AD-A274 109

Towards an Integrated Campaign Plan: The Use of Political, Economic, and Military Elements of National Power at the Operational Level of War

A Monograph
by

Major Judith K. Lemire
Ordnance Corps

DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 23 1993
S E D

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 92-93

THIS MONOGRAPH CONTAINS COPYRIGHT MATERIAL

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

93-30914

93 12 22 028

Best
Available
Copy

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*

2. REPORT DATE
May 1993

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
MONOGRAPH

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN PLAN: THE USE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR (U)

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJ JUDITH K. LEMIRE, USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
ATTN: ATZL-SWV
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900
COM (913) 684-3437 DSN 552-3437

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT *(Maximum 200 words)*
SEE ATTACHED.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
OPERATIONAL ART
CAMPAIGN PLANNING
OPERATION JUST CAUSE
OPERATION DESERT STORM

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
50

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNLIMITED

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Judith K. Lemire

Title of Monograph: Towards an Integrated Campaign Plan: The Use of Political, Economic, and Military Elements of National Power at the Operational Level of War

Approved by:

Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D. — Monograph Director

COL James R. McDonough, MS — Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. — Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 13th day of May 1993

ABSTRACT

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN PLAN: THE USE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR by MAJ Judith K. Lemire, USA, 50 pages.

Current U.S. military doctrine focuses on the use of military forces to defeat enemy armies. Other elements of national power, such as economic or political, are linked with military action at the national strategic level and passed to the operational and tactical levels through constraints or limitations on the use of force.

This monograph addresses whether this current approach or one which fully integrates all elements of national power at the operational vice strategic level of war is better for achieving overall strategic success. Through analysis of military theory and subsequent discussion and analysis of the recent operations, JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, potential shortcomings in the current doctrine are identified. An integrated methodology for campaign planning is then proposed. Based on tenets included in current doctrine, this new process expands current definitions to allow for the use of all elements of national power.

Integration of national power at the operational level offers many unique advantages. Difficult issues such as command and control and allocation of shared resources would be addressed early in the planning process. Courses of action could consider all elements of power in combination to attack any of the enemy's elements of power. With such integration there is a greater chance for strategic success.

DTIC COPY INSPECTED 6

Accesion For	
NTIS CRA&I	X
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and / or Special
A-1	

Table of Contents

Section		Page
I.	Introduction	1
II.	The Theoretical Basis for an Integrated Approach	2
III.	Current Doctrine	5
IV.	Historical Case Studies	11
V.	Analysis	26
VI.	Proposed Integrated Campaign Planning Methodology	30
VII.	Conclusion	38
Endnotes		40
Bibliography		46

I. INTRODUCTION

When one thinks of war, one sometimes conjures an image of military formations meeting each other in combat. However war is more complex. It goes beyond the use of one's military forces to defeat those of one's opponent. War is an instrument of national policy, albeit a violent one. While military power may be the primary tool a nation uses to wage war, it is not the only one available.

Military power, together with economic and political power, may be used to impose one's will upon an opponent. Whether in war or operations short of war, current U.S. doctrine focuses on the use of this military element of national power to defeat the opposing military forces. Other elements of national power, such as economic or political, are linked with military action at the national strategic level and passed to the operational and tactical levels of military actions through constraints or limitations on the use of force. Nevertheless, these other elements of power are not fully integrated at the lower levels of war. This monograph addresses whether or not this current approach is the best one for achieving overall strategic success.

To answer this question, this monograph will look first at the theoretical basis for an integrated campaign by analyzing the works of Clausewitz and later military theorists. By evaluating current U.S. military doctrine

and the recent American campaigns, JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, this monograph will then evaluate the extent to which integration is emphasized within current campaign planning and how that level of integration contributed to or detracted from the specific operations. Finally, the monograph will offer an approach for the operational artist and recommendations for the incorporation of such an approach into today's campaign planning doctrine.

II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

Clausewitz stated that war is an instrument of policy, with its goal being to bend the enemy to do one's will. As an element of national policy, Clausewitz recognized the need for integration of the use of the military with the overall plan for victory; to be successful, the commander-in-chief must be both a statesman and a general, with a "thorough grasp of national policy."[1] Objectives of the war must lead to the enemy's collapse of will (the purview of the statesman) and be achievable with the available resources (the purview of the general).

However, Clausewitz dealt solely with war and did not discuss other ways in which one might impose one's will on his enemy. Within the military realm, he focused primarily on combat operations. While refuting the concept that war is not conducted solely for war's sake,

he devotes much of his theoretical discussion to the concept of "absolute war," the unmitigated use of violence to destroy one's opponent. Consequently, he does not address the use of other policy efforts within the context of war itself.

The Soviet theorist A. A. Svechin, often referred to as the "Soviet Clausewitz," expanded upon Clausewitz's dictum of war as policy. In the Marxist tradition, Svechin included the possibility of war on economic and social fronts as well as on a military front.[2] The actions along all fronts must be fully integrated and in accord with the political goals of the struggle. Svechin discusses the use of diplomatic efforts to preclude an enemy alliance or a second hostile (military) front and economic efforts to insure sufficient financial resources for the conduct of combat operations.

Mao Tse-Tung, writing about the revolutionary war in China, stated the importance of understanding what he calls "the situation of the whole," i.e., the entire situation surrounding both the friendly and enemy societies and their relationship to each other. Not only must the military leader understand the military aspects of his own and his enemy's forces, but for the best chance for success he must also appreciate "...all other conditions related to the war, such as politics, economics, geography, and weather..."[3]

While eastern thinkers took a more holistic approach

to defeating their enemies, western theorists looked to increased technology. The advent of air power and nuclear weapons opened new possibilities for striking directly at the will of the enemy.

While possibly overstating the abilities of an air attack to break the will of an enemy's people, Giulio Douhet did correctly identify the targets of war as the resistance of the enemy both by material (capability) and moral (will) means. Douhet believed that the air arm could be used to attack these assets directly, without first attacking the traditional military target--the enemy's armed forces.[4] Although his belief in the air arm may have been exaggerated, Douhet did open up a school of thought that the military need not consider the enemy military as its sole objective.

John Warden, also looking primarily at air power, recognizes three potential targets for military forces: the enemy's military forces, the enemy's economy, and the will of the enemy government or people to resist.[5] While more realistic with respect to the limitations of air power as a sole weapon, Warden, like Douhet, advocates that the military element of national power not be limited to attacking the corresponding enemy's military, but rather be considered for a larger role.

