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DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMY?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

THOMAS M. MUIR, CPT(P), USA
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1982

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This study examines the role of the U.S. Army to resolve domestic contingencies. It defines the role of the Army in response to a domestic crisis by defining the taxonomy for domestic military operations. The author coins the term "domestic contingency operations" to describe the Army's role in response to domestic emergencies. The author uses domestic counterdrug operations as a paradigm to evaluate the effectiveness of domestic contingency operations using five parallels: strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics. The thesis concludes that current domestic contingency doctrine and plans do not provide adequate guidance for commanders to execute domestic missions. The author hypothesizes that the requirements for such operations will increase in the next decade due to a declining national budget and the current focus on domestic issues. The thesis highlights the impact of such domestic missions on Army force structure debate and its implications for the active and reserve component mixture discussions. Finally, it provides suggestions to improve unit responsiveness.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DOMESTIC CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS: A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMY? by CPT(P) Thomas M. Muir, USA, 162 pages.

This study examines the role of the U.S. Army to resolve a domestic crisis. Domestic contingency operations are viable Army missions and commanders must be prepared to execute military operations in response to a domestic emergency. The term "domestic contingency operations" describes the Army's role in a national crisis response. These missions include disaster relief, civil disturbances, and forest fires. The thesis evaluates the role of the Army to plan and execute domestic contingency operations.

There is a void of doctrinal guidance for domestic contingencies. However, domestic counterdrug operations provides a paradigm for other domestic military operations. Domestic counterdrug operations provide five parallels which provide a context for discovery to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The author examines the following parallels: strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics. He uses these parallels to evaluate domestic contingency operations.

The thesis concludes that current domestic contingency doctrine and plans do not provide adequate guidance for commanders to conduct domestic contingency operations. The thesis highlights the implications that domestic missions have upon the current Army force structure active/reserve component debates. Finally, the author concludes that the Army must prepared to conduct operations across the full spectrum of operations other than war, to include domestic contingency operations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

> It was three full days after the hurricane slammed ashore on 24 August that a worried Kate Hale, Dade county's emergency director pleaded, "Where in the hell is the cavalry on this one."[1]

The "cavalry", in the form of over 23,800 soldiers from the U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserve, were already enroute to the devastated areas of Dade County, Florida in the wake of Hurricane Andrew. Army forces, along with U.S. Marine Corps units and U.S. Air Force assets formed Joint Task Force Andrew and quickly joined federal and state disaster relief efforts in Florida. Joint Task Force Andrew joined the over 6,300 members of the Florida National Guard already committed to relief efforts and provided humanitarian assistance relief to the hundreds of thousands of Americans affected by the calamity of the most costly natural disaster in recent American history.[2]

The events that unfolded in Florida and again in Kauai, Hawaii less than one month later clearly demonstrated the capabilities of the Army to quickly respond and assist Americans during times of national emergencies. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate

Armed Services Committee, wrote the following comments to then Defense Secretary Cheney concerning the effectiveness of the military in providing humanitarian assistance in Florida: "The post-cold war environment means that the armed forces will have much greater opportunity than in the past to assist civilian efforts to address critical domestic problems."[3] Has the Army changed its primary mission in the wake of disaster relief efforts in Florida and Hawaii? Has the Army become a victim of its own domestic success?

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the primary research question: should the United States Army conduct domestic contingency operations? Has the United States Army changed its raison d'etre? The Army's recent successes in support of domestic missions in Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki provide a persuasive argument for an increased role of the Army in response to domestic emergencies. Key proponents for the increased role of the military in domestic missions, such as President Clinton and Senator Nunn, propose a greater role for the United States Army in support of domestic missions in light of an increasing budget deficit and despite a reduced defense budget. These

developments all relate to the importance of the primary research question for this thesis: should the United States Army organize, equip, train, and conduct domestic contingency operations?

Secondary Research Questions

Several secondary questions are critical in explaining the importance of the Army's role in domestic contingency operations. What is the taxonomy of military operations conducted within the domestic environment? What are domestic contingency operations and what types of Army missions are contained within this taxonomy? Are there paradigms within the domestic military taxonomy which will provide a context for discovery for domestic contingency operations? What parallels exist within these paradigms at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations and can they better enable Army leaders and planners to improve the Army's response to domestic contingencies? Finally, what implications does this research have upon current Army force structure debate and future domestic military missions? These secondary research questions guide the scope of this thesis and provide the focus for the author's conclusions.

Research Methodology

The author will attempt to answer the primary and secondary research questions by defining the taxonomy for domestic contingency operations, developing a paradigm and parallels for comparison, and establishing a context for discovery to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The taxonomy for domestic military operations provides the necessary background to define the environment for the application of Army resources in response to a domestic crisis. Within this taxonomy, the author establishes domestic counterdrug operations as a paradigm to evaluate other domestic military operations. This paradigm provides a context for discovery to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The context for discovery enables the author to answer the primary and secondary research questions and allows him to infer conclusions concerning the future role of the Army in response to domestic contingencies.

The author must first define the domestic military environment and develop a taxonomy to establish the categories of domestic military operations. This taxonomy enables the author to coin the term "domestic contingency operations" to describe domestic military operations conducted in response to

national emergencies with little advanced warning or preparations. The taxonomy additionally enables him to define domestic contingency operations as disaster relief, civil disturbances, and forest fires. The author uses the taxonomy for domestic military operations to establish domestic counterdrug operations as an effective paradigm for comparison with domestic contingency operations.

Domestic counterdrug operations provide several parallels for comparison with domestic contingency operations. These five parallels; strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics, establish the context for discovery to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The author then uses these parallels to evaluate current domestic contingency doctrine and plans. The parallels also enable the author to infer conclusions concerning the future role of the Army in support of domestic contingency requirements.

Taxonomy of Domestic Military Operations

The taxonomy of domestic military operations is not adequately defined in current doctrine. The primary research question requires the author to first define the categories of historical and doctrinal Army missions

within the domestic environment. These missions form the basis for the taxonomy of domestic military operations. The debate concerning the roles and missions of a post-Cold War Army is central to the argument concerning the taxonomy for domestic military operations. What types of missions constitute domestic military operations and what is the appropriate role for the Army in support of domestic requirements? The answers to these essential questions lie in joint and Army doctrine, military history, legislation and directives, and the recent debate over the appropriate roles of a peacetime Army.

Joint and Army Doctrine

There is a doctrinal void in both joint and U.S. Army publications concerning the application of military forces to domestic problems. Recent changes to draft doctrinal publications recognizes this void as doctrine attempts to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. These doctrinal changes attempt to answer the challenges of "peacetime engagement," a term coined by former-President Bush in August of 1990 to define the post-Cold War environment.[4] The challenges of the post-Cold War era will require the Army to define its appropriate roles and missions to meet domestic

requirements within the spectrum of peacetime engagement.

The taxonomy for domestic military operations formerly categorized most missions within the low-intensity spectrum of conflict. Recent revisions to doctrinal publications recognize an operational continuum rather than a spectrum of conflict. The operational continuum is listed below.[5]

National Policy Objective	Activities (Environment)	Use of Force or Forces	Military Role	Examples of Operations
*Fight and Win	War (War)	Level of Violence; Coercion	Force	Conventional Theater Operations
*Deter War	Hostilities Short of War (Conflict)	Compel; Suasion; Deter; Post-Conflict Activity	Force Forces	Raid/Strike Peacemaking Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Counter-terrorism
Promote Peace	Peacetime Engagement (Peace)	Influence	Forces	Nation Assist Counterdrug Antiterrorism Peacekeeping

* Desired end state of use of force or forces includes a return to the environment of peace.

Figure 1. The Operational Continuum

The Draft Field Manual 100-5, Operations, appropriately entitles missions within the lower end of the operational continuum as "operations other than war."[6] Domestic military operations within the taxonomy of operations other than war include

disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and support to domestic civil authorities.[7] The addition of operations other than war to military lexicology greatly assists to define the role of the Army in support of domestic missions but does not make a distinction among domestic military operations. This distinction was formerly found within the context of low-intensity conflict as defined by FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.

Low intensity conflict doctrine defines the lower end of the spectrum of conflict as "a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states" equating military terminology to "peacetime engagement."[8] Low intensity conflict doctrine defined four broad operational categories of low intensity conflict as: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.[9] Peacetime contingency operations perform as a "catch-all" for military operations and include such diverse Army missions as shows of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, rescue and recovery, and strikes and raids. It also includes the traditionally more humanitarian Army

missions such as disaster relief, counterdrug operations, and support to U.S. civil authorities.

The author contends that the Army conducts domestic military operations within the taxonomy of peacetime contingency operations and within the proposed definitions of operations other than war. The author coins the term "domestic contingency operations" as an adaptation of the low-intensity conflict term "peacetime contingency operations" to denote those peacetime contingency operations conducted by military forces with the borders of the United States, including its territories and possessions. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 1-02 defines "contingency" as "an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations."[10] Domestic contingency operations therefore require exacting plans and a rapid response to quickly address the nature of the emergency. Army missions within the taxonomy of domestic contingency operations include rapid responses to natural disasters, civil disturbances, and forest fires. This critical category of Army missions differentiates from other domestic military operations in respect to the nature of the emergency, which

requires a rapid response in support civil authorities and other federal agencies.

The current doctrinal taxonomy for domestic military operations does not integrate current joint terminology and planning doctrine. It also excludes many traditional domestic military missions from the taxonomy. Domestic military operations are currently categorized by departmental directives, letters of appointment, and memoranda into three categories: standing, crisis, and directed.[11] Domestic counterdrug operations actually forms a fourth category as it does not meet many of the previous doctrinal definitions. The author proposes to categorize domestic military operations into three categories: domestic military service, contingency operations, and counterdrug operations. Figure two (below) graphically depicts the proposed changes. These changes would integrate current joint planning and execution doctrine and include traditional domestic military missions within the taxonomy.



Figure 2. Taxonomy for Domestic Military Operations

Standing missions spans the proposed categories of domestic military service and contingency operations. Many of the missions currently listed as standing missions in DOD directives reflect both deliberate and crisis action planning methodologies and ignores many of the realities of contingency operations. Standing missions are routinely handled by DOD through the offices of the Director of Military Support (DOMS). Current standing domestic military missions include the following: (1) support to disaster relief operations, (2) support to civil disturbances (GARDEN PLOT), (3) support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in combatting terrorism, (4) support to the U.S. Postal Service (GRAPHIC HAND), (5) aid to the D.C. government in combatting crime, and

(6) Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST).[12] The author contends that disaster relief, civil disturbances, and combatting terrorism missions are crisis-oriented and require doctrinal contingency planning methodologies and responses. Support to the U.S. Postal Service, to the D.C. police department, and to the MAST program are less crisis-oriented and are better categorized as domestic military service operations. The author proposes to categorize standing missions within the taxonomies of contingency and domestic service missions based upon a required response to a crisis and the applicability of contingency planning methodologies.

The current taxonomy for crisis missions does not recognize contingency methodologies as a distinguishing criteria and therefore excludes many military missions conducted in response to domestic contingencies. Crisis missions arise from presidentially-declared emergencies and include a myriad of missions. Examples of recent missions are found in Figure three (below).[13] However, this listing excludes other crisis-oriented missions such as support for disaster relief, civil disturbances, and counter-terrorism. The author proposes to include crisis missions within the taxonomy of domestic

contingency operations to recognize the requirements for joint contingency planning methodologies.

Crisis Missions

* Miami Democratic Convention (1972)
* Wounded Knee Confrontation (1973)
* Vietnamese Refugee Resettlement (1976)
* Jonestown, Guyana (1978)
* Three Mile Island (1978)
* Mariel Boatlift/Cuban Refugee Relocation (1980)
* FAA Augmentation (1982)
* Air Florida Crash (1982)
* Puerto Rico Floods (1985)
* Operation Haylift (1986)
* Mexico City Earthquake (1986)
* Federal Prison Disturbance (1987)
* Western Forest Fire Support (1987-1989)
* Pittsburgh Oil Spill (1988)
* Alaska Oil Spill (1989)
* Loma Prieta Earthquake (1989)
* Haitian Refugee Settlement (1991-1993)
* Los Angeles Riots (1992)
* Hurricane Andrew (1992)
* Hurrican Iniki (1992)

Figure 3. Crisis Missions

Directed missions are less critical missions which are normally not conducted by DOD directives and include such missions as support for the presidential inauguration and other special events such as the the Olympics.[14] The author categorizes these missions under the heading of domestic military service as the missions are not in response to a national emergency and

normally do not require joint contingency planning methodologies. Directed missions are more traditional in nature and clearly fall within the taxonomy of domestic military service.

Current doctrine further confuses the taxonomy for domestic military operations by defining missions within the context of legislation. Many of the aforementioned domestic military operations fall under the statutory categories of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) and Military Assistance to Civil Defense (MACD) and, as such, are routinely governed by standing plans and orders. However, many other missions conducted by commanders in response to a domestic crisis or need are not so easily categorized as MACA or MACD.

The confused taxonomy for domestic military operations between categories of missions and statutory requirements highlights the need to develop a simpler model or taxonomy to better define the domestic environment. This model must integrate the doctrine of operations other than war with the missions of domestic military operations.

Recent doctrinal changes propose an operational continuum which recognizes three environments for the scope of military operations: peacetime, conflict, and war.[15] Operations other than war transcend the

environments of peacetime and conflict. The author proposes to place domestic military operations, to include domestic contingency operations within the context of peacetime operations other than war. He proposes to list the associated missions as defined within the taxonomy for domestic military operations under the environment of peacetime, or "peacetime engagement." The author ranks domestic missions in increasing order in terms of complexity, resource requirements, and associated risks beginnning with general military service, followed by domestic counterdrug, finally, domestic contingency operations.

The model enables the author to define the taxonomy for domestic military operations and to place the missions within the context of the operational continuum. This model, developed to depict the taxonomy for domestic military operations, is designed primarily on current joint and Army doctrine and proposed doctrinal changes. However, the model also incorporates the traditional domestic military service missions. These historical military missions further define the appropriate roles of the Army in support of domestic military operations.

