A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND
AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

HENRY M. ST-PIERRE, MAJ, USA
B.A., Virginia Military Institute, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
For the past forty years, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies on our national security had forced the U.S. to take a direct role in the defense of Europe. This commitment required the U.S. to permanently station large numbers of ground and air forces in Europe to deter against the threat of a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe. Since 1989, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has changed the security paradigm which governed our military posture since 1949. American focus has now turned inward to devote time and resources to the domestic agenda foreseen by the Clinton Administration. This turning inward has forced military planners to relook the need to station a large number of forces overseas. A major point of this look is our need to station a large number of forces in Europe. This thesis will study the feasibility of reducing our ground forces from one full up Corps to one Corps headquarters with selected CS and CSS assets intact, one division and one air assault brigade. In addition, Air Force strength would be reduced to two composite air wings. The total number of combat forces stationed in Europe would be between 70,000 and 75,000 personnel.
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Name of Candidate: Henry M. St-Pierre

Thesis Title: A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

Approved By:

[Signature]
Mr. William M. Connor, M.A.

[Signature]
LTC Kenneth W. Osmond, B.A.

[Signature]
LTC James E. Swartz, Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

[Signature]
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


For the past forty years, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies on our national security had forced the U.S. to take a direct role in the defense of Europe. This commitment required the U.S. to permanently station large numbers of ground and air forces in Europe to deter against the threat of a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The rise of the Soviet Union as a superpower and as our chief post-war rivals sparked, perhaps what has been, up to 1991, one of the greatest and most divisive military debates facing Pentagon strategists. The question was, who would be responsible for striking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in the event of war? Would it be the Air Force with its large fleet of strategic bombers and missiles or the Navy with powerful strike forces and ballistic missile submarines? This argument pitted the Navy against the Air Force in competition for limited dollars required to build the eventual winners' expensive weapon systems. An answer to this debate was found in the compromise that gave us our deterrence strategy.

Since then, events such as the promise of the complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces to its own borders by 1995, the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire have confirmed that the threat of immediate war between the two blocs has regressed ever more to unlikeliness.
These new and unprecedented events have, once again, anchored the crucible of debates within the defense establishment. At stake are the dollars that will be used to build the military structure which will safeguard our national interest into the 21st century.

Unlike the previous debate with its ultimate question of how to build up the military to face the growing Soviet threat, this debate centers on how to reduce the military structure and still meet our national security objectives and treaty commitments in a world which has no clear-cut threat against which to judge a need for a large military establishment.

Like all debates, this one has two sides. On one hand, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former Secretary of Defense argued that, in spite of all the changes that have occurred in the past three years, the remaining risks more than justify the cost incurred to maintain a large military presence overseas and a world-wide strategic deployment capability. These forces, represented by the four services on permanent or temporary overseas deployment, would serve to reassure our friends of our continued commitment to stability, to support of those friendly governments and convince our potential enemies that the U.S. is still a potent force with which to contend. These large deployments also would insure our influence overseas, thereby continuing to support our
national security needs. Further, these deployments would provide for forces close to potential trouble spots. In the event of trouble, these forward deployed forces could be moved quickly to enter nations which require our help—recent examples are Somalia and Saudi Arabia. These capabilities are seen by the Chairman as key to safeguard the nation's national security requirements in the future.

The threat as it existed before 1989, and the need to protect Western European democracies from the Eastern threat, was the basis by which the U.S. designed its force structure. It was also NATO's "raison d'être." Now the situation has changed—many say irrevocably. Western leaders and NATO strategists have admitted that the Soviet Union, and its successor state, the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), no longer poses a threat to the survival of a free and viable Western Europe.