The advent of nuclear weapons brought to light a new approach to warfare, that of deterrence. Although not completely absent from earlier military theory (in 400 BC

Sun Tzu wrote that to win without fighting was better than to have to fight to obtain victory[6]), more modern, western theorists had focused less on prevention and more on the use of the military in actual conflict. Bernard Brodie is one of the nuclear age theorists who discusses the use of military power (in this case nuclear weapons) in a deterrence role. Recognizing that the use of nuclear weapons can impact not only on military targets but also on society as a whole, Brodie's argument focuses around how to posture nuclear forces so as to preclude such an event.[7]

Although these modern western theorists are approaching the issue of using the military to weaken other elements of national power, they do not take the next step of using other elements of national power to weaken military power. In contrast, Svechin and Mao, by broadening the scope of conflict to include social and economic elements along with the military, come closer to the possibility of a fully integrated approach to war.

III. CURRENT DOCTRINE

Current U.S. doctrine addresses three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. With slight variations among the military services, current doctrine defines these levels as follows:

Strategic: Involves applying all elements of national power towards achieving national aims; focuses

on destroying the enemy's will to resist. Some doctrine further subdivides this level into national and military strategy, the latter being subordinate to the former. When this distinction is made, the integration of all elements of national power is done as part of national strategy. Military strategy is limited to selection of theater strategic objectives which support the overall national strategy and are to be achieved through the use of the military element of power.

Operational: The link between the strategic and tactical levels of war; involves designing and conducting campaigns to use military force to achieve strategic objectives within a theater. Focuses on destruction of the enemy ability to resist.

Tactical: Use of available forces in actual battles or engagements; where military power is brought to bear in attacking specific targets to achieve the operational objectives.[8]

All the service doctrines discuss the use of military power together with other elements of national power. However, the predominant focus for the military remains action against enemy capabilities, i.e., the enemy's military. For example, Air Force doctrine specifically states that "overcoming hostile will can involve military operations but primarily relies on other instruments of policy."[9]

U.S. military joint doctrine also recognizes the

need to integrate elements of national policy. However, as the Department of Defense controls only military actions, doctrine advises that "military leaders must work with other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent way to promote unity of effort."[10]

In accordance with this imperative, our current National Military Strategy document does in fact recommend that military planners consider other elements of national power. Under the concept of "Adaptive Planning," the strategy recommends that regional commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) consider multiple options, "encompassing all the instruments of national power."[11]

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) expands on this concept and offers more specific guidance for the operational planner. It defines "Flexible Deterrent Options" (FDOs) which can be considered by the CINC. These include economic, political, and diplomatic as well as military initiatives which may be useful in getting the opponent to conform to U.S. desires without resorting to actual combat. Some examples are provided in the table below. While the CINC lacks the authority to implement many of these, they can be coordinated with those other governmental agencies to insure unity of effort.

While this concept for integration of other elements of national powers may seem visionary, it is limited to

deterrence. The purpose of FDOs are to provide the CINC with multiple options without placing forces in danger. FDOs are to be used so that they facilitate the deployment of decisive force. If deterrence fails, military power is then postured to resolve the conflict. Should deterrence succeed, the FDOs can easily be reversed. Once military conflict begins, however, the JSCP no longer discusses FDOs as a part of the military campaign process.[12]

This attitude is also reflected in the emerging United Nations doctrine for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. Prior to an actual conflict, preventive diplomacy, to include military activities short of combat, attempts to resolve disputes. Post-conflict peace-building operations also include both diplomatic and military actions, in this case to rebuild institutions and nations torn by conflict. During actual conflict, however, diplomatic and military efforts, while mutually supportive, are separated into peacemaking and peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations. Peacemaking includes those political and diplomatic actions designed to resolve disputes throughout the conflict continuum, i.e., before, during, or after actual armed conflict. The military counterpart to these political and diplomatic efforts include peacekeeping operations (with mutual agreement from the belligerents) and peace enforcement (when belligerents may not consent to

intervention and may be involved in actual conflict).[13]

Table 1. Examples of Flexible Deterrent Options.[14]

Political
* Consult Congressional Leaders
* Increase Public Awareness
- Press Conferences
- Talk Shows
Diplomatic
* Send Demarches
* Reduce Diplomatic Ties
* Meet with Foreign Leaders
* Evacuate Unofficial Americans
Military
* Increase Reconnaissance Collection
* Intensify Training
* Put Forces on Alert
* Exercise Prepositioned Equipment
* Deploy Small Units
Economic
* Discontinue Assistance Programs
* Freeze Assets
* Enact Trade Sanctions
* Restrict Corporate Transactions

The precise definitions serve as indicators of the degree of integration of the military and other elements of national power in working toward resolution of the conflict. Only those activities which doctrinally occur outside of actual conflict suggest the use of military power along with the other elements of national power. During conflict, separate activities address the political/diplomatic and the military initiatives. The graphical representation of these intervention activities over the course of an actual conflict highlights this separation.



Figure 1. A Typical Scenario - Definitional Interrelationships of United Nations Roles

U.S. doctrine also has a more integrated approach to these pre- and post-conflict periods. Under the umbrella category of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), Army doctrine groups such military missions as support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations. While all military operations should support overall national policies, the Army considers LIC operations to be so closely linked to their political nature that the doctrine includes the imperative of "political dominance."[15]

While other uses of the military focus primarily on the military aspect of operations, LIC doctrine

specifically states that it "is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments."[16] Unity of effort, as defined in LIC doctrine, explicitly mentions the need for interagency "integration and coordination"[17] and calls on military planners to consider how their actions can be used in concert with those of other elements of national power.[18]

Although LIC doctrine does bring the integration of all elements of national power to the operational level, this aspect of planning and conducting operations does not extend to conventional, mid- or high-intensity conflicts. By examining two recent military campaigns, one can see the impact of this doctrinal separation of the elements of national power.

IV. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

Two recent U.S. military campaigns illustrate the potential impact of the separation of the military element from the other elements of national power at the operational level of war. Operation JUST CAUSE demonstrates the desynchronization which may occur with such separation, while Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM show how an operation can be successful when military and political leaders make the effort to fully integrate operations.

Operation JUST CAUSE

In December, 1989, U.S. forces invaded the nation of Panama to oust General Manuel Noriega and install the democratically elected Endara government. While most would agree that the military operations accomplishing the first objective were successful, the subsequent U.S. efforts at nation building were less auspicious.

