CHALLENGES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY:
REDRAWING THE LINE?

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Dedication

For my family:
Suki, Joanna and Anthony
and
in memory of
Andrew
I thank Professor John Lovell whose Socratic method caused me to think actively rather than listen passively. His guidance and patience are greatly appreciated. Someday, I hope to know the military as well as he does.

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Introduction

The new world disorder has created new challenges and brought old ones to the forefront for European security. To be sure, some of the traditional Cold War security agendas are still with us and still important; Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), conventional force reductions and arms control programs are ongoing. However, the search for a post-Cold War security regime has presented Europe, both East and West, with challenges that have much broader foundations and potential to shape the future of the continent. The purpose of this paper is to define these dilemmas and try to discern what is now realistically achievable for pan-European security.

For the purpose of discussion, I divide the challenges into four broad areas: democratization, economic liberalization, national identity and institutional enlargement. These problems are superimposed over questions, in both policy and theory, about the nature of the international system, definitions of security and even the meaning of "Europe" since the end of the Cold War. Certainly, any resolution or failure to resolve these challenges may shape the
answers to underlying questions. Although beyond the scope of this paper, some ideas about these basic questions will be outlined as part of the background discussion.

This paper takes an institutionalist approach that focuses on processes and the role of international institutions in shaping decisions about security. Increasing interdependence and the growth of global communications have strengthened the potential role of institutions in constraining the self-interest of states and managing conflict. This is not to say that national political will and leadership are not important, but that institutions also play a key role in fostering the cooperation that is now needed.¹

Conceptions of European security after the Cold War

With so many variations, and depending on the level of analysis, the definition of “Europe” is often in the eyes of the beholder. Since 1989, of course, this question has been complicated even more with Eastern Europe “moving” west and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations taking us back to the old “Atlantic to the Urals” idea. In an effort to briefly outline this basic underlying question I borrow three perspectives from Griffiths (1993, 4) who frames them from a practical security perspective:

- the “inner core” Europe, consisting of the EU (European Union, new name for the EC) and EFTA (European Free Trade Area) member states, forming a “community of values” to which the US and Canada are added.
- the “CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Europe” from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
- the “common European house” Europe consisting of Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals”.


The West's dominant threat-based conception of security began dissolving with the events of 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Currently the concept has broadened beyond being primarily concerned with a threat of military force. Talk of security now focuses much more on the promotion of democracy and economic liberalization. The relative importance of environment and natural resource issues as well as social issues such as migration and human rights has increased. This shift of emphasis, which will be discussed below, is reflected in the agendas and programs of many international organizations regarding CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) and the FSU (Former Soviet Union).

The lack of a new order has forced a reconsideration of the meaning of security that goes beyond the narrow military definition predominant during the Cold War. We may summarize these multiple definitions:

- Military security: the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and perception of their intentions.
- Political security: organizational stability of states and systems of government and the ideologies that provide their legitimacy.
• Economic security; access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.
• Societal security; the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom.
• Environmental security; maintenance of the local, regional and global biosphere.

Three of the four challenges that will be discussed below are directly represented by these definitions. Democratization and economic liberalization are related to political and economic security. National identity represents threats to societal security posed by migration and ethnic conflict. The dilemma of institutional enlargement is indirectly related to all the above definitions since membership usually implies varying degrees of coordination or integration of policies affecting each area.

Concern about the prospects of success for the many democracies newly emerging from the fall of Leninism has given a renewed emphasis to addressing sources of insecurity from this broad perspective. We now see a spectrum of concerns dealing with both internal and external threats to emerging democracies: political costs of marketization, uncertain civil-military relations, nationalism/ethnic conflict, abundance and proliferation of armaments, a grasping for accords and guarantees of security, and

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the exploitation of perceptions of external threat by internal opposition (Nelson 1993, 35:160-166). In part, the emphasis on democratization can be seen as based on the premise that democracies tend not to go to war against other democracies; but Nelson adds that “part of the explanation must be that democratic countries are likely to be those in which economic strength, social cohesion and political consensus have been an adequate counter-balance to threat, thus enhancing physical and material security. Democracies, however, cannot be nurtured in an insecure environment” (1993, 35:157).

The breakdown of the post WWII bipolar order has brought with it a renewed emphasis on and hope for democracy. International organizations such as the UN, EU, WEU (Western European Union), NATO and the CSCE embrace and profess democratic principles and some require a commitment to democratic governance as a condition of membership. From a security standpoint, there is significant empirical evidence that democratization should indeed reduce violent conflict, at least between democracies, because democratic states have rarely engaged each other in military conflict. However, the empirical paradox is that democracies are not less likely to be involved in violent conflict than states with other forms of governance (Dixon 1994, 88:14).