The counterpoint team in this debate, using the logic of the reduced threat, is of the opinion that, in view of the decline of the worldwide threat and the small residual risks, we should now reduce our overseas presence by bringing home the majority, or even all, of our overseas deployed forces and deactivate them. The resources freed by the reduction in defense spending could be used to finance the domestic programs envisioned by the new administration and, of course, contribute to the reduction of the deficit.
In view of these dramatic changes, withdrawal of forward deployed U.S. forces, and reducing the size of those forces, appears to be an easy solution to reduce the financial strain facing the U.S. today. Generally, such a move probably makes sense from a fiscal point of view. It can probably be done quickly and without adverse effect on readiness. What would be the U.S. risk by such a move, however?

This lack of threat brings up the third point in the debate—the issue of U.S. involvement in NATO and European affairs. The question is: since the Alliance's role of preventing a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe has been fulfilled and its forty year mission has been complete, has NATO outlived its usefulness? Do the present domestic issues justify the withdrawal of all or part of the forward deployed force?

Directly tied with the preceding question is why, if the reason for stationing U.S. forces overseas has essentially disappeared, should the United States maintain a forward deployed corps and separate air force permanently stationed in Europe? The next question, in this case the central one for this study, is: what should a new, restructured, forward deployed force look like, and what should it be capable of doing?
Nowhere else in the world does the resolution of this debate affect our overseas commitment more than it does in our relationship with our NATO allies.

Because there is no definitive answer, the resolution to the debate lies, like most things when dealing in the political arena, in the middle ground. The discovery of that compromise is, in effect, the purpose of this study. The basis for answering the main question, a question that may well determine the U.S. force structure into the next century, is based, in part, in four general areas introduced earlier. They are: What are the national security interests of the United States for the near term vis-a-vis Europe? That is, should we let our NATO allies fend for themselves when dealing with their security needs or should we stay involved in helping them solve the risk issues which face them today and in the future—in short, what is in it for us if we do? Second, what are the risks and threats that might require the involvement of U.S. forces in Europe? Third, are NATO's traditional roles and functions still viable in view of the emerging risks? If the Alliance's present structure is inadequate to meet those tasks, might it evolve into some structure better suited to meet future needs? Finally, in view of the already announced U.S. force reductions, what would be the best U.S. contribution to an evolving Alliance? Should the U.S. continue to station forces overseas based on its own
need to project force without taking NATO into consideration, or should it tailor its force representation to a force better suited to deal with a new NATO with an evolving mission based on a new strategic concept?

Central to this study is the controversy of how much America contributes to NATO, the deployment of forces to overseas bases, the military budget debates, and the issue of closing domestic military bases while maintaining a large number of overseas bases. This study, then, may show a way in which we can maintain fewer troops overseas and still meet our mission and treaty requirements. Such a plan would have three purposes: it would demonstrate our will to remain engaged in European affairs to support our European allies; it would allow us to maintain enough of a presence in Europe to maintain our influence, thus protecting our interest in that area; and finally, we could maintain a headquarters that could support a rapid expansion should the need occur.

In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis then, is to recommend a new combat structure which will be permanently stationed in Europe. This new force is to be based on the following concerns: (1) the need to secure our national interest in Europe; (2) the risks which face NATO; (3) the future missions NATO might take up; and (4) the forces which will remain in the U.S. force structure after expected cuts.
The following chapters of this thesis will concentrate on investigating these concerns.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to survey literature and determine what the literature reveals about the questions outlined in the previous chapter. These sources include official government documents, semi-official documents, interviews, works published by subject experts, and periodical articles.

Official documents surveyed include national security documents published by the administration in 1991 and 1993, military strategy documents, and State Department dispatches.

Semi-official documents include Congressional testimony taken as evidence to support the feasibility of reducing the defense budget in light of the reduced threat against our national interests worldwide as well as those facing our NATO allies. Congressional testimony taken as part of the Senate confirmation hearings for Secretary Aspin will also be surveyed to help determine the new administration's direction on national security and defense issues. This study also will survey speeches by the new President for the same purpose.
Following semi-official documents are the written products and interviews of subject matter experts. These products include Ph.D. dissertations and monographs produced for conferences on national security issues. Sources also include personal interviews conducted to help clear up any unanswered questions. These interviews also provide updates in the field of national security and strategic force planning which could affect the outcome of this paper. All the written products from the experts helped provide background on the sensitivities involved when dealing with issues which involve our European Allies.