Initial efforts to oust Noriega did not involve military force. In fact, United States policy under the Reagan administration was firmly against such an option.[19] During this time the administration did, however, attempt diplomatic and economic means. In February, 1988, two Florida grand juries indicted Noriega on drug trafficking charges. The Department of Justice attorneys who worked to get the indictments acted without regard to any difficulties concerning foreign policy. These actions came as a complete surprise to military planners, who learned of them only 24 hours before the indictments were announced.[20] Formal economic sanctions began on April 8th.[21] These tended only to hurt Panamanian businesses and civilians without having any apparent effect on Noriega.[22]

In spite of President Reagan's prohibition on the use of force, military planners were considering other options. Not all operational plans leading up to JUST CAUSE called for the involvement of U.S. forces. As early as 1988, General Woerner, the CINC Southern Command

(SOUTHCOM) presented a plan known as FISSURES. The FISSURES plan had been developed with the U.S. Embassy and in coordination with the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The FISSURES plan involved integrated political-military actions designed to separate Noriega from the political leadership of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), leading to an internal Panamanian solution. General Woerner considered this plan to be holistic in nature and believed that any piecemeal execution would defeat the plan's purpose. However, Washington did not approve the original FISSURES ONE and only approved of pieces of the revised version, FISSURES TWO.[23]

Planning for the commitment of U.S. forces against the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) began in 1987 with the ELABORATE MAZE (later called PRAYER BOOK) series of plans. In contrast with General Woerner's interagency efforts, these plans were compartmentalized for security reasons. Consequently, they received only limited discussion outside of the Department of Defense. Even the U.S. Embassy was excluded from the planning coordination, except for those parts of the non-combatant evacuation (NEO) plan which affected them.[24]

While the ELABORATE MAZE plans were under development, General Woerner continued to push for an integrated strategy which would consider political and economic factors along with military ones. As the

regional CINC, General Woerner believed he had a comprehensive picture of the Latin America situation. He continually advocated a strategy which included the Panamanian people and resisted imposition of a U.S. military solution. This attitude subsequently led to his replacement in 1989.[25]

Under General Woerner's replacement, General Thurman, the U.S. forces executed the combat plan originally called BLUE SPOON. This use of the U.S. military to bring down the Noriega government was very successful. In less than 4 days, the Noriega government and the PDF were impotent. Efforts to rebuild the Panamanian government under the democratically elected Endara government, however, were less thought out.

Looking at the planning process for ELABORATE MAZE/PRAYER BOOK, one can see several factors which contributed to the subsequent difficulties in executing the nation building aspects of the plan. Perhaps most significant was that for convenience sake, the ELABORATE MAZE series consisted of separate plans for combat and post conflict nation building operations. This separation led to several critical problems.

First, military civil affairs planners were denied access to the combat plan.[26] This contributed to the confusion between the specific political objective following combat operations and the execution of subsequent civil-military operations. In particular, the

status of the PDF would be a key variable in how civil order would be restored. Without access to the combat plan, civil-military planners were not able to properly synchronize their operations with the potential situations which might be present at the conclusion of the combat operations.[27]

Second, the separation originally born of convenience made it easier for military planners to focus on combat operations to the exclusion of post-conflict nation building requirements. This tendency was pervasive, as demonstrated when the newly assigned CINC SOUTHCOM, General Thurman, focused solely on the combat plan.[28]

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this separation of plans directly contributed to the resulting inadequate interagency coordination. The compartmentalization of the plans and the close-hold nature prevented interagency access even to the post-conflict plans which directly involved them. The nation building plan, originally known as KRYSTAL BALL, later BLIND LOGIC, and subsequently executed as PROMOTE LIBERTY, clearly involved the State Department and other agencies. In 1989, when military planners realized that the plans infringed on State Department operations asked permission from the Department of Defense (DOD) to coordinate with the political counselor at the Embassy. Initially, DOD refused, citing the secret nature of the

plans. Later, coordination was allowed, provided the military "talk around the plan." Consequently, many political-military issues, such as the interim military government in Panama, were never discussed.[29]

Given that the Department of Defense excluded the Department of State, the Agency for International Development (AID), the Justice Department, and other non-Defense agencies from the planning process for the post-conflict nation building effort, it is not too surprising that the U.S. failed to achieve the unity of effort required to fully integrate use of all elements of national power.[30]

One instance of poor integration occurred in January 1991, when the diplomatic mission returned to Panama. The State Department had no plan to assume responsibility for reestablishing the Panamanian government. Consequently, this task remained with the military elements already performing this role. The potential for diplomatic, political, and economic power within the State Department was thereby wasted.[31]

Another problem of PROMOTE LIBERTY was a shortage of civil affairs personnel. This situation might have been remedied by through reserve mobilization, however the decision not to do so was at least partly due to the potential political consequences of such an action.[32] In this instance failure to support the military with appropriate political power (by calling up needed

reserves) degraded the overall effectiveness of the operation. A similar failure occurred as inadequate political power was used to hasten the appropriation and delivery of economic aid to the rebuilding nation.[33]

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

While still lacking full integration in some areas, Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, in contrast to the planning strategy used for operations in Panama, offer a unique lesson in cooperation and unity of effort.

Almost immediately after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the U.S., using the medium of United Nations (UN), began building an international coalition condemning Iraq's actions. Within 5 days, the U.N. Security Council passed resolutions calling for economic sanctions; within 2 weeks, the U.S. Navy had begun a blockade to help enforce the embargo. These efforts indicate a clear linkage of diplomatic, economic, and military elements of national power.

As the sanctions continued, so did the political, diplomatic, economic, and military efforts of the United States. Through the International Monetary Fund, economic aid was offered to allied nations which might otherwise be hurt by the economic embargo.[34] At home, the U.S. Forest Service considered relaxing environmental rules on oil and gas drilling to offset potential shortfalls due to the embargo. President Bush also made

decisions regarding the potential use of U.S. strategic oil reserves while the Environmental Protection Agency urged energy conservation.[35] Meanwhile, the use of military power began with diplomatic overtures to the government of Saudi Arabia to gain its permission to deploy U.S. troops to the region. The subsequent deployment involved political power within the U.S. as well, as the President mobilized needed reserve forces.

So far, however, these military actions fell primarily into the doctrinal category of peacetime contingency operations, a form of Low Intensity Conflict.[36] Although posturing for the defense of Saudi Arabia, DESERT SHIELD can also be viewed as a show of force. While many troops were involved in potential hostile situations (such as those enforcing the embargo) the level of conflict still fell below that of being at war.[37] Economic sanctions and diplomatic initiatives continued to appear prevalent in U.S. strategy to free Kuwait.

