The Role of Civil Defense and the Scope of Its Mission in U.S. National Security Strategy

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## Research Report

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### Abstract
SEE ATTACHED
THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE SCOPE OF ITS MISSION IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

In our constantly changing world, and especially with the breakup of the Soviet Union, it seems timely to review the current status of the United States civil defense program with a primary focus being the future configuration of the program. Our current civil defense program evolved during a time when nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the primary threat to national security. This threat is now greatly diminished, but our civil defense program continues to emphasize attack-related emergencies with secondary emphasis on disaster-related emergencies. The National Security Strategy of the United States published by The White House in August, 1991 states that, "Our civil defense program is still needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while also providing capabilities to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes." (26)

One might question whether we still need a civil defense program to deal with the consequences of attack. After all, who has the capability and will to attack the U.S.? On the other hand, natural and man-made catastrophes continue to affect our country. While these catastrophes may wreak havoc on a local area, it could be argued that they most likely would not directly impact our national security. Therefore, we must determine whether our civil defense program should continue to emphasize the "consequences of an attack," or whether it is more appropriate to shift its emphasis to "natural and man-made catastrophes."

Due largely in part to changes in the international
environment and our growing budget deficit, Congress is reducing the size of our active armed forces by approximately 25 percent by 1996. Part of our alert forces that respond to nuclear attack are no longer in a rapid response mode and there are moves to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons that the U.S. will maintain to respond to future threats.

As we reduce our active forces in response to reduced threats to our national security, should our civil defense policy require that we retain large reserve forces or State National Guard forces? Should the primary responsibility for civil defense planning shift from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the Department of Defense (DOD)? Should the DOD respond to all natural and man-made catastrophes, or should they only respond when our national security is threatened? Since we will rely on the reconstitution of forces for a major conflict in the future, is there a "base force" for civil defense that we should establish during peacetime to ensure our country will be adequately protected should a future conflict arise? In sum, this paper will deal with the future of civil defense in a changing global threat environment.
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THE ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE SCOPE OF ITS MISSION IN U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

In our constantly changing world, and especially with the breakup of the Soviet Union, it seems timely to review the current status of the United States civil defense program with a primary focus being the future configuration of the program. Our current civil defense program evolved during a time when nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was the primary threat to national security. This threat is now greatly diminished, but our civil defense program continues to emphasize attack-related emergencies with secondary emphasis on disaster-related emergencies. The National Security Strategy of the United States published by The White House in August, 1991 states that, "Our civil defense program is still needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while also providing capabilities to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes."(26)

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As we reduce our active forces in response to reduced threats to our national security, should our civil defense policy require that we retain large reserve forces or State National Guard forces? Should the primary responsibility for civil defense planning shift from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the Department of Defense (DOD)? Should the DOD respond to all natural and man-made catastrophes, or should they only respond when our national security is threatened? Since we will rely on the reconstitution of forces for a major conflict in the future, is there a "base force" for civil defense that we should establish during peacetime to ensure our country will be adequately protected should a future conflict arise? In sum, this paper will deal with the future of civil defense in a changing global threat environment.
CURRENT STATUS OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950

The Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) of 1950, as amended, provides the basic policy guidance for civil defense for all levels of government and for all other civil defense documents. Section 3(c) defines the term civil defense as:

...all those activities and measures designed or undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the civil population caused or which would be caused by an attack upon the United States or by a natural disaster, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack or natural disaster, and (3) to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack or natural disaster. Such term shall include, but shall not be limited to, (A) measures to be taken in preparation for anticipated attack or natural disaster (including the establishment of appropriate organizations, operation plans, and supporting agreements; the recruitment and training of personnel; the conduct of research; the procurement and stockpiling of necessary materials and supplies; the provision of suitable warning systems; and, when appropriate, the nonmilitary evacuation of civil population); (B) measures to be taken during attack or natural disasters (including the enforcement of passive defense regulations prescribed by duly established military authorities; the evacuation of personnel to shelter areas; the control of traffic and panic; and the control and use of lighting and civil communications); (C) measures to be taken following attack or natural disaster (including activities for fire fighting; rescue, emergency medical, health, and sanitation services; monitoring for specific hazards of special weapons; unexploded bomb reconnaissance; essential debris clearance; emergency welfare measures; and immediate essential repair or restoration of damaged vital facilities). (1, 2)

