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**Humanitarian Assistance
and the Elements of Operational Design**

**A Monograph
by**

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Transportation Corps**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
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ABSTRACT

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This monograph examines joint warfighting doctrine to determine whether it applies to humanitarian assistance operations. Joint warfighting doctrine is based on campaign planning guidance. Campaign planning is characterized by operational art which consists of the elements of operational design: objective, sequencing of operations and the application of resources, and the operational functions. To determine whether joint warfighting doctrine applies to humanitarian assistance operations, recent Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope were analyzed using the elements of operational design.

The monograph demonstrated that the elements of operational design applied to humanitarian assistance operations. A major conclusion was that the centers of gravity were major hostile factions which threatened to disrupt or interfere with humanitarian assistance aid being provided by nongovernmental agencies and military forces. The friendly centers of gravity were the timely provision of humanitarian aid by nongovernmental organizations and military forces. Other conclusions discuss the shortcomings in the application of the elements of operational design and doctrine. Doctrinal shortfalls were found in the focus of intelligence, the design concepts for operational movement and maneuver, and the definition of operational fires which excludes nonlethal means such as psychological operations. Civil affairs played a prominent role in humanitarian assistance and should be considered an operational function by planners during plan development.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. Armed Services will increasingly be called upon to conduct operations other than war. They will act either as the leader or as a member of a United Nations (UN) or coalition effort. Many of these operations will be of a humanitarian nature as demonstrated by President Bush's commitment of forces to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq provides another recent example of the importance of humanitarian assistance to U.S. interests.

Humanitarian assistance is currently defined as "programs employing military personnel which are principally designed to promote nonmilitary objectives within a foreign civilian community. These objectives may include disaster relief; medical, veterinary, and dental aid; rudimentary construction; water and sanitation assistance; and support to/and or resettlement of displaced civilians (refugees or evacuees). Assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement the efforts of civilian authorities that have primary responsibility for providing such assistance." Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope were both designated as humanitarian assistance operations. However, both operations included a significant security mission.

This paper will explore Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope to determine whether our current joint warfighting doctrine applies to humanitarian assistance operations. Operational planners of joint, combined, or coalition forces should conduct humanitarian assistance operations using campaign plans. JCS Pub 5-00.1 (Initial Draft), Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning, the keystone manual for planning joint operations, specifies that the campaign plan is characterized by operational art. It defines operational art as the

employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.¹ Operational art consists of the elements of operational design which are objective, sequencing of operations and application of resources, and the operational functions.¹

Joint warfighting doctrine specifies that campaigns are intended to:

- o isolate the theater of operations
- o ensure uninterrupted air and sea lines of communication
- o gain and maintain air superiority
- o establish land, air, sea, space, and special operations in concert with military capabilities of allies and partners
- o build overwhelming combat power
- o attack enemy centers of gravity
- o win quickly with minimum of casualties.⁴

The elements of operational design appear primarily directed toward hostile activities. However, JCS Pub 5-00.1 also specifies that campaign plans are designed to apply across the operational continuum, able to address peace, conflict, and war.

For operations in peace, campaigns cover joint exercises to demonstrate resolve, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation, deterrent operations, and counternarcotics. Campaigns also cover low intensity conflict (LIC) which includes insurgency, counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, peacetime contingencies, foreign internal defense (FID), and recovery.¹ However, there is no discussion in joint doctrine of campaigns designed specifically for humanitarian purposes.

The question arises then, if joint warfighting doctrine and the elements of operational design focus on war and not humanitarian assistance, are they useful to operational planners in developing campaign plans for humanitarian assistance operations? To answer this question, this paper will first discuss operational design. Each of

the elements of operational design will be discussed in turn: objective, sequencing of operations and application of resources, and operational functions. The operational functions are intelligence, command and control, movement and maneuver, fires, support, and protection. The second section of the paper will discuss how operational design was applied during the recent humanitarian assistance operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope. Each operation will be examined in turn by first describing its background and then how each of the elements of operational design were applied. The third section of the paper will analyze how well the elements applied to humanitarian assistance operations. The paper will conclude with the major implications for joint doctrine and provide recommendations for future humanitarian assistance planners.

This monograph addresses a void in joint doctrine. The future seems to promise that U.S. armed forces will be conducting humanitarian assistance more frequently than in the past. While each operation is unique in scope and duration, campaign design provides the best start point for operational planners. This monograph provides some insights into how operations were planned and conducted in the past which should provide insights for planners in the future.

II. OPERATIONAL DESIGN

The Commander in Chief (CINC) or Joint Force Commander (JFC) executes campaigns through the application of operational art--the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Operational art requires that the JFC describe an end state (or vision) for achieving the strategic objective(s), operational objectives that achieve the

desired end state, a sequence of actions to achieve the operational objective, and the application of military resources to accomplish the sequence of actions. The JFC also applies operational art by synchronizing operational level activities called the operational functions. The six operational functions--command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, support, and protection--allow the JFC to directly influence the outcome of the campaign.

The first element of operational design is the objective. The objective is the central element of operational design because it establishes the conditions necessary to achieve the strategic aim.¹ The strategic aim or strategic direction comes from the National Command Authority (NCA) and describes the conditions which determine the end state.

The end state from the NCA is translated into strategic objectives which in turn form the basis of the mission statement. From the mission statement, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) determines what is to be done, what resources are available, and what actions may prevent mission accomplishment. The objective is then articulated through the commander's intent by defining the purpose of the operation, the end state with respect to the relationship among the force, the enemy, the terrain, and how the end will be achieved by the joint force. Tasks are determined that satisfy the requirements necessary to achieve the objective.

The objective normally focuses on destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity in order to be decisive in achieving the operational objective(s). The center of gravity is the enemy's main source of strength. At the operational level, the center of gravity is likely to be something physical such as the main enemy forces.

The second element of operational design is sequence of

operations and the application of resources. Once the objective(s) and the desired end state have been established, the JFC must envision the likely sequence of operations that will achieve them.' Generally this requires the JFC to focus on the enemy's center of gravity and the coordination of air, land, sea, and space assets. From this a plan is developed which synchronizes forces and the concept of their sustainment. Generally this plan encompasses phasing which divides the campaign to focus on major changes in the total effort.'

Phases normally include defensive, offensive, maritime action, land action, sea control, establishing lodgements, air superiority or other such activities. In each phase a main effort is described and each phase establishes the conditions for the next phase in the operation. Each phase has objectives and tasks it must achieve. Additionally, each phase describes the concept for achieving them with the necessary force requirements and supporting operations. The intent of phasing is to overwhelm the enemy as soon as conditions permit with simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of the battlefield.

Sequencing and the application of resources is constrained by limited resources and other considerations such as geographical distances. The U.S. strategy of force projection generally requires the U.S. Armed Forces to operate on exterior lines of communication making the U.S. dependent on strategic mobility assets and sustainment provided from CONUS to the theater of operations. Within the theater of operations, logistical bases must be established to support operational phases, and lines of communications have to be opened and maintained. Operations may also require intermediate staging bases due to distances involved.

Comprising a third element of operational design are the

operational functions. Operational functions provide the structure for designing a campaign plan. The JFC examines operations using these elements to determine the activities necessary to accomplish the mission.

The first of these functions is command and control, the direction by the JFC commander over apportioned forces.⁹ Command and control is exercised by arranging personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures to plan, direct, coordinate, and control forces to accomplish the mission.

Command and control is a process. The commanders at all levels are linked to receive intelligence and information on which to base decisions concerning accomplishment of the mission. The three primary decisions a commander makes are informational decisions, organizational decisions, and operational decisions.¹⁰ The key organizational decision is the structure of the organization because the structure facilitates the informational and operational decisions.

Intelligence, the next element, is key to the commander's informational and operational decisionmaking so that the other operational functions are centered on a common objective and arranged into a cohesive plan. Centering on a common objective normally requires that a joint campaign be oriented on the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity. Determining these centers of gravity requires intelligence collection and the integration of all sources of information. Successfully attacking the center of gravity will normally achieve the strategic aim of the campaign.

Operational intelligence is focused on the enemy in order to determine his strength and when and where he will conduct operations. Intelligence provides an understanding of the enemy, his methods of operating, intentions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and strategy.¹¹

Additionally, it provides insight into the enemy's character, social mores, language, and history. The intelligence estimate determines probable and potential enemy courses of action, as well as information on geography, weather, and other information which impacts on friendly courses of action.¹¹ Intelligence also furnishes support for friendly command, control, communication, and countermeasures.

