A US Division in the Pacific Ocean.
A US Division in an Allied Corps

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

As the US Army’s only significant ground combat force deployed in Korea, the Second Infantry Division merits special attention. The Division is positioned north of Seoul astride the main invasion route from North Korea into South Korea and there is no corps-level US Army headquarters currently deployed in Korea. Accordingly, the Division may be committed to battle early in a future Korean war and this commitment may be under the operational control of a Republic of Korea Army Corps.

This paper proposes that the Second Infantry Division is a strategic asset of the Combined Forces Command in Korea and that its commitment to battle with a Korean corps is a political—not a military—decision with profound implications for the United States. It further proposes that once committed to battle, the Division’s success in combat is critical to the US-ROK alliance and that Combined Forces Command should resource the Division to enhance its probability of success.

The paper examines the Northeast Asia security environment, the US-ROK security relationship and the Second Infantry Division’s contribution to that relationship, analyzes coalition warfare and combined operations from a historic and doctrinal perspective, identifies leadership, capabilities and doctrinal differences between the US and ROK armies and concludes with tactical recommendations for Combined Forces Command to apply to the Second Infantry Division in a US-ROK combined operation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Second Infantry Division (2ID) is the United States Army's only significant ground combat force deployed on the Korean peninsula. In peacetime, it is positioned north of Seoul astride the main invasion route from North Korea into South Korea (1). The Combined Field Army (CFA), a combined headquarters created in 1980 and led by a US Army general officer, was disestablished in the summer of 1992. No other US Army warfighting headquarters above division-level is deployed in Korea. In the 2ID's most recent Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercise, it participated under the operational control of the Republic of Korea Army's VII Corps (2). This suggests that 2ID may be committed to combat early if there should be another war in Korea and that such commitment may be under the operational control of a Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) corps.

Committing the 2ID to combat at the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula has profound political implications for the United States. This will involve US forces in ground combat in a second Korean war and those forces will be under the operational control of a ROKA corps. This operational decision has both tactical and strategic significance. Tactically, 2ID's success or failure in combat is very much a function of its leaders' ability to adapt US Army doctrine and capabilities to those of a ROKA corps in a very difficult combined environment. Strategically, the relative success or failure of the 2ID while fighting with a ROKA corps may serve to either sustain or undermine US-
ROK security relationships for the duration of the war and in the post-conflict environment that follows.

This paper has two purposes: first, to identify the 2ID as a strategic asset of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), whose commitment to combat is primarily a political—not a military—decision; second, to provide tactical-level recommendations to CFC that will enable 2ID to be successful in fulfilling its strategic role if committed to combat as part of a combined corps. The role of the 2ID as a strategic asset is determined by first examining the Northeast Asia strategic environment and the US-ROK security relationship from both an historic and contemporary context and then determining 2ID's present-day contribution to that relationship. Next, CFC command structures are analyzed and the command relationship between CFC and 2ID is compared to that between CFC and ROKA units. Finally, the strategic significance of committing the 2ID to combat with a ROKA corps within the context of the Korean operational and strategic environment is reviewed. This section concludes by assessing the impact of 2ID's success or failure in combat on the US-ROK security relationship.

Tactical-level recommendations to CFC are developed based on a brief review of coalition warfare and an analysis of five sources: 1) US Army combined operations experience in World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and Operation Desert Storm, 2) current and proposed US Army combined arms doctrine, 3) doctrinal and capabilities differences that exist between a US corps and a ROKA corps that effect a US division fighting with a ROKA corps, 4) an
after-action review of exercise Valiant Swabian, a multinational corps-level exercise conducted in Germany in September, 1992, and 5) the November, 1992 Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercise conducted for the 2ID.

II. THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION AS A STRATEGIC ASSET

1. Korea and the Northeast Asia Security Environment. Although Korea occupies a position only on the periphery of Asia, it is the historical nexus of regional power struggles in Northeast Asia between the Chinese, Japanese and the Russians. The Chinese and Japanese have each invaded and occupied the peninsula and disputes over which nation would reign preeminent in Korea were a contributing cause of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 (3). By virtue of its geographic centrality in the region and its maritime position astride the trade routes in the Sea of Japan and the Korean Straits, Korea occupies an important position. Korea thrusts dagger-like toward Japan from China and Russia and conversely, the peninsula offers an enticing north-bound invasion route into China (4). As Alfred Thayer Mahan suggested over ninety years ago, Korea guards critical maritime choke points that govern the flow of sea traffic in Northeast Asia from Russia and Japan to China and Taiwan (5).

Korea has been the scene of the United States-communist great power confrontation in Northeast Asia and the United States' forward line of defense against communist incursions into Japan since World War II. Post-war Korea has been invaded, divided and occupied by foreign armies and split into two
separate nation-states with diametrically opposed and generally hostile political, economic and social systems.

The Cold War has produced forty years of uneasy regional stability in Northeast Asia. While most post-World War II interstate conflicts have lasted about two to three years (6), the Korean conflict is in its forty-third year. It did not end at the conclusion of hostilities in 1953 and it has not significantly abated since the end of the Cold War in 1990. Despite conciliatory initiatives by the United States and South Korea—cancellation of last year's joint military exercises, Team Spirit, and the withdrawal of United States nuclear weapons from the peninsula (7)—the conflict continues in various guises, overt and covert, economic, political and social, just as it has for the past forty years (8). North Korea's refusal to allow international inspection of its nuclear facilities, its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its recent shipment of ballistic missiles to the Middle East belie the notion that the conflict is any less dangerous or volatile than it was during the Cold War. In the past, the conflict has survived the Sino-Soviet split, the United States-China rapprochement and the break-up of the Soviet Union; today it survives the superpower confrontation that fueled it during the Cold War (9).

Korea's history as a unified country ended at the conclusion of World War II when United States armed forces occupied the country south of the 38th parallel and Soviet forces occupied the northern half of the peninsula under a trusteeship mandated by the Allies. The trusteeship was originally planned to remain in effect for only five years and was meant to facilitate Korean self-rule
after thirty-five years of Japanese occupation. It never received the wholehearted endorsement of the Korean people nor the sincere political support of the Soviet Union and the Korean communists in the North. In 1950, North Korea, seeking to reunify the country forcibly, initiated the Korean War by invade the South. At the conclusion of the war, the country remained divided along the Demilitarized Zone—a 165-mile long intra-Korean border that is presently guarded by 1.5 million armed soldiers. The Korean peninsula was once again occupied by foreign armies—one American and one Chinese. Although the Chinese eventually withdrew their forces from Korea, the Americans did not, and Korea became a focal point of the Cold War.

