Special Report

THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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Experts from both inside and outside the government, writers, analysts, and practitioners of peace operations met during a roundtable held on October 5, 1993. They discussed what vital questions, problems, and issues such as the macro-level configuration of the international system, alternations in global values (especially the notion of sovereignty), and what the function of the United Nations would be in possible future international systems. While questions concerning such problems cannot be answered with certainty, they can serve as the basis for future decisions on doctrine, force structure, and strategy.
THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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Report of a Roundtable
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FOREWORD

President Clinton has expressed clear support for greater U.N. effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflict and the organization of collective security. This entails finding ways to improve U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement. The U.S. Army will have a vital role in this process and thus must better understand both the U.N. itself and the key issues and questions associated with peace support operations.

The foundation of such understanding is debate on a series of broad issues such as the macro-level configuration of the international system, alterations in global values (especially the notion of sovereignty), and the function of the United Nations in possible future international systems. While questions concerning such problems cannot be answered with certainty, they will serve as the basis for future decisions on doctrine, force structure, and strategy. It is thus vital for American security professionals to grapple with them.

To encourage this process, the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, sponsored a roundtable on October 5, 1993 that brought together distinguished experts from both inside and outside the government. They included widely-published writers, analysts, and practitioners of peace operations. Their goal was less to reach consensus on the future of the U.N. than to agree on what the vital questions, problems, and issues will be.

The following report is not a verbatim transcript of discussion at the roundtable, but an attempt to capture the debate and identify the core issues which emerged. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the debate on the future of U.N. peace operations and the role of the United States in them.

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SUMMARY

The roundtable examined grand strategic issues such as the nature of the future international system and the evolving role of the United Nations. Discussion was organized around a series of topics:

The Future of the International System. The participants generally agreed that the future international system would be two tiered with most conflict occurring in the second tier. This will include the emergence of "failed states." They disagreed on:
  - The degree of stability and cooperation within the first tier;
  - The extent to which instability and violence in the second tier can threaten first tier states, especially the United States;
  - The importance of non-state actors in the system;
  - The wisdom or feasibility of attempts to reconstruct failed states.

On the very vital question of when the United States should become involved in second tier conflicts, a majority of the participants supported U.S. involvement in second tier conflict—preferably in preemptive, coalition efforts. They did not agree on coherent strategic criteria for engagement.

The Role of the United Nations. Most participants were skeptical of expanded U.N. activities. There was a feeling that the U.N. does traditional peacekeeping activities fairly well, but would meet with much less success if it attempted to undertake operations requiring a robust military capability.

Strengthening the U.N.? The roundtable participants offered a number of suggestions for strengthening the United Nations. It should focus on the minimum necessary structural, political, and economic changes to deal effectively and in a timely fashion with traditional peacekeeping. This would
include improvements in force recruitment, supply of fielded forces, and transportation. The U.N. should also seek to enhance its "peace building" capabilities by developing better methods to recruit, train, and field competent electoral observers, civil administrators, and civilian police. There should also be a limited planning and support staff within the U.N. Secretariat and better coordination between the military and civilian components of peace support operations. The participants did not favor giving the U.N. control of large-scale military missions.

The United States and the United Nations. The roundtable participants generally anticipated a fair degree of compatibility between U.S. and U.N. objectives, and felt that the U.N. could play an important role in American national security strategy as we attempt to avoid a strategic ends/means mismatch. They agreed that gauging the extent to which we wanted to strengthen the U.N. was a vital foreign policy decision, but one on which no clear consensus currently exists. In the future, the United States will be forced to choose between a U.N. with limited utility which we control, or a more influential but autonomous organization.

Conclusion: Issues and Questions. All of the participants at the roundtable were moderates who saw at least some utility in the United Nations, but none considered it a panacea. There was deep agreement that most efforts of the U.N. in the promotion of peace and security would continue to take place in the second tier of the international system or, to use more traditional terminology, in the Third World.

Three "mission types" emerged from the discussion, each with its own problems and prospects: 1) traditional peacekeeping which usually entails monitoring a cease-fire or implementing a negotiated settlement; 2) reconstruction of a failed or destroyed state; and, 3) enforcement actions.

A series of questions will shape future U.S. support for U.N. operations. When should we care enough about second tier conflict to put ourselves at risk? How much should we empower the U.N.? And, is it possible to impose reconstruction on a society in deep conflict? Clear answers to these questions
would simplify the task of making the U.S. Army a more effective tool for the support of U.N. operations. Unfortunately, the Army will likely be called on to assist the U.N. even before the American public and policymakers frame coherent answers to these vital questions.

The Army will face at least two major dilemmas as it attempts to increase its proficiency at peace operations. The first is assuring that this increased proficiency does not come at the cost of decreased proficiency in other vital areas such as conventional land warfare. New missions or, at least, new emphases in a time of declining resources can generate great dangers. The second dilemma is one that has run throughout what was once called low-intensity conflict for several decades. The military in general and the Army in particular have devoted far and away the most effort to attempting to understand this sort of conflict and craft coherent responses. Yet the military is, by definition, a secondary actor standing in support of civilian agencies. The difficulty is finding ways to share the Army's accumulated knowledge with the key civilian agencies without militarizing the problem.
INTRODUCTION

The U.N. After the Cold War: Renaissance or Indian Summer?

Philosophers, statesmen, and victims of conflict have long dreamed of a world expunged of war. But so long as the international system was one where power—especially military power—was decentralized and the constituent units of the system varied by values, cultures, and perceptions, violence was endemic. The ultimate solution was obvious but unattainable: centralize power, delegitimize military force, homogenize values, and find methods to eradicate misperception. To many, this implied that peace would only come with world government. Somewhat less idealistic was what came to be called the liberal internationalist perspective. First given coherent form in the essay "On Eternal Peace" by the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, this sought disarmament, greater reliance on international law, and an international system composed of constitutional republics. Just as civil society emerged out of anarchy, so too, liberal internationalists hoped, would a more peaceful and organized international system.