The intelligence that the JFC receives directly impacts on the concept of operational movement and maneuver. Operational movement and maneuver is the disposition of joint or combined forces to create a decisive impact on major operations and campaigns.¹² A decisive impact is attained by securing a positional advantage before the operation or by exploiting tactical success. It also includes the initial movement or deployment of forces in the theater of operations or conducting maneuver to operational depths. Contained within movement and maneuver is the improvement of the mobility of friendly forces or degrading the mobility of enemy forces. Critical to mobility is controlling land, sea, and air in order to maintain freedom of action.

Coequal to operational movement and maneuver are operational fires. Operational fires are the application of firepower to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation.¹³ Operational fires are integrated with movement and maneuver to achieve the operational objectives. Yet, operational fires are by their nature joint/combined activities. Operational fires are a separate part of the operational scheme--they are not merely fire support. Operational fires focus on three major tasks: facilitating maneuver, isolating the battlefield, and destroying critical functions and facilities.¹⁴

JCS Pub 5-00.1 does not discuss nonlethal fires as a subelement

of operational fires. However, AFSC Pub 2, Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces, describes operational fires as including both lethal and nonlethal firepower.¹⁶ The U.S. Army's TRADOC PAM 11-9 also discusses nonlethal joint and combined operational fires as a means to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces. This includes the use of electronic warfare, special operations forces, and psychological operations.¹⁷ JCS Pub 5-00.1 takes a more limited view of psychological operations, electronic warfare, and special forces. It does not include them under the umbrella of nonlethal operational fires. In fact, in JCS Pub 5-00.1, psychological operations are listed as part of the campaign plan format, and electronic warfare appears in the campaign plan format under Signal.

The broader definition of operational fires contained in TRADOC PAM 11-9 lends operational planners greater flexibility in addressing or developing plans. Using this broader definition gives the JFC the option of delaying enemy operational movement, disrupting enemy command and control, degrading human and equipment performance, and affecting the enemy's will to fight.¹⁸

The fifth operational function is operational support which is defined as the logistical and other support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations.¹⁹ Operational support starts from the theater sustaining bases (the COMMZ), or forward sustaining bases, and it extends to the support units, resources, or facilities of the major tactical units thereby maintaining the tempo of operations throughout the course of the campaign and major operations.

Joint logistics planning falls into six broad functional areas: supply systems, maintenance, transportation, general engineering,

health services, and other services." Within each of these functional areas, the combatant commander, through the logistics planner, considers four elements of the logistics process: acquisition, distribution, sustainment, and disposition." Logistic considerations that the campaign planner must use when developing the campaign plan are logistics as a factor in determining objectives, coordination of logistics planning with operations, forward impetus, and the balance between combat forces and logistic forces. At the operational level of war logistics will have a marked effect or constraint on the employment options available to the commander to include movement, size, buildup, depth, and speed." With this in mind, logistics and operations are inseparable and must be integrated throughout the campaign planning process and phases.

Lastly, operational protection is the conservation of fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place." Foremost, it includes actions taken to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making friendly units difficult to locate and destroy. Operational protection includes protection of joint/combined forces, bases, and LOCs from enemy attack. Implied in this definition is the use of air defense systems, signal security, operations security, and physical security.

JCS Pub 5-00.1 says that the doctrine it contains for campaign planning should provide guidance for operational planners across the operational continuum which includes humanitarian assistance operations. Two recent humanitarian assistance operations will now be analyzed to provide examples for the application or nonapplication of this doctrine. The first operation to be studied is Operation Provide Comfort, the relief of the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

III. APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN

Operation Provide Comfort

After Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi Kurds began to eliminate Saddam Hussein's control over the northern Iraqi provinces. The Kurds took this initiative based on some of the statements President Bush had made indicating that the U.S. would support their efforts with military force. However, President Bush remarks were intended to provide the Kurdish people moral support only.¹¹ On 5 March 1991, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) committed guerrilla forces against the Iraqi military. By 14 March the PUK announced that it had control of four northern provinces. Subsequently, President Bush warned the Iraqi government not to use attack helicopters against the Kurds because it would complicate the Desert Storm cease-fire.

Saddam Hussein announced on 16 March that he intended to use attack helicopters, airplanes, and chemical weapons to destroy the Kurdish rebels. The U.S. reaffirmed its neutrality on 26 March, stating that it would not intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq. Thereafter, a major assault against the Kurdish people commenced involving reorganized Iraqi Republican Guard forces. Leaders of the PUK and KDP appealed to the U.S. to stop the annihilation and requested aid for their people who had fled to the northern mountains along the Turkey-Iraq border. Iraqi forces recaptured the northern provinces and over 3 million Kurdish people fled into camps 8,000 feet in the mountains. Reporters estimated that up to 2,000 people were dying each day from cold, hunger, and disease.¹² On 5 April, President Bush ordered forces to begin airlifting food and medicine and on 8 April, European leaders agreed to assist in this humanitarian

effort.

Within twenty-four hours of the mission assignment to provide immediate relief to the Kurds, the European Command (EUCOM) Joint Task Force (JTF) airlift elements arrived on the scene and twelve hours later administered the airdrop of twenty-seven tons of relief supplies. In the next seven days forces were introduced to administer humanitarian assistance directly to the Kurds and begin construction of the first humanitarian service support base. Within sixty days the dying and suffering had stopped and the population was either returned to their homes or transported to temporary transit camps built by the task force. During the same two month period over 17,000 tons of supplies were delivered over an area that stretched 83,000 square miles from ports and airports to final destination points. At the height of operations over 30,000 military personnel from thirteen nations either directly or indirectly supported the operation. Over thirty nations and fifty relief agencies from throughout the world contributed materiel and support to the operation.

How operational design applied to this monumental undertaking is discussed next.

Operational Design Applied

Objective

The initial strategic direction given to European Command (EUCOM), which later developed into Operation Provide Comfort, was to undertake a relief effort along the Turkey-Iraq border to save Kurdish civilians that had fled into the mountains." From this a mission was derived for the task force. Broadly, Joint Task Force Provide Comfort's (JTF-PC) mission was to relieve the plight of the Kurdish refugees. The initial task associated with this objective was to air-

deliver relief items to the civilians no later than 7 April 1991. A secondary task was to develop plans to provide medical support if this became necessary. The mission evolved along with associated taskings as operational assessments or estimates of the situation refined and modified the end state. Eventually, the final mission became to restore the situation to preconflict conditions. The initial short term air delivery operations had to evolve to longer term delivery of supplies and deployment of humanitarian forces directly to meet the critical needs of the refugees.

Continued estimates determined these actions were still insufficient to reach the desired end state. The environment of the mountain camps would not lead to the long-term survival of the people or return the displaced population to their homes. The operation had only stabilized the situation, not improved it. The only way the population could survive for the long-term was to establish a security zone in Northern Iraq. This zone was to be provided with suitable camps and facilities. The security zone was eventually expanded to encompass an area 160 kilometers by 50 kilometers containing 41 communities. This allowed the majority of the population to return to their homes."

Once the expansion was completed and the humanitarian assistance was passed to civilian relief organizations, the Combined Task Force (CTF) tasks were to provide security and monitor the situation. The security forces remained until humanitarian forces had redeployed to sustain the success achieved. When the security forces were withdrawn, a helicopter and ground force was stationed in Turkey to demonstrate coalition resolve and quickly react to any threat. CTF officials met with Iraqi and Kurdish leaders to monitor the situation and provide support. This operation became known as Provide Comfort

II.

The evolution of the the objectives caused a corresponding evolution in the sequence of operations.

Sequencing of Operations and Application of Resources

Operation Provide Comfort was characterized by three distinct phases of operation. The first phase of the campaign or operation was IMMEDIATE RELIEF. The objectives for this phase were 1) stop the dying and suffering, 2) stabilize the population, 3) provide shelter and physical protection, and 4) build a distribution system/infrastructure for continuous logistics support. The second phase of the operation was to ESTABLISH A SECURITY ZONE AND PROVIDE TEMPORARY FACILITIES. The objectives of this phase were 1) establish a security zone in Northern Iraq, 2) construct temporary facilities, and 3) transfer the population to the temporary sites. The third phase of the operation was the TRANSITION TO CIVIL AGENCIES. The objectives of this phase were 1) transition the humanitarian operation to international relief organizations and 2) enable the ultimate return of the refugees to their homes."

