.

This derivation is presented in Chapter Five. The reader should recognize that greater access to information in the former Soviet Union is required before a more precise estimate can be made.

American POWs were transferred to the territory of the People’s Republic of China during the Korean War to be interrogated by Russians and Chinese. Many of these POWs were returned to camps in North Korea. Those known to be held as political prisoners were repatriated in the mid-1950s.

The evidence that Americans were transported to and retained indefinitely in the territory of the People’s Republic of China is less compelling. The conclusion in this study is that, with the exception of highly publicized cases that eventually led to repatriation, American servicemen were not retained in China following the Korean War. This is discussed in Chapter Six.

One original purpose of this study was to determine the location of American remains in North Korean territory and to suggest policy measures that could improve the possibility that these remains could be recovered and repatriated. The last known location of the graves of at least 2,508 Americans in North Korean territory can be estab-
lished. In many cases, these graves may be associated with individuals. This is discussed in Chapter Eight, as is North Korea's bargaining behavior regarding these remains.

An important conclusion concerning North Korea's behavior derives from the condition of the human remains North Korea has delivered to the United States. Between 1990–1992, North Korea delivered what were claimed to be 46 sets of remains to the United States through the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission. With no exception, every North Korean claim associated with human remains has been shown to be false. For example, these 46 sets are actually fragments of more than 70 individuals. Forensic analyses suggest that these remains are not American, thus this report makes no references to alleged "repatriations." There is also no doubt that the North Koreans have curated these remains for years.

This report concludes with recommendations for a U.S. policy toward recovering remains from North Korea. The author was not asked by DoD to suggest a recovery strategy for the 2,245 BNR cases located outside of North Korea. The central elements of this strategy derive from the requirement to retrieve additional identification media from North Korea. The proposed change in U.S. policy shifts priority to methods of recovering remains that will increase the possibility that remains can be confidently associated with Americans who did not return from the Korean War.

This report does not pretend to be the final word on these subjects nor is this a comprehensive history of the Korean War. An effort has been made to present policy and action in detail to contribute to the work of the sponsor of this research.
I would like to recognize the contribution to this study made by
Sergei Zamascikov and Theodore Karasik, both members of the
RAND research team during Phase I and II of this project. Ben Lam-
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Nick Eftiamedes, who covered a lot of this ground before me, shared
his findings without asking for any credit.

The manuscript was reviewed by Professor Roger Dingman of the
University of Southern California and RAND's Harry Gelman. Their
comments helped focus this study considerably.

Lt. Colonel Johnie E. Webb, Jr., Commanding Officer of the Central
Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, and Sfc. David Bashford provided
support above and beyond the call of duty. I am indebted to them
for more help than space permits to summarize.

Numerous specialists in the United States and the former Soviet
Union facilitated the research for this project. Many have asked not
to be formally acknowledged, however, out of concern for the volatile
political content of the POW/MIA issue. To those who selflessly of-
fered their time, advice, and support under terms of anonymity, I
would like to say thank you. You were never taken for granted.

Research in Moscow could not have been done without the assis-
tance of the International Center for Human Values, Dr. Mikhail
Matskovsky, General Director.
Many family members have contacted me over the past year in the hope of finding any information about lost loved ones. I hope this study is a contribution to their own research efforts.

My wife Sara deserves recognition for the unreserved support she gave me during the many weeks I was away from home.

I would like dedicate this report to my father, Howard Cole, a World War II and Korean War veteran, and to my father-in-law, Ed Hill, a World War II veteran. You guys did the hard part.

Any errors in this report are my responsibility.
Chapter One

OVERVIEW OF THIS REPORT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the origins of this study, the scope of the entire project, the evolution of U.S. POW/MIA policy, and describes the contents of Volumes 1-3.

This three-volume report documents official efforts to account for American servicemen who did not return from combat abroad and American citizens—civilians and military—who might have been imprisoned in a Soviet bloc country during the years 1945-1969 (the so-called early Cold War years). This report, which complements ongoing U.S. government casualty resolution efforts, is not intended to be a comprehensive history of World War II, the Cold War, or the Korean War. Rather, it describes a variety of official activities using information from records located in various archives and from interviews with individuals who have first-hand knowledge. The purpose is to contribute to the Department of Defense (DoD) effort to compose a more complete picture of the prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) issue in U.S. history.

DoD's International Security Affairs (ISA)/East Asia and Pacific Region office was the project sponsor and monitor for Phase I (October 1991–April 1992). Phase II (May 1992–April 1993), though conceived in the ISA/East Asia and Pacific Region office, was conducted after February 1992 under the newly created DoD office of POW/MIA Affairs. As required by Public Law 102-183 (HR 2038-9) Section 406, the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress in March 1992 a Report to Congress Concerning Certain United States Personnel Classified as Prisoner of War or Missing in Action During World War II or
The Korean Conflict. This report summarized ongoing DoD efforts to resolve these POW/MIA issues. The Secretary noted in this report that Phase I of the RAND study will focus on American servicemen who were reported missing in action, presumed killed (body not recovered), or who were taken prisoner but remain unaccounted for. RAND research will be focused to describe United States and United Nations efforts made to retrieve those missing in action, prisoners of war, and remains of deceased servicemen buried in North Korea. This report suggests options that could lead to a fuller accounting for U.S. personnel.¹

The Secretary's report, submitted before Phase II of this project was under way, noted that the Phase I study results were "expected to be available in June 1992." The delivery schedule, which was revised by the Phase II contract, set the deadline for delivery of the final report at no later than July 1, 1993, to be followed by open publication within six months.

Origins and Objectives

The DoD initiated this study for two principal reasons. First, the impetus for the RAND project was Congressional action taken in 1991 when Congressman John Miller (R-WA) and Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced bills calling for measures that would result in a more complete accounting of American POW/MIs. The intent of Miller's legislation (HR 2038-9) was to compel the Department of Defense to search archive holdings and to locate, declassify, and release records concerning World War II and the Korean conflict.

The question of who in the Department of Defense would be responsible for responding to this legislation was raised within DoD in early 1991. After the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) determined in June 1991 that the DIA would limit its work to current intelligence-gathering tasks and analysis concerning the Vietnam War, DoD

¹Report to Congress Concerning Certain United States Personnel Classified as Prisoner of War or Missing in Action During World War II or the Korean Conflict, p. 7.
asked RAND to conduct a study that would focus on Korean War "archival research" as defined by DIA.²

The second principal reason DoD initiated this study was to augment its data base and develop policy guidelines that could be used in the event the United States opened bilateral negotiations with the North Korean government for the return of the remains of U.S. servicemen. The purpose of the RAND project as originally conceived was to respond to HR 2038-9 and to provide policy support for possible negotiations with North Korea over the issue of recovering the remains of U.S. servicemen. RAND was also asked to "document the U.S. government's recovery efforts," without touching on current or ongoing efforts whose effectiveness could be compromised by untimely publicity.

The final chapter of Volume I contains policy recommendations that if implemented may lead to a more effective policy toward U.S. remains recovery and casualty resolution in North Korea.

Issues and Scope

Phase I of this project focused on four Korean War issues as formulated by DoD. These are addressed in Volume 1:

First, establish what is known about the circumstances of loss for individuals who did not return from service in the Korean War.

Second, assess the probability that American servicemen with specialized military training or technical skills were transferred to the territory of the Soviet Union during the Korean War.

Third, present and assess the U.S. government's POW/MIA policy and efforts to obtain the release of American citizens and to recover

²The DIA's "primary contribution to ISA, the IAG process, and ultimately to the POW/MIA families and next of kin will remain limited to support of the U.S. Government's Vietnam War POW/MIA recovery effort . . . . The DIA feels that the U.S. Government effort (concerning the Korean War and World War II) is now, and will likely remain, predominantly an archival research effort with very limited requirements for pure intelligence analysis." From Dennis M. Nagy, Executive Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs, OASD (ISA)), June 26, 1991.
remains of U.S. servicemen from North Korea. Failing this, assemble as much information as possible on the circumstances of loss.

Fourth, document the evolution of U.S. policy on POW/MIAs and develop policy recommendations that if implemented could lead to a more effective remains recovery strategy.

In Phase II of this project, the scope was broadened to include an assessment of whether any American citizens—civilian and military—have been held against their will in Soviet territory since 1945. The research focus shifted in the second phase to an assessment of documentation and evidence obtained from Soviet sources in addition to the continued search of U.S. sources.

Volume 2 documents and discusses early Cold War incidents that may have resulted in American military personnel and civilians being detained or allegedly detained in Soviet and Soviet satellite territory between 1945-1969. Early Cold War incidents include the defection of American servicemen to the Sino-Soviet bloc, live sightings of people described as American citizens in Soviet prisons, and reports of crew members of U.S. military aircraft who may have been captured alive and imprisoned in Soviet jails after their aircraft were shot down by Soviet forces.

Volume 3 contains lists, rosters, and documentation referred to in Volumes 1 and 2.

The Evolution of U.S. POW/MIA Policy

Americans killed in action (KIA) were not systematically recovered until the middle third of the nineteenth century. Identification procedures for KIAs and efforts to account for MIAs began even later. Efforts by the U.S. government to recover soldiers killed in action can be traced to the Seminole Wars of 1835–1837. During the Civil War, the federal government accepted the obligation to identify and bury war dead in registered graves, though many who died in battle were buried, often in mass graves, with little attempt at identification.

The policy to recover war dead from foreign conflicts and repatriate them to the United States developed over time. During the Spanish-American War some American remains were disinterred from graves
in Cuba and returned to the United States. Not until World War I, however, did the United States have a Graves Registration Service. During World War II, Congress authorized a “return of remains” program under the direction of the Secretary of the Army. After the war, a five-year time limit was imposed for this mission. Several facilities tasked to identify World War II remains were not closed until 1951. Though many were returned to the United States, thousands of Americans killed during World War II are buried abroad. Thousands of combat casualties were declared unrecoverable even in areas where U.S. forces had unrestricted access to search battlefields.

The recovery of American war dead and POWs held by the Communist forces was a matter of U.S. national and United Nations Command policy from the very beginning of the Korean conflict. U.S. policy during the first six months of the Korean conflict was, by and large, merely an extension of policies developed and implemented during World War II. The prevailing assumption was that the UN forces would quickly win the war, which would lead, as in World War II, to full access to battlefields and prison camps. U.S. doctrine, planning, and policy, which were compatible with the requirements of World War II, were not adequate, however, to meet the demands of the Cold War environment of limited war, stalemate conflict, and intransigent opponents. Few anticipated that the Communists would first refuse to account fully for POWs and then attempt to exploit the issue over the course of four decades.

Recovery and repatriation of Korean War dead were separate issues until December 1950. Until then, U.S. forces followed a recovery practice established during World War II, which meant that temporary cemeteries were spread out along and across the Korean peninsula from Pusan to the Yalu River. There was no policy to repatriate war dead until after December 1950. In early 1951, after U.S. policy changed to a concurrent return policy, bodies were recovered, buried, and disinterred several times until a recovery and repatriation system could be implemented. From 1951 until the end of the war, concurrent recovery and repatriation were the principles of U.S. policy in Korea.

3 Not to Be Forgotten (U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, n.d.), “History.”
The resolution of cases in which prisoners of war were not repatriated or their bodies recovered (POW(BNR)) is a different problem entirely from resolving cases of MIA and KIA(BNR). Two years after the end of the Korean conflict, President Eisenhower signed a revised Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United States. At the signing ceremony the President stated:

No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States. Every available means will be employed by our Government to establish contact with, to support, and obtain release of all our prisoners of war.

The Department of Defense and the Department of State announced that they were “mindful of the obligation imposed by this order and are working in close cooperation to insure that everything possible is being done to carry out this Presidential mandate.”

The operational content of this mandate, however, has never been spelled out adequately. There has been no consensus on what “full resolution” means in practical terms or what policy measures could be used to realize such a goal. The issue has been discussed from the grassroots level to the White House for decades with solutions ranging from paying ransom to starting World War III. Congress has weighed in many times with solutions and resolutions concerning the Korean War; Congressman Zablocki’s effort in 1957 is an example. Zablocki said during the hearings on HR 140, “It is the desire of

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4Letter from Stephen S. Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, to Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, April 9, 1958, attached to, From Mr. Ayleward, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, to Col. John F. P. Hill, USA, Office of Personnel Policy, April 10, 1958.

5House Concurrent Resolution 140, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957. Sponsored by Clement Zablocki (D-WI): Whereas four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war in the hands of the Communist forces have not been repatriated or otherwise accounted for since the cessation of hostilities in Korea; and Whereas the application of the terms of the Korean Armistice agreement all American prisoners of war should have been accounted for long before now; and Whereas the United States of America has never acquiesced in actions by foreign nations which illegally deprive our citizens of their liberty; and Whereas the historic policy of firmly supporting the rights of American citizens should be continued: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President, through his own offices, and those of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, should make the return of the four hundred and fifty American prisoners of war still imprisoned by the Communist forces the foremost objective of
the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to receive an accurate and satisfactory accounting of our boys." The Department of Defense's position on House Concurrent Resolution 120, a resolution similar to HR 140, supported the intent of the Congress. H. Con. Res. 120, in the opinion of the Department,

accurately reflects United States policy in attempting to secure an accounting for these servicemen and the reasons therefor. It is consonant with the continued efforts of the Departments of Defense and State to find an answer to this tragic problem.

The effect of this continuing political interest can be measured in uninterrupted federal spending on MIA/POW(BNR) resolution efforts.

Defections, aircraft incidents, and military conflicts resulted in the capture, loss, or disappearance of thousands of Americans around the world. The U.S. government developed policies to deal with these incidents after they occurred. The only thematic element in these various policies is the fact that each policy was derived from the same principle: The U.S. government has the responsibility to account for American citizens. The content of the policy was changed in reaction to events for the simple reason that the events were so diverse there could be no fungible means to implement the policy in the various conflicts and contingencies of the Cold War. The question is not how a single policy was applied to each event but how various policies were developed in response to these events.

Official Inquiries

There have been many U.S. official inquiries into the POW/MIA issue. The list of proposals for other efforts, such as the so-called "Perot Commission on Americans Missing in Southeast Asia," that
never made it out of committee, is probably much larger. Some of the U.S. government’s investigations are listed in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1

Governmental Inquiries into MIA/POW(BNR) Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>The United States also participated in the United Nations ad hoc commission on unrepatriated POWs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Senate investigation of Communist interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation of American military and civilian prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Senate Korean War atrocity hearings (Potter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>House Foreign Affairs Committee “Return of American Prisoners of War Who Have Not Been Accounted for by the Communists”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) investigation of Laotian prison camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1983</td>
<td>DoD Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>House POW/MIA Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1985</td>
<td>DoD Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Americans Missing in Southeast Asia”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency internal review (Gaine’s Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency internal review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>House Committee on Foreign Affairs POW/MIA Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>DIA Tighe Senior Review Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1987</td>
<td>DIA’s Thai Senior Review Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>House Committee on Foreign Affairs POW/MIAs in Indochina and Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>DoD inquiry ordered by Secretary Cheney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>U.S.-Russian joint commission on POW/MIAs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aThe purpose of these inquiries was to evaluate accusations of a U.S. government “conspiracy and coverup of the POW/MIA issue. All of the above investigations concluded that there was no basis to the allegations of a government conspiracy or coverup on the POW/MIA issue.” U.S. Congress, Senate, 102nd Congress, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, POW/MIA Policy and Process (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), Part I, pp. 316–317.

bThe POW/MIA special office of the Defense Intelligence Agency is under constant supervision by the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence as well as the House POW/MIA Task Force.

A number of inquiries have been presented as semi-official. The various official and unofficial investigations produced a number of "final" reports on various aspects of the POW/MIA issue. The Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA, co-chaired by Senators John Kerrey (D-MA) and Bob Smith (R-NH) was created, in part, to resolve issues left unanswered in previous inquiries. The Select Committee chose to focus the attention of its hearings on issues related to Southeast Asia, though the scope of the Select Committee's agenda included many of the issues addressed in this study. The Select Committee devoted one day of hearings to World War II, Korean War, and Cold War incidents.

In February 1992, the Select Committee encouraged the Departments of State and Defense to engage in a joint research effort with the Russian government. As a result, a Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIA was created. The Commission is chaired on the U.S. side by former U.S. Ambassador Malcomb Toon. The Russian side is chaired by General Dimitrii Volkogonov. The list of original Commission members appears in Appendix 1. (All appendixes appear in Volume 3.)

On May 15, 1992, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood designated the U.S. Army as Executive Agent for the Department of Defense to support the work of the Joint Commission.

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9William L. White, in his book The Captives of Korea, noted 25 years ago that "from the outset" of his research the U.S. government "gave the project complete support." White pointed out that even though his book "is sometimes critical of our American policies or behavior . . . it still remains a cry to the world to examine the facts, in this strange matter of Korean captives." William Lindsay White, The Captives of Korea; An Unofficial White Paper on the Treatment of War Prisoners. Our Treatment of Theirs, Their Treatment of Ours (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. xiv.


METHODOLOGY

Approach

The issues addressed in this study follow a project description that was created to complement ongoing U.S. government casualty resolution efforts, thus an effort was made to avoid redundant research activities. This report reflects an effort to compile information from U.S. sources and to open new channels of information in the former Soviet Union. The reader is encouraged to use this document as a guide for further research.¹³

The way in which Cold War losses are estimated and evaluated differs from the way inquiries were made into World War II and Korean War losses. Since there was no declared warfare during the Cold War, there were, strictly speaking, neither prisoners of war nor missing in action. Americans were reported captured by an undeclared enemy in a twilight struggle under circumstances that were often vague or disputed. The search, therefore, focuses on reports of American citizens—civilian and military—who might have been imprisoned in the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Primary Sources

This study is based on primary source evidence presented in verbatim citations with complete references. Though this document is not based on classified material, the original classification for many declassified source documents is noted so that the reader can assess the importance attached to the information when the document was originally generated. There is no classified version of this study.

Spelling and Terminology

Original spellings, syntax, and grammar are reproduced as they appear in historical documents. Whenever possible, contemporary spellings, such as Beijing, are used when the proper name appears outside of a quotation. Department of State telegrams often lack

¹³A summary of access to information sources in the United States is shown in Appendix 2.
definite and indefinite articles. The Soviet/Russian security service is referred to as KGB, even by individuals who in interviews refer to the KGB's predecessors, thus KGB often appears as a generic name.

STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY

This report consists of three volumes.

Volume 1: The Korean War
  Chapter One: Overview of This Report
  Chapter Two: Korean War Casualty Statistics
  Chapter Three: Efforts to Recover and Account for Korean War Casualties
  Chapter Four: Research Parameters Regarding U.S. POW/MIAs in the USSR
  Chapter Five: The Movement of U.S. POWs to the USSR
  Chapter Six: Americans in the PRC
  Chapter Seven: The UNCMAC Lists
  Chapter Eight: Live Sightings, Returned Remains, and Remains in North Korea

Volume 2: World War II and the Early Cold War
  Chapter One: World War II
  Chapter Two: Early Cold War Aircraft Incidents
  Chapter Three: Recovery and Accounting Efforts

Volume 3: Appendixes

Rosters, lists, and appendixes referred to in Volumes 1 and 2 are presented in Volume 3. This volume is meant to be an integral supplement to Volumes 1 and 2.
POW/MIA STATISTICS

Introduction

This chapter has four purposes: (1) to show how Korean War casualty statistics were compiled during the war; (2) to illustrate how Korean War casualty statistics have evolved since the end of the war; (3) to associate geographic locations and circumstances of loss with unrecovered remains; and (4) to quantify the magnitude of BNR cases and to illuminate the circumstances of loss.

Dynamic Casualty Data and Terminology

The Department of Defense estimated in August 1952 that the task of establishing a final statistical record of Korean War casualties would require revisions that would be "carried on for months, perhaps years." This proved to be a prescient observation, though few would have believed then that the casualty resolution effort would carry on for four decades, still with no end in sight.

Data

The total number of combat deaths inflicted on U.S. forces during the Korean War was 33,629. There were, in addition, approximately 23,000 noncombat casualties.

Casualty reporting methods became much more detailed as the war progressed. Until the Chinese intervention, UN Command (UNC) data were collected and plans made according to the expectation that there would be a quick victory. In early November 1950, as Graves Registration Service (GRS) and other casualty resolution policies indicate, victory was thought to be in hand. Under these circumstances, the UNC anticipated that there would be full access to battlefields and POW camps. Following the Chinese invasion in November 1950, Korean conflict casualty data became more detailed. Compare, for example, DoD data of January 7, 1952, with a DoD report released in August 1953 and another from December 1953. Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show how the data became more detailed and precise and how casualty categories evolved.

Korean War casualty data have always been dynamic. During the war, casualty data changed as casualties increased, as ambiguous losses were resolved, and as information about the missing was collected and assessed. What is often left, however, is the development of final reports, graphs, and figures. Since the process of reshaping casualty data continued long after the end of hostilities, one should be cautious when comparing one set of casualty statistics from one year prepared by one organization with another set prepared years before or later by a different agency. In many instances, there is no historical record of the process by which data were processed. During and after the Korean War, hundreds of American BNR cases were progressively

### Table 2.1

**DoD Casualty Figures: January 7, 1952**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead</td>
<td>22,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>93,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in action</td>
<td>11,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>2,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to service</td>
<td>1,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,621</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *U.N. Prisoners of War Camps and Conditions in Korea, Manchuria and China, Supplement VI (Secret), January 20, 1953, p. 33.*
reclassified as many as four or five times, depending on how much information was acquired over time.

**Terminology**

Casualty terminology evolved along with the circumstances of the war. In June 1950, six casualty status categories were used: killed in action (KIA), seriously wounded in action (SWA), seriously injured in action (SIA), slightly wounded in action (LAW), slightly injured in action (LIA), and missing in action (MIA).\(^2\) To be counted as a casualty, a soldier had to be lost to his unit for one day.

Three months later, the Department of the Army promulgated Special Regulations No. 600-400-5, *Personnel Casualty Reporting During Combat*. The regulations for reporting combat casualties—14 rather than six categories—included two important sections.

2. **Types of casualties.**—a. **Battle.**—All casualties directly due to combat, or which are sustained during or as a result of going to or returning from a combat mission, are "battle casualties" and are grouped within the following categories, with symbols assigned for reporting as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>ETHER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died as a result of wounds received in action</td>
<td>HINGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died as a result of injuries received in action</td>
<td>SORRY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in action</td>
<td>GRAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured by opposing forces</td>
<td>URBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interned by neutral power</td>
<td>BLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously wounded in action</td>
<td>INGOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously injured in action</td>
<td>LEAST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly wounded in action (hospitalized)</td>
<td>FRIAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly wounded in action <em>(not hospitalized)</em></td>
<td>HUSKY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly injured in action (hospitalized)</td>
<td>HEAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly injured in action <em>(not hospitalized)</em></td>
<td>CATCH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously ill, gas casualty</td>
<td>POKEY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously ill, radioactivity</td>
<td>BLAST</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. **Nonbattle**—All casualties not listed in a above, including injury or death sustained in training operations not associated with a combat mission, regardless of whether or not extra-hazardous, are not nonbattle casualties. Mental disorders developing under battle conditions will not be classified as battle casualties. Injuries due to the elements will not be reported as battle casualties.

3. **Basis for report.**—a. Casualty reports will be based upon information in the form prescribed by your headquarters.

b. A person will be reported as dead when there is reasonably conclusive evidence of death or when there are circumstances which lead to no other logical conclusion. A report of death need not necessarily be predicated upon the recovery of remains. When a date of death is to be reported under circumstances permitting selection of a date, the latest date that death could reasonably be presumed to have occurred under the circumstances will be selected.

c. A person whose whereabouts or actual fate cannot be ascertained will be reported as missing or missing in action; where the circumstances reveal that an individual will not be reported as missing or missing in action. Whenever evidence indicates that an individual reported as missing or missing in action
is dead or in any other reportable status, a supplementary report will be submitted; if evidence of death is not reasonably conclusive, a report of all facts will be made.

The Korean War had been under way for nearly three months when these regulations were circulated. By this time, however,

Table 2.3
DoD Battle Casualty Figures: December 31, 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total DoD</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total casualties (sum of 3, 4, and 5)</td>
<td>142,118</td>
<td>110,081</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>28,110</td>
<td>1,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total deaths (sum of 3, 4a, and 5a)</td>
<td>30,606</td>
<td>25,208</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>4,137</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action—total</td>
<td>22,986</td>
<td>18,852</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>3,294</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action—total</td>
<td>105,807</td>
<td>79,644</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>24,651</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of wounds</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>103,327</td>
<td>77,733</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>23,651</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA total</td>
<td>13,325</td>
<td>11,585</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead or presumed dead</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>4,445</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to military control</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>4,638</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current captured</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current missing</td>
<td>2,953</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SOURCE: RG338 (Secret), Box 1, Folder 4.

aThese figures reflect findings of presumptive death and other determinations, changes in status, and revisions processed through 31 December 1953. The data indicate the cumulative number of permanent and temporary losses from effective military strength as the result of enemy action.

bStatus of Item 5c:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross captured</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td>5,145</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>4,418</td>
<td>3,973</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current captured</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
nearly 23 percent of all POW(BNR) cases and over 11 percent of all other BNR cases had occurred. Thus, casualty cases categorized later in the war were subject to criteria that did not exist when these BNR cases occurred.

On December 9, 1952, the Department of Defense decided to eliminate the word “casualty” in the weekly summaries. A DoD spokesman announced that emphasis would be placed on “categories rather than the over-all total’ and to dispel a popular misconception that casualties were fatalities.”

As it became clear that many American prisoners were murdered after capture, for example, two terms to distinguish this group from those who made it alive to a POW camp were used: “in the hands of opposing forces” and “post-capture incidents.” Thus, a casualty lost in the latter stages of the war under the same circumstances as one reported as “unconfirmed” POW in the early phase might be reported as “in enemy hands” or MIA rather than POW.

The term “unofficial POW” requires additional clarification. In the casualty terminology developed in September 1950, such a term does not exist. The term “unofficial POW” is a post-war term. The distinction between official and unofficial POWs, according to Graves Registration Service records, depends on whether a name appeared on a Communist POW list. Following the war, the Graves Registration Service produced a list, “Unofficial POW Roster,” that was compiled from the evaluation of report of death statements and repatriated POW statements.

The term “unofficial POW” was created to account for “soft” cases, i.e., individuals named in enemy propaganda broadcasts or last seen alive in enemy custody or those who in some other way were suspected but never proven by eyewitnesses to be in a formal POW status. One cannot exclude the possibility that after the war many American BNR cases were recategorized as “unofficial” or

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3This document, which was located at the Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), has two sections. Section I, “Official POW Roster,” is compiled from Communist POW lists from August 14, 1953, and September 2, 1953.
"unconfirmed" POW to give UNCMAC grounds for demanding information from the Communist side.

After the end of the Korean War, computer punch cards were prepared for each BNR case. To code the cards so that a BNR's status could be reflected in detail, six codes were used to represent information received that indicated an individual had been a POW. They are as shown in Table 2.4.

As of August 1953, the Casualty Information Section card format distinguished between "unofficial POW status" and "official POW status" though it is not clear when this distinction began to be used.

Table 2.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Communist Radio, Press Release and Publications. This code is used when the specific radio station is not identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Source Codes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.</td>
<td>A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>B.</td>
</tr>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>G.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>H.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. Letters from prisoners of war in enemy hands received by next of kin.
4. Captured enemy documents and photographs.
5. Interrogation of recovered UN Military Personnel and other eyewitness accounts.

SOURCE: GA Form 6801-C. USAFFE Casualty. RG 497, Records of Intelligence and U.S. Military Command, Pacific. NND 897586, Box 1. Ms. Gerri Montgomery Prescott located these records in the Suitland Reference Branch and provided copies to the author.
Official Estimates of U.S. BNR Cases

Conventional wisdom holds that

there are some 8,177 Americans still missing in action (MIA) and unaccounted for after the Korean War. Most are truly "missing"—that is, they are airmen who went down at sea or in rugged mountainous terrain, soldiers and Marines who disappeared in the confusion of battle and whose bodies were never recovered.4

The American Battle Monuments Commission list of Korean War missing, which has been in print for many years, lists 8,182 "killed but no body recovered from the Korean War."5 In 1991, 8,177 U.S. servicemen were listed as missing from the Korean War in a variety of official and unofficial sources, reflecting five resolved cases.6 The name of each BNR is inscribed on the ceiling of the mausoleum at the U.S. military cemetery in Hawaii. The aggregate figure in this cumulative list has not been disputed by any credible source.7

The aggregate number of 8,177 cases was accurate when this list was published, but the description of this roster as a list of MIAs or unrepatriated POWs is not correct. The aggregate list contains the names of every individual who went to Korea but did not return.

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5World War II Dead Interred in American Cemeteries on Foreign Soil and World War II and Korea Missing or Lost or Buried at Sea—Korea List of Missing and Isolated Burials, Compiled by the American Battle Monuments Commission, Washington, D.C. Volume III lists Korean War names on pp. 3949-4131.
7The figure 8,177 is the figure accepted and cited by the U.S. State Department, U.S. Veterans Organizations, and others, as the number of Korean War U.S. MIAs. (However, there are actually some adjustments, due to identifications, according to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii.) Major Funk, Point Paper—Remains Statistics," (UNCMAC IP/MAO), April 19, 1991.
thus it is more appropriate to refer to it as a list of BNR cases than one of MIAs or unrepatriated POWs. The circumstances under which individuals were lost vary dramatically, but these important distinctions are not reflected in the Battle Monuments or DoD aggregate lists.

The official record of Korean conflict POW/MIA data is, at best, confusing. Numbers cited in Congressional hearings and data provided by the Department of Defense are often contradictory, ambiguous, inconsistent, or a mixture of any of these. Two incompatible figures for the number of Marine Corps POWs, 2318 and 227,9 are cited in the same 1957 Congressional report. Of the 7,190 U.S. servicemen reported to have been POWs by the U.S. Congress, 4,428 were reported to have been repatriated. According to this Congressional report, therefore, 2,762 U.S. POWs were not repatriated. The Congressional report stating that 7,190 U.S. servicemen were POWs associates no names with its breakdown of 6,556 Army, 263 Air Force, 231 Marine Corps and 40 Navy POWs. This POW breakdown, however, adds up to only 7,090, a discrepancy of 100. A discrepancy of 100 also appears when the number of post-capture deaths estimated by the War Crimes Division of the Eighth Army Adjutant General (5,639) is added to the Army figure for POW(BNR) (2,638). The result (8,277) is 100 more than the figure provided by the American Battle Monument Commission (8,177).10

9Communist Interrogation ..., p. 19.
10The discrepancy of 100 is intriguing because an error of the same magnitude occurs in data provided on separate occasions by two separate agencies. One explanation for the 100 MIA cases is as follows. As of September 1992, 80 Korean War MIA cases are not associated with a date of incident. These are often treated statistically as a category different from other MIAs. If one were to generate a list of Korean War MIAs according to date of incident, one would not find these 80 cases. There are also 16 cases listed in the field of 8,177 MIAs in which the date of incident occurred after the end of the Korean War, i.e., after the Armistice. If one generated a list of Korean War MIAs bounded by the day it began (June 25, 1950) and the day the Armistice was signed (July 27, 1953) there would be a discrepancy of 16. Thus if one were to generate a Korean War MIA list by incident date bounded by the beginning and the end of the war, the discrepancy from the American Battle Mon-
POW data vary between institutions and even within the same institution. A 1955 Department of Defense publication states that 7,160 U.S. personnel who served in the Korean War were counted as POW (4,428 U.S. POWs were repatriated, 2,730 POWs were determined to have died in camps, and 21 "sincere converts" stayed behind). The sum of DoD's breakdown (2,730 dead + 4,428 repatriated + 21 voluntary nonrepatriates (VNR) = 7,179 total POWs) is 19 more than DoD's own total of 7,160 POWs.

No explanation has been found for the discrepancy in the Department of Defense POW figures. DoD's high total POW figure (7,179) is eleven fewer than the Congressional high POW figure (7,190). The greatest discrepancy (89) is found between DoD's high POW figure (7,179) and the Congressional low POW figure (7,090). POW(BNR) figures also vary by source and year: Congress, 2,762 (1957); DoD, 2,730 (1955); Army, 2,638 (1954).

This confusion is perhaps a logical consequence of the alluvium of data created during the three years of the Korean conflict. To clear this up, one would have to find the date for each data snapshot that is being compared. This is an impossible task given that any previous figure from a number of sources could have been used. In many cases the figures could not be traced or verified because the data are not referenced in these reports.

Baseline for This Report

The baseline source for data in this report is the CILHI Mapper database. This is the only computerized Korean War casualty database in existence. As noted below, CILHI has been working to bring together a wide range of casualty data. Consequently, CILHI data that have been taken from two separate samples may differ because of work that has occurred in the interim.

1 POW . . . The Fight Continues After the Battle: A Report by the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War (Washington, D.C.: August 1955), pp. 25-29 and 79. These data were collected by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War.
The BNR total used in this report is 8,140 (2,119 POW(BNR) and 6,021 BNR cases of all other categories). This figure reflects 37 cases resolved following the publication of the Battlefield Monuments list.

Post-Capture Killed, Body Not Recovered (PCK(BNR))

U.S. servicemen who were murdered after capture or who died from any cause before reaching a POW camp are referred to as post-capture killed, body not recovered (PCK(BNR)) if their bodies have not been recovered and identified. PCK(BNR) is an important subset of POW(BNR). In addition to the fact that this group of prisoners did not make it to a POW camp alive, PCK(BNR) is distinguished by the uncertainty with which the geographic location of “last seen alive” status or remains may be estimated. The purpose of making a distinction between the two groups, POW(BNR) and PCK(BNR), is to focus a remains recovery strategy on an approximate geographic location of remains that may still exist in North Korea.

Definitive conclusions about the number of PCK(BNR) suffered by U.S. forces in Korea are difficult to reach because the collection, reporting, and analysis of data concerning missing or captured Americans was severely impeded throughout the war. The estimates made by the Far East Command during the war were sometimes reports of all PCK cases. The number of PCK(BNR) cases was much smaller than the total number of reported PCK cases.

The collection of post-capture death data was the responsibility first of the Army Staff Judge Advocate of the Far East Command.

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12PCK body recovered would have been indicated in casualty records as “killed in action,” since the death was associated with enemy action. Letter from Colonel Curtis H. Bennett, Chief, Casualty Branch, to Congressman Timothy P. Sheehan, March 12, 1953. RG319 (Army Staff), AC of S, G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1953, 383.6, Box 1512.

The mission was transferred to the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in October 1950, then to the Commanding General, Korean Communication Zone, in September 1952. During the war, the status of captured Americans changed dramatically, often with no indication to the outside world. Many Americans were tortured, summarily executed, beaten, or marched to death and scattered randomly across vast geographic areas in shallow or unmarked graves. The extensive record of cruelty and barbarism has been assembled slowly and painstakingly over a number of years. "The atrocities committed by the North Korean People's Army were so common that they could only have been a matter of official government policy."14

The magnitude of PCK cases was highlighted on November 14, 1951. Col. James M. Hanley, head of the War Crimes Section of the U.S. Eighth Army's Judge Advocate Section, took exception to the Eighth Army's Training Directive No. 6, August 26, 1951, which implied that captured prisoners would receive better treatment in the hands of the Communist Chinese Forces than from the North Korean People's Army.15 Hanley wrote a memorandum to the Judge Advocate Section suggesting that publicity be given to the Chinese record of inflicting post-capture deaths on U.S. POWs.16 Hanley's report, which was followed by a press release, was intended to influence public opinion.

According to Hanley's report, between November 1950 and November 1, 1951, the North Koreans had "wantonly killed 147 American prisoners of war." The Chinese, on the other hand, had

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14 Korean War Almanac, pp. 56-57.
16 Memorandum from Colonel Hanley to Judge Advocate Section, September 27, 1951. Final Historical and Operational Report, War Crimes Division, Judge Advocate Section, Korean Communications Zone, May 31, 1954 (Secret), Exhibit 17. RG153 Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Division.
“killed 2,513 (United States) prisoners of war since November 1, 1950, and in addition, ten British soldiers, forty Turks, five Belgians, and seventy-five soldiers of unknown nationality.”17 (If the bodies of these victims were not recovered, they would have been counted as UNC missing or, if found dead, as KIA.)

U.S. officials would neither confirm nor deny the validity of Hanley's report though it had been cleared through Eighth Army channels before release. Post-war Senate hearings documented about one dozen massacres and well thought out, premeditated torture.18 On November 20, General Matthew Ridgway, who mildly censured Colonel Hanley for overstepping the limits of his duties,19 said from his headquarters in Tokyo that "it was possible 6,000 American soldiers now listed as missing in action in Korea had been captured and killed by Communist troops." At the same time, however, he said the United States investigation showed positive proof covering 365 Americans.20 When Ridgway made these comments, more than 10,000 U.S. servicemen were listed as missing.

18In late December 1950, five American airmen in a truck convoy were ambushed by North Korean forces. Their bodies, discovered shortly after by a South Korean patrol, showed that the flesh had been punctured in as many as 20 different areas with heated, sharpened bamboo sticks. The torture was so fiendish that not one perforation was sufficient to cause death itself. U.S. Congress, Senate, Korean War Atrocities, Report of the Committee on Government Operations Made Through Its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations by Its Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities Pursuant to S. Res. 40 (Washington, D.C.: January 11, 1954), p. 6 (hereafter, Korean War Atrocities).
19Hanley's duties, according to Ridgway, included "the responsibility of compiling reports and investigating reported incidents involving violations of the laws of war, interrogating witnesses, collecting and preserving evidence, and maintaining records of war crimes incidents." Ridgway rebuked Hanley on the grounds that the Colonel's duties "do not involve responsibilities for the reporting of casualties arising from the Korean operation." Murray Schumach, "365 Atrocity Deaths Proved, 6,000 Possible, Says Ridgway," New York Times, November, 1951.
20365 Atrocity Deaths Proved, 6000 Possible . . . ."
Recent histories of the Korean War brush by the Hanley report\textsuperscript{21} or ignore it altogether.\textsuperscript{22} In April 1953, however, Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINCFE) received a request from Washington (office unknown) asking for "the best current estimate of the number of American lives lost as a result of illegal action by the enemy following capture." Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC) replied on May 13 that as of April 15, "the best estimate of the number of such deaths was 1,379."\textsuperscript{23} General Mark Clark prepared a speech for delivery at the United Nations following Little Switch in 1953. In the prepared text of this speech, which was not made, Clark noted that of the 28,815 murders committed by the Communist forces in Korea, 11,622 victims were UN soldiers. Clark added, "The United Nations Command has been most meticulous and objective insofar as such is humanly possible, in its investigation of the background upon which I base my report."\textsuperscript{24}

In January 1952, the Secretary of the Army reported to the U.S. Senate's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee that the War Crimes Division estimate of over 6,000 murdered American servicemen "includes every reported atrocity regardless of the source and irrespective of the reliability of the informant." In addition, "responsible military agencies are making every effort to ascertain the truth with respect to all reports of atrocities and I can only assure the accuracy of the numbers where evidence clearly indicated they were victims of atrocity killings. To date this latter number, as I stated, only totals 365."\textsuperscript{25} The subset of PCK(BNR) cases who


\textsuperscript{23}"Deaths of Communist-Held Prisoners" (Confidential), in HQ FEC/UNC Command Report (Top Secret), May 1953, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{24}Mark W. Clark, \textit{From the Danube to the Yalu} (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 300-301.

\textsuperscript{25}RG319 (Army Staff), AC of S, G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1953, 383.6, Box 1512, Letter from Special Assistant T. A. Young to the Honorable Timothy P. Sheehan, March 3, 1953, with attachment \textit{Report of January 28, 1952, to Preparedness Subcommittee, United States Senate, Concerning Atrocities in Korea}. 
died on death marches, 959, is discussed in the following section, "Death During Transport to POW Camps."

Appendix 3 is a roster of U.S. victims whose names are mentioned in statements made by repatriated UN Command POWs. Appendix 4 is a roster of victims whose names appear in Eighth Army Judge Adjutant Section War Crimes Division card files. Both lists should be used as complements to other BNR rosters to shed light on the circumstances of loss for individual POW/MIA cases.

**Death During Transport to POW Camps**

For those who survived the initial phase of capture, the dangers had only begun. The trip from the battlefield to a POW camp was a death sentence for unknown hundreds if not thousands of people. American prisoners were

forced to participate in what was uniformly described by survivors as death marches. The treatment of prisoners on marches was the same in all instances, clearly establishing that such was a prede-termined plan formulated on a high Communist command level.26

Shortly after capture American POWs would be stripped of their clothes and boots and forced to march on frozen feet. Those who fell were killed by guards. Those who managed to survive routinely lost as much as 45 pounds. On a march from Kuna-ri to POW Camp No. 5, for example, 300 died of exposure and starvation or were murdered outright.

A great deal is known about a group of between 700-800 American POWs who were captured soon after the war began. The Americans were at first mingled with perhaps 70 to 80 civilians from a variety of countries. This well-documented Seoul to Pyongyang march began with 376 Americans on September 26, 1950. In the civilian group were missionaries such as Larry Zellers, who has written his memoirs,27 and other foreign nationals such as George

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26 Korean War Atrocities, p. 10.

Blake, the British SIS man in Seoul who was soon to become a Soviet spy, recruited during captivity in North Korea by Soviet KGB agents. Blake describes these events in Pyongyang and the subsequent march in his memoirs. Earl Colbey, a repatriated POW, contributed his memory of events as well. From Pyongyang, the entire group was forced to march over a three-week period via a series of villages to a permanent camp located near the Yalu River. The POWs and the civilians were under the command of the infamously cruel North Korean officer known only as the Tiger. In the course of the death march to the Yalu, at least 100 American POWs were shot by the North Koreans, according to Colbey. Blake, in contrast, said that the number of POWs shot during this “harrowing experience . . . may have amounted to ten or twenty, maybe. Not more, I don’t think.” Though the exact number of murders may never be established, the circumstances surrounding the murders are not disputed. Colbey recalled,

If they were weak and could not keep up, they were pushed to the side of the road and shot. They did not even both to bury them.

Bodies of American POWs who were executed in this fashion were left where they died or were tipped into ravines. In any event, no record appears to have been made of the location where these individuals eventually came to rest. This is a significant accounting problem for PCK(BNR) cases in general.

A standard technique used by Communist guards to beat to death prisoners was the following. One guard would stand on each hand of an American prisoner who had been forced to the ground. A third guard would beat the prisoner to death. The three guards

28Letter from Earl N. Colbey to Paul M. Cole, March 6, 1993, and phone conversation March 11, 1993. “When I was captured,” Colbey wrote, “I was 6’2” and 198 pounds. When I was turned over to the Chinese on October 19, 1951 I weighed 118. I was in as good or better shape than most. The average body weight was 85 to 90 pounds.”

would then shove the body to the side of the road before moving on. "Of the 706 prisoners who left Bean Camp and marched to Prisoner-of-War Camp No. 1 at Chongsong, approximately 100" were alive in the fall of 1953.\textsuperscript{30} It is not known precisely how many died in this way or what—if anything—was done with the bodies of the American PCK(BNR). Since the answers would not be provided by the Communist side, the U.S. armed forces made their own efforts to discover what happened to captured Americans. Body-not-recovered casualties (KIA(BNR), PCK(BNR), and MIA, not counting POW(BNR) cases) were inflicted on U.S. forces in the chronological order shown in Table 2.5.

The geographic distribution of American PCK(BNR) cases is vast and equally uncertain. Information collected after Operation Little Switch included details about death rates in camps and the fact that seriously wounded American POWs were sometimes "simply thrown over the side of a hill" by North Korean or Chinese guards. At the so-called Death Valley camp, approximately 1,500 U.S. and other UN prisoners died between June and October 1951.

The bodies of the dead were placed in shallow graves that were frequently washed out by heavy rains. In addition, North Korean civilians frequently dug up recently buried dead for the purpose of removing what little clothing remained.\textsuperscript{31}

During the 30-mile death march from the Chosin Reservoir that lasted two to three days in December 1950,

the number of American prisoners who participated is estimated as being from 300 to 350 men. Prisoners too seriously wounded or exhausted to march were shot. One returnee personally observed the shooting of eight or ten wounded American prisoners. One prisoner who became hysterical under these trying circumstances was executed by a Chinese guard. In the words of a returnee who observed this particular execution, "this Chinese guard walked up with his carbine, stuck it in his [the prisoner's] face and blew his head off." This particular incident occurred

\textsuperscript{30}Korean War Atrocities, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{31}Operation Little Switch, Korean War Crimes (KWC), Case 1823, RG153 Records of the Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Division, 1952–1954.
on 2 December 1950. The Chinese guards left the bodies of the dead unburied where they fell.32

Other Operation Little Switch repatriates told of a death march during which “approximately twelve or thirteen U.S. prisoners, unable to further sustain the rigors of the march, were forced over a cliff by their captors by means of rifle butts and bayonets.” Repatriates told of many instances in which American POWs froze to death or were left behind during a march, too ill to sustain the pace or unable to move at all. Approximately 200 of the 500 American POWs who began a three-day death march on Decem-

Table 2.5

Chronological Accumulation of Korean War MIA, KIA(BNR), and PCK(BNR) (Excluding POW(BNR))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
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<td>January</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>March</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>162</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>June</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>355</td>
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<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>81</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>Subtotals</td>
<td>3,341</td>
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Total: 6,029

NOTE: These data, taken from the CILHI Mapper system, are current through February 1993.

32 These cases, which occurred following the Korean War, are included in contemporary Korean War data. The decision to include these cases in Korean War statistics was apparently made in 1953.

November 1, 1950, died en route. To quote one repatriate who survived a death march, "many times when the men would straggle they would get behind the column and after the column had gone on some distance we would hear a shot and we would never hear of or see that man again." Prisoners who died while being transported by train, sometimes asphyxiated in tunnels, were "left unburied at the side of the tracks."

The DoD made efforts to collect information about POWs who died after capture. In June 1954, the Adjutant General of the Army, Brigadier General C.C.B. Warden, wrote to "Each United States Army Returnee."

1. You undoubtedly have knowledge of personnel who either died or were killed while in captured status, or of other personnel whom you believe were not or will not be released by the Communists.

2. Such information is of great importance to the Army, since it will be used by The Adjutant General in making a determination of the true status of personnel now listed as missing in action or captured. It will also provide the Army with factual information that can be furnished to their families.

3. Therefore, it is requested that you complete this questionnaire giving the most complete and detailed information possible. Different forms have been prepared for personnel in each category mentioned in category 1 above. A separate form will be prepared for each person on whom you have information. If you need additional forms, they will be furnished by the individual in charge of the casualty processing.33

An example of such a completed form appears below in the section "RECAP-K."

Operation Big Switch interviews produced similar evidence that not only corroborated the conclusions but also expanded the scale and scope of the post-capture kills inflicted on American prison-

33RG319 (Army Staff), AC of S G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1954, 383.6, May to July, Box 1642.
Over 1,000 interviews confirmed a deliberate pattern of criminal conduct by the Communist forces. The sworn testimony detailing starvation, disease and wanton murder is repeated over and over in terms identical to those obtained in the Operation Little Switch interviews. After five months of cross-checking and verification efforts, the Judge Advocate Section War Crimes Division concluded that at least 959 Americans died during forced marches.

Location of Permanent POW Camps

Permanent POW camps were located in the far north of North Korea, clustered for the most part near the Yalu River. The village of Pyoktong, located on a peninsula jutting into the river, was converted into the first permanent POW camp when the North Koreans evicted civilians from their homes and moved UNC POWs into them. By early 1951, Pyoktong became the largest camp as POWs were moved from many other temporary camps such as Death Valley, the Valley, and Peaceful Valley and collection points. By the end of March 1951, POWs were concentrated into Pyoktong, which became known as Camp No. 5, and Camp No. 7. Bean Camp and Mining Camp continued to operate for several months as temporary camps.

As the population of Camp No. 5 increased, the North Koreans and Chinese created a series of eight camps over a fifty-mile stretch of the Yalu. Camp No. 1, established March–April 1951, and Camp No. 3, established September–October 1951, were overflow camps for No. 5. In October 1951 officers were moved to Camp No. 2. Camp No. 4 was opened in August 1952 to handle the overflow from Camp No. 2.

The names and locations of the permanent camps including estimated number of deaths and camp burial sites are shown in Table 2.6.

34 *Operation Big Switch*, Supplementary to the Interim Historical Report, Operation Big Switch, November 1, 1953 (Confidential), RG153 Army Judge Advocate Section, Box 6.
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Table 2.6 (continued)

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<td>Honan-ri</td>
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<td>Ando-ri</td>
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<td>T-41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Chungdong</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-42</td>
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<td>6628-I</td>
<td>Kumphwa</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>The Bunkers</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Sanbakkol</td>
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<td>Kojak-kol</td>
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<td>Manpo-Chungang</td>
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<td>R-2</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Kumphwa-Corwon—Bean Camp</td>
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<td>R-3</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Death Valley—Camp #5</td>
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<td>Kunuri—Death Valley</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-5</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>R-6</td>
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<td>Bean Camp—Camp #1</td>
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<td>R-7</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Manpo-Kosan</td>
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<td>R-8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bean Camp—Camp #3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

POW Camp Deaths, July 1951 to July 1953

Throughout the period July 1, 1951, to July 27, 1953, evidence of the large number of Americans who were dying in POW camps began to accumulate. The gruesome nature of the POW camps administered by the North Koreans and Chinese resulted in the death of 2,730 U.S. POWs, 38 percent of all U.S. POWs in permanent camps. Out of 2,730 POW deaths, 2,119 (78 percent) are current POW(BNR) cases.

In permanent camps, conditions were fiendishly squalid. Over the first 12 months of the war, more than 500 American POWs died in captivity in one camp alone. On October 19, 1951, when the Chinese gained custody of the American POWs involved in the Pyongyang march described above, only 232 of the original 700–800 were alive. Colbey noted, “They were beat to death, shot, starved, died of malnutrition or froze.” Blake added that during
the time the civilian internees were among the military POWs, bodies could not be properly cared for.