Current United States strategy in Northeast Asia focuses on keeping the sea lines of communication between the United States and Northeast Asia open and defending Korea and Japan (10). Other strategic goals include enhancing and supporting democratic institutions, supporting human rights, promoting free markets and stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region (11). The United States has an interest in maintaining the geopolitical balance of power in Northeast Asia that presently exists among the regional powers. Historically, the calculus of power in Northeast Asia has focused on Japan, China and Russia with the Korean peninsula at its nexus. The Korean peninsula has been the most sensitive focus of Northeast Asian conflict since World War II because it is the place where the interests of Japan, China, Russia and the United States have intersected (12). The United States has bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan and South Korea while China and the former Soviet Union have had
similar bilateral arrangements with North Korea (13). Thus, Korea has been a determinant of United States strategy in Northeast Asia. The inter-relationships that exist between the Northeast Asian powers--Japan, China and Russia--and the two Koreas, the internal stability of the peninsula and the power balance on the peninsula have influenced United States policies in Northeast Asia since World War II (14). A brief review of each nations' strategic interest in Northeast Asia and Korea follows.

China is a nuclear power and the largest power in Northeast Asia in terms of both population and geographic area. As China struggles toward modernization, it represents a potentially huge market for trade, and of course, a military threat to its neighbors. With over 150 active divisions (15) China's army is the largest in Northeast Asia. Its 100-ship submarine fleet (16) is the third-largest in the world, its defense budget is growing rapidly and it is a significant exporter of arms to third-world countries (17). China is currently acquiring long-range ballistic missiles, long-range bombers with in-flight refueling capabilities and is conducting serious negotiations with the Ukraine to purchase an aircraft carrier (18). China faces the dilemma of supporting its communist ally, North Korea, while attempting not to jeopardize its relationship with the United States and its burgeoning trade with the Japanese and South Koreans. In this regard, the presence of United States forces in Korea is not detrimental to the interests of China; United States forces act to preserve stability and restrain North Korea (19). Thus, China's strategic interest is in maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula.
Russia’s interest in Korea and Northeast Asia is conflict prevention. The Russians perceive that any instability on the peninsula could cause the remilitarization of Japan, worsen Chinese-Russian relations and promote anti-Russian collaboration among the United States, China and Japan (20). Additional Russian strategic goals may be to undermine the rationale for United States military power in Asia with the ultimate political and economic goal of reversing United States alliances with Japan and South Korea (21). To achieve this, Russian authorities are considering resolving its Northern Territories dispute with the Japanese in order to gain financial and technological assistance from the Japanese while developing favorable political contacts with them (22). Russia may well perceive that the United States’ primary purpose of keeping United States forces in Korea and Japan is to prevent either China or Russia from pursuing a more active role in Northeast Asia (23). Current military programs in Russia suggest that Moscow has made a strategic decision to expand its defenses in the Far East by creating a naval, air and air defense umbrella over Korea and Japan (24) and by moving military equipment from Europe into Asia (25).

Japan is the United States’ largest trading partner. Together, Japan and the United States account for over one-third of the world’s industrial production. Despite its industrial might, Japan has insufficient armed forces to protect itself and is, in effect, a military protectorate of the United States (26). Japanese leaders believe that regional tensions may be caused by China, Russia and the two Koreas imbued with a strong sense of nationalism and an historically based
The United States military strategy designed to support its national strategy in Northeast Asia is based on the forward deployment of United States air, sea and ground forces in Korea and Japan (29). Presently, United States military forces in Korea serve a dual strategic role; they act to deter North Korean aggression and serve as a psychological shield for Japan against fear of exposure to Chinese and Russian power (30). Specific objectives of United States military strategy in Korea are to prevent war on the peninsula, ensure the military security of South Korea, and promote South Korean viability and stability (31). United States forces forward deployed in Northeast Asia provide added value to United States strategies. These values include stability, developing trust and confidence with regional allies and acting as an honest broker in disputes (32).

To Northeast Asians, the United States military presence in Northeast Asia represents the United States' determination and intention to remain a Pacific power (33). United States forces in Korea and Japan provide the basis for trust
and confidence among the powers of Northeast Asia by mitigating fears over Japanese rearmament and North Korean aggression. They enhance stability by providing hedges against unpredictability and uncertainty and they act as on-the-spot managers along the peace-crisis-war continuum. Finally, United States forces in Korea and Japan provide the United States with political leverage to balance power in Northeast Asia (34).

2. The US-ROK Security Relationship. Clausewitz suggests that among alliances the center of gravity lies in the community of interest (35). Officially, the US-ROK community of interest is defined by the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty; in reality, the US-ROK security relationship has been characterized by the different strategic goals of the US and ROK and by their remarkable inconsistencies over the years. The alliance has survived the past forty years because of US defense requirements in Northeast Asia based on US Cold War imperatives to defend Japan and deter Soviet and Chinese communist aggression and expansion in the region. Korea, as an entity, has had little intrinsic strategic value to the US. With the demise of the Soviet Union as a major power in the Pacific and the end of the Cold War, the security relationship continues to evolve.

The US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty institutionalized the US-ROK security relationship. The treaty is the more remarkable, however, because it does not require the United States to assist the ROK with armed forces if attacked by North Korea (36). Indeed, Article III of the treaty states only that if one party to the treaty suffers an armed attack on its territory, the other party
should act to meet the common danger in accordance with its own constitutional processes (37). As the weaker party to the treaty, the ROK naturally desires a commitment from the US that significantly reduces the security gap that exists between the ROK's interests—survival, most importantly—and its own capabilities to achieve those interests through deterrence and armed force. Most South Koreans perceive the alliance as essential for their security (38) and look to the US to close the security gap with armed force if necessary (39). Still, the US retains the option of forgoing the use of US ground forces in the defense of the ROK.

The US perceives the treaty as only part of a larger, regional strategy. Since World War II, Japan has been the centerpiece of US strategy in Northeast Asia while Korea has remained on the periphery of US interests. Indeed, US post-war policy toward the ROK has reflected this secondary status by its shifting nature. While US policy toward Japan has remained relatively constant in terms of US forces stationed in Japan, the same cannot be said of Korea. In fact, the US withdrew its forces from Korea in 1949 because the ROK was not considered to be within the US regional defense perimeter. Nonetheless, as the result of an abrupt policy change motivated by fears of a larger, Soviet-expansionary war the US came to South Korea's defense when it was attacked by the North in 1950. In 1954, the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed to demonstrate not only the US commitment to a free and democratic ROK, but more importantly, to ensure stability in Northeast Asia (40). Later, the Nixon Doctrine, influenced by the war in Vietnam, appeared to dilute the provisions of the treaty by requiring
threatened Asian nations to provide the manpower deemed necessary for their own defense (41). Subsequently, President Jimmy Carter attempted to disengage from the ROK by pulling US ground forces out of Korea. In 1981, the US again reversed itself by actually increasing the level of American ground forces on the peninsula (42). Today, the US is transitioning from a militarily predominant role in the alliance to a subordinate posture that supports the South Koreans in the defense of their nation (43). The Combined Field Army has been disestablished, the 2ID has been reduced to two maneuver brigades and, most recently, a ROKA general officer was appointed to lead the Ground Component Command of CFC. Only North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has precluded further reductions in US forces (44).

