A single unified U.S. military: a modest proposal

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A SINGLE, UNIFIED U.S. MILITARY -- A MODEST PROPOSAL

by
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Title: A Single, Unified U.S. Military -- A Modest Proposal
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With changes in the world brought about by the fall of communism and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States has realized it no longer needs a large military force ready to fight a global war beginning in the European Theater. The Bush administration devised the base force, a force structure some 25 percent smaller than the military of the late 1980's.

Implementation of this base force will cause dramatic changes in our warfighting capability. In addition, President Clinton and Defense Secretary Aspin have supported an alternate plan which will reduce forces beyond the base force level.

The Military Services are in the midst of a roles and missions controversy, much of their new doctrine is blurred and areas of responsibility overlap. Congress has noticed and tasked the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the area.

All of the Services recognize they will fight jointly in the future. The impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been significant and successful. This law lays the ground work for a fully unified U.S. military similar to the Canadian model. The author makes such a proposal.

The pros and cons of such a unification are reviewed from a historical perspective. The author concludes unification is the only alternative to retain a viable warfighting capability since the Services seem unable to drop their parochialism and work toward a more efficient military in the scarce resource environment of the future.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Leonard E. Kaplan was most recently the Commander of the 319th Communications Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, ND. From Jun 88 to Jun 91, he was assigned as Executive Assistant to the J6, U.S. PACIFIC Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI. From Jul 85 to Jun 88, he was assigned to the Defense Communications Agency in Washington, D.C. as an Information Systems Planner; Chief of the Corporate Planning Division, and Chief of the Management Analysis and Manpower Division. From Jun 82 to Jun 84, he was Commander of the 1916th Communications Squadron, Pease AFB, NH. From Jan 80 to Jun 82 he was assigned to AFCC Headquarters at Scott AFB, IL as a Logistics Inspector, AFCC IG Team; Aide-de-Camp to the Commander; Executive Officer to the Deputy Commander for Combat Communications and Reserve Force Matters; and as Executive Officer to the Vice Commander. He was an ASTRA officer from Jan 79 to Jan 80 serving at HQ USAF in the Directorate for Command and Control and Telecommunications. Prior to that, he spent two years in Tehran, Iran as Detachment Commander of a small communications unit. From Oct 73 to Sep 76, he was assigned to the 5th Combat Communications Group, Robins AFB, GA as a Maintenance Officer and Chief of the Quick Reaction Branch.

Colonel Kaplan has completed Squadron Officer School by correspondence and residence, Air Command and Staff College by correspondence, US Army Command and General Staff College in residence, the National Defense University's National Security Management Course by correspondence, and the Air War College by seminar. He has a BA in Biological Sciences from Lehman College (CUNY), and a MSA in Management from Georgia College.

He is married to Maj Hillary Kaplan, they have a daughter and a son.
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A SINGLE, UNIFIED U.S. MILITARY -- A MODEST PROPOSAL

I. INTRODUCTION:

The past four years have reshaped history. We have seen the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany. We have seen the demise of communism and restoration of democracy in the Baltic states and the former Soviet Eastern Block nations as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. President Bush declared the cold war over and the establishment of a new world order. The National Security Strategy of the United States recognizes the alliance leadership role of the country in view of the Gulf War and the reduced threat.(1:1-3)

The initial impact on the United States military has been a planned twenty-five percent reduction in force structure to a level described as our base force. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General Colin Powell has stated that the proposed schedule for these reductions represent the fastest we can draw down to these levels without breaking the force.(2:10-11)

However, his views are not shared by President Clinton, Senator Sam Nunn and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. President Clinton is on record supporting Mr. Aspin's plan for additional reductions in the defense budget beyond the Bush administration's base force. He has stated that the base force "leaves us with a military that does not fit our strategy and cannot do what we ask. It is burdened with redundancy."(3:36)

In addition the Congress, led by Sen. Nunn, has tasked Gen Powell to provide a reassessment of mission assignments by early 1993. The report should specifically address duplication in service capabilities and recommend areas for consolidation.(4:6) Sen. Nunn has been concerned about the "four air forces" we have in the United States military and has been
With the election of Mr. Clinton, the level of defense forces after the cuts will probably be lower than the base force. With the world-wide commitments the United States assumes, it is imperative we retain a viable military force structure. We cannot afford a return to the hollow forces of the post-Vietnam era. With the interest Congress has displayed in reducing redundancy and consolidation, we may have a restructure imposed upon the military if we do not cut the forces properly ourselves.