The last major source used to do research was newspaper and magazine articles. These articles, much like the written products discussed above, are helpful in providing background information. Because they are more recently written, they help provide a better source of information as to the specific problems of force reduction and ally concern with those potential U.S. reductions.

The first question that must be answered in developing a future force structure is what will be the national security needs of this nation in the future? That is, is it in our interest to withdraw into isolationism much the same way we withdrew after the two previous excursions into European affairs during this century or must the U.S. remain an active participant in building the "New World Order" envisioned by former President Bush?
During the height of the Cold War, the national security goals of the Reagan and Bush administrations had been to continue deterrence and containment against an overwhelming Soviet threat worldwide. This policy mandated a strong and active U.S. participation in European affairs.

The downfall of communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe (C&EE) and the break up of the Soviet Union were clear indications that new policies dealing with C&EE nations would be needed. In part President Bush’s National Security Strategy document in 1993 recognized this change when he stated that the goals for our national security strategy would be the support of growing democracies, maintaining free markets, competition with our economic partners, and prevention of and controlling military confrontation which characterize regional conflicts.¹ These goals recognized that, unlike the previous years when U.S. survival was based on the need to contain communist aggression, our new focus would be to safeguard our economy by insuring the safety of our markets and the acquisition of potential new ones in the emerging C&EE democracies.

These goals clearly indicate the need to remain engaged in European affairs. This view was the basis for the Bush administration’s recommendation of a European-based U.S. force structure of no less than 150,000 personnel.
Since January 1993, however, a new administration has taken the reins of policy formulation. It is useful to examine this new view on national security goals and strategies.

In a speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Association in April 1992, President Clinton stated that the U.S. policy should be to redesign its armed forces to meet changing needs, to encourage democracies abroad to succeed, and to "restore America's economic leadership at home and abroad."\(^2\)

President Clinton's views on the importance of the domestic economy were echoed by Secretary of Defense Aspin during his confirmation hearings when he stated, "In this new era, our first foreign priority and our first domestic priority are one and the same . . . ."\(^3\) These statements clearly indicate that the focus of the Clinton administration, like its predecessor's later goals, would focus on improving the U.S. economy. The major difference is the method to be used to achieve the goal.

Whereas the Bush administration would have focused on the ability to influence foreign markets through direct participation, the Clinton philosophy will rely less on direct participation in foreign markets and more on government influence on domestic markets. Such means will include infusion of funds on the domestic scenes and sanctions and duties on imports.

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The question, then, is how to promote the development of overseas democracies and maintain our influence over our overseas markets?

On this question, David Abshire, former Ambassador to NATO, states that the way to insure the growth of democracy is "to ensure cooperation and cohesion among the leaders of the three democratic centers." These democratic centers, he states, are the U.S., Germany, and Japan. In his opinion, the way to maintain that influence is by maintaining forward deployed forces in Europe and Asia.

Ambassador Abshire is not the only one who recommends maintaining strong troop presence in Europe. Francois Huisbourg, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, states that, even though U.S. vital interests are no longer threatened by an overwhelming and obvious threat from the East, there may be a tendency to want to disengage from direct participation in European affairs in the future. Huisbourg believes this should not occur. He outlines four specific reasons why it is in the U.S. national interest to remain engaged in European affairs. He states that the residual presence of Russian forces in Germany, our ability to quickly react to any crisis which might occur tied with our need to maintain the ability to influence western European economic affairs, and the need to maintain economic and political liberalism...
in western Europe makes it imperative that we remain engaged in Europe.  