The demise of the Soviet Union as a major power in Northeast Asia has served to reduce the relative strategic importance of Korea to the United States. Korea’s geographic position on the Asian mainland may have held strategic importance during the Cold War when it was considered the pivot about which Pacific Basin politics turned for the major Asian powers—the US, China, the former Soviet Union and Japan (45). Nonetheless, the Cold War strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the US derived not from its geographic position, but from its utility as a forward base from which the US could protect Japan. Without the Soviet threat, forward basing of US forces in Korea is no longer necessary to defend Japan.

3. Second Infantry Division’s Contribution. The 2ID contributes only marginally to the overall ground combat power available to the CFC. In its
current configuration, the 2ID adds only six maneuver battalions to a ROKA force of 500,000-plus soldiers organized into approximately fifty divisions or six-hundred battalions and 2ID’s 12,000 soldiers represent only about thirty percent of the total US Korean-based force of 36,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen (46). 2ID’s most significant contribution to CFC’s combat power lies in its component parts—its Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), Firefinder radars, attack helicopters and intelligence assets. The 2ID’s more important role is political (47); from an ROK viewpoint, the 2ID’s peacetime deployment north of Seoul in the Chorwon Valley represents visible assurance to the ROK and to North Korea that the US will defend South Korea in the event of attack (48). In its political role the 2ID serves two missions: it deters North Korea from attacking the South and it acts as a "tripwire" to involve US ground forces in combat in the early stages of conflict if deterrence fails (49).

The 2ID, of course, is only part of a much larger US deterrence package that includes air defense command and control, all-source intelligence, significant air and naval resources and US-based operational reinforcements and sustaining logistical support (50). Nonetheless, the 2ID remains, perhaps, the most important part. To deter effectively, a nation must not only have the military capability to retaliate, it must also convince the enemy that retaliation is plausible (51). Ground forces—in this case, the 2ID—represent a staying power in the deterrence equation that is not provided by other elements of the US deterrence package (52). Given its consistent and virulent denunciations of the US military presence in South Korea, North Korea is well aware of the strength of US forces
in South Korea—and forty years of relative peace on the peninsula indicates that the US and ROK have been effective in deterring North Korean aggression (53).

The importance of 2ID as a "tripwire" is more a function of North Korean perceptions than of reality. CFC has the intelligence capability to detect a North Korean attack well before it occurs and can reposition the 2ID out of the Chorwon Valley—and harm's way—while US political authorities assess the common danger in accordance with US constitutional processes as the Mutual Defense Treaty allows. This effectively eliminates the "tripwire" effect. Of course, if CFC is anxious to get the 2ID into battle to sustain the alliance, it may also inadvertently preempt the political process by allowing the 2ID to engage North Korean forces. This deliberately engages the "tripwire," but subsumes the decision-making prerogative of US political authorities. The "tripwire" is artificial because CFC decides when and where it will be engaged; it is nonetheless important because it distorts North Korean perceptions concerning US intentions.

As part of the larger US military presence in South Korea, the 2ID also contributes to regional deterrence and stability in Northeast Asia. In the extreme, the US presence in Korea probably serves to restrain the ROK from any erstwhile attempts to unify the peninsula by force (54). It is also likely that the Chinese privately welcome the US presence in Korea as a leash on both North and South Korea (55). Even North Korea may come to appreciate this role in
the coming years as the military balance on the peninsula increasingly favors the
ROK (56).

4. CFC Command Relationships. The US-ROK combined operations
system in Korea dates from the United Nations Command (UNC) formed during
authorized the activation of UNC under the leadership of the United States for
the defense of the ROK. Subsequently, on July 14, 1950, the ROK president,
Syngmann Rhee transferred command of all ROK forces to the Commander-in-
Chief, UNC (CINCUNC). In 1978, the US-ROK Military Committee created
the Combined Forces Command by the Terms of Reference and established the
legal basis for CFC. Under this arrangement, CINCUNC transferred the
operational control of all ROK forces (with the exception of the Second ROK
Army) to the Commander-in-Chief CFC (CINCCFC). CINCUNC retained
responsibility for armistice-related affairs and continued to execute functions in
Korea as directed by the US National Command Authority and the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff (57). CINCUNC is the lineal successor to the position held by
General Douglas MacArthur (who was also Commander-in-Chief, Far East
Command) and remains the agent of the US president and the United Nations
Security Council for carrying out the provisions of the armistice (58).

CFC's mission is to deter hostile acts of aggression against the ROK and,
in the event deterrence fails, defeat an armed attack (59). Since its inception,
CINCCFC has been led by a US general officer who has retained operational
control of most ROKA forces in peacetime. In recent years, ROKA forces have
modernized and have assumed greater responsibility for their nation's defense. The numbers and responsibilities of the US ground forces in Korea have simultaneously decreased and unlike ROKA forces, US Army ground forces in Korea—including the 2ID—have never been under the operational control of CFC in peacetime.

This peculiar command and control structure has contributed to mounting public pressures in Korea to adjust the command structure of CFC (60). Some Koreans believe that it is an affront to ROK nationalism and sovereignty that an American general has operational control over ROK forces in Korea but does not exercise the same degree of control over US ground forces stationed on the peninsula (61). Other detractors see CFC as an instrument to block Korean unification and as an organization that has consistently supported ROK military regimes that have delayed democratic reforms in the ROK (62).

The command and control arrangement that exists between CFC and the 2ID has subtler strategic implications that go beyond the more evident dissatisfactions with CFC found among elements of the Korean population. Most certainly it is an anomaly left over from the Korean war and a vestige of the ROK's client status with the US throughout the Cold War. Nonetheless, it provides utility for US political leaders in that it offers them options not necessarily obtainable if 2ID were under the peacetime operational control of CFC.