To accomplish the objectives of phase I, elements of the CTF established humanitarian service support bases (HSSBs). From these bases, humanitarian service support detachments (HSSDs) were sent to establish refugee camp sites. The detachments conducted assessments and established command, control, and communications at the various sites. They identified and established camp leadership and worked with private voluntary organizations (PVOs). They organized the receipt and distribution of relief supplies, basic medical care, and preventive medicine sanitation." The objective of establishing a distribution system and infrastructure initially focused on providing

immediate air drop supplies to the refugees.

Phase II involved establishing a secure area and constructing transit centers in Northern Iraq. A force cleared the area which became known as the Security Zone. The Security Zone provided the necessary security to permit the development of temporary sites. CTF forces designed a system of way stations with secure routes to incrementally move over 500,000 weakened refugees from the mountains to temporary destinations (in some cases final destinations). Those unable to return to their homes were initially housed in the way station camps. Sixty days after the operation began, the last of the mountain camps was closed and the personnel transported to the Security Zone.

Phase III began as the Civil Affairs Command coordinated with international relief organizations (IROs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and nongovernmental agencies to transition the humanitarian assistance operations to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A joint plan for transition was developed. UNHCR assumed the overall responsibility for coordinating the efforts of civilian relief agencies in the Security Zone. While the relief operations shifted to civilian agencies, a large security force was responsible for protecting the humanitarian operation against Iraqi hostile actions into the Security Zone.

Next, the operational functions will be analyzed to see how well they applied to Operation Provide Comfort.

Operational Functions

Command and Control

The organizational structure for Provide Comfort adapted constantly as the mission requirements evolved throughout the phases

of the operation. The end result was a CTF with subordinate commands/task forces and a headquarters designed to fulfill specified missions.

The headquarters was initially designed to provide command and control over U.S. air and special forces and evolved into providing command and control over coalition air, land, sea, and special forces. The Secretary of the Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated EUCOM to execute the mission. EUCOM in turn designated Joint Task Force-Provide Comfort (JTF-PC). Initially, EUCOM established a joint task force versus a combined task force because they felt that there was only going to be U.S. involvement.¹⁰ EUCOM selected the Deputy Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe to be the commander with his headquarters established at the U.S Air Force Base in Incirlik, Turkey. The initial selection of an Air Force component as the JTF was based on the preponderance of air assets required to accomplish the mission.

Following the European leaders meeting on 12 April 1991, the U.S. was informed that European and United Nations countries wanted to participate in the humanitarian effort.¹¹ With the participation of other nations, the JTF-PC evolved into Combined Task Force-Provide Comfort (CTF-PC). Commensurate with the increased responsibilities and the political and coordination requirements associated with coalition forces, the Deputy Commander of United States Army Europe (USAREUR) was designated CTF commander.

Thirteen nations joined the military coalition while thirty others provided humanitarian supplies. These nations provided air, naval, and ground forces and civilian relief organizations. Initially, the staff of the CTF consisted of U.S. personnel from EUCOM and its subordinate commands. As nations joined, the staff took on a

multinational flavor."¹¹ Each nation collocated their national headquarters in Incirlik with the CTF headquarters. Each coalition headquarters reported to its respective national government on policy and execution. The coalition staff managed the logistics and administration for all forces.¹²

Coalition partners assigned gave tactical control (TACON) of their forces to the CTF commander. While CTF-PC and subordinate commands/task forces had TACON, the coalition governments made the decisions on how they would allow their forces to be used by the CTF.¹³ Six subordinate commands were formed to execute the complex and varied missions of CTF-PC.

Combined Task Force-Alpha (CTF-A) had the mission of providing relief to the refugees located in the mountain camps along the Turkey-Iraq border. CTF-A was composed of air and ground special operations forces and civil affairs elements. Their tasks were to locate refugee camps, establish initial support bases and communications, organize camps and relief supplies, provide basic medical care, and enforce preventative medicine and sanitation.¹⁴ Eventually the task force was responsible for persuading refugees to leave the mountain camps and establishing a system to move the refugees to temporary or final destinations in Northern Iraq.¹⁵

Combined Task Force Bravo (CTF-B) was established to secure a safe haven and resettle the Kurds in Northern Iraq. To accomplish these missions, CTF-B constructed transit centers and camps, cleared routes, established a Security Zone, and provided relief aid.¹⁶ Establishing the Security Zone required development of a cohesive defense plan involving coalition forces. The CTF-B commander determined that integrating national forces to defend sectors maximized unit capabilities and offset limitations which created

multinational forces under each national headquarters." The establishment of two subordinate joint/combined task forces, CTF-A and CTF-B, was considered necessary to handle the missions because of the tasks, span of control, and expected duration of the operation."

Air Force Forces (AFFOR) consisted of all ground based helicopters, airlift, and fighters which allowed centralized control of air assets and provided a single interface with the Turkish air control system. The primary mission of AFFOR was to provide airdrop supplies to refugee mountain camps. Other missions included aerial resupply, reconnaissance, and transport."

Naval Forces (NAVFOR), operating from the carrier battle group Teddy Roosevelt (TF 60) located in the Mediterranean sea, was established to enforce the no-fly zone." In conjunction with this mission, NAVFOR conducted reconnaissance and provided air cover and close air support for the Security Zone."

The Combined Support Command (CSC) mission was to command and control the logistical support requirements of the coalition and manage humanitarian supply efforts." Normally, logistics requirements are a national responsibility, however, combining logistics provided centralized planning and execution to avoid duplicity and provide for rapid and efficient operations.

The Civil Affairs Command (CA CMD) was established to coordinate Kurdish resettlement operations and the numerous nongovernmental and voluntary agencies providing humanitarian assistance to the operation. CA units were under operational control of the task forces they supported."

An important element to the CTF was the Military Coordination Center (MCC) which was established to negotiate between the CTF Commander and the senior Iraqi General. The MCC mission was to

conduct daily communication with Iraqi military and civilian authorities to reduce conflict coinciding with the establishment of CTF-B in Northern Iraq." (See appendix A for the CTF organization.)

Intelligence

Operation Provide Comfort required all the normal intelligence functions associated with military operations. However, the most significant intelligence required for the operation was "cultural" intelligence." Cultural intelligence included information concerning the Kurds' political and tribal structure, lifestyle habits (such as food, and clothing), leaders and military organizations, and historical information concerning the conflict with the Iraqis. These information requirements formed what the CTF called essential elements of information (EEIS). EEIS was critical to the design of psychological operations and to civil affairs operations. In addition, EEIS provided the basis of the information the CTF leadership used in their decisions concerning the Kurds.

Several sources provided the CTF information that was processed into intelligence. Tactical reconnaissance provided the CTF with updated information concerning the refugee situation and intelligence regarding the disposition, composition, strength, and status of Iraqi military units. Human intelligence (HUMINT) sources within the Security Zone and in the refugee camps provided small unit leaders with important information and contacts. The information gathered was quickly transmitted directly to the CTF for analysis and dissemination. The contacts the MCC made were also a valuable source of intelligence. Regional, national, Turkish and local operations, security, and intelligence (OSI) detachments provided intelligence on terrorist groups located throughout the area. Inputs and assessments provided by these sources allowed continuous adjustment of security

measures and procedures."

Movement and Maneuver

Operational movement and maneuver for Operation Provide Comfort was not carried out in the classical sense, that is, to gain a positional advantage over enemy forces. Operational movement and maneuver consisted of actions to stabilize the population, establish a security zone, and ensure the safe movement of the refugees to the security zone.

Movement and maneuver for Phase I consisted of the rapid insertion of special forces elements into the widely dispersed, rugged, and inhospitable mountain areas where the refugee camps were located. Special forces elements provided security around each of these camps. (See appendix B for Phase I operational movement and maneuver.)

From these camps, light and highly mobile combat forces conducted reconnaissance along routes connecting the mountain camps to the Security Zone. Motorized combined arms teams cleared the mountain routes of mines, armed bands of guerrillas, bodies of victims, and abandoned or destroyed vehicles. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams assisted the combat forces with route clearance. Once the routes were clear, special forces established a system of secure way stations to incrementally move the refugees from the mountain camps to areas within the Security Zone.

Simultaneously, combat forces cleared the Security Zone. Initially, airborne and air assault elements were emplaced along the southern most limits of the Security Zone to defend against Iraqi Republican Guard forces located around the city of Dihok. Upon establishing a defensive line, additional combat forces expanded the Security Zone and eventually the Security Zone was divided into

sectors to be defended by multinational forces. Expanding the Security Zone also required a system of patrolling around urban centers as CTF forces entered major cities and towns.

Concurrently with the establishment and expansion of the Security Zone, combat forces conducted reconnaissance from the zone towards the refugee mountain camps to link-up with special forces elements. Secure transit centers were also established in the northern portions of the Security Zone as temporary housing locations until refugees arrived to final locations." (See appendix E for Phase II operational movement and maneuver.)