It could be postulated that increasing the number of democracies will reduce the incidence of conflict worldwide or regionally simply because a greater relative number of interstate interactions would be between democracies. This provides a
compelling argument for supporting the newly democratizing states in Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Why democracies don’t fight democracies is not clear, however recent research by William Dixon supports a norm-based theory of dispute resolution — that there are certain shared norms among democratic leaders that favor the peaceful settlement of disputes.³

Yet, with respect to the newly forming democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the FSU, many questions remain. How long does it take to acquire the necessary democratic norms? What is the effect of communal and inter-ethnic conflict within these states? Will democratic processes achieve enough stability to ameliorate internal ethnic conflict or will political instability exacerbate these problems? These questions are beyond the scope of this paper but they are unknowns which must be kept in mind.

Drastic reductions in force levels and defense budgets of both East and West are perhaps one of the most visible results of the post Cold War era. Yet, the perception that Europe is more secure has not followed. Predictions that NATO would dissolve in the absence of its raison d’être have not materialized. Instead, states of CEE and beyond have clamored for membership in this western alliance, and have

³ See Dixon’s recent article, “Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict” in the American Political Science Review, 88:1 (March 1994), which reviews previous research and adds new data that supports a norm-based explanation for the “democratic peace”. Dixon’s research promotes the proposition that democracy enhances prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
recently received the offer of “partnership”. Even this is viewed by some as insufficient for meeting the security needs of Europe amidst the uncertainty of the new world order. A recent reaction exemplifying this attitude was given by Czech President Václav Havel: “I am not criticizing the ‘Partnership for Peace’ proposal. On the contrary, I consider it a very reasonable starting point. (If I can fault it for anything, it would only be for not having come into existence two or three years ago.” (1994, 73:7)

In the new “no confrontation-high instability” climate, the perception and definition of security differs among the West, CEE, Russia, and some other states of the FSU (Baev 1993, 24:137). Furthermore, differing and sometimes unstable political–military or civil–military relationships complicate formation of national policies and consequently, the question of structuring a pan-European security regime. These considerations influence discussions about which organizations are best equipped to form the basis for European peace, or what their roles should be in relation to each other.

Those that take a utilitarian view of alliances suggest that the national gain-loss calculus in the new European order has shifted. The absence of a specific threat forebodes the loosening of security alliances because the costs and risks of extending security guarantees outweigh any promotion or protection of vital interests (Driscoll

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4 The Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, originally a U.S. initiative, was presented at the January 1994 NATO Summit. As of 10 May 1994 eighteen nations have signed on. See appendices for text of the Framework document and current list of signatories.
While granting that threat certainly plays a role in the formation of alliances, others contend that some alliances and international organizations acquire characteristics that go beyond the level of a national cost-benefit analysis. For example, speaking of NATO, Brenner contends that "The Alliance is much more than an exceptionally durable version of the classic ‘security community’. Rather, it should be viewed as an evolving civic community whose pacific relations are the institutionalized norm, rather than merely the calculated preferences of states" (1993, 35: 141).

Although it is useful to try to define shared perspectives based upon the categories of the West, the East (CEE), and Russia (FSU), it must be remembered that each of these groupings represents distinct states with distinct histories and cultures and that some of them, after more than 40 years, are now relatively free to express themselves in domestic and foreign policy. From the West’s point of view it was a much simpler world during the cold war when, for many purposes, everything east of the inter-German border had a homogeneous character. The persistence of this view today is suggested by the West’s choice of terms in often referring to eastern states as “post-communist countries” and “former members of the Warsaw Pact”(Havel 1994, 73:2).

Yet, keeping this caution in mind, we can still justify describing some common security conceptions since 1989. Prior to this time, the

5 Driscoll calls upon the historically poor record of alliance endurance over the last two centuries to support his position. He accounts for NATO’s endurance “as springing from the fact that the East-West confrontation lasted as long as it did”.

West's primary security concern was the Soviet military threat. Since the fall of communism, however, continued political and economic liberalization in the East are seen as key to Europe's future security. Added to this concern is the potential of ethnic conflict and nationalist movements to destabilize borders as a result of long repressed irredentist or secessionist claims (Mihalka 1994, 3:1). Russia, although no longer seen as a direct conventional threat to Western Europe, could destabilize the region if she were to use force in certain areas such as the Baltics or the Ukraine.