The FCDA also created, within the executive branch of the government, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and a Civil Defense Advisory Council. After numerous reorganizations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created by Executive

One of the key sections of the FCDA is contained in the "Contributions for Personnel and Administrative Expenses", Section 205, which authorizes FEMA to "make financial contributions to the States for necessary and essential State and local civil defense personnel and administrative expenses, on the basis of approved plans (which shall be consistent with the national plan for civil defense approved by the Administrator) for the civil defense of the States." Funding for civil defense has been a critical link between Federal and State civil defense agencies. State governments are provided some Federal funds for administering civil defense programs as long as these programs are consistent with the national plan for civil defense. This ensures a nationwide continuity of plans while easing the burden of expenses for the States. The Federal government will provide up to one-half of the total cost of State and local civil defense personnel and administrative expenses.

The FCDA, Section 207, "Dual Use for Attack-related Civil Defense and Disaster-related Civil Defense" provides that,

Funds made available to the States under this Act may be used by the States for the purpose of preparing for, and providing emergency assistance in response to, natural disasters to the extent that the use of such funds for
such purposes, in consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract from attack-related civil defense preparedness.

Since the creation of the FCDA, attack-related preparedness has been and continues to be the primary emphasis of our civil defense program. However, disaster-related emergencies (hurricanes, earthquakes, oil spills, floods, etc.) continue to impact on our population while receiving less emphasis in civil defense programs. While disaster-related events are routinely occurring throughout our country, our legislated dual use policy pursued by FEMA emphasizes attack-related events, and funding for preparedness is being held hostage to this fact.

Title V, Improved Civil Defense Program, of the FCDA spells out what Congress desired to be developed as the result of passing this Act. The entire Section 501, Sense of Congress, clearly lists exclusively an attack-related civil defense program that should be implemented. Section 502, Elements of an Improved Civil Defense Program, clearly separates attack-related and disaster-related civil defense programs:

Sec. 502.(a) In order to carry out the sense of Congress expressed in Section 501, the President shall, to the extent practicable, develop and implement an improved civil defense program which includes--

(1) a program structure for the resources to be used for attack-related civil defense;
(2) a program structure for the resources to be used for disaster-related civil defense; and
(3) criteria and procedures under which those resources planned for attack-related civil defense and those planned for disaster-related civil defense can be used interchangeably.

Section 502(b) continues to list attack-related defense measures
that are to be included in the program. These include population protection, shelter surveys, marking and stockpiling shelters, evacuation plans, warning systems development, radiological defense improvements, public information and training programs improvements, economic recovery plans, and civil defense related research and development.

The primary emphasis of Congress throughout Title V is for two separate civil defense programs, one for attack-related and one for disaster-related emergencies, with the greater emphasis being placed on an attack-related civil defense program. FEMA has continued to emphasize the need for attack-related civil defense and there is no separate civil defense program for disaster-related civil defense. By holding States accountable to spend dollars provided by the Federal government only for attack-related programs, or for programs that do not detract from attack-related programs, Congress, through dual use, has forced State and local civil defense programs to emphasize attack-related emergencies in their plans and actions.

The Role of Federal, State and Local Government in Civil Defense

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 47 of July, 1982, "Emergency Mobilization Preparedness", provides further guidance for an emergency mobilization program to meet defense and essential civilian needs during national security emergencies and major domestic emergencies. NSDD 47 establishes the policy for "government at all levels to respond decisively and effectively to any national emergency with defense of the U.S. as the first
Principles for domestic emergencies are clearly established in NSDD 47 with the overall guiding principle being the Constitutional role of the Federal, State, and local governments. In peacetime, State and local governments are responsible for preparing for and responding to domestic emergencies. Primary emphasis is placed on domestic emergencies of a catastrophic nature that require substantial Federal assistance. Federal preparedness measures should assist State and local governments in increasing their capabilities to meet their responsibilities.