A Brief History of Domestic Military Operations

The United States Army has a long-standing tradition of providing forces and assets to resolve domestic problems. Indeed, a brief review of U.S. military history delineates a long and distinguished record of domestic military service for federal forces and state militias. The Army and National Guard have responded to countless missions from the President and State Governors, from quelling the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 to assisting recovery efforts following the recent 1992 Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. A brief review of U.S. military history defines the taxonomy for domestic military operations into two distinct categories; domestic military service and domestic contingency operations. These domestic military missions have evolved with the growth of our nation and have been affirmed by history and statutes as traditional military missions.

Domestic Military Service

The Army and the National Guard have long histories of domestic military service to our nation. General Sullivan describes these traditional missions as "inseparable from the sacred notion of the America's Army as a servant of the nation and its people."[16]

The Army has served to expand the borders of the fledgling country, to ensure the safety of its citizens, and to enforce federal law and preserve the rights of all citizens. The traditional domestic missions for the U.S. Army have been ratified by presidential orders and sanctioned by the Congress since the inception of the Republic. Traditional domestic military service missions were the exploration of the U.S. western frontiers, the administration of the Civil Conservation Corps during the Depression Era, civil defense during the Cold War, and the continued administration of the nation's wetlands and inland waterways by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.[17] These missions, although not all inclusive, provide effective examples of the rich history of domestic military service.

The Explorers

Throughout our nation's early history of expansion, presidents have used the military, both the militia and regular standing forces, to enforce civil law, explore newly acquired territories, govern conquered lands, enter into treaties with Native Americans, and to build the nation's expanding infrastructure. Captain Lewis and Lieutenant Clark explored the Louisiana Purchase territories from

1803-1806 and Captain John C. Freemont mapped the Sierra Nevadas and California from 1842-1844. Army leaders have also played major roles throughout our nation's history as governors of newly explored lands and diplomats in treaty negotiations with Native Americans. The role of the Army in exploration continued into the twentieth century as the Army sent expeditions to the polar regions, constructed infrastructure in Alaska, surveyed canal routes in Panama, and assisted in worldwide mapping efforts.[18] The Army has continued the explorer tradition as Army rockets carried satellites into space and Army maps and astronauts helped to explore the surface of the moon.

The Civil Conservation Corps

The Army executed its most critical mission in domestic military service during the Great Depression by administering and directing the efforts of the largest civil works program ever undertaken in the United States. What began in 1931 as a proposal to involve the Army in the fight against unemployment by housing thousands of unemployed men in military facilities and organizing an unemployment corps for civil works, resulted in the Army playing in instrumental role in the nation's recovery from the Great Depression. In 1933,

President Roosevelt ordered the War Department and the Army to supervise the establishment of the Civil Conservation Corps (CCC).

The mission of the Civil Conservation Corps was to employ jobless young men for reforestation and to conduct other public reclamation projects. Although the original Army mission within the CCC was limited to organizing the work units and sending men from the conditioning camps to work camps, Army Corps commanders found themselves directing efforts within the work camps. Military leaders vehemently opposed the Army's involvement with the CCC, citing that the mission would weaken the Regular Army in carrying out its mission of national defense.[19] General MacArthur, then the Army Chief of Staff, remarked in 1942 that the CCC experience had molded the Regular Army officer corps and established a responsive system of mobilizing and training reserve officers. Historian Maurice Matloff noted of the CCC; "it furnished many thousands of Reserve officers with valuable training, and it gave nonmilitary but disciplined training to many hundred of thousands of young men who were to become soldiers and sailors in World War II."[20]

Civil Defense

Although originally intended to prepare the U.S. for nuclear devastation, the Civil Defense Act of 1950 had far-reaching impacts on the role of the military in supporting domestic disaster relief efforts. The Civil Defense Act, enacted in response to Soviet nuclear testing, established the War Department as the lead agency for all federal responses to an attack on the United States or a natural disaster. In 1979, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumed the role as the federal executive agent for disaster relief from the Department of Defense (DOD). However, the military continues to execute its statutory roles in civil defense, including supporting FEMA in disaster relief operations.

The foundations for military assistance in response to natural disasters has its roots in civil defense. The Civil Defense Act provided for a national "system of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack and from natural disasters."[21] Congress included "hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tsunami, earthquake, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire or other catastrophe in any part of the U.S. which may cause substantial damage or

injury to civilian property or persons" within the context of natural disasters.[22] The Act enabled the president to call federal troops to assist federal and state disaster relief efforts for a multitude of emergencies or contingencies.

The Nation's Corps

The Army has perhaps its longest and most distinguished tradition of domestic military service through the missions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has literally built America. The Corps of Engineers have surveyed the new land, aided the construction of railroads, built dams and bridges, erected public buildings, dug canals, and have been involved with virtually every public improvement since the founding of the Republic.[23] Since 1850, congress has entrusted the Army Corps of Engineers with the stewardship of the nation's inland waterways. Flood control and improving waterway navigation have been a mainstay for the Corps of Engineers as the Corps continues to faithfully discharge its daily missions in support of domestic military service.

Domestic Contingency Operations

The Army also has a long tradition of service to the nation in response to national emergencies. These contingencies include responding to natural and man-made disasters, civil disturbances, and forest fires. The Army has often been the most responsive and effective federal agency to meet the basic needs of the affected populace. It is in response to such presidential requests for support that the Army has achieved great success, particularly during recent deployments in support of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. While Army leaders and commanders often decry such missions as "nontraditional", the reality is that these missions have been part of the nation's charter for the Army since its inception. Indeed, former-Secretary of the Army, Michael P. W. Stone, recognizes the Army's continued commitment to domestic missions and stated; "We search out drug traffickers, fight forest fires, support communities with medical evacuation, and aid in disaster relief and riot control."[24] Domestic contingency operations such as disaster relief, assisting in civil disturbances, and fighting forest fires are historical and inevitable missions for Army leaders and planners.

Domestic Disaster Relief

Federal troops and state militia have responded with varying degrees of success to countless natural disasters. The origins of the Army's service to disaster relief efforts had their genesis following the Civil War. The Chicago fire of 1871 provided the Army's first disaster relief challenge for Major General Sheridan. Until the advent of the American Red Cross in 1881, the Army was the only federal organization manned, equipped and disciplined enough to effectively execute disaster relief operations. The Army held its reeminence as the nation's leading disaster relief agency until 1905 when congress designated the Red Cross as the country's official disaster relief agency.[25]

The San Francisco earthquake of 1906 provide the best example of the Army's capabilities in response to natural disasters. The Army was the only agency capable and resourced enough to provide for the needs of the people of San Francisco in the wake of an earthquake that consumed half of the city and killed over 500 people. The Army restored order, fed over 250,000 people daily, and provided medical support and temporary housing. However, the Army was not reimbursed for these expenses and other disaster relief efforts. In 1926, the Army published Army Regulation 500-60, which restricted

military assistance to only the most desperate situations where "overruling demands of humanity compel immediate action."[26] Since 1924, local commanders must receive approval from the War Department (DOD) before undertaking any disaster relief operation except under the most urgent circumstances.

Army units responded to countless disasters throughout the twentieth century. Massive flooding in 1937 prompted the War Department to order over 150,000 soldiers into flood control service should the Mississippi River spill its banks.[27] The Army also quickly responded to the devastating Alaskan earthquake of 1964. This pattern of immediate response to civil disasters continues through today with the recent responses to the Hurricane Hugo in 1988, the eruption of Mount St Helens in 1988, the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, and Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992.

The Army has a continued and expanding role in domestic and international disaster relief. General Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army recently stated, "the Army must be fully prepared to meet those expectations of the public on short notice in the future across a broad spectrum of likely disasters."[28] Critics argue that such missions detract from combat readiness, yet our nations leaders are committed

to employing our nations resources, to include the military, to quickly respond and alleviate unnecessary suffering. Debate rages over the roles of DOD and FEMA in disaster relief. This thesis will address this relevant issue and project future roles for the military in supporting disaster relief efforts. Perhaps the best rationale for the argument that disaster relief will remain a viable U.S. Army mission rings true in the comments of former-President Bush concerning Army relief efforts during Hurricane Hugo:

> Our role in Hurricane Hugo disaster relief operations in South Carolina has reached an end. For over two weeks our men and women toiled with a task not routinely associated with military readiness. They performed in a magnificent manner and were true ambassadors of the U.S. military. All are fully deserving of a hearty thanks for a job well done . . . . The responsiveness of our forces to request for civil assistance is appreciated by everyone and a source of accolades for the entire command. We can be justly proud of their accomplishments. My personal thanks to all who assisted in easing the suffering caused by Hurricane Hugo. 29

Domestic Peacekeeping Operations

The Army has a long history of domestic peacekeeping operations in response to civil disturbances. Federal Army forces and state militias have suppressed rebellions, protected U.S. citizens, quelled riots and violent strikes, and enforced federal law during numerous civil disturbances. The

introduction of federal troops into a domestic civil crisis often places soldiers into explosive situations which has resulted in heated debate concerning the role of the Army during civil disturbances.[30] However heated the debate, the Army has been very effective in restoring "domestic tranquility." The primary Army tradition in domestic peacekeeping operations is one of being the faithful servants of civil authority and the citizens that the forces were sent to protect.

President George Washington first used the constitutional powers of the presidency to order the domestic use of the military to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania in 1794. Four years later, President John Adams sent in a mixed column of militia and regulars to suppress the Fries Rebellion in eastern Pennsylvania.[31] In response to the raid of John Brown on Harpers Ferry, West Virginia on 16 October 1859, the president ordered Colonel Robert E. Lee to lead a contingent of U.S. Marines in the final peacekeeping operation prior to the Civil War. Captain J. E. B. Stuart stormed the arsenal and ended the raid.[32] It was the use of federal troops to enforce the Runaway Slave Act of 1854 that promoted the congress to enact the Posse Comitatus Act twenty four years later in 1878 to limit the roles of federal

forces in domestic peacekeeping operations.[33]

Following the Civil War, the Army's role in the enforcement of civil law and order during reconstruction was greater than any other time in American history. Military officials provided essential governmental services to the five military districts of the divided south and enforced the maintenance of peace and order. Legislation enacted in 1871 enabled the president to use troops to protect the civil rights of individuals or groups where the state was unwilling to comply.[34] The occupying troops were withdrawn in 1877 and the Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 to limit the military's authority to enforce civil law.

Presidents have used federal troops to resolve labor disputes and violent riots throughout the 20th century. The historical precedent for these missions arose in 1877 when President Hayes sent federal troops to selected sites to quell disorders in response to the nation's first great labor dispute, the railway strike.[35] In the 1890s, the Supreme Court upheld the power of the president to use federal troops to enforce civil peace in the decision of In Re Debs and stated the following:

> The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of

> all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care . . . . If the emergency arises the Army of the nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the nation to compel obedience to its law. 36

The most significant event of the World War eras involved President Roosevelt sending federal troops to quell violence racial riots in Detroit on June of 1943. President Eisenhower used federal troops in 1957 to enforce federal desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas.[37] Although several other presidents have used federal troops to enforce civil rights legislation, few have called upon federal troops to quell domestic disturbances with the exception of federalizing National Guardsmen to preserve the peace during anti-war demonstrations during the late 1960s.

Recent presidents have continued to call upon the Army to restore civil order during violent demonstrations and riots. Racial riots in Washington DC, Baltimore, and Chicago following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. caused the deployment of over 38,000 federal troops to restore order.[38] Regrettably, the most vivid American memory of federal troops involved in civil disturbance operations was the confrontation between the Ohio National Guard and anti-war demonstrators Kent State University which ended in the death of four students. The most recent examples

of military involvement in riot control were to quell the Watts riots of 1965 and the highly visible Los Angeles riots in April of 1992. While fulfilling their primary missions to fight and win wars, the Army and National Guard have continued in their roles as effective and rapid response forces to resolve domestic disturbances.

Wildfire Fighting Operations

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have a critical role in the federal response to wildfires. There are two situations or procedures where the DOD and the Army, as the DOD executive agent, provides personnel, equipment, supplies, or fire protection services in response to a request for assistance. The federal coordinator for fires, the Boise Interagency Fire Center (BIFC), can request assistance from the Army through the Director of Military Support (DOMS). States and local agencies can also request Army assistance through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) upon the declaration of a national emergency under the provisions of the Stafford Act. However, if the fire emergency is so serious as to not allow time for these two procedures, DOD directives enable local commanders to provide the

necessary assistance.[39] Recent Army deployments in support of wildfire fighting operations include extensive support provided across the Western states between 1987 - 1989, to include fighting fires in Yellowstone National Park in 1988.

Other Domestic Contingency Operations

Recent federal disaster relief plans and Department of Defense (DOD) directives have expanded the roles of the Army in response to domestic contingencies. These relatively new military operations include responding to environmental emergencies and urban search and rescue. More established contingency missions are the Army's role in response to a crisis in a federal prison and as part of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). These relatively unknown and less visible domestic military missions also fall within the taxonomy of domestic contingency operations as they respond to a crisis situation and employ contingency methodologies. Recent federal contingency plans expand the Army's participation in several of these missions.

The Department of Defense and the Army are tasked to provide support during environmental emergencies through the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Response System.[40] Although the plan has

been in effect for over twenty years, the Army's mission within the plan has been relatively untested with the noted exceptions of providing assets during the Pittsburg Oil Spill in 1988, and the Alaska oil spill in 1989.[41] The national contingency plan calls for DOD to provide on-scene coordinators for spills from DOD facilities or vessels as well as provide the expertise of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Army additionally provides representatives to federal Regional Response Teams (RRTs) to plan and coordinate a cohesive federal response to an environmental emergency.

The Federal Natural Disaster Response Plan tasks the Department of Defense (DOD) with interagency leadership responsibilities for urban search and rescue (US&R).[42] US&R is one of the twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF number 9) which involve federal interagency cooperation in response to a natural disaster. The military, with the Army as the primary agent, is therefore responsible to coordinate all federal urban search and rescue operations in preparation for and in response to a natural disaster. DOD assumed this role primarily due to its command and control capabilities. The US&R plan currently calls for FEMA to provide thirty four equipped and trained teams

which would operate under command and control of the Army during urban search and rescue operations.