One means of retaining force structure in a constrained resource environment is to consolidate the military and go to a unified military. In the course of this paper, I will address the roles and missions controversy as the Services develop new doctrines in the post Cold War era. Then I will look at jointness in the context of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Next, a look at the current budget is needed to establish a baseline for reductions, and then a look at a proposal for unification of the Services. Canada unified their military in 1964 and a review of their system is in order. Next I will look at Service parochialism and resistance to change as well as arguments against unification. Finally, I shall provide conclusions.

II. MILITARY DOCTRINAL TRENDS: THE ROLES AND MISSIONS CONTROVERSY

1. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

In March 1992, the Air Force published a new manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. This manual defines the aerospace environment as from the surface of the earth with no upper limit and with no natural lateral boundaries. (7-5) The manual goes on to state that
there are four basic roles: aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. Within each role are typical missions: aerospace control -- counterair, counterspace; force application -- strategic attack, interdiction, close air support; force enhancement -- airlift, air refueling, spacelift, electronic combat, surveillance and reconnaissance, special operations; and force support -- base operability and defense, logistics, combat support, on-orbit support.(7:6-7)

Aerospace doctrine goes on to state that the air component commander, an airman, should be responsible for employing all air and space assets in the theater. The air component commander should propose courses of action to the joint or combined commander as well as to the land and naval component commanders to ensure proper exploitation of aerospace assets.(7:9) In addition, the air component commander should control all forces performing interdiction.(7:12) The close air support mission is regarded as the least efficient application of aerospace forces(7:13); however, the Army and Marine air assets are primarily designed for this mission. In addition, the Navy's air forces are primarily dedicated to fleet operations which limit their ability to fully exploit aerospace power. Only the Air Force is organized, trained, and fully equipped in all aspects of air combat, and should therefore be in the forefront of developing and exploiting aerospace power.(7:17) Needless to say, these last statements from the manual have caused some controversy and concerns in the other Services.

The Army and the Air Force have been attempting to reconcile Air Force concerns over the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). The FSCL is the demarcation of responsibilities. New weapon systems such as the M109A6 Paladin howitzer and the Army Tactical Missile System are pushing the line further and further out. The Air Force believes they should control these
asset as well as new air defense systems. The Army believes the Corps commander should control these assets in order to properly prepare the battlefield.

The Navy and Marine Corps also have concerns. The Navy does not want to lose control of its air assets to an Air Force air component commander, who may not fully understand the intricacies of fleet defense. The Marine Corps wants to ensure the air assets in the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) primarily support the ground mission. This resulted in a 1986 omnibus agreement between the Air Force and Marine Corps to define how MAGTF air assets will be controlled.

In addition, in a recent interview, Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak acknowledged that the new composite interventionist wings at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho and Pope AFB, N.C. are designed to rival the Navy and Marine Corps by providing land-based aircraft carriers to provide quick, forcible entry into a distant conflict.

2. UNITED STATES ARMY

Current United States Army doctrine is expressed in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. The 1986 manual is undergoing revision to reflect the changes in the world threat environment. Currently, the AirLand Battle doctrine is defined by four tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Initiative means setting the terms of the battle through action. It implies offensive spirit throughout the conduct of operations. Agility is the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy. Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. Synchronization is arranging battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive
point. The revised manual will add the tenet of versatility, which is the ability of Army forces to shift focus, to be task organized, and to move from one mission to another quickly. This provides the capability to deploy quickly to a trouble spot.

The Army sees a shift in its warfighting focus -- from deterring Soviet aggression to projecting overwhelming land power to deter and defeat potential regional threats. The Army sees their light forces arriving first on the scene; this is totally compatible with the Air Force's land-based aircraft carrier role. The Marine Corps would arrive next with relatively heavier forces to reinforce the Army to facilitate the quick buildup of robust forces. While this version of FM 100-5 is only a draft document, it would seem the Marine Corps would regard the Army as infringing upon their traditional role of forced entry.

3. UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

The United States Navy and Marine Corps also recognize the changes in the threat from global to regional, and they are in the process of changing their doctrine accordingly. In September 1992, they drafted a white paper which outlines this overall change in focus from a deep water capability to one of littoral operations. This new direction will provide Naval Expeditionary Forces which are shaped for joint operations, and the capability of operating forward from the sea. The white paper envisions the Navy/Marine Corps team responding to crises by providing the initial enabling capability for joint operations and continued participation in a sustained effort. In addition to the traditional naval missions of forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift; four new operational capabilities will be built.
surveillance. It will emphasize exploitation of space and electronic warfare systems to provide immediate information, while denying data to our enemies. Battle space dominance means we can maintain access from the sea to permit the effective entry of equipment and resupply. Power projection provides the sea-based support to enable the application of the complete range of combat power. Force sustainment is a comprehensive and responsive logistics support system requiring open sea lines of communication. (147-9)

It would seem the Navy and Marine Corps also see themselves as providing the initial U.S. response in a crisis. In addition, the Navy sees space exploitation as part of their new requirement for command, control, and surveillance -- a mission the Air Force has also claimed.

All of the Services recognize the change in threat and the impending budget cuts. History tells us that budget constraints have dictated doctrinal changes such as the post-World War II era when the Eisenhower administration determined it was most cost effective to build forces based upon nuclear capability rather than conventional forces, and the post-Vietnam era when we "hollowed out" our military. It would seem that the Services today are individually modifying their doctrine while attempting to build force structure with scarce resources that will enable them to remain viable in the future and still provide the United States a warfighting capability. This individual emphasis is in line with the Services task to administer, equip, and train forces. However, will there be enough money available to allow this individualism in the future? This individual approach to doctrine and force structure pushes the decisions as to the proper mix of forces away from the military and into the civilian political arena. This is an arena where we do not want these decisions to rest.
III. JOINTNESS

1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Departments of War and Navy existed as autonomous, cabinet-level positions. After the questionable performance of the Army and Navy in the Spanish-American War, the Joint Army-Navy Board and later the War-Navy-State Board initiated efforts to unify the military, but autonomy was still present until World War II.(15:2)

Up to that point, senior military leaders in Washington, D.C, had little influence on military activities. The chain of command ran from the President to the Service Secretaries to the field commanders. With U.S. entry into the war, President Roosevelt established the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of the senior officers from the Army, Army Air Forces, and the Navy with a Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief being added later. They, along with their British counterparts, comprised the combined military council. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no legal power, the President's orders were now passed to the field commanders through them with the Service Secretaries dealing primarily with maintenance and mobilization issues.(16:4-5)

At the end of World War II, the United States was thrust into a position of world leadership. It became apparent that some means of formalizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff was needed in order to provide the proper national structure for assumption of this role. However, the Services were reluctant to give up their autonomy in the name of military unity.(15:3)(16:5)

After two years of debate, the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted. It created a weak, centralized National Military Establishment. The Secretary of Defense was principal assistant to the President for all military matters, with the Services subordinate to him. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, with an attendant Joint Staff, were the military link to the Secretary. They were established as the primary military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and were to provide strategic direction, prepare plans, and establish unified and specified commands. The Department of the Air Force was created equal to the Departments of the Army and Navy. The chain of command ran from the President through the Secretary of Defense through the Service Secretaries to the field commanders.(16:5–6)

The first amendment to the National Security Act took effect in 1949. It established the Department of Defense as an executive department, and the separate military departments lost their cabinet rank becoming subordinate to the DoD. The position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created as a non-voting member of the JCS, but who was to preside over the JCS with no command authority.(16:6)

Several other legislative changes were made through 1979. The major results were: the addition of a Director of the Joint Staff, strengthening the position of Secretary of Defense, removal of Service Secretaries from operational chain of command, granting of voting rights to the Chairman, increasing the Chairman’s authority to manage the Joint Staff, excluding the Joint Staff from acting as a General Staff, and full inclusion of the Commandant of the Marine Corps into the Joint Chiefs of Staff.(16:6)

In 1982, after six years as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones led an effort to reform the joint process. General Jones argued that organizational traditions and the dual-hatting of the Service chiefs caused the Service chiefs to put the needs of the individual Services ahead of joint issues. He called for additional strengthening of the Chairman’s position and increased authority for the unified and specified CINCs to command their assigned forces. He also pushed for limiting Service staff
involvement in the joint process and improved training, experience, and rewards for joint duty. (15:6)