The separate roles of the Federal, State, and local governments provide a division of responsibility to each level to meet the goals of the Federal civil defense program. The responsibility for civil defense begins at the lowest level. Each individual citizen must take action to protect himself in an emergency whether disaster-related or attack-related. Local government is the first line of official public responsibility for emergency management activity (Objectives for Local Emergency Management, 1-11). The local government develops and maintains capabilities to protect its citizens in all emergencies which could be a threat to its community (Civil Defense 1988, 2). The local government will be the first to respond to peacetime emergencies and prior planning and preparation are the key to success.

The State government shares responsibility for peacetime planning with local governments. They also share responsibility for attack preparedness with the Federal government. States must
have effective emergency preparedness organizations, and develop and maintain necessary plans, facilities, and equipment (Objectives for Local Emergency Management, 1-11). The Federal government focus is on national security emergencies by assisting States and local governments to improve preparedness by providing information to the public, and by encouraging States to develop agreements for mutual aid in the event of either an attack-related or disaster-related emergency (Civil Defense 1988, 2). FEMA coordinates with States and provides assistance and guidance to ensure civil defense plans are accurate and complete.

**DOD Responsibility and Support to Civil Defense**

The National Security Council and DOD share responsibility for oversight of FEMA’s civil defense efforts, with funding for civil defense programs coming from the DOD budget. DOD works directly with FEMA’s ten regional offices through the Continental U.S. Armies, Navy, and Air Force Planning Agents and with States through Army National Guard State Area Commands (Civil Defense 1988, 21). These ten regional offices support States in their respective areas in developing and maintaining civil defense programs by providing guidance, financial assistance, equipment, and training.

There is in DOD, a nationwide structure of headquarters' staff and individuals identified with specific responsibilities for military support planning and coordination of civil defense. These individuals plan with civil agencies for civil defense matters. Where there is no civil defense planning, DOD maintains a capability to respond to legitimate requests of civil authorities.
during an emergency (Civil Defense 1988, 39). DOD coordinates its planning with FEMA and civil governments. For example, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command has an officer assigned as a FEMA Liaison Officer, and this person coordinates with all 48 contiguous states and Washington, DC. There are also Reserve component officers of all services assigned as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers throughout the emergency preparedness system from FEMA regional offices to State and local government levels (Civil Defense 1988, 40). These liaison officers and reserve component officers would assume a greater role in civil defense planning if DOD assumes the responsibility for planning and response to all emergencies that impact on our national security.

DOD often supports civil authorities by providing manpower and/or equipment for recovery following a natural or technological catastrophe. DOD support procedures continue to follow three fundamental principles: First, defense resources are employed in civil emergencies only where essential to supplement inadequate or exhausted civil resources. Second, only effective decentralized civil and military capabilities will save lives and ensure continuity of civil government functions in a major disaster. Third, the nation's defense posture cannot be jeopardized to facilitate any response to a civil emergency.

In addition to manpower, DOD equipment, facilities, and expertise may be available to local governments during a disaster-related emergency. Possible activities include search and rescue, decontamination, emergency transportation, mass feeding, housing,
health care, temporary restoration of essential facilities, and debris clearing (Objectives for Local Emergency Management, II-21). However, military forces are not used as a substitute for civil resources. Military resources are only made available in peacetime after the President has declared a major disaster or national emergency. In the event of a war related emergency the degree of support depends upon military operations, the extent of damage, and the status and disposition of active and reserve forces (Objectives for Local Emergency Management, II-21). The President sets the priority; the likelihood is that military operations will have first priority.

Within the Federal Response Plan, the DOD has accepted, largely due to the absence of any more capable civil organization, leadership of the functional group for urban search and rescue. This mission is predicated on the availability of forces during an emergency. Should a civil emergency arise during an armed conflict when large numbers of our forces are deployed, as during Desert Shield/Storm, could our civil authorities still rely upon military support? Military support may not be available in a civil emergency and our State/local government plans for disasters must be able to respond without such assistance.

FEMA's Responsibility in Civil Defense

Presidential Executive Order (EO) 12656 (Nov, 1988), Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, establishes that the policy of the U.S. is to have sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during
any national security emergency. A national security emergency is described as "any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States." With regards to responsibilities, Section 103(b) of EO 12656 specifically states, "This Order does not apply to those natural disasters, technological emergencies, or other emergencies, the alleviation of which is normally the responsibility of individuals, the private sector, volunteer organizations, State and local governments, and Federal departments and agencies unless such situation also constitutes a national emergency." FEMA assists in the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with other Federal departments and agencies as well as State and local governments.