Fires

Operational fires consisted of lethal and nonlethal fires to deny the Iraqi Republican Guard forces freedom of maneuver within the exclusion zone and disrupt their operations against the Kurds. The primary method for denying Iraqi freedom of maneuver was the establishment of an exclusion zone or no-fly zone above the thirty-sixth parallel. Combat air patrol operated north of the thirty-sixth parallel to enforce the no-fly zone. Other lethal fires consisted of tactical systems to defend the Security Zone and refugee areas within the exclusion zone. Fighters escorted tactical airlift and helicopter transport and close air support and attack helicopters provided on-call support to ground maneuver elements.

Nonlethal fires consisted of leaflet operations directed at disrupting Iraqi military operations by stating that allied forces had the capability and the will to protect humanitarian operations. While no direct evidence indicates whether this was a factor in preventing Iraqi hostile activities, few aggressive actions were initiated by the Republican Guard forces.

Part of the nonlethal fires concept was also to prevent

terrorism. Leaflets were directed at the Peshmerga guerrillas and Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) dissidents emphasizing that an attack against the humanitarian relief operation would be counterproductive to the cause. Additionally, leaflets told the Iraqi people that operations were humanitarian and were being conducted in accordance with a UN resolution and morally correct in the eyes of Allah." These operations appeared to have been a factor in preventing terrorism as hostile activities ceased towards the coalition forces."

Support

Phase I of Operation Provide Comfort focused on a "push" system of supply to airdrop a maximum of relief tonnage in the camps. As Humanitarian Service Support Bases (HSSBs) were established close to refugee areas, the Combined Support Command transferred to a "pull" system that tailored deliveries to meet the requirements of each HSSB. During Phase II, stockage levels were determined at the various aerial and sea ports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs) and the HSSBs and transported to locations by air and truck. Foreign nation support was (FNS) contracted from Turkey to provide supplies, transportation, labor and services allowing for an easier transition to Phase III when civilian agencies took over the humanitarian efforts.

Establishing a distribution system that covered the vast expanse of the area of operations was the critical aspect of providing relief to the Kurds and supporting the force." The system began at the SPODs at Iskenderen, Mersin, and Izmir and APODs at Incirlik and Diyarbakir. Supplies and equipment were staged at these locations and moved by contracted trucks to the four HSSBs established at Sirsenk, Northern Iraq or the main logistics base at Silopi in Turkey. At these locations supplies were stored and packaged for daily delivery to designated sites by helicopter and ground support." (See appendix

D.)

To support operations, civil affairs units were employed from the start of the operation and used throughout every phase. They initially worked with special forces teams of Task Force Alpha in the refugee mountain camps. Civil affairs units researched and applied cultural and traditional factors to aid in the construction of Kurdish communities. The transition of the humanitarian assistance operation to civilian relief agencies/organizations was given to the Civil Affairs Command. The Civil Affairs units' knowledge of UNHCR construction criteria for temporary refugee camps and transit centers expedited this transition and the care provided to the Kurds.

Protection

Operation Provide Comfort illustrated the unique aspects of operational protection during humanitarian assistance. Operation Provide Comfort required continuous security operations throughout each phase including the transition to civilian agencies. Initially, CTF forces were threatened by large armed groups of Pesmerga guerrillas and PKK operating on both sides of the Turkish-Iraq border. Several incidents occurred between CTF forces and guerrillas until it became known that CTF forces were there for humanitarian reasons. Turkish escort forces had to drive off attackers on one occasion. Because the guerrillas were heavily armed, CTF forces had to take necessary precautions even after the humanitarian operations were recognized. Support areas also had to be secured. Leftist terrorist groups such as Dev Sol threatened CTF forces around bases. Combat forces provided protection from the Iraqi military which was also the largest threat to both the friendly forces and the Kurdish refugees.

Also key to the operational protection for Provide Comfort was the rules of engagement (ROE) established for the operation.¹¹ The

ROE provided the conditions in which the soldiers could protect themselves without endangering the accomplishment of their humanitarian mission. (See appendix E for Operation Provide Comfort ROE.) ROE were especially critical because of the mixture of terrorists, guerrillas, conventional Iraqi forces, and the indigenous population.

Although Operation Provide Comfort planners did not produce a campaign plan, the order which was developed and modified successfully incorporated the elements of operational design." In the case of Operation Provide Comfort, operational design applied fairly well to humanitarian assistance operations. As of this writing, Operation Provide Comfort II continues to provide security for the Kurds and the PVOs helping with reconstruction. Before Provide Comfort could end, the U.S. had to embark upon another humanitarian assistance operation.

Operation Restore Hope

The second great humanitarian assistance operation undertaken by U.S. forces in two years was Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Operation Restore Hope was a joint/combined operation to provide security to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian relief efforts by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Military forces were involved in administering humanitarian aid, conducting combat operations, and assisting with the reconstruction of the Somali infrastructure.

For twenty-one years Somalia was ruled by an extremely repressive military dictatorship which resulted in political unrest and the establishment of several opposition movements against the President, Major General Said Barre. In 1989, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF), declared war on

the Barre government."

In 1990, the USC, SPF, and the Somali National Movement (SNM) joined forces against Barre causing him to lose support of the intellectuals who called themselves the Manifesto Group. They asked Barre to step down but he refused and fighting ensued. In January, 1991, USC forces, under command of General Mohammed Farah Aideed, entered Mogadishu and Barre fled. Without consulting the other groups, the Manifesto Group appointed Ali Mahdi Mohammed as President." The alliance between the USC, SPF and SNM collapsed because the latter two were not consulted about the formation of the new government. Each clan and family group wanted recognition as the ruling power. Ali Mahdi and Aideed were also in disagreement and fighting broke out between these two factions and the country fell into a tribal civil war fought by fifteen clans and subclans. None of the clans were successful in their struggle for dominance which caused the country to go without a government or its services for two years. During this time the infrastructure of the country deteriorated and looting was rampant. This desperate situation was exacerbated by years of widespread drought, poor agricultural techniques, and a poorly developed economic infrastructure causing famine and starvation." Clan families exploited this situation by obstructing movement of international relief supplies and extorting money and food supplies as a method to gain power."

In April, 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established to provide a peacekeeping force to monitor a cease fire established between the warring factions and to protect international relief efforts. Fifty personnel were initially sent in July with an additional four 750-person units approved for August. However, these early efforts proved ineffective as looting, extortion,

and fighting continued. Relief supplies continued to be diverted from the starving population."

On 29 November 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations reported to the Security Council that the deteriorating security conditions in Somalia had severely disrupted international relief efforts and that an immediate military operation under UN authority was urgently needed." On 3 December, the Security Council adopted a resolution which determined that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security and authorized all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. In accordance with this UN resolution, President Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces under U.S. command as part of a multilateral response to address a "major human calamity, avert related threats to international peace and security, and protect the safety of Americans and others engaged in relief operations." Other members of the United Nations were introduced to achieve the objectives of the UN resolution. U.S. Armed Forces were to remain in Somalia as long as necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and then eventually to turn over responsibility of the operation to a UN peacekeeping force.

Against this backdrop, Operation Restore Hope will be analyzed on how the elements of operational design were applied.

Operational Design Applied

Objective

Operations Restore Hope and Provide Comfort were both classified as humanitarian assistance operations with a joint and coalition flavor. The similarities end there because Operation Restore Hope was a deliberate humanitarian assistance operation rather than an

emergency created from our own war activities. With the exception of disarming the population, the objectives did not constantly evolve. However, the task force had to remain flexible in achieving the objectives.

Operation Restore Hope commenced on 3 December 1992 with the issuance of a JCS warning order to U.S. Commander in Chief Central Command (USCINCCENT) to initiate direct U.S. intervention in Somalia. The NCA assigned the mission and apportioned forces to USCINCCENT to accomplish the mission. The mission was to conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia, to secure the major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and to assist UN/nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices." The JFC's vision for Operation Restore Hope was: "to create an environment in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts."

The strategic objectives set forth by the President, which subsequently translated into the operational objectives and missions, furnished the direction to formulate, the sequence, and accomplish the operations that were necessary.

Sequencing of Operations and the Application of Resources

The operational concept for Operation Restore Hope envisioned four phases from the very beginning of the operation. These four phases were designed to achieve the JTF's mission: 1) Phase I - ESTABLISH LODGEMENT/SECURITY FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS IN MOGADISHU, 2) Phase II - EXPAND JTF SECURITY OPERATIONS TO MAJOR INTERIOR RELIEF CENTERS, 3) Phase III - CONTINUE EXPANSION FOR INTERIOR RELIEF

CENTERS, and 4) Phase IV - RELIEF IN PLACE OF U.S. FORCES WITH THIRD NATION SECURITY FORCES."