The debate began in 1962. In 1963, the deployment of Marines to Lebanon and the subsequent loss of life, coupled with the invasion of Granada, spurred Congress to action. The after action reports for both events point out systematic failures in the chain of command, military incompetence, and the inability to operationally and tactically communicate between Services. Studies were begun by DoD, the Congress, the Chairman's Special Studies Group, and various Washington think tanks. Each found evidence suggesting reform was required. This culminated on 1 October 1986 with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. (15:7-8)

2. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

In passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress intended:

"- to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
- to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
- to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
- to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning;
- to provide for more efficient use of defense resources,
- to improve joint officer management policies; and
- otherwise enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense." (15:29) (16:8-9)

This law has had a far reaching impact on the United States armed forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has become the focus of the
military. For the first time, he is the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols he had to represent the corporate view of the Joint Chiefs, now he can speak his own mind. In addition, the Chairman now owns and operates the Joint Staff, no longer does it work for the corporate Joint Chiefs. Also, the Chairman was given certain personnel controls to ensure the quality of officers serving in joint positions and to ensure promotions of the joint officers are commensurate with the Services.(15:9-10)(16:37)(17:159-160)

The Goldwater-Nichols Act redefined and clarified the chain of command. Authority still runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commanders, but the Chairman was placed in the communications flow between the Secretary of Defense and the CINCs. The CINCs have direct access to the Secretary, but do most if not all of their business through the Chairman.(16:38)

The legislation granted the CINCs full operational control of the forces assigned to them. The CINCs also provide their input on Service resource and acquisition issues, by reviewing the Services' programs and evaluating how well they support the CINCs requirements and priorities. This assessment is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman.(16:38)

Assessments of the Goldwater-Nichols Act are generally positive. While the Services have lost some of their influence and autonomy, the warfighting capability of the United States has been enhanced.(15:29-30)(16:38-39)(17:158) High caliber officers are being sent to the joint environment and jointness is accepted as the means by which we will fight future contingencies by all Services. This is readily acknowledged within the Services' doctrine. Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm serve to validate the success of jointness and the Goldwater-Nichols Act as
implemented.

IV. DOD BUDGET, WHERE THE MONEY GOES

The Department of Defense budget is shrinking; from a budget of $290.9 billion in FY91(18:19), to a proposed FY97 budget of $237.5 billion.(19)

The Presidential budget submitted to the Congress in January 1992, called for $267.6 billion in DoD budget authority for FY93 with $272.8 billion in defense outlays. This represented a real-term decline of seven percent from the FY92 budget level. The six year defense plan, FY92-97, showed reductions of $63.8 billion in budget authority and $36.7 billion in outlays compared to the February 1991 plan. The 1992 plan calls for an average of four percent per year reduction in budget authority. By FY97 the cumulative real decline in budget authority is 37 percent from FY85, the peak year, and 29 percent from FY89. Defense outlays as a share of the Gross National Product are projected to be 3.4 percent in FY97. Defense outlays as a share of total Federal outlays are projected to be 16 percent in FY97. Both are 50 year lows.(20:135)

Force structure will decline about 25 percent from FY90 to FY95. Phased reductions include 10 Army divisions from 28 (18 active duty) to 18 (12 active duty), 10 Air Force tactical fighter wings from 36.5 (24 active duty) to 26.5 (15 active duty), and 94 Navy ships from 545 to 451, and 3 aircraft carriers from 16 to 13. Active duty personnel are projected to decline by more than 500,000 between FY90 and FY97 to approximately 1.6 million, reserve manpower by over 250,000 and civilian end-strength by over 200,000 over this same period.(20:135)(19)

The following chart depicts the changes in budget outlay in the areas of Military Personnel (Mil Pers), Operation and Maintenance (O&M), Procurement
(Proc), and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) in FY91, FY93, and FY97. The O&M figures for FY91 includes incremental costs for Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

**BUDGET AUTHORITY**

($ in billions)

<table>
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<th>TITLE</th>
<th>FY 1991 ACTUAL</th>
<th>FY 1993 ACTUAL</th>
<th>FY 1997 PLANNED</th>
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<td>Mil Pers</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>64.0</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>131.9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>77.8</td>
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<td>Proc</td>
<td>71.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>31.6 (18:19)(19)</td>
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The FY92-97 plan submitted by the Bush administration is called the base force. It has been described by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as “the best plan for meeting the demands and challenges of this new era. It has the right combination of components and capabilities to implement the new National Military Strategy -- to deter potential aggressors, fulfill our forward presence requirements and respond to any crisis.” (2:10) With regard to the question of not reducing forces fast enough, General Powell stated, “We are reducing as fast as we can. We cannot go any faster or we will break the force.” (2:11)

However, President Clinton’s and Mr. Aspin’s plan does call for additional reductions of $60 billion over five years: these cuts include 200,000 troops, eight Air Force tactical fighter wings, three Army divisions, and two Navy aircraft carriers. (21:2)

In view of the new world order, the controversy over roles and missions, and the expected additional reductions to the DoD budget, it is time we consider a more radical approach than the traditional reduction of force.
structure. We need to approach future cuts from a joint warfighting perspective. It is time we went to a single, unified U.S. military.