They weren't actually buried because there were no tools. The ground was frozen. They were buried under piles of stones. I can't imagine under the circumstances that anyone kept a record of the deaths. There were no officers. The POWs had no paper, nothing to write on. But I don't know if they kept a record other than in the memory.\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, the remains of hundreds of Americans who died in POW camps were exposed to the elements. Over the years, the Yalu River floods may have washed away any trace of the dead American POWs. To further complicate the accounting process, when American POWs were released during Little Switch and Big Switch, Chinese guards confiscated and burned lists of deceased POWs made by survivors.

In 1957 the Senate committee gathered evidence that showed

the treatment given American prisoners in Communist prisoner-of-war camps was a sequel to the brutalities and indignities suffered by the prisoners on death marches. The prisoners at these camps were survivors of marches and were necessarily in poor physical condition.

The deliberate plan of savage and barbaric handling of these men was a continuation of the policy which existed on all the marches, and violated virtually every provision of the Geneva Convention of 1929. They were denied adequate nourishment, water, clothing, and shelter. Not only were they denied medical care but they were also subjected to experimental monkey-gland operations. Housing conditions were horrible, resulting in widespread disease.\textsuperscript{36}

American prisoners died in some camps at a rate of 15 to 20 per day. "One witness testified that during a 7- to 8-month period 1,500 prisoners died of beri-beri, dysentery, pellagra, and other

\textsuperscript{35}Blake interview.
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Korean War Atrocities}, p. 11.
diseases as a result of malnutrition at camp No. 5 at Pyoktong."37
Not until early 1951 were there signs that a more systematic ap-
proach to the collection and retention of prisoners was in place.
POW(BNR) accumulation rates are indicated in the Table 2.7.

Maj. Clarence L. Anderson, who was a prisoner of war in Korea for
34 months, and four other American physicians who were prison-
ers, made a comprehensive study of their experiences along medi-
cal lines. He testified that from the start of the Korean War until
the spring or summer of 1951, 38 percent of all prisoners of war
died. During the war's first six months, the survival rate was sig-
ificantly lower. These deaths were to a great extent attributable
to the treatment by Chinese Communists who maintained the ma-
jority of the camps. Many American prisoners died of starva-

Table 2.7

<table>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>March</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td>October</td>
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<td>November</td>
<td>592</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yearly totals</td>
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<td>592</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
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</table>

NOTE: These data, taken from the CILHI Mapper system, are
current through February 1993. The total number of U.S. POWs
who died in captivity was 2,730. This table shows the accumula-
tion rate of the 2,119 POW(BNR) cases in CILHI data as of June
1993.

37 Korean War Atrocities, p. 11.
This compares with 2 percent (3,432 of 173,219) of the Communist prisoners held by UNC who died. DoD POW data as of mid-1955 are shown in Table 2.8.

### U.S. AIR FORCE POW/MIAs

Air Force POW/MIA issues deserve special attention. The problem of U.S. Army POWs was one of quantity in contrast to Air Force POWs who possessed specialized information of great interest to the enemy. Stalin, according to one report, singled out U.S. Air Force POWs to be held as hostages, though it remains unclear where they were to be held and if they were held in this status at all. As will be shown, Soviet intelligence focused on U.S. F-86 and B-29 pilots, crews, and hardware. All of the USAF POWs were segregated from other POWs, held in separate camps under Chinese jurisdiction in North Korean territory, and subjected to

<table>
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<th>Status</th>
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<th>Marines</th>
<th>USAF</th>
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<td>6,656</td>
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<td>263</td>
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<td>Died in captivity</td>
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<td>2,662</td>
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<td>Returned before truce</td>
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<td>650</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Repatriated</td>
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<td>3,323</td>
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<td>Voluntary nonrepatriates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Still retained</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>


38 *Communist Interrogation...* pp. 13-14.

39 In 1953, the Chinese People’s Committee for World Peace published an absurd booklet, *United Nations P.O.W.’s in Korea*, that purports to document “the Lenient Policy—in photographs and in the words of the ‘U.N.’ war prisoners themselves.” According to the Chinese version of events, UN personnel were treated like “long lost brothers” when they were captured. In the camps, according to the Chinese, there was too much food, plenty of recreation, and lots of laughs for the war-weary pawns of capitalist aggression lucky enough to spend some time under Chinese care. *Communist Interrogation...* p. 14.

interrogations by Chinese and Soviet intelligence officers. Some Air Force personnel, held in Chinese territory as political prisoners, were released in 1955.

According to USAF data, between June 25, 1950, and July 27, 1953, 1,303 USAF personnel were declared missing for all reasons. By October 6, 1953, the 1,303 figure had been reduced to 666 USAF BNR cases in the following way: 370 missing were declared KIA; 44 missing were returned to military control; 220 missing were declared POW; and three missing who had been POW were recovered before the end of the war.\(^4\) "According to Congressional testimony, of 263 Air Force personnel who were captured, 235 were repatriated to the United States."\(^4\) Thus, 28 of the 186 USAF personnel figure cited by the UN were unrepatriated POWs if one accepts Congressional data. The number of USAF POW/MIAs accumulated gradually over time in contrast to the large number of Army prisoners taken in the first half of the conflict.\(^43\)


\(^{42}\) Communist Interrogation..., p. 15.

\(^{43}\) "The Korean War, "in so far as Air Force prisoners were concerned, can be divided roughly into four separate phases. From June 1950, the beginning of the war, until the spring of 1951, most captives fell into the hands of the North Koreans rather than the Chinese. The first phase was characterized by extremely poor living conditions and inhuman treatment which resulted in physical suffering and often death. However, the spring of 1951 saw the Chinese Communist forces gradually taking over internment jurisdiction from the North Koreans. During this second phase, treatment improved noticeably as the Chinese developed what they described as a lenient, civilized policy toward prisoners. In the latter part of this phase most Air Force personnel, including airmen, were segregated from other prisoners and transferred to an officers' camp where living conditions in the main compounds were somewhat improved and treatment of the captives generally tolerable. For those prisoners who were thus transferred and for those who later joined them in camp during the balance of 1951, this phase was to continue relatively unchanged for the duration of the war. However, in January 1952 a third phase began when the Chinese inaugurated a program of intensive interrogations of downed air crews regarding bacteriological warfare missions. Many of those shot down in this period were forced to endure long months of isolation and solitary confinement, repeated interrogation, and varying degrees of mental and physical suffering. Finally, in about March 1953, this program of forced bacteriological warfare confessions was deemphasized to the extent that most newly captured air crews were not pressed for such confessions. In the final phase, which lasted for the duration of the war, most Air Force captives were relatively unmolested and able to lead fairly uneventful lives in the prisoner of war camp."
In January 1961, the Department of the Air Force released Manual 200-25, *Missing in Action—Korea*. The USAF list contains one more name than the UNCMAC roster: Darakis, Peter M., AO2224197, Second Lieutenant. Lt. Darakis was carried as an MIA even though the conclusion in this case from on-site observers was “it is doubtful either Lt. Darakis or his observer cleared the aircraft prior to the crash.” These cases are presented in greater detail in the discussion of the UNCMAC 389 list in Chapter Seven.


INTRODUCTION

This chapter has five purposes: (1) to document efforts made by the U.S. government to recover American servicemen captured during combat operations during the Korean War; (2) to document efforts to recover and identify KIAs from the battlefield and to record the location of KIA(BNR) cases; (3) to describe Graves Registration Service activities; (4) to describe post-war remains recovery policies and efforts; and (5) to present documentation concerning the possibility that American POWs were not released at the end of the war and to document official efforts to collect information on these cases. This chapter distinguishes between efforts made before and after the Armistice.

EFFORTS BEFORE THE ARMISTICE

Escape and Evasion

Efforts to recover and account for U.S. casualties in Korea began before the first casualty occurred. The U.S. government made efforts to minimize the number of prisoners taken during the Korean War as well as to maximize the opportunities for Americans to avoid capture or to escape if captured. Army Pamphlet No. 21-46 briefed U.S. forces in Korea on escape and evasion techniques.¹ Soldiers were

taught basic steps that could improve the prospect of avoiding capture. The pamphlet also makes it clear that escape attempts are the soldier's duty.

The official casualty list prepared by the Department of the Army shows that 670 U.S. soldiers captured by the enemy during the Korean War managed to escape and return to military control. This represents nearly one out of every ten men captured. Without exception, however, the escapees had been prisoners for a short period of time and none of them had been transported to permanent POW camps along the Yalu River.

The outstanding fact in a review of Escape and Evasion on the Korean Operation is that no U.S. military personnel succeeded in escaping from an established temporary or permanent POW camp and returning to areas under the control of U.N. forces.

There were no POW camp escape committees along the lines of those created in the German Stalag system. The few that existed were feeble in form thus hardly worthy of any serious consideration in the context of escape and evasion. "Returnee reports indicate that the primary reason for the lack of organized, operating escape committees, as well as for the failure of many of the planned escapes, was the presence of the POW informer." Of the 3,745 U.S. military personnel repatriated in "Little Switch" and "Big Switch," only 94 could be definitely established by 1954 as having participated in bona fide escape attempts. The average escapee avoided capture for two and one-half days. There were no successful escapes that resulted in return to U.S. military control.

The number of escapes from forward assembly points was reduced by the environment. The majority of U.S. Army prisoners were taken during the bitter winter months of November-December 1950. The rugged terrain was another important inhibiting factor, as was the scarcity of food. Most of the escapes were spur of the moment.

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moves made during the first few days of captivity. British diplomat-turned-traitor George Blake, who had been rounded up in Seoul in the first days of the war, managed to escape from a temporary camp into the countryside for a few days but was soon recaptured. He recalled, "You could easily get away if you wanted to, but there was no where to go." The rapid physical deterioration of U.S. POWs was perhaps the most important factor that accounts for the lack of escapes from temporary and permanent POW camps. Of the 4,100 U.S. Army personnel captured in the four-month period November 1950 to February 1951, more than 45 percent died in enemy custody.

The escape and evasion techniques and equipment used by the U.S. Air Force differed from those of the Army. Fliers had to anticipate going down far behind enemy lines or in the ocean. Aircrews were issued so-called "blood chits," silk maps printed in several languages with inquiries intended to contribute to evasion measures. Survival suits designed to protect against exposure were worn in many cases. Aircrews also carried individual radios and flashing devices intended to be used to contact aircraft flying combat air patrol (CAP) over a downed aircraft. Aircrews depended more on search and rescue than escape and evasion to avoid capture.

**Search and Rescue**

U.S. forces sought from the beginning of the Korean War to retrieve as many American aviators as possible as soon as they were in danger of capture. "The Korean war offered the first test for search and rescue organizational tactics developed in World War II." The Soviets recognized the value of the U.S. effort. The Commander of the Soviet 64th Air Corps, General Georgii A. Lobov, recalled, "The American rescue teams were very effective. The Americans realized that you can always get another plane, but pilots were a different matter." By June 1950, the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF) maintained

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8Paul M. Cole, interview with General Georgii A. Lobov, Commander, 64th Air Corps, December 19, 1991, Moscow.
two search and rescue units, the 2nd and 3rd Air Rescue Squadrons. These units operated the search and rescue version of the Flying Fortress, Sikorsky H-5A helicopters, and Grumman SA-16 amphibian aircraft. By the summer of 1951, search and rescue operations were increasingly focused on finding UN airmen who had been shot down behind enemy lines.

These units rescued downed pilots from the sea and also transported wounded soldiers from the front lines to hospitals in the rear. It was "not unusual to have a patient delivered to surgery in less than an hour after being wounded." By August 29, 1950, the Helicopter Detachment had evacuated 83 soldiers whom the Eighth Army surgeon said would never have survived a ten-to-fourteen hour trip by ambulance to a field hospital." The evacuation mission was given a high priority. In August 1950 the Fifth Air Force created a Rescue Liaison Office in the Joint Operations Center and the 3rd Squadron created Detachment F, which quickly resulted in the first rescue of a U.S. pilot from behind enemy lines. Heroism and bravery on the part of the search and rescue crews changed the nature of the battlefield.

Medivac operations became the responsibility of the Eighth Army, which flew its own medical evacuation helicopters. The "3rd Air Rescue Squadron reorganized its old Detachment F on June 22, 1951 and redesignated it as Detachment 1, 3rd Air Rescue Division." The size of the staff was expanded to permit a Search and Rescue Coordination Center to be opened in the Fifth Air Force's Tactical Air Control Center at Seoul. This facility coordinated search and rescue missions over the entire Korean peninsula. Rescue aircraft, which were routinely dispersed laterally along the front of a ground opera-

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9 The 2nd Squadron served the Thirteenth and Twentieth Air Forces, while the 3rd Squadron was based in Japan and came under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force and later the 314th Air Division and its successor Japan Air Defense Force. The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950–1953, p. 536.
ton, were redeployed when the air campaign shifted to the northwest in the fall of 1951. When U.S. strike aircraft flew into this

sector of enemy territory, an SA-16 from Seoul customarily orbited north of Cho-do. If a fighter pilot ran into trouble, he called out a "Mayday" and, if possible, headed to the predetermined orbit-rescue point off Korea's western coast. When the pilot ditched, crash-landed, or parachuted, his own flight gave him rescue combat air patrol until the SA-16 arrived.\(^{13}\)

Procedures were changed during the winter of 1951 to improve the survival prospects for crewmen downed in the icy waters of the Yellow Sea. The search and rescue teams had the most difficulty dealing with pilots downed in tidal swamps and offshore mud flats. The 3rd Air Rescue Group "added distinguished service to its already outstanding Korean war record."\(^{14}\) Between June 25, 1950, and June 30, 1952, "5,258 persons had been picked up and evacuated, 864 of them having been retrieved from beyond enemy lines."\(^{15}\)


\(^{14}\) "During the floods of July 1952 helicopter crews saved 710 United Nations soldiers who were stranded in exposed forward positions by high waters. Enemy opposition and mechanical troubles continued to send friendly pilots to Cho-do and Paengnyong-do bail-out zones, where air-alert SA-16's and ground-alert H-19's picked them up. Using standardized rescue procedures, Detachment 1 and 2157th Squadron crews worked fast and effectively. In probably the fastest air-sea rescue on record, an H-19 from Cho-do hoisted a reconnaissance pilot from the water in fifteen seconds. In September 1952 an H-19 crew rescued a downed airman and two men from a naval helicopter which had crashed in an attempted rescue. The SA-16s commonly flew escort for the H-19's, and other Grumman crews also made rescues. In September 1952 an SA-16 saved Major Frederick C. Blesse, then the leading Sabre ace, when he ran out of fuel over the Yellow Sea after combat in MiG Alley. Outstanding rescues continued in the spring of 1953. On April 12, an H-19 crew rescued Captain Joseph C. McConnell, Jr., when he parachuted into the Yellow Sea. Already an ace, McConnell would continue in combat and become the leading jet ace of the Korean war. In three days, 16-18 May 1953, the H-19's made five aircrew pickups to save six lives. In the first four incidents the H-19's lifted fighter pilots from the Yellow Sea, and in the last episode an H-19 from Seoul penetrated far into enemy territory to save two survivors from a B-26 which had crashed north of Haeju." *The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950–1953*, pp. 541-542.

\(^{15}\) *United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict*, p. 1.
During B-29 raids, SB-29s were assigned to follow the attacking aircraft and to loiter to be able to quickly come to the aid of stricken aircraft returning from the mission. The SB-29s were known as "Guardian Angels."

During the Korean War 1,690 USAF airmen went down in enemy territory and many of these men doubtless did not survive their landings, but air-rescue crews saved 170, or 10 percent, of USAF crewmen who were lost in action over enemy territory. The rescue crews also retrieved 84 airmen of other United Nations air services from areas held by the enemy. 16

Altogether, the Air Rescue Service retrieved 996 men from enemy territory, evacuated 86 airmen from within friendly lines, and evacuated a total of 8,598 men, most of whom were front-line ground casualties. 17 The rescue teams "contributed to the low death rate in Korea, only 25 deaths occurring among 1,000 men wounded as compared with 45 deaths per 1,000 wounded in World War II." 18

Released Prisoners and Rescue Attempts

During the Korean conflict, from time to time the Communist forces would simply release captives for propaganda purposes. These releases were consistent with the Maoist strategy promulgated in 1928. 19 This policy was repeated in the Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in 1947. 20

"Peaceful Valley" temporary camp, located at Kanggye, held 45 Marines and 250 infantrymen captured during fighting at the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950. The Chinese, who were in charge of the camp, "welcomed the POWs as liberated 'brothers-in-arms,'" launched a camp newspaper, held rallies and conducted classes in

In March 1951 a group of POWs, dubbed "The Workers," were taken south from "Peaceful Valley" to orient newly captured POWs and to explain China's "Lenient Policy." Eventually nineteen of these men, eighteen Marines and one Army corporal, were permitted to "escape" to friendly lines, bringing with them a large load of propaganda material.

On January 7, 1951, six out of seven American soldiers who had been captured by the NKPA on January 2 in the vicinity of Chigu-ri were released.

The six remaining US Army personnel were released with instructions to return to their unit. They were given a safe conduct pass to our lines and each received copies of propaganda forms. One of the men was given a letter signed by CMO Ik Cheen, Political Officer.22

The political officer's letter reflects the Maoist principles that guided the release of the prisoners:

Dear Sir:

We send you 6 American prisoners of war back to you.

Because they are not our enemy. Our real enemy is the American war mongers, monopolistic Capitalists and their clique.

We are peace loving people, therefore we advise you to stop the war soon.

We are fighting for self government and our Independence.

We hope that American army will be back home as soon as possible.

Throw away your guns and try to go back home.

I think your parents and wife are waiting for you very eagerly.

Remember me kindly to your soldiers.

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The propaganda included leaflets entitled, "Colored Men of U.S. Forces: Find The Only Way To Live!" and "Dear Officers and Men of U.S. Forces! Protect the Peace Against The War!" On January 15, 1951, the North Koreans released four U.S. servicemen who had been held for four days. This was the third instance within a short span of time that Americans had been released, "apparently for propaganda purposes."

Efforts were made by the UN command to free or retrieve personnel once they had been taken prisoner. These efforts were not always successful. On September 26, 1950, U.S. troops arrived too late to liberate approximately 360 U.S. POWs held in a stockade near the Shin Dang Khung section of Seoul. The U.S. POWs had apparently been moved hours before elements of the Seventh Infantry Division's Thirty-Second captured the prison. The U.S. troops found only prison records listing the POWs by name and rank. Nevertheless, on September 27, 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur announced that prisoners had been liberated when in fact U.S. forces had found nothing but a list of prisoners.

On October 20, 1950, 2,860 members of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team lifted off from Kimpo airfield aboard C-119s and C-47s. The targets were the cities of Sukchon and Sunchon. The main objective of the operation was to trap North Korean officials in the city of Pyongyang, which had been captured by the 1st Cavalry Division and Commonwealth 27th Brigade on October 19. A secondary objective was to rescue a trainload of U.S. POWs that was being moved north from Pyongyang. "On October 21 a paratroop patrol located a prisoner-of-war train hidden in a tunnel near

Myongucham, but the Korean guards had already murdered 75 of the Americans. Fifteen wounded men were saved, and next day these casualties were flown to Ashiya on Combat Cargo planes which were now landing at the newly-captured Pyongyang airfields.²⁶

Other rescue attempts were more successful. In May 1951, a U.S. tank patrol rescued 18 Marines and one U.S. Army soldier who had survived six months of captivity. The group was liberated from the town of Chunchon after they made a sign out of wallpaper that read, “POWs—19—Rescue.” The sign was spotted by the pilot of a U.S. observation plane who radioed the location of the POWs to the tank force.²⁷ It has not been determined how many Americans were rescued from captivity.

TRACKING AND PROCESSING KIA AND KIA(BNR) CASES

Initial Policy

U.S. casualty resolution efforts were initially as improvised as the initial UN military response. At first the effort was ad hoc. The voluntary casualty affairs officer, Col. James N. Lamont, set up a map in his office in the EUSAK compound on which he recorded the locations of MIAs, KIAs and the Missing Air Crews Reports (MACR). This approach did not last long.

The graves registration mission changed almost overnight when the two separate field commands began to fall back after the Chinese Communist Forces intervened in the fighting. Whereas the GRS units, until 25 November, had raced to operate cemeteries near the battle lines, after the Chinese intervention the emphasis was on evacuation to the relative security of rear areas, where the remains were concentrated, later to be further evacuated to Japan. In Japan the remains were to be processed for shipment to their homeland.²⁸

"All isolated burials which were reported by the divisions in their recurring reports and all those claimed by statements of witnesses also were recorded and filed for later use in recovery and disinterment work." 29

The repatriation of Gen. Walker's body soon after he was killed in a jeep accident on December 23, 1950, led to a public outcry in the United States to "send my boy home, too." U.S. policy changed abruptly, creating a new set of problems for the Quartermaster General and the Graves Registration Service. Never before had there been a mass evacuation of KIA remains during hostilities. This became U.S. policy in December 1950, which created an unprecedented demand on the logistic train for dealing with thousands of decomposing cadavers. Many could not be recovered. On November 1, 1950, the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) cut off the escape route for the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment then decimated it. "Hundreds of Cavalrymen perished in this fight; their bodies, unrecoverable under the terms of the Armistice Agreement, remained buried on the hills of Unsan." 30

This change in policy magnified the importance of the activities of the Graves Registration Service, which are discussed in a following section.

Graves Registration Service

Organization. Enormous difficulties confronted U.S. combat forces and all of the combat support services in the early stages of the Korean War. The Graves Registration Service (GRS) was severely understaffed, as has been the case in "every major conflict fought by the United States." 31 The records of the GRS are nonetheless the key to understanding the disposition of U.S. Korean War dead, particularly procedures for identifying KIAs and dealing with unidentified remains. The mission of the GRS in Korea was to verify the identity of all known remains and to establish the identity of unknown remains evacuated from Korea. This included the responsibility to determine

29 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 4.
30 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 31.
31 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. vi.
whether unknowns should be classified as unidentifiable. The GRS also determined whether MIA's and KIA's were recoverable.

When the Korean War broke out, the Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) was organized by Lt. General Walton H. Walker under two separate headquarters, one at Yokohama, Japan (logistics), and the other at Taegu, Korea (advance echelon). The GRS got off to a slow start because the U.S. armed forces regulations defined graves registration as a "wartime service only."

The United States, although its soldiers were being killed, was not officially at war, but the need for graves registration support was immediate, pressing. The support was furnished in small increments immediately, the policy which authorized the Graves Registration Service (GRS) only in wartime was not changed until 1951.32

At the outbreak of the war when four U.S. infantry divisions were in combat, the entire U.S. graves registration effort consisted of one group, the 108th QM GRS Platoon. The former Eighth Army Comptroller, Col. James N. Lamont, became EUSAK's Quartermaster, though immediate responsibility for graves registration was assigned to Capt. Robert J. Thomas. Zone Headquarters, American Graves Registration Service, 8204th Army Unit and Field Operating Section, 8205th Army Unit, were activated on January 2, 1951.33

The GRS in Korea eventually maintained three branches: Records Administration, Identification, and Special Research. The Records Administration Branch maintained records at the division level that consisted mainly of the "293 file," which is the record and case history for each remains. The 293 files were supported by locator cards, 371 forms (a description of the physical characteristics of each casualty), fingerprint files,34 and dental information.35 The Identification Branch was responsible for verifying the identity of known remains and for establishing the identity of unknown remains. The Special

32 Graves Registration Service In the Korean Conflict, p. vi.
33 Graves Registration Activities (American Graves Registration Service Group, February 1953), "Summary of Operations."
34 RG92 Ent 1894, Boxes 652–653.
35 RG92 Ent 1894, Boxes 651–652, see folders "dental data."
Research Branch (SRB) supported the Identification Branch by providing information such as the location of units at any given time so that associations could be made between remains and losses. The SRB assisted the search and recovery program in Korea by furnishing authentic casualty rosters by geographic area. A grid coordinate map similar to the one shown in Figure 3.1 was used to plot the location of graves, aircraft crash sites, and other casualty locations. These rosters were then turned into Field Search Cases (FSC), which were used to identify unknown remains or for making a board finding of nonrecoverability. The SRB also maintained liaison with the Air Liaison Officer responsible for the collection and maintenance of files on all air crashes and missing airmen. On February 21, 1952, a Machine Records Section was established to create a standard IBM card on each remains so that cases could be searched using an Electric Accounting Machine Sorter. This system permitted associations to be established more rapidly.

In July 1950, Lt. John Nolan, the man who suddenly became the first casualty officer, Pusan Base Graves Registration Officer and Personal Effects Officer, was until then a laundry officer. Lt. Nolan volunteered to take care of the dead on an ad hoc basis only after the first body had been in the Pusan area for at least two days. Even after Lt. Nolan received help, there were few supplies and no equipment for the task at hand. Lt. Nolan opened the Eighth Army’s first cemetery—U.S. Military Cemetery No. 1—in Pusan on July 14, 1950. The 2nd Division reported in August 1950 that “25 percent of the burials [of U.S. dead] had to be tagged as ‘unknowns’ because of the Communists’ penchant for removing identification tags ‘for propaganda purposes’.”

Hundreds of dead U.S. servicemen, buried in temporary graves or unburied on the battlefield, could not be recovered as the American forces retreated in the opening phase of the war. GRS personnel had their hands full trying to cope with burials.

\[36\text{Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 9.}\]
Figure 8.1—Grid Coordinate Map

Later coverage of Korea is published in series L752.
Although the few available personnel worked conscientiously, the enemy's tactics made it impossible to recover many of the dead and wounded. It will be recalled that the North Koreans, with their vastly superior numbers and their use of double envelopment maneuvers, isolated the 24th Division's small units and destroyed them piecemeal.37

Burials took precedence over both the vital task of identification and detailed battlefield searches.

**Division Cemetery Policy.** The urgency of the GRS manpower problem in Korea was compounded by a dubious cemetery policy. The EUSAK Quartermaster permitted separate U.S. divisions to maintain their own cemeteries, "in direct refutation of the lesson learned by trial-and-error methods in World War II, that this type of cemetery not only was wasteful of time and effort but also a deterrent to eventual identification of the deceased."38 The effort to retrieve remains was greatly complicated by the U.S. policy that permitted separate division cemeteries. But at the time, this may have been the only option. There were simply not enough trained personnel to maintain a large, central military cemetery. The lack of attention to the GRS function complicated an otherwise chaotic field of data. Divisions opened cemeteries as they advanced and abandoned them as they retreated. During attacks and retreats the QMC Form 1042 (Report and Interment) was frequently lost. In the breakout from the Pusan perimeter operation, no fewer than 12 separate cemeteries were opened. This state of affairs lasted until GRS companies began to arrive, but even then the resources committed to GRS functions were vastly outpaced by the rate at which combat dead accumulated.

During the push to the Yalu, EUSAK became alarmed by the fact that a string of cemeteries was scattered over a 350-mile expanse. On October 24, 1950, the EUSAK Quartermaster directed that remains were to be returned for reburial in a consolidated UN military cemetery operated by the 1st Cavalry Division at the city of Kaesong on the 38th parallel. This directive was never carried out. GRS could not comply with the directive because of a shortage of fuel for trucks and

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37 *Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict*, p. 2.
38 *Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict*, p. 6.
other equipment. The number of unidentifiable cases would have been reduced if this directive had been fulfilled. The Quartermaster of the 24th Division was able to move remains only as far as Sukchon, 400 miles from Kaesong, where they were reburied. If the directive had been realized, the number of remains required to be disinterred and transferred under the Armistice Agreement would have been greatly reduced. GRS estimated that instead of the 112 remains evacuated from Kaesong, over 1,000 remains could have been removed if the October directive had been implemented in full.

The retreat from the Yalu “complicated the immediate problem in Graves Registration and greatly intensified the one of final recovery of the UN dead buried in North Korea.”39 There were many isolated burials, remains left without any burial, and thousands of MIAs. It was impossible to sort out the status of each case at the time. Research went on for years in an effort to reconcile the data. At the Chosin Reservoir, the 1st Marine and 7th Division’s fight out of encirclement left 426 remains behind in cemeteries plus many more in shallow graves. Two cemeteries at Hungam, established to handle those killed during the evacuation, were captured by the Communist forces after the U.S. retreat.

During the Eighth Army’s retreat toward the 38th parallel, there was little time for the GRS to evacuate remains. The Pyongyang UN cemetery was ordered closed on December 3. A collecting point was opened at the Kaesong cemetery. Subsequent collecting points were leapfrogged south.

So precarious was its position that the 114th Company merely processed remains received and trucked them, wrapped in shelter halves and stacked in trailers, to the Inchon cemetery. 40

The Inchon cemetery had barely started operations when CINCFE issued an order that all American dead were to be evacuated to Japan. To this point, U.S. policy was to recover the dead from the battlefield, bury them in temporary cemeteries, then repatriate them after the war. This policy change marked the first time in U.S. history

39Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 31.
40Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 31.
that entire cemeteries were evacuated in the face of an enemy advance. In December 1950, the policy was changed to one of "concurrent return," which called for overseas embalming and shipment of bodies to the United States while the war was still being waged.\footnote{Army Times, August 2, 1982.} Operations began on January 2, 1951, when 864 remains were evacuated by ship from Inchon. Ten months of uneconomical, scattered cemetery operations finally came to an end. Processing of remains for identification began on January 29. As of February 3, 4,454 remains were stored at the Central Identification Unit, Kokura, Japan, following the evacuation of the Eighth Army and at Divisional Cemeteries at Inchon, Taegon, Taegu, and Masan.

Search and Recovery. Search and recovery operations, intended to keep battlefields cleared of the dead, began with Marker and Recovery Teams. Each GRS platoon or collecting point would organize search operations covering a certain map grid square. These teams would bring back either remains or information that no remains were located within a particular grid square. The squads were divided into Marker Teams and Recovery Teams. The Marker Teams following leads, many provided by local children, marked graves once they were located. Locations were recorded on an "Eighth Army Report for Marked Graves," which were later consolidated on a grid square for the use of the Recovery Teams. Recovery Teams left embossed plates or burial bottles to indicate that remains had been recovered. Remains were assigned a recovery number, tagged, wrapped, and tagged again before shipment to Japan. Efforts were made to avoid shipping non-U.S. remains to Japan.

This task was another responsibility of the understaffed GRS, which did not begin large-scale operations until after the Eighth Army began its offensive in the spring of 1951. After the Inchon landing, the Eighth Army's advance opened up an enormous area that had to be searched by a woefully inadequate number of search and recovery teams. When searches were not made expeditiously, weather and the tide of combat tended to obliterate physical clues and dull the minds of those later called upon to specify the location of isolated burial sites. Emphasis was put on the requirement to process the accumulated dead rather than to use scarce manpower to search for
KIA(BNRs). This is one reason why so many unidentified KIAs were accumulated during the first six months of the conflict.

Even after the 565th GRS was deployed, there were still too few men for search and recovery efforts on such an enormous scale. The dead had to be stored while their identities could be established. This required the use of untrained men who were simply assigned this task.

It was clear that the details in caring for the deceased would have to be spelled out clearly to the untrained men if the GRS program was to work. The EUSAK Quartermaster explained the details in publications, two of which reached operating personnel during the drive to the north.\textsuperscript{42}

The shortage of trained or even untrained GRS personnel did not stop the bodies from accumulating. The search and recovery program resulted in a reduced rate of unidentifiable KIAs. When search and recovery cases were received without skulls, patrol leaders or other GRS men were required to certify that a "thorough but fruitless search had been made for the skull."\textsuperscript{43} Other measures that inhibited decomposition, the occurrence of maggots, and other developments that reduced the chance of a positive identification were taken. These included special packaging for putrefied remains and the installation of refrigerated storage facilities at Tanggok.

By March 6, 1951, the EUSAK Graves Registration Officer (GRO) had accumulated reports on 9,182 MIA cases.\textsuperscript{44} Of these, 5,000 were north of the battle line. Because of a lack of equipment and trained personnel, search operations were conducted only in accessible areas known to contain nonrecovered MIAs and KIAs.

This meant that as time passed, recoveries and identifications would become more difficult: recoveries—because weather, tactical action, and reconversion of battle grounds into farm lands would erase clues to location and identification media.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict}, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict}, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict}, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict}, p. 41.
Four thousand remains were in areas that could be explored. Experience showed that a team of four personnel—an investigator, a medical specialist, a driver, and an interpreter—recovered on average one set of remains per day. In March 1951, it was estimated that 4,000 team-days would be required to recover the MIA cases in South Korea. Ten teams would need over a year to do the job.

These statistics, of course, assumed that MIAs were unrecovered KIAs, a postulation proven fallacious by later developments in the exchange of PW lists, the PWs themselves, and the identification of unknowns. This point gives rise to the advisability of developing an experience table to be used in projecting correct MIA and KIA unrecovered percentages.\(^4\)

GRS did not have ten recovery teams.

Search and recovery histories, prepared from information provided by GRS, were studied at Eighth Army Quartermaster Section where the GRS maintained files on all unrecovered MIA and KIA cases. The files consisted of a personnel card and the specific grid coordinates from where remains had been recovered. After the backlog of disinterred bodies had been processed in November 1951, Zone Headquarters took custody of the MIA/KIA files while Eighth Army maintained custody of air crash cases.

Between February and April 1951, the CINCFE estimated the total of accumulated American KIAs to be 7,000. Assuming that 800 remains could be processed per month, CINCFE noted that it would take nearly nine months to deal with the backlog. Since there is a direct relationship between the time between processing and the ability to make a credible identification, the remains handling system was producing fewer rather than more identifications. There were not enough people to handle the growing number of KIAs, thus bodies were not being attended to quickly enough. One GRS company serviced a combat area that included six widely separated divisions. There was obviously an inadequate capability for the search and re-

\(^4\)Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, pp. 41–42.
Efforts to Recover and Account for Korean War Casualties

covery, consolidating isolated burials, and identification tasks at hand.47

By early 1952, a battlefield search system referred to as search and recovery replaced the Marker and Recovery system. When a grave or a body was located, the following procedures were used:

1) The grave was opened, the body disinterred, and the earth thoroughly sieved through a wire screen to ensure recovery of all identification media and the complete remains.

2) Description of all identification media found in the grave and in the surrounding area was recorded on the "Search and Recovery Report." The media were always kept with the remains in a human remains pouch.

3) The grid coordinates of the grave or burial site were noted on the S&R Report, and an overlay or sketch was prepared.

4) Persons furnishing information to the team were interrogated. The statements that were obtained, when appropriate, contained such information as date of death, circumstances surrounding death, and a physical description of the decedent. The information thus gathered accompanied the body to the company operations sections. Here the facts were checked and sent back to the Eighth Army, where they became the framework of the case history.48

Skeletal blackout charts and other information were forwarded to Kokura to assist in the identification process.

GRS had to deal with the unique task of separating U.S. dead from UN dead and the bodies of enemy KIAs at a central facility in Tanggok before shipment to Kokura. One of the first tests of the new system occurred when U.S. dead, evacuated from Minyang then reinterred at Tanggok, were exhumed and shipped to Kokura for processing.

47Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 19.
48Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 45.
The collection of identification media was greatly improved after the central graves registration laboratory at Tanggok, which included a refrigerated storage facility, went into operation. Before remains were shipped to Kokura, the following preliminary identification steps were taken:

Step 1: The mortuary Identification Chief, under the supervision of the Operations Officer, had the remains placed on a processing table which was covered with a length of 72”-wide waterproof paper sprinkled with Lindane.

Step 2: The Identification Chief checked the ID tags against the emergency medical tag to verify the name and serial number of the deceased. If no ID tags were present, the Identification Chief took special care to examine clothing, belt, and shoes—which were removed by cutting laces with razor blade or surgical knife—for identification media.

Step 3: GRS men search all pockets for any identification media or personal effects which might have been overlooked in previous searches. In the event such items were located, they were placed in the [personal effects] pouch, and a notation to that effect was made on the Inventory of Effects form.

Step 4: Next came fingerprinting. After injecting a solution of 3 per cent formaldehyde into the distal portion of each finger, the mortuary personnel cleaned all fingers with water, alcohol, or carbon tetrachloride. The ID Chief then made two impressions of fingertips—carefully, to assure clear prints. (One set of fingerprints accompanied the remains; the other one was forwarded to the Eighth Army.) When fingers were too dehydrated for clear impressions, the ID Chief made latex moulages from which to take impressions. In other cases, when remains were in advance stages of decomposition and “skin slip,” the epidermis on the fingers was carefully cut off and thoroughly cleaned. Then the fingerprint operator slipped the epidermis over his own fingertip and made prints, after which he placed the epidermis individually in burial bottle containing alcohol or 3 per cent formaldehyde and marked with the deceased’s name, serial number, and the specific finger from which the epidermis came. In all of the above cases, when fingerprinting was completed, the fingers were wrapped in cotton and the hands encased in mittens made of waterproof paper and tied together for security.
Step 5: The fingerprinting completed, mortuary men dusted the remains with Lindane powder and sprayed them with wintergreen mixed with a deodorant. They also packed penetrating wounds and amputations carefully, using formaldehyde-soaked compresses, if necessary, to prevent leakage. The body was checked again to see if the emergency medical tag was in the burial bottle under the right armpit, and then the remains were wrapped in the waterproof paper and sealed with masking tape. The remains, placed in a human-remains pouch, were then consigned to the company's 900-square foot reefer to await shipment.

Step 6: This last step consisted of a last minute check of evacuation tags against passenger lists, movement in convey to the airfield, and loading aboard the plane.49

Following these procedures, the remains were then shipped to the Kokura facility in Japan. In the summer of 1951, the condition of the bodies received at Kokura was often ghastly. In the beginning of the cemetery evacuation operations, ships bearing the remains of Americans often arrived at the Kokura facility "shoe-top deep in maggots."50 The prospects for a positive identification were often severely diminished by the time an individual had been buried and reburied two or three times then shipped in an unrefrigerated cargo vessel to Japan in the middle of the Asian summer heat.

During February 1952, consideration was given to the possibility of evacuating remains by air rather than surface transportation. The change was motivated by the fact that bodies, which deteriorated rapidly in the summer, could be transported from a refrigerated facility in Korea to another in Japan in less than four hours by air. The first air evacuation, "Operation Test," was completed April 5-16, 1952. The result of air evacuation was noticed in the decreased number of unknown remains, more rapid verification of known remains and the most expeditious return of remains to the next of kin by the GRS since its inception. By July 1952, when there were five companies in Korea, the Graves Registration Service Group administered its responsibilities from Japan.

49 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, pp. 40-41.
50 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 56.
Central Identification Unit, Kokura

The American Graves Registration Service Group, the official name of the Kokura facility, consisted of a headquarters that handled administration and verified identifications, a Field Operating Section (FOS) that processed, embalmed, and shipped bodies, and a Central Identification Unit (CIU) that performed scientific research for identification media. The Kokura facility came into being on January 2, 1951—the same day that a shipment of 864 remains disinterred from the Inchon cemetery arrived for processing. The Zone Headquarters, American Graves Registration Service Group, Kokura, Japan, was established to process the thousands of U.S. dead that were evacuated from battlefields and cemeteries in Korea. "It had to be born a mature and capable entity, complete within itself, for there was no time for training and no precedent in history upon which to pattern its actions."51 By the end of January 1951, 4,453 war dead had been received. As the backlog of bodies was dealt with, the identification processing was simplified. This was because fewer skeletal or decomposed remains were received, which also made working conditions far less gruesome. The Kokura facility continued to operate after the Armistice.

The CIU in Kokura was responsible for processing remains, recording physical characteristics, and making comparisons with information in various records. The procedures the EUSA Quartermaster spelled out in the basic documents on GRS procedures pointed out that Report of Interment (MD QMC Form 1042) was the "most important basic record of the Graves Registration Service."52 This document, which provided details on identity and grave location, was used by the Adjutant General to determine the status of many casualties. The process of identifying the remains of those who bore some sort of identification tag was detailed but straightforward. In contrast, remains found without identification tags required additional attention on the battlefield. The unit commander or someone else acquainted with the deceased was required to view the remains then prepare a statement noting how long the identifier had known the deceased. "In all cases where positive identification had

51Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 49.
not been established, GRS personnel would record the deceased’s fingerprints on the reverse side of the Form 1042 before burial.\textsuperscript{53}

The directive was quickly changed so that fingerprints of all of the deceased would be collected if they were obtainable.

The CIU system developed during World War II was the basis for the same operation in Korea. The CIU removed and identified all clothing, identification tags and personal effects. The entire body was examined for scars, tattoos, physical abnormalities, and amputations. These marks and characteristics were photographed. Dental technicians charted the teeth for future comparison. Four anthropologists viewed the remains. In air crashes and tank battles that produced a great deal of disarticulated bones, the anthropologists segregated the pieces and reconstructed the physical characteristics for comparison with OQMG Form 371.

The following illustrates how the identity of known remains was verified:

The CIU processes the remains, completing DA Form 551, Report of Interment, AGO Form 54, Inventory of Effects, QMC Form 1044, Physical Characteristics; DA Form 569, Dental Chart; QMC Form 1044b, Skeletal Chart; Fingerprint cards; and furnishing X-Ray pictures, fluoroscope reports, and chemical findings as necessary.

A copy of the incoming Passenger list is forwarded by the Operations Officer to the Records Administration Branch as soon as received. The Passenger list is used as a basis to establish the Master File Card for each remains.

A fingerprint card is normally received from the CIU by the Records Branch within 48 hours after the remains arrive. In turn, this card is forwarded to OQMG for verification of the fingerprints by the FBI.

At the time the fingerprint card is forwarded, a request in the same communication is made for Form 371—Physical Characteristics, and for dental information of the individual concerned. This information not only comes to us from OQMG, but also from the AG Section of the Far East Command from records available in the casualty’s field 201 file.

\textsuperscript{53}Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 28.
Upon completion of the processing of the remains by the CIU, the case papers are forwarded to the Records Branch, where a locator card is made out, and a 293 file is then established. When the Form 371 is received, the case is sent to the Identification Branch where it is written in the form of a Case History verifying the identity of the individual concerned by comparing the results of the laboratory processing with date of record. Upon receipt of the fingerprint verification, the case is completed and forwarded to the Board of Review for approval, and then to the Chief of Identification for final approval.

A copy of the approved case is then forwarded to OQMG and a copy of the Board Findings is forwarded to the Field Operations Section as a casketing order and release for shipment. From the approved Board Findings the Records Branch prepares a Passenger List of all approved cases which are ready for return to the ZI on the 10th and 25th of each month.  

By the winter of 1952, the identification laboratory at Kokura, Japan, was receiving bodies on a regular basis. GRS platoon functions and responsibilities now included the maintenance of operational maps that pinpointed the location of MIA cases, places from where remains had been recovered, and the point of contact between UNC and enemy forces. This contributed greatly to the effort to identify KIAs.

The prospects for positive identification for many KIAs were greatly diminished, however, by the overwhelming magnitude of the problem initially faced by the GRS.

From the start of hostilities until the Eighth Army Laboratory [at Kokura] began operations on 28 January 1951, 7,924 interments had been made in various cemeteries; 15 per cent of these interments were carded as unknowns. In addition, a number of discrepancies had been discovered in the records of those buried as ‘known.’ The primary reason for this large number of unknowns was the shortage of graves registration personnel supporting Army operations and the lack of training and experience of the medical technicians. Early in the operation, if identification tags were present, no further effort

54 *Graves Registration Activities*, "Graves Registration Records Division: Mission and Functions."
was made to substantiate the identifications. In many cases where identification tags were not found around the neck of the decedent, the burial was made as an unknown and no further effort was made to establish identity. The measurement of height, description of birth marks, scars, tattoos, color of hair and eyes, clothing markings—all very important clues in identification—were not recorded because the personnel conducting the graves registration operations had no training in this type of work. Thus, when identification media were present on the remains, these media were buried and became irrevocably lost due to the deterioration of the evidence or decomposition and disarticulation of the bodies. Therefore, the neglect in recording all identification media when it was readily available was costly, as later events proved.55

This problem was addressed as the conflict continued but this had no effect on KIAs buried as unknowns during the first months of the war. On August 1, 1952, a new procedure called "Field Search Data," which required 11 distinct steps, was in place for search and recovery operations.

In addition to physical descriptions, in the case of unknowns a qualified dental technician at Kokura prepared a tooth chart. All of this information was typed on a Report of Interment. “When, in the opinion of the laboratory officer, a photograph of the deceased would help in identification, a Signal Corps photographer was called in. All information gathered was assembled in separate case brochures.”56 The results of the effort proved to be equal to the investment. During the first three months the identification laboratory was in operation, less than 2 percent were buried as unknowns and all of those fingerprinted were later identified. This success rate applied to bodies obtained directly from the battlefield. Over the same three-month period in 1951, the identification success rate for the 100 search and recovery cases was much lower. Fingerprinting was impossible. “Physical characteristics were obliterated because the bodies were disarticulated and skeletal. Tooth charts were made in most cases, and some laundry marks were found by careful searching. About 40 per cent of these S&R cases were unknown.”57

55Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, pp. 34–35.
56Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 35.
57Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 35.
As of January 1953, GRS had processed 4,172 unknown remains of which 2,472 (60 percent of unknown KIAs) had been identified. The identification process would last for many more months.

EFFORTS AFTER THE ARMISTICE

Armistice

The Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, that brought an end to the combat phase of the Korean War provided for the exchange of prisoners and the remains of the dead under the supervision of the Neutral National Repatriation Commission. The most important POW exchanges, Little Switch and Big Switch, are discussed in this section, as is the most important exchange of war dead, Operation Glory.

Post-War Remains Recovery Plans

U.S. Graves Registration personnel initially anticipated that they would have access to North Korean territory, perhaps under the protection of diplomatic immunity, to recover more than 1,600 UN dead buried north of the 38th parallel. The Far East Command (FEC)/UNC anticipated in 1952 that ten months to one year would be needed to complete a search and recovery operation in North Korea. "In a peace without total victory the only way to recover these bodies was by negotiation." The remains recovery plan presented at the truce negotiations was based on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that each side desired to recover war dead. Second, it was assumed that each side preferred to recover its own dead. Each side would therefore require access to territory controlled by the other side to complete this task.

As the negotiations proceeded, the UN negotiators no longer anticipated they would obtain permission to search for war dead above the demilitarized zone (DMZ). They also concluded that if the Korean People's Army (KPA)/CPV expressed a desire to search for remains below the DMZ, the purpose of such a mission would be for intelligence or propaganda. This was based on the fact that during combat...

58Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 59.
operations the KPA/CPV forces did not demonstrate any great interest in recovering their war dead.

Only one paragraph, Paragraph 13f, in the Korean War Armistice Agreement deals with the recovery of human remains. In the year following the signing of the Armistice, little activity occurred under the provisions of Paragraph 13b. Between August 12 and November 21, 1953, each side conducted search and recovery operations in its own half of the DMZ. Each side as it recovered its own dead was required to report to the other side the location and quantity of the other side’s dead found. This was the last time that either side has been permitted to enter the DMZ in search of remains.

At the 47th Meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) on August 17, 1954, an agreement was signed that fundamentally altered the remains recovery procedure. This agreement reversed the original concept, which provided for each side to recover its own dead in the other’s territory. This agreement expired on October 30, 1959.

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59. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves as to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). The Commanders of the opposing side shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

60. The first two paragraphs of the 20-paragraph agreement read as follows: "Paragraph 1: Each side shall be responsible for disinterring and transporting the bodies of military personnel, including bodies of prisoners of war, of the other side that have been confirmed after diligent search to be at reported places in the territory under its military control to the designated area agreed upon by the two sides, and to deliver them to the side to which the deceased military personnel belong. Paragraph 2: Establish a Graves Registration Committee to plan and supervise the delivery and reception of the aforesaid bodies by the two sides, and to handle other related matters. (a.) The Committee shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Each side may designate staff assistants to join in the work of the Committee when necessary. (b.) When the Committee is unable to reach agreement on any matters of its concern, it may submit matters to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. (c.) The Committee shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of its task."
1954. Only the last paragraph, Paragraph 20, remains in effect. The agreement to restrict recovery efforts in enemy territory was taken to deny North Korean and Chinese intelligence services masquerading as graves registration units access to South Korean territory.

**Operation Glory**

The exchange of bodies and other remains, which began on September 1, 1954, was known as "Operation Glory." The Glory plan divided the support and coordination among the Air Force, Navy, the Eighth Army, and the Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ), but the actual operation was carried out by GRSCOM (Graves Registration Service Command). The scope of the operation was limited to known cemeteries that were to be evacuated within 60 days. Accredited members of the UN press corps were given access to all phases of the operation, including access to the DMZ. The press was asked not to photograph the remains containers and by agreement no photographs were permitted of the personnel on ei-

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61. "Our side agrees that the 'Understanding on Administrative Details for the Delivery and Reception of Bodies of Military Personnel of Both Sides,' except for Paragraph 20, be terminated effective midnight Oct. 30, 1954, and the Graves Registration Committee be dissolved at the same time in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 19 and 2c of the said Understanding. Hereafter, matters pertaining to the delivery and reception of bodies of military personnel will be dealt with in accordance with Paragraph 20 of the said Understanding." Special Meeting of the Joint Duty Officers Held at MAC Headquarters Area, October 30, 1954.

62. The record of Operation Glory presented here is based on primary source documents from two sources: the National Archives and CILHI. Many of the CILHI records were saved from destruction by Tadau Furue when the Kokura CIU was closed. Much of this material, which would have been destroyed without Furue’s efforts, has apparently not been registered with the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For the order to close the Kokura facility and to dispose of its records, see Lt. Col. G. C. Maxwell, Assistant Adjutant General in HQ Korean Zone of Communications, noted on December 3, 1954: "1. Korean Communications Zone Operation Plan KCA-OPS 14-54 (Glory) has been implemented and may be retired from current files. 2. All reference copies of Operation Plan KCZ-OPS 14-54 (Glory) may be destroyed . . . . By Order of Colonel Vissering."

63. Operations Plan KCZ-OPS 14-54 (Glory) (Revised). The exchange was scheduled to commence on September 1, 1954, and be completed on or before October 31, 1954.

ther side involved in the exchanges in the DMZ, but otherwise there were no announced restrictions on the press.

During Operation Glory, remains were considered unidentified until a positive identification was verified. Army guidance for the operation was cautious, since “establishing positive identification is sometimes a long and ugly process.”65 The bodies of UN personnel were sent by train to Pusan then by ship to Kokura. The Army’s procedure was to make an identification at the Quartermaster Laboratories at Kokura, notify the next of kin, ask for a disposition decision, then release a roster of names to the press.