However rational the objectives of the liberal internationalists were, violence remained a common technique for adjusting the international power balance and resolving conflicts between and within states. War was seen as natural, instinctive, and even noble. Machiavelli and Hobbes rather than Kant were the patron saints of international politics. But the 20th century challenged this attitude. Two things in particular gave rise to the idea that there were alternatives to the war-torn balance of power. First was the emergence of a vigorous advocate for liberal internationalism as the United States became a world power. Woodrow Wilson was a particularly articulate and influential proponent of the spread of democracy, self-determination, free trade, and collective security against aggression. Eventually, American influence and enthusiasm forced even the most jaded European power
to take these alternative ideas seriously. The second challenge
to the traditional balance of power was the growing
destructiveness of war. The Marne, Verdun, Somme,
Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes, and a thousand other battles of
World War I shattered the glory of war and spurred the search
for alternative methods of ordering the international system.

Most leaders recognized that world government was
infeasible or undesirable and favored some less drastic way to
homogenize international values, provide a forum for the
peaceful resolution of conflict, and organize collective security.
This notion spawned the first global international organization
designed explicitly to do these things—the League of Nations.
But despite expectations that the League would revolutionize
international politics, it quickly proved impotent. The Senate
refused to allow the United States to join, so the organization
lost its most fervent patron. With the rise of Soviet Communism,
Italian Fascism, and German Nazism, all hope for the
homogenization of values among the great powers collapsed.
This, in combination with the League’s lack of an effective
enforcement mechanism, doomed it. As the world slipped back
into global war, the League of Nations was extant, but useless.

The League’s failure to prevent World War II could have
been the death blow of liberal internationalism, but instead, it
emerged from the conflict with new life. Rather than concluding
that the concept of collective security through international
organization was flawed, key world leaders such as Franklin
Roosevelt blamed structural defects in the League of Nations
for its inability to prevent global war. In addition, proponents of
international organization believed that any lingering
resistance was certainly shattered by the horrors of World War
II. So, like the League, the United Nations was designed to
provide a forum for the peaceful resolution of conflict, develop
international law, and, when necessary, implement collective
security against aggression. But in a departure from the
structure of the League, the heart of the U.N. was a Security
Council dominated by the five major wartime allies. This, it was
thought, would more realistically reflect the concentration of
power in the international system while still allowing for an
egalitarian forum in the General Assembly.
In a melancholy repetition of the experience of the League of Nations, the U.N. very quickly foundered on the hard realities of global politics. Since it was never intended as a world government with power greater than its member states, the U.N. could be no stronger than the willingness of its members to pursue the peaceful resolution of conflict and collective security. As the international system was riven by the cold war and, later, by the series of disagreements between the developed nations and the Third World known as the "North-South conflict," the U.N. weakened. The expectations of liberal internationalists again remained unfulfilled. The organization's inherent conceptual weaknesses also became clear. Formed at the end of World War II, it was designed to deal with traditional inter-state aggression rather than the type of internal conflict that dominated the cold war international system. With the Security Council paralyzed by the cold war and the General Assembly dominated by what the United States saw as the radical and unrealistic agenda of the Third World, the U.N. had, by the 1980s, sunk to near impotence. That it played any role at all in the peaceful resolution of conflict and collective security was due to extra-Charter innovations by visionaries such as Dag Hammarskjold and Brian Urquhart. Foremost among these innovations was peacekeeping.

In the early 1990s, the rapid and unexpected demise of the Soviet Union appeared to open the way for a renaissance of the United Nations. The ideological paralysis of the cold war lifted and, in a wonderful coincidence, the North-South conflict abated as many Third World nations abandoned authoritarianism and statism for greater political openness, market economies and, in some places, elected democracies. The U.N. itself found a talented and visionary leader in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Suddenly, the U.N. became the centerpiece or broker for resolution of a bevy of global conflicts; the blue flag of the organization had never been more conspicuous. For a brief period, all obstacles to attainment of the dream that drove the U.N.'s founders seemed surmountable.

Today, the heady euphoria that accompanied the end of the cold war has faded. Despite Boutros-Ghali's attempts to
invigorate the U.N., it is still more a reflection of the international system than a force which shapes it. The U.N. is no stronger than its members will allow, and the end of the cold war did not eradicate value conflicts, misperceptions, and suspicion among the nations of the world. In addition, the Charter still seems inadequate for dealing with the type of internal conflict that dominated the post-cold war international system. While the potential of the U.N. seems more attainable than it did 5 years ago, it is still potential rather than reality. Even the United States is torn. The fact that the U.N. was created at all and sustained through the dark days of the cold war was due, in part, to the U.S.’ lingering isolationism. We wanted something other than ourselves to promote the liberal internationalist vision of the world, and hoped that the United Nations would do this. But the traumas of the 1970s and 1980s made many Americans see the U.N. as a colossal mistake, a Frankenstein’s monster turning on its creator.

Today, the U.N. stands at a crossroad. It is not clear whether the end of the cold war opened the way for the organization to finally meet the expectations of its founders, or whether it is simply dying a loud and demonstrative death. For the historians of the future, the early 1990s may be seen as either the renaissance of the United Nations or its Indian Summer.

The Roundtable.

President Clinton has stated support for greater U.N. effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflict and the organization of collective security. This entails finding ways to improve U.N. peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement. Clearly the U.S. Army will have a vital role in this process and thus must better understand both the U.N. itself and the key issues and questions associated with peace operations. To encourage such understanding, the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, sponsored a roundtable on October 5, 1993 at Carlisle Barracks, PA. This brought together distinguished experts from both inside and outside the government. The group included published authors on the U.N., participants in the formulation or implementation
of U.S. policy toward the U.N., veteran peacekeepers, and active analysts of peace operations. (A participant list is at Appendix A to this report.)

This roundtable examined grand strategic issues such as the nature of the future international system and the evolving role of the United Nations. A subsequent roundtable will deal with the more specific subject of Army involvement in U.N. peace operations. All discussion was non-attribution to encourage frank and open debate. To build a foundation for discussion, roundtable participants received read-ahead material published by the Strategic Studies Institute. (See the bibliography at Appendix B.)