The Army additionally has supporting roles in response to civil disturbances in federal prisons and for mass casualty situations. The federal prison riots in Altanta, Georgia and Oakdale, California in November of 1987 illustrated the effectiveness of the federal prison response plan. Under the prison crisis response plan, the Director of Military Support (DOMS) forms a prison crisis joint task force to effectively integrate assets from U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Air Mobility Command (AMC), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADDOC).[43] The National Disaster Medical System requires the military and the Army to supplement state and local medical resources such as providing medical response, patient evacuation, and medical care. It also tasks DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to designate local coordination hospitals as Federal Coordinating Centers (FCCs) to integrate community planning and activation efforts.[44] These critical domestic contingency missions are constantly revised in scope as federal interagency plans are modified to meet the changing domestic environment.

Domestic Counterdrug Operations: "The War on Drugs"

Recent presidential directives and legislation have expanded the role of the Army in domestic military operations in response to the escalation of the "war on drugs." The domestic mission in the "war on drugs" and its importance to the national security strategy, effectively places counterdrug operations in a separate category from domestic military service and contingency operations. Counterdrug operations, while planned as routine domestic military operations, often result in execution of domestic contingency tactics, techniques and procedures. As the drug problem continues to destroy the fiber of this nation, the military and the Army can expect a never-ending commitment to counter the drug "threat" to our national security.

The "first shot" in the initiation of the "war on drugs" was made by then President Reagan with the signing of a National Security Decision Directive on Narcotics and National Security in 1986.[45] Former-President Bush expanded the role of the military in the war on drugs when he declared in 1989 that drug abuse was the gravest domestic problem facing our nation. Then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, echoed these concerns when he declared, "The detection and countering of the production, trafficking and use of

illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of the DOD."[46] Reduction in the supply of illegal drugs became a primary national security concern.

In response to the overwhelming support for the use of the military in the "war on drugs", Congress effectively amended the Posse Comitatus Act by "charging the military with the mission of detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transit of drugs into the United States (to) capitalize on the tremendous manpower and technology of the Department of Defense."[47] The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 directed the Department of Defense to assume the duties as the lead agency in the detecting, monitoring of air and sea traffic across the borders.[48] Although several senior military leaders question the value of the Army's efforts in the "war on drugs," current policies, structures and funding require the military's utmost efforts to meet this highly visible threat to the nation's security.

Legislation and Directives

A second source relevant to establishing the taxonomy for domestic military operations is the legal basis for the use of domestic military force. The

framers of the U.S. Constitution developed the legal foundations for the Army's role in support of domestic missions. Numerous statutes, directives and regulations have modified this foundation, particularly over the past forty years. This legal basis defines the boundaries for U.S. Army missions within the context of domestic military operations and establishes the distinction between the abilities of active component federal forces and National Guard state militias to conduct domestic military operations. These distinctions become important to the debate concerning force structures and roles of the Army in the post-Cold War era. The legal foundations also enable the author to refine the taxonomy for domestic military operations.

The Constitution

The founding fathers, although wary of the influence of an Army in a democratic society and distrustful of standing armies in general, empowered the president to use federal troops and militias under Articles I, II and IV of the Constitution.[49] Article I allows the congress, and by statute the president, to call forth the militia to suppress insurrections. Article II grants the president the authority to

use the military in domestic situations to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution" and to ensure the execution of federal law. Lastly, Article IV guarantees federal protection against domestic violence if requested by the state legislature or governor. The founding fathers balanced the powers of the president to call up federal forces by enacting the Bill of Rights simultaneously with ratifying the Constitution. The Constitution that establishes the legal foundations for the role of federal forces and state militias to conduct domestic military operations.

Posse Comitatus

The most relevant congressional statute defining the role of the Army in domestic military operations is the Posse Comitatus Act, enacted in 1878 to limit the role of the Army to enforcing civil law.[50] Posse Comitatus prohibited the direct use to the military to enforce civil law, a common practice until its legislation. The Act did not, however, end the involvement of the Army in domestic affairs as the president could still employ the Army in times of domestic emergency and to indirectly enforce civil laws. Relatively unchallenged in court, the Posse Comitatus has limited the role of the Army in domestic operations for one-hundred and fifteen years.

Federal Statutes

Several other recent, less well known federal statutes specifically address the role of the modern military in domestic military operations. The Economy Act of 1932 authorizes military to assist other federal agencies in the guise of use of material, supplies, equipment, work, or service on a reimbursement basis. It additionally established the basis for using military forces to maintain and operate other federal agencies in the event of a strike. The Economy Act was the basis for Army involvement in delivering U.S. mail during the mail carriers strike in the 1970s and for providing air traffic control throughout the U.S. during the air traffic control strike of the 1980s.[51] Presidents continue to use the statutory provisions of the Economy Act to ensure the maintenance and orderly execution of critical federal agencies and functions.

Directives and Regulations

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army implement the statutory authorizations for domestic military operations through a series of extensive directives and regulations. The author lists a sample of the most critical of these directives in the bibliography to this thesis.[52] DOD directives

encompass most domestic military service missions and contingencies. These have expanded in recent years to include supporting civil emergencies efforts, civil defense, civil disturbances, and disaster relief. DOD has also provided guidance for support of the U.S. Secret Service and Postal Service. DOD directives govern support for the shelter for the homeless program, interagency coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and assisting the District of Columbia law enforcement agencies and other civilian law enforcement officials. Army regulations (ARs) govern the Army's roles in the domestic action program, urban search and rescue activities, and the Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) program. Key regulations governing the Army's response to domestic contingencies include support for civil disturbances and civilian law enforcement and prescribe actions concerning the loan and leasing of Army material. These implementation documents enable the Army to plan, prepare and execute domestic military operations consistent with presidential directives and congressional intent.

Several legislative acts specifically address the military's role in domestic disaster relief. The

Civil Defense Act of 1950 originally gave the military the mission to plan, coordinate, and administer emergency assistance in the event of an attack of the United States or from natural disasters.[53] Although much of the administrative duties of civil defense passed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) upon its inception in 1979, the Department of Defense (DOD) retained a key role in supporting domestic disaster relief efforts. The Flood Control Act of 1962 designated the Army Corps of Engineers responsible for flood control and has been further implemented through DOD Directive 3025.1 and Army Regulation (AR) 500-60.[54] The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, also called the Stafford Act, expanded the role of the military in domestic disaster relief. The Stafford Act enabled the federal government to provide emergency assistance and aid to state and local governments during emergencies or natural disasters.[55] This act paved the way for military resources (personnel, equipment, and facilities) to assist in disaster relief efforts. These acts of legislation, along with public opinion, have guided presidential directives and DOD mission in response to domestic military operations.

Most recent legislation focuses on the role of the military in the war on drugs. The Military

Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials Act of 1981 modified the provisions of Posse Comitatus to enable the military to assist civil law enforcement efforts in the war on drugs. Although the legislation only addresses the use of military personnel, intelligence, equipment, and facilities to train and advise civilian law enforcement personnel, many critics argue that this act provided the impetus for the military's entry into the war on drugs.[56] The most recent legislation in this arena is the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989. This act made DOD the executive federal agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.[57] It additionally approved state governors' requests to use National Guard forces in support of state controlled interdiction and eradication efforts. The Army's missions in the domestic drug war continues to expand as DOD evaluates its role in light of recent legislation and court decisions.

Recent Debate Over Peacetime Missions

While key leaders in the Army currently debate the appropriate missions and roles for the post-Cold War Army, the president has increasingly called on the Army to quickly respond to domestic missions. The Army must

remain prepared to execute domestic military operations, for as General Sullivan stated in a recent article: "the American people demand nothing less from their Army."[58] Several factors are key to the debate concerning the roles of the post-Cold War Army. These factors include the demands of national security, the domestic imperative, and budget realities for the next decade. While key political and military leaders debate the appropriate roles for a peacetime Army, the realities of the domestic environment continue to require active and reserve component Army and National Guard units to deploy in support of domestic service, contingency, and counterdrug operations.

The Demands of National Security

The foundations of the role and missions of the Army in service to our nation are found in our national security strategy. The 1993 national security strategy, details four national interests:[59]

1. The survival of the U.S. as a free nation
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy
3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous alliances

4. A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish

The four foundations for military strategy apply the forces of the Army to secure the objectives of the national security strategy through: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.[60] The foundations of forward presence and crisis response imply a domestic mission. The Army's mission to "deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, defend the nation;s vital interest against any potential foe" also implies a domestic mission to ensure the survival of the nation and a healthy and growing economy.[61] The final toll for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki on an already stagnant U.S. economy was over $2 billion. While domestic military operations cannot deter disasters, such operations can defend the nation's vital interest in times of peacetime crisis. The Army must continue to perform its domestic military missions in support of the national security strategy.

The Domestic Imperative

The Clinton administration has included the domestic imperative to national security strategy to ultimately linked domestic issues to the debates on

force structure and service roles. The 1993 National Security Strategy writes of the overiding importance of growing national economy to our national security.[62] Therefore, a key assumption of this research is a continued, if not an expanded, mission for the U.S. Army in support of domestic military operations. Essential missions, such as the Corps of Engineers missions in flood control and the role of the National Guard as a state militia, remain relatively unchallenged in policy and public opinion. Recently, however, advocates of a reduced active military force structure argue for a larger role for the National Guard forces as well as federal forces in domestic military service operations. Several noted proponents of domestic military service allude an increased role for the Army in the maintenance of the "general welfare" for the United States.

President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Aspin, and Senator Nunn have sponsored initiatives to reevaluate the role of the Army in support of domestic missions. Senior Army leaders acknowledge the need for the Army to continue to provide general military service to meet the demanding domestic requirements of a troubled economy. Several research papers cite domestic

nation building as a viable alternative mission for the Army's resources. While critics of an increased Army role in domestic operations can decry that such operations will decrease combat readiness, few can argue with the past successes of the Army and the military community when it has been called into service to respond to domestic missions. In order to retain the critical warfighting edge, General Sullivan challenges the Army to:

> Enhance its peacetime value and expand its role as a versatile national resource by engaging in a variety of non-combatant missions at home and abroad that; support U.S. domestic and foreign policy; promote American values; assist friendly nations; and enhance the nation's domestic well-being and national security.[63]

Budget Realities

The continued reduction of both the overall defense budget and its corresponding affects on the size of the Army will play a significant part in determining the appropriate roles of a peacetime Army. Several defense policy leaders argue that the post-Cold War Army of the future must contribute to addressing the domestic needs of the United States.[64] Advocates of a smaller peacetime Army closely relate the proposed Army budget to its contributions in meeting both international and domestic military missions.[65] Public opinion has

joined the voices of congressional leaders in calling for the budgetary "peace dividend".[66] President Clinton, has proposed alternative domestic missions for a peacetime Army, ranging from providing teachers for our inner-city schools to repairing the decaying infrastructure of American cities.[67] These alternative missions, while a source of debate, are yet to be fully examined by the new Clinton administration. The post-Cold War Army must reevaluate its role in domestic contingencies in response to overwhelming budget priorities.

Senator Nunn, the influential Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, would like to expand the role of the Army and the National Guard for domestic operations. He argues for future Army performing general military service. In a recent Senate Armed Services Committee report on the 1993 defense authorizations bill, Nunn wrote:

> The American people have made an enormous investment in developing the skills, capabilities and resources of the armed forces. These resources, if properly matched to local needs and coordinated with civilian efforts, can make a useful contribution to addressing the serious domestic needs of the United States.[68]

Senator Nunn may well have defined the future role of the military using the realities of a declining budget and rising threats to our domestic national security.

Summary

The remainder of this thesis will attempt to answer the primary research question: Should the United States Army conduct domestic contingency operations? The taxonomy of domestic military operations defines domestic contingency operations within the context of operations other than war. The proposed model for the operational continuum recognizes the taxonomy for domestic military operations and attempts to fill the current doctrinal void for such operations. The Army has a greater doctrinal base for domestic counterdrug operations, which provides an effective paradigm to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The five parallels of strategic strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics, enable the author to evaluate current domestic contingency plans and policies. The use of the paradigm will provide a context for discovery and answer the primary question concerning the Army's appropriate roles in support of domestic contingency operations.

Domestic military operations will increase in frequency and scope during the next decade. These missions include domestic military service missions such

as exploration, civil defense, and the administration of the nation's wetlands and inland waterways. Domestic contingency operations include disaster relief, civil disturbances and responses to wildfires. Domestic counterdrug operations are indeed a separate category within the taxonomy of domestic military operations. However, these missions provide an effective paradigm for comparison with the less-defined domestic contingency operations. Contrary to opinions of senior leaders, these domestic missions are "traditional" military missions and are likely to increase in frequency due to domestic challenges to national security, the perceived domestic imperative and budget realities.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

> History is Humanity's knowledge of itself, its certainty about itself. It is not 'the light and the truth,' but a search therefore, a sermon thereupon, a consecration there to. It is like John the Baptist, 'not that Light but sent to bear witness of that Light.'1

Akin to Johann Gustav Droysen's 1886 view of the study of history, this literature review provides not "the light and the truth," but an insight into the search for the role of a peacetime Army in domestic contingency operations. The literature is vast and expansive, yet it only partially captures the essence of this thesis; should the Army conduct domestic contingency operations? The literature does provide a balanced picture of domestic military operations and enables the author to draw inferences and conclusions from past and present missions while theorizing about the future for the post-Cold War Army. This literature review will provide insights into the "light and the truth" of domestic military operations.

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a selected review of available literature to develop the taxonomy of domestic contingency operations. Much is written on domestic military operations yet few publications adequately provide the necessary guidance needed by commanders to successfully plan, train, equip, and execute such complex operations. This chapter will focus on the taxonomy of doctrine; the three levels of military planning: strategic, operational and tactical; and the availability of paradigms with which to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The literature review provides a point of departure from which to draw inferences concerning the application of Army forces and assets to domestic contingency operations.

Doctrine

Current doctrine for domestic military operations, to include domestic contingency operations, is inadequate. Although much of the doctrine concerning operations other than war is evolving, Army and joint doctrine do not provide the necessary definitions so essential to developing a sound domestic military strategy and to define the operational parameters.

Existing and emerging doctrine do not define the taxonomy for domestic military operations not do they establish the parameters under which units conduct domestic military operations. Doctrine must also establish the principals under which commanders can plan, train, and execute domestic contingency missions. The author will examine current Army and joint doctrine and discuss its failure to define the taxonomy for domestic contingency operations and to provide adequate planning guidance for commanders tasked to support domestic contingency missions.