Under the agreement between the UNC and the Communist forces, approximately 4,000 bodies and remains were to be returned to the UNC and approximately 14,000 to the Communists.66 The Quartermaster, Korean Communications Zone, was responsible for all phases of Operation Glory. U.S. forces were ordered to see that “all details will be carried out with respect and reverence.”67 The U.S. remains were listed by evacuation number (each beginning with the preface “N”), name, and serial number and grouped according to the 13 cemeteries, POW camp cemeteries, or isolated burial sites from which the remains were alleged to have been recovered.

As the dead were returned, the names that were provided by the Communist forces were released by the DoD and published in the New York Times in August.68 An example of the Operation Glory exchange list provided by the Communist side follows in Table 3.1.

Procedures followed at Kokura to identify the dead recovered during Operation Glory are well documented. Each set of remains was examined in the following fashion. The identification team removed

65Appendix A to Annex 2 to Letter of Instructions to KCZ-OPS 14-54 (Glory), Hq KComZ dated August 23, 1954, “Press Briefing.”
67HQ Korean Communications Zone AG 312.1 CZQM-0, Subject: Letter of Instructions to KCZ-OPS 14-54 (Glory).
68See the lists under the rubric “GI's listed by the foe as dead,” August 14 (121 names); August 15 (257 names); August 16 (209 names); August 18 (206 names); and August 22 (43 names). All were reported by the Communists to have died in POW camps. New York Times, 1953.
Table 3.1
Example of an Operation Glory Exchange List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Nationality: U.S.A. Name</th>
<th>Identifying Material</th>
<th>Burial Site</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Casey, William Alfred</td>
<td>tag 1</td>
<td>Hungnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Story, Leroy Gene</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 1090312USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>McRoberts, James H.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 026995USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Driskill, William C.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 1094018USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Trainer, Atlee B.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 649132USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Endsley, Wendell C.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 050019USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Beville, James E.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 1056906USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mitchell, Grady P.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 049074USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Pickett, James T.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 1065774USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hoadlund, Allan B.</td>
<td>tag 1 Report of interment 1</td>
<td>Hungnam 633665USMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ROSTER OF BODIES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND PRISONERS OF WAR FOR DELIVERY AND RECEPTION

It is acknowledged that the bodies listed above with a total of 25 remains have been delivered and received by both sides at Tongjiang-ni on 1 September, 1954.

SOURCE: RG92 Ent. 1894, Office of the Quartermaster General, General Correspondence, 1953-1954, Box 651.

clothing and equipment from the remains then fluoroscoped the body to detect metallic or other dense identifying media—identification tags, teeth, rings, wallets—that were sometimes driven deep into the body by shell fragments. The clothing was examined and tagged with a Central Identification Unit (CIU) case number that was used on QMC Forms 1044, 1044B, Identification Data; DD Form 559, Identification Dental Chart; and DD Form 551, Report of Interment (which superseded QMC Form 1042 in November 1951). Remains
Efforts to Recover and Account for Korean War Casualties

were identified as skeletal, semi-skeletal, flesh-covered, or current. "When sufficient portions of skeletal or semiskeletal upper and lower extremities were present, the team took measurements of long bones on the Rollet Scales and correlated the data with Krogman and Rollet tables to determine height." In the case of unknowns with recognizable facial features, full face and profile photographs were made.

The final step in the identification process was taken by the Graves Registration Records Division, Zone Headquarters. "Correlation of all evidence to produce a case of positive identity was the mission of the Records Division." CIU sent its findings and all other information collected to this division, which acted as the Quartermaster's bureau of missing persons. The division weighed the evidence, considered time, place, unit, characteristics, tactical situations, and cause of death, then forwarded to a review board its opinion on whether Body A was actually Serviceman A. Identification tags were considered to be circumstantial evidence good enough to a "believe-to-be" (BTB) but this was not sufficient grounds on which to base a positive identification. Evidence from FEC Form 371 was coded onto IBM punch cards that were stored at Camp Drake. This allowed researchers to sort information by machine in search of a particular set of characteristics. The Machine Records Branch kept three sets of cards on casualties.

In 1964, a decision was made to transfer "the punched card file of Korean War casualties" to magnetic tape. After this data transfer was completed, the 110,000 IBM cards were destroyed. The information was used as the basis for CILHI's Mapper system. The destruction of the IBM cards should not be confused with the casualty

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69 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 50.
70 Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 52.
71 1) One deck catalogued according to map-sheet location and maintained as such so that only the cards applicable to the area in which the remains were covered were run through the machine. 2) One deck catalogued according to dental characteristics (which, next to fingerprints, are the most definite indicators of identity). Keyed to missing teeth first, this second deck could rapidly associate remains with outstanding dental peculiarities. 3) One master deck arranged alphabetically so as to simplify withdrawal of cards on those remains which had been definitely identified." Graves Registration Service in the Korean Conflict, p. 55.
72 Letter from Col. J. M. Gardner, AGC Deputy Commander to Director, Adm Svc TAGO, January 1965.
cards last known to be at Camp Drake. Two sets of IBM cards labeled "Big Switch, FOD, ROD, Dishonorable discharges, Duplications, MIA, other services" and "Little Switch" have been located at the Suitland Reference Branch of the National Archives in the Phase II RECAP-K processing of returned American captured personnel files.

As Operation Glory began, the United Nations Command made it clear that no identification would be accepted until it was confirmed after an examination of the remains at Kokura, Japan. The U.S. government funded ground-breaking basic research in forensic sciences in an effort to identify remains with a high degree of certainty. In 1954 the U.S. Graves Registration Service retained Dr. T. Dale Stewart to help identify Korean War dead. Stewart worked for four months in Kyushu, Japan in a warehouse where boxes containing unidentified bones were stored.

Every day, boxes were unpacked, bones laid out in anatomical order on workbenches, and each one described in relentless detail under the scrutiny of the eminent professor from the Smithsonian. Although good-natured and jocular, Stewart insisted on a rigorous attention to method and an almost messianic devotion to the science.73

Stewart's work was "primarily on a special research project for the Office of the Quartermaster General and not in direct support of the immediate problem of the identification of remains."74 Stewart's research produced one of the most reliable methods for estimating age at the time of death. As shown in Chapter Eight of this study, these data play a role in the contemporary effort to determine whether the North Koreans have returned remains of Americans lost during the Korean War.

At the conclusion of Operation Glory in 1954, the Department of Defense stated that the remains of 4,023 UNC personnel, including

74 Memorandum from Col. John D. Marty, Jr., Chief, Memorial Division, to Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, February 19, 1953.
1,868 Americans, had been returned by the Communist side. Of the 4,023 remains, 2,476 were associated with names and 1,547 were listed as unknown. Of the remains associated with Americans, 1,020 were identified, and 848 unidentified remains were declared unknown casualties. Over the years since the end of Operation Glory, an additional 11 Americans have been added to the roster of those whose remains have been recovered but not identified, bringing the total to 859.

Table 3.2 shows the names of temporary cemeteries associated by the Communist forces with American unknowns obtained through Operation Glory. Unknown remains from the Kokura CIU and other Glory unknowns are also shown, to provide perspective.

In August 1982, UNCMAC requested, for the first time, the repatriation of all UNC personnel buried in North Korea. All American unidentifiable casualties with the exception of the Korean War Unknown Soldier are buried in Honolulu, Hawaii, at the Punchbowl Cemetery. The unknowns, whose names still appear on the Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporary Cemetery</th>
<th>Total Recovered Unknown Remains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kokura</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Glory</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ichon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masan</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanggok</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegon</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

75 Fact Sheet on Americans Unaccounted for in the Korean War, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, June 9, 1986.
76 Fact Sheet on Americans Unaccounted for in the Korean War.
Monuments Commission 8,177 list, are clustered in individual plots to the right of the main gates beyond the visitor's building. Thus, over 10 percent of all U.S. BNR cases are located in U.S. territory.

WITHHELD UNC POWs

Little Switch

Before and after the Armistice was in force, both sides exchanged prisoners of war according to a well-defined set of procedures. The first exchange, for sick and wounded prisoners, took place during the period April 19-26, 1953. This operation, which was known by the code name Little Switch,

would not have been possible had not fifty-two Red Cross societies called last fall for an exchange of sick and wounded; and had they not had an International Red Cross machinery, which included a man from the Soviet Union.77

During the operation, the Communist forces returned 684 sick and wounded UNC POWs, including 149 Americans.78 The formulation “sick and wounded” was offered by the Communist side and accepted by UNC, which had proposed “severely sick and wounded.” UNC returnees were sent to hospitals in Japan for medical treatment and interrogation. Americans were quickly evacuated to the United States by air, most in less than one week. On May 1, 1953, the Communist side announced that “all sick and injured prisoners fit to travel” had been released.79 The returnees had been, in many cases, carefully selected by the Communist side to create the impression that the UNC POWs had been well treated.

Debriefings of released U.S. POWs were conducted by the DoD for several purposes:

a) to learn as much as possible about the prisoner himself and to
determine whether or not he had succumbed to Communist indoctrination techniques; b) to collect information about prisoners still held by the enemy and to determine whether or not prisoners eligible for return (as sick and injured) were still being held in violation of the exchange agreement; c) to collect information of general interest to intelligence; and d) to collect information regarding mistreatment of Communist-held prisoners and other war crimes committed by the Communists during hostilities in Korea.80

Priority was given to obtaining information concerning prisoners eligible for repatriation under the terms of Little Switch who had not been returned. By May 1, 234 non-Koreans and 141 Koreans had been conclusively identified as eligible and willing for repatriation but not returned. Admiral Daniel, the Senior UNC Liaison Officer, accused the Communists of bad faith and lodged an official protest at the May 1 and 2 liaison officers' meetings. As of May 9, approximately 258 UNC prisoners (other than Republic of Korea) eligible for return were identified as being retained by the Communist side. The G2 document from which this information is taken does not identify how many of the 258 were Americans.

The UNC collected information from repatriates about POWs who were not handed over during Little Switch. One POW memorized the names and addresses of 50 Americans who, though listed as dead or missing, were seen in captivity.81 On May 2, 1953, UNC told Communist liaison officers that "indisputable evidence" proved that "more than 375 sick and injured captured United Nations Command personnel who are fit to travel and who desire repatriation" were not permitted to return to UNC control. North Korean Major General Lee Sang Cho, representing the Communists, said that all UN prisoners eligible for return under the terms of Little Switch had been returned.82 On May 3, General Nam II, the head of the Communist truce negotiators at Panmunjom, replied to a second day of UNC

protests by calling for a recess, presumably to allow time for him to seek instructions from his political masters. One former POW brought back in a small notebook the names of 76 Americans who were not repatriated. The list included John Curtin, Patrick J. Dempsey, Richard S. Raby, Morris R. Wills, and J. R. Liveillee. A list of 75 names was also publicized. Another Army POW, Private James J. Coogan, managed to smuggle out a list of 71 Americans who were thought to be alive in Communist custody following Little Switch.

Many of the names appeared to be written in the prisoner’s own handwriting in one of the books, while Coogan used the other to transcribe the names in a neat hand.


Corporal Fon Mitchell brought back the names of 56 Americans who had not been released. The Marine Corps announced on May 4 the names of 69 Marines “believed held by the Communists as Korean war prisoners.” On May 22, the Marines added 78 names to that list. On May 13, Private Peter La Claire released the names of about 200 American “prisoners he said he had seen recently and who were in good health.” The names included Frank Salerno, Tom Cole, James Tutino, Ratzell Diaz, and Luis Devalle.

84Since this was the first POW release, some of these men were accounted for after Big Switch and Operation Glory. Wills, for example, turned out to be a VNR who voluntarily chose to go to China rather than return home.
87“G.I.’s Smuggle Out Lists of Captives.”
Big Switch

The majority of American POWs were released between August 5 and September 6, 1953, in an operation given the codename "Big Switch." In contrast to the air evacuation of Little Switch repatriates, General Clark recommended a plan that provided for the return of POWs to the United States by ship. During Little Switch, POWs had been evacuated by plane through medical channels to Japan. DoD announced that unlike Little Switch, this time there would be no "special treatment for any soldiers, airmen, marines or Navy personnel who might have succumbed to 'Communist influence.'" DoD did not inform the public that under Clark's plan the time on board would permit intelligence officers to conduct extensive debriefings under more controlled circumstances, away from press scrutiny.

A Top Secret G2 evaluation following Big Switch "conservatively estimated that approximately 30 percent of the U.S. personnel processed had collaborated to some degree with the enemy." The assessment continued:

Three returnees confessed to accepting definite subversive missions in their respective countries and one of the three was equipped with an elaborate code and had a very practical channel of communication which utilized sound security measures. Another returnee indicated that approximately fifty repatriates had accepted Communist subversive missions in the U.S., Philippines, and Hawaii. G2 estimated that approximately 15 percent of returnees accepted some degree of Communist indoctrination.

At the end of the POW switches, the Communist forces had returned 284 more U.S., 338 fewer South Korean, and 48 more UN personnel than they had originally promised. This is illustrated in Table 3.3.

The UNC promised to return 74,000 Communist POWs but in fact returned 75,801, 1,801 more than originally planned.

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92 Korean War Almanac, p. 62.
94 Historical Report (Top Secret) Headquarters, USAFE, August-September 1953, p. 22.
Table 3.3
Final Report of Repatriation of POWs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Communist List Total POWs to Be Repatriated</th>
<th>Total Repatriated</th>
<th>Percentage Repatriated</th>
<th>Number Over or Under</th>
<th>Claimed by UN That Communists Still Hold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,313</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>108.57</td>
<td>+284</td>
<td>944&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>8,186</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>95.89</td>
<td>-336</td>
<td>2,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>140.00</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>102.49</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>215.00</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>200.00</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>133.33</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,763</td>
<td>12,760</td>
<td>99.97</td>
<td>+335</td>
<td>3,404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: These data were found in RG 319 (Army Staff) AC of S G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1954, 383.6, May to July, Box 1692.

<sup>a</sup>Army 610; Marine Corps 19; Air Force 312; Navy 3.
<sup>b</sup>Two POWs identified by the Communists as Japanese were proven to be ROK.

UNC Protests

During the POW exchange operations, questions were raised by the UN forces as to whether the North Koreans and Chinese were living up to the provisions of the Armistice. On the third day of the Big Switch prisoner exchange, General Mark Clark said,

We do have certain evidence that indicates that there are additional prisoners alive who should be returned, and I assure you as Commander in Chief, while I am there, I will press that in the military and political conferences . . . . [The Communists] respect force and I know of no way except through political and diplomatic means of getting any reaction from them on this prisoner of war.
question other than the application of force, which is not in the cards, in my opinion.95

Some of the first American returnees reported that just before August 5, 1953, the Communists held trials for UNC POWs, particularly officers, and sentenced them to prison. The returnees said that the Communists "had no intention of returning them during the prisoner exchange."96 As the prisoner exchanges progressed, the pattern of returnees was consistent with these reports. The number of officers returned was "very small," according to G2. On August 10, 1953, UNC Headquarters reported to General Taylor, who was acting UNC CINC during General Clark’s visit to the United States, that in view of the fact that the Communists might be withholding UNC POWs, perhaps the UNC policy of repatriating war-crime suspects should be modified. Such a modification would have required approval by the U.S. government. On August 12, General Taylor instructed the KCOMZ commander,

as a guard against bad faith, to insure that we do not return a larger percentage of our officer POWs than the Communists are delivering.97

Taylor was told that 2,812 Communist officers had already been returned, leaving only 230 in UNC custody. Taylor ordered that these officers and the war crime and post-capture offenders be held until the last shipment. On August 13, CINCUNC received JCS approval for these steps.

On August 14, HQ Far East Command asked for a list of American, ROK, and UNC personnel "believed still to be in enemy hands." The information was intended to be used by UNCMAC in subsequent efforts to recover all UNC personnel in enemy hands before the conclusion of Operation Big Switch. Taylor advised all relevant com-

95Eisenhower Sees ‘Victories’ in Truce; Reds Hint Some Captives May Be Kept; Clark Calls for Atom Bomb If Peace Fails,” New York Times, August 7, 1953.
96Historical Report, p. 22, citing G1 Staff Section Report (Secret), August 1953 (Annex 3).
97Historical Report, p. 23, citing Msg CX 64341 (Secret), CINCUNC (signed Taylor) to DA, August 12, 1953 (Incl. 5).
mands to be alert for factual evidence of Communist violations of the Armistice agreement to return all UNC personnel. He argued that UNCMAC should be prepared to retaliate if the Communists retained any UNC POWs. A system for collecting data was established at a meeting conducted by General Taylor on August 15. The G1 Section, Headquarters AFFE, was named as monitoring agency.

On August 15, CINCUNC received a report that only 139 of 230 Communist officer POWs remained in UNC custody. A Communist monitoring team was present at Koje-do where the 139 were held. It would have been impossible to delay their repatriation without creating the basis for a Communist protest. CINCUNC therefore ordered that the 139 be moved as if they were being repatriated, then held at a maximum security facility in the Munsan-ni area. In the final days of the Switch operation, all of the Communist POWs, including the 139 officers, were returned. Within one week of the end of the operation, the Senior Member UNCMAC asked the Communists for an accounting of 3,100 U.S. and UNC POWs "positively identified by returnees as being or having been in North Korean POW camps." Radio Peking replied with a charge that the United States retained POWs on trumped up charges of war crimes. John Foster Dulles, responding to a question before he had been briefed on the subject, said on September 7 that there was no evidence that the Communists were withholding U.S. POWs. Radio Peking announced that this proved the U.S. accusations were false.

This issue was pursued by UNC on behalf of all UNC forces. On December 22, 1953, the Assistant Secretary of the Army sent to the Secretary of the Army a "brief synopsis of past actions and future plans concerning the 3,404 United Nations and Republic of Korea personnel previously listed as prisoners of war and still unaccounted for by Communist Forces." The text of this letter is in Appendix 5. The Assistant Secretary promised to stay on top of the issue and to keep the Chief of Staff informed of significant developments.

98 Historical Report, p. 25.

99 Memorandum to Army Chief of Staff (Confidential), from Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army, December 22, 1953, OSA 363.6, located in RG319 "RECAP-K."
Before the end of the year, an effort was being made to determine a pattern that might explain the perceived course of action taken by the Communist forces. On December 23, 1953, the Assistant Secretary of the Army wrote to the Army Chief of Staff on the subject of “Former Prisoners of War Still Unaccounted for by the Communist Forces.” The Assistant Secretary wanted information “concerning 610 Army personnel listed as prisoners of war and still unaccounted for by the Communist forces.” The data were to be “computed and furnished to me as soon as possible.” The fact is, but could not be fully known at the time, that many of the so-called unrepatriated POWs had never been alive in the hands of hostile forces, had been murdered soon after capture or had been, in some cases, killed by friendly fire. The Assistant Secretary asked for:

a. Breakdown by grade, numbers only.

b. Breakdown by specialty, showing the number possessing military occupational specialties (MOS) falling in each of the following broad categories:

1) Combat specialties.
2) Highly skilled technical specialties, such as radar electronics technicians.
3) Common technical specialties such as mechanics, cooks and slow speed radio operators.

c. Number in each of the following educational level groups:

1) College graduates.
2) High school graduates.
3) Those who have completed at least 8 years of formal schooling.
4) Those who have completed at least 5 years of formal schooling.
5) Those who have completed less than 5 years of formal schooling.
d. Geographical area or areas of the U.S. from which significant numbers of these persons entered service. Indicate the number of each area mentioned.

e. Whether these people generally have a background which would make them particularly susceptible to Communist indoctrination.

f. Any other information which would tend to associate significant numbers of these people with any particular segment or segments of our society.

The Assistant Secretary also asked to be "informed immediately of any new developments in our effort to secure an accounting by the Communists for these prisoners of war." The results of this inquiry have yet to be located.

After a Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina held in June 1954, the Department of State initiated actions, described to Congress three years later, that resulted in a further reduction of the number of unaccounted for U.S. POW/MIAs to 450.

On March 13, 1955, Senator Joseph McCarthy announced during a speech in Everett, Massachusetts, that he "would start a war, if necessary, to free 526 American prisoners in Red China." McCarthy added, "We need not go to that extent . . . . We should tell our so-called Allies, 'gentlemen, so long as you continue to ship supplies to Red China, so long as she is holding American uniformed men, you can't get a red cent of American money.'" McCarthy received an ovation for his remarks.

On April 18, 1957, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) wrote to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force

100 Memorandum to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Confidential), from Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army, December 23, 1953, RG335, OSA 383.6.

101 A Department of Defense report on Korean War casualties, dated November 4, 1954, indicates that of the 5,866 U.S. personnel classified as MIA, only 24 were still identified as "current missing."

on the subject of "Korean War Prisoner Documentation." This memorandum followed two others, the first (Reference A) a DoD (Special Operations) letter of May 29, 1956, "Continuing State/Defense Efforts to Secure Accounting on Missing Prisoners of War," and the second (Reference B) a DoD Memorandum for Service Secretaries dated October 27, 1956, on the subject of "Actions to Obtain the Release of Prisoners of War." 

On August 5, 1957, the Office of the Secretary of Defense requested that the UNC "at an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission be instructed to again request from North Korean-Chinese Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission an accounting on POW not yet accounted for." The memo noted that "efforts of Department of State to secure satisfaction on this issue thru discussions with Chinese Communist officials

103 Memorandum from General G. B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) (Confidential), to Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, April 18, 1957, OSA 383.6.

104 The text of this memorandum is as follows: "The Department of Defense program for providing the State Department with basic documentation on Korean Prisoner of War Cases for their use in discussion with Chinese Communist officials at Geneva has reached completion. Individual dossiers containing all available information on each case have been compiled under the quarterly report requirement established by Reference b. above. Service contributions to this program appear to have been thorough and exhaustively covered all possible sources of information and intelligence on missing or unaccounted-for prisoners of war.

In view of the foregoing, quarterly progress reports required by memorandum Reference b. are no longer required at regular intervals. It is requested, however, that in lieu of these regular reports, any new information or any intelligence dealing with the general subject of the unaccounted-for prisoners of war be reported as it becomes available, in order that it may be forwarded to the Department of State for their use in continuing efforts to secure an accounting.

With regard to the general problem, it is contemplated that discussions will be held in the near future with the Department of State to determine what steps to take next. It may be desirable to reopen this matter at Geneva or at Panmunjom. It has also been suggested that the matter be discussed with officials of the USSR, possibly at a summit meeting if such is arranged.

As you know the current list of 450 was arrived at after the Services had made determinations of death on the remainder of the original list of 944 and the list of 450 includes those missing and presumed dead. In the past several months Service representatives have indicated that as a result of their continued efforts the list of 450 could be further reduced."
On August 22, 1957, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel recommended that the letter of instruction be sent to the UNC. The letter of instruction included a chronology of the efforts thus far pursued in prisoner negotiations, the statement made by the Departments of State and Defense to the Congress on this subject, and the "current official list of 450 Americans for whom accounting has not yet satisfactorily been made. The material forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) clearly indicates that the action in the MAC will be closely coordinated with the State Department discussions in Geneva on the same subject." The Department of the Army was the executive agency within the Department of Defense on matters pertaining to the UNC. Thus the Department of the Army was responsible for making such a request in keeping with existing command channels.

In 1957, a Congressional report listed the names of the 450 servicemen on the UNCMAC list for the first time in an unclassified form.

Few MIA classifications from the Korean War have been challenged by family members or other groups. One exception was resolved in court. Following the Dumas trial in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1983, by court order Roger Dumas was reclassified from MIA to POW (unrepatriated). Dumas had originally been categorized MIA. His family argued that he should be recategorized as POW(BNR). PFC Dumas's status on the list of missing United Nations Command military personnel who at one time "might have been alive and in the hands" of the North Korean or Chinese forces had never been indicated on the UNCMAC list, which is the case for all other names. The 389 list presented to the North Korean and Chinese forces in 1984 included Dumas's name just as the previous iterations of the list had since it was first derived in 1953.
Disposition of POW(BNR) Cases

In October 1953, the Department of Defense announced that “most of the military personnel now classified as missing in action in Korea ‘must eventually be presumed dead.’” Following the prisoner exchanges that ended on September 6, 1953, the DoD noted that 6,713 Army, 78 Navy, 671 Air Force, and 493 Marines were listed as missing. The Department’s announcement continued:

In the light of casualty reporting experience in Korea, it is now the considered opinion of the Department of Defense that most of these men must eventually be presumed dead.

They have not been so reported thus far because of strict requirements that there be reasonably conclusive evidence of the fact before a man is reported as having died.

In November 1953, the Army announced that by January 1954 almost two-thirds, or 4,000, of the 6,300 servicemen listed as missing would be declared dead. A “presumptive finding of death,” made in accordance with the Missing Persons Act, would apply to anyone missing for more than one year for whom, in the Army’s view, “there is no information that would indicate they might still be alive.” The remaining 2,300 included some who had been missing for less than one year and others for whom there was evidence that they may have been alive in the hands of hostile forces. The Air Force announced at the same time that similar findings of death would be applied to 170 of the 671 USAF missing. The Marine Corps carried 78 missing at the time but made no announcement concerning a change of status.

By 1955 all unrepatriated U.S. military personnel, excluding 21 VNRs but including the 470 of whom the Communists were thought to have some knowledge, were declared dead. This was done to provide death benefits and to allow for insurance settlements and

Member, Korean People’s Army, and Chinese People’s Volunteers Component, Military Armistice Commission.

111 “Most of War Missing To Be Presumed Dead.”
113 POW . . . The Fight Continues, p. 29. All POW(BNR) were declared dead by 1955.
other survivor rights.\textsuperscript{114} The record shows that this was a sound decision in many cases, since the Department of Defense has since determined that the majority of the men carried on the missing list had been killed in battle, died of wounds, or died of various causes in POW camps.

\textbf{VOLUNTARY NON-REPATRIATES}

The bitter experience of forced repatriation carried out following World War II resulted in the U.S. insistence during the Korean conflict Armistice negotiations on a policy of voluntary repatriation. In keeping with the terms of the Armistice, on or about September 24, 1953, 23 American soldiers who chose not to return to U.S. military control were transferred to the custody of the Custodial Forces, India. The 23 had until January 23, 1954, to decide whether or not to return to the United States. The two who chose to return were sentenced to ten years and life terms for collaborating with the enemy, though both were released by 1959. The 21 who chose to stay in Communist custody are listed in Table 3.4.

On January 23, 1954, the 21 voluntary non-repatriates (VNR) were dishonorably discharged from the Army. One VNR who returned to the United States, as did most of the VNRs, after 12 years in the PRC, had been persuaded by his Communist captors to stay behind. Morris Wills told the author of \textit{Turncoat} about his decision.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} Presumptive findings of death were made under the Missing Persons Act of 1942 (P.L. 490, 77th Congress).

\textsuperscript{115} Wills joined the Army when he was seventeen. "In Korea, Wills fought and killed Chinese and was severely wounded in combat. Two weeks after his eighteenth birthday, he was captured by the Chinese in a night battle. Then followed a brutal, degrading 'death march' northward to the prison camp near the Yalu River, on the very border of China. On the march, many men died and, Wills tells us, the struggle to live crushed most of the survivors' moral standards and broke their spirit. During two years in the POW camp, Wills' bitterness grew. The fear of being left there to rot, the despair of ever getting out, the lack of preparation to meet Communist indoctrination—all left a vacuum that the Communists filled. Wills was conditioned to respond to reward and deprivation and, in the end, was persuaded that Chinese Communism is a noble experiment and the United States an exploitative society. The Chinese indoctrination took. Wills wavered until the last moment and then chose to go to China." Morris R. Wills as told to J. Robert Moskin, \textit{Turncoat: An American's 12 Years in Communist China} (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 5--6.
Table 3.4
List of 21 American Voluntary Non-Repatriates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Service Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>lCpl Clarence C. Adams</td>
<td>RA 14 267 602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sgt Howard R. Adams</td>
<td>RA 38 556 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sgt Albert C. Belhomme</td>
<td>RA 13 296 992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pfc Otho G. Bell</td>
<td>RA 18 276 618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pfc Richard O. Corden</td>
<td>RA 11 150 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cpl William A. Cowart</td>
<td>RA 14 313 076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sgt Rufus E. Douglas</td>
<td>RA 38 713 869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pfc John R. Dunn</td>
<td>US 52 051 841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cpl Andrew Fortuna</td>
<td>RA 36 984 833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pfc Lewis W. Griggs</td>
<td>RA 18 322 825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pvt2 Samuel D. Hawkins</td>
<td>RA 18 273 591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Pfc Arlie H. Pate</td>
<td>RA 18 307 990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cpl Scott L. Rush</td>
<td>RA 15 277 362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Pfc Lowell D. Skinner</td>
<td>RA 15 291 649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Cpl Lorance V. Sullivan</td>
<td>RA 19 304 844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Pvt2 Richard R. Tenneson</td>
<td>RA 17 281 893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pvt2 James G. Veneris</td>
<td>RA 13 009 671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Cpl Harold Webb</td>
<td>RA 14 333 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Pfc William C. White</td>
<td>RA 18 330 412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Pfc Morris R. Wills</td>
<td>RA 12 356 664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Pfc Aaron P. Wilson</td>
<td>RA 18 284 033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Eleven of the 21 had left China by the end of 1958. By 1966, only three were left there, two of them World War II veterans. Since then at least one has returned to the United States.

SOURCE: Memorandum from the Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General (Confidential), to ten C-in-Cs and Commanding Generals March 14, 1955. RG153 Office of the Judge Advocate General, RCAP-K Program (VNR).

On June 23, 1954, DoD was notified by the Veterans Administration that they had received word from the Chinese Red Cross that Sergeant Douglas had died of a heart attack. Date of death unofficially reported to be June 8, 1954.

The Army had reason to believe that some or all of the 21 VNRs had committed serious offenses against either the Uniform Code of Military Justice or Title 18, United States Code, or both. The Commanding General, Military District of Washington, was designated as the responsible commander for the conduct of investigations and for bringing charges. The Military Justice Division's tentative assessment was that there was sufficient evidence to justify a court-martial
for 15 of the 21 for violating Article 105 and for six of the 21 for treason.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{RETURNED OR EXCHANGED CAPTURED AMERICAN PERSONNEL (RECAP-K)}

U.S. efforts to obtain information about and the release of detained service personnel in Communist custody was known as “Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel,” or RECAP. Various categories of RECAP were signified by one or two letters such as RECAP-K, which designated “RECAP-Korea,” RECAP-PAC,\textsuperscript{117} which stood for “RECAP Pacific,” and RECAP-WW, which meant “RECAP World Wide.” RECAP-K regulations Part I dealt with the overall policy for the application of administrative procedures for dealing with repatriated American POWs. This included intelligence processing. The consolidation of all major policy guidelines on RECAP-K for the U.S. Army were contained in RECAP-K, Part II. The chain of custody for returning POWs was as follows. The intelligence and security processing of Korean War POWs occurred under the Commander-in-Chief Far East who had custody from the time the POW was received until he departed for home at which time the Army resumed control. The Army surrendered control to the particular service the POW belonged to when the repatriate arrived in the Continental United States or his residence, whichever came first.

By 1954, the RECAP program grouped American prisoners into four categories:

\textit{Returnee} is any person returned to military control from the hands of the opposing forces pursuant to escape, release by the opposing forces or group exchange agreement. \textit{Special Report:} The Special Report is the means by which a major command notifies the

\textsuperscript{116}Memorandum from Major George S. Prugh Jr. (Confidential) to Chief, Military Justice Division, JAGO, undated but apparently written January 1955. RG153 Office of the Judge Advocate General, RECAP-K Program (VNR).

\textsuperscript{117}The Army memorandum describing the creation of RECAP-PAC is Regulation No. 600-15, March 14, 1969, Department of the Army, HQ United States Army Pacific. RECAP-PAC apparently superseded RECAP-K, since the former included responsibilities for the Far Eastern Communist nations North Korea, People’s Republic of China, and the USSR.
Adjutant General, Department of the Army, of the existence of a pending case. **Pending Case:** A pending case is any case which may be reasonably be expected to result, at any future time, in a trial by court-martial, or administrative restriction or separation, based on the individual's conduct while in a captured status. A pending case includes, but is not limited to, situations where court-martial charges are drawn or preferred. **Factual Summary:** A factual summary is the document which explains and supports the report to The Adjutant General. It may be brief and informal.¹¹⁸

Extensive efforts were made to accumulate evidence concerning POWs and other unaccounted-for Americans who may have been at one time alive in Communist custody. Information about an individual POW was accumulated through various sources, including debriefs of returning POWs. On the next page is one example of hundreds of similar forms used for this purpose.

This form, which contains information derived from interviews with repatriated American POWs, was designed to acquire data on servicemen who could be linked to a specific place of captivity through the testimony of eyewitnesses. The information was intended to be used by the U.S. government and UNCMAC in the pursuit of the release of anyone detained by the Communist forces after the repatriation operations following the Korean War.

Policy and staff procedures for the administration of RECAP-K were contained in a series of Army documents.¹¹⁹ RECAP-K studies

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¹¹⁹a. AGAC-C (M) 350.09 (10 Mar 53) G2, 13 March 1953, subject: "Intelligence Processing of Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel—Korea (Short Title RECAP-K, Part II)," to major commanders, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East (Main), and Commanding General, Sixth Army (Confidential).

b. AGPS-D (M) 383.6 (22 July 53) G1, 27 July 1953, subject, "Procedures for Processing, Return and Reassignment of Returnees in Korea (Short Title RECAP-K, Part I)," to major commanders and processing centers (Unclassified).


d. G2-SPD, 12 August 1953, subject, "Reports of Intelligence Processing Returned American Captured Personnel (short title RECAP-K, Part II)," to G2's of continental
EXAMPLE OF A POW CASUALTY INFORMATION FORM

Name: GLASSER, Gerald W.
Service Number: RA 13 260 232
Branch of Service: Army - Air Force - Navy - Marine
Rank: Corporal
Date of Birth: 30 November 1927

Date: Missing in Action Capture 18 May 1951

Nature of evidence on which POW deemed to be alive and in Communist hands (Circle appropriate [])

- Command reports
- Letters from POW
- Intelligence reports
- Interrogation of repatriates
- Interrogation of other UN prisoner
- IRC reports
- Propaganda broadcasts
- Press—Domestic
- Press—Foreign

Remarks: Seen alive at Camp #1
Date last known to be alive: June 1953

Any information, such as from interrogation of repatriates, regarding possible reason of Communists for retaining POW:

Added 7 March 1956: Sixty-six returnees reported that subject was a prisoner. The statements indicated that he was in prison Camp #1, Chang-song, N.K. In the Spring of 1953 he was taken away in a jeep by Chinese officers. He was in good health at the time and there was nothing to indicate that his removal from camp was in the nature of an arrest as he and his camp companions were given candy and cigarettes before leaving.120

reached three important conclusions. First, the Communist forces had not accounted for all of the American POWs held in Chinese or North Korean camps. Second, "some of the returned American personnel . . . participated in or themselves performed acts of a treason-


able or other serious criminal character (including offenses not related to Communist indoctrination)."121

The third finding was a security concern. Under the provisions of RECAP-K and RECAP-WW:

all military personnel who, for any reason, are captured in a Communist Zone or come under communist control, and who later return to friendly control, must be considered as possible security risks until such time as the complete circumstances are known. Each case will be processed and controlled to the extent appropriate in accordance with the policy set forth in the Department of the Army letter of 13 March 1953 to all major commanders, subject, "Intelligence Processing of Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel—Korea (Short Title RECAP-K, Part II) and this letter."122

All reports of espionage activity were to be forwarded to the G-2 Security Division of the Department of the Army under the title of "RECAP-WW."

The RECAP-K intelligence and security interrogations, which were not intended to subject returning POWs to undue stress, consisted of four phases.123 The first three were usually accomplished overseas or en route to the United States by Joint Intelligence Processing Boards (JIPB). The JIPBs were composed of intelligence interrogation specialists. As of March 19, 1954, 2,281 reports of intelligence processing of "Operation Big Switch" personnel had been received

123 Phase I is basically a personal history statement to assist in the positive identification of the returnee, followed by a very brief interrogation to determine the type of information he possesses. Phase II is a security questionnaire and is concerned with collecting information of a security and counterintelligence value. Phase III is a general military intelligence interrogation based upon EEI established by interested agencies in Washington and provided to CINCFE for application, plus EEI generated within FECOM to meet particular command requirements. Phase IV is a long-range interrogation designed to answer specific EEI on which the person interrogated is believed to be particularly well informed. Phase IV interrogations are being conducted on a limited number of returnees identified as possessing intelligence information of long-range or strategic value by the Army Security Center, a joint Service body, located at Fort George C. Meade, Maryland." Annex C, "Intelligence Considerations," RG338 (Secret), Box 1, Folder 4.
and processed through the Army's Special Reading Panel. Of these, 1,633 had been cross-referenced and processed by G-2. By June 1954, the Army reported that "evidence had been uncovered which concerned the assignment of Sabotage and Espionage missions to repatriated American prisoners of the Korean War during 'Big and Little Switch' and that quite recently new cases of this type had been discovered." In 1954, Corporal Claude J. Batchelor was convicted by court-martial on charges that he, among other crimes, participated "with the enemy in planning for the formation of subversive organizations of secret agents to be sent to the United States for communistic work." Army Intelligence concluded that "Communist interrogators collected information from American captives with little difficulty. In many instances, little or no coercion was applied to captives who revealed military information and signed confessions concerning alleged activities, or acts, of which they had no knowledge, or which were completely false."

NONGOVERNMENTAL EFFORTS OTHER THAN THE UN

On May 11, 1954, Ambassador Johnson met with a delegation representing the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The subject of this meeting was "United Nations Command and Other US Military Personnel in Communist Custody." The ICRC, which was interested in data on Korean War casualties, wanted to "discuss possibilities of their intercession to secure repatriation of US personnel."

124 Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the Army (Secret), from Gilbert R. Levy, Chief, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, subject: Espionage and Sabotage—Espionage Missions Assigned to Repatriated Prisoners of War, WAR CRIMES, June 14, 1954. Levy inquired, "Of paramount importance would be any information available to you which might indicate that there are Air Force personnel who might have received assignment by the Soviets or Chinese Communists to conduct Sabotage or Espionage missions on their return to the United States. As you know, this Directorate conducted detailed interrogations of our POW's following their release from Communist captivity. During these interrogations no confirmatory information in regard to subject matter was disclosed."


126 Annex C, C-3.
sonnel still in Communist custody.” Ambassador Johnson discussed the situation with the ICRC and offered data on the unaccounted-for UNC personnel, but there seemed to be little the ICRC could do.

On April 22, 1954, a group calling itself “Kin of America’s Forgotten Men” petitioned President Eisenhower to pursue the cause of “350 servicemen still being detained by the Reds.”

In 1953, the Army funded a project entitled PSYFREE, “Communist Methods of Indoctrination and Their Exploitation of POWs.” A part of PSYFREE was “Psychological Warfare Research Division of HumRRO, Subtask No. 8A12 (11-52), PSYPOOL,” designed to establish overseas bases in Europe and Asia for securing information from foreign informants, particularly those recently released from captivity in the Soviet Union. PSYPOOL, a part of the HumRRO’s psychological warfare research program, focused on emigres and repatriates. The PSYPOOL program was apparently responsible for the collection of live sighting reports of Americans believed to be held in the Soviet bloc.

**UNCMAC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A FULL ACCOUNTING**

The record of UNCMAC efforts to obtain information on U.S. MIA/POW(BNR) cases from the Communist side is presented in Appendix 6.

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129 Letter from Meredith P. Crawford, Director, The George Washington University Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) (Secret Security Information), to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Department of the Army, April 16, 1953. RG319 (Army Staff) AC of S G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1953, 383.6, Box 1512.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter has five purposes: (1) to discuss the environment in Russia for conducting research on POW/MIA issues; (2) to show how the Soviet Union exploited foreign POWs within the GULAG camp system; (3) to present direct evidence of the Soviet air and ground forces and intelligence services in Korea during the Korean War; (4) to demonstrate Soviet motivations for interrogating U.S. POWs in Korea; and (5) to show that information concerning U.S. POWs exists in Soviet-era archives.

RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT IN MOSCOW

Archives and Access in the Post-Soviet Era

In December 1991, many signs indicated that the Soviet government would permit unprecedented access to primary source material from Soviet-era archives. Archive materials related to Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA issues had been collected from Soviet military archives by December 1991 when it appeared as though the Soviet government was prepared to release a large amount of archive material related to the Cold War. Few of the initial promises of greater openness, including the offer by General Volkogonov to invite "one, two, three American historians or specialists" to work in the Soviet-era archives, including those of the KGB, have been fulfilled.¹

The rapid deterioration of the research environment in Moscow in 1992 coincided roughly with the demise of the Soviet Union, the politicization of the POW/MIA issue, and the decision on the part of Russian authorities to release archive material through a series of commercial deals. In addition, in 1992, custody of the Soviet military archives passed first to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) High Command, then to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Access to archive material was progressively restricted as this transfer occurred.

Following the first meeting of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission in Moscow in March 1992, by official Russian decree no independent research on POW/MIA issues was permitted in the archives of the former Soviet Union. According to Member of Parliament Yuri Smirnov, one decree that “forbids anyone outside of the Commission from doing archive work on POW/MIA affairs” was issued shortly after the initial Commission meeting. “Also,” Smirnov added, “due to ‘inventory’ requirements, all work in the KGB archives was ‘suspended until further notice’” by a subsequent KGB decree. The ban on access extended to Russians and foreigners alike. Deputy Chairman of Roskomarkhiv, Vladimir Kozlov, told Dr. Ludmila Lebedeva that the Joint Commission “has exclusive rights to POW/MIA archive material.” Further, any material located by researchers had to be registered with the Commission. “Any researcher who does not follow this decree,” said Lebedeva, “will be reported by the archivists to the Commission” and barred from further access to the archives.

Independent researchers have been systematically discouraged or overtly warned by Russian security services to stop research efforts. The American Embassy in Moscow reported to Washington in December 10, 1992, that the Russian spy agencies were playing a “spoiling role” and the Russian side of the Commission was using “intentional tactics of delay and obfuscation.” The Embassy concluded that information was being withheld because disclosure would contradict previous Soviet and Russian denials and thereby

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damage the reputation of present and previous government officials. In November 1992, the Senate Select Committee's investigator in Moscow testified that the United States was "intentionally being stonewalled" by the Russians on the subject of Cold War incidents.⁴ By December 1992, the American Embassy in Moscow noted that the Joint Commission's effort was "quickly" reaching "the point of diminishing returns." The American Embassy concluded, "We anticipate that the future will bring less, rather than more cooperation on the POW/MIA effort."

Soviet officials who pledged to work with the RAND team in December 1991 proved to be unable and in some cases unwilling to overcome the restrictions the Russian government imposed on access to archives. In addition to a generally oppressive research environment, researchers for the Senate Select Committee and the Joint Commission reported that Russian citizens who have come forward with information concerning POW/MIA issues have been intimidated and harassed by the Russian security services. Information obtained by RAND in Moscow supports the view of Joint Commission and Senate Select Committee investigators that a deliberate, coordinated effort by a variety of Russian officials and organizations to suppress POW/MIA information has occurred.

MP Smirnov's response to the obstacles to archive access erected by Russian officials, including the KGB, was to "bulldoze the barriers" with legislation. In February 1993, the Russian Parliament approved and Yeltsin signed into law legislation, drafted by Smirnov, that empowered local governments (on the oblast—a regional government, roughly equal to a county—level) to authorize access to local military and KGB archives. Smirnov's organization Memorial has established contact with a number of local governments and has begun work in various archives under the protection of this law. Smirnov's first priority, understandably, is to determine the fate of millions of Russians who vanished in the GULAG prison system, though Memorial has offered to assist in the search for American citizens and POWs.

Commercial Sale of Archive Material

Unlike the policies of Western archives that permit access to all researchers, the archives of the former Soviet Union located in Moscow have become subject to arrangements that permit officials to "sell national secrets as private entrepreneurs." A number of widely publicized contracts have been signed between Russian archive officials and Western research organizations and publishing houses. Arrangements with institutions such as the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Hoover Institution, the Library of Congress, and the British publishing house Chadwyck-Healey were supposed to produce microfilm copies of materials from Russian state archives. In early 1992 the plan was that "Chadwyck-Healey is to handle worldwide sales and marketing, with proceeds divided among themselves, Roskomarkhiv, and Hoover," according to an interview with Rudolph G. Pkhoia, chairman of the Russian Committee on Archival Affairs. Soviet-era archive material has also been offered for sale through informal channels.

In November 1993, Yuri Pankov, a Russian journalist whom Task Force Russia has recognized for his important contributions to POW/MIA research in the former Soviet Union, learned that the Russian military and security services had written a joint memorandum to President Yeltsin concerning the POW/MIA issue. Sources informed Pankov that the military and security services complained that they were uneasy working with the Russian side of the Joint Commission because a senior member of the Commission was earning large sums of money from the sale of Soviet-era archive material. The military and security services were reluctant to provide additional material out of concern that this individual would sell it for personal gain.

The issue of access to Soviet-era archives, even for researchers who do not have large Western publishing contracts to offer, is important because the degree of Soviet involvement in the Korean War suggests that a significant paper trail exists in military, diplomatic, and intelligence archives. These documents could help to clear up many ques-

tions concerning the fate of Americans who might have been transferred to the territory of the USSR during the Korean War.

RESEARCH FOCUS OF THIS STUDY

The purpose of conducting archive research in Moscow for this study was to determine whether military or intelligence records demonstrated that American POW/MIAs had been transferred to Soviet territory. The research also focused on an attempt to obtain records of Soviet organizations that may have transferred American POWs and information that linked Soviet forces to Korean territory during the war.

Of particular interest is the issue of whether the Soviet system was organized to exploit foreign POWs on Soviet territory. Soviet records confirm that such a system was in operation when the Korean War began. The answers to this question lie in the records of the GULAG and Sharashka prison camp systems.

THE GULAG SYSTEM

Background

To set the stage for a discussion of the Sharashka system, one must begin with a general overview of the Soviet GULAG system. In 1930, Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin created the GULAG (Glavnoye upravleniye ispravitelno-trudovykh lagerei i trudposelenii, or the Main Administration of Prison Camps) prison system. In the beginning, one of the KGB's predecessors, the OGPU (Obedinnnoe glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie or the Unified Main Political Administration), supervised the GULAG camp system, which existed alongside the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic) and NKIU (Narodnyi komissariat iustitsii or People's Commissariat of

\[7\] RAND staff member Ted Karasik contributed to this section.

\[8\] The former security organs of the Soviet state were the VChkP (Cheka, 1917–1922), GPU (State Political Administration, 1922–1923), OGPU (Unified Main Political Administration, 1923–1934), NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, 1934–1946), MGB (Ministry of State Security, 1946–1953), and the KGB (Committee for State Security, 1953–1991).
Justice) corrective labor camps. GULAG was the harshest of the three camp systems because of its strict work ethic, abusive camp directors and guards, and lack of food. OGPU Chairman G. G. Yagoda showed exceptional energy and ruthlessness in carrying out grandiose construction projects with the use of prison labor.

The NKVD (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), which replaced the OGPU in 1934, placed all USSR camps under its jurisdiction. This was a massive undertaking. By this point there were at least several hundred camps in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan with at least hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Moreover, the NKVD helped to organize some 15 specialized main administrations in the late 1930s and early 1940s to assist the country's economic development. These administrations included Dalstroi (Main Construction Administration of the Far Northeast), GYZhDS (Glavnoe upravlenie zhelezodorozhnogo stroitelstva), Gidrostroi (Water Construction Administration), GUGiMP (Glavnoe upravlenie gornoi i metallurgicheskoi promyshlennosti or Main Administration of the Mining and Metallurgical Industry), and others.9

By 1941, L. P. Beria was an increasingly important GULAG administrator. As the first state security chief to become a member of the highest CPSU organs, Beria had responsibility for the entire police apparatus and GULAG system, including surveillance, investigation, and arrest of criminal suspects. He was responsible for the several hundred GULAG camps throughout the Soviet Union and developed some of them into Sharashka camps. Moreover, Beria, who kept the police ministries busy during and after World War II, organized espionage operations targeted on German, French, and other Allied POWs. Beria's actions during the war received praise from the Soviet regime. The Supreme Soviet decreed the military title of Marshal of the Soviet Union on Beria for his service to the state—a rare honor for a state security chairman.10

9Several of these administrations became part of the USSR government. In 1953, Dalstroi became the USSR Ministry of the Mining Industry and GYZhDS was transferred to the USSR Ministry of Railways.

After World War II, Soviet dictator J. V. Stalin made a major reshuffle in the police organization. This had a dramatic effect on GULAG's administration. In January 1946, the Soviet dictator removed Beria as NKVD chairman and gave the post to Colonel General S. N. Kruglov, deputy chief of the disbanded wartime spy organization, SMERSH. In March 1946, Stalin reorganized all commissariats into ministries. With that, the NKVD was split into two organizations. One became the MVD (Ministerstvo vnoutrennykh del or Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the NKGB\(^\text{11}\) (Narodnyi komissariat gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti or People's Commissariat of State Security) became the MGB (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti or Ministry of State Security). Stalin retained Kruglov as MVD chairman and appointed SMERSH head General V. S. Abakumov as MGB chairman. Simultaneously, Stalin shifted Beria away from supervising state security and the police. Beria's new job was to oversee the development of atomic and conventional weapons.\(^\text{12}\) Beria retained an alliance with Abakumov, which proved to be quite beneficial to the Soviet defense industry.\(^\text{13}\)

By 1953, several hundred, or by some estimates several thousand, GULAG forced labor camps were located in every corner of the Soviet Union. Beria cunningly established camps that were concealed within major population centers.\(^\text{14}\) At its peak, the GULAG population was enormous—by some estimates as large as twelve million inmates, or Zeks—since millions of people were imprisoned in successive waves of repression. The first wave of prisoners was taken after Stalin launched a series of purges in the 1930s. After World War II, thousands of Soviet soldiers who had been labeled "traitors to the Fatherland" because they had retreated to avoid capture or had been captured by the Germans were sentenced to terms ranging from five to 25 years in the GULAG. Books by Soviet-era dissidents, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* and *The First Circle*,

\(^{11}\)Formed in 1941 for wartime internal security operations.


provide an account of the extent and horror of these prison labor camps.