V. A MODEST PROPOSAL

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provided DoD with a more effective and efficient warfighting capability. It streamlined the chain of command, reduced the power of the Services, gave appropriate forces to the CINCs, and created an effective Joint Staff with the Chairman clearly in charge. This structure provides a more efficient basis for conducting the business of the U.S. military.

There are currently nine unified commands and one specified command. Most of the unified commands have regional areas for which they are responsible. U.S. European Command is responsible for Europe, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for the Pacific, U.S. Atlantic Command is responsible for the Atlantic area, U.S. Southern Command is responsible for Central and South America, and the U.S. Central Command is responsible for the Middle East. The remaining four unified commands are functional in nature; U.S. Space Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. Forces Command, the only specified command, is responsible for defense of the continental United States.

Under the base force concept, the National Security Strategy of the United States written in 1991 suggests that our national security needs consist of four basic force packages: Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces, and it goes on to describe disposition of these forces and their areas of responsibility. Three of these commanders in chief already exist, and it would be easy to build a Contingency Command.
by combining Forces Command, Central Command, and Special Operations Command. In addition, we would need to keep a fifth force package, U.S. Transportation Command, as part of our new CINC structure. The U.S. European Command could become a subunified command under Atlantic Forces, and U.S. Space Command responsibilities could be centrally managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency with space experts on each of the CINCs’ headquarters staff and the joint staff. The remaining five CINCs would assume full responsibility for planning, programming and budgeting using their component staffs for air, ground, and sea. The budget would be submitted to the Joint Staff, J-8, for reconciliation and passing on to DoD.

In addition to eliminating five of the ten CINCs, we could also eliminate the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as their respective Secretarial and Headquarters Staffs. Traditional Service functions of organizing, administering, and equipping would become the responsibilities of the CINCs, their components, and the Joint Staff. Training would be a joint responsibility. We would have one unified military. Everyone would be joint. Many of these inroads have already been established. Currently, the budget process begins at unit level. Inputs are generated and passed up the chain of command to the various major commands for reconciliation. The major commands then pass their inputs on to their respective Service headquarters for input into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

The new process would be very similar since the major commands would be the component air, sea, land, and marine commands for their respective CINC. The CINC’s headquarters would reconcile the budget requirements across their components and pass them on to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff would review the inputs and assure that they satisfied national strategic
requirements and priorities within budgetary limits. Final reconciliation would then take place with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff for input to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in time for the Presidential budget input to the Congress.

The entire process would be streamlined since the CINCs would have the predominant input into satisfying their warfighting needs currently and in the future. The coordination needed for decisions would be reduced, there would be much less parochialism and in-fighting, and the planning, programming, and budgeting system would be streamlined. Efficiency should be greatly improved.

Manpower needs at CINC headquarters could be accommodated through the savings at the eliminated CINC headquarters. Additional manpower needed on the Joint Staff could come out of the Service and Military Department headquarters with significant manpower saved.

In addition to the elimination of Service headquarters, there are some other consolidations that could save significant resources. Some of these have already begun.

The military intelligence function could be singly managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency with Joint Intelligence Centers collocated with each of the five CINCs. Service intelligence commands could be eliminated. The National Security Agency could deal directly with the CINC's headquarters to disseminate communications security (COMSEC) material to the fighting forces.

The military communications mission is currently being consolidated under the Defense Information Systems Agency. Their efforts toward standardization should be continued. Computer systems purchasing, software development, and long distance telephone services should continue
to be centralized in this agency.

There are numerous locations world-wide which have redundant and expensive communications systems due to having multiple Services present. A single U.S. military would provide the opportunity to consolidate such facilities. Some progress has been made with programs such as the Oahu Telephone System in Hawaii. This telephone network consolidates and centralizes telephone service provided to all of the military bases on the island and has improved service and lowered costs. Other opportunities have been stifled in the past due to Service parochialism and arguments over who pays the bill. Telephone systems, and communications centers, and data processing centers could all be consolidated with significant savings.