Also from a western perspective, increased migration, not only from the East but also from the South, is seen as a threat. Western European states' perceptions of their national identities were already being challenged by significant numbers of foreign residents of non-european origin. This is true even in states such as France that have traditionally had assimilationist policies. The recent recession and high unemployment have offered opportunities for far right parties to exploit not just the fear of increased migration but also a threat to "traditional values" (i.e., national identity, societal security).6

The East's frame of reference is, of course, different in several ways even though, as in the West, it was formed by the same "catalyst" during the Cold War. László Valki contrasts the view quite succinctly:

With regard to the order of the bipolar system, it is a historic mistake in this context to speak about peace and stability. Those

who do so, simply confuse the avoidance of the Third World War during the past forty-five years with peace in Europe. What kind of peace was it in the last four decades when six countries were living under foreign rule and when armed forces were used on four occasions in Central Europe (in 1953, 1956, 1968 and 1981), amongst which three appeared as intervention by one or more foreign powers? (Valki 1992, 93)

If the CEE states are seizing every opportunity to anchor themselves to Western institutions it is in part only because they are keenly aware of the Russian predilection for empire building. The perception of the often described “security vacuum”, is really an awareness of their dependency on others for basic security needs (Frost 1993, 37:46). Furthermore, they realize that their “security” is both dependent upon and a prerequisite for their democratic and economic transitions which are also seen as linked to western support.

Russian conceptions of security, although seemingly wrought with day to day contradictions, do show certain continuities of which some have disturbing prospects. Part of Russian thinking is influenced by fundamental questions about the nature of the Russian state now versus what was the empire before. Hence there are difficulties in deciding “what constitutes foreign policy for a Russia that is hardly accustomed to thinking of its immediate neighbors in
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the Baltic States as truly foreign countries". In this context, and considering that 25 million Russians live outside the borders of Russia, the prevalent use of the term “near abroad” to denote a special category of policy interest is understandable (Lynch 1994, 3:12).

The May 1992 draft of Russia’s “new” military doctrine “named the defense of Russian minorities outside of Russia as a legitimate casus belli, and suggested that Eastern Europe, as well as the republics of the former Soviet Union, remained a part of Russia’s sphere of influence” (Foye 1993, 2:46). That a doctrine was not approved until after Yeltsin’s military backed confrontation with parliament in October 1993 reflects the extent of the internal debate over what constitutes Russian national interests and the allocation of authority to influence the security policy-making process. The doctrine approved on 2 November 1993 is not yet published (perhaps indicating continued debate about implementation), but official statements have indicated key tenets (Foye 1993, 2:46-47):

- The development of mobile forces capable of rapid deployments is a top priority
- Russian forces may be stationed outside Russia
Abandons previous “no first use” policy concerning nuclear weapons and, according to Defense Minister Grachev, Russia would use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear belligerent state if it were allied with a nuclear state.

Authorizes Russian participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN or the CIS.

The western view of security as a multidimensional concept with force as a last resort is not very prevalent in Russian thinking where force is still viewed as a legitimate policy instrument. This is particularly troublesome with regard to Russia’s participation in “peace-keeping” (read “peace-enforcement”) operations considering that Russia’s pattern of order-enforcement indicates little theoretical analysis of peaceful conflict resolution and an absence of the principle of neutrality (Baev 1993, 24:139-141). The CIS has failed

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7 The confusion of “peace-” terminology in news and literature notwithstanding, I borrow the following definitions from Baev’s discussion (1993, 24:140-141). Peace-keeping is the interface between peace-making (cessation of violence through mediation and negotiation) and peace-building (reconstruction of social and economic structures) and is based on (1) consent from the parties involved; (2) non-interference in internal affairs; (3) use of force only in self-defence; (4) strict neutrality and impartiality. Coercive measures of conflict settlement are termed peace-enforcement based on the following suggested principles: (1) clear and achievable political goals; (2) political will to enforce ceasefire; (3) Commitment to contribute substantial forces; (4) an integrated military command structure; (5) international legitimization of the intervention; (6) public support for the use of force when national interests are not at stake.
to be the "unbiased" arbiter of Russian military actions in Moldova and Georgia (S. Ossetia) where some actions appear to be independent of or even contrary to government wishes. Consequently, Russia has recently sought international legitimization for CIS "peace-keeping" operations by urging the CIS to gain observer status at the UN and recognition by the UN, EU and CSCE as a regional organization. In a February 1994 speech to the CSCE, the head of Russia's delegation, Vladimir Shustov, stated that "Article 52 of the UN charter allows regional organizations to take actions to maintain peace and security and there is no need for Russia or the CIS to seek the approval of CSCE or any other international organization for its peacemaking operations within the CIS" (RFE/RL Research Institute, Daily Report, 7 March 1994).
Economic reform and democratization