GULAG prisoners built large portions of the Soviet infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of starving and poorly clothed prisoners erected the first gigantic construction projects of communism despite the lack of mechanized equipment. Huge numbers of convict laborers constructed railroads and canals throughout Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far North. GULAG prisoners were forced to work on major construction projects such as the White Sea-Baltic Canal, the Tulom hydroelectric station near Murmansk, the Moscow-Volga Canal, parts of the Moscow subway system, the Saratov-Moscow gas pipeline, the Volga-Don Canal, many large metallurgical, chemical, and other plants located at Kuznetsk and Magnitogorsk, military fortifications, airfields, underground installations, harbors, railroads, and atomic plants and installations. NKVD generals or colonels supervised the productivity, security, and penitentiary aspects of the GULAG camps and administrations during the building of these projects. Millions of prisoners died from starvation and disease over several decades.

After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet leader N. S. Khrushchev transferred scientific and technical GULAG administrative functions to defense and economic ministries, stripping GULAG of its responsibilities for scientific and technical contributions. For instance, nuclear weapons production was reportedly turned over to the Ministry of Medium Machinebuilding.

GULAG Administration

The Soviet security organs divided GULAG camps into six administrative organs, which supervised life in the GULAG. Each division

16The Soviet Secret Police, p. 28.
17The KGB: Police and Politics . . . , p. 50.
served the GULAG’s four main goals. First, GULAG security forces sought to isolate unreliable and "suspect elements" within the camp population. Second, security organs supervised the transfer of a prison labor work force over any distance and to any destination within the USSR. Third, administrative organs opened new camps. Fourth, GULAG organs enforced periodic liquidation of prisoners. These organs or “sub-administrations” continued to exist following the reorganization of the OGPU into the NKVD. The six administrative organs were:

- **Production Organs**: The production organs included the Planning Division, the Administration of Major Construction Projects (Upravleniye kapital’nykh sooruzhenii), the Building Construction Division, the Lumber Division, the Agricultural Division, the Highway Division, and other divisions for camp economic development. These administrations and divisions determined the program of the camp inmates.

- **Regime Organs**: The regime organs included the Division of Guards and Regime (Otdel okhrany i rezhima), which controlled the militarized guard (Voyenizirovannaia okhrana or VOKhR); the Division for Accounting and Work Distribution (Uchetno-raspredelitelnyi otdel or URO); and the Cultural and Educational Division (Kulturno-vospitatelnyi otdel).

- **Administrative, Housekeeping, and Auxiliary Organs**: These bodies supervised the Personnel Division, the Administrative and Housekeeping Division, the Medical and Sanitary Division, the Veterinary Division, the Housing Division, the Transportation Division, the Chief Bookkeeping Office, and the Finance Division. After World War II, the Transportation Division worked closely with the MVD’s Main Administration of Prisoners of War and Internes (Glaumnoye upravleniye po delam plennykh i internirovannykh or GUPI) and the Main Transportation Administration (Glaumnoye transportnoye upravleniye) to transport prisoners and supplies during and after World War II.

- **Political Division**: This division supervised and ensured the indoctrination and propaganda objectives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik).
**Punitive Organs Division:** This division provided security forces for the GULAG.  

Each of the above organs implemented a harsh regime on GULAG prisoners. Inmates suffered greatly because of lack of food. Camp administrators based daily food norms on the prisoners' ability to complete their production tasks. The GULAG administration made sure that prisoners had no days off even though their work hours lasted 11.5 hours per day. Exercise occurred infrequently. Prisoners walked in a single-file line for no more than 30 minutes during the evening. Moreover, GULAG administrators failed to provide inmates with medical care. Chronic illness such as arthritis, asthma, hypertension, rheumatism, and heart disease were not treated. Millions of prisoners died. Contact with the outside world was prohibited.  

**Sharashka Camp System, 1930–1953**

In contrast to the banality of GULAG horror, a small, relatively unknown yet salient component of the GULAG system—*Sharashka*—exploited Soviet and foreign scientists and technicians who were forced to serve Soviet defense industry projects. *Sharashka,* also known as *Sharaga* or “Islands of Paradise,” were secret scientific research and design institutes within the GULAG system. Also known as *promploshkada* (industrial site or territory), these camps existed near large industrial enterprises. Solzhenitsyn describes *Sharashka* camps in *Gulag Archipelago.*

*Sharashka* camps began to appear following one of Stalin's famous show trials of the late 1920s. From May 1928 through July 1929, 53 engineers and technicians stood trial for attempting to create the Industrial Party—an organization that intended to sabotage Soviet industry. The OGPU quashed their effort. The trial, held in the city of Shakhty and widely reported in the Soviet press, ended on November 25, 1930, with the conviction of all defendants. The court sentenced the scientists, including L. K. Ramzin, a leading specialist in thermodynamics, to death. All had their sentences converted to 10 years "deprivation of freedom" and were sent to the special forced

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labor camps—Sharashka—to conduct scientific work. As the show trials and mass arrests continued, the security organs sent the highly educated and the well-trained to Sharashka camps that sprang up following the Shakhty trial.

From 1930 to World War II, Sharashka camps were located in only Russia and Kazakhstan. After 1945, they proliferated throughout the Soviet empire.20 In remote areas, security officials constructed the camps near other hard labor camps so prison officials could tap educated GULAG prisoners as potential assistants for the Sharashka scientists. One Sharashka camp, established on Furkasovsky Lane behind Lubyanka and the Izhora Factory in Moscow, was concealed in the confines of that large city within easy access to the country’s ruling elites.21 The OGPU and its successor, the NKVD, kept extensive lists of all specialists and tracked their movements through Sharashka camps.22

There were several infamous Sharashka camps. In the former Suzdal nunnery, microbiologist prisoners developed bacteriological weapons.23 The most notorious special research institutes were located in Moscow, Rybinsk, and Bolshino. A. N. Tupolev, one of the leading Soviet aircraft designers, became a victim of the mass arrests. In 1938, the NKVD arrested him as “an enemy of the people” and sent him to work in a Sharashka. By 1943, the security forces released him. Many of Tupolev’s airplanes and a number of his other industrial designs emerged from Sharashka work. In 1946, the MGB monopolized all such special research institutes and transferred Sharashka findings to the security services and the armed forces. A number of scientists, engineers, and other specialists were given the task of developing rockets, radar, submarines, and atomic energy.24 This type of work also occurred at OKB (Osoboe konstruktorskoe biuro or Special Design Bureau) facilities. Sharashka’s scientific output

22 Kuzmin interview.
23 Lebedeva interview.
was applied in many of the Soviet Union's irrigation and transportation projects. The probable location and function of Sharashka camps in the USSR are shown in Table 4.1 below.

Soviet security organs supervised Sharashka prisoners who were mostly Soviet scientists and engineers imprisoned after being accused or convicted of treason or sabotage. Foreigners, such as German nuclear scientists and rocket specialists who had been kidnapped in Germany following the war or captured by Soviet forces during World War II, were imprisoned in Sharashka camps. Security officials made everyday life in the Sharashka for these specialists easier compared to conditions that prevailed in the rest of the GULAG. In Sharashka camps, there was adequate food, an abundance of current professional literature, and freedom to discuss and explore topics with fellow prisoners. Internees often lived in a single dwelling or compound where they also worked—usually laboratories were on the first floor with living area on the second level. They had no restrictions on communicating with each other so that camaraderie and scientific findings could be shared. The scientists worked eight hours a day with one day off per week plus holidays. As for food, it was much better then in the rest of the GULAG. In fact, prison officials did not ration food. Prisoners spent their free time playing chess, volleyball, and basketball.

Sharashka populations varied among camps. Sharashka prisoners accounted for approximately 5 percent of all GULAG internees between 1937-1941. In contrast to the massive GULAG camps, Sharashka camps held as few as three or four scientists and technicians or as many as several thousand specialists. For example, the Sharashka where aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev worked housed over 3,000 technicians and specialists.

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25 Kuzmin interview.
Sharashka Administration

Sharashka camps had a separate Personnel Division, Administrative and Housekeeping Division, Medical and Sanitary Division, Veterinary Division, Housing Division, Transportation Division, Chief Bookkeeping Office, and Finance Division. When scientific work had to be discussed with security officials, for example, the above divisions shared responsibility for the transport of the prisoner to the proper authorities and his return to the camp.\textsuperscript{27} An Operative Department provided research supervision over Sharashka prisoners. Overall, few police functions were required in these camps.\textsuperscript{28}

The Soviet security services provided scientists and technicians in Sharashka camps with many of their basic needs and more. Officials provided the prisoners with recent and foreign technical publications in several languages.\textsuperscript{29} Lev Kopelev, a former Sharashka prisoner, reflected:

> Everything was set up very simply. Professors, engineers with higher degrees, inventors—they're used to being spoiled. They get lots of money and special food rations .... In those circumstances one occasionally got the urge to live it up—in a restaurant with girls or at the dacha with one's legal spouse.\textsuperscript{30}

Prison officials even allowed the scientists and technicians to correspond with their closest relatives. Sharashka prisoners had the opportunity to send pay to loved ones at home. Family members could even visit their imprisoned relatives.\textsuperscript{31} Finally, the Sharashka camps had relatively few guards. In the 1930s, there was one guard

\textsuperscript{27}See, for example, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, \textit{The First Circle} (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968).

\textsuperscript{28}Kuzmin interview.

\textsuperscript{29}Kuzmin interview. Kuzmin, who worked on Sharashka and GULAG issues for ten years, provided the authors with many citations from regional archives.


for every ten prisoners. In general, fences did not surround \textit{Sharashka} camps, since in many rural locations there was nowhere to flee. Overall, the atmosphere in the \textit{Sharashki} seemed free for pure academic thinking dedicated to the Soviet state; but the prisoners lacked freedom of movement.\footnote{Kuzmin interview.}

\textbf{Foreign POWs in the \textit{Sharashka} Camp System}

Foreign prisoners, including unrepatriated foreign POWs, were forced to work in \textit{Sharashka} camps. The purpose was to obtain military information that could be applied to Soviet tactics and strategy and contribute to the acceleration of the rate at which new technologies with military applications could be developed and applied. Within the Soviet leadership, the association between security chiefs Beria, Abakumov, and Kruglov provided a tremendous opportunity for boosting \textit{Sharashka}'s role in the growth of Soviet defense industry after World War II.

NKVD officials directed the removal of technical specialists and industrial equipment from occupied Germany to the Soviet Union for use in Soviet industry.\footnote{Some Russians and Germans argued that these arrangements actually made the academics happy, since they now lived in "monasteries" dedicated to scientific research and discussion. Kuzmin and Lebedeva interviews.} Foreign POWs in the \textit{Sharashka} system were forced to provide the Soviet state with scientific data and other information that contributed to weapon system design, refinement, and a more complete understanding of foreign tactics and strategy. Soviet officials tapped German POWs for their knowledge of chemistry, physics, metallurgy, radar work, and rockets. Security officials created a special prison and research institute for kidnapped German scientists and rocket specialists. Located on an island in the middle of Lake Seliger, the scientists assisted Soviet scientists in the exploration of rocket technologies.\footnote{\textit{Ease My Sorrow}, p. 4.}

Foreigners contributed greatly to the Soviet defense industry, including the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Soviet engineers de-\footnote{\textit{The Soviet Secret Police}, p. 23.
signed anti-aircraft missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons based on data obtained from German POWs and civilian prisoners. Soviet documentation shows how information derived from German POWs captured during World War II permitted the Soviets to accelerate design programs and to derive a better understanding of Western matériel, doctrine, and strategy. The demand for data on materials and flight characteristics of foreign aircraft intensified as the Cold War progressed.

There is no reliable estimate of how many foreign POWs were exploited in this manner, nor is it possible to determine from extant data how many POWs were not repatriated from the Soviet Union. It is possible, however, to describe the structures of the organization whose task was to derive information from and recruit agents among foreign POWs.

**MVD POW and Internee Assessment Report**

Portions of a 1,000-page MVD *POW and Internee Assessment Report* obtained for this study contain a great deal of information concerning the exploitation of foreign POWs in *Sharashka* camps during and after World War II. The 1950 report, classified “Top Secret” by Soviet authorities, *Ob agenturno-operativnoi rabote s voennoplennymi i internirovannymi v velikoi otechestvennoi voine sovetskogo naroda 1941-1945 (Concerning Spies, Operative Work with POWs and Internees Taken Prisoner During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People, 1941–1945)*, summarizes and assesses the methods and results of programs used to exploit foreign POWs in Soviet territory. Between 1945–1950, MVD officials had the responsibility for locating POWs who could work for Soviet defense industry. Several MVD administrative organs pursued this goal, *viz.*, the 4th Special Department and the 9th Administration.

The exploitation of foreign POWs was centralized and tightly controlled. According to this MVD assessment, the MGB placed their own agents (usually German nationals referred to as “X”) in POW

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36The MGB and the MVD maintained detailed written records of all POWs who passed through the *Sharashka* camps. Beria helped to establish this system and it "recorded prisoner movements better than modern-day computers." Kuzmin interview.
camps. The agents were given the task of identifying German prisoners with highly specialized scientific backgrounds including nuclear physics, aerodynamics, electronics, and other specialized fields. These agents reported to the MVD and other security organs the presence of individuals who met these criteria. The MVD then passed information to the USSR Council of Ministers. When a ministry—such as the USSR Aviation Machinebuilding Ministry, the USSR Metallurgy Industry, the USSR Electro-Industrial Ministry, the USSR Heavy Machinebuilding Ministry, the USSR Industrial Construction Materials Ministry, the USSR Chemical Machinebuilding Ministry, or any other organization—wanted to tap the available pool of POW expertise, the request first had to be directed to the USSR Council of Ministers. This body could authorize POWs to be put to work in: (1) their current location (RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Belarus, or Ukraine) with specialized equipment; or (2) other camps near research centers and factories. The MVD would supervise the transfer of these prisoners to MVD republic or regional organs (See Figure 4.1).37

Chapter 11 of the MVD report, Vyiavlenie vysokokvalifitsirovannykh spetsialistov i nauchnykh rabotnikov, ispolzovanie ikh v interesakh nashe strany (Identifying Highly Qualified Specialists and Scientific Workers and Using Them in the Interests of Our Country), is divided into three sections that analyze various contributions made by foreign POWs to Soviet industry. Section one, Organizatsionnye mernopriiatija, vyrabotka form i metodov raboty (Organizational Measures, Elaborating Forms and Methods of Work), describes how MVD agents recruited German POWs for Soviet defense industry work. This section, which analyzes the aftermath of a 1945 NKVD order to search for POWs with backgrounds in chemistry, radiology, nuclear physics, and electronics, also describes where the POWs worked and which ministries received their findings.

Section two, Poluchenie ot voennoplennykh i internirovannykh teknicheskikh predlozhenii (Acquiring Technical Proposals from POWs and Internees), discusses the manner in which German POWs  

37 Ob agenturno-operativnoi rabote s voennoplennymi i internirovannymi, zakhranennyimi v veliki otechestvennoi voine sovetskogo naroda 1941–1945 (Concerning Spies, Operative Work with POWs and Internees Taken Prisoner During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People, 1941–1945) (Top Secret).
worked. It also reveals how institutions, ministries, and factories could request the transfer of POWs through the USSR Council of Ministers.

The third section, *Peredacha spetsialistov iz chisla voennoplennykh i internirovannykh v narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* (Transfer of Specialists from Among the POWs and Internees to the People's Economy of the USSR), assesses the contribution of German POWs to Soviet economic objectives. This section reiterates the degree to which German POWs assisted Soviet industry, the location of camps they worked in, and which ministries requested their assistance. This section also gives a breakdown of areas of specialization for POWs. For example, out of a total of 1,353 German POWs who worked in *Sharashka*, 31 worked for the USSR Ministry of Defense. The third section, which gives an assessment of the German POWs' work, asserts that although POWs contributed much to Soviet industry, much more information could be obtained.
Table 4.1
Probable Location and Activity of Sharashka Camps in Former Soviet Empire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Republic</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Razdan</td>
<td>Radio electronic equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Baku</td>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Gomel</td>
<td>Radar systems</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>Nuclear technology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>Optical equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vitebsk</td>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Sukhumi</td>
<td>Nuclear research</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tbilisi</td>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tbilisi</td>
<td>Nuclear research</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tbilisi</td>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Alma-Ata</td>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Petropavlovsk</td>
<td>Missile transport and launchers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Semipalatinsk</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons research</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uralsk</td>
<td>Machine guns</td>
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<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Bishkek</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Kishinev</td>
<td>Electronic radio equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kazan, Tatarstan</td>
<td>Strategic bombers, helicopters, missiles, rocket engines, optical equipment, radio communications equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zelenodolsk, Tatarstan</td>
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<td>Glazov, Udmurtiya</td>
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<td>Izhevsk, Udmurtiya</td>
<td>Infantry weapons</td>
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<td>Votkisk, Udmurtiya</td>
<td>Strategic missiles</td>
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<td>Salavat, Bashkiriya</td>
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<td>Ufa, Bashkiriya</td>
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<td>Kharkov</td>
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<td>Kiev</td>
<td>Radar systems</td>
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<td>Transport aircraft</td>
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<td>Lugansk</td>
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<td>Pavlograd</td>
<td>Strategic missiles</td>
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<td>Sevastopol</td>
<td>Naval ships</td>
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<td>Zaporozhe</td>
<td>Communications equipment</td>
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<td>Zaporozhe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Tashkent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>Radio communications equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
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The MVD concluded that foreign POWs should be exploited for specific purposes. The MVD system for exploiting foreign POWs focused on the following eight objectives.

- Obtaining tactical information from POWs for immediate use.
- Recruiting agents among German POWs whose task was to identify POWs who possessed scientific and specialized technical training.
- Intelligence-gathering on German military decisionmaking.
- Obtaining work results from German, Japanese, Romanian, and Hungarian POW officers.
- NKGD operative measures to exploit correspondence between POWs and their relatives in Austria, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Manchuria.
- Exposure of intelligence agents among POWs.
- Exposure of American and English intelligence activities against the USSR through POWs.
- Methods for recruiting agents and double agents among POWs who would be activated after repatriation.

This was the organization and mission of the MVD when the Korean War broke out in 1950.
SOVIET FORCES IN THE KOREAN WAR

Soviet Air Force

There is no question that Russian pilots flew MiGs in combat in Korea. This fact is documented in memoirs such as those of General Clark and Lt. General Georgii Agyeyevich Lobov. Soviet 64th Air Corps commander, and in U.S. and Soviet archive material. The American and Soviet public, however, were not aware of the U.S.-Soviet conflict in the skies over Korea. The Deputy Chief of Intelligence of the 64th Soviet Air Corps, Viktor Aleksandrovich Bushuyev, said, "It's true that the presence of the 64th Corps was a secret. It did not appear in the Soviet press. It was a concealed fact. But it was not possible to hide three divisions, a regiment, 500-600 flights per day plus a lot of planes shot down. You couldn't hide this in Korea."

There is little physical evidence of the Russian presence in Korean air combat, since the Soviet policy was to conceal this activity to the greatest extent possible. Stalin did not want the United States to discover the extent of the Soviet Air Force's activity in Korea. Soviet planes were based in China, though not under the control of the Chinese or integrated into a joint command. General Georgii A. Lobov, Commander of the Soviet Air Force based in China that participated in the Korean War, said, "I took my orders directly from Moscow." Lobov elaborated in an interview with a British journalist,

Soviet markings were obliterated on all the planes and they were repainted with Chinese colors. Pilots had to hand in their documents and remove all signs of identification. They were dressed in Chinese uniforms—khaki jackets, blue trousers, and orange boots with no marks of rank, only a badge with the profiles of Stalin and Mao on it. Lobov pointed out that there was another reason for the Chinese uniforms: when his pilots returned to base, he did not


39 Paul M. Cole, interview with Viktor Aleksandrovich Bushuyev, Deputy Chief of Intelligence, 64th Air Corps, Moscow, September 16, 1992.
want the Chinese misidentifying the white faces and blasting away at them.40

Soviet pilots were reluctant or forbidden to engage in combat over water, for example, to avoid being captured alive in the event of a water landing. In the beginning of the war, Russian pilots were required to speak Chinese during combat. This quickly proved to be impossible.

The UN forces had no doubt that the Russians were in the air in large numbers.

Such was reported by covert intelligence sources; from time to time enemy pilots who bailed out were observed to be Caucasian types; and Sabre pilots frequently encountered adversaries of considerable skill who evidently accompanied a MiG formation in the role of instructors. In 1953 a Polish air force defector stated that many Soviet flight instructors in his country previously had fought in Korea against the Sabres.41

It is particularly revealing that after the UN forces began Operation Moolah, involving a reward of $100,000 to the first pilot to defect with a MiG, "an unlocated radio transmitter began jamming our Russian language broadcasts of the offer, but did not interfere with the Korean or Chinese language versions."42

Communist pilots, who flew against UN aircraft in Korea, were known to be from China, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Japan. American pilots considered their opponents to be either “very good” or “below average.” The Communists lacked pilots who, by USAF standards, were “average.” This indicated that a training cycle was in effect that required experienced pilots to be rotated while “honcho” instructors stayed behind to guide the next class. “FEAF intelligence officers always insisted that the Sabre pilots did not need to know the nationality of the men they fought, but Sabre pilots believed that

42From the Danube to the Yalu, p. 208.
most of the 'honcho' pilots were Russians and that the 'recruits' were Chinese and North Koreans.\textsuperscript{43}

Communist tactics revealed certain priorities. The gunnery of Communist pilots "was frequently poor, with notable exceptions against B-29s where it may be supposed that Soviet personnel were interested in seeking tactics of value against possible bomber raids of the future."\textsuperscript{44}

There is substantial anecdotal information about Caucasian pilots in Korea. What is known thus far is that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) army was definitely involved on the ground, but the evidence concerning any participation by the GDR air force is less clear. Dr. Hans Maretzky, former GDR ambassador to North Korea (1987–1990), recalled:

\begin{quote}
In my capacity as an ambassador, I asked some people in the North Korean Ministry of Defense—I have to exclude the defense minister since he was surprised when I asked him—and I asked one of my military attachés who came from the air force and he made some research. At the end, however, the answer to the question of whether the GDR air force participated in the Korean War was not a clear yes or no.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

There was some GDR diplomatic representation in Pyongyang during the Korean War as well. As shown in Table 4.2, a number of Soviet pilots were decorated for their service in Korea.

There is a Soviet Air Force cemetery at Port Arthur, China. Annual memorial services were held there when Sino-Soviet relations permitted such observances.


Table 4.2
Soviet Pilots Who Received the Title of “Hero of the Soviet Union” for Combat Duty in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Major Stepan A. Bakhaev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Captain Arkadii S. Boytsov</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Captain Nikolai G. Dokashenko</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Captain Grigorii I. Ges'</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Major Anatolii M. Kavelin</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Captain Sergei M. Kramarenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Major General Georgii A. Lobov, 64th Corps Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Captain Mikhail I. Mikhin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Major Stepan I. Naumenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Boris A. Obraztsov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Major Dmitrii P. Oskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Captain Grigorii U. Okhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Colonel Evgenii G. Pepelyaev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Mikhail S. Ponomarev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel Grigorii I. Pulov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Dmitrii A. Samoilov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel Aleksei P. Smorchkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Evgenii M. Steimakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Captain Trofim P. Subbotin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Captain Nikolai V. Sutyagin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>1st Lieutenant Pyodor A. Shibanov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Captain Lev K. Kirillovich</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


UN forces attempted to capture Soviet pilots to prove that the USSR was actively engaged in the Korean conflict but the Soviets were prepared to take extraordinary measures to prevent their capture:

For months FEAF attempted to capture ejecting MiG pilots, putting a Sabre CAP over them and alerting air-sea rescue. Each time, the MiG pilot so targeted escaped into the countryside. One day, a MiG went down over the coast, its pilot ejecting and then landing safely in the Yellow Sea. Alerted, a rescue helicopter left Ch'o-do island, heading north to pick him up. Meanwhile, a Sabre CAP orbited the
downed airman, floating safely in the water, obviously alive and well. Suddenly, four flights of MiGs jumped the Sabres, triggering a fierce dogfight. While the Sabres fought for their lives, four other MiGs suddenly appeared, diving down and strafing their erstwhile comrade in the water, a telling comment on Stalinist Russia’s regard for human life.46

There were visual sightings of Caucasian pilots flying MiGs or descending in parachutes, but there is no public documentation that a Soviet pilot was ever captured by UN forces in Korea.

UN forces were also interested in obtaining information about Soviet-made aviation hardware. UN forces attempted to obtain intact aircraft or, failing that, instruments, electronic devices, and other pieces that would shed some light on the state of Soviet aircraft industry. Early in the war, UN “technical intelligence forces shipped a captured Il-10 and a Yak-9 to the United States for evaluation, but those aircraft were old technology.”47 In April 1951, FEAF's intelligence branch put together a joint U.S.-Korean team trained to grab a downed MiG.

The team consisted of specialists hastily trained to dismember the MiG with small explosives and hand grenades and take selected pieces, such as instrumentation and engine parts, back for analysis; heavily armed and highly skilled ROK Rangers would accompany the intelligence specialists for protection.48

On April 17, 1951, a MiG recovery team blew apart a MiG on the ground in North Korea and returned with some engine parts and the horizontal stabilizer. The wreckage was transported to Ch'ŏnch'on, Paengyong-do, and Seoul, and was finally delivered to the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, for analysis.

On July 9, 1951, a MiG was spotted under 17 feet of water off the coast near the Ch'ŏngch'on river. A joint U.S.-British naval force cooperated in the effort to raise the aircraft. Using its crane, a Land-

The salvaging ship utility (LSU) raised most of the sunken MiG on July 20. The entire engine assembly was recovered. The Soviets were well aware of this operation as approximately 32 MiGs prowled around the vicinity of the salvage operation. The MiG fragments were transferred to the *U.S.S. Epping Forest* on July 21, which proceeded to Inch'on with its cargo. U.S. specialists did not obtain an intact MiG-15 in operational condition until North Korean pilot Noh Keum Suk defected on September 21, 1953. The MiG-15 was evaluated by, among others, then-Major Chuck Yeager at the Wright Air Development Center.

The Soviet efforts to acquire information about U.S. aircraft mirrored the UN effort, with the exception that Soviet forces had much more access to U.S. pilots.

**Anti-Aircraft Units**

Thus far no direct evidence links Soviet forces to ground combat operations in Korea. Soviet troops did participate, however, in anti-aircraft operations. An undetermined number of U.S. aircraft were shot down by Soviet ground fire during the war. Soviet archive material confirms the Soviet role. The following memorandum was written by a member of a Soviet air defense unit in Korea:

> No. 4510
> 23 November 1951
> To: Commander of Unit 54892
> From: Shakhta  To: Teleshu

> On November 22, 1951 at 18:18 hours an enemy plane, type B-26, entered the combat formation of the 2nd Battalion. Its altitude was 200–200 meters, course 270. The aircraft strafed a column of trucks on the Pyongyang highway.

> The plane was illuminated by a detail of searchlight station RAP-150, position 411 (executive chief of station Sgt. Levandy, P.A.). The

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50 Shakhta and Teleshu are apparently codenames for military units.
searchlights stayed with the aircraft for 52 seconds. The plane descended to 100–150 meters and turned sharply to course 180. Still in the searchlights, at the left turn along the depression the plane's right surface struck the hill at 18:19 hours. The plane crashed 2,000 meters from 411's position. The fuel tanks ignited following impact causing the aircraft to explode. The crew was killed.

The plane, type B-26, No. 122113/10, crashed in the vicinity of Pukhani village, Simchen district, Senchen region.

Enclosed are the papers and topographic maps found in the area of the crash site.

Attachment: Sketch of the crash site, 1 tracing paper sheet, unclassified.

Commander of Unit 10899
/Belenko/
Chief of Staff
/Yanushevich/

U.S. records show that a B-26 was lost on November 22, 1951, during "a night intruder mission on one of the main supply routes between Sinuiju and Anju."

Three crew members, 1Lt. Jack A. Fisher (AO-2087035), Maj. Gordon K. Kahl (AO-0437317), and 1Lt. John Roumiguere (AO-2221990) are currently listed as MIA. The aircraft number in the Soviet report does not correspond to any of the identification numbers of the B-26. The sketch in Figure 4.2 is attached to the Soviet report.

Soviet Motivations for Interrogating U.S. POWs

There is no doubt that Soviet intelligence services were on the ground prepared to interrogate and recruit POWs from the very beginning of the Korean War. The motivations were to collect intelligence on U.S. strategy and tactics and information on the organization of U.S. military units, and to recruit agents. The Soviets had to conduct intelligence operations separately, in some cases, from the Chinese and North Koreans. Soviet and Chinese interests in U.S. POWs were not symmetrical. Soviet and Chinese military intelli-

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51 Air Force Field Search Case 753.
Research Parameters Regarding U.S. POW/MIA in the USSR 121

Figure 4.2—Soviet Anti-Aircraft Unit Report from North Korea

gence sought information on the U.S. Air Force, though the Chinese focused on basic concepts concerning organization and training whereas the Soviets focused on the characteristics of aircraft, notably
the F-86 and B-29, and technical information concerning systems such as radar-directed gun sights, bomb sights, and other components. Since the Korean War occurred during the time when the U.S. declared policy was Massive Retaliation, the Communist forces had reason to believe that U.S. tactics in Korea might be repeated in the skies above Moscow and Beijing. The dismal performance of Soviet-made aircraft and anti-aircraft systems early in the war caused consternation among the Soviet design bureaus and intelligence collection agencies. The Korean War provided an excellent opportunity to experiment with new designs as well as to learn about the details of U.S. systems by studying the hardware and the people who operated it.

The KGB also attempted to recruit agents among the U.S. POW population. A retired KGB Major General, who asked not to be identified in this study, said, "At the time the KGB would have attempted to recruit American POWs." Gavril Korotkov, a former Soviet intelligence officer now working at the Institute of Military History in Moscow, said in 1993 that he interrogated Americans directly. Korotkov remembered one case in particular. "Our goal," he said, "was to try to recruit him, to get [the American POW] to work for us."52

George Blake, a British SIS officer serving in Seoul under diplomatic cover at the British representation, was captured in the opening days of the North Korean invasion.53 Blake asserts in his memoirs that he was not recruited by Soviet intelligence; rather, "I joined because of [the Communist] ideals."54 In Blake's words, late one evening in the autumn of 1951 he passed a note, written in Russian, to his guards. It was addressed to the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang. Blake requested a meeting with an embassy official "as I had something important to communicate which they might find of interest." Soviet intelligence officers responded. The picture is probably more complex than

53 Blake was part of a larger group of civilians and soldiers who were transported together. Larry Zellers, a fellow prisoner, details this experience in In Enemy Hands: A Prisoner in North Korea (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1991).
Blake’s version of events. A KGB source familiar with Blake’s operational file said that the North Koreans and Chinese contributed to the recruitment process by pointing out individual prisoners who appeared to be “soft” or potentially susceptible to recruitment. Blake was encouraged to believe, according to KGB sources, that he had volunteered his services.

The Blake case illustrates that KGB officers mounted recruitment efforts in North Korean territory. Other operations were staged in North Korea by KGB officers resident in Soviet territory. George Blake’s decision to work for the KGB gave the KGB additional incentive to find other potential agents among the UN POW population. Blake supported the idea that the KGB was screening and recruiting American POWs in Korea. In Blake’s view,

There must have been other [KGB officers] beyond the officer who recruited me. I was recruited by the head of the First Directorate (Intelligence) of the KGB in Vladivostok. He would have made a special trip in my case to see me. He had an assistant, we didn’t know his name, but Philip Dean, who had read a Russian novel, named him Kuzna-kuzni after a character in the book. That is what we called him. He spoke English quite well. To have contact with POWs you would need someone who speaks English. It could very well have been that the fellow we called Kuzna-kuzni saw Americans. There was a shortage of people who could speak English. This sounds very likely to me, though I have no personal evidence of it.55

In general, however, Blake supports the hypothesis that the KGB engaged in systematic, direct contact with American POWs. The KGB made such contacts with Blake’s civilian colleagues to establish a cover and context for the KGB’s contacts with Blake. “There must have been other KGB officers,” Blake added. “I was a particularly important case, but they would not have created such an operation just for my benefit alone.” According to a retired KGB Major General interviewed for this study, the effect of the George Blake case on Soviet intelligence operations during and after the Korean conflict cannot be overestimated.

In addition to the KGB general’s direct knowledge that there was a KGB interest in Korea, there is other evidence that attempts were made to recruit American POWs. U.S. Army intelligence (G2) discovered that an alarming number of returning POWs had been successfully recruited for espionage and sabotage purposes by foreign intelligence services. In June 1954 the U.S. Army advised the Air Force that evidence had been uncovered which concerned the assignment of Sabotage and Espionage missions to repatriated American prisoners of war during “Big and Little Switch,” and that quite recently new cases of this type have been discovered.

Army intelligence could not rule out the possibility that POWs had accepted “sleeper” missions, thus, repatriated POWs were not permitted to accept overseas assignments for 18 months after their return. Blake said that if recruited agents were detected after their return, “their defense would have been they were recruited under duress” or due to “brainwashing.”

The Soviet KGB presence in Korea, the pattern of contact with American POWs, and the direct testimony of two Soviet intelligence officers, one who acknowledges Soviet efforts to recruit a POW, suggest that the recruitment of Americans may not have been carried out by Chinese or Koreans exclusively. The Soviet structure for exploiting foreign POWs on the territory of the USSR was in operation when the Korean War broke out. The pattern of Soviet contact with American POWs in Korea parallels the Soviet exploitation of German POWs during World War II. The pattern is also consistent with NKVD efforts to recruit agents among the French prisoners held at Tambov in 1944–1946. The French experience in World War II and the U.S. experience in Korea reveal a consistent methodology on the part of Soviet intelligence.

56 Memorandum to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Intelligence, Department of the Army (Secret), from Gilbert R. Levy, Chief, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, June 14, 1954.

57 Blake interview.
U.S. AIR FORCE POW/MIAs IN SOVIET RECORDS

Appendix 7 (RAND List) contains names, all alleged by Russian researchers to be U.S. servicemen whose names appeared in the records of the Soviet 64th Air Corps. Note that the Russian side has been careful to point out that none of these individuals was interrogated directly by a member of the Soviet armed or security forces.

The RAND List is a composite of this and three other separate lists. The first list, compiled by RAND's Moscow-based research team, was delivered to RAND in May 1992. The second list was delivered by the Moscow team to RAND in September 1992. The first Russian list contained 59 names, the second 71. There are two duplications (Parks/Parks and Zwotker/Zweicker). The duplications apparently occurred because the list was prepared on a manual typewriter as names were found. The difference in the name “Parks” when written in Cyrillic is significant enough to conclude that the cases were separate when in fact they were not. The Parks duplication has been deleted as has the name Zwotker. (The correct spelling is probably Zwiacher.) One case has been identified as that of an Australian rather than an American.

The other two lists were obtained by the U.S.-Russian Commission on POW/MIAs. The first list of 71 names (70 after deleting one duplication) was provided by the Russian side in May 1992. The Russian title of this list is “List of U.S. Air Force Crew Members Participating in Combat Operations in North Korea 1950-1953 and about Whom Information Has Been Found in Documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.” On September 24, 1992, the Russians provided a list of 59 names (57 after deleting two duplications). The title of this list is “List of U.S. Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point.” The Commission list of 59 names is identical to the RAND list of 59 names. Forty-three names appear in the same order on both Commission lists.

The names, service numbers, capture date, and other information have been checked against the Mapper database system maintained...
at CILHI and against Task Force Russia data. Information on the original list (in Russian) has been corrected. The order in which the names appear corresponds to the list as it was provided by the Russians.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter has four purposes: (1) to document direct Soviet interrogations of American POWs in Korean and Chinese territory; (2) to show evidence of the means by which American POWs may have been transferred to USSR territory during the Korean War; (3) to estimate the number of individuals who may have been transported to USSR territory; and (4) to document the U.S. government’s assertions and subsequent denials that American servicemen were transported from Korea to USSR territory.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ORGANS ACTIVE IN KOREA

The GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and KGB (and its successor organizations) have been uncooperative with a variety of researchers including the Joint Commission. The KGB, in spite of numerous promises to reveal the truth about its activities in Korea, has continued to deny any involvement with American POWs in Korea or anywhere else for that matter. Interviews with individuals who claim to have participated in these activities contradict the official line pushed by the GRU and the KGB.

One may conclude, however, that Soviet-era archives contain documents that would clearly contradict this version of events. Soviet intelligence organs, which documented in writing their direct contact with American POW/MIAs, may have created a paper trail that links American servicemen to USSR territory. According to a Russian military source who requested anonymity, during the Korean War GRU
Operatives in North Korea and China were required to write regular, periodic summaries of their activities. Much of the historical record of the GRU, therefore, was at one time located in or around headquarters in Moscow, where the GRU was required to forward its materials. GRU headquarters during the Korean War may also have been located in Novosibirsk or Saryshagan. The GRU used Novosibirsk as a collection point for information obtained during the Vietnam War. In the view of experts in Moscow, the GRU is a creature of habit that would have used the same facility again and again. There is a certain sense of probability, therefore, that Novosibirsk was the GRU center during the Korean War as well. Soviet documents related to the exploitation of American POW/MIAs may have been stored in archives in Moscow and elsewhere.

KGB operatives, on the other hand, had different interests and more discretion in reporting from Korea. Their task was to pass along to the Moscow Center information judged to be of particular importance, particularly information concerning individuals targeted for recruiting efforts. The record-keeping for the KGB may have been more dispersed in the sense that regional archives associated with units that produced the information may have original documents or at least copies. The important issue for the KGB was to keep information and documentation within the KGB system, thus a regional archive served the same storage purpose as the Center in Moscow. The information may be stored in one of many regional archives, some of which are located in independent countries that were once republics of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Air Force 64th Air Corps maintained three divisions in China. During the Korean War, Soviet military intelligence was organized, for the most part, under the 64th Air Corps. Most Soviet units operating in Korea would have been under the jurisdiction of the 64th Corps. The deputy to the officer in the intelligence department of the 64th Corps, Viktor Aleksandrovich Bushuyev, said that there would have been no other units involved in intelligence opera-

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1The headquarters of the 64th Air Corps was located at Muk Den, an operational air defense unit was based at Andong, and there was a third training division. The HQ 8th U.S. Army Combined G2-G3 Periodic Report provided estimates of Soviet forces in China.
tions in Korea that were not subordinated to the 64th Corps.\textsuperscript{2} Other testimony suggests that the KGB operated independent of Soviet military control.

Soviet military and intelligence activities were usually not, however, coordinated with each other and, in general, the KGB and GRU sometimes competed against one another for information. The MGB within the military was known as SMERSH until 1948 when the name was changed to counterintelligence (kontrrazvedka). Within many Soviet units, one would find one MGB officer per battalion and in the staff up to corps level. There was usually great hostility between the MGB officer and the military political officer (Zampolit) as well as an air of profound distrust between the MGB and GRU. The identity of the MGB officer within military ranks was usually the worst-kept secret in the Soviet forces. Some MGB officers made no effort to conceal their identity. The MGB officers were referred to as "the special section," "boy," or "them," as in "He works for them." A GRU officer who served in Korea recalled, "Even in the Chief Military Advisor's Staff we had 'boys.' That's how we called the KGB men."\textsuperscript{3}

The Soviet presence in Korea was facilitated by the close political-military relations between Moscow and Beijing in the 1950s. Sino-Soviet political-military cooperation was at a historically high level during the years of the Korean conflict. The Chinese-Soviet Mutual Aid Treaty was signed on February 14, 1950. One of the most influential advisers to the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee was I. V. Kovalev, a Russian.\textsuperscript{4} A substantial amount of direct evidence from repatriated U.S. POWs and Army G2 illuminates Sino-Soviet cooperation in interrogations of American POWs in PRC territory. U.S. Army G2 noted that "all Russians serving with Chinese Communist Forces are given Chinese character names for the purpose of identification in kanji."\textsuperscript{5} By July 1954 there were approximately 10,000 Soviet and Soviet-satellite soldiers on Chinese terri-

\textsuperscript{2}Bushuyev interview.
\textsuperscript{5}G2 Periodic Report, April 13, 1951.
tory. "The majority of these people," according to Army G2, were "AA troops. The remainder are advisors and medical technicians."  

As will be shown, however, Soviet forces did not always have adequate access to prisoners, hardware, and information acquired by the Chinese or North Koreans. The Soviets compensated by organizing direct collection efforts.

Soviet Interrogation of American POWs

Neither the Soviet nor the Russian government has admitted that Soviet forces had systematic, direct contact with American POWs during the Korean War. General Dmitrii Volkogonov, Chairman of the Russian side of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIA(s), has stated that Soviet forces in Korea had no direct contact with American POWs. This assertion has been refuted by primary source data that has been accepted as conclusive by a variety of U.S. researchers and officials. The Senate Select Committee noted in January 1993,

There is strong evidence, both from archived U.S. intelligence reports and from recent interviews in Russia, that Soviet military and intelligence officials were involved in the interrogation of American POWs during the Korean Conflict, notwithstanding recent official statements from the Russian side that this did not happen. Additionally, the Committee has reviewed information and heard testimony which we believe constitutes strong evidence that some unaccounted for American POWs from the Korean Conflict were transferred to the former Soviet Union in the early 1950s.  

There is no doubt and there is ample direct eyewitness testimony to support the conclusion that Soviet intelligence organs exploited U.S. servicemen in Korea, in China and on USSR territory.

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Evidence obtained from Soviet-era archives demonstrates without a doubt that information concerning American POWs was of the greatest interest to Soviet authorities. A message to the Politburo dated December 16, 1951, for example, demonstrates that Stalin was consulted on the disposition of Major General William Dean, the highest-ranking American to be captured during the war.8

Soviet reporting from Korea confirms that Soviet forces were in direct contact with American POWs. The information collected by Soviet forces from American POW/MIAs was treated with great urgency. It was also reported to the highest levels of the Soviet government. A message from the Soviet chief of staff Stemenko to the Politburo dated December 30, 1950, details the interrogation of the American F-86 pilot Captain Laurence Bach (0016589A) who had been shot down by Soviet MiGs on December 22. The message, which indicates that Captain Bach had been interrogated by a Soviet officer named Mironov, was circulated to the entire Politburo, including Stalin.9

Contrary to the official position, Soviet sources have admitted to having routine direct contact for various purposes, including interrogations. General Lobov stated on December 19, 1991, that he never had any direct contact with American POWs in Korea, but later in the same interview referred to discussions he had with American POWs.10 Lobov, who again contradicted himself in another interview, told a British journalist, “Whenever [Lobov] met any captured American airmen, he made a point of asking them if they had been told the Soviet Air Force was in the war.”11

U.S. authorities were aware of the Soviet role in the interrogation of American prisoners. The Soviet military maintained liaison officers

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8 Decoded Telegram Number 508876 (Top Secret), from Razuvaev to Stemenko, copies to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulgarin, Khrushchev, Vasilievski, Sokolovski, and Schitmenko.

9 Decoded Telegram Number 601212 (Top Secret), from Schtemenko, copies to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulgarin, Khrushchev, Vasilievski, and Sokolovski.


in North Korea whose mission was to participate in the interrogation of U.S. POWs.

Interrogators of three nationalities, Chinese, North Korean, and Caucasian (presumably Russian) questioned USAF personnel during the Korean conflict.\(^\text{12}\)

Reports by repatriated USAF POWs of Caucasian (possibly Soviet) interrogators were relatively few and there were none at all by the end of 1952. Caucasians generally were reported to be at intermediary interrogation sites such as command posts, artillery, and antiaircraft battalions, where the prisoner was held temporarily. According to U.S. Air Force analysts, Soviet officers who were there as military advisers to the North Koreans performed a few interrogations out of curiosity or perhaps expediency.\(^\text{13}\) These contacts were more systematic than previously thought.

The fact that a Caucasian appears in an interrogation does not make him a Russian or Soviet intelligence officer. Caucasians from the military organizations of East European countries might have been in direct contact with American POWs. The armed forces of the GDR, for example, were involved in Korean War combat, though the extent to which this occurred remains to be determined. The presence of Caucasians who were Soviet military and intelligence officers, however, is beyond dispute.

In the beginning of the Korean War, there was apparently a shortage of Soviet intelligence officers (KGB and GRU) other than Caucasians trained in the English language. As the war progressed, a more clandestine Soviet presence was established as racially compatible Soviet officers mingled in North Korea with similar-looking Chinese and Korean interrogators. This is one explanation why repatriated American POWs reported that contact with Caucasian interrogators occurred only sporadically after approximately mid-1951. The Soviets continued to have systematic, direct contact with American POWs but it was impossible for American POWs to detect the true


\(^\text{13}\) Analysis of the Korean War Prisoner of War Experience, Appendix One, p. 26.
nationality of these individuals because of the deception. Chinese- and Korean-looking individuals who interrogated Americans during the last year of the war may not have necessarily been nationals of China or Korea. Another possible explanation for why there are no reports by repatriated POWs that they had been interrogated by Soviets on Soviet territory is that no one who was interviewed in this way returned to tell about it.

Descriptions of contact with Caucasians suspected of being Russian/Soviet officers are characteristic of the appearance of other Caucasians who participated in the interrogation of American POWs during the Korean War. Repatriated POW Earl N. Colbey, though he does not recall being interrogated by a Russian, noted that in late 1950 “I remember seeing quite a few Russians in Pyongyang when we first got there [September]. Some were military and some were civilians. We could tell they were Russians by their uniform.”

The presence of Russians and those suspected of being Russians in Korean territory was confirmed when “in a few scattered instances returnees claimed to have been interrogated by persons whom they thought to be Russians.” Returning POWs were asked by U.S. intelligence debriefers to recall contact with Russians and to describe their physical appearance. One POW recalled being asked if he could speak Russian or Polish by a Caucasian, 5’ 9”, 165–170 pounds, erect posture, 35 years old, dirty blond hair, long thin face with prominent nose, pale complexion with blue or green eyes. The POW reported seeing this alleged Russian twice, once at Pyongyang and Chungang and another time at Chungang-Jin where the individual was wearing civilian clothes. A Russian struck the POW with his sidearm during the course of the interrogation. In another incident, a Caucasian identified by Chinese guards as a Russian struck an American prisoner with a .45 calibre sidearm during an interrogation that took place on November 5, 1950, approximately one-half mile from the city of Unson.

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16RG319 (Army Staff), AC of S, G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1954, 383.6, February–April, Box 1693, Martin Watson statement.
The man who hit me was not a Chinese. He was of the white race, wore a different uniform and talked in a language that sounded to me like Russian. His uniform was Russian and the Chinese guards told us he was a Russian.\textsuperscript{17}

Another repatriated POW reported seeing someone claiming to be a Chinese citizen who spoke Russian and Chinese fluently. The POW thought he was a Russian.\textsuperscript{18} The reports of a Caucasian dressed in a Russian uniform carrying a Colt .45 may indicate the unit affiliation of Soviet officers. Soviet practice suggests that military personnel in Korea would not have been able to routinely carry a foreign sidearm. A KGB officer, on the other hand, would have had the flexibility to do this, particularly during the first year of the war.

Contacts between Russians and American servicemen were reported in the open press as early as 1950. U.S. Army personnel who returned to friendly lines after being captured in 1950 reported they were “questioned at three places by Russian officers in North Korean uniforms.”\textsuperscript{19}

The Lieutenant said he had been questioned by Russian officers at Andong, and thereafter at corps headquarters near Kongju and at this sector’s front headquarters at Chochiwon. He said their questions were wholly political.\textsuperscript{20}

The lieutenant added that the primary questions asked by the North Koreans were “right out of 101-5 and 101-10 [Army table of organization and equipment].” This information suggests that in the early months of the war, American POWs were routinely transferred into Chinese territory at Andong where they could be questioned by Soviet officers. One returning POW stated that a Chinese guard was overheard to say in Andong that the Russians had a section in the city

\textsuperscript{17}RG153 Entry 183 Army JAG War Crimes Division, Operation Big Switch Interrogations, 1953-1954, A-C Box 1, “B” Folder 1, Lloyd Brandon affidavit.

\textsuperscript{18}RG319 (Army Staff), AC of S, G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1954, 383.6, February-April, Box 1693, John J. Sutherland statement.


\textsuperscript{20}“Intelligence Considerations,” Annex C (Secret), “Enemy Procedure for Interrogation,” RG338 (Secret).
to themselves. Russian contact with American POWs was not limited to Chinese territory, as many report from repatriated POWs demonstrate.

An American infantryman captured near Masan on September 5, 1950, was liberated by the U.S. 25th Division on September 28th. During his post-capture interview conducted the following month in Japan, Pfc Kenneth W. Phillips recalled that during captivity a man he suspected of being a Russian had direct contact with a number of American POWs.

(Phillips): About thirty miles from the front lines we pulled out one night and some big shot that had on a uniform that looked like a Russian kept [Lt. Higgins] behind and said we were supposed to be in Seoul in three days and he was supposed to meet us.

Question: Who was this man that looked like a Russian?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You say he had on a different uniform?
A: Yes, sir. High top boots, brown pants, brown shirt, brown coat. He didn’t have nothing up here. He talked good English.
Q: Was he a white man?
A: He was white.
Q: He was with the North Korean forces?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know what his name was?
A: No, sir. We was trying to get out of that town because that was being bombed and they kept Lt. Higgins.
Q: He wasn’t allowed to go forward with you?

21RG319 (Army Staff), AC of S, G1 (Personnel), Decimal File 1954, 383.6, February–April, Box 1693, Shelton Foss statement.
A: They said in three days he would catch up with us.

Q: This same man you believe to be Russian?

A: Yes, sir. This captain, we had another one, and he said he was going to take him on to Seoul. When they liberated us they said they shot them both.

Q: You understand that Lt. Higgins and also the captain was shot, is that it?

A: Both of them.

Q: What about this Russian?

A: He shot this lieutenant.

Q: The Russian shot the lieutenant; this is what you heard? It was the Russian that killed Lt. Higgins?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How tall was he? Describe him.