The roundtable opened with an introduction of the recently-formed U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. (A fact sheet is at Appendix C.) Discussion was then organized around a series of topics: 1) the future of the international system; 2) the role of the United Nations in potential future systems; 3) methods for improving or strengthening the U.N.; and, 4) the compatibility of U.S. interests and those of the United Nations. The debate that emerged was often free-wheeling but consistently fecund. The remainder of this report attempts to capture the essence of the roundtable, but is not a verbatim transcript.
The Future of the International System.

The roundtable first dealt with the broadest (and perhaps most central) question of all: What shape will the post-cold war international system take and what will be the sources and forms of conflict within it? While it is impossible to answer such a speculative question with certainty, it is vital to attempt since the nature of the international system will largely determine the role and function of the United Nations.

To begin discussion, a participant offered a model of the future international system based on a two-tier configuration. The first tier is composed of advanced market democracies including the European Community, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Other states such as the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are on the edge of the first tier. The first tier is relatively homogenous in terms of interests and values and is economically interdependent. In terms of war and peace, first tier states are the core global actors, but war among them is almost inconceivable. They prefer stability because stability is good for business. The United States, as the preeminent core power, favors collective security as a means of sharing responsibility for global security, and finds its use of military power limited primarily by public opinion rather than capability.

The second tier includes all the nations which are not advanced market democracies, specifically the old Third World and most of the former Second World or Soviet bloc. The second tier is much less homogenous than the first, and ranges from nations which, in terms of economic development, are nearly in the first tier such as China, to states that have no chance of substantial development. In contrast to the first tier, there is no commonality of values in the second tier, and thus this is where major violence will occur in the future. Most of it will be internal—"self-determination run amok" as one participant phrased it. Outside the Persian Gulf and South Asia,
traditional regional conflict is nearly obsolete. Militarily, second tier states are limited by capability rather than public opinion. No second tier state can militarily confront a determined first tier nation. Most importantly, the survival of the system itself cannot be threatened by instability or violence in the second tier—a historically unique condition.

The first tier has few truly vital interests in the second tier with petroleum being the possible exception. This means that if the United States is to become involved in security problems in the second tier, we must alter or jettison our traditional definition of the national interest. Development of the notion of "humanitarian vital interests" is an attempt to deal with this dilemma. An additional important issue is how the first tier, particularly the United States, will interact militarily with the second tier. One alternative is a modification of the U.N. model where collective security is pursued through cooperation between first tier and second tier states. Another is "collective hegemony" where the first tier imposes its will on the second in order to promote stability and expand the ring of market democracies. When the United Nations actively promotes security in the second tier, first tier states will prefer to use the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. Potentially, the second tier may grow to distrust the U.N. as it recognizes that the organization is used by the first tier to impose its will or its values. To counter this, second tier states are seeking greater influence in the Security Council, possibly through some sort of permanent seat with a veto.

Another participant felt that relations among the first tier states would not be as cooperative as the author of the two-tier system suggested. While intra-core differences might not lead to outright war, they could spark surrogate conflict in the second tier. He also suggested that a multiple layer rather than a two-tier configuration might more accurately describe the world. The core would be composed of the first tier market democracies, the second layer of the "nearly first tier" states such as India, Brazil, and China, and, eventually, the outer tier of "failed states" such as Somalia and Bosnia. In this configuration, conflict occurs more at the interface of different layers than within a layer. Security will often be defined as
containing instability and violence within the layer where it emerged.

The author of the two-tier system felt that this underestimated the autonomy of the first tier and the degree to which it is united by shared values. This implies a duality in the international system which a layered "onion" model does not capture. He did note the possibility of movement from the second to first tier and suggested that this was the thrust of the new foreign policy recently outlined by the Clinton administration—to assist nations attempting to join the first tier.

Another participant pointed out that the two-tier model was essentially governmental or state-centered, and doesn't adequately account for the security dilemmas of post-colonial nations that are not truly states. The first tier is not particularly comfortable dealing with these pseudo-states that compose much of the second tier of the international system. American activity in a failed state like Somalia is a perfect illustration of this. The two-tier model may also underestimate the growing power of non-state actors. Furthermore, the economic, political, and security problems of the second tier erode the ability of the first tier to fully control the extent of its involvement. Phenomena like migration from the second tier transform its difficulties into problems for the first tier as well. As a participant phrased it, "The problems of the second tier become our problems as their people vote with their feet." This makes preventive measures such as peacekeeping and economic development important elements of first tier security, however politically unpopular they may be. It was also suggested that we should not overemphasize the military mismatch between first tier and second tier states since the permeability of first tier nations makes them vulnerable to unconventional applications of force such as terrorism. Another participant noted that non-state groups within the second tier find such unconventional violence especially attractive, and this can influence the more conventional application of force by the U.N. or first tier states.

A participant then reminded the group of the extreme limitations on the size of the first tier. He was skeptical of the ability of any of the Asian candidate members to make the
transition. India and China in particular have long histories of disintegration and reunification. He also noted that it is an oversimplification to assume that the second tier will be dominated by violence, and suggested some regions of the second tier will be quite stable. These would be useful partners for the first tier in achieving some sort of overall order.

Failed states pose particularly thorny problems for the emerging post-cold war international system. The American military in particular has had great difficulty dealing with societies lacking normal power-wielding institutions such as governments and legal systems. Cambodia and Somalia are examples, but the same problem emerged in Lebanon where the United States became affiliated with an institution calling itself the national government which really had no power outside a small sector of Beirut. During military operations in failed states, the United States searches for formal parallel institutions. This is especially true for bureaucratic organizations like the military which are accustomed to clear lines of authority and responsibility. When we do not find such institutions, we often attempt to create them. Sometimes this succeeds, but more often fails. Another participant pointed out that the United States does, in fact, have doctrine for dealing with societies where governmental authority has collapsed—counterinsurgency. To date, however, the process of using counterinsurgency doctrine to build doctrine for the reconstruction of failed states has not occurred.