Huisbourg also points out that the ability to react to crisis situation is not the only reason to maintain influence in Europe. The rise of the European community as one market with one voice and monetary system makes it vital that the U.S. be able to maintain some influence in the development of European affairs. He states that, should the U.S. withdraw its forces completely from the Alliance, the interest of the nation would not be well served. He cautions, however, that such a presence should be smaller and tailored for a different mission than what the force, even in a smaller form we have today, is designed to do--fight a major land war in Europe.

Alexander Gerry, Assistant Secretary General of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers, a NATO body responsible for the formulation of policy dealing with reserve officer augmentation to the NATO and SHAPE staff, states in an article of the Reserve Officers Association National Security Report that: "the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the foundation for a continuing American security role in Europe."

Johann Holst, a foreign affairs specialist with the Rand Corporation, states that not only does the U.S. need NATO to keep itself in the European arena; as long as there are risks NATO needs the U.S. to remain engaged.
The urge to remain involved in Europe through NATO is the only way to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe. Obviously, the argument for maintaining a strong military presence in NATO is neither unanimous nor should it be our only vehicle for contacting and influencing our European allies. Many suggest that greater participation in such forums already in place would give us a greater voice. One such body, for example, is the Conference for Security and Confidence in Europe (CSCE). This body was established to discuss security issues involving European specific security issues. The problem with this forum is that, unlike NATO and the UN, it is not a lawfully constituted body but only a forum for discussion. As such, it has neither formal authority nor power to enforce any of its decisions.

Clearly, all of the above sources realize the importance of a continued U.S. presence in Europe. What these cited individuals do not discuss, however, is the root issue for our need to maintain influence in Europe—stable and growing markets for our goods.

As stated in the introduction to this paper, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the subsequent transformation of the all-powerful Soviet Union into a confederation have forever changed the defense needs of western Europe. In designing a new force, the second problem planners must examine is the
Confederation of Independent States and its potential to reemerge as a threat against the Alliance. Those planners must also examine other sources of risk in the region.

The first risk to be examined is the CIS. One of the better descriptions of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union was presented by Zbigniew Brezenski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter. He described the Soviet Union as having suffered a complete collapse of not only its political system but also of its economic system. As such, it is a nation "without the slightest hope of redemption."\(^{10}\)

The question many analysts ask themselves, then, is what of the threat of the former Soviet troops remaining in Germany? What is the possibility of CIS senior military or civilian leadership stopping the tide of change? Also, what is the military potential of the force that remains between the Urals and western Russian borders?

In answer, NATO intelligence planners see no chance that the CIS or Russia will stop its planned withdrawal from German territory. As for the senior military leadership's ability to halt the changes, John Steinbrunner, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, at the Brookings Institution, testified before Congress, "For the foreseeable future, the Soviet military leadership will not be in any position to initiate deliberate aggression."\(^{11}\)
Finally, of the force remaining stationed between the Russian western border and the Urals, former Secretary of Defense Cheney stated in Congressional testimony that the remaining force will be cut from 115 divisions to 60 divisions. The reduction of these forces by almost half would make it impossible for them to launch any offensive moves against the West without mobilization of their reserves. Such reinforcements would then provide warning time for the Alliance to reinforce its own efforts.\(^1\)\(^2\) He also testified that circumstances which could lead to a surprise attack against the West have clearly changed. He explained that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, coupled with the signing of the CFE treaty has removed the option of the CIS changing their plans by stopping withdrawal of its forces from Germany and central Europe unilaterally. The CIS would now have to deal with nations, namely Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary who, at worse, would be neutral or perhaps even friendly to the West. This neutrality would make covert movement of troops westward impossible. Indeed, NATO planners no longer judge Russia or Ukraine capable of launching an "unwarned" attack on the West.\(^3\)

The second issue in terms of threats against NATO is the relationship of the Alliance and its C&EE neighbors. This relationship has been changed by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the turning inward of Russia to solve its
own problems. This withdrawal has left a vacuum in security assurances to those nations that were once covered by the Soviet umbrella and its guarantee that their security would be guaranteed. That is now gone.