The National Emergency Management System (NEMS) is the mechanism for communication and information that provides National Emergency Management Authorities, the President, the Vice President, and the Director of FEMA with information to exercise timely decision making in an emergency situation (National Emergency Management System, 1). As the focal point, FEMA gathers, processes, and exchanges information at the Federal, State, and local levels of government via NEMS with the emergency management community. NEMS provides for strong linkages and cohesion at all levels of government to carry out plans, programs, and operations in safeguarding the population.

EO 12148 tasks the Director of FEMA with the responsibility
for developing policies which provide that all civil defense and civil emergency functions, resources, and systems of executive agencies are "integrated effectively with organizations, resources, and programs of State and local government, the private sector, and volunteer organizations."

Emergency Operations Plans are developed by State and local governments based upon FEMA's Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) approach to emergencies. Included in the plans are actions that may be required for any hazard, whether natural, technological, or a nuclear war. The emphasis of both State and local plans is population and property protection in a disaster. The State provides policies, objectives, approaches and assumptions for local government plans and establishes the capability to mobilize all levels of government as a unified emergency organization. Local plans are tailored to the needs of the community by identifying resources and providing an orderly use of them. Through IEMS, some emergency management planning requirements are the same for all hazards, such as warning and communication, shelter, and evacuation. FEMA's influence ensures national objectives of emergency management continue to be key elements at all levels of government.

Summary of the Current Status of Civil Defense

A civil defense capability continues to be one small element of our overall national security program. With the advent of the Cold War and the escalation of nuclear weapons development, the civil defense program evolved under the guidance provided in the
FCDA of 1950. The Act has been amended over the years and continues to be the guiding force for civil defense planning. As such, the primary focus of civil defense planning is toward attack-related emergencies with disaster-related emergency planning as secondary. EOs 12148 and 12656 and NSDD 47 emphasize civil defense planning for dual use, again, as long as planning does not detract from attack-related emergencies.

The Cold War has ended, but there are still plenty of nuclear weapons in the world and more countries are developing such weapons. What should be the role of our civil defense program for the future to ensure the safety of our population and the protection of our resources and form of government?
OUR FUTURE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Review the Current Civil Defense Program

The FCDA of 1950, created during an era of escalation of the possibility of a massive nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union, has been modified and expanded over the years. Our civil defense program is functioning today based upon threats from our past that no longer exist, i.e., the Cold War. It is time to move our civil defense program into the future. The program currently in effect should remain active until a new program, tailored to the future, can be developed.

The National Security Council Policy Coordinating Subcommittee on Civil Defense, in conjunction with the DOD and FEMA, should conduct a thorough review of civil defense and emergency preparedness and provide recommendations that will both enhance our survival in attack-related emergencies and better prepare our country for disaster-related emergencies. The goal should be to complete a review of the program and recommend changes no later that 2 years from commencement of the study.

Our future civil defense program should consist of five primary elements. First, Congress should create a new Federal Civil Defense Act to respond to changes in the threat. Second, the DOD should assume a leadership role in civil defense. Third, the DOD’s role in disaster-related emergencies must be more clearly defined. Fourth, FEMA’s role should be defined as emergency management for disaster-related emergencies while assisting DOD in attack-related emergencies. Finally, establishing a civil defense
base force in the private sector will ensure that we can properly respond to future national security emergencies.

Create a New Federal Civil Defense Act

The FCDA of 1950 should be rewritten to clearly set the responsibilities and roles of the agencies involved in a new civil defense program. It should specifically detail the responsibilities of the DOD for civil defense when our national security is at risk. The new FCDA should include responsibilities for other Federal departments and agencies as well as State and local governments with respect to attack-related emergencies. All disaster-related emergency information should be removed and, if desired by Congress, be rewritten into a separate law espousing Federal, State, and local responsibilities during such disasters.