Army Doctrine

Army doctrine does not adequately address the taxonomy for domestic contingency operations. Current doctrinal publications provide only a few pages to domestic military operations. Proposed changes to doctrine expand this discussion of military operations other than war yet provide few doctrinal principals or imperatives to guide commanders and staffs tasked to support domestic missions. The logical place to begin a review of Army doctrine for domestic military operations is with Army's capstone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations.

The current 1986 version of FM 100-5 is inadequate in its application any military operation

short of mid to high intensity conflict. In fact, the manual does not address operations other than war except in a cursory examination of low-intensity conflict. The 1986 version only implies a domestic role for the Army within the context of peacetime contingency operations. The 1986 version of FM 100-5 defines peacetime contingency operations as inclusive of operations undertaken to protect U.S. interests, lives, and property.[2] The authors of airland operations doctrine attempted to remedy the doctrinal shortcomings concerning low-intensity conflict with a revision of airland battle doctrine undertaken in 1991.

Airland operations, the evolutionary successor to airland battle, better addressed the doctrinal deficiencies concerning operations short of mid and high intensity conflict. The Army's Training and Doctrine Center (TRADDOC) published Pamphlet (PAM) 525-5, Airland Operations, in 1991 which first identified the existence of "peacetime engagement" and "operations short of war."[3] TRADDOC PAM 525-5 defined "peacetime engagement" as:

> the strategic concept that guides the coordinated application of political, economic, informational and military means to promote stability and to counteract violence worldwide.[4]

The evolving doctrine of airland operations was the

first to identify a state of conflict, "operations short of war", which required the Army to conduct direct and indirect military operations in support of formerly non-traditional missions.

The doctrinal definitions of operations short of war have evolved to include domestic military operations. TRADDOC PAM 525-5 categorized operations short of war into four overlapping categories: support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and contingency operations.[5] These four missions remain in the current doctrinal definition of "operations other than war" found in the current revision of airland operations, FM 100-5 (Final Draft), circulated in January of 1993. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 includes nation assistance, security and advisory assistance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counterdrug, peacekeeping, arms control, antiterrorism, shows of force attacks and raids, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace enforcement, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, arms control, and support to U.S. civil authorities and peacekeeping as operations other than war.[6] It states: "skills gained in training for war are also of utility to the government for operations other than war."[7] The draft

1993 version of FM 100-5 attempts to integrate the domestic application of military forces and assets yet provides inadequate guidance to direct such operations.

Although current revisions of the Army's capstone doctrinal manual indirectly addresses domestic military operations, there is a vacuum for doctrinal planning of domestic military operations.. Commanders supporting domestic military operations can find little doctrinal material to assist their planning, training and execution efforts. Even the Army's only doctrinal publication for operations short of war, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, contains little guidance for domestic military operations.

FM 100-20 defines domestic military operations within the taxonomy of peacetime contingency operations.[8] FM 100-20 lists domestic missions including disaster assistance, civil disorder, threats to federal property, and other emergency situations, as statutory military support to U.S. civil authorities under the heading of peacetime contingency operations. The manual provides three principles for peacetime contingency operations: coordination, balance, and planning for uncertainty.[9] However, FM 100-20 only devotes two pages to domestic military operations and

provides little guidance for commanders charged with deploying to conduct domestic contingency operations.

Joint Doctrine

FM 100-5 (Final Draft) describes operations other than war as inherently joint in nature.[10] It so describes these missions as inherently combined and interagent in planning and execution. Unfortunately, joint doctrine does not provide any more of a doctrinal basis for domestic military operations than does Army doctrine. The capstone doctrinal document for joint or multi-service operations is Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication (PUB) 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. JCS Pub 3-0 defines a domestic role for military forces in support of peacetime contingency operations yet provides little doctrinal guidance.

JCS Pub 3-0 recognizes that the military may play an indirect role in domestic operations while supporting other federal and state agencies. JCS Pub 3-0 includes such domestic operations as: supporting counternarcotics interdiction, providing humanitarian assistance, providing support to disaster relief operations, assisting in civilian search and rescue, combatting terrorism, and conducting information programs.[11] It lists counternarcotics [counterdrug]

operations as a distinct mission. Although JCS Pub 3-0 provides a joint mission statement for domestic military operations and defines a requirement for strategic, operational and tactical planning, it provides little guidance for commanders to achieve these goals.

National Strategic Documents

Strategic planning objectives, embodied in the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy of the United States, apply to domestic military operations. The 1993 National Security Strategy defines two key national interests relevant to the domestic application of the military instrument of power:

> 1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
>
> 2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.12

The 1993 National Security Strategy reiterates these national interests while describing the domestic imperative found in the threats to a stable U.S. economy. The 1993 National Security Strategy states: "the top national security strategy today must be to strengthen economic performance at home and economic

leadership abroad."[13] It calls for unification of federal efforts in the domestic "war on drugs" but unfortunately does not imply that such an interagency effort could apply to all interagency domestic actions, including domestic military operations. Although it defines a domestic mission for the military in support of national interests and objectives, The National Security Strategy does not provide adequate guidance for strategic planning of domestic military operations.

The 1992 National Military Strategy also does not provide adequate strategic planning guidance for domestic military operations. The National Military Strategy defines a domestic mission for military forces within the taxonomy of crisis response. Crisis response gives the U.S. the ability to project power and decisively use military force when and where the national leadership determines it is needed.[14] This includes the domestic use of military force to combat drugs and provide humanitarian assistance at home and abroad. The National Military Strategy only alludes to domestic military operations and therefore does not provide the a cohesive domestic military strategy so necessary for effective planning efforts.

Operational Planning

It is within the taxonomy of operational strategy and campaign planning, where commanders can finally discover some form of guidance for domestic contingency operations. Domestic contingency operations are essentially joint or interagency campaigns. These campaigns seek to achieve national security objectives; specifically the preservation of domestic tranquility and the promotion of a stable and free U.S. economy. Therefore, commanders and planners can apply operational strategy and campaign planning doctrine to domestic military operations.

Fortunately for commanders and planners, it is within the context of operational planning that the majority of the writings concerning domestic military operations is focused. Although there is not a comprehensive campaign plan in support of domestic military operations, existing counterdrug campaign efforts can provide a paradigm for analyzing other domestic military operations such as disaster relief. Counterdrug campaigns, like domestic contingency operations, are joint and interagency in nature and both require innovative solutions in light of the current void in strategic and operational planning guidance. One such document that assists in this context of

discovery is entitled, Campaign Planning and the Drug War. Campaign Planning and the Drug War was written to fill the void that currently exists at the operational planning level in the "war on drugs."[15] The authors of the study, Munger and Mendel, provide a viable operational strategy to meet the demands of synchronizing domestic and international counterdrug efforts. This document provides the paradigm for application to domestic contingency operations and provides a context of discovery for the author. Using this model, the author will gain an insight into the effectiveness of the application of military power to domestic contingencies.

Unfortunately, the military does not currently have literature linking campaign planning and domestic contingency operations. A recent study project entitled, "Does the Military Assistance for Disaster Relief Require Joint Methodology," by LTC James J. Gallivan, examines the current lack of a coherent strategic planning methodology for domestic disaster relief.[16] Through a series of interviews and a review of available literature, Gallivan concludes that joint methodologies are applicable to the disaster relief planning process and that their use by strategic planners would enhance mission accomplishment.

Tactical Planning

Much like at the strategic and operational levels of war, literature concerning domestic military operations provide little planning guidance for commanders and planners. Although perhaps the greatest volume of literature on domestic military operations deals with the planning and execution of specific military missions, it is void of a cohesive compilation of tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to the broad spectrum of domestic contingency operations. Commanders are left to plan, equip, train, and execute domestic military operations on an ad hoc basis, condemned to re-learn the lessons of commanders previously tasked to support such missions.

In an effort to provide continuity and synchronization to domestic military operations, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has published numerous operations plans and manuals. However, this unified, rather than joint, approach to domestic military operations hinders responses to domestic contingencies. FORSCOM is tasked by the Department of Defense (DOD) in a series of DOD Directives and Army Regulations to synchronize the efforts of continental United States Army units in support of domestic military operations.[17] FORSCOM has developed, staffed and

published situation manuals and operations plans which attempt to synchronize U.S. Army actions in support of domestic military operations. Key among these documents are standing operations plans and the FORSCOM Situation Planning Manual (SITMAN).

Current classified and unclassified operations plans within Forces Command and Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) detail the Army's response to domestic contingencies. A review of operations plans for fire fighting (OPERATION HEATWAVE), earthquakes, and civil disturbances (OPERATION GARDEN PLOT) illustrate a lack of joint or interagency methodologies for domestic contingency planning. FORSCOM's comprehensive situation manual, (SITMAN), provides for rapid interagency crisis action planning in the event of a domestic contingency.[18] Although FORSCOM has coordinated these plans with other federal and state agencies and other military services, recent documents detail a lack of cohesive joint or interagency methodologies that hinders the synchronization of forces in support of domestic contingency operations.

COL Edward Kelly, Jr., details the applicable doctrine for disaster relief operations in his thesis entitled, "The U.S. Military and Disaster Response."[19] He discusses the use of military forces

in response to recent disasters. COL Kelly begins with the assumptions that the U.S. Army will continue to respond to domestic disasters and concludes with a listing of references key to any planning staff to effectively respond to a domestic contingency such as a natural disaster.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Harrison describes the evolution of the federal disaster response system in his thesis entitled, "Peacetime Employment of the Military - The Army's Role in Domestic Disaster Relief."[20] He utilizes the new Federal Response Plan and its relationship to earthquake preparedness to examine the structure and applicable regulations for the Army's organizational response. Harrison concludes with the challenge to retain Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters as the keystone in the disaster relief response system. He argues that we cannot reduce the CONUSA headquarters staff despite the organizational cuts in the Army for to do so would jeopardize the Federal Response Plan.

Recent newspaper articles and editorials focus on the results of the Army's efforts in response to Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. Much of the current material focuses on detailed descriptions of the organizations, equipment and personnel involved in the

disaster relief efforts. General Sullivan has provided several authoritative articles concerning the successes of the Army's responses to the hurricanes.[21] Recent commentary in the Army Times focuses on the perceived ineptitude of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to effectively respond to natural disasters. These articles argue for an increased Department of Defense role in disaster relief.[22]

Several documents provide insight into the historical background of the use of military in the domestic environment. One of these resources is an anthology entitled, Two Centuries of Service: The Army's Civil Contributions to Society, by the Center of Military History. It provides a wealth of research concerning the roles of the Army in the exploration of new territories, military governors, domestic peacekeeping operations, public works and infrastructure development, and domestic disaster relief.[23] The doctoral thesis submitted by John W. Killigrew to the Department of History at Indiana University, entitled "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929 - 1936," details the genesis, successes and failures of the Army-run Civil Conservation Corps during the Depression.[24] These documents describe a rich

heritage of domestic military operations throughout our nation's history.

Establishing a Paradigm

Perhaps the greatest volume of literature is within the taxonomy of domestic counterdrug operations. The extensive number of directives, reports, articles, and analysis provide the context for discovery for other domestic military operations and enable the paradigm for this thesis. There are extensive bibliographies, studies, writings and articles concerning counterdrug operations. The following resources are critical to establishing this paradigm for domestic military operations.

An essential reference to the study of counterdrug operations is the selected bibliography published by the U.S. Army War College Library entitled, "Narcotics Interdiction and the Military."[25] The informative bibliography lists books, journals, articles and government documenting the military's role in counterdrug operations. Although many of references are outdated, they provide a historical context to evaluate current counterdrug policies and plans and assist to the paradigm for domestic contingency operations.

Several journal articles define the role of the

U.S. military to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. A few articles chide defense planners that imply by their actions that additional military resources can win the "war on drugs." One article calls the notion of a possible victory in the "war on drugs" as a "Pyrrhic victory" whose costs "enfeeble the nominal winner."[26] A seminal article on the role of the military in counterdrug operations in light of national and international legal restrictions is entitled, "The 'Drug War': The U.S. Military and National Security" by Major Peter M. Sanchez of the United States Air Force.[27] Sanchez provides an outstanding analysis of relevant legislation, court cases and policies concerning the use of military forces both at home and abroad to support the administration's "war on drugs." These articles assist to establish the paradigm for domestic contingency operations.

The majority of after action reports from past domestic counterdrug operations reveal inconsistencies in interagency cooperation which adversely impacts mission accomplishment. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Directorate for Low Intensity Conflict at Fort Leavenworth, as well as the executing headquarters, Joint Task Force 6 at Fort Bliss, Texas, all maintain extensive documentation concerning the

successes and failures of domestic counterdrug operations. Without detailing the reports on a mission-by-mission basis, one thread of continuity of the majority of the reports reflects a need for a cohesive strategy to synchronize joint and interagency efforts in the "war on drugs."

The Domestic Environment

There is a wealth of material available concerning the appropriate roles of the military and the Army in response to domestic needs and policies. The premier work commissioned by the Army and published by the Rand Corporation is entitled, The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision.[28] It provides a well-founded debate concerning the challenges facing the Army within the context of a changing national security environment. The Rand study assumes that the changing national security environment will cause the the Army will to become more involved in domestic issues, such as disaster relief. The authors conclude that the Army of tomorrow will be a U.S.-based Army performing general military service in the international and domestic environments, to include domestic contingency operations.[29]

Several documents challenge the current roles and missions of Army active and reserve component forces in support of domestic contingencies. Colonel Philip A. Brehm, in his draft manuscript entitled, "Alternative Missions for the U.S. Army," provides an interesting counter to the Rand Corporation study.[30] Brehm argues that the Army, in particular the reserve components, should become more involved in domestic operations in order to justify budget expenditures. He essentially builds a strong case for domestic "nation building". He concludes that it is time for the Army to return to its heritage and expand its role in domestic missions during peacetime.

Not all debate is positive concerning expanding the role of the Army in support of domestic missions. In a frightening expose of the fears of several Army officers, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., described how the military's escalation in conducting formerly ancillary domestic missions led to a military coup d'etat within the United States in the year 2012.[31] General Fred C. Weyand and Colonel Harry Summers provide echoed these concerns in a more expository 1976 article entitled, "The Need for Military Power."[32] Like Lieutenant Colonel Dunlap, General Weyan and Colonel Summers

caution against an expanded role of the military in support of domestic needs and requirements.