Realizing that "nature abhors a vacuum," NATO heads of state and governments declared during the Rome Conference in 1991 that NATO would help provide needed stability by opening dialogue between NATO and its new security partners. This indeed happened in the spring of 1992 when the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) met in Brussels. That same Rome Conference that directed the formation of the NACC also, as stated by Gerry, "described a broad approach" which mandated the use of alternative elements of power, such as economic, social and environmental powers, to provide that security which the C&EE nations have been seeking. On the subject of security, Francois Huisbourg also states that the use of what could be called the elements of national power is what is needed to deal with risks and to prevent those risks from becoming threats as described earlier.

As already mentioned, the future risks the Alliance might face are the residual Russian military force, loss of control of nuclear weapons, insecurities at having some nations accepted into the Alliance while not accepting others, and, finally, the divergent cultural and social groups which have been under artificial control for the
past forty years and have now come to the surface. An example is the instability in the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{17}

The risks described above and the promise of stability offered by the Alliance with its Trans-Atlantic link are why the former Pact look at NATO for help.\textsuperscript{18}

To take the point further then, how will the Alliance set the minds of the CCEE nations at ease? The future European security picture, although looking better, still reflects some concerns. Treaties and the verification protocols that go with those treaties assure Western planners that the possibility of military attack on NATO territory is small. The possibility of military revolution in Russia is not, however, beyond the realm of possibility. On this subject, Sergei Rogov, Deputy Director for the Institute to the Study for the U.S. and Canada in Moscow, stated that the future of the CIS lies in three possible scenarios. The first is that the armed forces of the CIS will be under control of a central authority. This would be similar to a strong federal civilian confederation having overall power over a unified military structure. This situation would be the most preferable in terms of control of the military. He gave this scenario only a 10\% chance of success. The next scenario, and the second best vis-a-vis stability, is that the military would be under no central control, but Russia, as the number one military power in the region, would have
a leading voice in the use of military power. He compares this situation with the relationship of the U.S. and its NATO allies. He gave this plan a 30% chance of success. The last, and least desirable situation, has a 60% chance of occurring. He states that this situation would involve a total disintegration of any central authority and the total loss of control of the military.19

As time and events have shown, Rogov's pessimistic predictions that the former Soviet Union would completely disintegrate and its military would be under no control have not materialized and are not likely to.

Does the inability of the CIS to launch an unwarned attack on the West mean that NATO planners should not worry? The answer is an emphatic no. NATO must still look eastward with a wary eye because the break-up of the Soviet Union has now caused the controls it placed on its allies to disappear. The lack of controls has sparked the fragmentation of not only the Soviet Republics but also artificially created eastern European nations such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. These breakups have caused regional instability and, as in the case of Yugoslavia, violence and bloodshed. Repercussions from that war have already made themselves felt within the Alliance. These repercussions have included military incursion into neutral and Alliance nations and refugee influx into much richer western nations such as Germany and Greece.20
Ethnic and cultural differences are not the only potential causes of unrest and instability in the C&EE nations. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Stephen Biddel stated that the transformation of government controlled economies like those in Eastern Europe to market economies might also be a catalyst for civil war. This is especially true in view of these times of austere economic times.21

These dangers of instability on the Alliance's southern flanks have not been missed by NATO's military planners. Indeed, this year's REFORGER exercise calls for the deployment of a U.S. corps from the central region to the Alliance's southern flank. This clearly reflects NATO's concerns over instability from other regions.

The preceding evidence has concentrated mostly on the dangers of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. These are not the only dangers the U.S. and its allies face. There is a major concern by the Alliance's southern tier nations that a major south-to-north immigration flow will occur from the African littoral states. Indeed, this flow has already started happening in nations such as France, Germany, and Belgium. These mass migrations have, in turn, set off ultranationalist movements in those nations.22

In his confirmation statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin pointed
out that, in addition to dangers of instability, the nuclear weapons which exist in the Russian and Ukrainian arsenals are by no means secure. Another risk to the well-being of Europe and the Alliance is nuclear blackmail made possible by the loss of control of weapons of mass destruction owned by Russia and the Ukraine.²³

This portion of the survey indicates that the threat posed by the former Soviet Union has clearly and some say, forever disappeared. That disappearance has, however, given rise to new concerns—risks—which the Alliance must transform itself to meet. These new risks include instability generated by the lack of control and guarantees once provided by the Soviet Union to its allies.