As discussion returned to the two-tier model, its author reiterated that the current system differs from all its predecessors in that there is no immediate military activity which can challenge the system in the way that nuclear war threatened the cold war international system. Currently, second tier conflict does not have the potential to ignite conflict among first tier states. This offers first tier states the option of eschewing involvement in second tier violence. If first tier states do become involved in second tier conflict, they will usually do it cooperatively rather than competitively. Other participants, however, disagreed with the notion that first tier states could or should disassociate themselves from second
tier conflict but did not specify the rationale for U.S. involvement in second tier conflict.

A participant then asked whether the concepts of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity were relevant in the two-tier model of the international system. The author of the two-tier framework suggested that these concepts were derived from the traditional, state-centric international system, and therefore were of limited utility in the post-cold war system. Another participant noted that unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity were always used to describe the configuration of the core of the international system. If there is no conflict among first tier states, then these concepts are irrelevant. But, this participant argued, there will be more conflict among first tier states than predicted by the author of the framework.

A military officer then noted that the extent of cooperation or conflict within the first tier is a vital determinant of future U.S. force structure requirements. A military force designed only to intervene in the second tier would look markedly different than one designed to fight other first tier nations. One criticism of the recent "bottom up review" of the U.S. military is that by focusing on second tier conflict it ignored the possibility of intra-first tier violence. The author of the two-tier model later argued that the only reason for building a military force to fight another first tier nation is if we think one or more of them might revert from market democracy. War between market democracies, he stressed, is practically inconceivable. Reversion, however, is at least possible.

Another participant added that the notion of regionalism as it is expressed in American strategy doesn't always correspond to the realities of the world. The inherent weaknesses of regional organizations, whether formal or informal, give the U.N. a major role in the maintenance of peace and security almost by default. The power of regional organizations, according to another participant, is inversely proportional to the problems in their region. NATO is strong but Europe is stable; the Organization of African Unity and the Gulf Cooperation Council are weak and their regions are unstable. Several participants did, however, feel that strengthening regional systems is a desirable, if difficult, objective.
The discussion then returned to the question of whether violence and instability in the second tier warrants the attention of the United States. In disagreement with the author of the two-tier model, a participant argued that the proliferation of advanced weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, makes it very dangerous for the United States to eschew involvement in second tier conflicts. This, he concluded, supported preemptive or early involvement in potentially dangerous second tier conflicts.

In conclusion, the participants generally agreed that the future international system would be two tiered with most conflict occurring in the second tier. This will include the emergence of "failed states." They disagreed on:

- The degree of stability and cooperation within the first tier;
- The extent to which instability and violence in the second tier can threaten first tier states, especially the United States;
- The importance of non-state actors in the system;
- The wisdom or feasibility of attempts to reconstruct failed states.

On the very vital question of when the United States should become involved in second tier conflicts, even those participants in favor of an activist national security strategy did not offer concrete guidelines for determining which conflicts warranted our attention. The cold war provided such guidelines: We became involved when a Third World conflict became a surrogate superpower struggle or when it had the possibility of leading to direct superpower confrontation. In the post-cold war system, it is not yet clear what the criteria should be for the application of American power. If the potential for humanitarian disaster or presence of weapons of mass destruction become such criteria, then nearly every second tier conflict will require American involvement. Clearly this is at odds with our declining military force and presence. But while we have not yet clarified the criteria for engagement, we will not abdicate the right to do so. The American public will never
allow the U.N. to determine the locale and extent of our engagement in second tier conflict.

In the absence of coherent criteria for engagement, the tendency is to attempt to preempt or contain every second tier conflict. If this continues, the result will be strategic overextension or a serious means/ends mismatch as our commitments outstrip our capabilities or, at least, our will. Several participants at the roundtable, in fact, warned of dangers of overextension. So while a majority of the participants supported U.S. involvement in second tier conflict—preferably in preemptive, coalition efforts—they did not agree on coherent strategic criteria for engagement. We know "how" to become involved, but have not clarified the "why" and "when." A participant pointed out that this is due, in part, to the changing state of global values. Values shape the definition of national interest, and until we clarify the value structure underlying our post-cold war strategy, we cannot clearly define national interest or formulate coherent strategic criteria for engagement.

The Role of the United Nations.

During discussion of the future international system, several participants suggested the United Nations was becoming an agent for the interests of the first tier states. The roundtable then turned to deal explicitly with the evolving role of the U.N., especially its ability to promote peace and security.

The first item of discussion was the relationship of the U.N. and regional organizations. Most participants felt that regional organizations had an important role to play in the future international system, but nearly all agreed that they needed substantial improvement. Until this happens, one participant noted, the U.N. will be the only viable international organization for the promotion of peace and security. The U.N., in other words, is not actively engaged today so much because of its effectiveness as because of the ineffectiveness of regional organizations. It is thus a good substitute for direct intervention by first tier countries. This might be called "surrogate hegemony" in contrast to the "collective hegemony" of direct
intervention. A participant reminded the group that the United Nations has no independent objectives or interests, but is simply a tool for the attainment of the objectives or interests of its member states. Thus the role of the United Nations is whatever the people who pay for it say it is. And, clearly, the United States is still the most important member state in determining the role and objectives of the U.N.

The cold war limited U.N. involvement in regional conflicts but now this brake is released. One participant suggested that while the U.N. has a vital role to play in international consensus-building, its does not have the skills to actually apply force. This will persist despite the urging of people like Brian Urquhart to upgrade the U.N.'s command and control capability. It was also pointed out that most proposals for strengthening the U.N.'s enforcement capability called for only a small, permanent rapid reaction contingent while the bulk of peace enforcement forces will remain under national control. In a term used by General (Ret.) John Galvin, the U.N. must "subcontract" enforcement measures and provide only political guidance and moral mandate. But, another participant pointed out, the only regional organization with the capability of handling such subcontracts is NATO.

A participant then noted that anything that could be done with a standing U.N. force could be done with earmarked national units. A standing U.N. brigade, after all, would not solve the problem of overextension. Nor could it be specialized enough to serve in all of the types of operations where a U.N. presence is required.