To accomplish each of the phases and transition to the next phase, tasks were specified for each. The accomplishment of specified tasks for each phase meant that the completion of each phase was event driven instead of time driven.

Critical to accomplishing Phase I was securing the air and sea ports of Mogadishu. Subsequently, establishing these ports allowed the JTF to establish its headquarters ashore and Marine pre-positioning ships began moving equipment ashore upon conclusion of the amphibious assault. Once the JTF was established ashore the task was to establish contact with local leaders. The remaining task was to secure an additional airhead to expedite movement into theater."

Phase II operations required the JTF to secure additional key interior population centers where major relief agencies and nongovernmental agencies and relief centers were located. Simultaneously, additional U.S. and UN/coalition forces continued to flow into the theater. Once U.S. forces had secured specified relief centers or other objectives, phased exchange of U.S. forces with UN forces were to take place as the situation permitted."

To expand operations to the interior relief centers for Phase III, the JTF had to secure routes for the movement of food supplies to the interior. In conjunction with this task, JTF forces provided convoy security and conducted armed reconnaissance of the major supply routes used to distribute supplies to the interior relief centers. Specified tasks to be accomplished later during this phase were the selected redeployment of specified forces that had completed mission requirements and the selected retrograde of equipment not necessary to conduct operations. Additionally, the JTF conducted operations to

seize and uncover weapons caches. This task was added as a necessity to providing a better security environment."

Phase IV tasks required the transition from U.S. led peacemaking forces to UN peacekeeping forces. Conceptually, the priority for transition was the exchange of combat forces followed by combat support, combat service support, and command and control. Key to the successful transition was the identification of ongoing functions and how each of them would be transferred to UNOSOM II forces. Although time lines were used to estimate transition schedules, functional elements were not permitted to depart until certain events were completed and the replacement operation was fully functioning."

To accomplish the myriad of tasks for each of the phases, the JFC had to orchestrate the many activities associated with the operational functions. The next section will look at the application of the operational functions.

Operational Functions

Command and Control

For Operation Restore Hope USCINCCENT formed a Joint Task Force under the command of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander. Later it was renamed the Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF). In turn the JFC created service component commands under the JTF for Marine Forces (MARFOR), Army Forces (ARFOR), Air Forces (AFFOR), and Naval Forces (NAVFOR). Other subordinate commands were Coalition Command, Special Forces (SOFOR) and a Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC)."

Three major land forces shared the responsibility for achieving the security objectives. MARFOR, consisting of coalition amphibious forces, was to secure the main lodgement area and designated inland

relief centers and sectors. ARFOR, consisting of coalition army forces, was designated to secure a secondary lodgement and other designated relief centers and sectors. Coalition Command, consisting of non-U.S. ground forces, was to secure other major relief centers and sectors as assigned.

Coalition Command consisted of only those nations that provided a significant force structure in the country. For example, the French Brigade with 2,500 soldiers, took responsibility for securing the relief center at Oddur. These forces assumed primary responsibilities in their sectors during the transition to UN peacekeepers and retained residual forces under UN command. Other national without significant force structure worked with MARFOR and ARFOR in jointly securing relief centers were assigned to the U.S. command as TACON. For example, the Belgians which assisted the U.S. forces securing Kismayo were TACON to the ARFOR."

NAVFOR, led by carrier battle groups Teddy Roosevelt and Kitty Hawk, were deployed for contingency tasking in support of the operation." Their mission was to provide on-call close air support and other missions. AFOR were established consisting of U.S. and coalition theater airlift forces to transport and deliver humanitarian supplies. A special operations forces (SOPOR) command element was also established from Special Operations Forces Europe with reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection missions."

The JFC directed the establishment of a Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC) under the CJTF to provide logistical support to all coalition forces and assist in the support of humanitarian supply efforts. (See appendix F for a schematic of the organization of the [CJTF].)

Intelligence

Operational intelligence focused on the organization, composition, disposition, capabilities, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the major clans within the area of operations. The collapse of the central government pitted clan against clan with the warring factions essentially carving up the country among themselves. Intelligence gathered specific information concerning the clans and the areas under their control. (See appendix G.) This focus was also applied to other criminal groups and individual criminal activity.

Intelligence focused on clan leadership, their motivations, and possible causes of clan struggle. It appeared that the motivation to commit violence was a result of the struggle for survival in a chaotic environment where the principle objectives were to secure food and other necessities, ensure security against rival clans, and maintain political power in a post-conflict environment. Assessments indicated that motivations toward violent behavior might be overcome or mitigated by civil order and relief efforts.¹⁴

Other operational intelligence included an assessment of clan capabilities such as armaments, force strengths, likely actions such as raids and ambushes, and how the clans operated. The most difficult assessment was determining clan intent. Human intelligence (HUMINT) assets seemed the only means for the CJTF commander to collect this information.¹⁴

Somali infrastructure proved to be an important intelligence requirement for operational planners. Port and airfield capacities proved critical for force projection as they both had an impact on the flow of troops and equipment into theater. The conditions of road networks, facilities, and water availability were also deemed critical information.¹⁵

One of the most important areas of intelligence was information

concerning nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the area of operations. Where UNOSOM/NGOs were located, their strengths and status became one of the commander's critical information requirements. The locations and operations of these NGOs played a critical role in the development of the concept of operational movement and maneuver.

Movement and Maneuver

The operational movement and maneuver concept was to secure major distribution and relief centers, secure lines of communication, and expand security to encompass the entire southwestern region of Somalia in order to provide an unimpeded flow of relief support. Throughout execution, the concept had to support a rapid transition to a multinational UN command.

Phase I movement and maneuver was focused on conducting an unopposed amphibious assault to establish a lodgement in Mogadishu by securing the air and sea ports. The port in Mogadishu was the primary means through which international relief organizations received and distributed relief aid. To support this operation, NAVFOR elements were positioned in the Indian Ocean to serve as launching platforms and provide on-call close air support. Once the lodgement was secure, the CJTF and ARFOR headquarters were established ashore in Mogadishu. To extend relief operations, security was expanded to include security around two major interior relief centers at the key cities of Baidoa and Baledogle. Expanding security included air assault forces, securing airfields and ground forces securing lines of communication between Mogadishu and the two cities. AFFOR airlift assets were positioned in Mombasa, Kenya to support relief operations upon securing the airfields.¹⁴ (See appendix H.)

During Phase II, a secondary lodgement was secured around the

key port of Kismayo, another significant relief distribution point. In addition, coalition forces extended relief operations by securing numerous additional interior relief centers at four major southwestern Somali cities. Lines of communication between Mogadishu, Kismayo, and the other cities were protected to ensure a safe distribution of supplies to the interior relief centers." (See appendix I.)

Establishing security at interior relief centers set the conditions for Phase III. Securing the cities of Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bardera, Baidoa, Baledogle, Gialalassi, and Belet Uen provided the method to establish humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). Marka was also secured by Army forces during Phase III. Relief sectors were established around these key relief centers by expanding security which divided southwestern Somalia into security areas or HRS. Secure relief centers and sectors coupled with guarded lines of communication ensured a safe distribution network for food supplies." (See appendix J.)

The conditions created during Phase III operations permitted the efficient transition to Phase IV. Phase IV involved the transition of operations to a UN command. At the end of Phase III, nine sectors were centered around the key relief center cities. Operations rapidly transitioned to a UN command because the multinational forces took part in the initial operations to secure these nine sectors. (See appendix K for the multinational sector responsibilities.) Eventually U.S. forces will be phased out of some sectors."

Fires

Operational fires consisted mainly of nonlethal means. Psychological operations facilitated operational movement and maneuver by disrupting and disarming resistance as security operations were expanded. Themes focused on legitimizing UN and military efforts,

arms confiscation and its purposes, and informing people of ongoing operations. People were informed what they were supposed to do and what would happen if they did not cooperate. Citizens generally complied with instructions and did not interfere with operations, thereby validating psychological operations' contribution to maintaining freedom of action. Lethal fires were on-call; however, they were not necessary for humanitarian assistance to establish the conditions for success. The show of force with U.S. war planes prior to the landing did demonstrate the awesome power that could be used which had some psychological impact on the warring factions. Support

Logistics was phased in accordance with operational phases and transitioned from a Marine/Navy controlled operation to an Army operation. Initially, during phase I, the I MEF 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG) provided theater level logistics. Movement of supplies and equipment into the theater was accomplished by airlift until sea lines of communication were established. During Phase I, logistics stocks primarily depended on Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) stocks and Navy stocks pre-positioned in Kenya."