A: About 6’; just slim, did not wear glasses, had no scars on his face, no moles, just plain white looking, brown eyes. He didn’t take his hat off so that we could see his hair. He had a little red button on his cap that had a red star.

Q: Like our overseas cap?

A: No, sir. A brown cap. Up here was a little red button that had a red star in it.

Q: Did you see anything denoting rank, like chevrons, like bars, or the like or some of these gadgets you see British officers wearing?

A: No, sir. He didn’t have a thing on.

Q: Breeches were brown?

A: Yes, sir, brown. Coat brown. Everything was brown.

Q: He had on a coat?
A: He had on a coat.
Q: Like our Ike jacket?
A: No, sir. You know how these old jackets were?
Q: The blouse?
A: Yes, sir. Just like them. He had on a belt and a shoulder strap and a .45.
Q: You mean like the Sam Brown belts, that goes through the shoulder?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: From right to left or from left to right?
A: They wear them from right to left. And he had on a .45. He made us write letters about getting the UN out of here.

Q: You say this Russian spoke good English?
A: He spoke good English and good Korean.
Q: He had a North Korean behavior about him like a big shot?
A: Yes, sir. When he came in they went out.
Q: The North Koreans would always leave?
A: When he come in.
Q: Was this a room?
A: Just a big barn.
Q: And all backed out when he came in?
A: That is right. [.....]
Q: Did you see any more Russians or anyone else that appeared to be Russian?

A: Just that one.

Q: This particular individual, you say this man’s dress and his uniform was entirely different from the others?

A: He was different from all of them.

Q: Did you notice whether anyone saluted him or not?

A: Yes, sir, he was always saluted first.22

This is one of the more lengthy descriptions of a Soviet/Russian located in the U.S. archives during the research for this study.

Soviet contact was not reserved for UNC military personnel, as the recruitment of George Blake demonstrates, or restricted to American POWs. A Royal Australian Air Force Meteor pilot, Donald W. Pinkstone, was shot down on June 15, 1953, near the village of Codong-Ni. Pinkstone concluded that during his time as a POW he had been in contact with Russian/Soviets or with those suspected of being such.

The only known contact (albeit indirect) that I had, with whom I believe to be a Russian/Soviet person, was during one of the many interrogation sessions by Chinese interpreters at the centre where I was being held. There were three Chinese, one North Korean officer and one Caucasian present during this particular occasion.

I believe the last mentioned to be either a Soviet Army or Air Force officer for the following reasons:

(i) He was Caucasian.

(ii) His military bearing.

22Interview of Pfc Kenneth W. Phillips, Honshu, Japan, October 1950.
(iii) Subsequent discussion with an American POW who I believe was held at the same centre and stated that he had been interrogated by a Soviet Air Force officer.

(iv) The proximity of the interrogation centre to an Air Force MiG-15 Base. (I believe it was near Antung.)

This particular person did not speak directly to me or speak in English any time during the interrogation. He was not in uniform.

Retired Colonel Gavril Korotkov, who was stationed in Khabarovsk from 1950-1954, reported directly to the Commander of the Soviet Far East Military District concerning his contact with American POWs. Korotkov's group was not subordinated to the 64th Air Corps, though Korotkov maintained constant contact with his colleagues in that corps. Korotkov told Task Force Russia interviewers that "Soviet military specialists had been given approval to interrogate American servicemen in Korea and that some of the senior, more experienced Americans as well as those with specific specialties were selected for transfer to the USSR for further interrogation." Korotkov told TFR that hundreds of Americans were sent to Khabarovsk via Posyet. Interrogation reports were forwarded to the Far East Military District Headquarters, the 7th Directorate of the Main Political Directorate, and the GRU.

In subsequent interviews, Korotkov modified his original statement to the effect that no Americans were transferred to the territory of the USSR. Korotkov said that the interrogation facility was located along the "undemarcated" Soviet-North Korean border, thus it was more appropriate to refer to the location of the interrogations as the

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23This individual was John Giraudo.
25POW/MIAs p. 433.
26As of July 1993, no information from repatriated American POWs suggests that anyone who had been transferred to Khabarovsk via Posyet lived to tell about it.
27Though Korotkov told RAND researchers that he had not been pressured into changing his story, Task Force Russia researchers concluded that intense pressure was focused on Korotkov to alter his story to conform to the official line.
"Far East." No repatriates reported being interrogated by Russians outside of China or North Korea. Thus, Korotkov raised the question of what happened to the Americans who were interrogated in USSR territory in the "Far East." The GRU, according to an initiated source, produced a report summarizing the experience with American POWs in Korea that was used as a manual for similar contact in Vietnam.

The Organization of the Interrogations

When American POWs, particularly Air Force personnel, were interrogated by Soviet forces in permanent POW camps in Korea or at Andong, China, it was not unusual for a summary of the information collected to be prepared in writing. In the cases where Chinese or North Koreans conducted the interrogations, a copy of the material was given to Soviet translators who would prepare a copy in Russian that would routinely be forwarded to Corps Headquarters as well as the General Staff Headquarters in Moscow. The Soviet forces referred to the written summaries as interrogation protocols.

Viktor Bushuyev recalled his experience during the time he was stationed at Andong:

It's true that the presence of the 64th Corps was a secret. It did not appear in the Soviet press. It was a concealed fact. But it was not possible to hide three divisions, a regiment, 500-600 flights per day plus a lot of planes shot down. You couldn't hide this in Korea.

We had contacts with the American POWs, mainly the pilots. We weren't interested in anybody else. I was responsible for organizing the interrogations and for processing all of the information received during the interrogations.

All American pilots, with no exception, would be interrogated in the town of Sinuiju. It was the very northernmost point in Korea, near the Yalu river across from Andong where we were stationed. There was a special building there—the interrogation point. Americans would be brought there. We could see it from Andong. We would

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go there about twice a week to interrogate the prisoners. Sometimes there were just a few of them so we didn't need to go.

How were the interrogations organized? All arrangements, the structure of the interrogation, its content etc., were completely in the hands of the Chinese. We prepared questions in advance. Then we gave the questions to the Chinese. They asked the questions while interrogating the American POWs. When I was there I believe all American POWs were completely in Chinese hands on the territory of North Korea.

I was responsible for the interrogations of the POWs, but neither I nor the translators ever saw any of them with our own eyes. Contact on our level was completely prohibited. We would sit behind the wall, a thin wooden wall, and the translators would sit with us. We were prohibited absolutely from seeing the Americans.

We would enter the building from a different side before the POWs were brought there. We would go to our room and would sit there very quietly. Only then would they bring in the POWs. We had no visual contact. We would sit behind the wall, a thin wooden wall, and the translators would sit with us. We heard everything. The interrogations were in English, of course.

We were prohibited absolutely from seeing the Americans. Then a new translator appeared, his name was Kolya Monkuyev. He was a Buryat Mongol. He looked Chinese. This Kolya Monkuyev would go to that room and participate in the interrogations directly.

The interrogations were conducted in English. We received handwritten materials in English, written by the Chinese. They were on blank pieces of paper. After capture each POW filled in a form. This form would come to us and we would pick people who were of interest to us. I have never held such a form in my hands. We would just get excerpts from them. Our translators then translated all of the material.

Every week we would write an overview. It would go to Moscow, I knew that. I only wrote the report. I suppose they were sent to the General Staff. But if [the original English transcripts] were enclosed or not I didn't know. Maybe they were. Who would keep them in Korea?
The interrogations were easy. The only case was that of Neimann who refused to answer any questions. He was wounded and that was the formal reason why he refused. He was in some hospital. He said it was a violation of some international laws. Of course they wanted to interrogate him, but then I never saw any materials of his interrogations.

Every week I would write a report after reviewing all the material. The Main Intelligence Directorate in Moscow would give us questionnaires: ask this, ask that, whatever we thought was interesting. I don’t want to offend the American pilots, mainly we would deal with the pilots, but they were of no value. They didn’t know anything. They were average pilots and good athletes.

I was there for more than one year, the most tense period. Practically all the POWs went through my hands, not in person but their files and interrogation materials. Several hundred of them. But, again I want to say that none of them was of any serious value to us. We knew twice as much as they could tell us.

Practically all of the American POWs belonged to the Chinese. The war was conducted not by the Koreans but by the Chinese and Soviets. The Koreans were under pressure and had no rights. They would just load and unload stuff, build roads, that sort of thing.

There was no need to bring Americans to Russia. Military personnel, location of bases and all that were already known. We had no questions of this sort. We had the planes as well, all their parts, so it didn’t make any sense [to take pilots to Russia]. If someone asked for political asylum we would have, but I haven’t heard of any such cases. As far as I know our counterintelligence people didn’t express any particular interest in the pilots. We would have known this.

Of course, such an operation could have taken place without the knowledge of the 64th Air Corps. We were the military structure but I have no doubt that other contacts existed, not just those through our General Staff.29

Intelligence officers also discussed the value of transporting American POWs to the USSR.

29Bushuyev interview.
Bushuyev recalled that the chief of intelligence, Col. Tashchan, thought it would be a good idea to interrogate Col. John K. Arnold, who was shot down on January 12, 1953. Bushuyev said:

Arnold was an interesting figure. We thought it would be nice to get him to Moscow. That's all I know. I just remember those conversations about Arnold being a star. They checked him from here [Moscow] and found out that, yes, Arnold was a world star of the first category. He was known as a writer, journalist.

At first Arnold refused to speak. Then the Chinese conducted this thing with him. I didn't know then that it existed. The Chinese asked us to wait, let us work with him, he'd speak in three days. Three days later Arnold said he wouldn't answer our questions but he asked for a piece of paper. He said he'd write things down. And he wrote 18 pages with his small handwriting in one night. Our guys translated all of that.

Bushuyev's memory of events was supported by two Soviet officers, one a language specialist the other a military adviser, who were stationed in North Korea during the war.

In 1951, Colonel Alexander Semenovich Orlov was a student at the Military Institute for Foreign Languages. His focus was on the Afghan language and English. From the spring of 1951 onward, Orlov was assigned to the 64th Air Defense Corps, which was headquartered at Mukden south of Harbin, in the PRC. Orlov was stationed near Andong, just across the Yalu River from Sinuiju. The 64th Corps

30"References to the 'Chinese Communist Air Force' were euphemistic. Far East Air Force (FEAF) intelligence had well-substantiated evidence that powers other than China had begun to crew many of the MIG-15 fighters and probably to direct the Red side of the air war in Korea. In Mukden a 'Supreme Joint Headquarters' of Chinese and North Korean forces apparently served policy-making and administrative functions for the Communist air forces, but an 'Allied Joint Headquarters' at Antung exercised day-by-day control of Red air activities over North Korea. The Antung center appeared to be managed by Chinese Communist officers, but an intelligence informant reported that it was actually run by Russian advisers who were present in the control room at all times. A part of the MIG's were also flown by Soviet or Soviet-satellite pilots. Such was reported by covert intelligence, and on occasion Sabre pilots saw blond Caucasians parachute from stricken MIG's. A Polish air force pilot who defected in Europe stated that many Russian flight instructors in his country had previously fought in Korea." Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961), p. 370.
was divided into three divisions. One was for rotation, one trained PRC and North Korean pilots, and the third, at Andong, guarded a hydroelectric plant and a bridge. Orlov's task was to monitor U.S. aircraft, including B-29s and F-86s. He would see them on radar and alert the North Korean air defenses.

In April 1951, Orlov was sent to the headquarters of North Korea's forces near Pyongyang. His "technical-tactical" mission was to "interrogate USAF personnel on the technology and tactical characteristics of the B-29." According to Orlov, Soviet personnel were not permitted to see U.S. POWs face-to-face. "I wrote questions in English that were passed to the Americans by North Korean intelligence and military personnel," said Orlov.31 The areas to be investigated were sent down to Orlov from the Soviet Military Command. "Of particular interest were the design of the survival suits, the radar-directed gun on the F-86, and the B-29 bomb sight. The F-86, the latest aircraft, was much more interesting than the F-80."

Orlov said that he had contact with American POWs "a couple of times" even though such contact was officially forbidden. Orlov said he met with a "Lt. Col. Black" in a North Korean POW camp in June 1951. "Staff Lt. Colonel Black was getting some flight time in a B-29 when it was shot down," said Orlov. "I set up an interview between Black and the local Pravda correspondent. The interview appeared in the summer of 1951." In the Pravda article, "Lt. Col. V. Black" told the correspondent that "on May 6, 1951, his jet was knocked down by Korean anti-aircraft fire, but Black parachuted to earth and was put in a POW camp."32 (Orlov's story is consistent with the facts known about a "Lt. Col. Black." The Far East Air Force's monthly report for May 1951 lists one B-29 lost to enemy ground fire.33 Orlov is apparently referring to Lt. Colonel Vance E. Black of California who was reported MIA on May 7, 1951 after being shot down.34)

32A. Tkachenko, "Manners of Interventionists in Korea," Pravda, August 14, 1951, p. 4.
33FEAF report for May 1951, "Combat Statistics." The B-29 was not a jet as the Pravda article infers.
34Alarich Zacherle reported that he had been told by a Chinese interrogator that "Lt. Col. Black died at Pak's Palace." Statement by Lt. Colonel Alarich Zacherle, RG319
Orlov continued,

We sent our comments and assessments, in Russian, to staff HQ in Muk Den. I think the information was subsequently assessed by aviation experts in Moscow, though I am not sure. The questions we asked covered a broad range of topics. The answers would have been of interest to many people. More specific questions came from the Soviet military adviser. We received feedback from Corps HQ to help us focus our questions. We wrote these questions from Kim Il Sung's command post. It was like a cave, a small igloo. We lived in these to avoid the napalm. The Chinese asked questions as well, but they were in the process of building an Air Force. Their requirements were much more primitive than ours, as were their methods.

When asked how the U.S. POWs were screened to receive the questions Orlov wrote, he said, "We never knew who did this. All we did was write the questions. We got back signed answers and sketches made by the Americans. They were signed with the name, function (pilot, navigator, etc.), base, and perhaps rank. I would expect these records to be stored in Pyongyang," Orlov said.

As stated earlier, after mid-1951, fewer reports of contact with Caucasian interrogators were made by repatriated U.S. POWs. In addition to the Mongolian interrogator referred to by Bushuyev, there were other Soviet intelligence officers who presented themselves as Korean nationals. Georgii K. Plotnikov, a Korean language specialist assigned to the 64th Air Corps, was in North Korea for one month in 1952, from June 1953–May 1957, and June 1961–July 1963. Plotnikov, who described his job as "military liaison" between the USSR and North Korean forces, told how contact between Soviet military personnel and American POWs was forbidden. He said that each Soviet officer stationed in Korea was issued instructions from the Central Committee of the CPSU. These instructions, which banned contact with all foreigners, had to be read and signed. Plotnikov said that he had no access to American POWs.

Plotnikov told of one exception he knew of personally. Plotnikov said that in 1953 he met an American POW, against standing orders, out
of simple curiosity. Plotnikov was dressed, as usual, in a North Korean Army uniform, which Soviet personnel routinely wore without insignia. Before he met the American, Plotnikov put on a major's insignia and adopted the name Kim Muk Su, which means carpenter in Korean just as Plotnikov does in Russian. With this cover, Plotnikov met an American POW, whom he described as a 30-year-old infantry battalion captain, "perhaps from the 2nd Division," face-to-face. "I have Asian features," Plotnikov said, "and I spoke Korean, so the American did not suspect that I was Russian." The meeting took place at a camp located approximately 20 kilometers north of Pyongyang. According to Plotnikov, the meeting, a consequence of his own initiative, served to satisfy personal curiosity and nothing more. He said he did not report his contact with the American to anyone.

Interrogation Protocols

Five POW interrogation protocols and fragments of six others from archival sources in Russia were obtained for this study. Each protocol appears to be the summary of one or more interrogation sessions with a single U.S. Air Force POW who was interrogated during the Korean War. The information in the protocols is straightforward. There are no lurid details of torture or anything of the sort. In some cases, answers to questions on what appears to be a form are recorded in handwriting. In others, the information is more free-wheeling, including sketches of combat or diagrams of mechanical devices.

All of the interrogation protocols obtained thus far involve USAF POWs. U.S. policy on the issue of the degree to which U.S. military

36In 1953 there were at least two POW camps in the vicinity of Pyongyang where U.S. POWs might have been held. These camps, both located on the main North Korean highway, were part of the series of POW camps clustered around Pyongyang, collectively known as Camp 11. One was located at "YD 464255, near Mirim." It contained "15 UN POWs, 100 CCF personnel, English interpreters, Russian soldiers .... The POWs, all US, 1 CCF guard for each. POWs transferred here from Pyongyang." The other was a POW camp at Huan-Dong (YD 4333). "5 July 1952, approximately 300 US POWs (100 of them USAF) here." UN Prisoners of War—Camps and Conditions in Korea, Manchuria, and China—Supplement VI (Support Plans Section, January 20, 1953) (Secret Security Information), p. 15.
personnel could discuss substantive issues with enemy interrogators is not fully understood, though there are some insights. In March 1951, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force submitted to the Joint Intelligence Committee a memorandum entitled, *Extension of Authority to Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, to Extend Scope of Information Which Captured Personnel May Reveal to the Enemy*. The memorandum cites J.C.S. 2053/1, which authorizes "unified and specified commanders" to determine what could be discussed by captured U.S. personnel. The memorandum focuses on permissible conduct in a hypothetical conflict rather than on conduct for Korean War POWs. The guidance for Strategic Air Command personnel, however, might reflect the parameters within which USAF POWs were permitted to operate in Korean POW camps. The protocols obtained from Russian sources can be used,

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37The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, each acting as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may authorize unified and specified commanders in accordance with policies which have been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to permit personnel captured by the enemy to discuss items of military information which have been determined to be of public knowledge or already in the hands of the enemy." J.C.S. 2053/6, March 19, 1951 (Secret). This document was located in the Suitland Reference Branch of the National Archives by an Army Task Force Russia researcher.

38*Instructions for SAC Personnel in Event of Capture:* 1. Information deemed to be public knowledge or easily obtainable by alien powers and, in consequence, of a nature which can be divulged by captured crew personnel:

a. Political, economic and social conditions in the United States.
b. Pre-military history of the individual.
c. Military history of the individual excluding advanced military schools and advanced electronics training.
d. Location of Strategic Air Command forward bases and unit identity.
e. General performance characteristics of SAC bombardment aircraft.
f. Radio and radar information pertaining to equipment installed on the aircraft of which the individual was a crew member, excepting frequencies available or employed and excepting any data pertaining to IFF.
g. General armor and armament characteristics.
h. Size, weight and shape of the basic A-bomb, method of loading, and number carried in aircraft.

2. Information, the disclosure of which to enemy captors must be forbidden under any circumstances:

a. Military forces of Allied countries, their operations, equipment and personnel.
therefore, to assess the degree to which Soviet officers were involved in direct interrogation of American POWs, the type of information obtained, and the extent to which American policy on disclosure was successful.

The protocols tell a great deal about the areas of Soviet interest as does the way in which the documents were distributed, collected, and stored in Soviet archives. The protocols obtained for this study appear to be from two separate collections. One group of documents was bound with string through two holes in the left hand margin. Others show as many as four holes through which binding string is passed. The documents are paginated in two different ways. The first is the pagination for the document. The second is the pagination for the collection in which the document was placed. One document, for example, is numbered 1–45 from the collection 101–148. In the lower left hand corner of the transmittal letter and the final page, there is a number that shows the document’s registration number representing the series in which it was produced. A protocol from January 29, 1952, shows series number 314; one from February 24, 1952, is number 450; and another from February 24, 1952, is number 451. The routing list shows that copies went to the Headquarters of the 64th Air Corps in addition to the General Staff in Moscow. An example of the coversheet for an interrogation protocol, signed by General Lobov, is shown in Figure 5.1.

b. Military forces of the U.S. Army or Navy, their operations, equipment, and personnel.

c. Future operations and plans.

d. Special weapons—capabilities, construction, stockpiles, or tactical use.

e. Tactical employment of electronics countermeasures.

f. Codes.

g. Radar and radio frequencies.

h. Escape and evasion.

i. Critical lines of supply.

j. Prisoner of war instruction other than name, rank and serial number.
Представляем материал допроса, удостоверение личности и личный номер военнослужащего летчика с пилотажа 3-652, сбитого в воздушном бою с Миг-15 201.01.1952 года в районе ранее САЙН.А.

Приложение: 1. Материал допроса экз. 3 и 4 на 1 листах.
2. Удостоверение личности в СССР.
3. Личный номер.
4. Фотозаказ влека 13 и 51 группа на 1 листе.
Все только адресату.

Примечание: 2-3 отпечатки с походной №6/928

КОМУНЮССР. № 32, КОМИССИИ АНТИСПУЩЕСТВИЕ
ФАКТУРУМ КАБЕР. РУПЕЛЬМЕР

Оф. 2 экз.
No. 1 — адресату.
No. 3 — в дело.
Список.
Список.
248. 526. 426.
160. 190.

Figure 5.1—Interrogation Protocol Copy
The fact that the interrogations show a series number of 451 suggests that there were at least 451 or more interrogations in this collection (Bushuyev referred to "hundreds" of interrogations). During the entire Korean War, 1,303 USAF were declared missing in all categories. Of these, 263 USAF personnel were officially listed as POWs. There is considerable evidence that Soviet officers and interrogators had direct contact with USAF personnel who were not subsequently listed as official POWs. If there are 451 or more interrogation protocols that deal exclusively with American Air Force POWs, then this suggests two alternatives. Either more interrogations were made of individuals who died of wounds in captivity shortly after capture, or individuals who were interrogated by Soviet officers were transported to USSR territory to mask the fact that direct interrogations by Soviet officers had taken place.

One interrogation protocol obtained from Soviet sources concerns an American RB-45 pilot, Captain Charles E. McDonough, who did not return alive from Korea. McDonough lived long enough after capture to be interrogated by Communist Chinese and Soviet forces. A fellow prisoner, Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, described to USAF investigators that McDonough told him he had been burned and lost his flying boots after being shot down by MiGs. McDonough wandered for three or four days without any shoes and suffered severe frostbite that reached from his feet to his knees. After turning himself in, McDonough was interrogated and moved from a hospital to a prison near Sinuiju. On December 16, McDonough was placed on an ox cart by the North Koreans, allegedly to be moved to a hospital. He was never seen alive again by Americans. Since McDonough was a crew member of one of America's most sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft, the RB-45, Soviet forces would have been interested in obtaining information from him. McDonough was last seen by an American being taken away in a cart, allegedly to a hospital for treatment. Since McDonough was alive in Soviet custody yet did not return, Soviet records may shed light on his fate. Since American

39A fragment of an interrogation protocol of Charles E. McDonough (USAF AO-794558) was sent to the author of this study by Jeanne McDonough Dear on February 12, 1993. McDonough, who was shot down on December 4, 1950, on an RB-45 mission, is carried on the Battle Monuments Commission list of 8,177. A note at the end of McDonough's protocol states, "Kuznetsov prepared the questions. A Chinese comrade translated from English."
POWs were routinely transported to China in the early stages of the war, one cannot exclude that the Soviets were transporting McDonough to Andong or even to Soviet territory. This could be resolved if the Russians would locate documents that would show where McDonough was taken and where his remains are buried if, as in the case of other USAF POWs, McDonough died in Soviet custody.

In September 1992, Volkogonov turned over to the American side of the Joint Commission, with much publicity and fanfare, what were described in the press as 54 interrogation protocols. Volkogonov provided interrogation protocols that show the interrogation had been conducted by the Chinese or North Koreans then translated by a Soviet language specialist. Korotkov, who is working with the Russian side of the Joint Commission as a consultant, remarked that the protocols given to the American side were not meant to convey who conducted the interrogation. In Korotkov's view, Volkogonov's redactions and selections are intended to present a distorted view of the degree to which Soviet officers engaged in direct interrogations of Americans. Korotkov noted that Volkogonov knows "personally" what happened but due to "official policy" changed his own views.

Other protocols from apparently the same collection indicate that the interrogation was conducted by a Soviet officer who was in direct contact with the American POW. Korotkov said that he has in his possession copies of documents submitted to the General Staff during the Korean War that also show direct interrogation by Soviet officers of American POWs. Korotkov said the protocol contains names and dates that leave no doubt on this question. Protocols obtained from the Soviet General Staff archives for this study are consistent with Korotkov's description.

The Soviets did not stop with direct contact. Some American POWs were apparently transferred to the territory of the USSR. General Georgii A. Lobov, who commanded the Soviet 64th Air Corps during the Korean War, remarked that during the war he "heard rumors that American POWs had been taken to the USSR."
TRANSPORTING U.S. POW/MIAs TO THE USSR

Background

A useful starting point for a discussion of how American POW/MIAs may have been transferred to USSR territory is to search for a particular pattern of behavior. Russians transferred POWs taken in their own wars to Siberia several times over the past 283 years. After the Swedish army under Charles XII was defeated at the battles of Poltava and Perovotjno in 1709, 23,000 prisoners taken by the Russians were transferred to Siberia. Of these Swedish POWs who were forced to contribute to the economic development of Siberia, only 4,000 ever saw home again. This practice continued in the Twentieth Century. In World War II, the Soviets captured over three million Germans and several hundred thousand other POWs. Many of the German POWs captured during World War II who were transferred to Siberia remain unaccounted for today. In 1950, the Federal Republic of Germany reported that some 923,000 POWs verified as being in Soviet hands were still missing.” In Soviet labor camps, the survival rate for German POWs was very low. “In such camps conditions were appalling . . . of the 93,000 POWs captured at Stalingrad, only 6,000 survived to return to Germany by as late as 1958.” In January 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he would hand over the names of 38,000 Japanese prisoners of war who died in Siberia after the end of World War II.

The use and exploitation of enemy POWs is not unique, however, to Soviet or Russian history. Moving POWs to the homeland of the capt...
The Movement of U.S. POWs to the USSR

...tor was a common Allied and Axis practice during World War II. Each side worked out various schemes to exploit the muscles and brains of POWs. Britain transferred 250,000 of the three million enemy POWs to Britain. Approximately one million German POWs were transferred to France to assist with post-war reconstruction. During the war, large numbers of German POWs were transferred to the United States, where they were put to work in industry. The United States "accepted the surrender of about four million enemy troops during the Second World War and interned some 435,000 of them in the United States." German POWs were put to work in grain mills in Midwest cities such as Clinton, Iowa. These POWs were permitted to return to their countries of origin after the war.

After World War II, American servicemen and civilians detained by Soviet forces were repatriated first through military-to-military contacts, then through diplomatic channels. During the Cold War years, government-to-government contacts provided the only plausible channel through which an American detained illegally in the Soviet Union could hope to be released. At least there was a mechanism for Cold War cases. There was no established bilateral channel for recovering American POWs who had been transported from Korea to USSR territory, because according to the Soviet government they were not there.

Soviet Motivations

What motivations would Soviet authorities have had to retain Americans on USSR territory or to capture them in Korea then transport them to USSR territory? In the case of POW/MIAs who had specialized knowledge or training, the motivation could have been to obtain this information. In the case of dual citizens, the story is more complex. Under Soviet law, dual citizenship did not exist. Those who were American citizens but also could be defined as Soviet citizens, such as the children of emigrés, were treated as Soviet nationals. These people were subjected to the same arbitrary arrests and detentions that were a common feature of life in the Soviet Union in the

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1950s. For military personnel who were captured, kidnapped, or in some instances defected, the motivations include interrogation, punitive measures, or simply a move to collect hostages who could be traded for Soviet citizens held in the West.

The Korean War was the first direct contact between Soviet and U.S. military equipment and technology. The North Korean night air defenses, which were sustained by the Soviets, had a "clinical" aspect that some have referred to as a laboratory.

It was as if encounters between B-29s and MiGs, and later between the F3Ds, F-94s, and MiGs, were laboratory experiments, with the Communists seeking to refine GCI control of intercepting fighters.49

The evidence suggests, however, that the environment in Korea was closer to a school than a laboratory, since the emphasis was on training rather than experimentation although much of the latter certainly occurred. The 1950s was the time of America's declared policy of Massive Retaliation. Perhaps the Communist forces considered USAF strikes on North Korea to be a dress rehearsal for strikes on China or even the Soviet Union. Mao, whose comments were reported to Washington through the Swedish ambassador, often referred to the Korean conflict as the beginning of World War III. In this air warfare academy, the Soviets had the opportunity to obtain an unprecedented insight into the plans and operations of the USAF.

Around 1949–1950, Soviet engineers began to design anti-aircraft missiles and other AA weapons. The Soviets had to create an AA system for the Saryshagan complex, for example. Two requirements were first, how to build AA weapons, and second, inquiries into flight characteristics and materials of U.S. aircraft.50 The construction of a missile research and production complex was a state task. The source of these requirements was, according to one source, one of Beria's deputies who was the manager of the construction of the complex.

49The Naval Air War in Korea, pp. 182–183.
50Alpha interview. Alpha is a serving military officer who requested anonymity.
According to another source, a classified directive was issued by the MGB early in the war. This directive allegedly gave the MGB the task of collecting information concerning the U.S. Air Force. How was the MGB supposed to collect this information? The MGB had two groups of people in Korea. The first was responsible for making sure that no Soviet personnel fell into the hands of the UNC. It was important that no one should ever be able to prove that the Soviets fought in Korea. The second group was organized to collect all the necessary data on U.S. aircraft technology. In 1952, another secret directive, which sources state was issued to unit commanders, directed them to shoot down U.S. planes and to capture U.S. pilots. According to a Soviet military source, this MGB directive was signed as an order by the Ministry of Defense.

Valentin Sozinov, a Soviet General Staff Adviser in Korea (December 1950-October 1952) and First Deputy to the Soviet Main Military Adviser, Razuvayev, recalled, I haven't heard about the order to capture pilots. I do know that there was an order to capture American aircraft. The American aircraft at that time had a lot of electronic devices in them. Since we were, and still are, very much behind them in that field, our experts wanted to have a sample. I personally never heard about any order concerning pilots. We were interested in the F-86 because of its powerful electronic equipment. So, of course we wanted to see such technology. In a war it's easier to get.

The operation to collect U.S. matériel and personnel would have had at least three major components: (1) requirements and political authorization; (2) units assigned to search for and capture Americans; and (3) a system for evaluating and selecting Americans to be transported to the USSR.

Requirements and Political Authorization

As shown in the previous chapter, during the Korean War, the Soviet Union had in operation a sophisticated and extensive system designed to exploit foreign POWs. The pattern of Soviet contact with
Americans in Korea is consistent with this system, though the movement of Americans to USSR territory was a political problem infinitely more delicate than the movement of German POWs. A figure who is frequently mentioned as the person who could have organized the transfer of Americans from Korea is Beria. KGB Chairman Beria controlled access to foreigners, prisons, and much of the technical expertise in industry including aircraft manufacturing. The KGB controlled the Soviet Union's industrial research. Within the KGB "the task of the Fourth Special Department of the MVD was to solve scientific problems, using prisoners." This may have been the organization that wrote the requirements that resulted in the transfer of POWs.

An operation to move Americans to USSR territory "would have had to have been approved at the highest political level," said Orlov. "Beria could have done it." The Deputy Chairman of the KGB would be the lowest political level that could have approved such an operation. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister George Kunadze supported the view that "such an operation would have been approved at a level "no lower than Beria." During the Korean War, "when Stalin was living his last years or months, nobody knew who would be the next victim or what would be the next state task. Beria was one of those in charge of this project. My sources have no doubt that the transportation of POWs could have taken place."

Valerii Musatov, who was First Deputy Head of the CPSU's International Department of the Central Committee, speculated that approval for such an operation would have been required "from the very top, such as a top body like the Politburo." Musatov added,

It could have been some very important leader, like a General Secretary, especially if it were not a document but a phone conversation. In the time of the Korean War, when Stalin was alive, such a decision would have been made personally by Beria.

54 *Gulag Archipelago*, p. 604.
55 Orlov interview.
57 Alpha interview.
In any case, I can tell you that the Party apparatus was not involved in such operations. If it was something concerning some technical or defense problem it would be either the KGB or the Ministry of Defense which was very much interested in such things. Or even it could have been the Military Industrial Commission.58

Musatov noted that although he was not aware of any decision to transfer American POWs to the territory of the Soviet Union, “there are some events that have no traces.”

In Plotnikov’s view, the motive for moving Americans to the territory of the USSR would derive from “specialized organs” in the Soviet Union making requests for particular types of Americans. “Design bureaus might have made such requests,” he said. According to Plotnikov,

Grabbing American POWs would have been a political decision in response to a request. Infantry was of no interest to Soviet intelligence. There would have been no regular transfer. American POWs who would have been moved as specialists fell into the camps. They would be identified and moved. The interest would not have been in people who operated equipment as much as it would have focused on people who understood the principles of why things worked as they did.

Plotnikov said the Soviets were interested in the F-86, particularly the gun sight. He said that two F-86 aircraft that ditched in water had been salvaged and transported to Moscow.

The commander of the Soviet 64th Air Corps, General Georgii A. Lobov, recalled:

We wanted the F-86 gun sight at all costs. One F-86 crashed after it was hit. The aircraft lost fuel which prevented the pilot from ditching in the sea. The other F-86 landed in shallow water at low tide, the only problem was the gun sight had been damaged by gun fire or by the crash. One F-86 was located off shore.59

59Lobov interview.
A Sabre jet was disassembled then shipped to Saryshagan in 1951 and at least one more Sabre was shipped intact to an Air Force research bureau north of Moscow where it was evaluated. Later that same year, Soviet pilots attempted to fly the reassembled Sabre jet from an airfield in Saryshagan.

The reason why North Korean or Chinese forces would release U.S. POWs into Soviet custody would have been because of a "request from the Soviet side to give them such and such experts. But those people had to know radio, electronics, in other words, to be experts in some field. But no simple people." "The demand for specialized information could have been generated by a number of sources, including the GRU, the design bureaus, or the main political directorate." "The Chinese needs were primitive in comparison to Soviet interests. There was, however, close coordination between the Chinese and the Soviets then." "In a military sense North Korea depended completely on the Soviet Union." Soviet intelligence knew better than any American Army captain how an American battalion works. "But experts could be of interest." The most likely POWs to be transferred would have been "pilots, a few soldiers, people with specific skills. It would not be a punishment operation. A proper debriefing takes a lot of people—you have to bring them in to do it well. The people who would screen the POWs and make the selections would have been the GRU liaison in Korea."

Soviet Efforts to Capture F-86 Aircraft and Pilots

The lack of cooperation among the Chinese, North Koreans, and Soviets led Soviet forces to organize their own pilot and matériel col-

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60 Lobov interview.
61 Alpha interview.
62 Plotnikov interview.
64 Lobov interview.
65 Plotnikov interview.
66 Plotnikov interview.
67 Macharenski interview.
lection operations independent of the efforts of their fraternal allies. Soviet forces were trying to capture U.S. aircraft and pilots, just as UNC forces were trying to capture Soviet aircraft and pilots. Soviet forces on the ground in Korea were trained to capture pilots and to strip aircraft of important equipment and instruments. 64th Air Corps Commander Lobov reported to Moscow in early May 1952 that “Chinese and Korean authorities hardly report on American aircraft which fall on the territory of Korea.” Thus, according to General Lobov, the Soviets deployed “search-group expeditions to remote regions and especially near the coast.... On the average, 70 Soviet servicemen participate daily in our search groups.” Lobov reported that it was necessary to have Soviet forces do this work because the North Korean and Chinese forces would not share information and captured matériel adequately nor were they sufficiently forthcoming with access to and information concerning captured American Air Force personnel. (At least two dozen F-86 BNR cases occurred in the area specified by Lobov.) Thus, it is clear the Soviets had an independent capability to capture Americans without direct North Korean or Chinese involvement. The Soviets also maintained an independent capability to transport captured American servicemen to destinations outside of North Korean territory.

Marine Corporal Nick Flores, who spent 33 months as a POW in Korea, reported during his repatriation debriefing that he had been captured by Soviet soldiers, transported to China, interrogated by Soviet officers, and returned to a POW camp in Korea. Flores was captured by a Soviet group after he escaped from a North Korean POW camp on July 22, 1952. According to Flores’s account, the Soviets were convinced that he was the pilot of an F-86 fighter that crashed in the vicinity of where Flores was captured. The Soviets thought that because Flores was wearing USAF flight clothes—which had been given to him by fellow prisoners to help him survive his escape—he was an F-86 pilot. (The Soviets apparently confused Flores with F-86 pilot and BNR case Felix J. Asla.) Flores reported that after he had been interrogated in China by men in Soviet uniforms for 48 hours, the Soviets concluded that he was not an F-86 pilot. He was later returned to a POW camp in Korea. The most salient substantive

68 Decoded Telegram Number 501817/Sh (Top Secret), Lobov to Comrades A. M. Vasilevskij, P. F. Kigarev, and S. A. Krasovskij, May 7, 1952, p. 3.
element in Flores's story is that he is thus far the only American who has first-hand experience showing that the Soviet forces in Korea had a system independent of the Koreans and Chinese for taking prisoners, transporting them to China, and interrogating them without Chinese or North Korean involvement. Flores's story is consistent with the efforts of the search teams described by Lobov.

During the Korean War, a total of 110 F-86 fighters (of all models) were lost as a result of enemy action (80 to air-to-air combat, 19 to anti-aircraft fire, and 11 to unknown causes).\(^6\) According to Task Force Russia analysts, of the 56 pilots who became casualties, 16 were repatriated and 11 were lost under circumstances that suggest the pilot died in a crash. The remaining 29 F-86 pilots, 52 percent of all F-86 casualties, are BNR cases. Task Force Russia analysts also note that the BNR rate for F-86 pilots (52 percent) represents the highest BNR rate for casualties associated with any airframe or military unit that participated in the Korean War. Table 5.1 shows the names, date of incident, and location for 42 F-86 BNR cases found in CILHI records.

As shown in the following maps (Figures 5.2 to 5.5), the locations of 24 F-86 BNR cases coincide with the coastal areas where Lobov reported Soviet forces were active.

F-86 pilots figure prominently in Soviet records and in interviews with Soviet officers who were involved in Korean War operations. The list of Air Force personnel whose names appear in Soviet archives, according to the Task Force Russia and RAND lists, includes at least 16 F-86 pilots (15 American, one Canadian). Of these 15 American F-86 pilots, 11 were repatriated. These men represent 67 percent (10 out of 15) of all repatriated American F-86 pilots. No information has thus far been obtained that indicates what happened to the four U.S. F-86 pilots who, according to Russian records, died in Soviet custody. The only information available confirms that these men lived long enough to be interrogated, directly and indirectly, by Soviet forces. Table 5.2 is a list of F-86 pilots whose names appear in Soviet records.

\(^{69}\)FEAF Summary (Secret), September 30, 1953, p. 8.
The Movement of U.S. POWs to the USSR

Table 5.1

F-86 BNR Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/BNR Status (M/P/KIA)</th>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Map Sheet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William D. Crone/M</td>
<td>18Jun51</td>
<td>6133-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert H. Lader/P</td>
<td>19Jun51</td>
<td>6134-IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence C. Layton/P</td>
<td>02Sep51</td>
<td>6232-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl G. Barnett/M</td>
<td>25Sep51</td>
<td>6332-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Pratt/P</td>
<td>08Nov51</td>
<td>6230-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles D. Hogue/M</td>
<td>12Dec51</td>
<td>6332-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lester F. Page/M</td>
<td>06Jan52</td>
<td>6331-III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiel M. Reeves/M</td>
<td>11Jan52</td>
<td>6332-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Rhinehart/P</td>
<td>29Jan52</td>
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<td>Charles R. Spade/M</td>
<td>03Feb52</td>
<td>6532-7</td>
</tr>
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<td>John W. Hatchett/M</td>
<td>04Feb52</td>
<td>6129-II</td>
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<td>George A. Davis/M</td>
<td>10Feb52</td>
<td>6233-IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graham S. Hulse/M</td>
<td>13Mar52</td>
<td>6133-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John R. Baldwin/M</td>
<td>15Mar52</td>
<td>6230-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>James K. Carey/M</td>
<td>24Mar52</td>
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<td>George V. Wendling/M</td>
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<td>Albert G. Tenney/M</td>
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<td>John F. Lane/M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austin W. Beetley/KIA</td>
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<td>XC560680a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard S. Drexen/M</td>
<td>16Jul52</td>
<td>6129-II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Felix A. Asa/M</td>
<td>01Aug52</td>
<td>6234-IV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deitris H. Fincher/M</td>
<td>22Aug52</td>
<td>6333-II</td>
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<td>Troy G. Cope/M</td>
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<td>John Turberville/M</td>
<td>18Nov52</td>
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<td>Paul J. Jacobson/M</td>
<td>12Feb53</td>
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<td>Richard M. Cowden/M</td>
<td>05Mar53</td>
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<td>Robert F. Niemann/M</td>
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NOTE: Names in boldface are on the TFR list of cases possibly transferred to the USSR. The numbers in the first column correspond to the circled numbers on the maps following.

aNot on BNR tables due to lack of grid coordinate.
Figure 5.2—Location of All F-86 BNR Cases, 1951–1953
The Movement of U.S. POWs to the USSR

Figure 5.3—F-86 BNR Cases, 1951
Figure 5.4—F-86 BNR Cases, 1952
The Movement of U.S. POWs to the USSR

Figure 5.5—F-86 BNR Cases, 1953
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To illustrate the high-level Soviet interest in U.S. F-86 pilots, the first page of the ten-page interrogation of the pilot of the first U.S. F-86 shot down in Korea, Laurence Bach, is reproduced in Figure 5.6.

American F-86 pilots have been identified by name by Soviet officers who served in Korea during the Korean War. Plotnikov and Sozinov mentioned repatriated F-86 pilot Walter “Bud” Mahurin. Plotnikov also mentioned the name “Major Delts,” which is probably a reference to BNR case Deltis Fincher. Plotnikov said that a “Major Delts was captured and escorted somewhere.” Bushuyev mentioned BNR case Niemann, as did Plotnikov. Roshchin recalled the name of BNR case Crone.

As noted previously, the 64th Air Corps deployed troops on the ground whose mission was to find pilots and American military equipment. The Soviet Air Force also deployed another unit whose mission was to capture American pilots through air operations and another that had the same mission on the ground. The air unit operated on at least two occasions, 1951 and 1953. The mission of the special operational unit, subordinate to General Blagoveshchenskii, was to force down U.S. Sabre jets to capture the pilot alive. The unit was pulled together from two operational Air Force units: Mary in Turkmenia not far from Afghanistan and Primorsky krai not far from Khabarovsk. Nine expert pilots constituted the group. Each was required to sign a secrecy statement.

The mission was to cut a Sabre jet out of a dog fight, then force it to land intact. If the plan worked, the plane and the pilot could be captured simultaneously. In 1951, the mission was a failure. In the course of the operation, the Soviets lost two of their own aircraft, perhaps because the Soviet pilots in this unit were forbidden to engage American aircraft in combat. The Soviets managed, however, to damage one Sabre jet, which then made a forced landing. It is not known what happened to the pilot, though the Soviet pilots participating in the mission were told the American pilot managed to escape to the Yellow Sea where he was picked up by U.S. search and

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70Major Deltis Fincher (MIA/BNR), Date of incident August 22, 1952, Location 6333-II (YD-5099).
Товарищу ПЕТРОВУ,
Товарищу ЛИЛАЕВУ.

Докладываем показания американского летчика с самолета F-86 оббитого в воздухе самолетом MiG-15.
Допрос производился представителем тов. МИРОНОВ.
При допросе пленный показал:
Капитан БАЛ Дональд родился 20 февраля 1945 года, американец, прародитель — швейцарец. До армии — учился. Отцем работал укладчиком на конфетной фабrique в городе Гранд-Форкс 350 миль северо-западнее города Макинейла штат Северная Дакота. В этом же городе проживает жена пленного с четырьмя детьми — ДОНА МАРИЯ БАЛ, уроженка 1411 Лекс Судьер.
В армии БАЛ — 7 лет.
До поездки в КОРС служил в 1-й истребительной эскадрилье в Калгари, базировавшись в НАЧ-ЭСС, — 75 на самолете F-80.
Из рассказа можно заключить, что работал офицером штаба по боевой подготовке, летал.
Командир 1-й эскадрильи полковник ФРАНК ФЕРГАЛЬ.

Расшифровка 30-12-50 21:10 Ева Марина /см., сл., лист/

Отчеты в 5-м эскадрилье
№ 1 10. СТУДЕНТ 2 10. СТУДЕНТ 3 10. СТУДЕНТ 4 10. СТУДЕНТ
№ 2 10. МОТОРЫ 2 10. МОТОРЫ 3 10. МОТОРЫ 4 10. МОТОРЫ
№ 3 10. МАШИНА 2 10. МАШИНА 3 10. МАШИНА 4 10. МАШИНА
№ 4 10. МАШИНА 2 10. МАШИНА 3 10. МАШИНА 4 10. МАШИНА
№ 5 10. МАШИНА 2 10. МАШИНА 3 10. МАШИНА 4 10. МАШИНА

Figure 5.6—Laurence Bach Interrogation
rescue forces. Some of the Soviet pilots doubted this version of events, since they saw the American land several kilometers from the sea.

The total number of F-86 aircraft lost as a result of enemy action (110) offered the enemy ample opportunity to obtain this aircraft intact or in pieces significant enough to be studied by Soviet aviation experts. The FEAF was aware that downed U.S. aircraft would be of particular value to the enemy. Statistics were kept for lost aircraft that might have, in the FEAF's estimation, compromised USAF technological advances. Table 5.3 shows that 75 percent of the F-86 aircraft lost as a result of enemy action (82 of 110) were counted as losses that might have compromised USAF technological advances.

On February 18, 1991, Soviet Korean War veteran Vladimir Mikhailovich Roshchin said that in late March or early April 1951, a new Soviet Air Force unit under the command of regiment Commander Major Perevoscikov began combat operations in Korea. The group "conducted three or four operations," called "arkanshchiki." "In late September or early October," Roshchin recalled, "a U.S. aircraft was shot down quite unexpectedly near An-Syu." The plane, an F-86, was shot down somewhere near Port Arthur; it landed near the coastline and the pilot ran away. "Some experts came from Moscow and took all they needed, everything possible. All the equipment, the engine, everything. There was nothing in it."

Q: You told me something interesting about this man. I thought his name sounds German. Karl Crone.

A: Right. I saw his papers. He was a pilot.

Q: So you remember who brought those papers?

A: I believe it was our chief of staff.

Q: When was it?

A: In August, or even September [1951].

Q: Did you hear about that Crone being captured?

A: No. I just know he was shot down.
### Table 5.3
Aircraft Losses Which Might Have Compromised USAF Technological Advances

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<td>RF-51D</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The information Roshchin recalled is consistent with the shootdown of F-86 pilot Captain William D. Crone A0-0799922, MIA(BNR), DOI June 18, 1951, location of incident, XD 5595 (6133-II).

Soviet efforts to capture and fly U.S. aircraft were successful. During the war, American pilots reported at least one F-86 and one F-30 were flown in combat against U.S. aircraft. The “Rogue” aircraft, painted in Communist colors, were heavily protected by MiG-15s.71

Transport Capabilities and Methods

The Soviets had operational experience with selecting individuals to move from North Korea to the USSR for political training. The Soviets were intimately familiar with the potential that such transfers promised. Kim Il Sung is perhaps the best example. In 1941, before anyone had any idea he would become dictator of North Korea, Kim Il Sung was moved to the USSR where he was trained for years. In 1946, the budding “Great Leader” was returned to North Korea by the Soviets to participate in the formation of a puppet government.

The Soviets had the capability to move POWs, the North Koreans would have permitted such an operation, and transport across the PRC would have been no problem, in Plotnikov’s view. “At the time there was train service from Pyongyang to Moscow with a stop in China.” The POWs, he said, “would have been loaded into trucks with canvas drawn around them, then transferred to trains at night.” “The North Koreans hated Americans,” Plotnikov pointed out. “They would have cooperated in such an operation if asked by the Soviets. The North Koreans could not have said no to a Soviet request.” Responding to speculation that American POWs might have been transported through the territory of Mongolia, the Military History section of the Military Research Institute in Ulaanbaatar reported that there was no record of “any reasonable possibility that Mongolian territory was used by the Soviets to transfer U.S. POWs . . . . There

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were other, more convenient ways to transfer the POWs to the Soviet Union from North Korea rather than via Mongolia." 72

One organization in the Soviet Union that could have acquired the political authority and capability to transfer U.S. POWs to the USSR during the Korean War was the KGB. This would have been a decision taken for political rather than military reasons. Colonel Orlov could think of no reason for the Soviet military to transfer U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union:

I can't speak for the KGB, but from a military perspective it was not necessary. There were no rumors of this going on at the time. Everything then was Top Secret. We knew nothing. It was not until perestroika came along three years ago that we could discuss these issues openly. Beria could have done it, but I have no idea why they would have wanted them. Perhaps they wanted experts or they wanted to brainwash people. 73

Plotnikov was asked, "Would it have been possible for such a transfer to take place without you or the GRU being aware that it was going on?" "Yes," said Plotnikov without hesitation. "How would you have organized it in order to keep it secret from you?" he was asked. "It would have been a KGB operation in cooperation with North Korean intelligence," he said. "The Soviet Army had no GULAG and was not prepared to deal with a stream of prisoners. The KGB could do all of these things."

The KGB maintained contact with North Korean intelligence and the Chinese Volunteers, which would have been essential to sustain access to POWs. In other cases, according to Plotnikov, it would have been routine for the Army to turn over to the KGB prisoners for transport. 74 No other Soviet organization could handle a stream of prisoners from Korea to the USSR. The KGB maintained control over

72 Letter from Mr. R. Bold, Executive Secretary, Center for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, to Paul M. Cole, January 10, 1992.
73 Orlov interview.
74 Plotnikov interview.
all border crossings. The KGB, not the Army, maintained a system of camps and other facilities required for such an operation.\textsuperscript{75}

The KGB had the capability to sustain the type of contact required for such an operation. Formal contact between the Soviet Chief Military Adviser's apparatus connected to the Korean People's Army and American military personnel "did not exist during the Korean War."\textsuperscript{76} Soviet military personnel in North Korea were required to sign a statement provided by the International Department of the Communist Party Central Committee. This document banned all contact with foreigners.\textsuperscript{77}

Plotnikov said many of the KGB "boys" who worked within the Soviet military stayed on at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang after the war. The transport of Americans to the USSR, in Plotnikov's view, could have happened, of course, without the military personnel knowing. The MGB had contacts with the North Korean KGB and I guess they could have arranged something together. Yes, they could. It was very much possible. Beria was ruling then. But he was too high for us. There were some "little Berias" over there.\textsuperscript{78}

The MGB was responsible for transporting back to USSR territory Soviet military personnel who were suspected of misconduct while stationed abroad. The prisoner would be transported in the custody of two MGB officers. When the party reached the border of the USSR, the prisoner would be arrested.