CINCCFC is also Commander-in-Chief, US Forces Korea (CINCUSFK) and, in that role, exercises operational control over US ground forces and the
21D in Korea. But for CINCUSFK to transfer operational control of 21D to CFC, authority must be granted from the US Pacific Command, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and political leaders. Failure of the US to extend peacetime operational control of 21D to CFC, intentional or otherwise, acts to check CFC's ability to commit US ground forces to combat in Korea without decisive political authority. Given the inconsistencies of US-ROK relations since World War II, it is by no means certain that such authority will be forthcoming. Indeed, US political leaders may desire to refrain from committing US forces to ground combat until it becomes clear that ROKA forces by themselves are insufficient for the task. Ironically, the relatively small military contribution that 21D makes to CFC may serve to further convince US political leaders that deferring US participation in the ground war is not only politically prudent, but militarily sound. Such a decision may be fatal to the alliance because it places CINCCFC in the difficult, perhaps untenable, position of commanding the majority of ROK ground forces without even token US participation. The ROK civilian and military leadership may well balk at keeping over 500,000 ROKA soldiers under the command of a US general unless the US demonstrates an early commitment to participate in a ground war with significant US forces.

5. 21D's Impact on the US-ROK Security Relationship. CINCCFC's position is no less difficult if authority is granted to commit 21D to combat early in the war. In this situation, 21D's success or failure at the tactical level of war has strategic effects on the US-ROK alliance. Given the propensity of Americans to oftentimes measure success in war by a small number of US casualties,
American resolve to continue ground combat operations—and, therefore, the flow of ground reinforcements into Korea—may not be forthcoming if casualties seem excessive. If the reason for this is further attributed to a botched combined operation in which 2ID was under the operational control of a ROKA corps, then American support may become more questionable and ROK sensitivities to combined operations may be adversely affected. It follows that a successful combined operation can be defined as one in which the 2ID gains its tactical objectives without excessive casualties—and in post-Operation Desert Storm America, excessive casualties may well be defined as exceeding those experienced by US armed forces in the Gulf War. Success by this measurement may serve to sustain the alliance by galvanizing US support for further ground and combined operations.

It is vitally important for CFC to understand the diverse strategic roles of 2ID and the mechanisms and conditions under which 2ID may be committed to combat. Failure to understand these roles and their impact on the US-ROK security relationship may serve to inadvertently involve the US in a ground war that neither the American public nor its political leadership desire. Committing the 2ID to combat with a ROKA corps without insuring the tactical success of both the ROKA corps and 2ID may contribute to the total erosion of both US public and political support for US participation in the ground war. 2ID is only one of fifty allied divisions on the Korean peninsula and its tactical importance may appear insignificant to CFC military operations. 2ID’s political and
strategic importance is, however, disproportionate to its size and its success in combat critical to sustain the alliance.

III. TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Coalition Warfare. Any future combined operation conducted in Korea between the 2ID and a ROKA corps will derive from the coalition established between the United States and the Republic of Korea for the purpose of defeating a North Korean attack on the South. This coalition, defined by the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, has as its genesis the United Nations coalition that was established at the outset of the Korean War by the United Nations Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950. Because combined operations derive from and are politically directed by coalitions formed among nations to wage war, it is useful to briefly examine the nature and characteristics of coalitions in general and those of the Korean War US-ROK coalition in particular.

Coalitions are not formed for reasons of friendship or good will but for reasons of self-interest—usually that of self-protection (63). They are generally complex and complicated in nature and are often a source of weakness as well as strength (64). Historically, coalitions have tended to make conflicts last longer because coalitions tend to have greater resources than individual nations and because the various interests of the coalition tend to make it more difficult for nations to achieve peace (65). Nations that are part of a coalition gain confidence because they have partners with which to share the burden of war, but they are often discomfited by the demands of their coalition partners (66).
Coalition partners usually have different goals that they wish to attain in wartime and these goals place differing demands on military operations (67). Often, weaker partners to the coalition possess influence among their partners that is totally disproportionate to their contribution to the coalition (68).

These characteristics can be observed in the relationships between the United States and the ROK at two discrete points during the Korean War—the point at which the coalition decided to attack across the 38th parallel in September, 1950, and again, in June, 1951, during preliminary armistice discussions. In September, 1950, Syngman Rhee, the President of the Republic of Korea, was determined to attack across the 38th parallel regardless of US intent to do otherwise. He announced his intention at a public rally in Pusan on 19 September when he stated that his army would continue the attack to the Manchurian border until he expelled the North Korean Army from Korea (69). Again, during the preliminary armistice discussions in Korea in June 1951, Rhee pre-empted the US. He was vehemently opposed to military discussions with the Chinese and North Koreans and was able to exact from the United States a set of five conditions that constrained the discussions. Among these conditions was the requirement that the actual demarcation line between the North and South would be the actual battle line and not the 38th parallel (70).

Both situations illustrate the ability of a weaker party to a coalition to exercise influence far in excess of its actual strength. Rhee’s determination to cross the 38th parallel in September, 1950 was made without consultation with the US and essentially drove the US to foreign policy decisions that effectively
prolonged the war. Later, in June, 1951, Rhee's stubbornness in resisting armistice discussions resulted in the United States proposing a truce line north of the 38th parallel (71). The truce line was the most important and controversial issue to both sides in the discussions and was not resolved until December 1951. Getting Rhee to agree to the final armistice terms involved American promises to establish a mutual defense treaty with South Korea, agreements to support a twenty-division ROK Army and commitments of billions of dollars in military and economic aid to South Korea through the post-war years (72).

Today's US military presence in Korea is largely the result of Rhee's persistence in exacting a US commitment to the future military security of Korea. Rhee influenced US strategic and operational policy throughout the war and frequently received concessions from the US that were not necessarily in the best interests of the stronger coalition partner—the US. Because of Rhee's disproportionate influence in the coalition, the Korean War was prolonged and US strategic and operational policies were distorted by the goals of the weaker ally—South Korea. In a future Korean War, US policy makers and military leaders may well expect their Korean allies to exercise the same disproportionate influence over the alliance as Rhee did in the later years of the Korean War. The nature of coalition warfare—and that of the US-ROK coalition particularly—suggests that the commitment of the 2ID to combat with a ROKA corps is as likely to result from skewed political decisions as from military necessity. 2ID may be committed to combat more to satisfy a politically-driven requirement of
the alliance to present a combined force in the field than to meet a tactical or operational requirement. This is a real possibility as the following review of US Army experience in combined operations demonstrates.

2. US Army Experience in Combined Operations. Historically, the problems of combined operations have been solved through trial and error during the execution phase of combined operations (73). US military leaders have entered each coalition in which the country has participated on an ad hoc basis and relearned lessons previously discovered by their predecessors (74). This has been a costly approach to combined operations in terms of men, material and time (75). Combined operations endure because they are driven by political motives rather than operational considerations. They are inherently difficult because they require enhanced levels of performance from three interrelated factors: leaders, capabilities and doctrine (76). Succinctly put, a combined operation is never likely to achieve the same amount of combat power as a strictly national operation. Differences in personalities, cultures, languages and national interests continually beset every combined operation to the detriment, not the enhancement, of combat efficiency (77). The commander is the key to integrating the forces of the several nations' forces into a cohesive force and the closer those forces resemble each other in capabilities and doctrine the more likely are its chances for success (78). US participation in combined operations during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm serve to illustrate these difficulties.