Summary

The purpose of this cursory literature review is to provide the taxonomy for domestic military operations and to describe the current debate over the use of military forces and assets in the domestic environment. It has revealed a doctrinal void, both at the Army and joint levels, concerning domestic contingency operations. Documentation concerning domestic counterdrug operations is more extensive and can provide a paradigm for comparison. The author will use these strategic and operational planning documents for domestic counterdrug operations as a paradigm for examining the appropriate roles of the military in response to domestic contingencies.

Endnotes

[1] Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, January 1988): 49.

[2] U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington: Department of the Army, January 1986), 5.

[3] U.S. Army, TRADDOC Pamphlet 525-1, Airland Operations, (Washington: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1991), 4.

[4] Ibid; 49.

[5] Ibid; 26.

[6] U.S. Army, "FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft)", (Washington: Department of the Army, January 1993), 8-7.

[7] Ibid; 8-12.

[8] U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington: Department of the Army, December 1990), 5-1.

[9] Ibid.

[10] "FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft)", 8-2.

[11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Test Pub), Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1990), II-11.

[12] George H. W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993): 8 - 9.

[13] Ibid; 9.

[14] Colin Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992): 7.

15 Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, January 1988): ix.

16 James J. Gallivan, "Does Military Assistance for Disaster Relief Require Joint Methodology?" (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, March 1988): 38.

17 Thomas G. Harrison, "Peacetime Employment of the Military - The Army's Role in Domestic Disaster Relief," (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1992): 12.

18 Ronald E. Jones and E. H. Dinkel, Jr., "Safeguarding the Internal Security of the United States - Old Mission, New Challenges for the Military". (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1990): 6.

19 Edward M. Kelly, Jr., "The U.S. Military and Disaster Response," (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1992): 3.

20 Harrison, iii.

21 Gordon R, Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army 43 (January 1993): 16 - 22 and "A Trained and Ready Army: The Way Ahead," Military Review 71, (November 1991): 2-9.

22 Rick Maze, "Pentagon May Get Disaster Relief Role Back," Army Times, 21 September 1992: 26; Soraya S. Nelson, "New Military Mission Could Surface in Andrew's Wake," Army Times, 7 September 1992: 17; and George C. Wilson, "Disaster Plan: Give Military the Relief Role," Army Times, 21 September 1992: 33.

23 William G. Bell and others, "Two Centuries of Service: The Army's Civil Contributions to American Society", (Washington, U.S. Army Center of Military History, December 1975).

24 John W. Killigrew, "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929 - 1936," (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1960).

25 U.S. Army, "Narcotics Interdiction and the Military: A Selected Bibliography," (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College Library, 1990).

26 Alan Ned Sabrowsky, "A War Unwon: The U.S. Fight Against Drug Trafficking," Small Wars and Insurgencies, (October 1992): 8.

27 Peter M. Sanchez, "The 'Drug War': The U.S. Military and National Security", Air Force Law Review, 34 (1991).

28 John K Setear, Carl H Builder, M.D. Baccus, and Wayne Madewell, The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, June 1990).

29 Ibid; 64.

30 Philip A. Brehm and Wilbur E. Gray, "Alternative Missions for the Army," (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, June 1992).

31 Charles J. Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, (Winter 1992-1993): 13.

32 Fred C. Weyand and Harry Summers, "Serving the People: The Basic Cause for the United States Army," Commander's Call, (May-June 1976).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework to objectively evaluate past, present and future U.S. Army involvement in domestic military operations. Unfortunately, little doctrine or tactics, techniques, or procedures currently exist to assist in this evaluation or to guide commanders tasked to support domestic military operations. While focusing on the more important traditional warfighting missions, the Army has been criticized for neglecting its constitutional domestic responsibilities. Few commanders will argue that there exists an increasing possibility of their units deploying in support of domestic military operations in a post-Cold War era of peacetime engagement. Yet the Army has not developed sufficient doctrine to guide the planning, training and execution of domestic military operations or to adjudge the effectiveness of its response to domestic missions. This lack of a sound doctrinal basis for domestic military operations has developed a paradox for military

planners and complicates the objective analysis of the Army's involvement in domestic missions.

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to define the research methodology used to develop the framework with which to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The author will use domestic counterdrug operations as a paradigm to discover parallels between counterdrug and domestic contingency operations. The five relevant parallels are as follows: strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics. These parallels provide a context of discovery for domestic contingency operations and enable the author to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of current doctrine and guidance for domestic contingency operations.

Counterdrug Paradigm

Counterdrug operations provides an effective paradigm to evaluate other domestic military operations. The author makes a critical assumption for the purpose of this thesis that military and the Army has been relatively successful in the application of forces and assets to the "war on drugs." Although this is a topic of great debate, counterdrug operations

are comparatively firmly established in doctrine, principals, and practice. The extensive documentation of counterdrug operations enables the author to draw inferences concerning domestic contingency operations and enables him to objectively apply relevant parallels between the two types of domestic military operations. These parallels are derived from the strategic, operational and tactical levels of execution and the author contends that the parallels apply to all domestic military operations. Counterdrug operations thus provide an effective paradigm to evaluate domestic contingency operations.

The Strategic Paradigm

The paradigm for counterdrug operations must begin with addressing the strategic application of military power to the domestic environment. Essential to the application of military forces to domestic military operations is the strategic concept that military strategy must support national [security] strategy and comply with national policy.[1] The national security strategy must dictate the military strategy for domestic military operations in accordance with national security goals, interests, and objectives. The application of a cohesive strategy to

domestic military operations dictates a balanced approach towards the ends, ways, and means for the appropriate application of military forces to peacetime military missions. The author will therefore evaluate domestic contingency operations terms of the ends, ways and means for military forces applied to a domestic environment.

There is a distinct lack of a cohesive and comprehensive national strategy for the application of military resources to domestic contingencies. The only exception to this general statement is in domestic counterdrug operations. The President's National Drug Control Strategy applies the strategic interest and objectives of the national security strategy to the "war on drugs" and it provides an effective paradigm to evaluate strategic planning for other domestic military operations.[2] This strategic document provides the necessary documentation to explore the strategic guidance parallel and to therefore evaluate domestic contingency operations.

The Operational paradigm

Operational art is necessary to translate strategic goals, interests and objectives into operational and tactical action. The author defines

this paradigm within the taxonomy of domestic military operations as the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in the domestic environment. Operational art involves the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major military operations. Operational principals apply to the domestic application forces as well as for combat. It requires a definitive end state, operational objectives to achieve the end state, a sequence of actions to achieve the operational objectives, and the application of military resources or means to sequence actions. Operational art requires unity of effort in the application of these resources to achieve operational objectives. These two operational principals of objectives and unity of effort, enables commanders and planners to translate the broad strategic guidance for domestic military operations into specific military operational campaigns and tactical missions.

The current application of operational art for domestic military operations does not provide for the application of military resources to achieve a strategic end state or operational objectives. However, operational planners have recently proposed campaign plans for counterdrug operations that apply the principals of operational art to achieve a synchronized federal response to the "war on drugs." Munger and

Mendal have proposed a model campaign plan for counterdrug operations which provides an effective paradigm for domestic contingency operations.[3] The proposed counterdrug campaign plan translates the National Drug Control Strategy into operational objectives, the second parallel Counterdrug operations will provide an effective paradigm to evaluate the application of operational art to the identify the domestic environment.

One of the most significant challenges of domestic military operations is to synchronize diverse and often conflicting joint military forces and civilian agencies in order to achieve a synergistic effect. This synchronization is critical to achieve the operational principal of unity of effort which translates to unity of command at tactical levels. Once again, counterdrug operations provide the paradigm to evaluate the application of unity of effort to domestic military operations. The author will use the joint methodologies of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) as the model for an organizational structure that ensures unity of effort.[4]

The Tactical Paradigm

The tactical level of war in the domestic arena directly relates to execution of tasked domestic support missions by commanders and units. Commanders plan, train, equip, and conduct domestic military operations in support of NCA and FORSCOM-directed missions. Units conduct such missions in accordance with current statutes, policies and directives which guide and limit the use of military forces in the accomplishment of domestic missions. The author will define the tactical paradigm within the context of tactical execution and logistics. Tactical execution relates to the accomplishment of the tasked mission; hence, the definition of success or end state. Logistics refers to the application of Army, joint, and interagency logistics principals and imperatives to ensure the uninterrupted sustainment of units tasked to conduct domestic military operations. These two parallels will enable the author to evaluate the effectiveness of domestic contingency operations.

The Army has responded to countless calls for domestic military operations with varying degrees of success. The definition of which end state translates to military success often eludes commanders and planners alike. Counterdrug operations have defined success in

relatively quantifiable terms and provides an effective paradigm to evaluate the fourth parallel of tactical execution. Counterdrug operations often define success in terms of numbers of missions supported or taskings answered. The author contends that this definition of success equally applies to domestic contingency operations. Commanders must clearly define success or quantify the desired end state to effectively execute domestic military operations.

The application of logistics characteristics or imperatives are critical to the successful execution of tasked domestic missions. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 (Final Draft) identifies these logistical characteristics (previously termed logistics imperatives) as: anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness and versatility, and improvisation.[5] The demands of joint and interagency operations which characterize domestic missions require the flexible, innovative and responsive application of resources. These requirements are often complicated by federal and state agencies with differing logistical doctrines, procedures, and equipment differences. Although counterdrug operations are not totally effective in the application of sound logistical principals, they provide an effective paradigm to evaluate domestic contingency

operations. This fifth parallel between domestic counterdrug and contingency operations enables the author to apply many of the lessons learned by commanders and planners while logistically sustaining their forces during domestic missions. The logistical support of counterdrug operations also provides an nsight into the problems associated with joint and interagency logistics. The application of these critical logistical principals and imperatives are essential to achieving success in the domestic arena.

Summary

Domestic counterdrug operations provide an effective paradigm to evaluate domestic contingency operations. Counterdrug operations provides a context of discovery in the the levels of military operations; strategic, operational, and tactical. The paradigm enables the author to infer parallels which equally pply to domestic counterdrug and contingency operations across the three levels of military operations. These parallels are; strategic guidance, operational bjectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics. The author will then use these parallels to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of domestic contingency operations military. He will reserve the

debate concerning the effectiveness of counterdrug perations for later chapters. He will therefore accept, or the purpose of establishing a context for discovery, that domestic counterdrug operations provides an effective paradigm to model the Army's response to domestic contingencies. The five parallels thus form an effective model for evaluating the effectiveness of domestic contingency operations and assist to hypothesize future roles of the Army in support of domestic contingency operations.

Endnotes

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test Pub), (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992), I-2.

[2] George H. W. Bush, National Drug Control Strategy, (Washington: Office of the National Drug Control Policy, January 1992).

[3] Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, "Campaign Planning and the Drug War," (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, January 1988).

[4] Joint Task Force-6 (JTF-6) is a standing joint task force formed by Forces Command (FORSCOM) to plan, coordinate and integrate interagency domestic counterdrug operations. JTF-6 is located at Fort Bliss, Texas and coordinates with the civil interagency counterdrug task force, Operation Alliance, to ensure responsive military support for counterdrug operations. A good description of the task organization and reponsibilities of JTF-6 is found in: National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, "Interagency Counterdrug Manager's Course Resource Guide, Second Edition", January 1993, 4-14 - 4-16.

[5] U.S. Army, "FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft)," (Washington: Department of the Army, January 1993), 9-4.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate domestic contingency operations using counterdrug operations as the paradigm for comparison. The current methodology for planning and conducting domestic contingency operations is faulty at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations. Domestic counterdrug operations provides a better paradigm for the planning and execution of domestic military operations. The five parallels of strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics provide the context for discovery in developing a better model for domestic contingency operations. These parallels enable the author to develop a sound model for planning and executing domestic contingency operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations. It also enables him to infer conclusions concerning the primary research question as to viability

of domestic contingency operations as a U.S. Army mission.

Strategic Paradigm

Strategic guidance is imperative for the focusing of national resources or instruments of national power to effectively resolve a crisis and to ensure national stability. A cohesive national strategy provides the goals, interests and objectives for the United States for applying the political, economic, military, and informational instruments of national power to address a political policy or national need. It also synchronizes the use of scarce resources by establishing the national goals, interests, and objectives for the use of military forces and resources. Counterdrug operations has a comprehensive national strategy which synchronizes the application of all federal, state and local agencies in the "war on drugs." The National Drug Control Policy provides this essential strategic guidance and direction. Domestic contingency operations do not have a national strategy and lacks the guidance and direction necessary to synchronize military resources with other agencies or to maximize the joint capabilities of the military services in response to national emergencies. Strategic guidance

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

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is critical to the synchronization of often competing agencies and resources to support domestic counterdrug and contingency operations.

Strategic Guidance

The greatest distinction between domestic counterdrug and contingency operations is the existence of a national drug control policy which provides essential strategic guidance for counterdrug operations. Strategic guidance defines the goals, interests, and objectives of national policy. This guidance thus defines the parameters for the application of scarce resources and establishes priorities for their commitment. The National Drug Control Policy defines the short and long-term goals, interest and objectives for the synchronization of national counterdrug efforts.[1] Domestic contingency operations lack the strategic guidance necessary to focus the application of Army resources to resolve national emergencies. This lack of a clear national strategy continues to hinder the planning and execution of domestic contingency operations.

Counterdrug Strategic Guidance

The National Drug Control Policy provides the necessary strategic guidance to synchronize domestic

counterdrug operations. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 mandated strategic planning for the national counterdrug effort. It established the Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to publish a yearly national drug control strategy and to unify the federal counterdrug effort in a "national partnership" counter the threat that illegal drugs pose to national security.[2] The ONDCP engages a coalition of national resources, from federal to state, in order to produce a synergistic positive reduction in the supply and trafficking of illegal drugs. This clear, strategic end state for counterdrug efforts synchronized national resources and placed counterdrug operations at a distinct advantage over the more disjointed federal efforts in support of domestic contingency operations.