FEMA would become the focal point for emergencies affecting the U.S. in peacetime, while DOD would become the focal point for emergencies affected by an attack on this country. FEMA would continue to conduct conferences and briefings for State and local emergency directors and produce publications to assist all levels of government in emergency planning. In addition, training exercises conducted by FEMA simulating emergencies will ensure State and local programs are functional. These training evolutions will still be necessary and can be managed most effectively by FEMA.

DOD Assumes Leadership Role in Civil Defense

Our civil defense program should be limited to attack-related emergencies or those emergencies which impact national security.
As such, the responsibility for civil defense should fall under the DOD vice FEMA. The DOD will continue to work through existing Army National Guard State Area Commands (STARCs) to coordinate with State and local governments while Forces Command and others so designated retain responsibility for defense of the country. All defensive measures, such as Strategic Defense Initiative, could be included as a civil defense item in the DOD budget. The emphasis should be to prevent attack upon the U.S., both from nuclear and conventional forces, and to prepare mobilization plans to defend this country in a time of escalating crisis. With the planned reduction in active armed forces, we should retain large reserve and National Guard forces to provide a base force for civil defense, among other responsibilities.

Funding for civil defense would continue to be part of the DOD budget, as it is now. States and local governments should not be required to match funds provided for the overall defense of this country from attack. Congress would then determine, through the funding process, how much emphasis is to be placed on civil defense, as related to attack only emergencies in the DOD budget.

The mission of a new civil defense program managed by DOD should be to protect the life and property of our population and to ensure that our constitutional form of government continues against threats to our national security. Our civil defense program should emphasize our preparedness for attack-related threats only. Although the Cold War is over, the proliferation of nuclear weapons continues. The former Soviet Union and the breakaway republics
with nuclear weapons still possess the capability of striking the U.S. with long range missiles. As long as some other country has the capability to strike the U.S., we need a civil defense program capable of responding to such an attack and recovering from the effects of an attack.

The level to which we develop our civil defense program could vary from one extreme to another. On the low end of attack preparation, we could argue that there will be indications of a pending attack from the intelligence community. On the high end, we might argue that a surprise attack could come at any time. This argues for civil defense shelters ready and stocked, industries built for protection (such as underground), and regular training and attack drills at the local level so our population knows what to do when the attack occurs. Somewhere in between these two extremes lies the answer.

There are few things that can be done to protect against a surprise attack. If it happens, we should be able to respond by counterattacking the enemy. Programs now in place to ensure the continuity of our government should continue to remain active.

Of all the possible scenarios, it seems most realistic to assume that we will have time to prepare for an attack during increasing hostilities with a country that may have the capability to strike the U.S. Therefore, our civil defense program needs a baseline infrastructure capable of rapid expansion during a national security emergency, such as an attack, upon receipt of advanced warning. The civil defense program baseline should
emphasize plans for population protection, industrial protection, stockpiling essential resources, and an active warning system activation against an attack during the early phase of civil defense buildup.

More importantly, it should emphasize a baseline for survival, that is, recovery following an attack. Long term plans should be developed for rebuilding our economy, transportation systems, education systems, health care systems, energy sources, communication systems, and constitutional form of government as the baseline from which we evolve following an attack. State National Guard and reserve forces should be assigned specific roles during the recovery phase. This is quite different from the current civil defense program which emphasizes short term survival following an attack.

DOD's Future Role in Disaster-Related Emergencies

Military support to civil defense during a disaster-related emergency may still be requested by State and local governments. As the program now exists, state governors are authorized to use the State National Guard, when not in Federal service, within the boundaries of the State to assist local authorities in the preservation of life, the protection of property, and the maintenance of order during domestic emergency conditions which are beyond the capability of civil authorities (Objectives for Local Emergency Management, II-21). DOD has a system of peacetime planning (with emergency execution) for all appropriate activities for DOD components to support civil government agencies during
actual or anticipated attack on the U.S. Peacetime planning follows the same DOD command and control lines used during an attack. This basic structure as established should remain and the DOD should provide support in disaster-related emergencies. Such support can provide valuable training experiences for our troops in peacetime that may be essential in the next war.