A persistent myth of World War I is that the American Expeditionary
Force (AEF) fought throughout the war as a national entity. In fact, AEF commander John J. Pershing was never able to collect all of his American troops together into his field armies (79). Altogether, 23 US divisions fought with the French, some for considerable periods (80). Six other divisions fought in France with the British Expeditionary Force (81). The AEF’s division-sized combined operations with both the British and the French were usually conducted in an environment of trust and amiability, although not without some derision from the European counterparts. Generally, integration of units at the division level was accomplished when adequate time was given to prepare for combined operations and AEF units performed best when paired with allied commanders and staffs with whom they had previously trained (82). Doctrinal differences between Americans and their allies were slight and focused primarily on AEF commander John J. Pershing’s desire to preserve American national characteristics that focused on initiative and independence; Pershing felt that the French and British focused too heavily on trench warfare. Differences in capabilities were not an issue. Americans used allied equipment because American industry was unable to support the AEF, and the British actually trained ten US divisions for combat (83). British, French and American capabilities therefore were roughly equal (84). Qualified, trained, language-proficient liaison officers that possessed the confidence of their own commanders and were known by the commanders and staffs of the units to which they were sent were critical in establishing rapport between AEF units and their allies (85). The US Army experience in World War I suggests that combined operations at division level can be successful when
the capabilities and doctrine of the combined forces are roughly similar and when combined leaders have sufficient time to train the force and establish effective liaison and habitual relationships among the respective national forces that make up the combined force. The US Army was less successful during Operation *Shingle* in World War II when these conditions did not prevail.

During World War II, the US led a corps-level combined operation that included an amphibious assault at Anzio and was designed to break the stalemate on the Italian front and facilitate the capture of Rome by allied forces (86). This operation, named *Shingle*, included the US 1st Infantry Division and the British 1st Infantry Division organized as the US Fifth Army’s VI Corps. Conducted in January, 1944, *Shingle* was originally conceived by the Fifth Army staff as a one-division US effort (87) but reconfigured as a two-division combined operation at the insistence of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and General Sir Harold Alexander because of political considerations. Churchill considered *Shingle* to be a risky operation and wanted the British to share the burden with the Americans (88).

Prior to *Shingle*, the Allies had conducted unsuccessful combined operations below division level in North Africa and had learned that satisfactory integration of forces at this level was difficult to attain (89). *Shingle* represented the Allies’ first effort to integrate division-sized forces at corps level in World War II (90); the effort was made the more difficult because of the extremely difficult time schedule under which *Shingle* was planned and executed and by a command climate within the VI Corps that was characterized by antipathy and
mutual distrust between British and US commanders and staffs (91).

*Shingle* was conceived as a combined effort by Churchill and Alexander on 25 December and executed on 22 January. The VI Corps staff and the staffs of the US and British divisions did not meet until the end of December and the Fifth Army operations order was not issued until 12 January—a scant ten days before the landing at Anzio (92). The compressed time schedule, in turn, affected command and staff relationships between the Americans and British. The VI Corps commander, Major General John P. Lucas, openly questioned the use of a combined force in the operation (93) and was never able to build a cohesive combined force nor establish unity of effort during the operation (94).

*Shingle* never attained its military objectives. By the end of February, Allied forces involved in *Shingle* had sustained over 6500 casualties and the VI Corps commander had been relieved by the Fifth Army Commander (95)—perhaps as a sacrificial lamb to British desires (96). An Allied Forces after-action report on *Shingle* pointed out the difficulties of combined operations below corps level and emphasized that differences in capabilities and doctrine made such operations very difficult (97). The report further suggested that units from different nations should not be integrated except in emergencies and that it was best to segregate nations by sectors on the battlefield (98). After *Shingle*, the Allies never again conducted combined operations below corps level during World War II (99).

The failure of *Shingle* to attain its military objectives reinforces the value of lessons learned by the US experience with combined operations during World
War I. Combined commanders must have sufficient time to train a cohesive force and they will be most successful when the units that make up the combined force have similar doctrines and capabilities. Additionally, Churchill’s directive that Shingle be a combined operation demonstrates the impact that political decisions have in combined operations.

The combat actions of Brigadier General Paik Sun Yup’s 1st ROK Division during the early stages of the Korean War provide a unique example of successful ROK-US combined operations and further emphasize the important role personalities play in conducting combined operations. In August 1950, the US 27th Regiment supported the 1st ROK Division during the defense of Tabudong north of Taegu. The commander of the 27th, Colonel John H. Michaelis, and Paik immediately established a positive rapport and cooperated fully in the initial defense (100). Later in this battle, the 1st ROK Division was supported by the US 23d Regiment commanded by Colonel Paul Freeman. This was the first instance of successful ROK-US combined operations at division level in the Korean War and was to be the only time in the war that a ROK division was to be assigned two major American units in a supporting capacity (101). This first tentative effort at combined operations at division level almost failed on 20 August when elements of the 1st ROK Division’s 15th Regiment uncovered the 27th Regiment’s right flank as a result of heavy enemy pressure. Michaelis had already requested permission from Eighth Army to withdraw his regiment from support of the 1st ROK Division when Paik personally rallied the 15th Regiment and restored the defensive line to recover the 27th Regiment’s flank (102).
As a result of the successful defense of Tabu-dong, Paik's 1st ROK Division was the only ROKA unit that US leader's consistently entrusted with operational control of American combat units. In September, the 1st ROK Division received an antiaircraft artillery (AAA) group from the US I Corps and in October the division was the first ROK unit to be provided a US tank unit--C Company of the 6th Tank Battalion (103). By mid-October this tank force had grown to over fifty tanks with the addition of the battalion's D Company; this force contributed significantly to the 1st ROK Division's victory at Sibyon, south of Pyongyang and Paik's 1st Division gained further theater-wide repute in combined infantry-armor operations. Paik was considered the ROK Army's ablest commander (104) and his success in ROK-US combined operations--success that included the integration of two reinforcing US regiments, a US AAA group and a battalion-equivalent of tanks with a ROK infantry division--was the result of the mutual trust and confidence he established between himself and supporting US commanders (105). The US Army's next experience in combined operations with the ROK Army occurred during the Vietnam war.