The National Drug Control Policy synchronizes domestic counterdrug operations by mandating the coordination of diverse supporting federal, state, and local agencies to achieve a strategic end state. The strategy requires supporting agencies, to include the Department of Defense (DOD), to provide supporting strategies with quantifiable goals. The Defense Counterdrug Strategy tasks the Army as DOD's executive agent for counterdrug operations, provides for standing joint task forces (JTFs) to combat illegal drugs, and

integrates active and reserve forces in the "war on drugs."[3] The Army Counterdrug Plan provides effective strategic guidance for the Army's role in support of the national counterdrug strategy.[4] It acknowledges counterdrug operations as a high priority military mission and tasks Forces Command (FORSCOM) to support the DOD mission as the lead federal agency in the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transport of illegal drugs into the United States. It fails to link the strategic goals of demand reduction with the Army's missions in support of the counterdrug operation but does translate the goals, interests, and objectives of the Drug Control Strategy into specific operational objectives.

Domestic Contingency Strategic Guidance

Domestic contingency operations lack the strategic guidance necessary to focus the application of Army resources to resolve national emergencies. Primarily due to a lack of a cohesive taxonomy for domestic contingency operations, there is no single-source national strategic document for the synchronization of resources in response to domestic contingencies. The history of domestic contingency operations illustrates the piecemeal effect that the

lack of a national strategy has upon the application of resources. Recent national security strategies only indirectly identify the nation's goals, interests, and objectives for domestic contingency operations. Unlike counterdrug operations, there is not a yearly published national strategy that synchronizes the nation's instruments of power to meet the threats to domestic tranquility. The sole national contingency plan that currently addresses strategic guidance is the Federal Plan. The strategy excludes the remaining taxonomy for domestic contingency operations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates the Federal Response Plan and oversees federal disaster relief efforts.[5] However, FEMA is only tasked to coordinate one, albeit significant, mission of the overall taxonomy for domestic contingency operations.

FEMA is the lead federal agency for the synchronization federal disaster relief efforts. It has recently been soundly criticized in its overly bureaucratic and often slow responses to major natural disasters.[6] FEMA recently updated the Federal Response Plan in 1992 yet failed to clearly define the strategic goals, interests, and objectives critical to achieving a strategic end state for disasters. FEMA and the Federal Response Plan only have the authority to

respond to presidentially-declared national disasters. This requires states and local municipalities to develop often disjointed local strategies that compete for critical resources. FEMA has directed all supporting agencies to develop contingency plans and disaster response capabilities in support of the Federal Response Plan yet the guidance only applies to presidentially-declared national emergencies. DOD coordinates its roles in disaster relief efforts through the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) as the DOD action agent for the execution of domestic contingency operations.[7] The DOMS attempts to synchronize the application of military resources in coordination with the Federal Response Plan. However, due to a lack of a comprehensive national strategy for domestic contingency operations, DOMS must continually plan DOD support within a strategic vacuum. The Federal Response Plan does not provide the necessary unifying strategic guidance for the employment of federal resources to meet the demanding requirements of domestic disaster relief operations.

Strategic Paradigm Conclusions

The lack of a strategic concept for the implementation of national policy hinders the

application of the instruments of power to implement policy decisions. The author uses strategic guidance as the strategic parallel to evaluate the effectiveness of domestic counterdrug and contingency operations. Domestic counterdrug operations have a comprehensive national strategy to provide the required strategic guidance necessary to synchronize the Army's efforts in the "war on drugs." The National Drug Control Strategy and the Army Drug Control Plan provide effective strategic guidance for the Army's counterdrug efforts, specifying strategic goals, interests, and objectives. The strategies clearly define the end state for national counterdrug operations: a reduction in the illegal drug use. Domestic contingency operations does not have cohesive strategic documents to provide strategic guidance and synchronize joint and interagency efforts in response to national emergencies. The only strategic disaster relief plan excludes a large portion of the taxonomy for domestic contingency operations. The lack of a comprehensive national strategy for domestic contingency operations severely degrades the synergistic effects of a cohesive application of military resources in response to a domestic crisis.

Operational Paradigms

Domestic contingency operations do not apply the principals of operational art to achieve strategic objectives. The application of operational art through campaign plans translates strategic goals, interests, and objectives into operational and tactical actions and is essential to the success of domestic military operations.[8] Military planners must develop domestic campaigns to achieve these strategic objectives within the domestic environment. Domestic campaign plans must synchronize the use of military resources in a phased series of unified or joint actions to achieve strategic end states. Proposed counterdrug campaign plans effectively employ the operational art to synchronize operational concepts with strategic goals, interests, and objectives. The two most relevant parallels among the operational concepts include operational objectives and organizational structure. These parallels exist within current or proposed domestic counterdrug operations and do not exist for domestic contingency operations. Domestic contingency operations do not effectively apply operational concepts to synchronize the total interagency commitment to federal emergencies.

Operational Objectives

An effective domestic campaign plan synchronizes the employment of forces and resources to achieve operational objectives. Domestic campaign plans must coordinate the joint application of military resources within the domestic environment as well as coordinate the operations, logistics, and sequencing to implement the national strategy.[9] The campaign plan translates operational art into operational objectives and tactical actions to synchronize forces and agencies tasked to support domestic missions. These operational objectives support the national strategy and ensure unity of effort within the joint and interagency domestic environment. Counterdrug campaign plans effectively link operational objectives to strategic policy. Domestic contingency plans do not even identify operational objectives for domestic contingency operations. Operational objectives are imperative to the synchronization of Army military operations with joint and interagency efforts.

Counterdrug Operational Objectives

Counterdrug campaign plans effectively translate the strategic guidance of the National Drug Control Strategy into operational and tactical objectives. Although there is not a comprehensive counterdrug

campaign plan to address domestic operations, several sources are coming forward to fill this void. Foremost among them are the U.S. Army War College and the National Interagency Counterdrug Institute (NICI). The NICI serves as the DOD clearinghouse for information on counterdrug-related training, conferences, and seminars.[10] NICI and War College documents provide templates for operational campaign planning in the "war on drugs" and translate strategic goals, interests, and long-range objectives into operational objectives. These documents establish unity of effort for joint and interagency operations and define the operational objectives for each agency tasked to support counterdrug missions. These operational objectives are quantifiable Army, joint, or interagency actions which contribute to achieving the overall strategic end states. Domestic counterdrug operational objectives effectively translate strategic principals to operational actions.

Domestic Contingency Operational Objectives

Domestic contingency plans and documents do not adequately define strategic end states and thus do not link operational objectives with specific strategies. This observation is true for most of the taxonomy for

domestic contingency operations with the noted exception of the Federal Natural Disaster Relief Plan. This plan defines an interagency approach to achieving the strategic end state of a quick return to a pre-disaster environment. However, the plan does not provide specific operational objectives and does not phase resources into the affected locations. Other domestic contingency operations, such as civil disturbances and wildfire fighting, also lack specific operational objectives to translate strategic end states to quantifiable operational actions. The lack of specific operational objectives for the taxonomy of domestic contingency operations will continue to restrict interagency cooperation, hamper the joint and interagency synchronization of resources, and delay the response of federal assets following a national emergency.

Operational Organizational Structure

The lack of a clear operational headquarters for domestic contingency operations degrades the effectiveness of the Army's response to domestic contingency missions. Army leaders should apply the joint and interagency lessons learned by Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) in the planning and execution of

counterdrug operations to domestic contingency operations. Numerous after-action reports and studies indicate that the current organizational structures for domestic contingency operations do not enable commanders to quickly respond to a domestic emergency.[11] Domestic contingency operations, like counterdrug operations, require joint and interagency organizational structures and methodologies, to ensure unity of effort in the domestic environment. Joint organizational structures and methodologies are critical to a rapid and synchronized response to domestic emergencies and often define the measure of military success during a domestic crisis. The lack of these organizational structures and procedures will continue to restrict the Army's abilities to meet the needs of the affected populace and to therefore achieve success.

Organizational Structures for Counterdrug Operations

The current organizational structures for counterdrug operations enable Army leaders to effectively synchronize the Army's role in support of national and Department of Defense (DOD) drug control strategies. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) synchronizes the actions of over fifty federal agencies and departments to ensure a unity of effort in

the "war on drugs." This operational role within the DOD is focused by supporting missions of unified commands and their respective joint task forces (JTFs). Foremost among these unified commands for domestic military operations is Forces Command (FORSCOM) and JTF-6. FORSCOM coordinates all DOD operational support to domestic counterdrug missions as well as coordinates and directs the deployment of DOD forces within the U.S. to support domestic contingency operations.[12] Numerous after-action reports and studies document the successes of the standing joint task forces (JTF-4, JTF-5, and JTF-6) in the military's efforts in support of the "war on drugs."[13] Joint task forces synchronize the application of joint resources and provide the necessary command and control mechanisms to effectively direct domestic counterdrug efforts. Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) provides an ideal model for the effective employment of Army resources to domestic military operations. Joint organizational structures and methodologies are critical for the effective synchronization of DOD resources in support of domestic military operations.

Organizational Structures for Domestic Contingency Operations

Domestic contingency operations require joint organizational structures and methodologies in order to effectively respond to domestic emergencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) and Army unfortunately do not duplicate the joint approach for counterdrug efforts to meet domestic contingency requirements. Lessons learned during the joint application of military resources to Hurricane's Andrew and Iniki should cause DOD to re-evaluate this approach for future domestic contingency operations. Commanders and planners faced with the challenges of conducting domestic contingency operations find few joint structures and methodologies to support their contingency planning efforts. Little documentation of domestic campaign planning exists at the operational levels. DOD relies upon directives and service regulations to guide the application of military resources to domestic contingency operations.[14] These directives do little to synchronize the joint application of military resource in a rapid, responsive and adaptable manner. The current organizational structures detract from the Army's responsiveness to domestic emergencies and do not contribute to the successful accomplishment of domestic missions.

The current routing of all requests for military support during domestic emergencies through the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) lacks the benefits of a joint regional focus and often results in a delayed military response for requested support. The DOMS must apply crisis action planning principals for joint operations in order to effectively respond to domestic emergencies and meet the desired end state for interagency domestic operations. Department of Defense should consider the benefits of forming a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) to plan and coordinate domestic contingency efforts. Such a task force would provide the same benefits as the joint approach to domestic counterdrug operations, ensure unity of effort, and probably hasten the arrival of much needed personnel, equipment, and supplies to a stricken area.

Operational Paradigm Conclusions

The skillful application of operational concepts is critical to the success of domestic military operations. Domestic counterdrug operations apply these concepts to define operational objectives and provide joint and interagency organizational structures to ensure unity of effort in achieving these objectives. Although domestic contingency operations employ the same

resources and are bound by the same concepts, current applications fail to effectively employ the doctrinal concept of operational objectives and do not routinely employ joint and interagency organizational structures. The misapplication of operational concepts degrades the effectiveness of the Army's responses to domestic contingency operations. Commanders are often forces to relearn costly lessons after each mission. By not focusing on the key tenets of operational art as they apply to domestic contingency operations, the Army continues to provide only partial solutions to a much larger domestic interagency crisis and squanders costly resources in its efforts. The Army should apply the same operational concepts and procedures which have contributed to the success of the military's participation in the domestic "war on drugs." These concepts will resolve many of the same problems which challenge current domestic contingency operations.

The Tactical Paradigm

The tactical level of war that holds the greatest number of parallels between counterdrug operations and domestic contingency operations. Although tasked to perform often dissimilar missions in support of domestic operations, units have found similar

lessons learned concerning the tactical application of military forces to counter a domestic threat. These most relevant of these lessons are the two parallels of tactical execution and logistics. Tactical execution examines interoperability and command and control issues necessary to conduct domestic military operations. It also provides a discussion of the implications of such missions on combat readiness. Logistics examines the application of the characteristics of logistics (formerly classified by doctrine as sustainment imperatives) to sustain domestic military operations. Lessons learned within these tactical battlefield functions equally apply to counterdrug and domestic contingency operations and expand the context for discovery for domestic contingency operations.

Tactical Execution

Success in the tactical execution of domestic military operations is dependent upon the resolution of interoperability problems. The level of interoperability between diverse agencies directly relates to success in the domestic environment. This observation is true for both counterdrug and domestic contingency operations. Information management,

automated data management and intelligence systems focus upon streamlining the interagency exchange of information and coordination. Interoperability efforts enable managers and commanders to standardize command relationships, requesting channels, and reporting criteria. They also enable agency leaders, planners, and military leader to focus their agencies' resources at the decisive place and time. Interoperability actions are therefore cost effective. Common observations concerning training for domestic military operations indicate that well-trained and disciplined units can perform any tasked mission to standard, regardless of the environment or parameters of mission accomplishment. Commanders should focus their planning, coordination, and training efforts to improve interoperability while integrating mission essential task list (METL) training with the domestic mission demands to best sustain combat readiness.

Tactical Execution of Counterdrug Operations

The primary considerations for the tactical execution of missions in support of the "war on drugs" are command relationships and interoperability considerations. The command and control relationship dictates the limits of the supporting military

commander's authority over employed military forces and details the relationship to the supported law enforcement agency or official. The required complex and multi-branched command relationships provide a sound argument for an effective and interoperable communications systems. Since the terminology is often markedly different between the military and the supported civilian agency, interoperable communications systems, to include liaison responsibilities, become absolutely essential to effective command and control. Thus much of the funding for counterdrug operations is applied towards providing interoperable communications systems and equipment to ensure that effective command and control relationship. These critical considerations of command relationships and interoperability issues frequently determine the success of the interagency counterdrug effort.

Command relationships are critical to the effective planning and execution of domestic counterdrug operations. Military commanders often find themselves answering the mission taskings of the senior law enforcement officer while supporting domestic counterdrug operations. Operations plans and orders normally direct the military to retain the operational chain of command within the tasked service. Army units

are often tasked to support counterdrug operations as part of a larger Joint Task Force (JTF), requiring the use of additional joint command and control procedures. Forced to often deploy as platoon-sized units or smaller, Army small unit leaders are challenged to coordinate a myriad of issues with civilian agencies or joint headquarters. The controlling headquarters, joint or civilian, often have little knowledge with the capabilities and limitations of the units tasked and not used to operating with military units. This creates enormous problems for the effective command and control of domestic counterdrug operations and forms the bulk of most of the negative comments found on after-action reports. Established liaison channels and effective interoperable communications systems are therefore critical to mission accomplishment.