The Defense Logistics Agency can assume full responsibility for logistics support and depot maintenance for all military equipment items. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency can assume the acquisition roll from the respective Services and consolidate the effort with their ongoing research and development. Another option would be to create a single Defense Acquisition Corps as recommended by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Logistics in 1985. This concept was studied by the Packard Commission in 1986 and rejected. They stated that they reviewed the (ASD(A&L)) paper and supported many of its specific features, but they rejected it because they believed it put too much distance between acquisition programs and users.

One training command can be established to conduct basic military training as well as advanced military training and professional military education. It may no longer be necessary to have multiple training centers. It should not matter to a radio or computer repairman if the equipment they maintain is on board a ship, in a ground division, or on an aircraft. With
commonality of equipment and the interoperability this new system would foster, the equipment similarities would be such that one training location would be adequate. Pilot training could be consolidated as well as many other training facilities into one overall command. There may be some opportunities to consolidate the military academies and the professional military education schools.

Locations where we have multiple facilities could consolidate overhead management. For example, at locations such as Fayetteville, N.C. which houses both Ft. Bragg and Pope AFB there would be no need for two base commanders, facility engineers, communications battalions, etc. Post and base support could be consolidated. The same would hold true at all such locations. These consolidations would make base closing decisions easier, by pointing out which facilities were unneeded in the new joint environment.

There would be one personnel system to manage the people in this dynamic environment. Imagine a pilot being able to have one tour on an air force base, a second tour on an aircraft carrier, and a subsequent tour in a Marine air wing. The same would hold true for most military specialties.

Even the civilian personnel system could be revamped to have one DoD system which has common rules and regulations as opposed to the current system where individual Services and Defense Agencies have made different rules for hiring and firing and designed separate pay and accounting systems.

There would be one set of regulations, rules, and standards. Recruiting could be consolidated as well as Reserve Officer Training Programs in universities. Chaplain, Judge Advocate General, Medical and Dental services would all be easy to consolidate.

The roles and missions controversy would ease, since the CINC would determine the needs of his air, ground, and sea components in theater. As the
senior warfighter responsible for the area, this is fully appropriate. The Chairman and the Joint Staff would have the responsibility to ensure new requirements were valid and that they were incorporated where applicable. Equipment compatibility and interoperability issues should go away since it is in everyone's interest to ensure the best quality support to the U.S. military rather than a Service or component parochial view.

The savings achieved through this full revamping of the military structure should allow us to retain force structure at the expense of management headquarters, and it may be the only way we can absorb such drastic resource reductions without "hollowing out" the military as it was in the post-Vietnam era. The Air Force has already begun reducing headquarters staffs at alternate echelons of command as a means of streamlining and saving fighting forces. This should be continued across all of the component staffs.

The big difference today is threat. In the post-Vietnam era there was still the Soviet threat for DoD and military planners to use to justify forces to the Congress and the American public. This is no longer the case. Future contingencies are expected to be regional, and our recent successes may actually work against us. The Congress will continue to insist on reducing military expenditures through consolidation and efficiency. If we do not look at unifying options and continue to insist on maintaining a parochial view of roles and missions, the Congress will do it for us.

VI. THE CANADIAN MILITARY

Whenever the subject of unification of the military arises, someone mentions that Canada tried it and it did not work. Let's take a look at the Canadian system, the underlying reasons for consolidation, and the problems
they had.

In 1962, the Royal Commission on Government Organization, also known as the Glassco Commission, submitted its final report. In the area of defence, the commission listed a number of shortcomings including a burgeoning bureaucracy, aging equipment with no budget for modernization, and a top level military hierarchy more often divided by parochialism than united in common purpose. The commission recommended consolidation of authority at the highest military levels and leaving the remainder of the services untouched. In a White Paper in 1964, the Defence Minister recommended the integration of the Canadian Armed Forces under a single Chief of Staff and a single Defence Staff as a first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada. Legislation enabling the changes was subsequently passed. (25:1-2)

In 1967, Phase III of the reorganization, elimination of the Royal Canadian Navy, Air Force and Army passed the House of Commons. By February 1968, the Canadian Armed Forces were established. (25:22-23)