From 1965 through 1970, the ROK had substantial forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Their numbers reached 50,000 in 1968, enough to form two divisions and a corps headquarters (106). During this period, the ROKA corps never entered a formal command and control agreement with the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Nonetheless, an informal agreement between the MACV commander, General William C. Westmoreland, and the ROKA corps commander resulted in defacto operational control of the ROKA
corps by MACV.

Some problems were encountered by Americans working with the Koreans. The Commanding General, I Field Force, William G. Rosson, suggested that ROKA aspirations, attitudes, training, political sensitivities, and national pride culminated in characteristics of restraint and inflexibility. Rosson lessened the impact of these characteristics by occasional calls on Korean officers (some junior to himself), encouragement of staff-level visits between US and Korean counterparts, combined conferences for planning and coordination to consider subjects of mutual interest, visiting Korean units during combat operations and fulfilling requests for support whenever possible (107). For their part, the Koreans sent combat units to RVN with the best records from the Korean war and manned them with their best soldiers (108). ROKA officers spoke excellent English and were trained in and familiar with US doctrine (109). Significant capabilities differences existed between ROKA and US forces; Rosson usually addressed these by providing appropriate equipment support to the Koreans. Because the ROKA corps did not work formally for MACV, the US and ROKA did not conduct combined operations below corps-level. The US Army’s next experience in combined operations during wartime occurred during the Gulf War.

During Operation Desert Storm a successful corp-division level combined operation took place when the British 1st Armored Division supported the US Army’s VII Corps. This operation was characterized by sufficient training time and by the high level of integration of the division into the corps operation. The
British participated fully in the corps’ planning process and conducted several rehearsals of the battle plan with US divisions. The British assigned a significant number of officers to act as liaison to VII Corps and adjacent divisions; this contingent was led by a full colonel. Differences in doctrine and capabilities between the US corps and the British division were slight and what differences existed were mitigated by the conduct of rehearsals (110).

The capabilities of the division were similar to those of US heavy divisions. The British main battle tank, the Challenger, and its main infantry fighting vehicle, the Warrior, were comparable to the US M1 tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, although the British systems lacked the sophisticated fire control systems of the US vehicles (111). Additionally, the British were supported by their own Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, 8-inch howitzers and attack helicopters. The British were able to adapt to US doctrine because they had sufficient time to train with the US corps and conducted realistic rehearsals with their US counterparts (112).

3. US and ROK Army Combined Operations Doctrine. The very complicated nature of combined operations precludes directive doctrine. Current US Army doctrine does not provide solutions or make provisions for problems associated with combined operations nor does the US Army education system train officers in combined operations (113). At best, US doctrine sensitizes leaders to the political demands and cultural diversities encountered in combined operations. Perhaps correctly, current US and ROK doctrine are primarily non-directive in nature and draw from historical experiences in addressing the subject.
The preliminary draft of the US Army’s FM 100-5, *Operations*, discusses combined operations in terms of principles that emphasize the importance and diversity of alliance goals, doctrine, equipment, culture, language and personalities. The conduct of combined operations is discussed within the framework of battlefield operating systems (with the addition of liaison and the absence of mobility and air defense). The preliminary draft of FM 100-8, *Combined Army Operations*, approaches its subject from a theater perspective; it emphasizes theater command structures and combined command and leadership. Drawing as it does from historical examples of combined operations, it is primarily anecdotal—not directive in nature. Both manuals are designed to sensitize leaders to the inherent difficulties of combined operations; in this regard both FM 100-5 and FM 100-8 emphasize the critical importance of leaders, capabilities and doctrine in combined operations.

The ROKA FM 100-5, *Operations*, addresses major points of interest in combined operations. This provides for a more eclectic approach than does the US discussion, but still results in similar, non-directive doctrine. Main points addressed are command and control, combined standard operating procedures (SOP), intelligence, organization for combat, fire support, liaison and adaptability and flexibility in leaders (114). ROKA doctrine does not discuss the roles of capabilities and doctrine differences in combined operations. Unlike US doctrine, ROKA doctrine does suggest that clear limits be determined between the combined force commander and subordinates that delineate the specific responsibilities of each (115). Interestingly, although the ROKA’s experience in
combined operations has been almost totally conducted with US forces, its approach to combined operations is generic. That the Koreans emphasize the requirement for a combined SOP suggests that their approach to combined operations may be more methodical and sequential and less bold and aggressive than that of the US Army; it also reflects that for over forty years the entire ROKA has been working in a combined environment with the US, and by its very nature, may have acquired a more rigid combined perspective. Such a perspective may well be a result of similar cultural characteristics that Rosson experienced in Vietnam with the ROKA corps.

At first glance it appears that the US and ROK armies approach combined operations in a similar manner. In both doctrines, combined leaders are reminded that nations conduct war based on a variety of diverse factors that include culture and national interests among others. Adaptability, flexibility and accommodation to diversity are required traits of combined leaders common to both doctrines. Differences between US and ROK doctrine do exist, however. For example, even after participating with the US for forty years in a combined environment, Korean combined operations doctrine is generically—not US—focused. This suggests that nationalism, as might be expected, will play an important role for the ROKA in any combined operation. The importance with which Koreans regard a combined SOP suggests a step-by-step approach to combined operations that may conflict with a less restrictive ally’s approach. Finally, the omission of capabilities and doctrine differences as major points in ROKA combined operations doctrine is important because significant differences
do exist between the US and ROK armies. Combined operations between the 21D and a ROKA corps might be more easily and more efficiently conducted were ROKA doctrine to address these differences.

4. Doctrinal and Capabilities Differences. No US division has fought under the operational control of an allied Corps since World War I. A US division has never fought under the operational control of an allied corps wherein US doctrine and capabilities were markedly different from that of the allied corps. In Korea, US capabilities and doctrine differ significantly from those of the ROK Army. As Figures 1 and 2 on the following two pages show, US doctrine is much more offensively oriented than is ROKA doctrine and the capabilities of a US corps in terms of deep operations are far greater than a ROKA corps'. At US division level, the 21D's MLRS (to include its Army Tactical Missile System or ATACMS), Firefinder radars and night-capable attack helicopters combined with its direct access to theater-level intelligence systems give the 21D a deep-strike capability that even a ROKA corps does not possess. These capabilities allow the US division commander to anticipate and conduct doctrinal combat operations in greater time, space and depth dimensions than ROKA corps and division commanders (116). US doctrine compels a US division commander to maintain the initiative in combat; operations in depth allow him to do so (117).

Because ROKA doctrine is more conservative than US doctrine, a ROKA corps commander may find it more difficult to accept the increased risk that normally accompanies deep operations. Nonetheless, ROKA doctrine does
## DOCTRINE GAPS

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*IN THE 1993 VERSION OF FM 100-5, THE DEEP BATTLE IS NOT TIED TO THE CLOSE BATTLE. IT IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT IN AND OF ITSELF AND IS TIED TO THE FUTURE BATTLE.