Currently the U.N. cannot command and control even a limited standing force. The major institutional shortcoming of the U.N., a participant argued, is that the highest decision-making body—the Security Council—does not have a permanent structure for military advice. The Military Staff Committee is ineffective. While the national representatives on the Security Council receive military advice from their national armed forces, the Secretary-General has no independent source of information or guidance. As an ad hoc solution, the Secretary-General tends to solicit military advice (and intelligence) from the United States and other Western states.
A permanent U.N. military staff would solve this problem. But, this participant felt, even a U.N. with better military advice and intelligence should not attempt anything other than small-scale military operations. A strengthened U.N. could handle operations like Somalia but major enforcement operations such as Desert Storm require the more advanced staff and intelligence systems of its member states.

It was then suggested that discussions of a robust U.N. military capability may not capture the true essence of the peacekeeping problem, since so much of the work in such operations is actually civilian. Furthermore, the U.N. is fully capable of deploying and controlling some of the most valuable types of peacekeepers, especially truce and election monitors, mediators, and civilian police. The U.N. can be effective in situations where antagonists in a conflict have fought to the point of exhaustion and genuinely want outside assistance. Thus the roundtable participants generally supported actions to improve the Secretary-General's effectiveness in these more traditional functions.

Since most participants rejected the notion of major changes in the structure of the U.N., discussion focused on methods for enhancing the effectiveness of the organization within existing parameters. Paramount among these is better horizontal integration of the various organizations involved in operations like Somalia which combine peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. In these, coordination tends to be informal and personality-dependent. A participant with in-depth knowledge of the Somalia operation noted that it was the military that was most persistent in tying together all the disparate relief and development agencies. He proposed something like a "country team" concept to synchronize efforts. The proposals of Boutros-Ghali, according to another participant, would empower the U.N. to take actions that are relatively inexpensive and do not require robust military force. The reinstatement of lapsed cease-fires and promotion of political solutions are activities appropriate for the U.N. The problem is that few conflicts are amenable to this type of solution. National contingents must continue to deal with conflicts that require robust military forces. The group was
reminded, though, that even standing U.N. forces would remain under national commanders—the Secretary-General would not have actual military command. If the force commander exceeded the terms of reference established for the operation and accepted by the participating nations, then a national contingent commander would have the right to disagree and inform the force commander that he cannot obey.

As the discussion returned to the grand strategic level, a participant suggested that since relations between the first and second tiers of the international system will not be amicable in the future, the U.N., which reflects this division, may disintegrate rather than increase in effectiveness. One of the major determinants of how fast this collapse occurs will be the leadership skills of the secretaries-general who follow Boutros-Ghali. The current selection method for the Secretary-General does not lend itself to the emergence of effective and dynamic leaders. Another participant suggested that rather than the collapse of the U.N., we are simply witnessing the testing and definition of its limits. Once we discover what it can and cannot do, its functions can be clarified. In fact, commonality and cooperation between the first and second tiers is growing, thus giving multinational bodies a more important role to play rather than a lesser one.

In conclusion, most participants were skeptical of the sort of new U.N. activities proposed by Boutros-Ghali, Urquhart, and others. There was a feeling that the U.N. does traditional peacekeeping activities fairly well, but would meet with much less success if it attempted to undertake operations requiring a robust military capability. While nearly all participants agreed that the U.N. should improve its ability to control peace operations, they were critical of plans for standing military forces or military staffs. The participants did not agree as to whether the U.N. is currently experiencing a renaissance or an Indian Summer.

Strengthening the U.N.?

The roundtable participants offered a number of suggestions for strengthening the United Nations. They
concluded that this must be from the "bottom up." Rather than looking first to development of the capability for military enforcement, the U.N. should focus on the minimum necessary structural, political, and economic changes to deal effectively and in a timely fashion with traditional peacekeeping. Such improvements would come in the areas of force recruitment, supply of fielded forces, and transportation. The U.N. should also seek to enhance its "peace building" capabilities by developing better methods to recruit, train, and field competent electoral observers, civil administrators, and civilian police. There should also be a limited planning and support staff within the U.N. Secretariat. This should be entirely separate from the sort of command and logistics staff required for large-scale military operations.

Another participant noted that the real weakness of the U.N. is at the nexus of the economic, political, and military elements of power. Cases such as Cambodia or Somalia show that the integration of diverse capabilities when "standing up" failed states is a topic in dire need of further work, study, and analysis. In Cambodia, the United Nations "stumbled into success" rather than "organizing for success." In Somalia, the problem has not been so much a failure in the application of military force (although this has occurred) as a failure of the political, economic, and diplomatic process of reestablishing civil society and government. While the reconstruction of failed states may not be the most common form of U.N. operations in the future, it will be among the most difficult.

Another participant further stressed the secondary role of the military in peacekeeping and civil reconstruction operations. The way you exit the military, he argued, is to have a coherent political strategy. That has been missing in recent operations. And, another participant added, it is important to note that the civil affairs units in the Army are not suited to this. Unlike the World War II era, they are not designed to reestablish government, order, and administration after fighting has subsided. Another participant stated that the primary function of Army civil affairs was support of Third World developmental projects. It should be added that while the doctrinal roles and missions of Army civil affairs units could
allow them to play an important role in reconstruction of failed
states, their location in the reserve component complicates the
sort of sustained effort that such reconstruction would
demand. And unfortunately, the U.S.' past experience at
reconstruction is not applicable to situations such as Somalia.
At the end of World War II, the governments, economies, and
militaries of Germany and Japan were destroyed, but their
societies were intact. This is not true in Somalia where we are
attempting to socially engineer in 2 years something that has
fallen apart over decades or perhaps was never there.

A participant noted that there is no clear foundation in the
Charter of the United Nations for operations entailing the
reconstruction of failed states. But, according to another,
where all U.N. activity in civil conflict violates the Charter
prohibition against involvement in the internal affairs of
member states. Another participant asserted that the political
and civil elements of the United Nations have usually been well
prepared for traditional peacekeeping operations which occur
when the actual combat has subsided. They are not prepared
to perform their functions in the midst of fighting. The result is
a circular deadlock where the civilian agencies claim that they
cannot continue their activities until order is fully restored and
the military claims that it cannot complete its mission without
the public support that would be generated by the civil
activities.