While debate continued over whether sanctions alone would be sufficient to break Saddam's will, military planners from U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) began working on an offensive military option. In October 1990, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell briefed President Bush on the military requirements for this approach.[38] Enhancing the chances for success of the military option through the use of

diplomatic power, the U.S. continued to work through the U.N., and by the end of November had obtained a resolution authorizing the use of force to remove the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait.[39]

Keeping with U.S. doctrine, the focus of the military planning was against the Iraqi military forces. The original plan consisted of four phases: Phases One through Three involved air attacks on command and control facilities, logistics facilities, and finally Iraqi ground forces; Phase Four was a ground attack.[40]

Although the initial air attacks were clearly sequenced to provide the battlefield conditions necessary to achieve ultimate success in the ground efforts, they also allowed for continuing diplomatic efforts. Prior to the campaign decision point to initiate ground action, President Bush issued a final ultimatum for Iraqi withdrawal.[41] Although probably not a formal part of the military campaign plan, this ability to integrate diplomatic initiatives in the midst of a military operation demonstrates the unity of effort achieved during this strategic operation.

During DESERT STORM, the need to sustain the coalition also drove some operational military decisions. One example occurred in January 1991 as Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel threatened to provoke retaliation which could impact on the U.S.-Arab coalition. Deployment of U.S. Patriot missile batteries

to Israel and subsequent increased efforts to find and destroy Scud launchers were military decisions with diplomatic impacts.[42]

Another example involved the President's decision to order the cease fire after 100 hours of ground combat reflected the diplomatic pressures of the Saudi and Egyptian leadership who feared that the deposing of Saddam might lead to the rise of a more fundamentalist, Shiite Muslim government.[43] Political pressure from home, based on media coverage of the apparently wanton destruction along the so-called highway of death, may have also contributed to this military decision.[44]

Focusing primarily on military combat operations, post-conflict civil-military operations (CMO) were not a top priority for in-theater military planners. First, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, ARCENT, the army component of CENTCOM, lacked a full-time civil affairs officer. Next, deployment of civil affairs elements was continually being delayed in favor of additional combat forces. Late mobilization and deployment of the reserve component civil affairs units also tended to push back civil affairs planning.[45] Civil affairs units also lacked essential communication and transportation equipment.[46] Arabic linguists, essential for conducting CMO, were in short supply.[47] In some cases, civil affairs planners had adequate security clearances but were not granted access to intelligence data such as current imagery which might

have been critical to their CMO planning effort.[48]

The VII Corps was surprised by the large number of Iraqi refugees fleeing persecution by remnants of the Iraqi Republican Guard forces.[49] With assistance from civil affairs teams from the 352d Civil Affairs Brigade, however, the corps established the facilities and provided services as necessary.[50] Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts convinced the Saudi government to reverse its initial policy and accept many of these Iraqi refugees.[51] U.S. military assets were used both to construct facilities in Saudi Arabia and to transport refugees to the new location.[52]

One problem related to refugees which the military experienced which might have been better handled with support from the State Department involved Iraqis and other third country nationals requesting political asylum. Without published guidelines, military elements needing to process such requests were often confused on how to deal with them.[53]

Still, some of the post-conflict planning exhibited a large degree of interagency coordination. Specifically, the plans to assist the Kuwaiti government in their effort to rebuild their nation was a multi-agency effort. A team of Kuwaiti bureaucrats assembled in Washington, D.C. in December 1990 to begin to address this problem. Sanctioned by the Kuwaiti government in exile, this team worked through the Department of State

who coordinated contacts with other U.S. agencies, including the Army Corps of Engineers, military Civil Affairs specialists, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).[54] Based on a request from the Kuwaiti government, the U.S. military created the civil affairs Kuwaiti Task Force (KTF) which estimated the potential damage and required reconstruction effort.[55] These elements of the 352d Civil Affairs Command later deployed to Saudi Arabia and subsequently Kuwait City where they assisted the Kuwaiti government with law enforcement and establishing emergency services.[56] Still, the majority of the responsibility for rebuilding Kuwait fell on the Kuwaiti government, who contracted for much of the work.[57]

COMPARISON OF OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE AND DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Operation JUST CAUSE shows how unity of effort can be lost as military efforts are separated from their political, economic, and diplomatic counterparts. Interestingly, this separation occurred even during the LIC phase of nation building, where doctrine asserts that integration of all elements of national power is key.

In contrast, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM demonstrate how unity of effort can be achieved, even during a conventional war, when statesmen and generals appreciate the unique capabilities each has to offer to the crisis resolution. While this paper is intended to

evaluate consequences rather than causes of such separation, it is interesting to investigate some of the factors which may have contributed to this disparity between the two campaigns.

First, the strategic goals of the two operations were very different. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM had a very recognizable goal of defending Saudi Arabia from Iraqi aggression and removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Establishing a democratic government in Panama is a less well-defined end state. The clearer the end state, the more likely that various government agencies will achieve unity of effort. With a vague end state, different agencies might perceive different goals and the effort will therefore be disjointed.

Second, the availability of political power, i.e., President Bush's ability to rally the American people (and Congress), was markedly different during the two campaigns. For JUST CAUSE, fear of political difficulties contributed to his decision not to mobilize needed civil affairs personnel. Yet his ability to build an important domestic consensus on the need for military action to free Kuwait was indicative of greater political power. Why this difference? There are many possible explanations, but the more definable end state offered in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM might have made a political consensus easier to achieve.

Third, the international coalition created and

sustained during the Gulf crisis brought the political and diplomatic needs to the forefront of planning for all elements of power. No longer could the military operate without constraints. From selection of the theater objectives to deployment of Patriot missile units to Israel, military actions clearly supported a larger political agenda.

Finally, one could argue that the importance of each campaign to the United States' national security interests made DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM much more visible to the entire administration than was JUST CAUSE. Consequently, as the Gulf crisis unfolded, the Department of State, instead of being excluded from the planning process, was a key player.

No matter what the causes, the results of both campaigns are very distinct. Within 6 months after the Panama invasion, the press was beginning to question whether or not anything was gained. It remained unclear whether the Endara government would in fact be able to provide the needed democratic leadership and even if it could, if the Panamanian people be better off under this regime than they were before the invasion.