**FIGURE 1**
CAPABILITIES GAP

US CORPS

ROKA CORPS

FIGURE 2
address deep operations. Like their US counterparts, ROKA corps commanders execute deep operations to affect future close operations and do so with a full array of electronic warfare, aviation, artillery and maneuver systems (118). These ROKA systems are neither as capable nor as numerous as either a US corps’ or division’s systems, however, and ROKA doctrine directs that corps deep battle be conducted to a depth of only 20 kilometers—ROKA doctrine therefore reflects ROKA capabilities (119). In a future Korean war, ROKA corps will be largely dependent on US intelligence systems for deep operations targeting information. This intelligence is passed to a ROKA corps through a field army—a time-consuming process that involves transmission through an army staff as well as translation from English to Korean. Although US and ROKA doctrines are similar for deep operations, ROKA corps are generally unable to conduct operations in time, space and depth dimensions to the same extent as the 2ID because they lack the capabilities.

The conundrum for both the US division commander and the ROKA corps commander in a combined operation is to synchronize the US division’s superior capabilities and offensively-driven doctrine into a corps plan that is based on fewer capabilities and driven by a more conservative doctrine. Given the 2ID’s strategic roles, this must be accomplished while insuring that the 2ID is both successful in attaining its military objective and that it does so without suffering excessive casualties. This is a difficult set of circumstances to obtain. A ROKA corps commander who strips off the 2ID’s deep operations assets—MLRS, aviation and radars—to fight the corps deep battle risks the 2ID—a strategic asset-
-in the close battle. Likewise, a US division commander who conducts combat operations in accordance with US doctrine and maximizes the division's capabilities may desynchronize the entire corps battle and is likely to chafe at any corps-imposed restrictions on the division's fighting capabilities. Meshing the differing capabilities and doctrines of US and ROKA forces in a combined operation poses a significant challenge for US-ROK combined force leaders. Two recent exercises, Valiant Swabian and Warfighter demonstrate this.

**Exercise Valiant Swabian.** Valiant Swabian was a multi-national corps-level exercise conducted in Germany in September, 1992. The US 1st Armored Division (1AD) and the French 7th Division were under the operational control of the German II Corps during the exercise. Like US-ROK doctrine, US-German doctrine is roughly compatible; nonetheless, challenges evolved from differences in US and German doctrinal approaches to conducting deep battle operations that may serve as a model for the 2ID when under the operational control of a ROKA corps.

Unlike the Koreans, the Germans have the capabilities to look and strike deep. However, because the Germans do not have a doctrinal imperative to do so, they rarely used those capabilities to strike deep. German intelligence assets were not focused on acquiring deep targets for attack and their artillery and aviation assets were not committed to deep operations. The 1AD pushed its own assets well forward (or laterally into adjacent division areas) to conduct deep operations on behalf of the corps while simultaneously shaping its own division battle. Intelligence proved to be the weakest link during the exercise since there
was no provision for exchanging intelligence between the 1AD and the German corps. Because 1AD was operating without the doctrinal intelligence support normally provided to them by a US corps, the effectiveness of its intelligence system suffered with subsequent degradations to its maneuver and fire support systems (the US Army in Europe has developed a Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) that is capable of providing theater and national intelligence via direct downlinks to its divisions and brigades. The 1AD recommend that a DISE be provided to a US division in a multi-national corps and also to the non-US corps for which it works. DISE was not used during Valiant Swabian). Results from Valiant Swabian suggest that even when doctrine and capabilities between national forces are similar, subtle differences act to the detriment of the combined operation. The 1AD essentially took responsibility for the corps deep battle to facilitate its own deep operations and to enable it to shape the division fight. The 1AD further suffered from a dearth of intelligence from the German corps that degraded its ability to conduct maneuver and fire support operations (120). Because of the doctrinal and capabilities gaps that exist between a US corps and a ROKA corps, the 2ID can be expected to face similar challenges with a ROKA corps in Korea.

Warfighter. The Battle Command Training Program conducted a Warfighter exercise for the 2ID in Korea in November, 1992. During this exercise, the 2ID conducted combat operations as part of a combined corps under the operational control of a ROKA corps. The ROKA corps was not a particularly active player in the exercise in that it did not significantly guide,
impede or restrict 2ID’s operations nor did it require the 2ID to perform specific missions, such as deep operations or counterfire, for the corps. Perhaps inadvertently the ROKA corps perceived the 2ID’s strategic importance by providing it with significant theater-level assets—aviation and ATACMS, for instance,—with which to fight. The 2ID also had a direct link-up with the theater military intelligence brigade that the ROKA corps lacked. Largely because of the ROKA corps’ relatively passive role in the exercise, the 2ID conducted successful, independent deep operations—often with theater assets—throughout the exercise. Intentionally or otherwise, the ROKA corps provided an environment that permitted the 2ID to fight in accordance with US Army doctrine at the extent of its capabilities. The costs of this somewhat permissive attitude to the ROKA corps in terms of the corps battle are unknown and whether 2ID would be permitted the same freedom of action during actual combat operations is problematic. Warfighter, nonetheless, provided fertile ground for examining the ROKA corps-US division relationship at the tactical level of war.

As the central point in the AirLand battle, a US corps synchronizes combat power, conducts deep operations and provides significant assets to its subordinate divisions (121). While a ROKA corps performs similar tasks for its subordinate divisions, it does so with less capability and with a doctrinal intent that is different from a US corps. The following observations highlight major difficulties experienced by the 2ID during Warfighter as a result of doctrinal and capabilities differences that exist between it and the ROKA corps.

If leaders are important to successful combined operations then the liaison
officers that represent them in allied headquarters are critical. During Warfighter the 2ID put together a substantial liaison team at the ROKA corps. These officers, some thirty in number, were led by a major and extracted from line positions at substantial costs to the division. Once in place, the liaison officers suffered from a lack of skilled linguists and the inability of the team leader to gain access to the corps leadership because of his relatively junior rank. The orders process from corps to 2ID suffered accordingly (122).

The intelligence support provided by the theater military intelligence brigade to 2ID was substantial and enabled the 2ID to have a more detailed, accurate and timely picture of the battlefield than the ROKA corps. Such support in itself contributes to successful division operations. Unless the ROKA corps receives similar support, however, the 2ID is at risk of becoming the corps' primary source of intelligence—a task it is ill-equipped to accomplish.