Because of the U.N.'s aversion to the use of force, it does
not make the most effective use of certain military assets such
as civil affairs and psychological operations units. The attitude
in the U.N. has traditionally been "un-Clausewitzian" in that
military force, rather than being an integral adjunct of political
efforts, was only used when diplomacy failed and then stopped
as soon as diplomacy could be reinvigorated. (This same
charge has long been leveled against American statecraft so
the delinkage of force and diplomacy in the U.N. may, in part,
reflect American influence over that organization's institutional
culture.) Militaries must accept this situation and limit
themselves to providing security, transportation, and logistic
support while the political organizations bear the brunt of
responsibility for actually resolving conflicts.
The absence of an effective military headquarters system also hinders U.N. operations. Any decision which the force commander cannot make on his own is referred to the Security Council through the Secretary-General's special representative. There it is often bogged down in political debate. For the application of military power under the Charter, a participant argued, there is a need for some sort of intermediate organization to pass guidance downward and information upward. Discussion then focused on the diversity between the institutional culture of the civilian U.N. secretariat and that of the military force which participates in peace operations. These can be exacerbated when member states experience military coups and by interservice rivalries within member states.

A more skeptical participant questioned the basic premise of strengthening the U.N. He was especially critical of attempting to reconstruct failed states. The U.N. will become no more effective, he argued, than the United States allows. As Somalia disintegrates, the American public may well lose confidence in the U.N., thus ending its renewed importance. The reconstruction of failed states or those emerging from long conflicts, according to another participant, is more the function of the various U.N. specialized agencies than that of the Secretary-General and his immediate staff. For example, the distribution of food during reconstruction and relief operations is not handled by the Secretary General or the Security Council. But the U.N. has never been able to effectively coordinate economic and social activities or control the civilian organs which largely determine the ultimate success or failure of an operation. Both the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Administrative Committee on Coordination have tried and failed. So the core problem is more than a "two culture" one pitting military and civilian institutions, but is a "multi-culture" one where stark differences in attitudes and perspectives exist between the civilian agencies of the U.N. as well as between the U.N. and nongovernmental relief groups (NGOs).

A participant countered that it is possible to discern the embryo of such coordination in the Cambodia operation. This
reflected the "lead agency" concept. The first participant felt, however, that this does partially address some of the short-term problems like food relief and the holding of elections, but not the long-term ones such as constructing a self-sustaining economy. It is especially difficult for the Secretary General to coordinate NGOs since there are about 124 of them involved in Cambodia and 225 in Bosnia. Such coordination tends to take place informally in the field. Another participant noted that there are methods for encouraging NGOs to participate in efforts at coordination since the U.N. and the U.S. Agency for International Development funnel money to many of them. Another participant argued that these coordination problems and the lack of institutional solutions make the selection of participants in a U.N. operation, whether the Special Representative or the actual military units, all the more vital. The personalities of the participants, in other words, often becomes a vital determinant of success.

It was pointed out that making the U.N. more efficient at the type of operations that it has traditionally undertaken is radically different from the more extreme proposals which call for making it capable of new kinds of activities such as military enforcement. From this perspective, one way to strengthen the U.N. is to simply not encourage it or allow it to take on missions beyond its inherent limitations. The goal, then, would be to seek enhanced efficiency rather than augmented effectiveness. The ability to assess missions may also be a crucial skill for the U.N. This, according to another participant, is the position of the Clinton administration—that the U.N. "has to learn to say No." The U.N. must develop a tradition, as other participants suggested, of occasionally letting conflicts rage until conditions for resolution are ripe.

This argument, however, implies that the U.N. can select between involvement or noninvolvement in a conflict much like a nation. It is not clear that this is a realistic option since the U.N. is almost forced into global activism by tradition and by political imperatives. It is the U.N.'s birthright to at least attempt to solve all conflicts. In "significant states," meaning ones skilled at playing to world public opinion, restraint could only occur if the permanent members of the Security Council chose
to limit U.N. activity to the sort of operations where it stood a high chance of success. In fact, the United States is currently attempting to force the Security Council to clarify the conditions for both entrance and exit before engagement in a conflict. But if the U.N., at the urging of a permanent member of the Security Council, does "say no" to engagement in a conflict, this would place responsibility for the conflict directly on the shoulders of that permanent member. In the end, the permanent member would rather see the U.N. try and then fail to solve a conflict than shoulder the onus for a disaster unfolding on the television screens of the world.

In addition, another participant pointed out, the sort of conflicts which most demand U.N. attention are those where armed violence is simply a symptom of deeper problems of underdevelopment and the absence of a functioning civil society. The U.N.’s record in helping make the sort of fundamental political, economic, and social changes involved in nation assistance is not propitious. This leads to the conundrum that the U.N. is really only capable of dealing with the type of problems where its involvement is not vital. The systemically responsible step, according to a participant, may be for the U.N. to actually take over and administer failed states. But that, of course, smacks of colonialism, and would therefore be unacceptable to most second tier states—the people on which a U.N.-engineered order is imposed quickly become "something less than grateful." Phrased differently, the second tier was a great proponent of the U.N. when it saw the organization as a bulwark against the imposition of the will of a first tier focused on the cold war, but now that the U.N. may be becoming an agent for the imposition of first tier interests, the second tier is increasingly suspicious.

Even in operations such as Somalia, the nature of global information flows complicates the U.N.’s task. The group was reminded that outside south Mogadishu, the Somalia operation was quite successful. But because media coverage focuses on violence in Mogadishu, public support for the operation in the United States has crumbled. The U.N. is simply not very effective at mobilizing support for its activities. But, it might be added, any attempt to sway public opinion by the U.N. would
probably meet intense resistance by the governments of member states.

The United States and the United Nations.

The roundtable participants then turned to the question of the compatibility of U.S. national security interests with the ongoing evolution of the U.N. A participant noted that we tend to throw issues to the U.N. that we prefer not get involved with directly. As a superpower, we feel some degree of global responsibility, yet as a superpower with no imperial ambitions and a long isolationist tradition, we find many problems where our concern is far below the threshold of effective action. The U.N. thus moves problems away from our own front door.