All resources should be available from DOD, but no DOD resources should be dedicated solely for military support to civil defense prior to an emergency. Emergency support should only be provided to civil authorities after other Federal, State, and local agencies have used all their capabilities. Civil defense operations should continue to be decentralized to the lowest level possible through the regional planning agents of all DOD components with particular emphasis on the emergency planning and management capabilities of the five continental U.S. Armies and 54 State Area Commands (STARCs) (Civil Defense 1988, 40). STARCs, the Army National Guard headquarters currently in place for each state, DC, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands should remain active U.S. Army headquarters during mobilization under a new civil defense program.

FEMA's Role - Emergency Management for Disaster-Related Emergencies

Disaster-related emergencies should be funded and managed by FEMA. FEMA's primary responsibilities would be focused on emergency management in disaster-related emergencies with a secondary role of assisting DOD in attack-related emergencies (such as shelter management). Disaster-related emergencies would include
mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery for natural disasters, man-made disasters, terrorist acts, or technological disasters. FEMA also would retain responsibility for radiological defense preparedness and shelter programs for population protection. Emphasis at the Federal level should be in assisting State and local governments in mitigation and preparation for emergencies, but most emphasis should be on assisting State and local government during the response and recovery phase of an emergency.

The primary change for FEMA is that they would no longer emphasize attack-related emergencies. Instead they would direct their energy to helping State and local governments mitigate and prepare for natural and man-made disasters while managing the response and recovery phases. FEMA would continue to operate ten regional offices and work with State Emergency Directors. Funding and oversight for FEMA’s programs should be separated from DOD with the National Security Council retaining sole oversight.

State and local governments would continue to work in all four areas of emergency preparedness; mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. Funds could continue to be provided to States on a matching basis for money used to mitigate or prepare for disaster-related emergencies. States and local government funds for disaster-related emergencies could be funded at whatever level the States and local government and their population feel is appropriate for the hazards that their communities face. A greater reliance should also be placed on private insurance to cover the
risks of everyday life. Some areas of planning, response, and recovery during both attack-related and disaster-related emergencies will overlap, but no more than they currently do.

Systems that are in place, such as the National Attack Warning System (NAWAS), should continue to be used for both attack-related and disaster-related emergencies. Another system in place and operating nationwide in during an emergency is the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). During fiscal year 1988 the EBS was activated over 1000 times from local emergency operations centers to warn the population of hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. The NAWAS was activated 1600 times to warn State and local governments of tornadoes, and other peacetime threats and emergencies (Civil Defense 1988, 14). These systems serve to maintain a communications base nationwide between the Federal government and the population. Responsibility for developing and maintaining systems should be delegated to the organization for which the system was designed (NAWAS maintained by DOD, for example).

Create a Civil Defense Base Force

The final area to consider for civil defense in the future is the use of the private sector and volunteers in both civil defense and emergency management. If we are to maintain a baseline from which to surge in either civil defense or emergency management, the availability of people and assets for surge must be known. A surge would require increasing the number of assets (funding, people, and equipment) directly involved in both civil defense and emergency management as threats to our national security develop. Since this
involves primarily the civilian arena, FEMA should maintain a computer list by region of all assets available should a surge be required for either attack-related or disaster-related emergencies. This list could include such assets as construction and transportation equipment locations, food warehouses, medical facilities, doctors, teachers, civil defense trained personnel, and others that would be essential for recovery.

Volunteer organizations should be trained and used to the maximum extent possible. Organizations such as the American Legion, Rotary Club, or Lions Club are just a few of the civic minded organizations that, with proper training, could become valuable assets in a national emergency. Another key to success will be support from members of business and industry, professional organizations, and individuals who have a desire to assist when needed. It is important that care is taken to ensure that key volunteers are not also military reservists or State National Guard who may be called to active duty and unavailable for civic duty. For a volunteer program to be a success, there must be equipment, facilities, programs and training to attract and keep volunteers. It might be better for State governments to work with civic organizations or other groups to build an infrastructure that can be expanded in a time of need to ensure support is available and not rely on the U.S. military for disaster-related emergency response.

Another source for creating a base force for civil defense and emergency management is the civilian work force of the Federal
government. Government employees and elected officials can be trained to serve in emergency management roles during a surge condition. This program could be established by a Presidential Executive Order. It would be understood that to become a Federal employee, one would also be required to receive training to fulfill this additional role.
CONCLUSION

Civil defense has been a low priority item in the DOD budget for many years. Emphasis in the past has been toward attack-related emergencies while disaster-related emergencies continue to affect the U.S. population on a regular basis. It is time to shift the emphasis and reestablish priorities that apply to disaster-related emergencies and fund FEMA adequately from non-DOD resources.