The KGB could have transferred U.S. personnel without the cooperation of any other Soviet organization (e.g., the military, the Foreign Ministry, or even Stalin). The KGB had the capability and the political power to conduct this type of operation without informing any other Soviet organization as well. Approval at the level of Deputy Chairman of the KGB would have been sufficient for such an operation to take place without the knowledge of either the GRU or Stalin.

\textsuperscript{75}Orlov interview.
\textsuperscript{76}Plotnikov interview.
\textsuperscript{77}Orlov interview.
\textsuperscript{78}Plotnikov interview.
Beria could have conducted such an operation on his own authority.\textsuperscript{79}

Transport of U.S. POWs to USSR territory would have been "handled by professionals at the highest level. Real names would not have been used. If the POWs were transferred, the records will be kept under the assumed names rather than the real ones. This will make the search for documents difficult."\textsuperscript{80} "The importance of the people transferred would determine the level at which the operation would be approved. The problem could be solved at a remarkably low level in some cases. This is the nature of totalitarianism."\textsuperscript{81} If this operation occurred, "I think they would have put the POWs into closed rail cars. This would have to be done at night. Once at the border the cars would be placed in a train. The POW rail cars would have only small windows."\textsuperscript{82} The Soviet government had by agreement in 1950 ceded to the Chinese its railroad possessions in Manchuria, thus the Soviets would have been intimately familiar with this transportation system.

Another Soviet source, who asked not to be identified in this report, disagreed with Plotnikov's view of how POWs might have been transported. "My KGB sources say that if there was some equipment it would go by vehicle. The KGB has a rule: people should not be transported by plane or train. I don't know how it was in Korea, but I know this was the case in Vietnam."\textsuperscript{83} The rules for transporting people by automobile may have been as follows.

They would pick four KGB officers. As a rule it would be a KGB major who would be in charge of such a group. In the KGB a major is a very high ranking officer. There were officers who worked in contact with the group at the 'window.' In this case the window was Otpor. The window group would be informed in advance that on such and such a day, at such and such an hour, a certain car would

\textsuperscript{79}Lavrenti P. Beria (1899–1953), Georgian Bolshevik, became close Stalin associate in 1938, in charge of secret police and national security. Executed after Stalin's death.\textit{The Gulag Archipelago}, p. 622.
\textsuperscript{80}Paul M. Cole, interview with Dr. Mikhail Titarenko, December 18, 1991, Moscow.
\textsuperscript{81}Titarenko interview.
\textsuperscript{82}Plotnikov interview.
\textsuperscript{83}Alpha interview.
approach their station. When the window people receive such information they don’t ask any questions. When that car would appear, they’d make sure that no one would even approach it. Border troops were also under KGB supervision. They would be given a command to allow the car to pass. And the car would disappear in an unknown direction, but somehow people thought that it would be to Alma Ata and then to Saryshagan. Nobody knows for sure if any people were transported but it seems to be logical as another way to find out about U.S. technology.\footnote{Alpha interview.}

Material crossed the Soviet border at so-called “windows,” i.e., stations where authorized personnel could cross routinely. The Soviets would transport everything including pieces of metal, navigation equipment, documents, and the rest. All of this was probably transported through Otpor-Alma Ata-Saryshagan corridor.

During the Korean War, Soviet military intelligence maintained two centers. One was located somewhere near Novosibirsk, the other in Saryshagan in Kazakhstan. The GRU center was located 40 kilometers from Novosibirsk. The intelligence center in Saryshagan belonged to the KGB. If Americans were debriefed or interrogated in these or other centers, the records may have been copied to a central file or stored in regional files. The transcripts of interrogations or debriefings of Americans who were transported to the Soviet Union may still exist.

**Preliminary Identification of a U.S. POW/MIA Transported to the USSR**

In December 1991, Nikolai Dmitrievich Kazerskii wrote the following letter to an editor of Radio Russia after listening to a program concerning foreign POWs in the Soviet GULAG.

I know of one American pilot who was in the same concentration camp with me. This concentration camp was called Zimka . . . . The chief of the Zimka camp was Sherstneva and later Kalashnikov. The chief of this Zimka camp was Novichkov who was later replaced by Major Simonov. This was the winter of 1952.
This American was sent to our camp during the winter of 1951–1952. He was of average height, slim, light brown eyes, dark hair. He was sentenced to 10 years. He was born around 1924–1926.

We heard rumors that these crewmen (three of them) were shot down in Korea. They were all given 10 year sentences and sent to different camps. Only one of them was in our Directorate, in the Zimka camp.

Kazerskii's letter was obtained by Russian journalist Yuri Pankov who, as a consultant to RAND's research project in Moscow, passed the letter to the author of this study who shared it with Army Task Force Russia in 1992.

Task Force Russia interviewed Kazerskii. During this interview, Kazerskii described the physical characteristics of the American he saw in the Zimka camp. One important distinguishing feature, according to Kazerskii, was a circular scar on the American's cheek. Task Force Russia videotaped the session in which Kazerskii was shown a variety of photographs of individuals who resembled the person described by Kazerskii. Kazerskii made what Task Force Russia has described as a "soft" identification of Captain Ara Mooradian (AO-932011). The general data provided by Kazerskii matches the Mooradian case. Mooradian, born November 11, 1924, was a B-29 bombadier shot down on October 23, 1951. Mooradian had a circular scar on one cheek. Mooradian, who was of Armenian descent, fits the profile of an individual who may have been considered under Soviet law to be a Soviet citizen.

Captain Mooradian and two other crewman from the same aircraft, 1st Lt. Wayne Forest Black (AO-590031) and Sgt. Alos Fuehrer (AF-13223572), are carried on the UNCMAC 389 list. Their B-29 departed Korean Air Base, Okinawa, on October 23, 1951, to participate in a bombing mission over Nemei Air Field, North Korea. On turning away from the target, the B-29 was attacked by enemy fighters, which inflicted damage on the B-29's engines. The B-29 was seen to be

The Kazerskii interview was shown to Pankov and the author of this study by Task Force Russia.
under control as it banked toward the Yellow Sea. Because of combat conditions, however, continuous observation of the B-29 could not be sustained and accompanying aircraft could not determine what happened to it. Approximately 233 search missions were made over the area during the three-day period, October 23-26, including air search at night and water search by surface vessels. The copilot of the B-29, Lt. Beissner, was rescued three and one-half hours after he landed in the water. During the succeeding ten days, returning combat aircraft were diverted to search the crash site. No trace of the remaining crew was found. There is a consensus among survivors that Mooradian, Black, and Fuehrer had adequate time to clear the aircraft alive.

Lt. Beissner reported that he had been one of the last crewmen to bail out of the B-29, which had been set on automatic pilot at an altitude of 23,000 feet. As Beissner broke through the cloud cover at approximately 8,000 feet, he reported seeing three other parachutes descending. He landed in the water approximately 12 miles west of the village of Oryong-dong. The remains of one crewmember were recovered and the names of four other crewmembers, Sgt. Strine, Sgt. Kisser, Lt. Wentworth, and Cpl. MacClean, were mentioned in a list of alleged prisoners submitted by the North Koreans and the Chinese in December 1951.

The attack and the crash took place in the vicinity of Map Sheet number 6233-IV, which is in the center of MiG Alley and well within the reach of Soviet forces stationed at Andong.

Kazerskii's story tracks well with the Mooradian case in particular as well as with the Black and Fuehrer cases. The Russian side of the Joint Commission was presented with these findings in 1993.

**African-American POWs**

One must treat with great care alleged first-hand or eyewitness sightings of large or small numbers of Americans, particularly African-Americans, outside of the territory of North Korea.

The report that large numbers of African-American POWs—a 1952 CIA report states that of 400 U.S. POWs en route to the USSR via
China, 300 were "Negroes"—does not stand up under scrutiny. In another report, an alleged eyewitness claimed to have seen an undetermined "large number" of African-American Air Force NCOs being transported to the USSR from China.

As shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, casualty data do not support these claims. Neither the absolute number of African-American POW/MIAs nor the chronological accumulation of POW/MIAs of this race are consistent with reports of large numbers—in the hundreds—of African-Americans being transferred en masse to the territory of the USSR in 1952.

For it to be true that 300 African-Americans were transported alive from Korea to China (and perhaps onward to the USSR) in mid-1952, this group would constitute 86 percent of all African-American MIAs lost by June 1952, 108 percent of all African-American POW(BNR) cases, or 50 percent of all BNR cases involving African-American servicemen in Korea as of June 1952. For such large percentages to have been transported to China, the eyewitness reports of death for all African-American POW(BNR) cases must be false and there is no evidence to this effect.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF U.S. POW/MIAs TRANSPORTED TO THE USSR

BNR Cases That Could Not Have Been Transported to USSR

As of February 1993, the number of American BNR cases from the Korean War stood at 8,140. This figure is used as the baseline for the following derivation of how many BNR cases were confirmed as deaths by eyewitneses. The purpose of this exercise is to determine the number of U.S. BNR cases whose deaths were not witnessed or otherwise documented. Those whose deaths were witnessed or documented are not candidates for transport to the USSR.

The subset of BNR cases that could have been transported to the territory of the USSR may be estimated by subtracting from the 8,140

86See information from Senator Bob Smith in Appendix 8 referencing CIA Report No. S091634, July 17, 1952.
Table 5.4
Total Korean War MIA/POW(BNR) Data: Race

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>389 List</th>
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<tr>
<td>Caucasoid</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>5,195</td>
<td>6,946</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroid</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Add. Mixture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongoloid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guamanian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>6,066</td>
<td>8,191</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.5
Chronological Accumulation of African-American MIA/POW(BNR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1950 MIA</th>
<th>1950 POW</th>
<th>1951 MIA</th>
<th>1951 POW</th>
<th>1952 MIA</th>
<th>1952 POW</th>
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<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>&lt; 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

figure the sum of individuals whose deaths were witnessed or otherwise documented. Among the BNR cases that could not have been transferred to USSR territory are the following:

(1) BNRs whose deaths were witnessed by repatriated POWs and others and reported to UNC and U.S. officials.

(2) BNRs lost outside of Korea (Japan, for example) and after the Armistice. Korean War casualty data include a number of deaths that occurred beyond the geographic limits of the Korean War Zone (KWZ) and after the end of the Korean War. These cases were included in Korean War data at the time of the incidents under the Graves Registration Service concurrent death policy.

(3) BNRs located in UN cemeteries in North Korea.

(4) BNRs whose isolated burial locations were recorded by the GRS. These locations are usually specific to name and always include geographic location.

As shown in Table 5.6, the deaths of at least 73 percent of all BNR cases were witnessed by repatriates or otherwise documented.

Maximum of 2,195 BNR Cases

Of the 2,195 BNR cases with no direct evidence of death (8,140 – 5,945 = 2,195), a large percentage were combat fatalities who were disintegrated by explosives or simply lost on the battlefield. Given the nature and duration of combat in Korea, the estimate of battlefield casualties that resulted in BNR cases ranges as high as 3,070.\(^{87}\) There is no way to be precise about this figure, but it must be greater than zero in any calculation.

Estimate of Transfer Cases Derived by Researchers and Officials

The number of individuals from this group who would fit the profile of individuals of interest to Soviet forces is much smaller than the to-

\(^{87}\) Col. Harry Summers, *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts on File, 1990), p. 184. Summers estimates that the majority of MIA cases were the result of combat conditions that did not permit the recovery of the body.
Table 5.6
BNR Cases Where Death Was Witnessed by Repatriates or Otherwise Documented

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missing in action at sea (all services)</td>
<td>293(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed POW(BNR) deaths</td>
<td>2,119(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. graves on North Korean territory</td>
<td>2,096(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. burials linked to aircraft crash sites</td>
<td>412(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNR cases occurring outside Korea</td>
<td>53(^e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNR (died during marches)</td>
<td>959(^f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-war BNR cases grouped with war data</td>
<td>13(^g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total confirmed or documented BNR deaths</td>
<td>5,945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)This figure derives from CILHI data as of February 1993.

\(^b\)The total number of witnessed POW camp deaths is 2,730. The 2,119 number represents current POW(BNR) cases, because 611 remains have been recovered and identified.

\(^c\)UNC temporary cemeteries, 1,520; total isolated burials, 576 (Army, 217; Air Force, 4; branch and nationality unknown, 108; Memorial Division, QM data on unidentified American isolated burials, 247). This figure does not include POW camp graves, because POW (BNR) cases are counted in category two.

\(^d\)Headquarters Korean Communications Zone (KCOMZ) consolidated lists of air crashes into one master list showing that 322 crash sites and 412 casualties listed by KCOMZ as "number of remains" and "burial" number. There is no indication that these remains are any other than American personnel.

\(^e\)Figure derived from CILHI data. This includes BNR cases that occurred in Japan or between Japan and Korea, for example.

\(^f\)The number of evaluated cases was reduced from 1,367 based on Little Switch debriefings of repatriates to 959 following evaluation of Big Switch repatriate reports.

\(^g\)Data from CILHI records.

As Soviet intelligence officers pointed out, "average" American servicemen would have been of no interest to Soviet forces.

Estimates of the number of Americans transported to the USSR have been made by Russian researchers and officials and American investigators. The following estimate of American BNR cases that may...
have been transported to USSR territory is made against the background of the assumptions listed above as well as the U.S. government’s interest in determining whether Americans with specialized knowledge or training were targeted for transfer to the USSR during the Korean War. There is little indication that Soviet forces would take the risk to transport anyone except servicemen who met a particular set of criteria for specialized skills, training, or rank.

The Senate Select Committee’s investigator in Moscow, Al Graham, testified before the Committee in November 1992. Graham concluded, “Although we have no direct evidence to prove it, there appears to be a strong possibility that at least a handful of U.S. POWs, possible more, were transferred to Soviet territory during the Korean War.” On November 10, during testimony before the Select Committee, the author of this study stated that fewer than 100 American POWs, perhaps no more than 50, were transported to USSR territory from Korea or China. There is no room in Korean War casualty data to account for hundreds of American POWs being taken to the USSR. Too much is known about the circumstances of loss for such large variables to occur. Those who assert that hundreds were transported must justify their argument with an estimate of the magnitude of undocumented battlefield deaths and an explanation of Soviet motives for such a massive operation. The equation that must be used is the following: 5,945 documented deaths + x undocumented deaths + x transfers to the USSR = 8,140 total BNR cases.

Two Russian sources have provided an estimate of the number of Americans transported to the USSR during the Korean War that supports this study’s estimate. The sources are unwilling at this point to make the estimates public. The first reported through mutual acquaintances that he had first-hand knowledge to the effect that 30 Americans had been transported to USSR territory. But he was not willing to report this information to U.S. officials. The second source, a former high-ranking KGB official, said in an off-the-record discussion that the “number of Americans taken to the USSR was quite small, 25 or 30 or so.”

88 POW/MIA, p. 403
U.S. Government's Position on Transfer of American POW/MIAs to USSR

The position of the U.S. government on the issue of whether Americans were transported from Korea or China to USSR territory has changed over time. In May 1954, the U.S. Department of State delivered a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry accusing the Soviets of having transferred American prisoners to Soviet territory from Korea. The note, according to a Senate version, reads as follows:

The United States Government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange for their repatriation at the earliest possible time.89

The Soviet government's rejection of the U.S. note was the first public notice that the U.S. had made such a protest. The number of prisoners involved and other details were not made public. The Soviet reply, published in Soviet and U.S. newspapers, reads as follows:

The assertions in the note of the United States Government, that American prisoners of war, participants in military action in Korea, have been transferred to the Soviet Union and are at the present time maintained under Soviet guard are without any kind of basis and are clearly invented, as there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.90

Nine months later, the U.S. government's position changed, but thus far there has been no evidence that explains adequately on what grounds the original charges were reversed.

89 See Senator Smith's "April 19, 1954" declassified cable from Secretary of State Dulles to the American Embassy Moscow in Appendix B, which contains additional evidence of the transfer of Americans from North Korea to the USSR.

The Movement of U.S. POWs to the USSR 185

The U.S. government's position on this issue in 1955 was unequivocal. In spite of a previous U.S. government protest to the Soviet government that asserted the Soviets held American POWs taken from Korea, on February 10, 1955, a coordinated interagency position concluded that there was no evidence to support such a position.

With regard to the question of United States personnel captured in Korea, the Department of Defense has informed us that all American servicemen, missing or unaccounted for in that conflict have been presumed dead. In close cooperation with the Department of Defense, however, we intend to continue to seek information from the Communists about their fate. Further, we have no evidence that any United States personnel captured in Korea were ever taken to the Soviet Union.91

One year later, the U.S. government was still pursuing the idea that Americans had been transferred to the territory of the USSR from the Korean theater of combat operations.

On June 20, 1956, Secretary of State John F. Dulles circulated a draft démarche that asked for comments on whether it was “desirable at this time to question the Soviet Government specifically with reference to the possibility that “the Soviet Government has in its custody members of the crews of other United Nations aircraft, particularly crew members of aircraft engaged on behalf of the United Nations Command side of the military action in Korea since 1950.” Two years later, the U.S. government returned to the February 1955 position that Americans had not been transferred to the territory of the USSR from the Korean theater of combat operations.

On March 25, 1958, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations William B. Macomber, Jr., wrote to Congressman Clement Zablocki, Jr., on this subject. Macomber stated that after “exhaustive efforts in analyzing the information” provided by people who claimed that American POWs from Korea were being held in the USSR, “the Departments of State and Defense... have not been able to identify American servicemen reported to be so held.”

91 Letter from Assistant Secretary Thruston B. Morton to Congressman Vorys, February 10, 1955, 611.61241/1-2156. Emphasis added.
There has been no official explanation that squares these apparently contradictory positions. Additional historical reporting from official U.S. sources and additional evidence from Task Force Russia and Senator Bob Smith that suggest Americans were transported from Korea to the territory of the USSR are presented in Appendix 8.

In August 1993, the American delegation to the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIA's presented the Russian side with a document entitled *The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union*. The report concluded, "The Soviets transferred several hundred U.S. Korean War POWs to the USSR and did not repatriate them." The report cites "broad and compelling evidence," including statements by former Soviet military and intelligence officers. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Joint Commission member Edward Ross contradicted this finding by asserting, "There isn't one shred of evidence" that any U.S. airman was taken to the USSR and not returned. Robert Burns, "A Defense Official Contradicts POW Report," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 30, 1993. In a subsequent interview "Ross, who now says he was misquoted, claims he was only referring to some men specifically named in the report, adding that he does not want to undercut the report." "Breaking a Bond of Trust," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 22, 1993, p. 29.
AMERICANS IN THE PRC

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has five purposes: (1) to discuss Chinese motivations for transferring American POWs to PRC territory from Korea during the Korean War; (2) to present evidence that transfers took place; (3) to document transport methods; (4) to present evidence that Americans were held in PRC territory as political prisoners and released following the end of the Korean War; and (5) to document U.S. governmental efforts to obtain the release of Americans known or thought to be in Chinese prisons.

TRANSFER AND RETURN FROM THE PRC

Background

"In Chinese custody" during the Korean conflict did not necessarily mean that a prisoner was held in PRC territory. A distinction must be made between Americans held captive under Chinese guard in North Korea and those held in PRC territory. During the Korean War, the Chinese obtained custody of American servicemen in at least three ways. First, Americans were captured by Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) after the CCF entered the Korean War in late 1950. Several POW camps in North Korean territory were under the jurisdiction of the CCF. Second, USAF crews crashed on, parachuted into, or were transported to Chinese territory. Some Americans were imprisoned, for varying lengths of time, as political prisoners on Chinese territory long after the end of the Korean War. Third, 21 U.S. Army POWs chose to stay in Communist control rather than return to the United
States after their liberation from captivity at the end of the war. These voluntary non-repatriates (VNR) resettled in China, though most eventually returned to the United States.

**Chinese Motivations**

Prisoners of war have been considered "valuable sources of information throughout recorded history." Evidence gathered from repatriated POWs and from captured documents demonstrated the importance the North Korean and Chinese forces placed on interrogations of POWs. The Soviets were equally interested in information that could be derived from captured Americans, but the methodology for obtaining it was complicated by the declared Soviet policy of non-involvement in the Korean conflict. The Chinese had no restrictions, thus the evidence of direct involvement with U.S. POWs is much more extensive.

**Brainwashing**

Discussions of Chinese intelligence operations during the Korean conflict inevitably touch on the *Manchurian Candidate*, usually in the context of whether American POWs were subjected to Chinese "brainwashing." Returning American POWs were interviewed to ascertain whether they had succumbed to brainwashing.

Brainwashing differs from interrogation in two important respects. One, it seeks not merely to extract information from a captive but to actually change his beliefs, his attitudes, his thoughts; and two, it has, in the past, resulted in the captive, as well as parting with information and changing his views, actively collaborating with the enemy by indulging in such things as broadcasts and false confessions which can be used as propaganda by the enemy captors.²

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According to Peter Watson, the term brainwash, derived from the Chinese "hsi nao," was first used by Edward Hunter to describe Communist indoctrination techniques developed shortly after the revolution in 1948. These techniques, themselves derived from the abuses of psychology perpetrated during the Stalinist purges in the 1930s, have four historical roots in the science of thought reform: the Russian purges of the 1930s; World War II; the Korean War; and the Chinese thought reform programs.³

The two most important results of Chinese brainwashing efforts were first, a great deal of military information was obtained, and second, the Communists derived a great deal of value from the propaganda generated by collaborators, defectors, and converts. Many American POWs falsely confessed to using "germ warfare" in Korea. As noted earlier, the rate at which American POWs collaborated with the enemy and the number of Americans who agreed to participate in espionage activities was so alarming that these returnees were segregated by U.S. intelligence following Little Switch. Brainwashing was a one-way street. According to one assessment, the American prisoners "apparently learned nothing from the Communists that would be of strategical value to the United States."⁴ "Brainwashing" also provided a ready-made excuse in the event American POWs who had been recruited as agents were detected, in the view of George Blake, "Their defense would have been they were recruited under duress."⁵

Tactical-Technical Information

During and after the Korean War, U.S. intelligence analysts studied the interrogation techniques used by the Communist forces. In the Korean War, one purpose of interrogation was to obtain tactical, strategic, and political information from American prisoners. The unique aspect to the interrogation of American POWs was the additional element of indoctrination. French captives held by the Viet

³War on the Mind, p. 215.
⁴War on the Mind, p. 218.
Minh in Indochina had experienced this but for Americans it was something new and unanticipated. The Communist interrogation and indoctrination procedures were, in the view of Army intelligence, "based upon the application of established psychological and educational principles. They possess identifiable characteristics which are recognizable in the case of UNC personnel captured by the Chinese Communist and North Korean forces in North Korea."

The type of information required for the purposes of indoctrination tended to be personal, which required interrogation techniques that differed from those used to obtain military information. Approximately one-third of the U.S. POWs reported that they were interrogated near the point of capture by what appeared to be line officers who routinely used interpreters. The goal of the first interrogation session was to make an identification of the prisoner and to obtain information that had an immediate tactical significance. Prisoners were then transferred to collection points for transport to camps.

Trained intelligence officers conducted the interrogations at the collection points. One objective during these sessions appeared to be a study of the English language. Particular attention was paid to idioms, expressions, and psychological mannerisms used by the prisoners. The Chinese used U.S. POWs for other sorts of language instruction as well. A report from January 1953 noted that Caucasian POWs were being used as English teachers by North Korean Army troops. The interest shown by the Communist forces in language skills was part of a coordinated interrogation agenda.

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6Anita Lauve Nutt, *Prisoners of War in Indochina* (Secret) RM-5729-1-ARPA (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1969), declassified October 5, 1992, at the request of the author of this study.

7Sources stated that a Chinese Communist (CCF) officer and a Caucasian from 15th Army HQ came to 2nd Company, 1st Bn. CP for one day. Sources learned from CCF officer that Caucasian was a UN POW. Caucasian and officer (who acted as interpreter) gave men of 2nd Co. 2-hour lesson in English, teaching them to say: Stop! Don't move; Surrender; No kill; Follow me; Lay down your arms; Get out; Don't be killed for Wall Street capitalists. In June 1952, 7th Company, 3rd Bn., 134th Regt. captured a US soldier on Hill 419 (CT 6044). POW sent to Army HQ (loc. unknown). Source told by Co. Political Officer that UN POWs were sent to rear camps to receive political training by the CCF. After POWs were exchanged, these POWs were to be restored to their homes to expound Communism. A US POW toured each of the 45th Division to teach English. In September 1952, a US POW came to the 2nd Company for one hour. Taught following English phrases: Stop; Follow me; Don't move; Hands
Once in the permanent camps, the interrogations were conducted by specialists, most of whom spoke fluent English.

North Korean Army interrogation was very slight. Interrogation began in earnest with CCF entry. Interrogators were English-speaking Koreans, Chinese, Russians (according to returned U.S. POWs). Some were political officers, others Chinese students. There was no fixed interrogation policy re: number of questions asked—some interrogations were brief (name, rank, serial number, unit), others extended. Interrogations by NKA became more detailed after CCF entry.\(^8\)

In the permanent camps, the dominant theme appeared to be political exploration and indoctrination. "Approximately 30 percent of the returnees claimed to have been successful in resisting tactical and strategical interrogation." An additional 20 percent "admitted giving no resistance whatsoever to interrogators and freely giving any information demanded. (The majority in this category justified their lack of resistance by stating it was merely a matter of giving the information or being shot.)"\(^9\) Indoctrination was the third of three steps in the interrogation process. The first two were selection and instruction.

The selection process began soon after capture. The interrogator looked for biographical data, which often came from a compulsory autobiography each prisoner was compelled to write. The essay covered the prisoner's family, religion, political, social, and economic background. The biographical data were used to segregate the prisoners into categories based on an assessment of their potential susceptibility to indoctrination. Homogenous groups were formed and graded from "highly susceptible" to "strongly resistant."\(^10\) The "strongly resistant" were transferred to labor camps where they were ignored for the purposes of indoctrination. The "highly susceptible," which included people with weak family backgrounds, little or no re-

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\(^8\) *UN Prisoners of War,* p. 32.

\(^9\) "Enemy Procedures for Interrogation," C-5.

igious training, weak political ideological convictions, and little or no feeling of group identification, were not forced to work. In the prison camp, a vacuum was created then filled with predetermined means. The Communists considered indoctrination to be both a short-term and long-term political weapon. According to a KGB source and the MVD report discussed in the *Sharashka* section, the KGB received reports of "soft" individuals identified by the Chinese and North Koreans. Blake was identified in this fashion, according to a KGB source familiar with the details of Blake’s recruitment from the KGB operational file.

The experience of U.S. Air Force prisoners differed markedly from that of other UNC forces, including other U.S. services. From the outbreak of the war until the spring of 1951, USAF crewmembers captured by the NKA endured a period of "great physical suffering" that "offered the prisoner the least chance of survival." Capture by North Korean civilians or security police sometimes involved a severe beating. This gradually changed following China's entry into the war. As Chinese forces dispersed over North Korea, USAF crews tended to be captured by the Chinese or turned over by the NKA to the Chinese shortly after capture. The most noticeable difference between the North Korean and Chinese treatment of USAF POWs was that "the Chinese made attempts to alleviate unfavorable conditions and there were far fewer instances of the wanton, senseless brutality that characterized some North Korean captors." "Interrogation centers, notably the notorious Pak's Palace near Pyongyang, were often places of brutality and inhumane treatment." All USAF POWs apparently passed through the interrogation centers before being transferred to a POW camp.

11"Among Army personnel, case files indicate that 'brainwashing' when that term is used in the mystical or sinister sense of the word, was not employed but the method used was that of indoctrination, which as indicated, was the application of sound psychological and educational techniques. This confirms that drugs and hypnosis were not used and physical torture was not employed in any direct relation to obtaining any particular act of cooperation." *Enemy Procedures for Interrogation*, C-7-8.

12*USAF Prisoners of War in Korea* (Confidential), Headquarters, United States Air Force, The Inspector General, Directorate of Special Investigations, July 1, 1954, p. 2.

13*USAF Prisoners*, p. 8.

14*USAF Prisoners*, p. 4.
The improvement in the treatment of USAF POWs also coincided with the opening of truce negotiations at Panmunjom. But the basic pattern of prisoner processing continued in the following way: capture; search; initial interrogation; transfer to interrogation centers; and transport to POW camps. In the fall of 1951,

all but a few officer prisoners, other than those of the Republic of Korea Army, and all USAF airmen were transferred to a point designated as Camp No. 2 near the Yalu River, where, for the most part, they remained for the duration of the war. The reason for this move was not formally announced but, in the opinion of a number of U.S. repatriates, it was for the purpose of facilitating the Communist indoctrination of other United Nations prisoners. According to the repatriates, the Chinese exhibited great interest in the indoctrination of the young and of those with relatively little education or intelligence.15

The camps offered a sense of companionship and stability, but the USAF POWs were segregated and subjected to similar interrogation techniques.

Conditions in the POW camps were not significantly different from those in the interrogation centers. The big difference was that prisoners were not constantly called in for interrogations. In the camps the interrogations were less frequent.

Almost all prisoners were at one time or another interrogated during their stay in Camp No. 2. These interrogations took place outside the main camp but somewhere within the Camp No. 2 complex. The duration of these sessions ranged from a few days to a few months . . . . Great interest was displayed in the Air Force training methods because, according to some interrogators, the Chinese Air Force was then in the process of establishing a training program. On one occasion all B-29 crew members were taken from camp and interrogated on all phases of their B-29 training, equipment, tactics, organization, etc. Thus it appeared that these interrogations were prompted by intelligence requirements that were sent down to the camps from higher Chinese authorities.16

15 USAF Prisoners, p. 10.
16 USAF Prisoners, p. 13.
Prisoners were normally interrogated alone, "therefore there is no method, short of examining enemy intelligence files whereby accurate assessment can be made of the amount of sensitive material actually extracted from them." Camp 2 was equipped with facilities that were used for interrogations, solitary confinement, and for housing prisoners captured later in the war.

The Soviet and Chinese armed forces were interested in the operation of U.S. forces in Korea for different reasons. The standard topics covered by Communist interrogators included the following:

- Tactical information; personal background; finances; religion; size, occupations, status of family; morale, economic conditions, social welfare in US; what POW thought of war and US participation; why POW fighting; what POW thought of Truman and MacArthur; did POW own a car; whether POW capitalist or communist.

U.S. authorities were aware that "POWs did not confine themselves to Geneva Convention. CIC believes enemy obtained a lot of valuable tactical information from POWs." U.S. Air Force POWs were the subjects of intense scrutiny that went beyond the general intelligence issues pursued with other prisoners. Of particular interest to

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17 USAF Prisoners, p. 5.
18 UN Prisoners of War, p. 32.
19 UN Prisoners of War, p. 32. Interrogation protocols obtained from Russian sources confirm that USAF POWs in some cases provided a great deal of tactical and technical information to the Chinese. The interrogation protocol of a senior USAF officer is nearly 100 pages long, while that of a junior officer merely notes that he refused to answer questions.
20 Total resistance to interrogation was, according to the testimony of repatriates, virtually impossible. The interrogators demanded detailed biographic information on the individual prisoner and his family and every conceivable type of military information, not only on U.N. Forces in Korea but on the USAF in the zone of the interior as well. These interrogations were often not exhaustively comprehensive. However, based on the biographical data obtained from the prisoner, the interrogator usually touched upon a wide variety of subjects which he thought might be within the prisoner's knowledge. These interrogators had the additional advantage of possessing a store of accurate USAF information including Air Force manuals, maps of installations, etc. After several months in these interrogation centers, the surviving prisoners were usually transferred to one of the many prisoner of war camps scattered around North Korea. At times during the first phase, such transfers were literally death marches for some prisoners. The permanent type of prisoner of war camp offered slightly improved conditions in some respects. The captives were no longer
Americans in the PRC

the Communist interrogators were the performance of the USAF's equipment, and combat doctrine and tactics.

UNC POW/MIAs IN THE PRC

Routine Transfer and Return

Early in the Korean conflict, the UNC suspected that UNC POWs, including Americans, were being transferred from Korea to PRC territory. A great deal of firsthand testimony and archive documentation supports this suspicion. According to Army records, on December 16, 1950, approximately 20 American POWs were transferred to Andong for interrogation. Questioning often came from the "Citizens Committee of An'Tung." Reports from other repatriated U.S. POWs indicate that American POWs were transferred to China for interrogation then returned to POW camps in North Korea. Transfer from North Korea to China and back to North Korea appears to have been routine practice during the first year of the war. Ambassador Alexis Johnson told the U.S. Congress in 1957 that the U.S. government was aware of the transfer of Americans to China from Korea.

Mr. Chairman, my understanding of the situation is that there was a certain amount of movement back and forth during the Korean hostilities. We know of some cases in which men were captured in Korea, taken to Manchuria, and then later returned to Korea. In other cases, for example, the 11 B-29 personnel and 4 jet pilots, the Chinese allege that they were captured in Manchurian territory.

badgered by interrogators although they were still occasionally called up for interrogations. Shortly after the Chinese armies swept across the Yalu River into North Korea in late 1950, they began taking USAF air crews prisoner. By spring of 1951, the Chinese armies were spread extensively across the battle lines and deep into rear areas. The simple consequence of their wide dispersion was that increasingly larger numbers of air crews fell into Chinese rather than North Korean hands. Even those who were captured by North Koreans were often immediately turned over to the Chinese or, at least, processed through North Korean interrogation centers then transferred to Chinese camps. Apparently the Chinese, at a point soon after their entry into the war, assumed primary jurisdiction over the control of prisoners of war."

USAF Prisoners, pp. 4-8.

21 RG319 Entry 26 (Army Staff).

The cases Ambassador Johnson referred to were well publicized and widely debated in the United States at the time.

Two factors help explain why UNC POWs were sent over the Yalu River to China then returned after interrogation by Communist forces to POW camps in North Korea. First, UNC air power was forbidden to operate over China. This created a relatively safe sanctuary for Communist intelligence services, particularly the Soviets, who were responsible for organizing and conducting interrogations on Chinese territory. Second, during the first year of the war both sides were convinced the conflict would end in a few months. This created a sense of urgency among those interested in obtaining information from UNC POWs. Soviet forces maintained facilities in Andong, for example, where intelligence officers were based. Later in the war, according to a Soviet intelligence officer stationed in Andong, Soviet intelligence officers crossed the Yalu to listen to the Chinese and North Korean interrogations of American Air Force POWs. The transfer of American POWs to PRC territory appears to have been most frequent in the early months of the war.

**Transport Methods**

Transporting Americans captured in North Korea to PRC territory was not a difficult task. In one documented case, it was simply a matter of loading the Americans into a vehicle and driving across a bridge over the Yalu River. There was also a tunnel under the Yalu connecting Sinuiju and Andong. Americans were transported to China by train under heavy guard or simply marched across bridges. Repatriated POWs who had been transferred to the PRC reported that they were sometimes hooded to conceal their identity and to block their vision. Windows on vehicles and trains were often blacked out so that no one could see in or out.

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23Bushuyev interview.

Camps in China

The prospect that POWs had been transferred to and imprisoned in Chinese territory was of great concern to UNC officials. On March 9, 1952, Rear Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, the Allied truce negotiator, accused the Chinese Communists of secretly holding American prisoners of war in Manchuria. Libby told the Chinese, “We have convincing evidence that you are holding prisoners of war in detention camps outside of Korea without having reported them to our side.” U.S. intelligence concluded that 12 suspected POW camps thought to be in Chinese territory were abolished between April 15, 1952, and January 20, 1953. The abolished camps, according to Army G-2, are shown in Table 6.1.

As of August 1952, only one POW camp in Chinese territory known as Tungk’antzu was suspected of holding UNC prisoners. All this information was considered by intelligence sources to be “fairly reliable” but not confirmed.25 U.S. forces obtained information

Table 6.1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspected POW Camps in PRC Territory Reportedly Abolished by January 1953</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chinan (Tsinan)</td>
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<td>2. Chuchiang</td>
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<td>3. Fengcheng</td>
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<td>5. Kaifong</td>
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<td>10. Shanghai</td>
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<td>11. Tientsin</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Tunghua</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

25 UN Prisoners of War, pp. 1, 26.
that could be taken as one explanation for the absence of POW camps in Manchuria or China:

While the 67th CCF Army was stationed in China, the source heard from various Section Chiefs that the Army Groups in Korea had sent UN POWs into Manchuria and that this had drawn strong protest from KAO, Kang, chairman of all Manchurian Provinces, who argued that international complications would arise if UN POWs were found in China proper, and that the Chinese government should not assume responsibility of caring for UN POWs. According to the Section Chiefs, KAO won his argument and UN POWs were returned to North Korea.26

This information from November 11, 1952, was considered to be reliable, according to a U.S. intelligence evaluation.

AMERICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE PRC

Background

There were over 15 highly publicized cases of Americans being held as political prisoners—hostages for all intents and purposes—in China. Whether there were other Americans held after the Korean War is a matter of ongoing debate and analysis. In January 1993, for example, researchers and analysts from Task Force Russia and the Joint Commission visited Beijing in an effort to obtain Chinese assistance in the resolution of Korean War POW/MIA issues. During the Korean War POW exchanges, there were suspicions among the UN forces that Americans imprisoned in China were being withheld by the Communist side. On May 15, 1953, following Little Switch, Lt. General William K. Harrison Jr., senior United Nations negotiator at the Armistice talks, demanded of chief North Korean delegate General Nam II,

What about [UN] personnel sent to peace camps in Manchuria?
What about personnel sent to reform camps in Manchuria? Are

26 UN Prisoners of War, p. 28.
these men to be free to return to our side after the armistice becomes effective?27

Since the beginning of the war, however, the Communists refused to verify prisoner manifests, thus it was impossible to establish how many, if any, UN captives had been transferred to but not returned from PRC territory. The only answer Harrison got was the standard Communist line that all eligible prisoners had been released.

Chinese Foreign Policy Objectives

The Chinese Foreign Ministry was less than four years old when Chou En-lai turned to hostage-taking to achieve foreign policy objectives. From the beginning of the People's Republic of China, Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues sought to establish China's presence on the world stage. In the Seventeenth Century, the Pope decided who should be considered a great power in the world. The government of the PRC decided to achieve the same end by transferring American and other UNC air crews to PRC territory where they were jailed as political prisoners. The beginning of China's hostage-taking policy roughly coincides with the souring of Sino-Soviet relations and the death of Stalin.

On October 19, 1950, China entered the Korean War without Soviet air cover. The Soviets did not appear in the skies above North Korea until two weeks later. Although there is an ongoing debate over the degree to which Beijing acted independently of Moscow during the Korean War, this example of the manner in which Chinese ground forces took the initiative illustrates the fact that the Chinese were not controlled entirely by the Russians. By January 1953, after two and one half years of direct combat with Americans, the Chinese were not only more confident, they were also faced with Stalin's bizarre exit.

Stalin's death was announced on March 6. The doctors' plot, the campaign against Beria and the rumors of yet another massive purge raised serious doubts about the degree of political stability in

Moscow. China’s decision to transfer American Air Force crews from North Korea to China coincides with Stalin’s demise. The Chinese were keenly aware that Soviet support for the Chinese effort in the Korean War had always been more popular with the Soviet military than with the Soviet political hierarchy. Thus, the high profile taking of American hostages may have been the result of a Chinese calculation that it was time for China to confront America in a direct political struggle commensurate with the degree to which the military conflict was being waged. This suggests the Chinese realized the value of hostages in this political struggle with the United States.

As one considers the possibility that other Americans were secretly transferred to PRC territory, one should bear in mind that China openly admitted and went to great lengths to publicize the fact that American hostages were being held in Chinese jails. Since the PRC Foreign Ministry had few tools with which to pursue its policy goals, viz., great power status and a seat in the United Nations, one must ask what political end, if any, would be realized by holding a large number of Americans without any publicity? China publicized and exploited the American prisoners it held. The task of making the case for the political utility of retaining prisoners in secret is left to others.

Direct Negotiations with the United States

On May 28, 1954, a Chinese spokesman at the Geneva conference on Far Eastern affairs announced that “the best way” for the United States to obtain the release of Americans held in China would be through direct negotiations with the Chinese government.28 A U.S. spokesman remarked that the issue was how to conduct these negotiations without implying a change in U.S. policy toward the Chinese government.

The Chinese reportedly told the crew of a B-29 that they were being “used for bargaining purposes in connection with Peiping’s cam-

campaign for admission to the United Nations." Chou En-lai's "diplomatic strategy was to use the momentum of Bandung, the spirit of Geneva, and the vogue for 'coexistence' to put himself on a par with Dulles. That was Peking's real aim."

Research Facilities

In July 1992, the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected news accounts of a U.S. government report that concluded Americans had been held in a research facility in Manchuria during the Korean War. "One knowledgeable [U.S.] government source called the report extremely preliminary" and another said "that American officials were uncertain which country—Russia or China—to press for more information given the uncertainty of the location of the alleged research facility in China and the role allegedly played in it by the Soviet Union and its East European allies." The Embassy of the People's Republic of China called the report "totally groundless, and it was a sheer fabrication made with ulterior motives. The Chinese side settled the issue of American prisoners of the Korean War long ago. There are no American POWs in China, nor any issues remaining unsettled." A subsequent report linked American POWs to a biological weapon facility located in North Korea.

Air Force Hostages

The UN Command and the United States government have publicized over the years firm evidence that USAF personnel were being

32Newsletter, No. 21, July 10.
held on PRC territory during (as POWs) and after (as political prisoners) the Korean War. The most publicized USAF captives held in the PRC were 11 crewmen of a USAF B-29 shot down over North Korea. On January 12, 1953, a B-29 on a classified psychological warfare leaflet mission was downed by a MiG flown by a Soviet pilot south of the Yalu River. USAF Field Search Case A654, which contains details on this incident (Case No. 1079), notes that the last radio contact at 23:16 reported the aircraft's location in Transverse Mercator Grid XE-6050, near the Chinese-North Korean border. The missing aircrew check list noted:

Unidentified crafts appeared to merge on friendly craft and friendly craft disappeared from the radar scope at XE 6050. Search efforts made by 5th Air Force consisting of maximum altitude fighter sweeps over area of missing craft with negative results.

The crash site was identified in an "unrecoverable remains" report of March 1, 1955, as grid coordinate 6134-I, well south of the Yalu River and Chinese territory.

The Chinese claimed the plane flew over Liaoning Province where it was shot down. The purpose of the overflight, according to the Chinese, was to "airdrop special agents into China and the Soviet

34 The crew members on the B-29 shot down on January 12, 1953, were:

Colonel John K. Arnold, Jr. 1212A (repatriated)
Major William H. Baumer A0733786 (repatriated)
Captain Elmer F. Llewellyn A020723609 (repatriated)
Captain Eugene J. Vaadi A0825068 (repatriated)
First Lieutenant John W. Buck A0787245 (repatriated)
First Lieutenant Paul E. Van Voorhis A02091867 (repatriated)
First Lieutenant Henry D. Weese A02091871 (repatriated)
First Lieutenant Wallace L. Brown A02221926 (repatriated)
Technical Sergeant Howard W. Brown AF36809947 (repatriated)
Airman First Class Alvin D. Hart, Jr. AF16353684 (repatriated)
Airman First Class Steve E. Kiba AF15426310 (repatriated)
Airman Second Class Harry M. Benjamin, Jr. AF27345828 (repatriated)
Airman Second Class Daniel C. Schmidt AF19391475 (repatriated)
Airman Second Class John W. Thompson III AF13361709 (repatriated)

35 Viktor Aleksandrovich Bushuyev, deputy chief of intelligence of the Soviet 64th Air Corps, said "the guy who shot down Col. Arnold's plane was a very good friend of mine."
This was a bizarre charge inasmuch as neither the Soviets nor the Chinese ever disputed the fact that everyone aboard the B-29 was in uniform, an odd choice of disguise for a spy to say the least. The pilot of the B-29, 2nd Lieutenant Wallace Brown, who saw the wreckage of the B-29 and watched but was unable to communicate with the CAP, was certain the plane crashed on North Korean territory. Brown described in his memoirs how after being captured he was covered with a parachute canopy by Communist forces then transported in a captured American weapons carrier across the Yalu to Andong, China. The other surviving crew members, according to Brown, were transported in a similar fashion. In addition to the crew of the B-29, at least four other American Air Force personnel shot down during the Korean conflict were captured and transferred to PRC territory.

**U.S. EFFORTS TO FREE THE POLITICAL PRISONERS**

The U.S. government acted on reports that U.S. servicemen had been transferred from Korea to the People’s Republic of China. The Department of State noted in 1956, for example, that “the United States Government has never ceased trying to obtain information that might throw light on the fate of United States soldiers who disappeared during the Korean War or at other times.” The illegal detention of U.S. servicemen was a salient political issue. Assistant Secretary of State Thruston B. Morton assured Congressman Morgan M. Moulder in 1955 that “the imprisonment of American servicemen is a matter of grave concern to the President and Secretary Dulles and we are exploring every feasible means to obtain their release.”

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38 *The Endless Hours*, pp. 31–33.

39 Steve Kiba confirmed this version of events. Kiba interview.

40 Memorandum from EE—Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., to NA—William G. Jones, March 5, 1955, 611.61241/3-556.

41 Letter to Representative Moulder from Assistant Secretary of State Thruston B. Morton, July 13, 1955, 611.61241/6-1755.
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, described U.S. government and UN efforts to obtain the release of the Air Force personnel held in China.\textsuperscript{42}

As a result of a direct approach to the Chinese Communists at Geneva, concerning individuals who we had reason to believe might be held in Communist China, the Communists in June 1954 for the first time formally admitted holding 15 American servicemen, 4 of them fighter pilots, and the remaining 11 members of a bomber crew. The United States representative, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, demanded the immediate release of these men. This demand was reiterated in subsequent meetings between members of our consulate general in Geneva and the Chinese Communist consulate general.

In November 1954, the Chinese Communists announced the sentencing of the 11 B-29 airmen. The Department of State asked our delegation to call this to the attention of the U.N. which by an overwhelming majority condemned the Communist action. The U.N. resolution requested the Secretary General to seek the release of the 11 airmen and all other captured personnel of the United Nations Command still detained. Pursuant to this resolution, U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld went to Peiping in January 1955. Through diplomatic channels, we sought and obtained the willing cooperation of various free-world nations having relations with the Chinese Communists—notably the United Kingdom and India—in making representations to Peiping. As a result of these combined efforts, the four fighter pilots were released on May 31, 1955. The 11 B-29 airmen were released on the eve of the renewal of the Ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva on August 1, 1955.

With the release of these two groups by the Chinese Communists, there remained no reliable evidence that any of our missing military personnel were still alive or in Communist hands. However, the possibility could not be excluded that some of them might be alive. In any case, we were entitled to know what had happened to them. Consequently, this was made one of the three subjects which the United States has taken up with the Chinese Communists at the ambassadorial talks which began on August 1, 1955, at Geneva.

\textsuperscript{42}Return of American Prisoners, pp. 5–6.
this time the release of the airmen and assiduous investigation by
the Department of Defense had reduced the list of unaccounted-for
personnel to 450 names.

Ambassador Johnson, our representative in the ambassadorial talks,
has repeatedly demanded an accounting from the Chinese Com-
munists. The first time he demanded an accounting, the Com-
munist representative flatly denied any of the men were being held
in Communist China. He insisted this was a matter to be taken up
in the Military Armistice Commission in Korea.

The United Nations Command was able, soon afterwards, to cite
this statement in the Military Armistice Commission in renewing its
demand for an accounting. At this meeting of the Military Armistice
Commission in November 1955, the Communists accepted the list
of missing UNC personnel, with the implication that an accounting
would be forthcoming.

Three months went by with still no sign of an accounting from the
Communist side in the Military Armistice Commission. After con-
sultation with Defense, the Department again instructed Ambas-
sador Johnson to take the matter up at Geneva. Shortly afterward
the Communist side in the MAC produced their so-called account-
ing.

Ambassador Johnson has continued with undiminished persistence
to demand a full accounting from the Communist Chinese repre-
sentative at Geneva, despite the fact that the Communist represen-
tative has now ceased even the pretense of a response to his de-
mands.

The Department of State, in close cooperation with the Department
of Defense, will continue to pursue all feasible means to secure an
acceptable accounting.

On March 5, 1954, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs
Walter S. Robertson wrote to Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank C.
Nash.\footnote{Robertson to Nash (Confidential), March 5, 1954, RG383.6, "Unaccounted for
Americans Believed to Be Still Held Illegally by the Communists."} Robertson noted that the British Government "offered to make on behalf of the Unified Command an approach to the Chinese
Communists at Peiping to seek the return of United Nations Command personnel who may still be in Communist custody." Robertson’s purpose in writing was to establish the Department of State’s position on this matter, since the Chinese Communists “continue to retain in a non-prisoner of war status certain United States Air Force personnel, alleged to have overflown Chinese territory[.]” The Department of Defense has reported that 18 USAF personnel were in this category. From September to November 1953, the United Nations Command made “repeated efforts in the Military Armistice Commission to secure from the Communists an accounting of United Nations Command personnel who may at one time or another have been in Communist custody. These efforts were unsuccessful.” Ambassador Dean, who was negotiating with the Communists at Panmunjon, was authorized in November to “discuss the subject of Americans held in Chinese custody if a suitable opportunity presented itself.” Though this opportunity did not arise, the United Nations Command renewed its efforts in January 1954 to obtain a full accounting, again without success.