Canadian force structure and budgets, as a percentage of national spending, continued to decline. Restructuring and consolidations continued to the lowest level in 1974-75. (25:24-25)

In 1975 a new five year funding bill was passed finally allowing purchase of new equipment. Also, an Air Command was created restoring all air resources under one senior airman. In 1979, a task force was created to look at the impact of the unification. (25:26-28)

The task force conducted extensive hearings over an eight week period interviewing more than 1100 people most of which were currently on active duty. The report reached conclusions listing 30 findings in the areas of support service, personnel, training, recruiting, base concept, mobilization,
reserve force and cadets, command and control, and identity. In the area of operational effectiveness, the report praised the Canadian Forces performance. However, it noted that in terms of obsolescence of equipment, numbers of personnel, adequacy of funds, and perceived lack of Government and public support for the Forces' mission there were serious deficiencies. (25:29-39)

By the time the report was submitted in May 1980, there was a new Canadian Government, which commissioned the Defence Staff to conduct an internal review of the report. The Defence Review Group concurred with 23 of the 30 recommendations. The Group agreed with the resource impact, citing that the process of unification helped significantly in seeing the Department of National Defence through a long period of fiscal restraint. They also acknowledged that they had ignored many "people programs." (25:40-42)

A new Canadian Government in the mid-1960s promised military reform. In fact, there have been some evolutionary changes. While the Canadian military is still unified, there are currently three uniforms and three military commands: Air Command (air), Mobile Command (ground), and Maritime Command (sea). Air Command is responsible for all flying activities whether fixed or rotary wing. They support the maritime and ground missions of the other two commands with detachments of their personnel and equipment. (26)

Support functions are unified with common regulations. There is a single personnel system with functional management and common recruit training. Headquarters staffs have been reestablished; although, much smaller than those prior to unification in the mid-1960. Overall the Canadian system seems to work well with the three commands dependent upon each other, and
working to jointly satisfy Canadian military requirements.(26)

The Canadian Government was faced with problems similar to those facing the U.S. government today. They chose to unify. While they had problems, most were caused by inadequate funding of their military and the Department of National Defence's lack of support to military personnel. The conclusions of the Canadian reviews show that only unification allowed the necessary cost reductions and efficiencies that keep their military viable during the period of extreme fiscal constraint.

VII. EVOLUTION OF UNIFICATION

The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Military Establishment and made extensive changes in the country's defense organization to include the creation of the Department of the Air Force. While the act was noteworthy, it fell short of armed forces unification that its proponents espoused. It had followed three years of studies and negotiations between the Departments of the Navy and War and the President and resulted in a watered down version of the original vision of a unified military.(27:85-87)

Under the new law, on 17 September 1947, James Forrestal assumed duties as Secretary of Defense, and on 18 September 1947, W. Stuart Symington took the oath as Secretary of the Air Force.

In March 1948, the Joint Congressional Aviation Policy Board reported that there were basic differences of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force over the mission of Naval aviation. The Navy interpreted President Truman's executive order and the National Security Act as allowing them to develop any type of weapon and to base its plans on using any weapon. Secretary Forrestal decided the time had come to sort out roles and missions.
and on 11 March 1948, he assembled the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida to do so. (27:88)

The agreements reached were approved by President Truman in April 1948 and issued as the Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The agreement specified the Army had primary interest in operations on land, the Navy in operations at sea and they could proceed with the development of weapons essential to its function such as the aircraft carrier and nuclear bombs that could be carried by naval aircraft; however, they could not develop a separate strategic bombing capability. The Air Force had primary interest in equipping air forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations and its functions included: air supremacy, strategic air warfare, close combat and logistical air support to the Army, and providing air transport to the armed forces. (27:88-89)

The Navy was pleased with the agreement, but Air Force Generals Spaatz, Vandenberg, and Doolittle were not. They all claimed that there was not enough money for two air forces, and that the Navy was infringing on the Air Force mission of strategic bombing through the creation of a fleet of supercarriers. The Key West Agreement remained in dispute. (27:89)

Army generals spoke of absorbing the Marine Corps into their forces or keep it as a small amphibious attack force until the National Security Act of 1953 legislated a floor on the size of the Marine Corps and ensured its continued existence. (28:41-42)

There have been numerous disputes over new weapon systems. The Army and the Air Force competed over medium range ballistic missiles and again over surface to air missiles. Each Service built long range missiles in an attempt to get a satellite into orbit. (28:42)