The Honorable Wallace E. Stickney, Director of FEMA, stated before the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the House Armed Services Committee FY 92 budget hearings, April 25, 1991, that, "civil defense should transition toward a new direction which is consistent with the existing Civil Defense Act, yet responsive to current world conditions." Global nuclear war should no longer be the overriding basis for civil defense programs.

Our civil defense program should be developed with a baseline from which DOD will surge in an attack emergency, while emergency management and disaster-related emergencies should become the focus for FEMA. The Director of Emergency Planning, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense(Security Policy), Mr. Joseph E. Muckerman II, at the same budget hearing stated DOD’s view of civil defense as follows:

...the Defense Department believes the National Civil Defense Program also must continue to include explicit focus on the threats of attack to this country, from whatever source, by whatever means. Absent the threat of attack, there is little rationale for a Civil Defense Program separate from a disaster relief program.

Civil defense should remain an area of expertise within DOD. It
should be included in all mobilization plans of both the DOD and civil government. A significant effort should be made to develop plans and maintain a computer base of people to work in civil defense should the need arise.

With the build down of U.S. armed forces, DOD must take the lead and assume a greater role in our civil defense program. DOD's involvement is critical in the allocation of vital resources. During future reconstitution for a perceived threat, it is imperative that State and local Civil Defense Directors are not also serving as Reservists who may be called to active duty thus leaving a civil defense position vacant. State and local Civil Defense Directors should be identified and trained, but not necessarily maintained on a payroll full time. These positions would be activated during mobilization as the need evolved. An excellent source of such directors could be retired military personnel who volunteer to fill the positions. These retirees would receive annual training at the government's expense so they remain proficient in civil defense policy and programs.

DOD must also consider civil defense in all areas of reconstitution/mobilization. The direct defense of this country should always be the number one priority. Mobilization of the medical community for both people and equipment should not cause shortages of either throughout this country. Transportation of DOD people and equipment will be essential, but transportation for civil needs must also be considered. During mobilization civil defense shelters will need to be stocked with food, water and other
essential human needs, while the military will be building its own supply stocks. Energy vital for military purposes may be needed for civil defense as well. As we build up for global war, our citizens will need education on the civil defense program so they can become a part of the program and survive should an attack occur. Civil defense and military interaction and coordination to ensure our industrial base will support reconstitution and global war can best be coordinated by the one agency that will be heavily involved in both - DOD.

Our infrastructure and mobilization plans must include civil defense defined in terms of attack-related emergencies. At the same time, State and local governments should assume a greater role in disaster-related emergency preparedness. By establishing two separate programs, we ensure that civil defense does not take a back seat to disaster-related emergencies. The steps this country takes now to preserve and improve our civil defense program for the future will determine whether we can survive an attack on this country in the unlikely event that one should occur.
ENDNOTES

1. According to FEMA publication Civil Defense 1988: The Year in Review, in 1988 dollars, spending for civil defense dropped from $492.2 million in 1965 to $152.7 million in 1980, a 68% decrease. For 1992, the civil defense budget is $153.5 million.

2. This information is from an article in The Officer magazine (Oct, 1991), "Military Support to Civil Authorities: New Dimensions for the 1990s" by Colonel Maxwell Alston.

3. See the article by Colonel Alston mentioned above.

4. IEMS stresses preparedness activities common to all emergencies, including planning, warning, communications, command and control, population movement, food, shelter, medical care, and the provision of other critical resources.

5. In April, 1990, the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities, House Armed Services Committee, tasked FEMA to review the civil defense program and determine how best to structure FEMA and their mission and funding arrangements. As of November 1991, the report is still not complete and a new deadline of April, 1992 is approaching. The recommendations from this report should be carefully reviewed and any changes to roles and missions should be implemented within two years.

6. E.O. 12656 currently establishes these responsibilities. These responsibilities should be refined and written into the new Federal Civil Defense Act to become a statutory requirement.
Works Cited