The process and requirements for democratization are fairly well understood but there is a gap in our knowledge of transitioning from a command to free market economy. The debate over “shock” versus gradual economic reforms highlights not only the lack of knowledge but also some inherent conflicts in simultaneously trying to democratize politics and liberalize the economy. International institutions often make their support, whether it be financial (World Bank, EC) or political (NATO, EC), contingent upon meeting certain economic or democratic standards. Unfortunately, these requirements often constitute a catch-22 for leaders in the newly democratizing states. For example, requirements to privatize or cease subsidizing large state-owned industries may raise unemployment which can threaten the electoral legitimacy of the leadership charged with implementing economic reforms and following democratic norms (Huntington 1992, 15:8-13).8

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8 Huntington suggests that despite the short run high costs of “shock economic therapy” it is better suited to produce results while simultaneously democratizing where electoral legitimacy may rapidly dissipate. It allows reform governments to make concessions, allowing greater maneuver room, without compromising overall economic reforms.
This is not saying that criteria should not be imposed for acceptance of western aid or integration into western institutions, but caution regarding competing requirements is warranted. Failure to coordinate the myriad of international and national programs providing resources and hopes for integration could prove counterproductive. There is the danger of backlash against democratic leaders by a disaffected electorate or the implementation of ineffective economic reforms in order to maintain popular support. This suggests that the West be prudent in providing resources and support that is commensurate with their expected criteria.

As NATO’s recently proposed Partnership for Peace (PFP) demonstrates, the security arena imposes its own criteria. In addition to reinforcing a commitment to democratic principles, there are some less obvious implicit criteria that impose potentially large economic costs for states wanting to move down the road towards full NATO membership. One PFP objective for subscribing states is “the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance” which implies an unspecified degree of standardization or compatibility of equipment, doctrine and training (NATO Public Data
Service, 1994a). Since the PFP Framework Document indicates that subscribing states will “fund their own participation” and “endeavor otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part”, it remains to be seen where the resources will come from. What degree of “interoperability” (on the partnership countries part) will be required for full membership? After all, how necessary was it for Spain and Portugal?

While many CEE states are struggling to meet western criteria for membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO, the Western nations and institutions must constantly evaluate whether they are providing adequate external support. This support is especially critical when implementing radical reforms — Western economic policies have great potential for influencing chances of success. As keynote speaker at the summer 1993 NATO Economic Colloquium, Leszek Balcerowicz cautioned:

The Western governments seem not to realize their own potential to harm or to increase the chances for success of economic reforms in the former socialist countries through — what to Western countries are — quite marginal actions. This is especially true of measures determining the access to their own markets for exports from the Central and Eastern European countries. Given that the share of these exports is at about 2% of the total Western imports, but that those exports account for about 50% of the total exports of the former socialist countries, there is an enormous leverage, which may work either way. ... thus affecting the complicated economic, social and political dynamic ... (Balcerowicz 1993)
This broader conception of European security encompasses questions of democratic and economic transition in countries, most of which, have had little previous experience with either system. Their chances of success vary by country and region. In a world of finite financial resources, the West is faced with the challenge of establishing criteria for distributing those resources in ways that enhance democracy, economic health and security in Europe. The search for a new European security regime is influenced by the parameters of resources (political and financial), economic and democratic criteria, and questions about the appropriate institutional arrangement for guaranteeing that security.
National identity

The third challenge of security is the threat to identity, as defined by civic community, ethnicity, state or nation. In the East it is the absence of a civic society capable of representing pluralist interests (in civic, rather than ethnic terms) that threatens political fragmentation. An ethnic mosaic that crosses national borders challenges territorial boundaries and political identities. This, and the costs of economic transition, make the establishment of stable democracies even more difficult.

Ken Jowitt’s analysis of the Leninist legacy suggests underlying factors that contribute to the difficulties of the democratic transitions. He states that elements of this legacy...

... combine to provide a remarkably consistent and continuous support for a worldview in which political life is suspect, distasteful, and possibly dangerous ... the Leninist legacy, understood as the impact of party organization, practice and ethos, and the initial charismatic ethical opposition to it favor an authoritarian, not a liberal democratic capitalist way of life; the obstacles to which are not simply how to privatize the economy, or organize an electoral campaign, but rather how to institutionalize public virtues. (1992, 293)

Jowitt’s thesis also cautions that the events of 1989 did not leave a
tabula rasa just waiting for the formulas of democratic and economic transitions to be written, but left a legacy or "inheritance" that will shape new institutional patterns (1992, 285-36). Of course, each country's ability to overcome negative aspects of this inheritance varies based on its unique cultures and history. For example, difficulties in establishing a successor elite capable of representing or articulating interests is a widespread problem of leadership and political organization in the East. However, in Poland this is much less of a problem to a certain degree because of the existence of Solidarity as a counterelite for almost two decades (1992, 294-95).