Another participant noted that there will be times when cooperation with the U.N. is in our national interest, and there will be other times when divergent perspectives between Washington and the U.N. lead us to ignore or bypass the organization. This participant argued that the compatibility of U.S. and U.N. interests will depend, in part, on the activism of the Secretary General. To the extent the Secretary General rather than the Security Council frames the U.N.'s agenda, the U.N. will be less a tool of American policy and more an autonomous actor in world politics. So long as primary decision-making power remains with the Security Council, the interests of the United States and U.N. will largely remain compatible.

After all, according to another participant, it was Boutros-Ghali who put Somalia on the world political agenda to fulfill a promise made to African leaders during his bid for the Secretary-Generalship. When Boutros-Ghali failed to gain support within the chambers of the Security Council, he took his case to the public. The United States was then pressured to participate in the operation even given our minimal or nonexistent national interests. We saw Somalia as strategically insignificant, but an apparently easy operation, so we became involved in order to help establish a precedent of activism and success. In Bosnia, which was strategically significant, we anticipated limited chances of success, and thus eschewed
involvement. Symbolism and the establishment of precedent as much as national interest in the traditional sense are shaping our national security strategy.

The connection was then made between the declining size of the U.S. military and the United Nations. The implication was that a more active and robust U.N. could shoulder some of the responsibilities that the United States might be forced to abdicate. This could be called the "junior partner" approach since it assumes that U.N. objectives are generally compatible with those of the United States. Another participant warned that the Somalia operation might deplete the support of the American people for the use of military force in general, and thus place us in a dangerous position should a real threat arise.

A participant then argued that the roundtable had largely ignored American public opinion during the day's discussion. Public support, he felt, was a vital component of U.S. relations with the United Nations. Problems arise from widespread public distrust of the U.N. left from the dark days of the 1970s and 1980s. In a broader sense, he felt that the American public had not been convinced that any U.N. peace operation was worth placing American servicemen at risk. Evidence of this can been seen in Congress' growing reluctance to fund peace operations. In the face of this trend, the Clinton administration seems to have lowered its enthusiasm for peace operations rather than attempted to mobilize support for it. But another participant argued that the humanitarian urge in the American public is an important force. It might not be powerful enough to sustain a long, costly military operation, but could generate approval for the initial involvement in places like Somalia. In a sense, the President's role is to sustain public support more than to mobilize it.

A participant then placed the question of the compatibility of U.S. and U.N. interests within the context of the new American strategy as explained by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. This strategy is to replace containment—a defensive grand strategy—with enlargement of the community of market democracies. By contrast, this is a proactive or offensive grand strategy. This could come into conflict with the traditional American desire to avoid seeming imperialist or to
forestall imposing our will on other states. The implication is that the U.N. can reconcile these divergent desires. But, another participant countered, part of the normative basis of the United Nations is respect for diversity rather than systemic homogeneity. Our new national security strategy runs counter to the fundamental principles under which the U.N. was established. Other participants noted, however, that the normative basis of the U.N. is undergoing fundamental change. Somalia and other operations violated the principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs. Boutros-Ghali, as a prime proponent of a new, more limited notion of national sovereignty, is contributing to this normative change.

The U.N. has traditionally sought at least the appearance of strict neutrality (with some stark exceptions such as Israel and South Africa). When the organization did take sides as in the Congo crisis, it made enemies and lost the veil of neutrality. This may again be the outcome if Boutros-Ghali's vision of a more active and interventionist U.N. bears fruit. By seeking to expand its functions, the U.N. may lose the ability to perform its traditional missions in peace operations.

For the United States, the U.N. allows burden-sharing and gives us the opportunity to lead politically but not necessarily militarily, at least in traditional style peacekeeping. Another participant suggested that it might be useful for the U.N. to perform an operation without a U.S. role in order to better gauge the usefulness of our contribution. The first participant was skeptical of such an operation's chances of success. But, it was pointed out, the member states actually have an interest in preventing the U.N. from becoming too efficient or the Secretary-General too powerful lest they lose control of the organization. This participant disagreed with the earlier contention that Boutros-Ghali had a substantial impact on U.S. policy toward Somalia. Whenever the United States wanted to ignore the Secretary-General, he argued, it did so. As another participant noted, top Clinton policymakers have made clear that multilateralism is a means, not an end in itself. It was then argued that deciding how much authority to transfer to the United Nations is one of the key decisions that will define the post-cold war U.S. foreign policy. It is possible that we may find
ourselves facing a Secretary-General strengthened inadvertently through the accretion of a number of apparently minor policy decisions.

In conclusion, the roundtable participants generally anticipated a fair degree of compatibility between U.S. and U.N. objectives, and felt that the U.N. could play an important role in American national security strategy as we attempt to avoid a strategic ends/means mismatch. They agreed that gauging the extent to which we wanted to strengthen the U.N. was a vital foreign policy decision, but one on which no clear consensus currently exists. What they did not discuss in great detail was the fact that such compatibility can and perhaps will erode the influence of the U.N. in the second tier. Saddam Hussein attempted to picture the U.N. as the stooge of the United States. In the future, this perspective may become widespread in the second tier. If so, the United States will be forced to choose between a U.N. with limited utility which we control, or a more influential but autonomous organization.

Conclusion: Issues and Questions.

Since the founding of the United Nations, Americans have viewed it in many ways. On one end of the spectrum were the skeptics who saw the organization as useless at best and, at worst, an outright threat pushing toward world government. This position was most common on the right side of the political spectrum and given its most coherent expression by scholars associated with the Heritage Foundation. The other pole was populated by those who considered the U.N. a panacea for international conflict. These thinkers, who usually came from the left side of the political spectrum, agreed that the U.N. was the first step toward world government, but considered that a beneficial thing.

All of the participants at our roundtable were moderates who fell somewhere between these extremes. All saw at least some degree of utility in the United Nations, but none considered it a panacea. Some were fairly skeptical of the U.N.'s utility, others more optimistic. In this the participants probably reflected the American public as a whole. The U.N.,
as the participants continually reiterated, is a microcosm of the international system and thus can be no stronger than the broader techniques for the resolution of conflict and the values that undergird them. There was deep agreement that most efforts of the U.N. in the promotion of peace and security would continue to take place in the second tier of the international system or, to use more traditional terminology, in the Third World.