Tactical Execution of Domestic Contingency Operations

Many of the same problems that within the battlefield function of command and control that exist for counterdrug operations at the tactical level, equally exist for domestic contingency operations. After-action reports attest to the problems in defining the military and civilian operational and logistical command relationships. They also attest to problems in

interoperability of communications systems. However, domestic contingency operations are additionally plagued with unique problems in command relationships primarily due to the diversity of missions with the domestic contingency arena.

Although several agreements exists among various agencies within the domestic contingency arena, little is codified at a central location or with one specific federal agency. This is partially due to confusing command relationships between supporting agencies. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) often finds itself coordinating with several military headquarters, to include Forces Command (FORSCOM) and a specific Continental United States Army (CONUSA) or Army CORPS headquarters, depending upon the location of the disaster.[15] Other military agencies, with different operational chains of command and logistical support relationships deal with responses to civil disturbances and wildfires. Unity of command is further muddled with the integration of National Guard forces as a state militia under the provisions of Title 32 of the United States Code. The conflicting approach to operational organizational structure and chains of command degrades the responsiveness of military assistance. Unity of command is essential to responsive military contingency

operations and, unfortunately, responsiveness is frequently the most vital operational requirement to the overall success of the mission.

Logistics

The logistical challenges to sustain domestic counterdrug or contingency operations require the application of sound logistics principals. These principals, doctrinally termed logistical characteristics, require commanders and logisticians to adapt logistics doctrine in order to sustain joint and interagency task forces. The demands of interoperability require detailed pre-deployment coordination of all logistics efforts. Equipment, supplies, and logistics procedures often vary from agency to agency as well as within the joint military environment. Although joint logistics principals provide guidance for the application of military resources to the interagency environment, commanders and logisticians are also guided by the five doctrinal considerations of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness and versatility, and improvisation to effectively sustain forces deployed to support domestic military operations. The sound and innovative application of these logistics

characteristics enables commanders to ensure the uninterrupted support of domestic counterdrug and contingency operations.

Logistical Support of Counterdrug Operations

Domestic counterdrug operations employs an extremely effective logistics coordination system to ensure the supportability of tasked missions. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) directly, or through Forces Command (FORSCOM), tasks Army units to provide logistics support to planned or on-going counterdrug efforts on a regional basis. This support can include lending military equipment to law enforcement agencies and providing sustainment for joint or interagency forces operating in the field. DOD Regional Logistics Support Officers (RSLOs), co-located at four key geographic sites with their corresponding civilian counterparts, spearhead this logistics coordination effort for counterdrug operations.[16] RSLOs, FORSCOM, the standing Joint Task Forces (JTFs), the CONUSAs, and regional National Guard or Reserve units, all ensure the sustainment of forces tasked to support counterdrug efforts. Key to this total sustainment effort is the application of the doctrinal logistical considerations to the joint and interagency environment.

Forces Command and Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) have developed an effective and responsive logistics coordination system to alleviate many of the problems normally associated with joint or interagency logistics. Counterdrug operations often require battalion-sized and smaller units to deploy to remote locations with few doctrinal support elements or systems available to provide habitual logistics support. Much of the required supplies and services will have to be contracted for from local agencies. Logistics support for counterdrug operations is not "train as you fight" in application. It requires commanders and logisticians to anticipate logistical requirements through extensive pre-deployment coordination and by establishing separate funding to sustain the operation. Commanders must integrate their logistics systems with other supporting agencies, often with dissimilar equipment and procedures. Continuity of logistics is critical to sustain the often high optempo required during counterdrug operations. Supporting units must be responsive and versatile to adapt to changing procedures, conditions and environments. Interoperability considerations require improvisation until established procedures are in place through formal agreements or doctrine. Although FORSCOM and JTF-6 have

developed an effective and responsive logistics coordination system to prepare units for deployment and to sustain them while deployed, Commanders must coordinate relevant logistical considerations prior to deployment and continually update logistics procedures as the situation requires.

Logistics Support of Domestic Contingency Operations

Domestic contingency operations employ a similar logistical support concept as counterdrug operations, albeit less comprehensive due to the diversity of the missions. FORSCOM sustains forces employed in support of domestic contingency operations through the actions of CONUSAs, JTFs, CORPS, or other geographically nearby Army headquarters. Often the closest units are those of in the U.S. Army Reserve yet current mobilization directives restricts their participation except on a volunteer basis. FORSCOM provides funding on a reimbursable basis for supplies and equipment used in the course of the operation. These systems, much like those employed in support of counterdrug operations, provide an efficient and effective method of sustaining Army forces deployed to support domestic contingency operations.

Few peacetime military operations can task the logistics system of the Army as a natural disaster.

Domestic contingency operations provide ideal case studies for examining the viability of the Army's logistics systems for peacetime and post-conflict environments. The lessons learned from Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki testify to the problems, particularly at the joint level, in supporting domestic contingencies on such a large scale.[17] Domestic contingency operations, like counterdrug operations, require commanders and logisticians to anticipate joint and interagency considerations and to integrate logistics requirements through coordination and liaison. Domestic contingencies such as large-scale disasters will require continuous and responsive logistics support to effectively meet the emergent norms of the affected populace.[18] As in other interagency operations, domestic contingency operations will require versatile commanders, confident to improvise when necessary in order to accomplish the tasked missions. Unlike counterdrug operations, the logistical success of domestic contingency operations is defined by the degree with which the military forces or resources meets the required needs of the affected populace. The emergent norms of popular opinion will ultimately determine the perceived success of the entire domestic contingency operation. The requirements to meet these

emergent norms during a large-scale natural disaster such as Hurricane Andrew, pose unique challenges for commanders and logistical planners.

Tactical Paradigm Conclusions

The parallels between domestic counterdrug operations and domestic contingency operations at the tactical level of military operations are greater than for any other part of the paradigm. Hundreds of documented after-action reports raise many of the same tactical issues for both types of domestic military operations. Many of the after-action reports provide identical observations concerning the importance of interoperability and command and control in the tactical execution of tasked domestic missions. The efforts of JTF-6 and Operation Alliance greatly increase interoperability and assist command and control efforts. JTF-6 provides an effective model for the application of interoperability considerations to domestic contingency considerations.

JTF-6 also provides an effective paradigm for the application of joint and interagency logistical considerations to domestic contingency operations. Both counterdrug and domestic contingency operations require commanders and logisticians to skillfully apply the

doctrinal logistical considerations of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness and versatility, and improvisation. However, the scale of logistics required to support large-scale disasters will task even the most robust military peacetime logistics system. Lessons learned from large-scale disasters, such as Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, provide a good model for post-conflict logistics requirements, where military forces would be required to also meet the emergent norms of the affected populace.

Summary

This chapter has provided a model for the context of discovery for domestic contingency operations by using counterdrug operations as the paradigm for comparison. Keeping in mind the assumption that domestic counterdrug efforts have been relatively effective in meeting the domestic threats to national security, then domestic counterdrug operations provides an effective paradigm with which to evaluate domestic contingency operations. The paradigm applies at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations. The paradigm focuses on five parallels across the levels of military operations: strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational

structure, tactical execution, and logistics. These parallels provide a thorough examination of the paradigm across the spectrum of peacetime engagement.

The strategic paradigm illustrated the effectiveness of current national counterdrug efforts on identifying the strategic goals, interests, and objectives to combat the domestic national security threat posed by illegal drugs. This strategic guidance is lacking for domestic contingency operations with the exception of disaster relief. The annual National Drug Control Strategy and the Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) focuses our nations resources on the domestic counterdrug efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) performs this corresponding role through the recent publication of the Federal Natural Disaster Relief Plan, but it lacks strategic goals, interests, and objectives and excludes the remaining taxonomy for domestic contingency operations. Domestic contingency operations requires strategic guidance to synchronize the application of joint and interagency resources in order to achieve success on the domestic battlefield

The operational paradigm again testified to the effectiveness of the application of operational art to counterdrug efforts. Domestic contingency operations do

not effectively apply these operational concepts throughout the taxonomy for domestic contingency operations. Counterdrug operations campaign plans provide quantifiable operational objectives to focus the application of military resources in a unified, cohesive, phased campaign to defeat the threat to our domestic security. Success in the drug war is defined as reduction in the demand for illegal drugs with specific operational objectives which translate strategic guidance into operational and tactical actions. Domestic contingency operations do not adequately define operational objectives for the taxonomy. Emergent bureaucratic norms define success for domestic contingency operations and are much more difficult to quantify than a reduction in the demand for illegal drugs. Domestic contingency operations do not translate the strategic goals, interest, and objectives into operational objectives and actions. Domestic counterdrug operations therefore provides an effective paradigm for revising domestic contingency operations to link operational objectives with strategic guidance.

The Joint Task Force (JTF) structures and methodologies of domestic counterdrug operations increase interagency cooperation and would effectively

provide responsive regional military support to both counterdrug and domestic contingency operations. Counterdrug operations provide an effective paradigm for revising domestic contingency operations, using the lessons of JTF-6 as a model. Domestic contingency operations may require the establishment of a standing joint or interagency task force to better synchronize the application of resources throughout the taxonomy for operations. The operational paradigm documented the effectiveness of the joint organizational structure for counterdrug operations and provides a paradigm for revising domestic contingency operations.

The tactical paradigm provides a plethora of parallels to compare domestic counterdrug operations with domestic contingency operations. Many of the lessons learned during domestic counterdrug operations directly apply to domestic contingency operations. The most relevant parallels exist for tactical execution and logistics considerations. The routine joint and interagency methodologies of domestic counterdrug operations provides a model to develop similar tactical execution plans and procedures for domestic contingency operations. The tactical execution considerations of interoperability and command and control equally apply to both domestic counterdrug and contingency

operations. Many of the same lessons learned during such operations apply across the taxonomy for domestic military operations.

Doctrinal logistical considerations also apply across the taxonomy for domestic military operations. Domestic counterdrug and contingency operations require the detailed and innovative application of logistical considerations to sustain the joint or interagency effort. These logistical considerations include anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness and versatility, and improvisation. The experiences of JTF-6 provide examples of the effective sustainment of domestic military operations. However, large-scale disasters, such as Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, will require commanders and logisticians to test the limits of current logistics doctrine and structures to meet the critical needs of the affected populace and the emergent norms of public opinion. These operations provide an ideal model for the examination of post-conflict logistical requirements. Commanders and logistical planners must skillfully integrate these logistical considerations into joint and interagency domestic military operations.

Counterdrug operations provides an effective paradigm to evaluate domestic contingency operations.

The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations provide parallels for comparison between domestic counterdrug and contingency operations. These parallels provide the context for domestic contingency operations. Army leaders and planners should model domestic contingency operations on the more established and more effective principals applied to counterdrug operations.

Endnotes

[1] George H. W. Bush, National Drug Control Policy, (Washington: Office for National Drug Control Policy, 1993), 13.

[2] National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, "Interagency Counterdrug Manager's Course Resource Guide, Second Edition", January 1993, 4-2.

[3] Ibid; 4-10 and 4-11.

[4] Ibid; D-2.

[5] The Federal Response Plan is a cohesive national strategy published by FEMA in 1991 to synchronize the federal response to natural disasters. It is the foundation for all supporting federal agency and regional plans. The plan establishes twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) which support directed disaster relief efforts. FEMA tasks specific agencies are tasked with lead or supporting roles in the accomplishment of ESFs.

The ESFs include the following: Transportation (ESF #1), Communications (ESF #2), Public Works and Engineering (ESF #3), Firefighting (ESF #4), Information and Planning (ESF #5), Mass Care (ESF #6), Resource Support (ESF #7), Health and Medical Services (ESF #8), Urban Search and Rescue (ESF #9), Hazardous Materials (ESF #10), Food (ESF #11), and Energy (ESF #12). The Federal Response Plan tasks DOD with the lead agency responsibilities in Urban Search and Rescue (ESF #9). The Army is the DOD executive agent for Urban Search and Rescue.

Thomas G. Harrison, "Peacetime Employment of the Military - The Army's Role in Domestic Disaster Relief," (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 1992): 20.

[6] Saundra K. Schneider "Governmental Response to Disasters: The Conflict Between Bureaucratic Procedures and Emergent Norms, Public Administration Review 52, (March/April 1992): 142.

[7] Harrison, 11 - 12.

[8] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0,Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test Pub), (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992, III-7.

[9] Ibid; III-8.

[10] National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, ii.

[11] Bernard Adelsberger, "Troops were Ready and Waiting for the Word, Army Times, 7 September 1992, 17.

[12] The 1993 annual Goldwater-Nichols report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposes to consolidate joint disaster relief activities under a unifed command of Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), based in Norfolk, Virginia. Forces Command (FORSCOM) would become the Army component headquarters of LANTCOM. The impact of this change on the domestic counterdrug and contingency operations is yet to be determined as the proposal has not been accepted by the President.

[13] Joint Task Force 4 coordinates counterdrug interdiction operations in the Atlantic and Caribbean under command of LANTCOM. JTF-4 is based in Key West, Florida. Joint Task Force 5 coordinates counterdrug interdiction operations in the Pacific. It is under the command of Pacific Command (PACOM) and is based in Alameda, California. JTF-5 is proposed to move to Fort Lewis, Washington upon the closure of Alameda Naval Air Station. Joint Task Force 6 coordinate domestic counterdrug operations within the borders of the United States. It is commanded by Forces Command (FORSCOM) and is stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas.

[14] Recent proposals by the the former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic Policy in 1992, seeks to consolidate all policy and responsibilities for domestic emergencies under the category of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). DOD Directive 3025.1-R (Draft) would establish a single point of contact within DOD to plan, respond to, and coordinate requests from civil authorities for military assistance. The draft DOD Directive would replace DOD Directives 3025.1 (Use of Military Resources During Natural Disaster Emergencies Within the United States, its Territories, and Possessions), 3025.10 (Military

Support to Civil Authorities), and 5030.45 (DOD Representation on FEMA Regional Preparedness Committees). The draft directive is being staffed within DOD. Harrison, 12-13.

[15]Forces Command (FORSCOM) applies a regional approach to synchronize military disaster relief operations. Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters are organized to support the four regional areas of responsibility. The Fourth Army was recently deactivated and its regional responsibilities transferred to First Army. Further downsizing of CONUSA headquarters will directly impact the responsiveness of current domestic disaster relief contingency plans. Harrison, 14.