During JUST CAUSE, the military leaders separated themselves from the critical post-conflict activity planning. Not only disjointed from an interagency perspective, the military operators separated themselves from their own civil affairs operations. Consequently,

the transition to the stated national aim of fostering democracy in Panama was hindered. With the legitimacy of the new Panamanian government at stake, any faltering, real or perceived, of the new government could mean its demise. Through separation of military and other elements of national power, the U.S. risked winning at the operational level and still failing to achieve victory.

In direct contrast, DESERT STORM planning clearly involved all political as well as military players, especially the Department of State. Unlike JUST CAUSE, the need for nation building was openly addressed, with the State Department coordinating the interagency effort with representatives of the Kuwaiti government in exile. This is not to say that all post-conflict planning was perfect. Planning for civil-military operations could have been better integrated. Still, the effort was greatly improved over the detached planning of JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY. And although controversy still surrounds the political decision to halt combat operations at 100 hours, no one can contest that the military accomplished the primary strategic objective of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

V. ANALYSIS

During peacetime, the U.S. military seems to accept the need for cooperation among agencies. During war, however, the military sees the need for a relatively unimpeded operation under military control. The argument is that once the decision is made to use decisive military force, the military operation should be well enough defined to let it reach its objective before one must again consider the political ramifications.

Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger first articulated these thoughts in 1984, in what is now referred to as the "Weinberger Doctrine." He argued that military force should be used only when the following conditions are met: (1) use is deemed vital to U.S. national interests; (2) there is a clear intent to win; (3) use of force is carried out with "clearly defined political and military objectives"; (4) these objectives and the need for use of force are continually evaluated and adjusted as necessary; (5) the American people and the Congress support such use; and (6) it is a last resort.[58]

The U.S. 1993 national security strategy also echoes this thought, with its call for the "capability to generate decisive combat power," which will enable a military force, when used, to "terminate a given conflict swiftly on terms favorable to us and with minimum loss of life."[59]

If decisive military force is used only as a last resort, after extensive diplomatic, economic, political, and even military power short of actual war have failed to break the will of the enemy, a quick and well placed application of military force would leave little opportunity for the implementation of further non-military initiatives.

But even DESERT STORM, which clearly fits this model of application of military force, shows that diplomatic efforts can be integrated within a military campaign without needlessly risking the outcome of the military action or servicemen's lives. In this case, a diplomatic effort (the pre-ground attack ultimatum) did not appear to affect the timing of the final operation. Had it resulted in Saddam's withdrawal from Kuwait, many lives on both sides would have been spared. Although it did not produce this effect, by offering a peaceful alternative, the coalition gained moral ground, reinforcing the values for which they fought. In achieving this integration, however, it is important to note that Saddam was given only a limited time, so that the military conditions achieved by the air attacks would not be reversed prior to the launching of the ground effort.

In contrast, current doctrine is based on the concern that interspersing diplomatic and other non-military initiatives within a military campaign could

lead to a piecemeal application of force. With less than a full commitment to military action, the government may be left with a policy of gradual escalation which could place military forces at risk. Perhaps this is our Vietnam syndrome, where the commitment of forces continued to increase without an apparent strategy for success. A counter argument is that overemphasis on this strategic failure has led to a policy (the Weinberger Doctrine) which will preclude fighting anything but traditional conventional wars.[60] Whatever the historical basis for current doctrine, it clearly stresses giving military forces the freedom of action needed to accomplish specified military tasks with minimal, if any, political constraints.

LTC Helmut Zehrer of the German Army presented a model which describes this meshing of military and political perspectives and the relationship of the degree of coherence to the ability of the military and civilian leadership to maintain freedom of action within their separate realms. This model proposes that the better the balance between the two elements, the more successful will be a campaign. LTC Zehrer took three periods of conflict from German history and charted them using his model. When the military and political coincided as in the 1870s under Bismark and von Moltke, the Germans achieved the best results.[61]



Figure 2. Balancing Political and Military Action in Controlling Policy

To insure a proper balance, U.S. doctrine advocates the integration of all elements of national power, even if only at the strategic level. Use of the military element without consideration of how it interrelates with the other elements will almost always produce a bankrupt strategy. However, this does not preclude closer integration of these elements at the operational level.

Just as current doctrine places high value on the mutually supporting nature of combined arms and joint operations, integrating all elements of national power offers a greater potential for success than the separate application would. Just as today's army would no sooner attack an opponent's army without the support of air force assets, one should not envision defeating an enemy's military with military assets alone. Instead, all elements of national power should be combined to defeat the enemy's will.

While this may seem an obvious statement, the

question still remains at what level should this integration occur? Current doctrine places this responsibility at the (national) strategic level. As the first common authority for the use of all elements of national power is the President, this approach seems rational. Due to distinct chains of command, any coordination of efforts below that level (for example between a CINC and the Embassy) will not be on a command basis. Given the right person, such coordination may prove very fruitful. But without formal doctrine requiring such efforts, there is no guarantee that effective coordination will occur below the National Security Council.

To insure effective coordination between all agencies, the campaign planning process would need to be revised to incorporate the planning for all elements of national power. This planning should not be integrated only in peacetime (such as is advocated in the Adaptive Planning concept) nor should it be centered around the military.

VI. PROPOSED INTEGRATED CAMPAIGN PLANNING METHODOLOGY

Current doctrine provides certain tenets for campaign planning. In general, a campaign plan should specify operational objectives and then sequence operations and allocate resources to achieve those objectives. The campaign typically focuses on the

enemy's center of gravity, provides for command and control relationships, and synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts.[62] Following this methodology, one can develop a similar process, expanded to include the non-military elements of national power.[63]

Defining Operational Objectives

The theater commander, together with national strategists, should determine the theater strategic/ operational objectives. In designing a theater campaign to achieve these objectives, the theater commander can not forget the overall strategic aim and how the national strategy plans on getting there.

Current doctrine bases selection of operational objectives both on the value to the overall strategic objective and to the suitability of the military as a tool to achieve them. This concept should be expanded to include not only those objectives within the reach of the military acting in isolation but also those achievable by the military in concert with other elements of national power.

For example, a common military objective might be capture of an armed force cordoning a city. A larger objective might involve capture of the city, to include the economic and political infrastructure. A military effort alone might not be able to achieve such an aim, but coupled with appropriate economic and informational

elements, the city might be won without combat by convincing the inhabitants of the futility of fighting and offering them economic or other incentives.

In considering the objective, one must remain aware that the value of any given objective will change over time as friendly action and enemy reaction shape and reshape the arena of conflict. For example, an initial objective may be destruction of the enemy's armed force. However, the enemy may undergo a change in political leadership which enables him to create an alliance which enhances his military power. The focus on the original force may no longer be sufficient to achieve strategic success. Now maybe diplomatic efforts are needed with the new operational objective of breaking the alliance. All campaign planning must remain open to the reevaluation of the selected objectives and be flexible enough to adjust as the "situation of the whole" changes.