Phase II operations initially envisioned that the ARFOR would assume theater logistics responsibilities with the 593rd Area Support Group working with the 10th Mountain Division. However, the decision was made to establish a Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC) to replace the 1st FSSG. The 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM) was selected to provide this organization." Sustainment during this period transitioned from MPF and Navy stocks to theater logistics through air and sea lines of communication from CONUS."

Port operations at Mogadishu transferred from the Commander, Maritime Pre-positioned Force (CMPF) to the Army's 7th Transportation Group (Terminal) during Phase III. Additionally, during Phase III,

the 7th Group assumed aerial port operations from the 1st FSSG."

Finally, during Phase III, the JTFSC assumed all joint service logistics functions including water, fuel, transportation, materiel management, and movements control. This assumption required some transfers of fuel and water equipment between JTFSC units and units of the 1st FSSG." Phases I through III were a doctrinally sound program of Marine and Navy support operations transitioning to the Army as the scope and duration of the operation increased.

During Phase IV, transition operations, the 593d ASG assumed JTFSC responsibilities under the UN command. 593rd commanded residual logistics forces required for remaining U.S. and coalition forces unable to support themselves. To support this concept, minimum theater support units were established to expedite redeployment and reduce dependence on U.S. support." (See appendix L for the organization of the JTFSC.)

The logistical concept was to provide support in an austere environment assuming no foreign nation support was available due to the devastation of any existing support infrastructure, including transportation. As previously discussed, the concept of operations created nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). Each sector in turn was designated as the responsibility of a particular subordinate command of the CJTF. For example, Baledogle, Kismayo, and Marka were designated the responsibility of ARFOR."

Logistics support was tailored to support both the humanitarian and security missions of the forces. Theater logistics was designed to support the 25,000 U.S. forces and the 13,000 coalition forces. The support concept was to minimize the support "push" from theater to forward units to minimize the amount of logistical supplies (stockage levels) in forward support bases.

Civil Affairs was the primary interface with humanitarian assistance organizations. The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) run by the senior staff member and other key members. The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) collocated with this element. The CMOC coordinated, explained, and defended CJTF operations. HOCs were also established in each of the major relief cities. The HOCs held meetings attended by CA teams, the military unit responsible for the area, NGOs, and village elders. The HOC resolved issues and was also the impetus for reestablishing local government and services (such as schools, local police, sewer/sanitation, medical care, and the local marketplace). CA teams assisted in finding food distribution sites, coordinating with relief agencies, and ensuring food distribution was equitable. Integral to this operation was ensuring that the local civilian leadership played a lead role which kept CA teams from having to make a long term commitment."

Protection

ROE was also an especially important element of operational protection of forces involved in Operation Restore Hope. The chaotic environment and the political sensitivity associated with the humanitarian effort made ROE key to the success of the operation." Another important element of protection became disarming of gangs, clans, and other criminal elements and the subsequent destruction of their weapons so they could not be used again.

An important part of operational protection was base defense. The area of operations for Operation Restore Hope did not have a clearly defined rear area; therefore, the CJTF and ARFOR Provost Marshals assumed responsibility for base and base cluster defense plans. Coalition forces were also incorporated into the base defense

plan. A common defense plan which provided for common responses to threats was essential to the survival and protection of the force."

USCINCCENT's campaign concept was extremely successful and applied the elements of operational design. Operation Restore Hope demonstrated that all operational design concepts except lethal fires were incorporated into the humanitarian assistance operation.

Both Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope show how operational design can be applied to humanitarian assistance operations. Some functions and design concepts applied better than others and were meaningful for campaign planners. Some operational functions need additional definition to provide better guidance to operational planners. The next section will compare doctrine with how the elements were applied.

IV. COMPARISON OF DOCTRINE AND APPLICATION

Humanitarian assistance operations are characterized by two basic missions--security and assistance. All humanitarian assistance operations have these to some degree if military forces are used. This distinction between security and assistance becomes important during the analysis of how doctrine was applied.

The first issue concerning objective was that in both cases studied the National Command Authority established good strategic objectives which led to an end state. In turn, the end state led to excellent operational objectives.

The major deviation from doctrine was the absence of a focus on a center of gravity for determining the operational objectives. In neither operation was it readily evident that this concept was used by the operational planners to gather intelligence to use in determining the objectives. The first question that has to be asked is whether

this concept was applicable to the humanitarian assistance operations, and if it did apply, what were the centers of gravity? Clausewitz says that the focus of all efforts should be centered on the destruction of the enemy center of gravity. However, in humanitarian assistance this does not necessarily apply because humanitarian assistance is defined as an operation other than war. However, an enemy center of gravity exists and the operational planner has to be prepared to focus on them in the security portion of the mission. In Operation Provide Comfort, the targeted center of gravity was the Republican Guard forces which threatened operations in the security zone. The CTF could not attack these forces as this would no longer be considered a humanitarian assistance operation and would constitute an act of war. In Operation Restore Hope, the center of gravity was the major clans which threatened to disrupt or impede relief efforts.

Clausewitz also stated that you must protect your own center of gravity. In humanitarian assistance, the friendly center of gravity is normally defined as time, the coalition, or nongovernmental organizations. The operational planner has to ensure that campaign design protects the friendly center of gravity. In Operation Provide Comfort, the friendly center of gravity was the coalition of armed forces and NGOs providing relief aid. In Operation Restore Hope, the friendly center of gravity was the humanitarian aid provided by UNOSOM and other NGOs.

The implication for operational planners is that in humanitarian assistance there is no enemy center of gravity that must be attacked. In humanitarian assistance operations there is a friendly center of gravity that must be protected or defended such as the timely administration of humanitarian aid provided by nongovernmental agencies or military forces. The targeted centers of gravity are

those primary hostile factions which threaten to disrupt the humanitarian aid efforts, but they cannot be directly attacked as this would be outside the scope of a humanitarian assistance operation.

The second element examined was sequencing and application of resources. A principle component of this element is building overwhelming combat power. While overwhelming the enemy is not the purpose of humanitarian assistance, the use of overwhelming capabilities to quickly achieve operational objectives was paramount in Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope. In both cases combat capabilities were brought to bear in sufficient force to ensure security of relief efforts and deny any possible interference from hostile factions." Humanitarian assistance operations require a redefinition of overwhelming power to describe the term as overwhelming capability because each operation demonstrated that the objectives required a higher ratio of noncombat forces to combat forces. While significant infantry and other forces were needed, there was also a great need for civil affairs, engineers, logisticians, military police and other support forces required to fulfill the humanitarian assistance roles.

The implication to planners in sequencing operations for humanitarian assistance operations is that they must balance security forces which protect the force with noncombat forces which assist in providing the humanitarian relief efforts. In the early phases of the operation, the preponderance of forces will be combat but these forces must quickly give way to noncombat forces which provide unique capabilities in assisting or providing relief efforts.

The key concept affecting command and control was mission which was derived from the objective. Both operations highlight that each humanitarian assistance operation is unique and no two organizational

structures are alike. Doctrine says that command and control can be established using functional components, subordinate task forces, service components, or a combination. Both operations under study used these variations successfully. Operation Provide Comfort developed a structure with functional commands including subordinate joint task forces. Operation Restore Hope developed a command structure that consisted of service component commands and some functional commands. In each situation they were adapted for the conditions and incorporated coalition partners.

The second operational function was intelligence. Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope showed that the focus on the enemy needs to be redefined to include hostile factions, (such as clans and subclans), which impact on friendly courses of action. The other major difference in the two humanitarian assistance operations observed was that a majority of the collection efforts were directed at friendly activities such as nongovernmental agency operations which have a dramatic impact on designing the other operational functions. For example, Operation Restore Hope showed that the locations of NGOs influenced the concept of operational maneuver.

Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope demonstrated that the concepts for designing movement and maneuver for humanitarian assistance operations differed from those designed for war. Some considerations remained the same such as the movement into theater by securing lodgements. However, the concepts of conducting maneuver to operational depths and exploiting tactical success were fundamentally different. Movement and maneuver for the security portion of humanitarian assistance operations consists of securing and/or controlling key terrain (including cities, distribution points, relief centers), sectors or areas from violent activity. It also includes

developing methods to secure lines of communications between major security zones, sectors, and areas to ensure the unimpeded movement of relief supplies, refugees and other items. It also consists of the separation of warring factions, if necessary, through a system of counter mobility, patrolling, check points, and demilitarized zones. The concept of maneuver must be designed to accomplish the security mission quickly so that the assistance may begin. Ideally, the two can take place almost simultaneously. Operational planners must balance the security and humanitarian assistance requirements when developing their concept of operational movement and maneuver.