The prospect of fragmentation in the East is in itself a threat to the West. In addition, this must be understood with respect to internal dynamics within Western Europe that are a challenge to nation-state identities. The gradual evolution of the EC over decades, the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the coming into force of the Treaty of European Union (Maastricht) in 1993 all represent a transfer of sovereignty away from the state (some believe too much, others not enough). Within the states, changing demographics, large foreign resident populations of which many are "non-european" (e.g., North Africans in France, Turks in Germany) and increased
immigration to the West since 1989 have threatened the identity of dominant societies. High unemployment has provided the opportunity for right-wing parties to attack these "non-european" segments of society, successfully forcing changes in France's citizenship policies and Germany's asylum rules.

An interesting and useful way to examine these observations from a security perspective is to utilize the concept of societal security. This concept differentiates between state security with sovereignty as its focus and societal security with identity concerns as the focus. Wæver provides this example to clarify the concept:

The referent object of societal security is society. In the case of straight nation states, the difference will be small between the pure state definition and the new more complex one of state security via societal security. There will, however, be other cases where the difference is vital: when nation and state do not coincide, the security of a nation will often increase the insecurity of the state — or more precisely if the state has a homogenising 'national' programme (France), its security will by definition be in conflict with the societal security of 'national' projects of sub-communities inside the state (Corsica). ... In some other projects (Czechoslovakia), the state would be more secure if the minority nation (Slovaks) felt secure as to their national identity and national survival (societal security) within the federal state. (Wæver et al. 1993, 26)

The "we" identity of a society, however defined, may be threatened

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9 State security is defined in reference to four sectors: political, military, economic and environmental. Wæver adds that "societal security is relevant in itself and not only as an element of state security, because communities (that do not have a state) are also significant political realities, and their reactions to threats against their identity will be politically significant." (1993, 26-27)
from the outside or from within. The threats may be real or perceived but “as with other forms of security, what is perceived as a threat, and what can be objectively assessed as threatening, may be quite different ... and yet still have real effects” (Buzan 1993, 43).

These considerations present a dilemma on multiple levels for European security. Within many states it is a question of how to make the security of the state coincide with the security of ethnic “nations” or at least ensure that border changes are effected peacefully. While most examples of failure that have erupted in some combination of inter-state and inter-societal conflict are seen in the East, the West, although with much less violence, has its examples of identity struggles: the Basque region and Catalonia in Spain, and Northern Ireland. Fortunately, there are also examples of solutions, like Switzerland and the Alto Adige (South Tyrol) in Italy, that maintained national identities and made their security coincident with the state.

The examples above represent territorially bounded groups, while migration offers a more diffuse threat to societal security. As mentioned before, even in states such as France where many immigrants from overseas departments (e.g., Algeria) had French
citizenship, distinct cultural groups are seen as threatening to the traditional French identity. The German *ius sanguinis* definition of citizen has kept its large population of resident guest workers (now second and third generations) more politically marginalized\(^\text{10}\), but with increasing immigration after 1989 added to the costs of unification the question of identity has been politicized. As Timothy Garton Ash frames it; “This whole complex of issues — minorities, out-settlers, asylum seekers, immigration and the treatment of foreigners — raised further questions. One of them could hardly be more fundamental. It was: Who is German?” (1993, 400-401).

Considering another level, one may ask: Who is European? The definition of a European citizenship in the Treaty of European Union signals a qualitative difference between the EC of 1986 and the EU of 1993. In addition to moving beyond a customs union to a truly single market the seed has been planted for a European political identity. Yet, the awareness of the average citizen of what this identity entails probably has a long way to go judging from the confusion and a weak “yes” in the French referendum on the Treaty and the initial “no” by

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the Danes. Nevertheless, it is still useful to ask that if integration continues to erode the traditional nation-state political order in Western Europe, will an overarching European political identity be able to provide security for "national identities" and keep the nationalist genie in the bottle? (Wæver, Buzan et al. 1993, 198)

Looking East to the countries seeking membership in the "House of Europe", there are legitimate concerns about the effects of integration. The dominance of nation-state sovereignty in these newly independent states would have to be reconciled with almost 40 years of aquis communautaire. Recently, Lech Walesa, on an official visit to Switzerland remarked "The new Europe should be a compromise between the necessity of integration and each nation's right to its own identity"(RFE/RL Research Institute, Daily Report, 26 May 1994). Alberta Sbragia points out what membership would currently mean for these "identities":