Sequencing Operations

The campaign plan must provide a sequence of operations which will achieve the stated end. For an integrated campaign plan, these operations could include a variety of possibilities encompassing all elements of national power. For some examples of operations, see the table below.

To sequence these operations for the maximum effect, planners must be aware of the various interrelationships

among the elements of national power. The sample table below describes how various elements of national power might be used to attack specific targets among the enemy's elements of national power. The critical aspect of this planning is to recognize that each element can impact any of the enemy's elements, i.e., military is not limited to its effects on the opponent's military.

Table 2. Possible Operations Matrix - Each Element of National Power and the Potential for Use Against the Enemy Power Base.

Friendly "Actor"	Enemy "Target"			
	Political	Economic	Military	Diplomatic
Political	Gain popular support Gain Congressional support	Domestic mobilization of economic resources Building political support base for economic aid	Mobilization of reserves Support recruiting efforts	Gain Congressional support for diplomatic initiatives
Economic	Build support for corporate trade embargoes	Freeze monetary assets Enact trade sanctions	Reduce security assistance programs Arms embargoes	Cancel US funded programs Provide economic aid to allies
Military	Mobilize reserves Increase informational efforts (psyops)	Attack key economic infra-structure Enforce embargo	Increase exercise activities Deploy forces to region Combat ops	Increase use of mobile training teams Increase military exchanges
Diplomatic	Promote democratic elections	use UN or other institutions to enact sanctions	Build/reinforce military coalition Initiate NEO procedures	Informational efforts to isolate international support Restrict activity of diplomats

One example of proper sequencing might be to use diplomatic power to build a coalition, thus increasing friendly military strength prior to commitment of military force. Another might involve the proper timing of a diplomatic demarche during an anticipated pause in military operations. Yet a different approach could be to schedule a military engagement so as to insure continued political support on the homefront. In this manner, as one element of national power nears a culminating point, another can come to the forefront.

Applying Resources

Agencies responsible for conducting portions of the campaign must be adequately resourced. Unfortunately, future wars will most likely be fought under substantial resource constraints. Many of these resources are used by more than one element of national power. For example, strategic airlift can be used by the military to deploy or sustain combat forces. It can also be used to transport and sustain media representatives and members of Congress, who as contributors to the political element of national power can help build domestic support. Limited communications links are likewise shared.

The integrated campaign plan insures that this potentially divisive issue of resource sharing is addressed early on. The solution developed in a cooperative pre-campaign atmosphere is more likely to

support the overall campaign strategy. *Ad hoc* arrangements developed during execution have inherent limits and are more likely to reflect parochial concerns than the cooperative attitude required to achieve unity of effort.

Center of Gravity

Clausewitz defined the center of gravity as the hub of the enemy's power base. To win, one must defeat this, either by a direct attack or through indirect actions against critical vulnerabilities which will lead to the collapse of the center of gravity. Some common examples of center of gravity include the enemy's military force or his capital city. More recently, with the increase in low intensity conflicts, the U.S. military has accepted a broader definition of center of gravity, including such attributes as the political legitimacy of a government.[64]

By focusing on the use of the military to defeat the enemy military capability, current doctrine drives planners to consider the enemy's armed force as the primary center of gravity. An integrated campaign plan should look beyond this narrow definition, to evaluate the enemy's strengths and weaknesses in all areas, not only his military. Below is a table giving some possible centers of gravity in each of the power domains.

Table 3. Candidates for Center of Gravity

Political:	Popular support for government Popular support for conflict
Military:	Armed forces Key logistics facilities
Economic:	Key economic infrastructure Supply of critical raw material (such as oil)
Diplomatic:	Alliance structure

Command and Control

As noted previously, the national level is the lowest level at which unity of command among all government agencies can be achieved. However, unity of effort is possible with proper coordination.

The regional CINC and the ambassador/country team are obvious key command and control players in any campaign plan. For a specific campaign, the relationship between these individuals must be based on previous experiences, mutual respect, and their unique personalities. A single cookie cutter type command and control solution will not suffice for every campaign. As cooperation is even more critical with interagency efforts, it is imperative that the President provide a clear command relationship for each planning effort.

While it will probably never be feasible to establish a direct command relationship between two such agencies as the Departments of Defense and State, one agency must be given the lead during any operation.

Selection of the lead agency will depend on the mission involved, the personalities and experiences of the respective agency heads and local officials, and the desires of the President.

Currently, with separate operational efforts, there is no guarantee that the essential command and control relationships within a theater will even be addressed. An integrated operational concept will force this discussion.

Synchronization

Current doctrine calls for the synchronization of joint operations within the campaign plan. An expanded campaign, including all elements of national power, will require an even greater synchronization effort. This effort will be made even more difficult by the lack of a single interagency commander.

The synchronization of all elements of national power is currently a strategic level task. Bringing it to the operational level will insure greater understanding of the intent of the plan and will allow for closer interaction among key players. While a definite additional burden on the theater commander, this effort will most likely lead to greater synchronization and more efficient accomplishment of the operational objective.

While this methodology offers few specifics, by addressing each aspect of campaign planning with an expanded perspective it is easy to envision a greater planning effort which can incorporate all elements of national power.

VII. CONCLUSION

While current doctrine reserves the integration of all elements of national power to the strategic level of war, integration at the operational level offers many unique advantages. In the past, much of this integration depended on the individual circumstances of the campaign. Operations JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY demonstrate the difficulties present without adequate interagency planning; Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM displayed a smoother, more coordinated planning effort.

By forcing integration down to the operational level, difficult issues such as allocation of limited resources and theater command and control among multiple government agencies will be addressed. Instead of relying on the initiative of current leaders or depending on ad hoc solutions to possible dilemmas, a change in doctrine would ensure early consideration to the degree considered necessary by the national leaders.

Through the use of an integrated campaign plan, the military would no longer be restricted to attacking only the enemy's military. Other options cutting across all

elements of national power could now be considered on a routine basis. Should defeat of the enemy's military capability be the best way to defeat the enemy's will, that would still be an appropriate target for the friendly military. However, if an alternate target such as the political legitimacy of the enemy government would lead to a timlier, more decisive victory, then that too could be considered.