The Chinese Communists had indicated through indirect channels that the release of the Americans could only be achieved through diplomatic rather than military-to-military channels. Robertson wrote that “the Department of State believes that diplomatic efforts should now be undertaken to attempt to achieve the return of United Nations Command personnel who may be in Chinese Communist custody.” In Robertson’s view, the British approach offered a “small possibility of success” since the Communists would not have to admit in public a violation of the Armistice Agreement. The diplomatic approach made sense, since many “free-world personnel have been released from behind the Iron Curtain after diplomatic negotiations.” Robertson notified the Department of Defense:

> It is therefore proposed that the Department of Defense concur in authorizing the British Government to make on behalf of the Unified Command formal representations to the Chinese Communist authorities at Peiping to secure the return of United Nations Command personnel who may still be in Communist custody.

The Department of State noted that this was consistent with the Department of Defense, which had concurred “in another approach to the Chinese Communists which is presently being undertaken by the
British Government on behalf of eleven non-United Nations Command United States Naval and Coast Guard personnel missing as a result of two plane crashes off Swatow on January 18, 1953. Robertson asked for DoD’s concurrence with State’s desire to “take appropriate consultations with the British and other Governments concerned.”

On April 12, the DoD replied to Robertson, “The Department of Defense concurs in this proposal.” DoD asked, since this would be a diplomatic initiative, that State coordinate “carefully with the efforts of the Military Armistice Commission [and] continue to collaborate closely with appropriate members of the Department of Defense staff.”

In April 1954, the Department of Defense sent the Department of State the following list of American Air Force personnel held by the Chinese Communists on the territory of the PRC:

1. Col. John K. Arnold, Jr. 1212A (repatriated)
2. Maj. William H. Baumer A0733786 (repatriated)
3. Captain Elmer F. Llewellyn A020723609 (repatriated)
4. Captain Eugene J. Vaadi A0825008 (repatriated)
5. 1st Lieutenant John W. Buck A0787245 (repatriated)
6. 1st Lieutenant Paul E. Van Voorhis A02091867 (repatriated)
7. 1st Lieutenant Henry D. Weese A02091871 (repatriated)
8. 1st Lieutenant Wallace L. Brown A02221928 (repatriated)
9. Tech Sergeant Howard W. Brown AF36609947 (repatriated)
10. Airman 1st Class Alvin D. Hart, Jr. AF16353684 (repatriated)
11. Airman 1st Class Steve E. Kiba AF15426310 (repatriated)
12. Airman 2nd Cl. Harry M. Benjamin, Jr. A027345828 (repatriated)
13. Airman 2nd Class Daniel C. Schmidt AF19391475 (repatriated)
14. Airman 2nd Cl. John W. Thompson III AF13361709 (repatriated)
15. Lt. Colonel Edwin L. Heller 9900A (repatriated)
16. Captain Harold E. Fischer A02204126 (repatriated)
17. 1st Lieutenant Lyle W. Cameron 23634A (repatriated)
18. 1st Lieutenant Roland W. Parks 23197A (repatriated)

44 From Vice Admiral A. C. Davis, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs (for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)) (Confidential), to Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, April 12, 1954.
Weese and Van Voorhis are particularly interesting cases. Neither was confirmed to have been alive in captivity, though Kiba has in conflicting testimony claimed to have seen Van Voorhis alive in a Chinese prison. Neither man was repatriated, yet both appear in the records of the Soviet 64th Air Corps.

On March 3, 1954, the DoS responded to a request from Senator Leverett Saltonstall who, on behalf of a constituent, wanted information “regarding American civilians and military personnel who may be in Communist custody.” The constituent was inspired to write after reading an article in *U.S. News and World Report* on this subject. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Thruston B. Morton outlined the DoS’s position “with regard to the situation in Communist China, from the time that Americans first began to be held prisoner in Communist China, the Department has explored every channel which appeared to offer hope of bringing about their release.”

The cases of the 15 fliers held in China became *causes célèbres* for two reasons. First, the Chinese held the Americans long

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45Morton continued, “The representative at Peiping of the British Government, which represents our interests in Communist China, has protested vigorously and repeatedly to the Chinese Communist authorities against the continued detention of American citizens in contravention of all humanitarian considerations. He is continuing his efforts on every appropriate occasion to assist these unfortunate citizens. In our efforts to assist these persons, we have had, in addition to the assistance of the British, the services of other friendly Governments whose representatives at Peiping have been helpful in endeavors to alleviate their situation. Through the American Embassy at Moscow, the Department has also requested the Soviet Government to intercede with the Chinese Communist authorities on behalf of these American citizens. While our efforts along these lines will continue, it must be pointed out that our approaches to the Soviet Government have, since their beginning in 1951, been without result. The question of the American citizens detained in Communist China has also been brought up at the United Nations. In a public speech on March 25, 1953, the United States representative at the United Nations asked the Soviet Delegation at the UN for information regarding the intentions of the Chinese Communist regime toward the Americans detained in Communist China. I am enclosing for your constituent’s information a copy of a statement prepared by the Department of State concerning the efforts which have been made to obtain information about the missing American military personnel in Korea about whom there is evidence that they had at one time been in Communist custody, and to secure the return of those who may still be alive. It continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all of these persons who may still be in Communist custody and all feasible measures are being taken to accomplish this objective.” Letter from Assistant Secretary Thruston B. Morton to Senator Leverett Saltonstall, March 3, 1954, 611.61241/2-1954.
after the end of the Korean conflict, which violated, in UNC's view, the Korean Armistice. Second, some of the fliers, including members of the B-29 crew, were sentenced by a Chinese military tribunal in November 1954 on charges of espionage to terms ranging from four years to life. 46 This set off a fierce and prolonged debate in the United States over how to obtain the release of all Americans held against their will in China. The first reaction by the U.S. government was a note expressing the "strongest possible protest" of the imprisonment of the Americans on "trumped up" charges of espionage. 47

The protest was made by the American Consul General at Geneva where channels were established to exchange information between the United States and China. 48 The Department of Defense added that charges the crew of the B-29 were "political prisoners" guilty of "spying" were "palpably false." The Chinese initially refused to meet with U.S. representatives in Geneva to discuss the issue.

The U.S. public was involved in a discussion of how to respond to the Chinese. This was an integral element of China's strategy to engage the American people in open conflict with the American government. This strategy, designed to pressure the American government into accepting China's demands for direct negotiations, for example, worked. On May 28, 1954, the parents of Harold Fischer, Jr., asked President Eisenhower to negotiate for the return of their son. 49

Fischer, one of the more successful F-86 pilots during the Korean War, was brought down over Chinese territory after his aircraft, the Paper Tiger, ingested debris from a MiG that Fischer was shooting at near the Yalu River on February 16, 1953. 50 By August 1954, the Chinese admitted holding a total of 15 American airmen, 11 from one B-29 and four from single-seat aircraft shot down or forced to land

46 "13 Americans Get Terms Up To Life As Spies in Peiping." For example, Arnold was sentenced to ten years, Baumer to eight, Kiba four, Benjamin four, Thompson four, Schmidt four, and Howard Brown four.


on PRC territory.\textsuperscript{51} In November, five of the B-29 crew members were permitted to write home for the first time in two years.\textsuperscript{52}

That same month, President Eisenhower gave assurances to the parents of one of the B-29 crew that the U.S. government was doing everything humanly possible with peaceful means to liberate the Americans sent to prison as "spies."\textsuperscript{53} The following day the President sent telegrams to the families of those sentenced. The telegram pledged the United States would "work resolutely and tirelessly" for the proper treatment and eventual freedom of these men.\textsuperscript{54} Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., head of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, condemned the Chinese act as one of "barbarism." Prime Minister Winston Churchill's government announced that its view the Chinese action was "outrageous" and a violation of international law.\textsuperscript{55} The Chinese government responded in an editorial in \textit{Peiping People's Daily},

A denial by the United States aggressive clique would be futile in the face of facts brought to light by the captured American spies. These facts are an ironclad proof of the United States attempt to start an aggressive war against China and overthrow the Chinese People's Government from within.\textsuperscript{56}

The United States followed up its protest in Geneva with an "unusually strong" note delivered to the Chinese Foreign Ministry through the British embassy in Beijing and through the British Foreign Ministry to the Chinese Embassy in London.\textsuperscript{57} (At the time, only three western countries—Sweden, Britain, and the Netherlands—

\textsuperscript{52}P.O.W.'s in China Write, "\textit{New York Times}, November 6, 1954
maintained embassies in Beijing.) The Chinese broadcast "confessions" obtained from the Americans.58

After the Chinese refused to release the airmen, referring to the U.S. request as "hysterical outbursts and denials," U.S. officials began to propose strong measures. Senator William F. Knowland (R-CA) proposed the day after the Chinese broadcast the "confessions" that the United States Navy should be used for a "blockade of the Chinese mainland unless Peiping released" the Americans.59 Knowland stressed that the U.S. government had a "moral obligation" to "use more than words" to protect Americans abroad. The blockade measure had been proposed by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and advocated by General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean conflict. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded quickly to Senator Knowland's proposal during a speech to an annual 4-H Congress in Chicago.60 Dulles said:

Our nation will react, and react vigorously, but without allowing ourselves to be provoked into an action which would be a violation of our international obligations and which would impair the alliance of the free nations.61

The issue certainly made for strange political bedfellows. Senate Democrats expressed their support for the Secretary of State and the Republican President, putting the White House in league with the Democrats in opposition to the Senate Republicans. Senator Walter F. George (D-GA) expressed "thorough disagreement" with the blockade proposal on the grounds it would "invite war and retaliation on our own people" and lead to a "speedy death" for the very people Senator Knowland sought to liberate.62 George was quickly supported by soon-to-be Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson

who also expressed support for President Eisenhower’s policy. Senator Thomas J. Dodd (R-CT) proposed a “trade embargo” that would pit China against “all free nations.”

President Eisenhower went on record on December 1, 1954, with the position that a blockade would be an act of war. Eisenhower said,

in many ways the easy course for a President, for the Administration, is to adopt a truculent, publicly bold, almost insulting attitude . . . . Those actions lead to war.63

Dulles’s address in Chicago had been widely interpreted as a sign the United States would pursue the issue in the United Nations, perhaps seeking a condemnation of the Chinese by the General Assembly, since the Soviet Union would veto any measure introduced into the Security Council. Eisenhower confirmed this interpretation by calling on the United Nations to act for the release of the uniformed veterans of the Korean conflict being held in China.64 A short time later, former President Harry Truman gave his support to President Eisenhower’s policy on relations with the Communists.65

On December 2, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., revealed that the United States would indeed seek UN condemnation of China.66 On the same day the New York Committee to Combat Soviet Kidnappings sent a cable to Mao Tse-tung demanding the release of the Americans held in China.67 On December 7, 1954, the United States informed the United Nations that “four United States airmen shot down during the Korean War were being held by Communist China in violation of the

Armistice. They are in addition to the eleven previously named.\(^6\) Four days later the UN voted 47-5 to condemn the “trial and conviction of prisoners of war illegally detained” by the Chinese after the date fixed by the Korean armistice.\(^9\) Another resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union, calling on the UN to condemn U.S. aggression against China, was defeated 39-5. The British representative, Ivor T. M. Pink, ridiculed the Soviet resolution’s reference to “aggressive circles” by asking if the Soviets were concerned with “political flying saucers.”

The U.S. resolution, cosponsored by the 16 nations that made up the UN combat force, also called for Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to make “continuing and unremitting efforts to obtain the release” of the Americans. Hammarskjöld’s role was considered to be most appropriate, since direct U.S.-China negotiations were ruled out because the United States did not recognize China. The Secretary General said he would accept the responsibilities “with a deep sense of the importance of the issue” and promised he would do everything within his power to serve the interests of the United Nations.\(^7\) On December 10, Hammarskjöld wrote to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to propose a visit to Beijing by the Secretary General. The initial reaction by Radio Peiping was to blast Hammarskjöld on the ground that the UN had no right to interfere with China’s treatment of “American spies.”\(^7\) Informed speculation at the time suggested that if the Chinese agreed to receive the administrative head of the UN, the meeting would be followed by an offer to release all Americans held against their will in China. The Department of State indicated that Hammarskjöld had the “full confidence” of the U.S. government.\(^7\)

\(^7\) U.N. Vote, 47 to 5, Condemns Peiping for Jailing Fliers.”
Ambassador Johnson and Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, informed the U.S. Congress in 1957 that efforts to recover the American hostages in the PRC were being directed through the UN.

Mr. Johnson: I am not aware of any active steps [other nations who had forces in Korea] are taking at the present time in this regard.

Mrs. Church: Mr. Chairman, since this is described as United Nations actions I think it is appropriate to ask whether the United Nations has ever taken any steps.

Mr. Robertson: Yes. When Mr. Hammarskjöld went to Peiping, he went not only to make strong representations on behalf of the flyers whom they had admitted holding, but also he carried with him a list of all the unaccounted-for military personnel which was made up and given to him by the Department of Defense. He made strong representations that the Communists make an accounting for these. The Communists, as we indicated, at first denied holding any of them. They had agreed in the armistice agreement to exchange all military personnel. It was some months later that we found that they were holding the 15 flyers who were subsequently released. As no one could feel sure that what they said had any bearing on the truth, a continuous effort was made to induce them to give an accounting. They should know whether or not they were dead or alive. At first they contemptuously refused to give any answer. They would not even receive the list. After long months of pressure, they came back with a very unsatisfactory accounting.

Mrs. Church: Do you think that everything has been done that could be done?

Mr. Robertson: I think everything has been done that could be done.

Mrs. Church: You have no suggestions for what could be done further?

Mr. Robertson: Except to keep on demanding release.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{73}Return of American Prisoners, p. 10.
The decision to focus efforts through the UN placed demands on the UN Secretary General in whom U.S. officials had great confidence. Dag Hammarskjöld was considered to be one of Sweden's sharpest minds on economic issues. A CIA assessment in 1949 concluded that Hammarskjöld was "one of the most important and influential men in Sweden, exercising almost unquestioned authority over Swedish foreign financial matters." U.S. officials were able to come to an agreement with Hammarskjöld on such a sensitive matter because he was "definitely pro-Western," one of the few Swedish officials who would "lean over backwards to be fair in dealings with United States officials."  

On December 16, Hammarskjöld announced that he had an appointment to see Keng Piao, China's ambassador to Sweden, in Stockholm. The purpose of this meeting, set up by an unpublicized message carried to Beijing by the government of India, was to determine whether Chinese leaders would see the General Secretary in Beijing. Pressure was mounting in the United States to permit 35 Chinese students to return to China in exchange for the Americans. Exit permission for the 35 students had been delayed as the political battle over whether the United States should deal in kind with the Chinese waged. Several Chinese students volunteered to return to China in exchange for the Americans. On December 17, more than one week after the UN Secretary General sent his note to Beijing, Chou En-Lai announced that he would see Hammarskjöld. Chou's acceptance, however, included a harsh denunciation of the United States for its "aggression" and of the UN's interference in China's...

74*Sweden (Secret),* Copy No. 1, for the President of the United States, CIA SR-7, April 6, 1949, p. 70.

75*"U.N. Head Will See Chinese in Sweden on Jailed Fliers," New York Times, December 17, 1954.* In 1991 the Swedish government, under directions from Prime Minister Carl Bildt, conducted a search of the Swedish archives for information that would complement this account of Hammarskjöld's activities and of Swedish efforts to free Americans held in the PRC. The Swedish research effort did not turn up any additional information on this topic.


Chou also said that the agenda would concern "the case of the United States spies." Reaction in the United States was mixed. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-WI), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, noted that if this approach did not work, the United States would probably ask the United Nations to contemplate the use of force, though the senator had no idea how to pass such a resolution in the Security Council, where it would be subject to a Soviet veto.

The 11 surviving crew members of the B-29 were released by the Chinese through Hong Kong on August 3, 1955. The Department of State summarized these cases in the following manner:

On 21 January 1953, a propaganda broadcast from Peking, China, claimed that the B-29 had been shot down over Manchuria and all but three of the 14 crew members had survived and were captured. The names of Colonel Arnold, Major Baumer, and Captain Vaadi were mentioned in the broadcast. No change in the status of these crew members was made since the information received was considered unofficial.

Interrogation of UN personnel who were repatriated during Operation Big Switch produced no information on the status or fate of this crew, although the names of Colonel Arnold and Major Baumer were mentioned to repatriates by Chinese interrogators. Subsequently, a Communist newspaper report stated that those men who were allegedly shot down or captured in Manchuria would not be repatriated since they were considered political prisoners rather than prisoners of war. Efforts of the State Department to obtain official information on the fate of this crew were unsuccessful.

On 21 June 1954, in direct reply to lists presented by the State Department to the Communist delegation at the Geneva Conference, it was learned that First Lieutenant Van Voorhis, First Lieutenant Weese, and Airmen First Class Hart had perished in attempting to parachute over Antung on 13 January 1953. The Communist

delegation further indicated that they held prisoner 15 Air Force personnel, 11 of whom were believed to be the remainder of this crew.

The crew members indicated below were repatriated by the Chinese Communists on 4 August 1955. The status of First Lieutenant Von Voorhis, First Lieutenant Weese, and Airman First Class Hart were administratively changed from missing to deceased 6 August 1955 based upon debriefing reports from repatriates. Their remains have never been recovered.

Four American fighter pilots were released from China in the same time frame. Two CIA agents, Fecteau and Downey, were released much later.

**Ambassadorial Talks**

In 1955, formal bilateral talks between the United States and the People's Republic of China began. Between August 1, 1955, and 1967, U.S. and Chinese diplomats met on an irregular basis 130 times, first in Geneva then in Warsaw. These meetings, which became known as the Ambassadorial talks, were the most important contacts between the two nations. The scope of topics was broad but the question of Americans held by the Chinese was always in the forefront. The first U.S. ambassador to the talks, U. Alexis Johnson, told Congress in 1957:

> Mr. Johnson: My first talks with [the Communists] on the subject of prisoners was in June of 1954, at the time of the Geneva Conference. That contact was subsequently maintained through the consul general there, and then talks were renewed by me on August 1, 1955.81

> Mrs. Church: How many times have you contacted them?

> Mr. Johnson: Since August 1, 1955 I have had 67 meetings with them. I have brought up the prisoner question, this question of

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missing military personnel, on numerous occasions throughout those 67 meetings.82

"An agenda for the Talks was the principal obstacle . . . Washington insisted on specifying only the repatriation of Americans and an agreement on the renunciation of force."83 Secretary Dulles outlined the return of citizens and other "practical matters" the talks were to cover:

1) Return of American civilians detained in Communist China. The United States was also prepared to discuss the status of "the few Chinese students" in the United States "who desire to return to Communist China and who the Chinese Communists claim are prevented from doing so."

2) Reinforcement of the efforts of the United Nations to secure the return of Americans who became prisoners of war under the United Nations command in Korea.84

The Chinese used the talks to further their foreign policy agenda and to broaden the U.S.-Chinese dialogue.

The Chinese also sought to use the talks for propaganda purposes. "On July 31, the day after Chou spoke and the day before the Talks opened, the Chinese government in Peking released the eleven airmen who had been sentenced and imprisoned in November 1954."85 The U.S. position was intended to obtain the release of all American citizens held against their will in China. "At the fourth meeting, the Americans again took the position that no discussion on Chinese nationals in the United States could take place until the forty American civilians in China were freed."86 During the Ambassadorial talks, the PRC dished out U.S. prisoners piecemeal. When things got bogged down, the PRC routinely "went over the heads" of U.S.

82Return of American Prisoners, p. 15.
83Negotiating, p. 50.
84Negotiating, pp. 53ff, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, No. 841, August 8, 1955, pp. 219–220.
85Negotiating, p. 56.
86Negotiating, p. 69.
officials, making appeals to the American people through the press. This was seen as part of a deliberate negotiating strategy.\textsuperscript{87}

The Chinese used the talks for prestige purposes as well. "For the Chinese there had to be the image and appearance of equality in status and treatment with the United States. This first accord with the 'enemy' was absolutely symmetrical in form for both the United States and the People's Republic of China. For the Americans, it was the substance that counted. In fact, only six key words were the heart of the matter: 'expeditiously exercise their right to return.'"\textsuperscript{88} Chou En-lai's objective was to use the U.S. interest in recovering its citizens as leverage. Chou wanted the United States to treat the PRC as an equal. The similarity of this approach to the efforts of the North Koreans is striking.

\textbf{Additional Reports of Americans in the PRC}

Additional reports of Americans in the PRC appear in Appendix 9.

\textsuperscript{87}Negotiating, passim.
\textsuperscript{88}Negotiating, p. 74.
KOREAN WAR MIA/POW(BNR) CASES

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the derivation and validity of the United Nations Command Military Armistic Commission (UNCMAC) list that has been known as a list of "unrepatriated POWs" since the end of the Korean War.

Background

During the first eight months of the Korean War, the Communist forces appeared to be indifferent to whether captured Americans were murdered, marched to death, or collected in POW camps and allowed to die unattended and unregistered. Information on those allegedly held in POW camps was hard to come by and when it was available the Communists seemed to do their level best to make a murky picture all the more muddled. On August 18, 1950, for example, the Communist side gave the Red Cross a list of 50 UN POWs. With no explanation, 31 of these names were left off the list the Communists submitted in December 1951. On September 14, 1950, the Communist side submitted a list of 60 UN prisoners, yet with no explanation, 35 of the names on the list did not appear on their December 1951 accounting.\(^1\) On December 18, 1951, the Communist

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forces gave the UN side a list containing the names of 1,000 UN prisoners, about 7,000 South Korean prisoners, and 3,198 American prisoners of war. The Communist forces had previously informed the Red Cross that they held 110 UN prisoners even though over 1,000 had been named in Chinese radio's "humanitarian" propaganda broadcasts. "Communist boasts in 1951 put their POW bag at 65,000, but at Panmunjon they admitted holding only 11,500" UNC personnel.

Verifying a 1951 Communist list of 3,198 American POWs, which was published in the New York Times, was a priority for the U.S. government. The task was difficult. The New York Times reported:

No one on the Allied side knows exactly how many prisoners the enemy holds. Unofficial estimates place the number at about 100,000, mostly South Koreans.

When the list was released, the U.S. armed forces listed 11,042 Americans as MIA, the status that was assigned to most cases until more information became available on which to base a reclassification. All of these were considered to be potential POWs until proven otherwise.

President Truman cautioned the American people that the names on the New York Times list had to be verified before any legitimate conclusions could be drawn about individual servicemen. Truman said through Joseph Short, his press secretary:

This country has no way of verifying whether the list is accurate or inaccurate, true or false, complete or incomplete.

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2The exact figure came a day after the list was made public. "The Missing Prisoners," New York Times, December 19, 1951.
3"Reds List 3,100 Americans As War Prisoners in Korea; Dean Among Those Named," New York Times, December 18, 1951.
For the sake of the families whose sons are missing in action, everyone should treat this list with skepticism.\textsuperscript{6}

As the Communist list was checked, a few names were found of POWs listed by the UN as KIA or MIA.\textsuperscript{7} By and large, however, the Communist POW list matched the UNC accounting of MIAs and those suspected of being "in the hands of enemy forces." After checking this list, the U.S. Army sent 3,232 telegrams to the next of kin of 2,724 servicemen listed by the Communists as POWs (multiple notifications could occur for a single POW). The Air Force notified relatives of the 76 USAF personnel listed as prisoner as did the Navy for eight POWs and the Marines for 58 prisoners. (A total of 284 Marines was listed as missing when this list was issued.) More than 8,000 men registered as MIA did not appear on the Communist POW ledger. Table 7.1 illustrates the POW camp survival rate for U.S. Army POWs known to have been alive in a Communist POW camp at one time.

The Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Jacob Malik, further confused the picture by releasing a list of 37 alleged American POWs. The problem was that although 12 of the names on Malik's list matched the list provided by the North Koreans and Chinese, 25 of Malik's names did not appear on the North Korean-Chinese accounting.\textsuperscript{8} One theory was that the Communists had submitted a partial list as a hedge against the need to use the remainder of the prisoners in the future.\textsuperscript{9}

**UNCMAC's POW Resolution Efforts**

After the war, the U.S. government and UNC continued to try to sort out the unrepatriated POW issue. The Communist forces steadfastly refused to help resolve the cases on this list despite repeated UNC


\textsuperscript{7}Repatriated POW Pfc Raymond Becker of Milton, Washington, for example, was listed as KIA until his release.


Table 7.1
U.S. Army POWs Surviving Internment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Captured and Interned</th>
<th>Died During Internment</th>
<th>Percent Repatriated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,961</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

requests for assistance. On September 9, 1953, UNC gave the Communist forces the list of unaccounted-for UNC personnel. Unaccounted-for UNC personnel came from ten countries as shown in Table 7.2. The total UNC list, 3,404, contained the names of 944 Americans in September 1953 and was consistent with U.S. government data presented in May 1954.

One of the first notes from the UNC forces to the Communists on the issue of unrepatriated POWs described the 3,404 names on the list as "personnel known to have been captured by you and to have been in your custody."

This complete tabulation of names of individuals together with their nationalities and service numbers contains the names of men who we know you held. The list contains only the names of people who:

1) Spoke or were referred to in broadcasts from your radio stations.
2) Were listed by you as being your captives.
3) Wrote letters from your camps.
4) Were seen in your prisons.

None of these people have been reported by you as having escaped or died as is required by Paragraph 58a of the Armistice Agreement.\(^\text{10}\)

The UNC's description of the names on the 944 list was not entirely accurate. Whether UNC officials were aware of this at the time is another issue that remains to be resolved. What is indisputable is the fact that many of the names on the original UNC list were men who had never been held alive in enemy hands. Many were KIA(BNR), as will be shown.

On September 21, 1953, the Communists stated that 518 of the persons on the UNC list had been repatriated and 380 had been previously reported as dead, escaped, or returned. No identification by

\(^{10}\)The Secretariat, Military Armistice Commission, Panmunjon, Korea. Eighteenth Meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, held at Panmunjon, Korea, September 9, 1953. Photocopy.
Table 7.2

Unaccounted-for UN Command Personnel
(Including Republic of Korea)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>September 1953</th>
<th>May 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium/Luxembourg</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>2,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,404</td>
<td>3,405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Eighteenth meeting of the UNCMAC, September 9, 1953.
*c The British government issued a White Paper on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1955). The total number of British POWs was 978.

name, nationality, or service number was made by the Communist side.11 At the 22nd MAC Meeting on October 3, 1953, UNCMAC accused the Communist side of withholding 3,404 POWs.12 Of the 3,404 UNC (including ROK) unaccounted-for personnel, 944 were U.S. personnel referred to as Americans the UNC “had reason to believe the Communists should have some knowledge of their whereabouts if alive, or the circumstances of their death and the location of their remains, if deceased.”13 On December 31 this number was raised to 3,427 (965 Americans).

11 Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army from Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army, December 22, 1953, OSA 383.6.
This is how the UNC Command Report in October 1953 summarized the way the 944 list was put together:

UNC compiled lists of persons not accounted for by the Communists but mentioned in Communist radio broadcasts, listed by the Communists as captives, mentioned in letters from prisoners, or reported by repatriated POWs as having been seen or contacted while in Communist captivity.\(^\text{14}\)

Additions to the original list were restricted to cases where UNC had "positive information indicating that the person to be listed might be alive." The Department of State noted

in the period September to November 1953 the United Nations Command made repeated efforts in the Military Armistice Commission to secure from the Communists an accounting of United Nations Command personnel who may at one time or another have been in Communist custody.\(^\text{15}\)

The words used to described the Korean War list were chosen so as not to exclude those held in the PRC from the effort to obtain an accounting for or the release of all U.S. personnel held by Communist forces. (U.S. airmen were being held at the time in the PRC as political prisoners, not POWs.)

The 944 list and those that have followed it have been referred to as the list of "unrepatriated POWs." In early 1954, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens referred to the 944 as a list of "missing American servicemen listed as prisoners of war."\(^\text{16}\) As soon as the 944 list was prepared, the UNC various U.S. officials began to refer to it as if it were a roster of Americans who had once been alive in the hands of hostile forces. In fact, the list of 944 unaccounted-for American personnel was neither a list of unrepatriated POWs nor a list of Americans who were known to have been left in Communist custody.

\(^{14}\)HQ FEC/UNC Command Report (Top Secret), December 1953.

\(^{15}\)Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson to Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank C. Nash, March 5, 1954. Emphasis added.

\(^{16}\)Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, February 2, 1954.
944 list included "those missing and presumed dead" as well as POW(BNR) and several KIA(BNR) cases. The 944 names included POW(BNR) and PCK(BNR) known to have been alive in Communist control and MIA for whom there was no evidence of capture or indication the individual was ever alive in Communist custody. In March 1954, Army G2 reported to the U.S. Senate that of the unaccounted-for U.S. personnel in Korea, "A. Officially captured: 120 (98 Army, 18 Marines, 4 USAF) B. Personnel considered by G-2 to have been in Communist custody: 892 (827 Army, 1 Navy, 6 Marines, 58 USAF)."

As shown below in the section "389 List," many names on the 944 list never met UNCMAC criteria announced in October 1953.

Some U.S. officials were clearly aware that the 944 list was more than a roster of confirmed POWs who had not been repatriated. Others, such as General Mark Clark, former Far East Commander, did not. After the war, Clark continued to express the belief that nearly "1,000 Americans" were being held as "hostages" by the Communist forces. Clark gave no indication of the basis on which his claims were made. American Representative to the UN James J. Wadsworth opened a debate over the unification of Korea by charging the Communists of holding "hundreds of United Nations captured personnel in violation of the armistice agreement."

On May 11, 1954, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson briefed an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation that was interested in discussing how the ICRC might intervene most effectively on behalf of U.S. personnel who remained in Communist custody. This included Americans who might have been held either in North Korea

17 Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from General USMC (ret.) G. B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), April 18, 1958.

18 Army G-2 Memorandum to the U.S. Senate, March 17, 1954, cited in Chronology of Policy and Intelligence Matters Concerning Unaccounted for U.S. Military Personnel at the End of the Korean Conflict and During the Cold War, prepared by the Office of Senator Bob Smith, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, November 10, 1992, p. 23.


as POWs or in the PRC as political prisoners. Ambassador Johnson emphasized that the

figure for the U.S. missing personnel should not be considered in any way as conclusive evidence that they were either alive or in Communist custody at the present time.

Johnson said that the 944 Americans might have been retained as a "result of slipshod personnel reports to the Communist Command (who perhaps were unaware of all those under their control) or a desire to retain those individuals whose technical knowledge might be valuable to the Communist war potential, or who might continue to have some propaganda value to the Communist cause."  

In his briefing to the ICRC, the ambassador presented the data shown in Table 7.3.

In June 1954, the UK Mission in Peiping (Beijing) asked for an accounting for UNC personnel from other countries including the United States. In August 1954, Rear Admiral T. B. Brittain, senior member of the UNCMAC, presented a list of 2,840 unaccounted-for

Table 7.3

Ambassador Johnson's POW/MIA Data (May 11, 1954)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>ROK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in action</td>
<td>23,196</td>
<td>58,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded in action</td>
<td>105,871(^a)</td>
<td>175,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing in action</td>
<td>13,108(^b)</td>
<td>166,297(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142,175</td>
<td>400,167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Of this figure, 2,495 subsequently died of wounds, in addition to those killed in action.

\(^b\) Returned to military control 5,131
Refused repatriation 21
Missing 7,956
Total 13,108

\(^c\) No comparable breakdown available for ROK personnel.

\(^{21}\) Johnson briefing for the ICRC, May 11, 1954.
UNC personnel to Lt. General Lee Sang Cho, his Communist counterpart, at the forty-seventh meeting of the MAC. Brittain said of the 526 Americans on this list, "We are convinced these men were in your hands and we still consider them as not having been accounted for in a satisfactory manner." The Communist side, which left without looking at the list, said "All persons have been repatriated in accordance with the armistice agreement. Your list is a fabricated roster." In October 1954, UNC asked the Communists to make additional inquiries and searches for 688 UNC dead—288 buried in seven UN cemeteries in North Korea and 400 Allied airmen presumably killed in 318 crashes in North Korean territory.

In 1957 the Department of Defense was asked to provide to Congress an estimate of the number of unrepatriated U.S. POWs from the Korean conflict. Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Stephen S. Jackson testified that this number was 944. The list Jackson was working from was not a list of unrepatriated POWs; rather, it was a roster of BNR cases whose status in contemporary terms would include "unofficial POW," “in the hands of hostile forces,” MIA, PCK(BNR), POW(BNR), and KIA(BNR). The Jackson list contained the names of servicemen identified by UNC as those whose whereabouts and fate might be known by the Communist forces. The misperception of the 944 list was perpetuated because Jackson responded to a request for a list of unrepatriated POWs by delivering the UNC list that named all U.S. body not recovered cases on the UNCMAC roster.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Jackson told Congress in 1957 about the evidence and methods on which the DoD's findings were based:

The point I am trying to make here is that there is considerable circumstantial evidence from which to draw the conclusion that [the 944 missing] were alive and under Communist control in relatively stable situations, removed from battle, and at periods ranging from several days to many months after they had become missing in action from their own UN Command units.

---

This demand on the Communists for an accounting produced a superficial and totally unacceptable reply. On several subsequent occasions similar demands were placed upon the Communist side through the Military Armistice Commission for an accounting. The results have been essentially negative. In addition to the efforts to secure an accounting through the Military Armistice Commission, the Graves Registration Units of the UN Command continued their investigations, the military services continued the sifting of thousands of reports, interviews with returned POWs, and the interrogation of friendly sources of Korean and other nationalities, attempting to piece together all available information which would throw light on the fate of the missing.24

Jackson noted in his 1957 testimony that the servicemen on the DoD list "had been alive in Communist hands" but not necessarily in POW camps. This distinction between POW and "in hands of enemy forces" was lost on the Congress. Jackson was also explicit in pointing out that the list included those whose status was based on information derived from "air crews who had seen our airmen parachute from disabled aircraft and, after safe landings, surrounded by enemy forces or civilians." By DoD's own standards, Jackson was referring to "unofficial POWs," not unrepatriated POWs, but this critical distinction was not emphasized at the time. By 1957, therefore, the mythology of the 944 list was firmly established. (Jackson's statement appears in Appendix 10.)

It is possible to verify the status of a later version of the UNCMAC list that contains 450 names, but the original list of 944 and the criteria used for selection from the field of 8,177 have not yet been located.

The 450 List

The 944 list was reduced to 526 in August 1954 based on the results of U.S. government efforts to resolve MIA cases.25 By December 6, 1954, as a result of other information obtained by the U.S. govern-

24 *Return of American Prisoners of War*, p. 3.

25 85th U.S. Congress. 2nd Session. House. Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "H. Con. Res 140 (and similar measures) to express the sense of the Congress with respect to the return of 450 American prisoners of war who have not been accounted for by the Communists," May 27, 1957, pp. 2-5.
ment, the list was reduced to 470. This number was announced by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., at the December 8, 1954, Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In 1957, the UNCMAC list of 450 names was made public for the first time. The list of alleged unrepatriated POWs that DAS Jackson provided to Congress in 1957, the 450 list, is reproduced in Appendix 11.

**Reductions from 450 to 389**

The list was further reduced to 450 by 1955 after the Army removed 55 names, "39 of which were based on evidence submitted by repatriates and 16 of which were based on recovered identifiable remains." Two names, Pfc Connor and Pvt Dickinson, were added to the 450 list in December 1957, bringing the total UNCMAC roster to 452. The manner in which the list was reduced from 452 to 391 and then 389 can be documented. On May 12, 1958, the Acting Adjutant General of the Army recommended, in light of the presumptive findings of death for 39 servicemen and the recovery of identifiable remains of 16 others, that 55 names be removed from the Korean War unaccounted-for personnel list. The evidence for the death findings in the 39 cases was derived from interviews with repatriated POWs. The Acting Adjutant General noted that

> wide publicity has been given this list because of Congressional hearings and publication of the list of 450 names. It is anticipated that notifying the families of the 16 persons whose remains have been returned for burial that the names have been deleted will result in no unfavorable publicity. However, notifying the families of the 39 persons whose remains were never recovered may result in criticism as some of these families have never given up hope that the men may be recovered alive.  

Recommendations for reductions were made after reviewing cases, obtaining eyewitness accounts, recovering bodies and drawing conclusions from a review of case files that missing cases could be recat-
egorized as KIA(BNR), remains recovered, or otherwise resolved. In 1960, the list was reduced to 391 "through the efforts of U.S. Graves Registration Units and the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, working with little or no assistance from the North Korean or Chinese Communists."

Throughout this time, the roster continued to be known as the list of unrepatriated POWs.

On May 23, 1958, the Assistant Secretary of the Army responded to an April 18 memorandum from the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) on the subject of "Korean War Prisoner Documentation." The Assistant Secretary promised to report "any intelligence dealing with the general subject of the unaccounted-for prisoners of war" as it became available. The deletions from the unaccounted-for personnel list, however, were not made until 1960.

On June 10, 1960 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) noted that the Departments of State and Defense "thru the Military Armistice Commission in Korea and thru direct contact with Chinese Communist diplomatic representatives at Warsaw" had not received an accounting for the 452 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel. The Assistant Secretary noted that though the Department of State preferred to freeze the number at 452 for negotiating purposes, the

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28 "Draft DoD Statement on Reduction of List," attached to Memorandum from General USMC (Ret) G. B. Kreskin, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) (Confidential), to The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, June 10, 1960.

29 The contents of this memorandum follow: "2. The list of 246 Army personnel has been examined with a view toward a possible reduction of the list. Official reports of death have been issued on 55 persons on the list as evidence considered conclusive of death has been received in their cases. Presumptive findings of death, for administrative purposes under provisions of the Missing Persons Act, have been issued on the remaining 191 persons on the list since conclusive evidence of death is not available. 3. The list of Army personnel is being reduced by deleting the names of those 55 persons for whom evidence of death has been received. Attached is the revised list of 191 Army personnel for whom an accounting should be sought. Included in the list are two names (Pfc Connie M. Connor, RA 19 360 219, and Pvt Donald Dickinson, RA 19 341 489) which were added to the list of 450 in December 1957. 4. The files of the 55 men deleted from the list are being procured and the next of kin will be notified of the removal from the list and reasons therefor. Since the addresses of record may no longer be current, there may be a delay before all of the next of kin are reached. Your office will be notified when action in this connection is completed."

Memorandum from Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Confidential), to Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), May 23, 1958, OSA 383.6. The names of the 191 unaccounted-for prisoners are attached to this memo.
time had come to adjust the list to reflect the "few additional bodies that have been recovered and the definite evidence of death that has been established for an additional number." The Assistant Secretary suggested that 55 to 70 deletions could be made if the various services agreed on such a course of action. The inter-service meeting to discuss this subject was held on June 14.

On June 23, 1960, the Acting Adjutant General of the Army wrote to the Assistant Secretary of the Army and others on the subject of "Lost or Unaccounted for PWs from the Korean War." This memo notes that the June 14 meeting "was short and two instructions were issued." The instructions were the following:

a) Each of the services must apply the same basic criteria for removing a name from the list. The criteria are:

1) Recovery and identification of remains, or
2) Receipt of one or more statements that death had been witnessed or remains had been viewed.

b) After the services have made whatever reductions are possible each next of kin will be notified of the removal of the name of their loved one from the list. Each of the services is to screen the list for removals and then prepare the necessary letters. These letters, however, will be undated and will be released only upon direction of OSD. The tentative release date is 1 July 1960.

The purpose of the joint release of the letters was to permit the Office of the Secretary of Defense time to prepare a public statement explaining how the list had been reduced.

As of June 1960, the breakdown of the list of 452 unaccounted-for personnel was as shown in Table 7.4.

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31 Memorandum from Maj. General Bruce Easley, Acting Adjutant General (Confidential), to Assistant Secretary of the Army (MP&RF), June 23, 1960, Subject: List of Unaccounted for PWs from the Korean War, OSA 383.6.
Table 7.4
The 452 List (June 1960)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reduction from 452 to 391 was "merely the fruition of staff action started in April 1958 . . . . Apparently, action to reduce the list at that time was not completed due to objections by the Department of State." The Acting Adjutant General pointed out:

In May 1958 the Army, using the criteria referred to above, was prepared to reduce the list by 55 names. Since that time it has been determined that 1 more name can be deleted, making a total of 56. Next of kin of these men have previously been notified that the status of their loved ones has been changed from presumed dead to known dead. The letters proposed for dispatch on or about 1 July 1960 are in keeping with the desires of the President as expressed to the Secretary of Defense that, next of kin of these men are to be kept fully informed of every action affecting the men on this list.

The Adjutant General of the Army's office offered to take the action on all items discussed in this memorandum.

On July 19, 1960, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Special Operations wrote to the Service Secretaries, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and to three Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ISA, MP&R, Public Affairs) requesting comments on a "Draft Public Statement on Reduction of List of Unaccounted For PWs."32 The memorandum summarizes responses to the June 10, 1960, request that each of the services "survey their records with a view to making a reduction in the list of unaccounted-for PWs from the Korean War." The survey was completed with the following results:

32From General Graves B. Erskine (ret.), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) (Confidential), July 10, 1960, CS 383.6.
Army List: Reduced from 246 to 190
Navy List: No reduction. Remains at 3
Air Force List: Reduced from 190 to 186
Marine Corps List: Reduced from 13 to 12

(The records showing how the Air Force and Marine Corps reduced their lists have not been located.) Since the DoD intended to make a public statement concerning these reductions, the recipients of this memorandum were asked to comment on a draft public statement, a copy of which was sent to the Department of State for concurrence. Once the public statement was coordinated, three action measures were proposed.

a) The Services will notify the next of kin and other interested parties of the change in status of those individuals being deleted from the list.

b) Concurrently the Department of State will notify Ambassador Beam in Warsaw of the deletions, in view of the fact that Mr. Beam is under instructions from the Department of State to pursue demands for an accounting in his discussions with the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Warsaw.

c) After a and b above have been accomplished, the public statement will be released at a time considered appropriate by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

Notification of next of kin was scheduled to begin simultaneously as soon as the public statement was coordinated and approved.

The text of the “Draft DoD Statement on Reduction of List” from 450 to 389 appears in Appendix 12.

On July 28, 1960, the Adjutant General of the Army determined that the draft press release was acceptable. The Army’s “letters of notification to next of kin are all prepared and require only signature and dating prior to dispatch upon direction of OSD.”

33From Maj. General R. V. Lee, The Adjutant General (Confidential), to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations) on July 29, 1960, that the "Department of the Army con-
curses in the proposed Department of Defense public statement[]."
Copies of these letters of notification have not been located yet. By
1960 the list was down to 391. The following Army cases were re-
moved between 1960–1984, bringing the 391 figure down to 389:

Balbi, Joseph A. US51142209 Pfc
Jewett, Richard G. 02003239 2nd Lieutenant

In 1984, a list of 389 names was presented to the Communist side by
the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission.35

In 1991, the Department of Defense stated in testimony before
Congress that 389 U.S. servicemen who had been POWs in North
Korea had not been repatriated or otherwise accounted for by the
Korean People's Army and the Chinese.36 This information relied on
familiar but misleading terminology. This appears to be a perpet-
uation of the mistaken notion that the 389 were all unrepatriated
POWs. The POW/MIA Fact Book produced by the Department of
Defense in 1991 should have referred to this group of 389 U.S. ser-
vicemen as those whose fate might be resolved with the assistance of
the Communist forces. This clarification appears in subsequent edi-
tions. The evolution of the 944 list is shown in Table 7.5.

Individual cases that were removed when the 450 list was reduced to

VERIFYING THE 389 LIST37

The MIA or prisoner status of the individuals on the 389 list can be
verified or at least crosschecked by using three sources: original ca-

34July 29, 1960, OSA 383.6.
35Memorandum from Rear Admiral Charles F. Horne III, Senior Member, UNCMAC,
to Major General Li Tae Ho, Korean People’s Army, Senior Member Korean People’s
Army, Chinese People’s Voluneteers Component, Military Armistice Commission,
August 17, 1984.
35.
37The 389 list, complete with casualty information derived from CILHI records,
appears in Appendix 14.
Table 7.5
The 944 List Becomes the 389 List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>944 (A 610, N 3, M 19, AF 312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1955</td>
<td></td>
<td>450 (A 244, N 3, M 13, AF 190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>452 (A 246, N 3, M 13, AF 190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td>389 (A 188, N 3, M 12, AF 186)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casualty status cards, POW casualty assessments, and personnel files. The cards are either white “GR-36 Cases Status Cards” or blue “Office of the Quartermaster General Form T-320 Title: Casualty Data Cards.” The white cards contain basic case data and the blue cards include basic data plus dental records and other information. The POW casualty assessments, which thus far have been located only for Army personnel, reflect information derived from repatriate interviews, intelligence reports, and enemy propaganda broadcasts. An individual’s casualty status may also be verified with the information in an Individual Deceased Personnel File (so-called 293 file). The Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, has begun the tedious but necessary process of comparing the information on the status cards against the information in the 293 file to ensure that the Mapper database, which was built on status card information, is accurate. This verification process will also determine whether the information on the status cards was correctly entered four decades ago. As of June 1993, CILHI had completed 14 percent of the crosschecking between the status cards and the 293 files.

The 944 list from which the 389 list derives was misrepresented to the Communist side from the very first day. Because UNCMAC had no access to battlefields on POW camps, the 944 list could not be verified. The 944 list was never a list of Americans reported by UNCMAC to the Communists as exclusively those characterized in UNCMAC protests to the Communists.
known to have been captured by you and to have been in your custody.

This complete tabulation of names of individuals together with their nationalities and service numbers contains the names of men who we know you held. The list contains only the names of people who:

1) Spoke or were referred to in broadcasts from your radio stations.
2) Were listed by you as being your captives.
3) Wrote letters from your camps.
4) Were seen in your prisons.

None of these people have been reported by you as having escaped or died as is required by Paragraph 58a of the Armistice Agreement.3

The contemporary problem is that many Americans believe that if a name appeared on any iteration of the 944 list, then the U.S. government must have information demonstrating that the individual at one time had been alive in the "hands of hostile forces." This is simply not true and has never been the case. Table 7.6 shows the POW/MIA distribution of the 389 list.

The Army roster on the 389 list contains 188 names. Of these, Casualty Status cards show that 76 were last thought to be POWs and 112 MIAs. The great majority of the 188 Army cases occurred in the first eight months of the Korean War.

The casualty status data maintained by the U.S. government is utterly and irreconcilably contradictory to the assertion that the 389 list and its antecedents are rosters of unrepatriated POWs. The last known status of the 389 individuals on the contemporary UNCMAC list is 47 percent (181 total) POW, 53 percent (207 total) MIAs, and

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one case with the status R (resolved). But even POW status does not necessarily mean that an individual was ever alive in enemy custody. Prisoner status suggests that the individual was lost under circumstances that were consistent with a probability of live capture or the individual was determined to be an unofficial or confirmed POW (the ratio of unofficial to confirmed POWs has yet to be determined).

Second, the negotiating strategy and recovery methods used to resolve these cases should reflect this reality.
Chapter Eight

LIVE SIGHTINGS, RETURNED REMAINS, AND REMAINS IN NORTH KOREA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has five purposes: (1) to discuss whether any Americans were held alive in North Korean territory following the end of the Korean War; (2) to document the last known location of the remains of American servicemen in North Korean territory; (3) to present a forensic analysis of the human remains delivered to the United States by North Korea; (4) to examine North Korea's apparent policy concerning the delivery of human remains to the United States; and (5) to make recommendations that if implemented may contribute to making U.S. efforts to recover remains from North Korea more effective.

LIVE SIGHTINGS

Every American who did not return from the Korean War and for whom no information was received for at least one year or more has been declared dead under the Missing Persons Act. Even so, there is no a priori reason to conclude that all American POW(BNR) cases must be deceased. Thousands of repatriated American POWs, from the same age group as the POW(BNR) cases, are alive today in the United States. A North Korean captured during the war was repatriated to North Korea in 1993.1 If an American were hidden in North Korean territory at the end of the war, there is a possibility this person could be alive today, though there is no conclusive evidence that

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this is the case. There have been few signs over the past 40 years that offer even a glimmer of hope that an American retained in North Korean territory following the war was alive at any time.

If American POWs (or defectors) were in North Korean territory following the Armistice, their presence was carefully concealed by the North Korean regime. In contrast to the American hostages held by Beijing and in contrast to the American hostages held in North Korea following the Pueblo incident, if there were American POWs in North Korea after the Armistice, the North Korean government made no effort to publicize the presence of these individuals. No evidence proves the North Koreans attempted to extract concessions from the United States in exchange for Americans captured during the Korean War. North Korea has, on the other hand, attempted to use the alleged remains of Americans as leverage in negotiations.

In contrast to hundreds of detailed live sightings of alleged Americans in USSR territory presented in Volume 2 of this study, live sightings of alleged Americans in North Korea have been sparse and sketchy. In August 1968, a North Korean defector claimed to have seen two American POWs on the outskirts of Pyongyang at an unspecified time. He reported that he had been told that "ten American pilots at this location had been sent to North Korea during the Vietnam conflict." There have been other equally vague sightings. Thus far, no live sighting of an American POW has been confirmed or, as in the case of the USSR, reported by repatriated prisoners to be in North Korean captivity. North Korean officials have stated and retracted the statement that some Americans sent to China never returned to North Korea.

Caucasians sighted in North Korea after the war were not necessarily unrepatriated American prisoners. (Thus far there have been no sightings of individuals of other races who were reported to be American citizens.) There were many Caucasians in North Korea after the war. In the early 1950s, a large number of engineers and construction specialists from the GDR worked in and around Hamhung in North Korea, for example. There were Russians and a

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number of other Soviet Bloc diplomats assigned to Pyongyang. Sweden maintained an embassy in Pyongyang as well, one of the few Western nations to do so. Several American aircraft were shot down in the Korean DMZ or over North Korean territory after the end of the Korean War. At least 13 Americans, all of whom were thought by the DoD to have perished as a result of the attack or the subsequent crash, have not been recovered from these incidents. Thus, there have definitely been Caucasians and perhaps even Americans in North Korea after the Korean War. Whether any of them were American POWs who were not released after the Armistice remains to be demonstrated.

**AMERICAN REMAINS IN NORTH KOREA**

**Total Possible Remains**

A great deal is known about the quantity and location of American remains in North Korean territory. Careful records were kept by U.S. forces on the location and quantity of American remains in North Korean territory. Records show the locations for remains found in: (1) permanent cemeteries, (2) temporary cemeteries including divisional cemeteries, (3) so-called isolated burial sites, (4) aircraft crash sites, and (5) POW camp cemeteries.