Such countries will be joining a Community in which investigators from the Commission raid the files of private companies if they suspect price-fixing, in which countries with polluted beaches expect to be publicly identified and to suffer considerable economic damage, in which governments are restricted from subsidizing their industries and in which national courts are expected to refer to the European Court of Justice. New members' businesses will be expected to conform to health, safety, and environmental standards now being formulated, monopolies will be open to serious challenge by the Commission ... and member states' national representatives can be outvoted in selected areas ... (1992, 15)
Since it is hoped that eventual inclusion in Western institutions might prevent fragmentation in the East, perhaps the question to answer is what constitutes the best mechanism for preparing these nation-state identities for membership?
Institutional enlargement

This wide ranging debate primarily focuses on the EU, but it also highlights challenges applicable to the WEU and NATO. It is usually framed as deeper integration versus wider membership, although it is far from clear that they must be mutually exclusive. Certainly, accepting new members into any institution requires consideration of many practical political questions — even more so in the primary institution of European integration. Beyond questions of national identity discussed previously, there are questions about balanced development or a multi-speed Europe, budget, a defence identity and efficient decisionmaking.

The European Community has taken on new members before, the last being Spain and Portugal in 1986, with no apparent damage to efforts to increase integration. The recent vote on 4 May 1994 by the European Parliament (EP) to accept Norway, Finland, Sweden and Austria will increase membership to 16 by January 1995, assuming positive national referendums and ratifications (Economist 1994, 331:54). Yet common sense might suggest that a widening “may well inhibit a further ‘deepening’ of the integrative process by increasing
the frequency and intensity of conflicts and tensions among the member states” (Cameron 1992, 30).

We may now ask; What about Central and Eastern Europe? Here, there is both a qualitative and quantitative difference. The countries to be admitted in 1995 will be net contributors to the EU coffers and thus there is great economic incentive to include them. Beyond that, they are considered stable democracies who have already gone a considerable way towards meeting requirements of the *aquis communautaire*. By contrast, CEE states would initially be net recipients of community structural funds and are considered relatively unstable democracies who have a long way to go in meeting entrance requirements. In this sense, the decision to include any Eastern countries would be primarily political and could face resistance by current net recipients of EU funds who would gain new competitors.

Another aspect is concern about whether the EU can maintain effective decisionmaking; an ineffective EU would be attractive to no one. Both the SEA and the Treaty on European Union increased use of majority voting in the Council and the relative powers of the Parliament. The seeds planted at Maastricht with regards to a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have not yet sprouted, and a separate European defence identity in the form of the WEU is still in its infancy. Major changes in decisionmaking procedure and institutional structure to accommodate even more members is unlikely before 1996 — the date set for the next Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) to review progress towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union.

Although concerns are similar, the enlargement of NATO membership to the East has added considerations. Of key concern is that extension of a security guarantee would create a new line of confrontation with Russia, providing fuel for the nationalists and provoking expansionist policies. Another key concern is the effect on NATO decisionmaking which, unlike the EU, has no provisions for majority voting and currently requires consensus of all members (Rose, Roth and Voigt 1994).
Institutional Responses to the East

Although responses among the western institutions varied they all have had to deal with the pivotal question of future membership in their organizations in addition to aspects of the other challenges discussed above. So far none of the western institutions (EU, WEU or NATO) have established a timeline for membership that is linked to the attainment of clearly defined criteria. However, different forms of association agreements have been established that help target countries focus on moving towards expected norms.

Hesitation to actually guarantee that membership is a question of "when" can perhaps be attributed to several factors. First, there is real concern about preparing institutions to handle additional members (who were not even considered before 1989) and adjust their agendas to the realities of a "new" Europe. Second is the concern about stability of states to the East and the relative risk of dealing with a potential crisis internally. Third, there are postulated effects of redrawing "European" lines that might isolate Russia and fuel nationalist ambitions.