One must never lose sight of the overall objective of warfare which is to get the enemy to do one's will. This may be best achieved through a thoughtful and complete linkage of all elements of national power. With that linkage brought down to the operational level, chances for a long-lasting victory will increase dramatically.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 111-112.

2. Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992), p. 84.

3. Mao Tse-Tung, "Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung," in the Combat Studies Institute reprint for the Evolution of Military Thought, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), p. 87.

4. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 19830, pp. 175, 188.

5. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988) pp. 133-134.

6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 77, 79.

7. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

8. From Air Force doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, March 1992, integration of all elements of national power occurs at the strategic level of war. The operational level of war is limited to orchestrating forces to obtain strategic objectives within a theater of war, (volume I, p. 2). The Marine Corps doctrine, FMFM 1, Warfighting, March 1989, divides strategy into two elements, national and military, and places integration of all elements of national power in national strategy, keeping the military strategic focus as the application of military force. Military strategy selects the theater strategic objectives. The operational level is defined as the link between strategy and tactics. Army doctrine, Field Manual 100-1, The Army, December 1991, defines the elements of national power as political, economic, and military and states that these are combined to support the national security strategy. Emerging Army doctrine, from Field Manual 100-5, Operations, final draft, January 1993, defines strategy as "art and science of employing armed forces and other elements of national power during peace, crisis, and war to secure national objectives," (p. 5-2). The operational level of war is defined as the vital link between strategy and tactics, to include determining campaign objectives.

9. U.S. Air Force, AFM 1-1, p. 1.

10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, (Washington, D.C., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 Nov 91), p. 39.

11. U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992), p. 12.

12. U.S. Department of Defense, Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (IJSCP), (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), p. III-2.

13. U.S. Army, Chief of Staff, Army, Strategic Fellows, Briefing, "Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement," 6 Jan 93, slide 12A, 13A, 14A, 15A, and 16A.

14. Joint Staff, J-5, Strategy Division, Briefing, "Flexible Deterrent Options," provided by LTC Mike Vernon, 24 March 1993.

15. U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, December 1990), p. 1-5.

16. Ibid., p. 1-1.

17. Ibid., p. 1-5.

18. Ibid., p. 1-5.

19. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 15.

20. Ibid., p. 21.

21. Ibid., p. 31.

22. Ibid., p. 34.

23. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 15, 1992), p. 7. Based on Fishel's interviews with Gen Woerner, May 6, 1991. Donnelly, et. al., Operation Just Cause, p. 33.

24. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, p. 7. Based on Fishel's interviews with military planners and State Department personnel, April/May 1991.

25. Donnelly, et. al. Operation Just Cause, pp. 42-42, 50-51.

26. Ibid., p.10.

27. Ibid., p. 18.

28. Ibid., p. 25, 65.

29. Ibid., p. 21. Donnelly, et.al., Operation Just Cause, p. 25. General Woerner states that "the reason we could not develop [the civil affairs portion of the plan] past a certain level was because I was not permitted to enter into plans with the Department of State, for security reasons."

30. Fishel, The Fog of Peace, p. 58.

31. Ibid., p. 38. Based on Fishel's interview with a senior State Department officer, April 1991.

32. Ibid., p. 61.

33. Ibid., pp. 61-62.

34. "Anti-Iraq Coalition Gets $13 Billion of Aid Pledges" in the Wall Street Journal, November 6, 1990, p. C9; Sanjoy Hazarika, "India Gets $450 Million Loan for Gulf Hardship," in The New York Times, November 18, 1990, p 15 (National Edition).

35. John Lancaster, "Forest Service Considers Relaxing Environmental Rules on Oil, Gas Drilling," in The Washington Post, September 11, 1990, p. A6; Matthew L. Wald, "E.P.A. Urging Electricity Efficiency," The New York Times, January 16, 1991, p. C16 (National edition); Steven Greenhouse, "Emergency Oil Release Plan is Set," The New York Times, January 12, 1991, p. 19 (National Edition).

36. U.S. Army, FM 100-20, p. 5-1, 5-4. In addition to shows of force and demonstrations, peacetime contingency operations include forward deployment of military forces and the introduction or buildup of military forces in a region.

37. James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert, (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), p. 97. Blackwell discounts that the embargo phase was a "phoney war" citing 8,961 ships being intercepted and 1,185 being boarded.

38. Bob Woodward, The Commanders, (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991) pp. 304-306.

39. Ibid., pp. 319-322.

40. Ibid., pp. 288-289.

41. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 445.

42. U.S. News and World Report, Triumph without Victory, (New York: Times Books, 1992), p. 261.

43. Ibid., p. 395.

44. Ibid., p. 395.

45. Joint Uniform Lessons Learned (JULLS), Observation number 62127-60813 (00309), "Deployment of Civil Affairs (CA) Personnel," 15 July 1991.

46. JULLS, Observation numbers: 16848-18100 (00928), "Lack of Communications Equipment," 12 Jun 91; 16847-74500 (00927), "Lack of Essential Equipment for CA Teams," 12 Jun 91; 16385-93900 (00895), "CA Logistics," 12 Jun 91; and 16379-98300 (00884), "CA Brigade Equipment," 12 Jun 91.

47. JULLS, Observation number 16775-78200 (00916), "CA Linguists at Division Level," 12 Jun 91; 16406-02400 (00900), "Civil Affairs Interpreter Support," 12 Jun 91.

48. JULLS, Observation number 16775-52300 (01259), "CA Intelligence," 25 Jun 91.

49. LTC Peter S. Kindsvatter, US Army, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Post-Cease-Fire Operations," in Military Review, June 1992, p. 7.

50. Ibid., p. 8.

51. Ibid., p. 12.

52. Ibid., p. 12.

53. JULLS Observation Number 61953-97412 (00311), "Political Asylum/Refugee Status for Iraqi and Third Country Nat. Civilians," 15 July 1991.

54. Martin Tolchin, "Kuwaitis in Washington Plan Rebuilding of Nation," in The New York Times, December 30, 1990, p. 10(Local edition), col 1.

55. Jeffrey R. Smith, "Massive Effort May Be Needed to Rebuild Kuwait," in The Washington Post, 26 February 1991, p. A12.

56. Mary Jordan, "Local Reservists Give Kuwait a Hand," in The Washington Post, March 2, 1991, p. A15.

57. _____, "Winding Down the War," in the Los Angeles Times, March 5, 1991, p. A7, col 1; Tom Furlong, "Army Corps of Engineers to Help Rebuilding and Cleanup in Kuwait," in the Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1991, p. A5, col 1.