The total number of American remains that could be distributed in the Korean War zone of operations is 7,781, as shown in Table 8.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.1</th>
<th>Total U.S. Remains Distributed in the Korean War Zone of Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total BNR cases</td>
<td>8,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unidentified recovered remains</td>
<td>-859a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unrecovered U.S. BNR cases</td>
<td>7,781b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aThe names of these individuals are still on the 8,140 list even though the bodies have been recovered.

bTotal number of bodies distributed in the Korean War zone of operations.
AMERICAN GRAVES IN NORTH KOREAN TERRITORY

Location of Graves

As documented in Chapter 2 (Volume 1), the wide geographic distribution of American remains in North Korea is due in large measure to U.S. combat burial policy and the chaotic retreat upon the Chinese invasion in November 1950. U.S. Army Graves Registration overseas policy changed during the Korean War. During the first six months of the war, the policy had been to recover remains from the battlefield, bury them in temporary graves until war's end, then return the war dead to the United States. In 1951, this policy was replaced by a "concurrent return" policy, which called for bodies to be embalmed overseas for shipment to the United States. Although thousands of American war dead were retrieved from North Korea, the remains of hundreds of Americans could not be exhumed or repatriated.

Recovering remains of U.S. casualties buried in North Korea became a forty-year exercise that will not be completed. North Korea's position has always been that there is no obligation to search for battle casualties. Neither the United States nor the UNC has had direct access to the sites in question. Estimates of how many graves are intact today can be based on only tenuous information.

For example, three areas around POW Camp 5 at Pyoktong were used as cemeteries for POWs who died in captivity. Site One, located on a slope near the Yalu, was at one time estimated to contain 1,500 bodies. This area has been washed away by rains and Yalu River floods over the years. Site Two, northeast of the camp, contained an unknown number of bodies. Site Three, situated on a hill behind the camp, was a small area estimated to contain few bodies. Other burial sites were identified but none was confirmed. Estimating the number of bodies located in any one area was complicated by the fact that the North Koreans and Chinese would often bury two or more corpses in the same grave. There is no way to determine with certainty how many graves are still intact without extensive on-site searches.
Unrecovered Graves

In June 1953, the Headquarters of the United States Armed Forces, Far East, Office of the Quartermaster, prepared a roster of "individuals interred in North Korea." The roster, which includes 1,520 names, is a compilation of temporary cemeteries. It is reproduced in Appendix 15. The roster is significant, for to determine how many of these graves still exist, a meticulous comparison must be made between the Operation Glory manifest and the roster of graves in North Korean territory and also of the grave sites that appear from the records to be unrecovered. An example of this exercise is shown in Appendix 15 for the following POW camp cemeteries:

- Koto-Ri #1
- Koto-Ri #2
- Sukchon
- Pukchong
- Won-an
- Hungnam
- Hungnam #2
- Pyongyang

Names that appear on both the Alphabetical Roster of VAC's Received Under Operation Glory as Named Cases and on the "individuals interred in North Korea" lists are highlighted in bold type in Appendix 15. The names in plain text were either not returned during Operation Glory, were declared unidentifiable, or were misrepresented as being buried in the first place.

The names on the Glory rosters include those of individuals who could not be identified. The unidentified remains from Operation

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4From Major Philmon F. Hazelbaker, Acting Chief, Memorial Division, to The Quartermaster General, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1953, RG92 Ent1894, Box 649, Office of the Quartermaster General, Miscellaneous File 1953-54, Army Forces, 293 Army Far East (Current deaths), 333.1, Army Far East.

5A complete comparison has not been done because of research resources limits and a lack of a complete roster of individuals interred in North Korea. The reader should note that the text on some of the historical documents was too blurred to read. Illegible text is noted and individual illegible letters are represented with question marks.
Glory, at least 859—over 10 percent of all POW(BNR) cases—are buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii. (This cemetery is also known as the Punchbowl.) By reducing the list of unrecovered graves, a picture of the remaining individuals begins to illustrate those who might have been buried in Hawaii as "unknowns."

Individuals who appear on the Battle Monument Commission 8,177 list also appear on burial rosters. Thus, the burial locations of individuals who are commonly referred to as "MIA" because they appear on the 8,177 list were recorded by U.S. forces. The body has not been recovered, but the rosters show evidence of where it was last located before American forces withdrew.

The names in Appendix 15, since they were sorted by grave plot rather than alphabetically by last name, demonstrate graves that were reported to be opened and the remains allegedly repatriated during Operation Glory. By indicating in bold the graves allegedly emptied, a pattern of North Korean recovery efforts can be tentatively established.

Appendixes 16 and 17 contain the locations of "isolated burials" in North Korean territory.

GRS Isolated Burials in North Korea as of June 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>Data from Quartermaster General Memorial Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These rosters pinpoint the location of hundreds of unrecovered, isolated American graves in North Korean territory. Appendix 18 is a list of 322 aircraft crash sites (412 casualties) in North Korean territory. Many of the casualties on this roster are those of American aviators, listed by the type of aircraft involved (B-29, for example). Appendix 19 is the roster of U.S. burials in North Korean territory that was submitted by UNCMAC to the Communist side.

Table 8.2, which was located among Kokura records stored at CILHI, contains the location of death for POW camps, including figures on how many remains were recovered during Operation Glory.
## Table 8.2
Reported Deaths of POWs Associated with Prisons and Camps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prison or Prison Camp</th>
<th>Geographical Coordinates</th>
<th>Returned 1 Sept. to 12 Oct.</th>
<th>Difference 1954</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reported Dead</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyoktong</td>
<td>40 37 15N 125 26 05 E</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukchin</td>
<td>11 25N 125 44 15 E</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangdong</td>
<td>39 08 30N 126 05 45 E</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toksan Mining Camp</td>
<td>38 59 20N 126 08 10 E</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunggangjin</td>
<td>41 46 15N 126 52 00 E</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpo</td>
<td>41 09 15N 126 17 05 E</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachang-ni</td>
<td>38 47 15N 126 22 30 E</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunchon</td>
<td>39 25 10N 125 56 00 E</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanggye</td>
<td>40 57 45N 126 35 10 E</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsan</td>
<td>39 57 45N 125 47 50 E</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songchon</td>
<td>39 14 30N 126 12 15 E</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konha-dong</td>
<td>41 07 45N 126 20 35 E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>39 00 35N 125 46 15 E</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Honam-ni)</td>
<td>39 03 35N 125 55 00 E</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chung-dong)</td>
<td>38 59 58N 125 48 15 E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sinmak Hospital Fatalities

|                       |                          | Reported Dead | Difference |
|                       |                          |               |            |
| Osan-dong             | 39 26 45N 125 57 45 E    | 1             | 0           |
| Antung                | 40 05 50N 124 23 45 E    | 5             | 0           |
| Wonsan                | 39 08 55N 127 26 50 E    | 1             | 0           |
| Huichon               | 40 09 50N 126 16 25 E    | 5             | 0           |
| Teksil-li             | 40 44 25N 127 11 10 E    | 38            | 0           |
| Kumgang-san           | 40 11 00N 124 40 05 E    | 1             | 0           |
| Chosan                | 40 49 45N 125 48 05 E    | 1             | 0           |
| Kujang-dong           | 39 51 40N 126 01 00 E    | 2             | 0           |
| Sinanju               | 39 35 55N 125 36 20 E    | 1             | 0           |
| Sinui ju              | 40 05 50N 124 23 55 E    | 1             | 0           |

### En Route Fatalities

|                       |                          | Reported Dead | Difference |
|                       |                          |               |            |
| From: Manpo           | 41 09 15N 126 17 05 E    | 37            | 0           |
| Via: Konha-dong       | 41 07 45N 126 20 35 E    |               | 37          |
| To: Chunggangjin      | 41 46 15N 126 52 00 E    |               | 0           |
| From: Manpo           | 41 09 15N 126 17 05 E    | 4             | 0           |
| To: Kosanjin          | 41 02 35N 126 07 45 E    |               | 4           |
| From: Pukchin         | 40 11 25N 125 44 15 E    | 16            | 0           |
| To: Pyoktong          | 40 37 15N 125 26 05 E    |               | 16          |

Total                  |                           | 1041          | 556        |

| 1285                  |                           |               |            |
REMAINS DELIVERED BY NORTH KOREA

Background

The United States has obtained via the UNCMAC human remains from North Korea on six occasions between 1954–1992. The North Koreans claim the remains are of U.S. servicemen. In some cases, the North Koreans have associated names with individual sets of remains. None of the North Korean claims has been confirmed in subsequent investigations. There are as yet no grounds to justify the use of the word repatriation for the human remains provided to UNCMAC by the North Koreans because there is no evidence that the individuals represented by the remains derive from the United States.

Human Remains Obtained from North Korea in 1954

On November 9, 1954, the Communist forces delivered what were alleged to be 66 remains, 62 of which were “reported as recovered from air crashes” and the other four recovered from “other than air crashes.” Given the North Korean tendency to comingle remains and to present other false data, there remains doubt as to how many remains were actually returned. No records associated with this recovery have been found at CILHI or at UNCMAC, though the possibility that these remains were treated as part of Operation Glory recovery efforts cannot be excluded. The Communist forces did not associate names with these cases, but they did provide longitude and latitude coordinates for the alleged location of each recovered set of remains. It is unclear whether as a result of forensic examination any of these remains were associated with missing Americans. The locations associated by the North Koreans with the remains are shown in Table 8.3.

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6The July 1993 delivery of remains is not discussed in this report. Preliminary reports indicate that the condition of the July 1993 remains does not deviate from that of previous remains delivered in the 1990s.

7Memorandum from Lt. Colonel P. F. Hazelbaker, Acting Chief, Memorial Division, QMC, to The Quartermaster General, November 23, 1954, RG92, Ent 1894, Box 648.
### Table 8.3

**1954 Delivery of 66 Remains**

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RETURN OF 66 REMAINS (SECTION 2)

UNKNOWN

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<td>39 10 15</td>
<td>127 16 26</td>
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aThe notation, "Tag L," appears on the manifest with no explanation.

bThe notation "Identification Card" appears on the manifest with no explanation.
HUMAN REMAINS OBTAINED FROM NORTH KOREA IN THE 1990s

Background

The Senate Select Committee reported in January 1993 that "over the past two and one-half years, North Korea has repatriated the remains of 41 American servicemen." As will be shown, CILHI analysts have determined that there is no factual basis for the Select Committee’s conclusion. Three facts contradict the Select Committee’s information. First, since 1990 the North Korean government has delivered what are alleged to be 46 sets of human remains through the UNC-MAC to the United States. Second, there is no evidence that these human remains are those of Americans lost during the Korean War. Third, in contrast to North Korean claims, the 46 sets of remains represent in excess of 70 individuals.

Transfer Procedure and North Korean Quantity Claims

On May 27, 1990, after months of difficult negotiations, North Korea turned over what were alleged to be five sets of human remains to Representative Sonny Montgomery at Panmunjom. The United States insisted that the remains be returned through the MAC. The North Koreans asserted they were not required to use the MAC for this purpose. The ceremony at which the remains were handed over included representatives from the Congressional delegation and the MAC, thus no precedent was established to contradict the U.S. commitment to the Armistice arrangements. Congressman Montgomery’s report states that the North Koreans “claimed to have unearthed the remains in separate sites in North Hwanghae Province, located north of Panmunjom in southern North Korea.” The remains were accompanied by generic artifacts—buttons, an Air Force jacket, and two dog tags—provided by the North Koreans. The five sets of remains were subsequently examined by U.S. forensic special-

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ists at CILHI. The remains were actually fragments of seven bodies. "By comparison of the dental and physical records . . . none of the remains were of the two servicemen which North Korea, based on finding two dog tags, had associated by name with two sets of remains."

In September 1990, the North Koreans offered to turn over 11 sets of remains. The United States replied that this would be acceptable as long as the remains were delivered to the MAC. The North Koreans refused to do so and criticized the United States for showing no interest in recovering remains. At the same time, the North Korean Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations, Ho Jong, continued to pursue the North Korean strategy that seeks to pressure the U.S. government into a bilateral government-to-government dialogue. Ho invited Senator Bob Smith (R-NH) to New York for a discussion of the remains issue. In a meeting with Ho Jong on February 23, Senator Smith offered to go to Pyongyang to receive the remains. The Department of Defense advised against this action since it is consistent with North Korea’s efforts to encourage U.S. citizens and Congressmen to deal with Pyongyang on a bilateral basis, thus creating the appearance that the U.S. government is not cooperative or flexible on the remains issue.

On June 24, 1991, Senator Smith received "what North Korea said were remains of 11 U.S. soldiers who fought in the Korean war" at a ceremony at the Panmunjom peace pavilion. The North Koreans linked the return of these remains to an agreement in principle to establish a joint U.S.-North Korean commission that would explore the possibility of returning more remains. Senator Smith, who was reported by the North Korean press as acting "on behalf of the U.S. Administration," agreed to discuss such a commission. Officials from the Departments of Defense and State accompanied Senator Smith, though they would not discuss Senator Smith’s actions with the press. The only comment was that Senator Smith was not empowered to "negotiate on behalf of the U.S. government" and that

U.S. policy was to obtain remains "though the MAC." Senator Smith had previously held a meeting with North Korea's First Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju where only one UNC representative, a legislative aide, and an interpreter were present. U.S. government representatives did not attend to avoid sending the wrong signal to the North Koreans. Senator Smith did not discuss this meeting with the press. The distinction between Senator Smith's status as a Member of Congress and the "U.S. Administration" was not readily apparent in North Korea's portrayal of the meeting.

The information associated with the remains obtained by the Smith delegation from the North Koreans did not correspond to the evidence produced in subsequent examinations at CILHI. The 11 remains were actually partial sets of 15 remains. The remains showed signs of having been hastily prepared. The boxes containing the remains were roughly assembled in contrast to the boxes used a year before. The paint on the boxes was still wet. The remains were arranged in ludicrous patterns. One remains delivered by the North Koreans consisted of a skull and five or six femurs laid end to end. This is consistent with the assessment that the North Koreans regard the remains issue as a political factor that can be used to placate the United States. Thus, when remains are needed they are produced. Whether the goods are legitimate or not is immaterial to the Pyongyang regime.

On May 12 and 28, 1992, the North Koreans delivered what were alleged to be 30 remains in two equal deliveries. Work at the Army CILHI is currently under way to determine whether the remains delivered on May 12 correspond to any of the six names the North Koreans associated with them. The North Koreans claimed that all of the remains were exhumed in October 1991 at Namjonggu, Suan County, North Hwanghae Province.

A roster of the remains turned over by North Korea appears in Table 8.4.

14"N. Korea Returns Remains of 11 American Servicemen."
Table 8.4

North Korean Data on Remains Returned in the 1990s

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<th>Name Associated by North Korea</th>
<th>Exhumation Location</th>
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<td>1. No name</td>
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<td>May 1987</td>
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<td>2. Saunders, Jack J.</td>
<td>Namjonggu, Suan County, N. Hwanghae Province</td>
<td>July 1987</td>
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<td>4. No name</td>
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<td>July 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No name</td>
<td>Namjonggu, Suan County, N. Hwanghae Province</td>
<td>July 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 20, 1991—Eleven sets of remains</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Bowers, John R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Kubic, Peter</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Woodruff, David</td>
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<td>4-11.</td>
<td>No name association.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>May 13, 1992—Fifteen sets of remains</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. No name</td>
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<td>October 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. No name</td>
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<td>October 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. No name</td>
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<td>October 1991</td>
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<td>4. Smith, James</td>
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<td>October 1991</td>
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<td>5. No name</td>
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<td>October 1991</td>
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<td>6. Smith, Lawrence</td>
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<td>11. No name</td>
<td>Namjonggu, Suan County, N. Hwanghae Province</td>
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<td>12. Figueroa, Frank</td>
<td>Namjonggu, Suan County, N. Hwanghae Province</td>
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Live Sightings, Returned Remains, and Remains in North Korea 255

Table 8.4 (continued)

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<th>Name Associated by North Korea</th>
<th>Exhumation Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>13. No name</td>
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<td>14. No name</td>
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<td>15. Falk, Herman L.</td>
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<td>October 1991</td>
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May 28, 1992—Fifteen sets of remains

1. Arthur, Patrick               | Information not available |
2. Katzman, Ross W.             | Information not available |
3. Porter, George A             | Information not available |
4. Sund, James N.               | Information not available |
5–15.                            | No name association.       |

Evaluated Number of Individuals

As of July 1992, the North Korean government turned over 46 sets of remains in four separate groups. Each set of remains was alleged by the North Koreans to be a recently exhumed American serviceman. Each set of remains was delivered in its own "coffin" or case. As of February 1993, the contents of 35 (76 percent) of the 46 coffins have been analyzed at the Army CILHI. A minimum of 57 individuals are represented in the 35 cases studied thus far. If the minimum number of individuals per case (1.6) for the 35 cases is constant in the remaining 11 cases (11 × 1.6 = 17.6), the minimum number of individuals represented in the 46 cases obtained in the 1990s will be at least 75 (57 + 18). Thus, it is appropriate to note that the North Koreans have actually delivered fragments of at least 75 individuals.

Condition of Remains

The remains were returned with a variety of personal effects, *viz.*, buttons, boot fragments, badges, glasses, dentures, etc. The generic

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\(^{16}\)Data and photographs in this section are taken, unless otherwise noted, from Thomas D. Holland, *Problems and Observations Related to the Forensic Identification of Human Remains Repatriated to the United States by the Republic of North Korea* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, P-7820, March 1993).
personal effects have been associated with U.S. origin, but have not been associated with a single individual. The denture associated by the North Koreans with a returned mandible did not, in fact, match that individual or the mandible of any other set of remains. (See Figure 8.1.) All of the remains show the same degree of preservation. The bones are dry and brittle. They are free of adipocere and grease. Dry bone indicates that the material has been out of the ground and stored. The remains obtained from the North Koreans are exfoliating, which is an indication that the bones have been curated for a long period of time without adequate climate control. In at least one case, hair and tissue remnants are present, which would not be the case if the bone had been buried for four decades as claimed. (See Figure 8.2.) Therefore the bones could not have been exhumed, as claimed, as recently as 1991.

The bones delivered by the North Koreans show a remarkably similar degree of curation, decomposition, and color. In contrast, bones recovered from the Vietnamese show signs of curation—inventory cards and registration numbers etched on bones—and variations in color and decomposition. Skeletons returned by the Vietnamese include some that were autopsied—pelvic bones were cut and vertebrae sawed in half. One Vietnam case was strung together into a wired skeleton. None of this variation appears in bones delivered by North Korea.

Post Mortem Damage

Nearly all of the remains received post mortem damage during excavation. There are numerous holes caused by probes as well as cuts from digging tools. The bones show signs of shovel trauma, root marks, and animal scratchings, which indicate the individual was buried without a coffin. There are few small bones, which suggests that burial sites were not properly screened. Alternatively, the small bones were lost during subsequent curation. (See Figure 8.3.)

Incoherent Geographic Record

First Lieutenant Jack J. Saunders (O-00968472) and Cpl Arthur L. Seaton (RA-57200941) were attached to Support Team Baker, which was part of the 3rd Battalion 38th Infantry Regiment. At 02:50 on
Figure 8.1 — Unmatched Denture
Figure 8.2—Skull with Dried Tissue

(Photograph: CILHI)
ALLEGED STORAGE SITES FOR HUMAN REMAINS IN NORTH KOREA

There is no doubt the human remains obtained in the 1990s had been curated in North Korea for years. Whether the North Koreans have remains of Americans stored has not been proven, since thus far none have been obtained. In the absence of any evidence that the
Table 8.5

U.S. POW/MIs Lost in Hwanghae County, DPRK

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<th>Average Ages for All U.S. POW/MIs (Y-M-D)</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
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SOURCE: CILHI. Spec. Steven Schroeder made this table.
North Koreans have any American remains, one wonders why any credence is given to North Korean claims. Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of speculation over a number of years as to whether the North Koreans are storing remains of American servicemen. According to the office of Senator Bob Smith, in 1987

The U.S. government received information that a high ranking North Korean diplomat is reported to have told a visiting Westerner in North Korea that his country was holding up to 2,500 sets of remains of U.S. servicemen.¹⁷

This hearsay information is derivative to the point of incredulity. There are many reliable channels of communication between North Korea and the United States and there have been many opportunities for such an important message to be delivered. The issue of whether remains have been stored, and if so for how long and in what quantities, must be examined carefully nonetheless. One possible explanation is that the North Korean government is simply supplying excarnated bones confiscated from terra cotta storage jars at shrines for ancestor worship.

Ambassador Hans Maretzky, GDR Ambassador to Pyongyang 1987–1990, noted that in light of the immediate post-war circumstances, there is little reason to think that the North Koreans collected American remains shortly after the war. "There was such hatred for anything connected to the United States, if they found something they would probably destroy it at that time."¹⁸ Collection, if it occurred, would have taken place in response to a political requirement and a directive from the top leadership. Local authorities would have no incentive to store human remains. When the leadership asked for human remains, in Maretzky’s view, “bones would be produced.” The point at which such a political requirement would have been translated into a recovery directive is open to speculation. If one accepts the remains recovered thus far as an indication of how long all

¹⁸Maretzky interview.
remains have been curated, then the material has been in storage for many years, perhaps a decade or more.

Informed sources in Pyongyang reported that "there could be three places outside Pyongyang where remains of Americans could be stored thirty meters below ground. The places are Hangdong, Yodok, and Taesuk." The source indicated that this information came from "foreign military attachés." These locations are somewhat vague, inasmuch as Hangdong is a county and Yodok and Taesuk are cities. The information was obtained as a result of this individual's "utmost efforts," said Maretzky, "but people like him obtained a lot of their information from people like me, not from the North Koreans who would tell him only lies if they told him anything." In Maretzky's view, this information is "hard to believe, though I would not exclude the possibility that for a long time they have stored bones to be used in a moment of bargaining."

Prospects for Identification

The remains obtained from North Korea are human. Other than this, the remains have little evidence on which to make a professional forensic anthropological assessment. Entire bones are missing and those that have been returned were collected in a sloppy fashion that resulted in breakage that occurred during curation through incompetence or deliberate efforts to conceal evidence. The faces of the remains have been smashed—only 8 percent of the crania have the facial area intact—which is significant, since the face is the most reliable indicator of race. The skulls of the 11 remains (actually 15 partial sets) obtained in June 1991 by the Smith delegation are all missing faces. (Peasants exhuming bones for ancestor worship would not have followed professional forensic or sophisticated anthropological collection techniques.)

The bones are comingled in a way that casts serious doubt on the integrity of all remains received from North Korea. The remains have no soil samples that can be compared to alleged recovery sites. The lack of coherent geographic information exacerbates the problem of

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19 The source of this information is a diplomat serving in Pyongyang whose government does not wish to be identified in this report.
how to limit the size of the list of prospective individuals that might be compared with a set of remains.

Because of the manner in which the material was collected and curated, the human remains delivered by the North Koreans will not be identified with Americans lost during the Korean War. The condition of the remains obtained from North Korea casts serious doubt on the ability of CILHI, or any other forensic laboratory for that matter, to associate the remains with an individual lost during the Korean War. The absence of ante mortem evidence cannot be compensated for by additional money or scientific effort.

Remains Identified in 1982 and 1987

If remains are recovered correctly, isomorphic associations between human remains recovered in Korea and Americans lost during the Korean War can be made. The key to the entire exercise is proper collection techniques that in turn provide adequate identification media to the forensic anthropologist.

On two occasions, remains exhumed after 30 years or more have been associated with Americans who were lost during the Korean War. Note that the recovery of identification media makes positive identification possible. Note as well that the condition of the identified remains differs dramatically from those allegedly recovered by the North Koreans.

On December 11, 1981, the Mortuary Officer, U.S. Army Mortuary, Korea, was notified that human skeletal remains and one identification tag for “McInnis, John R.” had been recovered from a site near Chonui, South Korea. The remains had been reported by a Korean policeman. On December 13, the Mortuary Officer visited the site where the remains had been reinterred after the initial recovery. The Mortuary Officer accepted custody of only a portion of skull and mandible with teeth and one dog tag. On December 18, the grave site was investigated to recover additional remains and identification media. During the search, a dog tag was found along with personal effects and military equipment. No additional remains were recovered. On December 31, the U.S. Army CILHI received these remains (XK 001-81) and the effects for anthropological examination and evaluation. The remains delivered to CILHI consisted of a portion of
a calvarium (skullcap) and a nearly complete mandible with eight intact teeth. There is evidence of trauma to the skull at the time of death.

During the anthropological examination, a unique osteo-morphologic individuality was observed. A remarkable difference in the size of the mandibular rami was observed, the right being smaller than the left. Also the parieto-occipital portion of the skullcap indicated evidence of an asymmetric morphology of the skull base. These portions, determined to be from one and the same individual, were designated CILHI 0001-82. Based on craniological and odontological characteristics, the remains were determined to be male Caucasoid. The post mortem physical and dental characteristics of the remains were favorably compared with ante mortem physical and dental characteristics recorded in official records made available for M/SGT John R. McInnis. Comparison of the integrated individuality of CILHI 0001-82 with that of 62 casualties lost in the vicinity of the recovery site revealed negative association. This conclusion was consistent with the secondary identification media, the identification tags, one Zippo lighter with the initials JRM, and the name McInnis etched on the casing and one Ronson lighter with letters Mc etched on the casing.

In view of the favorable agreement in the recovery site and the general location where M/SGT McInnis was missing and presumed killed in action, the matching of the physical and dental individuality and association of the recovered ID tags and personal effects without contradiction, and the negative comparison with other casualties in the vicinity, it was recommended that the skeletal remains designated CILHI 0001-82 be identified as the recoverable portions of McInnis, John R. (M/SGT) RA34130719, who was reported missing in action on July 11, 1950.20

On July 31, 1950, Pvt Jack L. Walker was last seen in action at Chinju, Korea. He had not been seen since that date. On October 2, 1987,
the scientific staff of CILHI unanimously recommended that the remains of CILHI 0054-87 be identified as those of Jack L. Walker. Identification tags for Walker had been found with the remains. All biological determinations of the anthropologists and odontologist were consistent with the physical descriptions of Walker. All physical evidence and personal effects were consistent with the equipment of an American infantry rifleman. There were no conflicts between the descriptions of Walker or the incident of his death and the nature or location of the remains. On October 2, the CILHI Commander recommended that the remains be identified as Korean War casualty: Walker, Jack L., Cpl, RA13295325. This marked the end of the second recovery and identification completed in the 1980s.

Conclusions on Recovered Human Remains

Remains collected and delivered by the North Koreans have been in the same custody and storage system for a long time. The remains have been carefully cleaned, which makes a comparative soil analysis test impossible. The remains were collected and stored by untrained people or inept and uncaring specialists. There is little evidence of professional or academic method evident in the remains returned by the North Koreans. Signs of unprofessional recovery in the North Korean cases include missing mandibles and new breaks. Since race is determined by examining the face, the explanations for why the faces are missing include carelessness, incompetence, or a deliberate attempt to conceal evidence. The remains are consistent with what one would expect to get if recovery was done using a shovel with no sifting.

Not one North Korean claim associated with these remains has been corroborated by subsequent forensic investigations. The name associations have no basis in fact. The locations of the exhumations are inconsistent with fact. None of the remains recovered has been or is likely to be identified. Thus far the only conclusion deriving from fact is that the human remains delivered by the North Koreans to the United States are not the remains of Americans lost during the Korean War.
NORTH KOREA'S REMAINS STRATEGY

Background

North Korea and the United Nations remain in an official state of war. This, in addition to the fact that the North Korean government has not told the truth on a single issue related to the recovery of American remains, is the point of departure for any discussion of North Korea's remains strategy.

The UN forces have attempted to encourage North Korea to return UNC remains by establishing a pattern of behavior that could lead to reciprocity. UNCMAC continues to identify and recover KPA-CPV remains, though these remains sometimes are not accepted by the Communist representatives. The KPA-CPV representatives do not want to establish a precedent of accepting remains that have been "searched for" in the meaning of the UNC interpretation of the Armistice agreement. The KPA-CPV representatives agree to accept some remains such as recent drowning victims yet sometimes refused to accept remains recovered from grave sites or battlefields. The CPV representatives to the MAC also assert that the remains of CPV personnel lack "characteristic artifacts" that would link them to the CPV. In 1987, the KPA accepted the remains of 25 KPA soldiers killed in the battle of Obang-ni Ridge (25 miles northwest of Masan) in 1950.21

Does North Korea have a “remains policy,” or is North Korea’s behavior a by-product resulting from American attempts to recover remains?

Kim II Sung’s Assessment

There is little doubt that Kim II Sung, North Korea’s self-annointed “Great Leader,” makes most of the important decisions regarding relations with the United States. There is evidence that this decisionmaking authority is being gradually transferred to his son, Kim Jong Il, also known as the “Dear Leader.” Thus, one can personify the decisionmaking in North Korea. There is evidence of a North Ko-

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21From CINCUNC Seoul (Unclassified), to USCINCPAC Honolulu, SECDEF, Washington, D.C., February 1987.
rean "remains policy." This policy appears to be the product of pragmatic analysis packaged in a familiar dialectical format.

The Great Leader has the reputation for being a pragmatist first and a Communist second. Ambassador Maretzky, who had a great deal of direct contact with Kim Il Sung, noted,

In spite of all the things said about Kim Il Sung, he is a sober thinker. He has a good memory of events as well. The only problem is he tends to mix up real events with legends.22

The North Korean dictator receives some advice from a small group of foreign policy experts who, in Maretzky's opinion, are kept "on a very tight leash" in Pyongyang. This group is one of the two main sources of information that Kim Il Sung uses to formulate policy on the remains issue. The group is responsible for reading the western academic literature as well as, according to Maretzky, "every single South Korean newspaper, line by line." The information from this group is distributed to a small clique of top military and political officials close to the Great Leader.

The other source providing information to the Great Leader is the United States government. The remains issue has been raised repeatedly with the North Korean minister counselor in Beijing by American diplomats, visiting American politicians, and private citizens. The North Koreans are very well informed as to the importance of the remains issue in domestic U.S. politics, but this is not an independent North Korean assessment. The U.S. government has therefore both defined the issue and the value America attaches to it. The North Koreans have had to do little analysis of their own.

Perhaps the most important issue to understand about Pyongyang's strategy or policy is that North Korea occupies the territory where hundreds of remains may still be located. North Korea also controls access to hundreds of known burial sites. This is the critical asset if the intent is to verify claims made by North Korea during the various remains repatriation exercises. These are the only assets controlled by Pyongyang. Other than this, the United States is in possession of a massive amount of detailed information concerning the location of

22Maretzky interview.
graves, the identity of individuals buried in North Korean territory, the circumstances of death and the prospect that a particular set of remains might be found where it was left four decades ago. North Korea has few data to add to the sum of knowledge in the possession of the U.S. government.

In Kim II Sung's view, several objective factors must be recognized.

- First, there is no possibility that normal relations can be established between North Korea and the United States. (Normal meaning relations on Kim II Sung's terms.)
- Second, the United States represents the single most important threat to the existence of the North Korean regime.
- Third, the external threats to the North Korean regime are more dangerous than the internal threats.
- Fourth, the United States has sustained remains recovery as the central issue in U.S.-North Korean relations for many years.
- Fifth, the remains issue cannot be liquidated in the interest of the United States, but if properly managed the issue can be used to suppress foreign threats to the North Korean regime.
- Sixth, those who think about foreign policy in Pyongyang recognize that the United States is prepared to offer something in exchange for remains.
- Seventh, due to the importance attached to the remains issue by the United States, the remains have become a factor in domestic U.S. politics.

The synthesis of these factors, in Kim II Sung's view, is strikingly simple.

- The regime can only survive in its present form. There is no room for change.
- Political developments of the type witnessed in Eastern Europe are ruled out categorically. Change, if it begins in North Korea, will result in an avalanche that will crush the regime.
- North Korea's apparent willingness to negotiate with South Korea and the United States derives from the same purpose. These
negotiations are a tactical measure intended to project an image of flexibility. In reality, however, there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

- The North Korean leadership has no intention of being flexible on any issue that concerns the survival of the regime in its present form.

Pyongyang has lost support from Moscow and is in the process of losing support from Beijing. Except for a minimal amount of economic support from Iran, Pyongyang has nothing. With their backs to the wall and with no intent to compromise, the leadership in Pyongyang is pursuing a foreign policy that is intended to reassure foreign enemies. Part of this policy is to receive in Pyongyang American politicians, researchers, and others referred to by Lenin as “useful idiots” who can be counted on to carry back to the United States Kim Il Sung’s desire to be “flexible.”

The North Korean regime understands that it must project an image of flexibility on the remains issue. This flexibility veils an underlying pragmatism bordering on cynicism. “If you want bones, they will give you bones,” said Maretzky. This approach took a different track in late 1992, when the North Koreans introduced the concept of “gratitude payments,” which are meant to be a demonstration of America’s gratitude for North Korea’s remains recovery efforts. North Korean policy should not be confused with either the Soviet effort to obtain compensation for the repatriation of American dead in the 1940s or the Vietnamese policy of charging the U.S. government for the right to visit crash sites. The North Koreans asked the United States to reimburse Pyongyang for its efforts but left the determination of the amount to the discretion of the United States. The amount of the “gratitude payment,” according to North Korean officials, would indicate the degree to which the United States valued the return of the remains of “American” servicemen.

North Korea’s Assessment of U.S. Interests

The North Koreans view the delivery of remains in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars to be a convenient way to subsidize the current regime. Kim Il Sung and his closest advisers believe the United States does not pay cash for things that have no value. Yet the
Americans compensate Pyongyang for delivering remains whose pedigree is at best dubious, by engaging in negotiations and discussing compensation schemes. The North Korean policy is to calm American opposition to the North Korean regime and engage the American side in an irrelevant discussion over compensation. The North Korean government has limited expectations in its dealings with the United States. As long as the Americans engage in talks with this regime, it will survive because the talks can be presented as a sign that Pyongyang is trying to improve North Korea's international standing. If the U.S. government pays for bones that cannot be associated with Americans, then in Pyongyang's view this is all for the better.

The government of South Korea has made no effort to recover remains of South Korean soldiers killed or buried on North Korean territory. Some South Korean officials have expressed private concerns that the return of American remains from North Korea will be paid for in the coin of South Korean interests. Seoul has no interest in seeing American remains returned if this requires American concessions to Pyongyang over what Seoul considers to be significant security issues, such as the presence of American troops in South Korea. Thus, Pyongyang's view that the remains issue is more a bilateral matter than a multilateral affair requiring resolution through the United Nations is strengthened.

The North Korean position is that there is no agreement that compels them to search for remains, thus the issue is outside the jurisdiction of the MAC. The UNC considers all issues involving remains to be within the meaning of the word "discovery" used in the Armistice agreement. Until 1993, the United States was committed to the policy that calls for remains to be recovered without a bilateral government-to-government North Korean-U.S. dialogue to sustain the integrity of the UNC and the credibility of the MAC. Until 1993, the United States maintained a dialogue with North Korean through UNCMAC. This policy was all but abandoned by UNCMAC by late 1992. The United States has, through the UN Command, shown a willingness to conduct direct negotiations with the North Koreans over the remains issue.

The United States has shown signs that its commitment to the UNCMAC process has weakened. Kim Il Sung's tactics have taken
time but have produced results favorable to Pyongyang without any tangible progress on the issue of recovering American remains.

Assessment of North Korea’s Remains Policy

If the leadership in Pyongyang has derived any lessons from history, North Korea has apparently learned two from Chou En-lai’s use of American citizens in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. First, Chou used captured American air crews as hostages to obtain the perception of par status with the United States. This was one of China’s primary foreign policy goals. Included in this goal was the desire to obtain a seat in the United Nations. Second, Chou exploited the American hostages for emotional and political purposes to “go over the heads of U.S. officials” by appealing to the general public. The intent was to bring U.S. public pressure to bear on U.S. officials to strengthen China’s bid for the achievement of the first goal.

North Korea has attempted to apply something akin to China’s hostage strategy to the human remains issue. North Korea’s goals appear to be similar to those China pursued in the 1950s. First, North Korea has exhibited an interest in achieving the perception of par status with the United States. This is illustrated by North Korea’s interest in bilateral negotiations with the United States. Second, North Korea has attempted to appeal to the American public to bring pressure to bear on U.S. officials. Thus far, the North Koreans have realized little if any tangible advantage beyond winning valuable time from the use of remains for foreign policy purposes.

North Korea’s bid to placate the United States by providing dubious remains is a remarkably shortsighted policy. North Korea has not demonstrated the anthropological sophistication of the Chinese or Vietnamese, for example. The North Koreans have not been able to properly derive or take advantage of the American political calculus concerning hostages. The flaw may lie in the inability to borrow wholesale from the Chinese a strategy for the exploitation of living hostages. If North Korea is watching Vietnamese behavior it has yet to demonstrate any lessons learned.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA

Scope of Recommendations

The recommendations in this section are limited to Korean War MIA/POW(BNR) cases in North Korean territory. RAND was not asked to propose policy recommendations for any other issue.

Define the Contemporary Task

Purpose should always precede analysis. The North Korean government will not permit search or recovery efforts in its territory and will not conduct these operations. But if the U.S. government insists on attempting to obtain remains from North Korea, the contemporary recovery task must be more clearly defined.

U.S. government actions lack a sense of coherence primarily because there is no clear statement of objectives. Extant policy toward North Korea does not go beyond commitments to "obtain a full accounting" when in fact a rather full accounting for individual cases already exists. The U.S. government must define "full accounting." If the task is to recover and identify remains, significant changes in U.S. policy and action must occur. Unless these changes occur, the United States "will continue to pay for and receive human remains unrelated to the task of resolving Korean War POW/MIA cases.

Recover and Identify Remains

The primary objective of U.S. policy should be to recover and identify remains returned from North Korea. This objective requires a fundamentally different recovery strategy that derives from established and accepted practices of forensic anthropology. The current process, if it continues, will compound the problem. The continuation of the current process will result in more, rather than fewer problems and greater expense for the U.S. government. A continu-

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23Identify refers to the process by which recovered remains are associated with a single individual.
tion of the status quo ante will not contribute to the resolution of individual cases.

The current declared U.S. policy is to recover the remains of U.S. servicemen lost during the Korean War. When the North Koreans have returned remains of alleged U.S. servicemen in the past, their actions have been consistent with the declared objectives of U.S. policy. Experience and accumulated forensic data show that the current U.S. policy and recovery strategy does not serve the legitimate needs of the families or the interests of the U.S. government. For remains recovered under the current policy, the prospects are minimal that these remains or any others returned in similar condition will ever be associated with an individual missing case.

The flaw in the current recovery strategy is that the remains recovered in this way cannot be identified. No amount of science or research can compensate for the lack of identification media. Recovered remains are unlikely to be associated with a single individual if current practice is continued. Additional investments in forensic anthropology cannot compensate for the absence of identification media.

A Larger Warehouse

This study recommends that the objectives of U.S. policy be changed to recover and identify. If this measure is not adopted, this study recommends that the U.S. government should invest in a larger warehouse for the storage of human remains obtained from North Korea.

Refer to the 8,140 List as a BNR List

The individuals listed on the 8,140 roster are not exclusively missing in action cases. These cases should be referred to as body-not-recovered (BNR) cases.

Refuse to Accept Curated Human Remains

This study recommends that the U.S. government refuse to accept from the North Korean human remains that show signs of curation.
MIA/POW(BNR), "Unknown Soldiers," and Believed to Be (BTB)

Since the end of the Korean War, the U.S. government has declared .00012 percent of all MIA/POW(BNR) cases to be Unknown Soldiers. The identification media for an additional .00037 percent of the MIA/POW(BNR) cases have been destroyed by the U.S. government. These measures were widely accepted by the U.S. public.

The policy issue is why these measures are accepted on such a small scale but cannot be applied to all cases.

This study recommends that the U.S. government adopt the policy of the other members of the UN Korean Combat Force by eliminating any reference to "unaccounted for" personnel. The term "missing in action" should be replaced with "believed to be" (BTB) categories such as BTB Prisoner, BTB Deceased, and so on. MIA implies that the U.S. government has no information about the circumstances of loss. Each of the 8,140 Korean War BNR cases can be categorized under a BTB heading. The effect of such a reorganization will be to present to families and the public a clear statement of what is known about the loss of an individual and the U.S. government's assessment of an individual's fate.

Joint Recovery Efforts in the DMZ

The U.S. government has proposed a joint recovery exercise with the North Koreans. The first site selected for this joint effort is the DMZ. CILHI was asked to choose a couple of alternative sites where the remains of Americans are likely to be discovered in the course of a forensic recovery exercise. A spinoff of this effort is the possibility that a team of North Korean specialists could be trained by the U.S. Army so that the North Koreans will not continue to destroy identification media in the course of exhumations. The prospects for this initiative were not entirely optimistic in early 1993 but the effort continues.

24 One Unknown Soldier divided by the total field of 8,140 total cases.
25 Three candidates for Unknown Soldier divided by the total field of BNR cases, 8,140.
This study cautions against undue optimism on the part of those who have not dealt with North Korean intransigence. The framework of the deal would be to offer a fixed price for remains recovered from North Korean territory and to pay a prorated amount as remains are recovered according to the revised methods described in this report.

**Explore the Idea of a Massive Payoff to North Korea**

The extent to which the United States is able to influence Pyongyang’s actions is limited. How does one influence or exert leverage over a country that has nothing? There is little, if any American leverage that can be brought to bear on North Korea. Pyongyang’s sponsors and political masters once had the ability to effect a change in North Korea’s behavior, but even this option is limited in the contemporary political environment. The Soviets could pressure North Korea into curtailing its nuclear weapon program by threatening to curtail weapon deliveries. As long as the Soviet Union existed, Kim II Sung had to be cautious. This restraint has been removed. In February 1993, the Russian government renegotiated the North Korean-Soviet mutual assistance treaty.

The extent to which the United States will be able to influence Pyongyang will depend on the degree to which Washington is willing to invest in a wide range of diplomatic and political initiatives. The North Korean regime may not be willing to compromise for anything less than a bribe of massive proportions. Such a “Baby Doc” strategy could be effective.

This study recommends that the option of a massive payoff to North Korea be studied in greater depth.

**Take a More Active Explanation Role with Families**

As things currently stand, the release of information concerning Korean War MIA/POW(BNR) cases is driven by Freedom of Information Act requests and by inquiries from family members and conspiracy theorists.

This study recommends that the U.S. government create a more effective mechanism for presenting findings, records, and information to the public in general and to families in particular.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMAINS RECOVERY EFFORTS

Focus on Unrecovered Graves

The chronological accumulation and geographic location of MIA/POW(BNR) burials were catalogued decades ago. To improve the prospects for the recovery and identification of remains of Americans, a firm estimate of the number of American remains in North Korean territory must be made. In the following section, the number of MIA/POW(BNR) cases in North Korean territory is estimated first, then suggestions are made for ways to focus recovery and identification efforts on cases whose geographic location can be established with a high degree of certainty.

The field of Korean War MIA/POW(BNR) cases is not symmetrical. A hierarchy of recovery priorities is suggested by the degree to which it is possible to establish with certainty the geographic position of remains. Approximately 27 percent of all MIA/POW(BNR) cases occurred outside North Korean territory.\(^2\) A recovery and identification policy for North Korea, therefore, must focus on 73 percent of all MIA/POW(BNR) cases.

Tables 8.6 to 8.8 show the magnitude, location, and distribution of all Korean War MIA/POW(BNR) cases.

Recover Isolated Graves

The precise or approximate locations of the graves of thousands of Americans are known. In addition, hundreds of crash sites where Americans might have perished have been identified to an area of approximately 80 square feet. What is not known is the extent to which the North Koreans have excavated these sites or permitted unrelated earth-moving projects to occur.

The intent of recovery efforts must derive from the requirement to collect adequate identification media on which to base an isomorphic association between remains and an individual lost during the Korean War.

\(^2\)Many of these remains were lost in South Korean territory, yet there has been no policy for searching for or recovering these remains.
Tables 8.9 and 8.10 suggest steps that can be taken by American investigators even if no access to North Korean territory is permitted.

Table 8.6

Korean War MIA/POW(BNR) Cases

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<td>Total U.S. Korean War MIA cases</td>
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SOURCE: March 1993, CILHI Mapper data.

Table 8.7

Location of Site of Incident for MIA/POW(BNR) Cases and Unidentified Remains

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total American MIA-POW(BNR) Cases</td>
<td>8,153d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable loss in North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW(BNR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA + PCK(BNR)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNR cases with no location</td>
<td></td>
<td>408b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable losses outside North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable losses in DMZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable losses in South Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses with no map coordinates</td>
<td></td>
<td>488b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable losses outside Korea counted as Korean War losses</td>
<td></td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNR cases occurring after the Armistice</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: March 1993 CILHI data.

a The total of 8,153 (5,908 + 2,245) reflects errors and duplications in the CILHI database which are being identified and corrected.

b The geographic locations of 976 BNR cases have not been entered into the CILHI Mapper system from individual field search cases. Thus, for the sake of analysis the total field is divided evenly (488 + 488) between North and South Korea even though the final distribution may weigh more heavily one way or the other.

c Some losses that occurred in Japan, for example, are included in Korean War data.
Table 8.8
Possible Distribution of 5,049 MIA/POW(BNR) in North Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POW(BNR)</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCK(BNR) occurring during forced marches</td>
<td>959(^a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrecovered isolated burials in North Korea</td>
<td>576</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>217</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch and nationality unknown</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data from Memorial Division, QM</td>
<td>247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC air crashes in North Korea</td>
<td>412(^b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrecovered graves from temporary cemeteries</td>
<td>500(^c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other cases</td>
<td>480</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,049(^d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Estimate derived by the Judge Advocate Section War Crimes Division. The location of some individual deaths may prove to be in South Korean territory. All death march cases are included here as a part of a comprehensive recovery and identification strategy.

\(^b\) This figure could also be treated as a subset of MIA cases. It appears as a separate category because the locations of the crash sites are precisely known.

\(^c\) Derived by subtracting the number of identified remains obtained through Operation Glory (1,020) from the total number of graves in temporary cemeteries (1,520).

\(^d\) 5,049 is derived by taking the total number of BNR incidents in North Korean territory (5,905) and subtracting the number of unidentified American remains (859) repatriated from North Korean territory.

TWO CASE STUDIES

To recover PCK(BNR) cases, searches and excavations must occur over hundreds of square miles of North Korean territory. U.S. data can help guide these searches. The following cases studies are presented to illustrate the magnitude of the recovery effort.

Case Study Number One

In December 1950, between 300 and 350 American POWs were marched from the Chosin Reservoir to the Death Valley Camp. The
Table 8.9
Steps That Can Be Taken to Resolve High Degree of Location Certainty in POW/MIA Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missing in action at sea (283)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very low probability of resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declare these remains to be unrecoverable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW(BNR) (2.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify location of camp cemeteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to Operation Glory manifests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to overhead imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known and unrecovered burials in North Korea (576)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to Operation Glory manifests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to overhead imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to alleged North Korean recovery sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air crash sites (412 personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to 1954 remains return (86 sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to overhead imagery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare to FEAP records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified repatriated remains (859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refuse to accept curated remains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locate North Korean storage facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer a fixed price for identifiable remains</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 mile distance was covered in two or three days, depending on repatriate estimates. This march, KWC 1825, is not indicated on the death march map.

Prisoners too seriously wounded or exhausted to march were shot. One repatriate witnessed the shooting of eight to ten wounded American POWs. One prisoner who became hysterical was shot by a Chinese guard. In the words of one returnee, “this Chinese guard walked up with his carbine, stuck it in his (the prisoner’s) face and blew his head off.” This incident occurred on December 2, 1950. The Chinese guards left the bodies unburied where they fell.27

27Operation Little Switch, Supplementary to Interim Historical Report (War Crimes Division, Judge Advocate Section, Korean Communications Zone, November 1, 1953), RG153, Box 0, File 183, based on the statements of McTullay Cox, Stc Robert Lee, Cpl Ellos Villegas, and Sgt Harold Curtiss.
Table B.10
Steps That Can Be Taken to Resolve Low Degree of Location Certainty in MIA/POW(BNR) Cases

| Post-capture killed (BNR) (minimum of 950 on marches) |
| Search march routes 1,000 meters either side |
| Search POW collection points |
| Anticipate DPRK will not permit a) or b) |
| Ground combat disintegrations |
| Derive more precise estimate of nonrecoverables from combat models |
| Recovery or prospects for identification are near zero |
| Aerial combat disintegrations |
| Derive more precise estimate of nonrecoverables from combat models |
| Recovery or prospects for identification are near zero |
| Combat kills left in place carried as MIA or POW(BNR) |
| Field search case map overlays |
| Crash sites |
| Compare with overhead imagery |
| Remains stored in North Korea |
| Curated remains might resolve high and low uncertainty cases |
| Anticipate curated remains will be unidentifiable |
| Require North Korea to demonstrate that American remains are stored in addition to the proven reserves of generic human bones |
| Anticipate curated remains will have little identification value |
| Post-capture transport to third countries |
| Assessment of one-way transport to former USSR |
| Stop the harassment of independent researchers |
| Resolve issues through research methods |
| Find and examine Shareable administrative files |
| Coordinate CILHI and UNCOMAC efforts |
| Assessment of one-way transport to PRC |
| Assessment of one-way transport to Nth country |

Case Study Number Two

In December 1950, approximately 100 American POWs were marched from the Chosin Reservoir to Kangyue. Death march KWC 1826, which is indicated on the death march map, covered 100 miles over approximately 13 days. Temperatures hovered around zero. POWs were compelled to march barefooted or with their feet
wrapped in newspapers. The guards were both Chinese and North Korean.

At one point, approximately 12 to 13 American POWs, unable to go on, were forced off a cliff by their captors by means of rifle butts and bayonets. Seriously wounded prisoners were without medical attention during the entire course of the march. Approximately 75 of the POWs survived this march.28

**Death March Map**

The Judge Advocate Section War Crimes Division catalogued the routes of various death marches. These maps can help guide recovery efforts if North Korea ever permits U.S. teams into the country (see Figure 8.5).

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28 Operation Little Switch, Supplementary to Human Historical Report, based on the statements of Sgt Odbe Lawless and Cpl Wendell Truflery
Figure 6.3—Death March Map