The next area worthy of examination in designing a new U.S. force structure for NATO is examining what NATO might be called on to do in the future.

As already examined, the old threat against NATO, that is, a massive land based attack which NATO members built its armed forces to counter, has gone away. This has been replaced by certain risks which, if not controlled, could possibly develop into new threats.

In looking at future potential risks, the question becomes how can NATO best handle the risks described above? Before this can be answered, it is useful to examine emerging and existing European organizations interested in security issues.
The first is, of course, the United Nations. The fall of the communist regime in Russia has changed the role of the UN from a largely ineffective body for dialogue to the forum for mutual security it was meant to be. As such, the organization might be in a better position to help settle potential security problems in Europe. The second organization is the Conference on Security and Confidence in Europe (CSCE) and the role it can play in solving regional security risks. The third is the Economic Community (EC). All of these bodies, some legally constituted and others, like the CSCE, are bodies set up to discuss security issues in Europe.

The help these emerging groups could provide has also been noticed and commented on by former Secretary of State James Baker when, in November 1991, he inferred that only a network of European security institutions, of which NATO was but one, would be capable of supporting a Europe "whole and free." The EC and the CSCE would also have important roles to play in integrating the East into the community of nations.24

This statement clearly indicated that the U.S. would look at other organizations to help gain and maintain stability in Europe. In light of the above suggestions and trends, what would be the best use of the military power under NATO's control?
The answer could lie in three specific areas: crisis management and liaison, peacekeeping, and its traditional mission of deterring attack on its members.

In his confirmation hearings, Secretary of Defense Aspin stated, "Our overall strategy should not to be to go at it alone but to strive to get new burden sharing agreements with our allies." 25

This indicates a willingness on the part of the new administration to let NATO, under its own authority or with cooperation from the CSCE, if it so chooses, to accomplish these crisis management missions. These are missions for which, unlike the UN, CSCE, and the EC, the military infrastructure needed to accomplish such a task is present and functioning under one body. Indeed, this example is not without precedent in recent history. The food airlift to Russia during the winter of 1991 was managed by NATO even though the Alliance was not the proponent agency. The alliance provided the in-country expertise and much of the infrastructure to support the operation, but it was not in charge.

Crisis management is not the only viable mission for NATO. The troops assigned to NATO could, with their individual nation's support, be involved in peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation, search and rescue, civil unrest, strikes and raids, support of national authorities who
request NATO's help, and show of force and demonstrations.  

Should crisis management fail, then the next step, the use of force, could be used. This mission, again under the overall responsibility of the UN or CSCE, could be given to NATO to handle as the executive agent. Again, why NATO? According to Ambassador James Goodly, former negotiator on CFE and START and Ambassador to Finland, because NATO is the only organization in existence which has the military force and infrastructure capable of carrying out the various missions from peacekeeping to war.

Four types of peacekeeping missions the Alliance could be trained to accomplish are:

1. Humanitarian missions. These missions would include organizing and shipping foodstuff and medicines under hazardous condition.

2. Observers in situations that contain some risks or conflict

3. Border patrols or patrols of buffer and demilitarized zones

4. Protection of enclaves of ethnic minorities from harm in the event of hostilities

Again none of these missions are without precedent for NATO forces. As already discussed, NATO infrastructure provided support to the Russian food relief missions during the winter of 1991-1992. Presently, the Standing Naval
Force Mediterranean, under UN request, is patrolling off the Yugoslavian coast to enforce the UN sanctions against the region.