Three "mission types" emerged from the discussion, each with its own problems and prospects. First were what can be called traditional U.N. peacekeeping which usually entailed monitoring a cease-fire or implementing a negotiated settlement. This occurs with the consent of the antagonists, and the actual peacekeeping operation is secondary to the diplomatic and political processes that led toward resolution of the conflict. This mission type first coalesced in the Middle East and was largely the creation of Dag Hammarskjold and Brian Urquhart. The participants at the roundtable generally agreed that the U.N. was fairly good at this. There are problems with overextension and funding as well as the need for some structural reforms in pursuit of greater efficiency, but the prospects for success are good and the United States should support this type of activity.

The second mission type entailed guardianship of a nascent state as in the Congo operation or reconstruction of a failed or destroyed state as in Somalia. In such efforts, there are major problems including the difficulty of coordinating diverse organizations, expense, a lack of patience and persistence, and, most of all, the absolute magnitude of the task, especially when the process of reconstruction was imposed. There is no good historical precedent for the imposed reconstruction of a failed or destroyed state. Furthermore, the fact that reconstruction of a failed or destroyed state smacks of Western colonialism can generate resistance within the target state and in the Third World in general. Thus the prospects for U.N. success at reconstruction are not good.

The third mission type includes enforcement actions such as Korea or the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. The recent literature on the U.N. has dealt extensively with
peace-enforcement and has resulted in a number of plans for a standing U.N. military force or, at a minimum, substantial improvements in the ability of the Secretary General to command and control large military forces. It is likely that the participants at the roundtable considered these passing fads, and would have concluded that future large-scale enforcement actions will follow the *Desert Storm* model where U.N. political approval adds legitimacy to military actions taken by the United States or a coalition led by the United States or the other first tier nations.

What emerged from the roundtable, then, was a series of strategic issues and unanswered questions that will shape future U.S. support for U.N. operations. When should we care enough about second tier conflict to put ourselves at risk? How much should we empower the U.N.? And, is it possible to impose reconstruction on a society in deep conflict? Clear answers to these questions would simplify the task of making the U.S. Army a more effective tool for the support of U.N. operations. Unfortunately, the Army will likely be called on to assist the U.N. even before the American public and policymakers frame coherent answers to these vital questions.

The Army will face at least two major dilemmas as it attempts to increase its proficiency at peace operations. The first is assuring that this increased proficiency does not come at the cost of decreased proficiency in other vital areas such as conventional land warfare. New missions or, at least, new emphases in a time of declining resources can generate great dangers. The second dilemma is one that has run throughout what was once called low-intensity conflict for several decades. The military in general and the Army in particular have devoted far and away the most effort to attempting to understand this sort of conflict and craft coherent responses. Yet the military is, by definition, a secondary actor standing in support of civilian agencies. The problem then, is finding ways to share the Army's accumulated knowledge with the key civilian agencies without militarizing the problem. Specific solutions to these two key dilemmas await discovery.
ENDNOTES


3. To structure discus<ication> on this issue, roundtable participants were provided a copy of Steven Metz, "Post-Cold War Models of the International System," unpublished manuscript, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.


7. See Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

8. Although it occurred after the roundtable, the U.N. did reject a request by Burundi in November 1993 for peacekeeping forces. (Julia Preston, "No Mission To Burundi, U.N. Says," Washington Post, November 3, 1993, p. A10). This may reflect Burundi's inexperience at mobilizing world opinion rather than indicate a pattern of restraint on the part of the U.N. In a similar move, the U.N. threatened to withdraw mediators from Liberia if no progress is made on talks between the warring factions. (Kenneth B. Noble, "As Liberia's Factions Talk, Strife and Fear Drag On," New York Times, November 5, 1993, p. A3.)
APPENDIX A
ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

Moderator: COL John Mountcastle (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute)

Participants:

- Maj Gen (Ret.) Indar Rikhye (United States Institute of Peace)
- Ambassador Daniel Simpson (U.S. Army War College)
- Dr. Earl Tilford (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute)
- Dr. Robert Jordan (Air War College)
- Dr. William Durch (Henry L. Stimson Center)
- Dr. Donald Snow (University of Alabama)
- Dr. Richard Kessler (Senate Foreign Relations Committee)
- Capt Paul Dahlquist, USN (Office of the Secretary of Defense)
- COL Karl Farris (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)
- COL James Dorton (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)
- LTC Robert Johnson (Army Staff)
- LTC Michael Burton (Mershon Center, Ohio State University)
- LTC William MacDonald (U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute)
- LTC William Doll (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute)
- Mr. Randolph Ryan (Boston Globe)
- MAJ Michael Bailey (Army Staff)
- Dr. Steven Metz (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute)

Administrator: MAJ Carl Griffin (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute)
APPENDIX B
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APPENDIX C
FACT SHEET ON THE U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING INSTITUTE

The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute was created at the Army War College for the study of peace operations at the strategic and high operational levels. The mission of the Institute is to:

Study and confer on the strategic and operational implications of peace operations; develop peace operations concepts and doctrine in support of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, the Army War College, and the combatant commanders; and refine the application of land power in peace operations at the United Nations, interagency, joint, and combined levels through the use of studies, conferences, simulations, exercises, and wargames.

As part of the Center for Strategic Leadership, its charter includes:

• Providing a capability within the Army to examine strategic and operational issues supporting the Army's participation in peace operations.

• Conducting research, studies, and exercises designed to refine Senior Leaders' skills in peace operations.

• Interacting with national and international agencies to examine concepts and evaluating strategies for use in Army doctrine and programs.

• Evaluating and assisting Army educational and training institutions in curriculum development involving land forces in peace operations as requested.

• Monitoring, assimilating, and adapting for Army use, peace operations research conducted by other services, academe, government agencies, and other countries.
• Providing support to, and participating in, interactive gaming by the Senior Level Colleges and government agencies.

• Acting as the Army's repository for information on the strategic and operational employment of land forces in peace operations.

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