The EU has responded to CEE states who have the greatest near
term potential (primarily the Visegrad group) with an associate membership status. The association agreements negotiated in 1990-91 have been subjected to criticism:

In most of the critical economic sectors where these countries could immediately hope to export more goods to the EC (agriculture, coal, steel, textiles), these agreements were in fact still protectionist, perfectly illustrating the way in which the EC could, at its worst, function as the aggregate of national, regional and sectoral sacro egoismo. (Ash 1993,398)

Despite this failure on the economic front, the agreements have encouraged, according to Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “a strategy of anticipatory adaptation on the part of eastern governments” (1993, 232). He adds:

... the Community expected candidates for membership to adapt simply by adopting Community laws and regulations, the aquis communautaire, into their domestic laws. ... the central Europeans sought to adapt to EC norms and regulations in anticipation of membership negotiations, a strategy of anticipatory adaptation. In the course of 1990 each of these governments issued orders that no legislation be passed without a check of its conformity with EC law. (Nicolaïdis 1993, 236)

The effect has been to provide a policy template along with some technical support from the EU to help with conformity.

NATO’s initial response was formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991, open to all former members of the Warsaw Pact. This institutionalized the dialogue of
cooperation espoused at the June 1991 London summit. Many CEE states urged full membership in order to give substance to NACC talks about making cooperative peace-keeping a reality and, of course, to provide real security guarantees. The US proposal for a "partnership" that was presented at the January 1994 NATO summit represents an artful compromise between those urging NATO membership for certain CEE states and those concerned about the possible effects of excluding Russia. (Mihalka 1994, 2)

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) program\textsuperscript{11} requires subscribing states to commit to democratic values and human rights and fulfill obligations agreed to under the UN charter, CSCE documents and arms control agreements. It is not exclusive, being open to all CSCE countries (i.e., does not exclude Russia), and clearly indicates that the program provides a path to eventual membership. Yet, it clearly stops short of any security guarantee, simply indicating that "NATO will consult with any active participant ... if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security." (NATO Public Data Service 1994a)

\textsuperscript{11} See Appendix for full text of the Invitation and Framework documents.
The PFP program also identifies some specific military related objectives and further institutionalizes the relationship to NATO. The objectives are summarized as follows:

- Defence planning and budget transparency
- Democratic control of military forces
- Capability to contribute to UN/CSCE operations
- Cooperation with NATO through joint planning and training
- Long term improvement of force interoperability with NATO

The institutional changes that support these objectives include an option to establish liaison offices in Brussels and a separate coordination cell at Mons (NATO Headquarters). Each partner negotiates the pace and scope of its participation, making it an individualized program. (NATO Public Data Service 1994a)

To date, most controversy has been related to Russia's demands to be accorded a special status within the partnership. Initial indications of an April 1994 signing has been delayed by Russia because of NATO's refusal to accord special status. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said in his address to the first PFP meeting on 25 May 1994 that they would join without conditions but that

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12 The Partnership Coordination Cell was opened on 28 April 1994.
"Russia's nuclear status required it to aim for a 'consultative mechanism' with NATO that went beyond the partnership" (RFE/RL Research Institute, Daily Report, 26 May 1994).

NATO's "shadow organization", the WEU, represents the reactivated European defence identity which has steadily been increasing its role since the mid-1980's. The events of 1989, coupled with the Maastricht objective of a common foreign policy and defence identity and a declining U.S. presence gave the WEU added importance. It capabilities are still limited, but it is developing a complementary relationship with NATO by developing force packages that could be used under a EU mandate for peacekeeping, humanitarian missions and crisis management, as well as co-participating in operations with NATO (NATO Public Data Service 1994b).

The WEU is often referred to as not separate, but "separable" from NATO. In reality this is probably more a long run objective


14 It must be noted that the WEU could accept members who are not in the Atlantic Alliance and in this sense provide more flexibility for crisis response with or without NATO participation. The exact "doctrine" for accepting non-NATO states as full members is now being worked out.
that won’t be realized without further integration or “deepening” of the EU. In addition, its ability to mount a major operation without U.S. strategic assets (lift, intelligence, etc) or NATO command and control support would be limited. Therefore, for the near future, it is not capable of providing any security guarantees.

As the European “pillar” of the Atlantic Alliance the WEU has also extended associate member status to countries of CEE, essentially following a parallelism of their relations with the EU (Baumel 1994). In some respects these agreements also parallel NATO’s PFP, but as with the EU they act as a policy template for future EU integration and “widening”.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) is the fourth institution responding to the new environment engendered by the events of 1989 and thereafter. An inclusive organization by definition, it quickly increased its membership from 35 to 54 to accommodate all the newly independent states. Its challenge was to institutionalize a process in order to strengthen its ability to deal with increased membership and numerous new conflicts.

15 Currently 53 members due to the suspension of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
(Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1992). Like the EU/WEU however, its credibility with regards to conflict prevention was damaged by events in the former Yugoslavia. It has yet to implement many of its new mechanisms or provide peace-keeping forces under its auspices.