Operational fires did not have a prominent role in the two humanitarian assistance operations studied. Nonlethal fires, as defined in TRADOC PAM 11-9, predominated and consisted primarily of psychological operations. Psychological operations were vital to preventing hostile activities towards humanitarian assistance forces and to gaining public support within the supported country. Psychological operations will always have a dominant role in humanitarian assistance operations and therefore, should be incorporated in all joint service publications as nonlethal fires.

The scope of each humanitarian assistance operation is different; therefore, lethal fires must continue to be considered as operational planners develop their campaign concept. Some humanitarian assistance operations may require a higher degree of lethal means to ensure that humanitarian assistance operations are not affected by hostile factions. For example, operational fires may be required to isolate the battlefield from outside interference from a third nation which is providing support to one of the factions. In addition, establishment of no-fly zones will continue to be an important factor in developing a fires concept.

The Combined Support Command (CSC) of Operation Provide Comfort and the Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC) of Operation Restore demonstrated that current support doctrine was on target. The U.S. will most likely assume primary logistics responsibility for any future joint or combined operation. Because of the austere nature of most locations in which humanitarian assistance operations are likely to take place, logistics planners must strive to avoid redundancy so that the logistics systems remains available for the main purpose-- humanitarian assistance.

Often, coalition participation is contingent on the U.S. providing logistic support because many nations have limited means of supporting their forces outside their own country. The U.S. has the logistics capability to support large forces in the field. Primarily, the U.S. has the greatest strategic lift capability to project combat, combat support, and service support forces. The implication is that it is probably inevitable that the U.S. will provide the preponderance of operational logistics and other support requirements; therefore, operational planners must incorporate this into their plans.

Civil affairs is a vital aspect of humanitarian assistance operations, yet it is only discussed briefly in the operational support element of JCS PUB 5-00.1. The manual states that obtaining support from the civilian economy is the role of civil affairs. However, it is much more than host nation support. TRADOC PAM 11-9 describes it as the activities which embrace the relationship between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in a friendly country or occupied country or area when military forces are present." The critical nature of civil affairs, as depicted in Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope, demonstrate that it has an equal and important role in the design of campaign plans for

humanitarian assistance. As such, it should be considered an operational function during plan development. Civil affairs operations are inextricably linked to the other operational functions, particularly in concepts developed for command and control, movement and maneuver, and support. Civil affairs personnel identify and coordinate nongovernmental agency operations, arrange and organize humanitarian supplies and efforts, assist in the reestablishment of basic government services, and transition operations to civilian control.

The element of protection applies equally well to humanitarian assistance operations as it does to war. Planners use the same considerations to protect the force for humanitarian assistance, (such as ROE, base defense, and air defense), as those used in campaign planning for war.

While the doctrine of operational design provides adequate guidance for humanitarian assistance, the operations under study showed that one of the requirements of operational art, deception, does not apply well. Operational deception, an important concept of operational art, as described in JCS PUB 5-00.1, was not used for either operation. Deception manipulates the perceptions about friendly force intentions, perceptions, and positions." This does not mean that deception is irrelevant to the success of any future humanitarian assistance operation. However, Operations Provide Comfort and Restore displayed that friendly actions were broadcast well in advance. In humanitarian assistance it is usually beneficial for all players to know what is going to happen so they can react accordingly. Keeping all parties informed reduces conflict, disagreement and, most importantly, reduces casualties.

Two final factors not covered in doctrine impact significantly

on humanitarian assistance operations. First, the JFC must consider the political requirements associated with building a command organization. Governments may place restrictions on the use of their forces and the JFC commander must display the flexibility to incorporate them into the campaign plan as the political conditions dictate and be able to maximize the unit capabilities while accomplishing the mission. Both of the operations under study depict the multinational flavor of humanitarian assistance operations. This is difficult to address in doctrine but the joint force planner must be aware of the political sensitivities involved in coalition warfare. Again, each case is unique.

Second, the media has a dramatic affect on the public perception of how quickly humanitarian assistance relief aid is provided to the people of the supported country. The media affects the perceptions of the American people on how rapidly efforts are being made to improve the conditions of the people in the supported country. The media should be given as much access as possible throughout the operation. Humanitarian assistance operations are essentially good things and should be given as much publicity as possible. This ensures public support within the U.S. and helps solidify the U.S. position as world leader. Operational planners should plan for providing adequate support for the media in humanitarian assistance.

V. CONCLUSION

Operations Provide Comfort and Restore Hope demonstrated that the elements of operational design used in joint campaign planning apply to humanitarian assistance operations. This monograph provided operational planners ideas on how to apply them to future operations. Despite their applicability, some shortcomings were identified during


the analysis. These shortcomings have implications as well for future humanitarian assistance planners and doctrine.

The operational functions of intelligence and movement and maneuver both applied to humanitarian assistance operations. However, some definitional changes need to be implemented in the doctrine. The definition for intelligence needs to include a statement that the focus for humanitarian assistance operations, an operation other than war, needs to include hostile factions that may attempt to disrupt security or humanitarian assistance operations. These hostile factions do not fit the current definition of enemy. Doctrine also needs to add a focus on nongovernmental agencies' operations and other friendly activities which impact on friendly courses of action, particularly movement and maneuver.

The concept of movement and maneuver is fundamentally different for humanitarian assistance operations than for war. In war, movement and maneuver consists, among others, of exploiting tactical success and reaching operational depth. For humanitarian assistance, the concept is centered around securing zones, sectors, areas, and lines of communication from hostile activities to ensure the unimpeded movement of supplies, refugees or other relief activities.

While the mission is the dominant factor in developing the campaign concept, political agendas will have a dramatic effect on design concepts for command and control, movement and maneuver, and support. Political requirements determine command relationships, affect how force capabilities are maximized for movement and maneuver and how logistical and other support is provided to the force. Mission and political requirements have a dual relationship when developing campaigns for humanitarian assistance as most actions outside the U.S. will involve a coalition command.

The future holds promise for more humanitarian assistance operations led by U.S. military forces. Each situation will be unique but each will be the same in that some form of need will require urgent resolution by a military force. In most cases, there will be a security requirement and a humanitarian assistance requirement. All will require fast action under the scrutiny of the media. U.S. joint planners can look to doctrine and these lessons to ensure success in these crucial humanitarian assistance actions.



CTF-PC*

CA CMD

CMOC
353rd CA CMD (-)
354th CA BDE (-)
Task Force CIV
354th CA BDE (-)
432nd CA Co (-)
(CTF-A)
418th CA Co
431st CA Co
432 CA Co (-)
(CTF-B)
96th CA Bn
(3rd CDO BDE)

AFFOR

7440 Comp Wing (Prov)
81 Tac FTR WG (A-10)
86 Tac FTR WG (F-16)
36 Tac FTR WG (F-15)
552 ACACW (E-3 AWACS)
306 Stral WG (KC/RC-135)
39 Tac GP
43 ECS (EF-111/EC-130)
52 Tac FTR WG (F-4G)
123 TRS (RF-4)
Canadian AF (C-130)
Portuguese AF (C-130)
Royal AF (C-130)(UK)
COM HELO-Provider Ops
4/8 AVN (UH-60)
4/11 ACR (UH-60)
502 AVN (CH-47)
Royal AF (CH-47)(UK)
IT AF (CH-47/UH-1)(IT)
HMM-264 (CH-43/CH-46/
UH-1/AH-1)

COMALF
37 Tac Arftt SQ (C-130)
61 Tac Arftt SQ (C-130)
302 Tac Arftt WG (C-130)
317 Tac Arftt WG (C-130)
143 Tac Arftt GP (C-130)
58 MAS (C-12/C-21)
French AF (C-160/DHC-6)
Italian AF (G-222/AY-22)
Belgian AF (C-130)


CSC

21st TAACOM (-)
9th MMC (-)
21st Pers GP (-)
9th Fin GP (-)
16th Chem Det (-)
AMC (-)
82nd Ord Co (-)
72nd EOD
279th SIG PLT (-)
70th Trans Bn (-)
14th Trans Bn (MC)
29th ASG (-)
66th Maint Bn (-)
5th Maint Co (-)
51st Maint Bn (-)
5th QM Det
SSIG
593rd S&S Co (-)
44th SIG
CTF Surgeon
7th Med Log 99th Med Det
159th Air Amb
C/3 FSB/3 ID
C/501 FSB/1 AD
CMAGTF 1-91 (LSB Bn -)

APPENDIX A (CONT.)