58. Woodward, The Commanders, p. 89.

59. U.S. Government, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1993), p. 14.

60. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 274-275. Krepinevich argues that as a result of the Army's analysis of both Vietnam and Korea, "instead of gaining a better understanding of how to wage counterinsurgency warfare within the unique social, economic, political, and military dimensions comprising that form of conflict, the Army is trying, through the six tests enunciated by Secretary Weinberger, to transform it into something it can handle."

61. LTC Helmut Zehrer, German Army, Presentation to the School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 Feb 93.

62. Strategic Studies Institute, Campaign Planning, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988), p. 8.

63. Most current military publications agree that the elements of national power include military, economic, and political power. The IJSCP adds diplomatic, which it differentiates from political as being externally oriented (vice internal orientation of political). Other documents cite informational or psychological. For purposes of this methodology, I will use the IJSCP definition, with informational and psychological capabilities being used as tactical tools within the political (domestic) and diplomatic (international) domains.

64. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 595-596. The expanded definition grew out of the Vietnam War experience as the North Vietnamese correctly identified the U.S. center of

gravity as the U.S. domestic political support and the U.S. failed to identify any power base other than the elusive enemy military.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Blackwell, James. Thunder in the Desert. New York: Bantam Books, 1991.

Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: The Free Press, 1988.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Donnelly, Thomas; Roth, Margaret; and Baker, Caleb. Operation Just Cause. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman and Petre, Peter. It Doesn't Take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

Summers, Harry. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. New York: Dell Publishing, 1982.

Summers, Harry. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Svechin, Aleksandr A. Strategy. Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992.

U.S. News and World Report. Triumph without Victory. New York: Times Books, 1992.

von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Warden, John A. III. The Air Campaign. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Pocket Star Books, 1991.

Government Reports, Studies, and Papers

Strategic Studies Institute. Campaign Planning, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1988.

U.S. Department of Defense, National Military Strategy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992.

U.S. Government, National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1993.

Government Publications

U.S. Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Air Force, March 1992.

U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute reprint, "Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung." Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.

U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-1, The Army. Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1991.

U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1986.

U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations. HQ, Department of the Army, Final Draft, 1993.

U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, D.C.: HQ, Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990.

U.S. Department of Defense, Instructional Joint Securities Capabilities Plan (IJSCP)(U). Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1992. Secret.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 November 1991.

U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1, Warfighting. Washington, D.C.: HQ, United States Marine Corps, 6 March 1989.

U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1-1, Campaigning. Washington, D.C: HQ, United States Marine Corps, 25 January 1990.

Periodicals and Articles

_____. "Anti-Iraq Coalition Gets $13 Billion of Aid Pledges" in the Wall Street Journal, November 6, 1990, p. C9.

_____. "Winding Down the War," in the Los Angeles Times, March 5, 1991, p. A7, col 1.

Furlong, Tom. "Army Corps of Engineers to Help Rebuilding and Cleanup in Kuwait," in the Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1991, p. A5, col 1.

Greenhouse, Steven. "Emergency Oil Release Plan is Set," in The New York Times, January 12, 1991, p. 19 (National Edition).

Hazarika, Sanjoy. "India Gets $450 Million Loan for Gulf Hardship," in The New York Times, November 18, 1990, p 15 (National Edition).

Jordan, Mary. "Local Reservists Give Kuwait a Hand," in The Washington Post, March 2, 1991, p. A15.

Kindsvatter, Peter S., LTC, US Army, "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Post-Cease-Fire Operations," in Military Review, June 1992, pp. 2-19.

Lancaster, John. "Forest Service Considers Relaxing Environmental Rules on Oil, Gas Drilling," in The Washington Post, September 11, 1990, p. A6.

Smith, Jeffrey R. "Massive Effort May Be Needed to Rebuild Kuwait," in The Washington Post, 26 February 1991, p. A12.

Tolchin, Martin. "Kuwaitis in Washington Plan Rebuilding of Nation," in The New York Times, December 30, 1990, p. 10(Local edition), col 1.

Wald, Matthew L. "E.P.A. Urging Electricity Efficiency," The New York Times, January 16, 1991, p. C16 (National edition).

Unpublished Dissertations, Theses, and Papers

Burdett, John C. An Approach to Campaign Planning, Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 23 March 1987.

Cook, Stephen K., Campaign Planning - or Lack of Campaign Planning - and the "Drug War", Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 13 Apr 92.

Fletcher, J.M. Campaign Planning in Low Intensity Conflict, Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 23 Apr 89.

Hanlon, Thomas E. The Operational Level of War: After the Smoke Clears, Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 9 Mar 88.

Horris, James A. OCONUS Counternarcotic Campaign Planning, Monograph, School for Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 90.

Leaman, G.R. Media Considerations for the Operational Commander, Report, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI, 23 Jun 91.

Tritten, J. J. America's New National Security Strategy: New Scenario for Military Operations Research, Research Report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 11 Jun 91.

Virgin, Michael E. Coalition Strategy, Paper, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., April 1991.

Wojdakowski, W. Today's Operational Challenge: Defining Victory in Operations Short of War, Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 Apr 88.

Other Sources

Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Fellows, Briefing, "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement," given at the School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 January 1993.

Joint Staff, J-5, Strategy Division, Briefing, "Flexible Deterrent Options," provided by LTC Mike Vernon, 24 March 1993.

Joint Uniform Lessons Learned (JULLS), Observations:

_____. "CA Brigade Equipment," Observation Number 16379-98300(00884), 12 Jun 91.

_____. "CA Intelligence," Observation Number 16775-52300 (01259), 25 Jun 91.

_____. "CA Linguists at Division Level," Observation Number 16775-78200(00916), 12 Jun 91.

_____. "CA Logistics," Observation Number 16385-93900 (00895), 12 Jun 91.

_____. "Civil Affairs Interpreter Support," Observation Number 16406-02400(00900), 12 Jun 91.

_____. "Deployment of Civil Affairs (CA) Personnel," Observation Number 62127-60813(00309), 15 July 1991.

_____. "Lack of Communications Equipment," Observation Number 16848-18100(00928), 12 Jun 91.

_____. "Lack of Essential Equipment for CA Teams," Observation Number 16847-74500(00927), 12 Jun 91.

_____. "Political Asylum/Refugee Status for Iraqi and Third Country Nat. Civilians," Observation Number 61953-97412(00311), 15 July 1991.

LTC Helmut Zehrer, German Army, presentation given at the School for Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 February 1993.

Syllabus, Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, provided by LTC Tom Ryan, February 1993.