The CSCE’s weakness is also its strength. The fact that it is a non-legally binding forum for consultation and preventive diplomacy that essentially requires consensus (consensus “minus two” allowed in some cases) for decisions is its weakness. However, its inclusiveness provides strong political legitimization of decisions that are reached. It also plays a large role in the monitoring of human rights, democratic processes and confidence and security building measures. (Bouvard and George 1994)
Conclusion

One objective of this paper, in addition to describing the challenges of European Security, was to discern what is currently achievable in terms of pan-European security. It’s clear that we have an inter-locking web of institutions espousing the same democratic values to their members, associate members and potential members. However, it is not clear that democracy will prevail in all cases and provide for a “democratic peace”. Even without democracy, it is possible that economic liberalization could continue in some states — as it has in Chile, South Korea and China, for example. Yet, as Nelson indicated, the chances of either occurring are diminished in an insecure environment.

In answering the question of redrawing new lines in Europe, two contexts must be considered. First, there are practical limits to resources: both institutional and financial. Therefore, as in the past, any enlargement of the EU/WEU or NATO will be gradual and, by definition, redraw the lines. Resources must be first placed where they have the most chance of success, using clearly defined criteria.

Unfortunately, the relative chance of a successful democratic
transition in Russia is very uncertain. The ability of Russia to meet other key criteria in the near term — civilian control of the military and renunciation of territorial claims against others — is also suspect. The Russian military has been ardently pushing for an increased military budget from an amount currently equal to 6% of GDP (37 trillion rubles) to 9% of GDP (55 trillion rubles). This would be a much higher percentage than that of other major industrialized countries and arguably represents a desire to maintain parity with the U.S. and NATO combined. (RFE/RL Research Institute, Daily Report, 30 May 1994)

This brings us to the second context of the question: redrawing the lines? Within the context of our current criteria and norms, the West should not hesitate to redraw lines. Enlarging NATO to the most promising CEE candidates would establish credibility and demonstrate to neighboring states, including Russia, key aspects of civilian control and defence transparency. Enhanced stability could have regional spill-over effects. Special care should be taken to reassure Russia within the current institutional framework, but without special status or a de facto veto power over enlarging institutions.
The current policy of allowing concerns about furthering the cause of Russian nationalists to dictate western policy toward CEE is misplaced. Not demanding explanation of Russian military actions in Moldova or Georgia only encourages the nationalist agenda. Gary Geipel adds to the argument:

Far from erecting a new wall in Europe, an expanded Alliance would install a more meaningful bridge to Russia. If there is to be a “Partnership for Peace” short of actual membership, it should extend eastward to a democratic Russia from Central Europe and form a part of Russia’s broader integration with the West ... Ultimately, the manageable costs of extending the boundaries of NATO must be compared not to the status quo but to the horrendous cost of a worst case scenario in Europe. (Geipel 1994, 8-9)

NATO currently, and in the near future, remains the only organization capable of guaranteeing security for current and new members. It has demonstrated the ability to adapt to the broadened context of security. Whether implementing traditional roles or newer roles in peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance, NATO has proven competency and is the repository of expertise in planning and implementing joint, multinational operations.

NATO is not the sole answer, the other inter-locking institutions discussed above must complement it. The EU can aid greatly by opening its markets more and concluding an “EFTA” agreement with CEE states. All institutions need to seek policies that minimize
nationalist and ethnic divisions to promote regional integration and confidence within CEE. The CSCE, within its security and human rights dimension, encourages intrastate Confidence and Security Building Measures. Perhaps the world’s financial institutions and national aid programs could lift one lesson from the Marshall Plan which furthered integration by disbursing funds to regional organizations comprised of the recipient nations.
Appendix A

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: INVITATION
(Source: Nato Public Data Service 1994a)

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 10-11 January 1994

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and long standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership — a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand
and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance’s activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:
(a) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;

(b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

(c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

(d) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

(e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual
Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

• those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;

• they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;

• they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;

• those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;

• building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;

• they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

• develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating
forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;

- promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
## Appendix B

**Signature of Partnership for Peace Framework Document**  
*Source: NATO Public Data Service (Updated: 10 May 1994)*

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Appendix C: Membership of various organizations
(Source: Science Applications International, Arms Control Policy Division 1992)

CSCE

1 THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE (CEI) WAS FORMERLY THE HFXAGONALE

2 IN JULY 1992, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO WERE SUSPENDED FROM CSCE FOR THREE MONTHS. YUGOSLAVIA HAS ALSO BEEN EXPULLED FROM THE CEI, AND CROATIA, SLOVENIA AND BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA HAVE BEEN ADMITTED.
References


Vita

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