[16] National Interagency Counterdrug Institute, 4-11.

[17] Gordon R. Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army 43, (January 1993): 19 - 20.

[18] Schneider, 143.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Primary Research Question

The purpose of this thesis was to answer the primary research question: Should the Army conduct domestic contingency operations? The author concludes that the answer to the primary research question is yes. The Army must continue to conduct domestic contingency operations. The realities of the domestic threats to our national security, the domestic imperative, and declining federal and military budgets require the active participation of the Army and the military to effectively respond to domestic emergencies. The Army must continue to perform the traditional missions associated with domestic military service and to support domestic contingency operations during federal emergencies. National Security Strategy will require the Army's continued, if not expanded, participation in domestic counterdrug operations. The author concludes that the three types

of domestic military operations will remain a viable mission for the Army during the next decade.

Secondary Research Questions

The secondary research questions define the taxonomy for domestic military operations and establish counterdrug operations as a paradigm for domestic contingency operations. The author recognizes this taxonomy for domestic contingency operations and defines the relationship between domestic military service and counterdrug, and contingency operations within the context of domestic military operations. Domestic Counterdrug operations provides an effective paradigm for the revision of current domestic contingency operations plans and procedures at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military operations. The parallels of strategic guidance, operational objectives, organizational structure, tactical execution, and logistics provide effective models for restructuring current doctrine and procedures for domestic contingency operations to meet the successes of domestic counterdrug operations. The Army must realize that domestic military operations will only increase in scope and frequency during the next decade and should direct its planning efforts to better

synchronize the application of joint and interagency forces to domestic contingencies. Counterdrug operations provides the appropriate and effective paradigm to guide those planning efforts.

These parallels apply to all military operations within the continuum of operations short of war. They apply to all military operations conducted during periods of peacetime engagement, whether force projection or domestic-oriented. The sound application of strategic, operational and tactical principals to the operations short of war will increase the war will increase the responsiveness of Army forces and assets to domestic and international contingencies. Responsive support for domestic contingencies directly translates to strategic and operational success. The application of appropriate military resources in accordance with established doctrinal principals enables commanders to meet the perceived needs of the affected populace and to satisfy the emergent norms during period of great distress and concern. The military is often the first and the best choice to rapidly respond to a domestic crisis. Disasters and other domestic contingencies will continue to strike when least expected and the American people will expect the military and the Army to be the first federal agency to respond.

Implications

This thesis suggests several far reaching impacts concerning the proposed role of the Army in support of domestic contingency operations. Although many of these topics are beyond the initial scope of this thesis, the author feels that they hold great significance for the debate concerning the appropriate roles and missions for the post-Cold War Army. Relevant implications to this debate include the roles and missions of a Post-Cold War Army, to include the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve; force structure considerations; the DOD role in disaster relief; and finally, domestic contingencies and their impact on unit combat readiness. The author will attempt to describe each of these implications within the context that the Army will expand its domestic role during the coming decade.

Roles and Missions of a Post-Cold War Army

The current presidential administration and congress has continually called for the application of military resources to resolve domestic problems. As a result of the domestic imperatives and declining international threats for the post-Cold War Army, the military's budget will continue to decline until another

contingency significantly threatens the national interests of the United Sates. Recent Rand studies concerning the future organizational vision for a post Cold-War Army recognize this paradox for strategic military planners and concludes that the Army will an expanded role in support of domestic missions.[1] Army leaders recognize the importance of public service while continuing to train for the uncertain wartime missions of the future.[2] These missions are not exclusive for commanders. General Sullivan recently commented that "the Army's wartime focus and robust doctrine provide a sound basis for disaster relief operations [domestic contingency operations]."[3] Domestic contingency operations provides only one important mission for the Army. The president, congress and military leaders will define the remaining spectrum of missions over the coming years. The author concludes with the hypothesis that this spectrum will include a larger role in domestic military service and counterdrug operations as well.

Roles and Missions of the Army National Guard

Domestic disaster relief has traditionally been a mission for the state militia. However, increasing numbers of active forces and federalized National Guard

units have deployed in support of recent domestic contingency operations. Debate rages among senior official concerning the correct application of state militia, and federal active and reserve forces during domestic contingencies. Recent deployments to quell riots in Los Angeles in 1991 and to support disaster relief efforts in 1992 illustrate the continued friction concerning the appropriate roles for militia and federal forces in support of domestic contingency operations.[4] Federalized militia lose their many of their legal capabilities under Title 32 of the United States Code as well as often lose rank, pay and positions.[5] It is often better to leave Army National Guard forces as a separate, yet integrated chain of command under state control as was done during the short life of JTF-Andrew. The appropriate command relationships and missions for domestic contingency operations will continue to be a major issue of concern for active and reserve component commanders tasked to support domestic missions.

The author contends that the Army National Guard must assume the role as the Department of Defense action agent for military disaster relief efforts. MG Stadler, the Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve, recognizes the tremendous capabilities of the National Guard units in

response to disasters. He recently stated, "...the Army Reserve could easily undertake [domestic contingency missions] because we have the kinds of units needed to restore order and services to civilian communities."[6] Reserve forces have the predominant number of personnel with the requisite skills, experience, and ties with local communities to quickly achieve success in support of domestic contingency operations. After-action reports from Los Angeles and Hurricane Andrew support this assertion.

Several recent reports propose an expanded domestic role for National Guard forces as domestic "nation builders."[7] These authors hypothesize that the continuing decay of the nation's infrastructure and declining federal budgets to address these problems will predispose our nation's leaders to employ military forces in support of domestic nation building missions. Recent reports from the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) echo this innovative approach to apply reserve forces to domestic issues, including rebuilding the nation's infrastructure and solving environmental problems.[8] The U.S. Army Reserve Command recognizes that there is diverse spectrum of domestic missions where reserve forces are appropriate to resolve domestic problems. These missions include "using medical units

to provide health screenings, inoculations, and other services to urban areas; operating youth/labor training centers and supporting counterterrorists operations."[9] Senator Nunn cites the recently passed Civilian-Military Cooperation Action Program as the catalyst for an increased role for the military to address critical domestic problems such as health care, nutrition, education, and infrastructure repair.[10] These developments support the innovative expansion of reserve forces into a larger spectrum of domestic military service and support an increased role of reserve forces in domestic counterdrug and contingency missions.

Roles and Missions of the U.S. Army Reserve

Congressional and military leaders propose an expanded role for reserve forces in response to domestic imperatives. Many of these missions will require the critical skills and competencies found only in U.S. Army Reserve units. Skills such as civil affairs, construction engineering, transportation, linguists, and health services directly translate to the domestic environment. This critical skills are essential for disaster response as well as domestic military service. Unfortunately, current mobilization legislation

restricts the ability for U.S. Army Reserve units to participate in domestic contingency operations except on a volunteer basis. Recent proposals to amend mobilization requirements will enable selected reserve component units to be activated by presidential directive for up to 180 days without invoking the current 200,000 personnel call-up legislation. This measure has the support of key legislators and military lobbyists but currently remains in debate. MG Sandler, the Chief of the Army Reserve recognizes these restrictions and is looking for ways to fully integrate U.S. Army Reserve units into the expanded spectrum of domestic missions.[11] The current debate on reserve mobilization will have a tremendous impact on the abilities of reserve component forces to answer the call for domestic contingencies.

Force Structure Debate

The increased involvement is the Army in domestic contingency operations will have a profound impact upon the force structure debate. Essential to this debate are the roles of the proposed force structures, both active and reserve component, to support domestic missions. Inherent in the discussion of force structure is the major issue of the

appropriate active and reserve component force structure mixture. The author contends that Army's increased participation in support of domestic contingency operations will play a large role in the congressional decision process concerning the appropriate active and reserve component force structures.

Recent debate concerning the levels of appropriate post-Cold War active and reserve component force structures centers on the roles and missions of each component. A preliminary report of a draft Rand study concerning the appropriate active and reserve component force structures and roles, alludes to reserve forces assuming a greater role in the domestic environment. Noted congressional leaders have suggested that the Total Army can increase its stature in the federal budget debates by increasing its visibility in the domestic arena. Historical examples of from the Depression Era support the theory that the Army can retain trained cadre and soldiers during periods of severe military reductions by applying Army resources and experience to resolve severe domestic problems. Perhaps the Army's role in support of domestic military operations provides the key to retaining the budgetary funding and force structures critical to sustaining combat capabilities.

Congressional debate over budgetary constraints will ultimately determine the fate of force structures and will directly impact the roles and missions of the Total Army.

Finally, an additional concern for Army leaders dealing with the difficulties of downsizing the force structure without adversely impacting capabilities is the Army's abilities to respond to domestic disasters. One good example of the impact of such decisions would be the proposed restructuring of Continental United States Army (CONUSA) headquarters, which are currently tasked to coordinate the Army's involvement in regional disaster relief plans. Recent downsizing has eliminated the Fourth United States Army and consolidated its missions under the First United States Army. Further downsizing may of CONUSA headquarters elements might adversely impact the capabilities of the Army and the Department of Defense to quickly and effectively respond to national emergencies. Army planners must be wary of the impacts of downsizing decisions on domestic missions as they guide the Army's force structure through this critical period.

The Role of the Department of Defense in Disaster Relief

Recent articles following the Army's response to the devastation of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki propose an increased role of the Department of Defense in the Federal Response Plan. The Army's success in responding to recent natural disasters have lead policy makers to suggest designating the Army as the lead federal agency in disaster relief. Much of the debate on this issue focuses on the perceived inabilities to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to effectively respond to the complexity and breadth of missions associated with large-scale disaster relief efforts. Critics of FEMA argue that the military, vic the Army, has the appropriate command structures, communications systems, manpower, and equipment to better respond to major natural disasters. This debate has led several authors to propose the transfer of federal disaster relief responsibilities to the Department of Defense (DOD) from FEMA.[12]

The proposal to move federal disaster relief responsibilities from FEMA to DOD is actually a relatively old concept. Prior to the passage of the Stafford Act, DOD was the lead federal agency for disaster relief under the provisions of civil defense. In fact, at the state level, many governors have

co-located their Offices of Emergency Relief with the State Adjutant General to synchronize planning efforts and interagency coordination. Critics propose this state model as a paradigm for FEMA. They additionally propose that Forces Command (now Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) under the proposed unified command structure) should become the lead federal agency for natural disaster and civil preparedness response. The end result of this debate could embroil the DOD into a domestic mission that could detract from its legislative responsibilities for national security.

Domestic Contingency Operations and Combat Readiness

The Army can respond to domestic contingencies without sacrificing training for combat readiness. General Sullivan has stated that well-trained, combat-focused units adapt quickly to domestic contingency operations and implies therefore that units need not train specifically to conduct domestic missions.[13] The critical skills of command and control, communications, small unit discipline, and versatility apply to both combat and domestic missions. Additionally, many of the wartime mission essential, collective, and individual skills for combat support and combat service support units can be thoroughly

exercised, trained and evaluated during the execution of domestic contingency operations. 1st COSCOM was recently able to exercise the full-range of deployment and post-conflict operations while providing support to disaster relief efforts in Florida. Innovative commanders can increase the combat readiness of their units while deployed to support domestic contingency operations by integrating battle-focused training into the conditions posed by domestic missions. Domestic contingency operations do not require concentrated training on new skills, only adaptations of skills which are already part of the unit's battle-focused training plans.

Recommendations for Further Study

The author was bound by time and breadth to limit his research into the implications of domestic contingency operations. This limitation provides several recommendations for future research. Current congressional and military debate will determine the appropriate force structure and roles of the active and reserve components of the Total Army. Based upon the outcome of this debate, potential researchers should examine the impacts which expanding the roles of reserve component forces for domestic military service has upon

current and proposed mobilization plans. An increased role for DOD in the disaster relief portends the importance of training key National Guard leaders in essential interagency coordination skills. The author argues that this role should be coordinated by a standing joint task force, staffed by a cadre of reserve officers duty at LANTCOM or FORSCOM headquarters. A final opportunity for further research concerns the impact of domestic contingency operations on combat readiness. Potential researchers should examine unit status reports of units which deployed for domestic counterdrug and contingency operations and compare the reports with the unit's status prior to deploying to examine any potential degradation of combat readiness.

Summary

Domestic military operations are traditional missions for the United States Army. Missions such as domestic counterdrug, contingency operations and general military service will increase in breadth and frequency in the next decade. The Total Army, both active and reserve components, will be increasingly challenged by the President, Congress, state governors, local officials, and the general public to accept a greater role in domestic missions. General Sullivan

summarizes the importance of domestic military operations in his article concerning the Army's actions n response to Hurricane Andrew: "The U.S. Army must remain fully prepared to carry out its critically important role in this arena. The American people demand nothing less from their Army."[14]

Endnotes

[1] John K Setear, Carl H Builder, M.D. Baccus, and Wayne Madewell, The Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, June 1990).

[2] Gordon R, Sullivan, "Vital, Capable and Engaged," Army 42 (October 1992): 32.

[3] Gordon R, Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army 43 (January 1993): 22.

[4] James D. Delk, "Military Assistance in Los Angeles," Military Review 72, (September 1992): 16.

[5] Several sources document the legal differences under Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code which restrict the capabilities of federal and state Army forces respectively in the enforcement of civil law uder the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act. Essentially, Title 10 forces are prohibited from making any arrests of conducting surveillance in the United States on American citizens. Title 32 forces, employed as state militia, are not enjoined from such activities. These difference are most apparent in response to domestic counterdrug or contingency operations, where there is a possibility of violence or criminal apprehension.

[6] Roger W. Sandler, "Positive Force in Future Plans," Officer, (February 1993): 58.

[7] Philip A. Brehm and Wilbur E. Gray, "Alternative Missions for the Army," (Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, June 1992).

[8] John O. Marsh, Jr., "American Might in New Scenario," Officer, (February 1993): 47.

[9] Sandler, 58.

[10] San Nunn, "Roles, Missions Under Scrutiny," Officer, (February 1993): 23.

[11] Sandler, 52.

[12] George C. Wilson, "Disaster Plan: Give Military the Relief Role," Army Times, 21 September 1992, 33.

[13] Gordon R, Sullivan, "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report," Army 43 (January 1993): 22.

[14] Ibid.

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