Those roles and mission arguments still continue today as stated
VIII. CURRENT ARGUMENTS AGAINST A UNIFIED U.S. MILITARY

There are several arguments against a single, unified military. First, there is tradition. Our Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have more than two hundred years of tradition. The culture is established and the American public and veterans organizations will never let these institutions be done away with. The same thoughts prevailed in Canada. However, they found just the opposite. When the government announced the consolidation as a means of reducing the defense budget in a period of economic stress, there was a distinct lack of public outcry.(25:6)

Some tradition can be maintained by retention of the units as opposed to the Service. For example, we could retain Marine and Army Divisions, as well as Navy and Air Force unit designations. While there would no longer be a Marine Corps or an Army, Navy or Air Force per se, the units would still exist and the personnel would be as proud of their units and their history.

Another argument against consolidation is the loss of Service in-fighting and competition which assures the best quality military through the checks and balances inherent in the system. Through the budget process, we continually look to provide the best quality military for the lowest cost. However, if we continue taking the traditional view of defense budget reductions, cutting force structure and fighting personnel, parts will become scarce, training will suffer, and readiness will be effected. We will “hollow out” our military once again.

As in Canada, unification is the best way to get the biggest “bang for the buck”. The new military structure will still have the CINCs and their components debating the best mix of force structure. In addition, the Joint
Staff and the OSD staff will continue to do the same with the Administration and the Congress. The big difference is that the warfighters will play the dominant role in building the forces for current and future needs.

Loss of diversity is another area mentioned by opponents of unification. They state that reductions in ROTC programs and subsequent dependence upon military academies for officer acquisition is dangerous because it results in a much more uniformly oriented military elite class.(29:10-11)

The military officer commissioning programs are divided across ROTC, military academies, and Officer Training Schools. This mix provides a diverse officer corps with varying degrees of military experience and training. However, varying quality officers come from each of the programs. Ultimately, it is on the job performance and experience and the individual's talent which determines the officer's value to the military and society. There is no reason to assume that reductions in one or more of these accession programs or consolidation of them would be dangerous to national security. Diversity is very expensive. We can no longer afford this luxury. As we look for ways to save money in order to retain what we can of future force structure, we must carefully assess what we can afford and consolidate where possible.

Another area of concern has to do with creating one general who commands the U.S. forces and the subsequent concern over civilian control of the military. Our tradition of civilian control of the military goes back to the constitution. It carefully lays out that the President is the Commander in Chief of the military. Each military member takes an oath to support and defend the constitution as part of their accession into the military.

When we created the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we ensured the chairman was not in the chain of command. This practice has continued as we modified our
defense structure since the National Security Act of 1947. We have evolved
to the present structure under the Goldwater-Nichols Act in which the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while not in the chain of command, is
clearly in the chain of communication. Under unification this would remain
the same. The Chairman is a political appointee, serving at the behest of the
President. There is clear precedent that if there is a problem between the
two, the general can be fired.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

The cold war is over and the United States finds itself as the lone
superpower. Our political leaders, both Republican and Democrat, seem
willing to live up to the associated leadership role that goes with that
position. At the same time, the world is in an economic recession, and we
find ourselves as the biggest debtor nation with a huge national debt. The
American public is so concerned about economics that an incumbent
President who successfully led the nation through two wars and was in
power during the fall of communism and the end of the cold war was forced
out of office. The new administration must fight the economic battle or it
will not last.

The common perception is that the military is one of the areas in which
extra dollars can be found. Horror stories of waste in the military, long
gone, are still remembered by the public. The military cannot use a threat
such as the former Soviet Union to focus national leading to weapon systems
procurement. We can only express concern that an unspecified regional
threat will arise and we need to remain prepared.

In this environment, we cannot afford inter-Service rivalry and posturing
for the scarce resources. We must be united in building the very best
military the country can afford. The Goldwater-Nichols Act gave us a skeleton for warfighting -- one that has proven successful. The big question is how do we best posture for peacetime and retain maximum warfighting capability?

We can no longer afford the luxury of multiple Services and their associated headquarters staffs. We must go to a single, unified military if we are going to absorb extensive force structure reductions and hope to maintain the American military's capability the public depends upon. A single, unified military will allow us the best chance to keep a viable, warfighting military during a possibly prolonged period of reduced resources.


5. Sam Nunn, "Revamp It, Don't Just Shrink It," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 Jul 92.