APPENDIX A (CONT.)

**OPERATIONAL
MOVEMENT & MANEUVER
PHASE I**




**- 8 MAJOR CAMP SITES
- 43 SEPARATE LOCATIONS**

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B



Source: U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, *Chil Afairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium* (Fort Bragg, NC: USA/SWCS, Oct 25-27, 1991): 267.
Graphic representation—scale approximate.



Source: Donald G. Goff, *Building Conditions for Humanitarian Operations: Operation Provide Comfort* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992/93).

Graphic representation—scale approximate.

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT LOGISTICS FLOW



Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other Than War Volume 2: Humanitarian Assistance (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Command, 1992): 8.

Graphic representation—scale of 1:100,000

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

- 1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the Law of War.
- 2. The use of armed force will be utilized as a measure of last resort only.
- 3. Nothing in these rules negates or otherwise over-rides a commander's obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for his unit's self-defense.
- 4. U.S. forces will not fire unless fired upon, unless there is clear evidence of hostile intent.
- **HOSTILE INTENT:** The threat of imminent use of force by an Iraqi force or other foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the U.S., U.S. forces, U.S. citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located above the 36th parallel or otherwise located within a U.S. or allied safe haven refugee area. When the on scene commander determines based on convincing evidence that **HOSTILE INTENT** is present, the right exists to use proportional force to deter or neutralize the threat.
- **HOSTILE ACT:** includes armed force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of U.S. or allied forces.
- 5. Response to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. or allied cars shall be rapid and directed at the source of hostile fire using only that force necessary and proportional to eliminate the threat. Other foreign forces (such as reconnaissance aircraft) that have an active integration with the attacking force may be engaged. Use the minimum amount of force necessary to control the situation.
- 6. You may fire into Iraqi territory in response to hostile fire.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT ROE (CONT.)

- 7. You may fire into another nation's territory in response to hostile fire only if cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop force's hostile acts effectively and promptly.
- 8. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel.
- 9. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft south of the 36th parallel only when they demonstrate hostile intent or commit a hostile act. Except in cases of self-defense, authority for such engagement rests with the designated air defense commander. Warning bursts may be fired ahead of foreign aircraft to deter hostile acts.
- 10. In the event U.S. forces are attacked or threatened by UNARMED hostile elements, mobs, or rioters, the responsibility for the protection of U.S. forces rests with the U.S. commanding officer. On scene commander will employ the following to overcome the threat:
 - a. Warning to demonstrators.
 - b. Show of force, including use of riot control formations.
 - c. Warning shots fired over the heads of hostile elements.
 - d. Other reasonable uses of force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.
- 11. Use the following guidelines when employing these rules:
 - a. Use of force only to protect lives.
 - b. Use of minimum force necessary.
 - c. Pursuit will not be taken to retaliate, however, immediate pursuit may begin and continue for as long as there is an imminent threat to U.S. forces. In the absence of JCS approval, U.S. forces should not pursue any hostile force into another nation's territory.
 - d. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter, neutralize, or destroy threat as required.

APPENDIX B (CONT.)

APPENDIX B (CONT.)

COALITION JOINT TASK FORCE SOMALIA (CJTJF)

as of 1 Jun 93

MARFOR

RCT-7
3D MAW
1st FSSG
ENG TF 30
Botswana Forces
Kuwaiti Forces
Egyptian Forces
Nigerian Forces
Pakistani Forces
Saudi Arabian Forces
Turkish Forces
UAE Forces
Zimbabwe Forces

NAVFOR

PHIBRON 3 CTF 156
CTF 155
SPMAGTF (SOC)
HMCS Preserver
DET DAV LOG SUP

AFFOR

German AF C160 DET
Royal AF C130 DET

ARFOR

10th MTN DIV (-)
1st Belgian Para BN (-)
1st RIAR (Aus)
Royal Moroccan Forces
TF Kismayo
36th ENG GRP

SOFOR

COALITION


Canadian Forces
French BDE
Indian Naval SQDN
Somalia Forces
Italian Forces
F-16s ABN BDE
San Marco TAC GRP

JTFSC

7th Trans GRP (TML)
593rd ASG
62nd MED GRP
54 GIRREG CO (-)
49th MCC
JLSG
4th MMC

APPENDIX F


APPENDIX F



Source: "Somalia Report: Somalia", Army Times (December 14, 1982): 16.


APPENDIX D

**OPERATIONAL
MOVEMENT & MANEUVER
PHASE I**




Source: United States Central Command, Briefing, Operation Restore Hope (ShoD) APB: HQ CENTCOM, 8 Jan 89; Slide No. 80AF0308.

Graphic representation—scale approximate.




Source: United States Central Command, Briefing, Operational Posture Hqs; Slide No. 900822002

Graphic representation--scale approximate.



Source: United States Central Command, Briefing, Operation Restore Hope, Slide No. OPH101005.

Graphic representation—scale approximate.



Graphic representation—scale approximate.

Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned, Restore Hope After Action Report: End

JTF SUPPORT COMMAND

**54TH GRREG
CO (-)**

49TH MCC

JLSG

4TH MMC

**62ND MED
GRP**

- 32 Med Log Bn
- 86 Evac Bn
- 159 Med Co
- 423 Clearing Co
- 514 Med Co
- 61 Med Det (Sanitation)
- 73 Med Det (Vet)
- 227 Med Det (Epld.)
- 248 Med Det (Vet)
- 257 Dental Det
- 486 Med Det (Ent.)
- 555 Med Det (Surg.)
- 528 CBT Stress TM

593RD ASG

**240 QM BN
(POL TLOP)**

- 22 POL Lab
- 26 ROWPU Barge TM
- 82 Wtr Pur TM
- 110 Wtr Sup Co
- 267 PL/TML OP Co
- 364 Sup Co (DS)(-)
- 418 Mdm Trk Co (Wtr)
- 30 ROWPU Barge TM
- 360 Trans Co (Mdm Trk)

548 CSB

- 18 QM Cc (-)
- 57 Trans Co (L/Mdm)
- 226 Sup Co (DS)(-)
- 606 Ammo Mag PLT
- 13 EOD
- 62 Supply Co (DS)(-)
- 157th Fld Svc Co
- 54th GRREG Co (-)

**7TH TRANS
GRP**


**6TH TRANS
BN (TRK)**

- 22nd Trl Trf Pt
- 24 Trans Co (Mdm Trk)
- 100 Trans Co (L/Mdm)
- 406 Trl Trf Pt
- 670 Trans Co (Cgo Trf)


**24TH TRANS
BN (TML)**

- 119 Trans Co (Tml Svc)
- 169 Hvy Crane Det
- 491 Trans Det (Cgo Doc)
- 710 Trans Co
- NTMC Tiger TM

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT THEATER OF OPERATIONS



Source: CALL Newsletter: Humanitarian Assistance Volume I, Dec 92.



APPENDIX N

APPENDIX N


PROVIDE COMFORT RELIEF AGENCIES

Action Nord-avd
 Adventist Develop & Relief Agency
 American Friends Service Ctr
 American Red Cross
 American Refugee Ctr
 AMHURST
 CARE
 Catholic Relief Service
 Christian Outreach
 Concern
 Danish Church Aid
 Doctors Without Borders
 Doctors of the World
 Equilibre
 German Bergwacht
 German Red Cross
 Global Partners
 Help Mission
 Hulp Aan Kuterdaan
 Intl Action Against Hunger
 Intl Ctr of the Red Cross
 Intl Medical Corps
 Intl Refugee Year Trust
 Intl Rescue Ctr
 Irish Concern
 Italian Red Cross

Japan Sotoshu Relief Ctr
 Maltese Hills Dienst
 Medical Volunteers Intl
 Mideast Council of Churches
 Operation Mercy
 OXFAM
 Red Cross & Red Crescent
 Samaritan's Purse
 Save the Children
 Swedish Rescue Service
 Swiss Charity Team
 Swiss Mission
 Swiss Project of Emergency Help
 Tear Fund/UK
 Turkish Red Crescent
 United Nations
 UNICEF
 World Council of Churches
 World Food Program
 World Relief Intl
 World Vision Relief & Develop
 World Vision, Australia

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX C



APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2

Source: U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, TRADOC Combined Arty.3 Assessment Team, Briefing, Operation Restore Hope (as of 1 Jan 89).

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