The 2ID suffered from the lack of a US field artillery brigade. Although, the ROKA corps provided reinforcing artillery brigades to the 2ID, they were unequipped to manage digital traffic from 2ID Firefinder radars and thus to execute the counterbattery battle. The 2nd Infantry Division Artillery was challenged to command and control the deep, close, and rear artillery battles while simultaneously conducting counterbattery operations.

5. Recommendations. The recommendations that follow are associated with battlefield operating systems. Alternatives to the task organization are based on the above analysis of the US Army's experience in combined operations, its current and proposed combined operations doctrine, and recent 1AD and 2ID
experiences in combined operations with allied corps. The recommendations are designed to enhance the 21D’s probability of success in combat when under the operational control of a ROKA corps. Because of the declining role of US forces in Korea, these recommendations are designed to be cost-effective and practically achievable in a scarce-resource theater environment. They are based on the following assumptions:

- CFC will place the 21D under the operational control of a ROKA corps in wartime.
- 21D is a strategic asset; its success in combat is critical to the alliance.
- Major combat systems and organizations cannot be added to 21D in peacetime.
- Some additional theater resources are available with which to augment 21D.

Command and Control.

- Insure that the commander, 21D has combined experience. Ideally, position him on the CFC staff prior to commanding the division to familiarize him with ROKA doctrine and capabilities and cultural and political imperatives.

- Resource 21D’s liaison requirement in peacetime as well as wartime. Provide a liaison team leader of appropriate rank. Provide skilled linguists and state of the art equipment to facilitate accurate and timely translation of written material. Based on 21D’s Warfighter experience this requirement should number between 30 to 40 soldiers led by a colonel.

- Develop standard national agreements for use at corps and division level
to facilitate combat operations in the combined ROKA corps. These agreements may be modeled on NATO agreements (STANAGS).

- Limit the extent to which a ROKA corps can take operational control of 2ID assets in wartime. This should be part of the orders process and will enable 2ID to employ its assets—MLRS, attack helicopters, Firefinder radars and intelligence assets—in combat as it is doctrinally expected to do.

**Intelligence.**

- Insure that the same intelligence link that exists in peacetime between 2ID and the theater military intelligence brigade is provided in wartime.

- In peacetime and wartime provide 2ID with analysts to filter/refine intelligence received from theater.

- Provide the combined ROKA corps with the same intelligence links as the 2ID in wartime.

- Provide 2ID with wartime priority coverage from theater intelligence assets when it is committed to combat. Permit 2ID to coordinate directly with CFC for such assets.

- Develop a theater-wide SOP that allows for dissemination of compartmented information to ROKA liaison officers at corps, division and brigade levels.

**Fire Support.**

- Identify a reserve US Army field artillery brigade headquarters battery for early deployment to Korea on the time phased force deployment list. Pre-position its equipment in Korea. Deploy it to Korea during Team Spirit for
training. This headquarters should be capable of commanding and controlling the 2ID’s Firefinder radars through digital means to direct the Division’s counterbattery battle.

**Air Defense Artillery.**

- Establish formal support relationships at theater level to provide early-warning to 2ID—i.e., direct data links to the Air Component Command and AWACS.

**Combat Service Support.**

- Provide theater-level transportation assets to haul Class V to 21D on a through-put basis.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

This monograph has identified the 2ID as a strategic asset of the Combined Forces Command and has determined that because of its strategic importance, 2ID’s success at the tactical level of war is critical to the overall US-ROK wartime security relationship. The 2ID’s strategic role is linked to its tactical role through a review of the US-ROK security relationship within the context of the Northeast Asia security environment, a review of coalition warfare and analysis of the US Army’s experience in combined operations from both present and historical perspectives. This review and analysis concludes that the CFC should enhance the potential for 2ID’s battlefield success by applying lessons learned from previous combined operations and by narrowing, inasmuch as possible, the doctrinal and capabilities gaps that exist between a US corps and a ROKA corps. The methods by which CFC can apply these lessons learned
and reduce doctrinal and capabilities gaps are restricted to achievable reallocations of scarce resources, changes in task organizations and restraints and constraints on command and control between a ROKA corps and 2ID.

The historical review of the US Army's experience in combined operations is rich in lessons learned. During World War I, the US Army conducted successful combined operations when the combined force was provided sufficient time to train together, when habitual relationships between units were established and maintained and when appropriate liaison was resourced and sustained. In World War II, Operation Shingle was unsuccessful largely because these conditions did not prevail. During the Korean War, the ROK 1st Division was able to integrate fairly large US forces into its operations because of the personality and cooperative attitude of its commander. While the US and ROK armies did not conduct combined operations in Vietnam, the two armies worked in an environment of cooperation and trust. In Operation Desert Storm, the British 1st Armored Division fought successfully with the US VII Corps because it had sufficient time to train with the Corps, establish effective liaison and integrate its similar capabilities into the Corps plan. The 2ID's experience in its Warfighter exercise with the ROKA corps affirmed the validity of lessons learned in the historical review of combined operations. Liaison, for instance, remains critical to a successful combined operation as does cooperation between combined commanders.

The analysis of differences in doctrine and capabilities that exist between the 2ID and the ROKA corps were validated during the 2ID’s Warfighter
exercise; that these differences were also present in Exercise Valiant Swabian suggests that they are not unique to a specific theater but that they are likely to be present in all combined operations in which the US participates. To a great extent, these differences can be addressed by applying the lessons learned in past combined operations in which the US has participated. Liaison, training and leadership can mitigate the effects of differences on combined operations when US divisions fight with less capable and less offensively oriented allied corps. However, when a US division performs in a strategic, as well as tactical role, as does the 2ID, the differences in capabilities and doctrine should be addressed with additional resources to insure success. The tactical recommendations presented in this monograph are designed to facilitate the 2ID’s success by applying lessons from history and by eliminating gaps between US and ROKA doctrine and capabilities through the application of resources.

These recommendations are not intended to be a panacea for the inherent challenges involved in CFC-directed combined operations with the 2ID and a ROKA corps. Rather, they are presented to sensitize CFC to the difficulties involved in integrating two nations’ military leaders, capabilities and doctrines into a relatively cohesive combined force. The US Army’s experience in combined operations has not been altogether successful and the strategic role of the 2ID in the early stages of a second Korean war merits special attention. Once committed to combat with a ROKA corps, 2ID is not simply one of fifty divisions. It at once becomes the most important division fighting on the peninsula and its success becomes critical to the alliance. Implementing the
above recommendations gleaned from history, doctrine and training will lessen the difficulty of combined operations for 2ID and the ROKA corps with which it fights. Combined operations are always complex and risky; the 2ID will perform better with a ROKA corps if it is able to focus its efforts in wartime on the enemy rather than on solving the problems associated with the combined operation.
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