The problem with the above stated new missions and priorities is simply that NATO is neither organized nor are its troops generally trained for such missions. Indeed, Ambassador Goodly and others emphasize that if NATO is to survive and develop beyond its present structure, it must "metamorphose" into an organization that will provide genuine collective security throughout Europe. To do this, he urges that NATO should give priority to training troops for such peacekeeping missions as quickly as possible.

There can be little doubt that much of the literature available on the subject of NATO's future strongly supports the idea that the Alliance develop the force for these future missions. What it does not emphasize is the Alliance's continuing deterrence role and its role as a forum for discussion of mutual security concerns between the West and C&EE nations. Finally, what this literature also does not discuss is how NATO must organize itself to perform those missions.

The fourth question that must be examined in order to develop a military force for future NATO missions is the
U.S. domestic political environment and its effect on the future U.S. force structure as a whole.

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev began unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, political leaders and think tank specialists have advocated that the Alliance in general and the U.S. in particular should show support of these initiatives by reducing equal amounts of forces from the Alliance arsenals. Given these feelings, coupled with new treaties, reduced tensions, and a growing domestic agenda, we must look forward to reduced spending on defense.

Since early 1991, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have been looking at ways to reduce defense spending in view of the new posture in Europe. In an opening statement before the House Budget Committee, Committee Chairman Leon Penetta stated that the spending plan agreed to by the Bush Administration would not achieve the promised reduction in spending promised by both the Executive and Legislative branches during the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. He stated that, in order to achieve the goals set by the budget agreement, military spending would have to be cut by a total of 40 billion dollars annually. Chairman Penetta, in that same hearing, also set the stage for further defense spending reduction when he stated, "We cannot afford to waste our
resources on defense spending against threats that no longer exist."

In the October 1992 edition of the Reserve Association Journal National Security Report, President Clinton stated that it was his goal to reduce the defense budget by 60 billion dollars from the proposed Bush budget by 1994. He also stated that in the future, the U.S. would have to fight as part of coalition and to do that "We must also be able to fight effectively on our own," thus necessitating basing a larger part of our forces in the U.S. This belief was confirmed when he, on 27 March 1993, in a joint press conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, stated that his goal was to have a force level of 100,000 troops in Europe. In fact—not only will the administration's policy force a return of forces from Europe, it but may well cause the floors agreed to by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 to become ceilings. This would reduce the defense budget even more. This expected change and the new administration's attitude on basing more forces in the continental U.S. will obviously cause a reduction of force deployment in Europe.

In view of these inevitable reductions beyond those already in effect—that is reducing the deployed forces from 350,000 to the present number of 150,000, what should the size of the forces overseas be? To do that, we need to
examine what JCS Chairman Colin Powell suggests the total future force should look like.

The force envisioned by General Powell is called the "Base Force." This force is to have four major goals. First, it must be able to deter aggression mounted both against U.S. interests and those of our allies with whom we have treaty obligations. This study will concentrate on the deterrence affect U.S. forces would have for our NATO allies. Second, the force must be able to project forward presence. Third, it must be able to respond to world-wide crisis—again, for this purpose, in Europe. Lastly it must be a strategic force—that is, it must be able to deploy worldwide. To do these various missions, the force is to be divided into four regions of concentration. They are to be: Atlantic forces, which would include Europe; Pacific forces; Contingency forces, which would be stationed in the United States ready for world-wide deployment; and finally, strategic forces, under whose responsibility would fall maintenance of the nuclear force.

Concentrating specifically on Europe, what would those forces, that is, the Atlantic forces, be able to do? First, according to General Powell, those forces should be able to deter aggression in that area and provide initial combat forces if deterrence fails. He suggests that assurance against threats in Europe is present because of the military commitment represented by the large force
still present in Europe. Ambassador David Abshire agrees with him. The Powell/Abshire solution to the question of deterrence in Europe, that is the placing of troops in Europe in large numbers, is not agreed to by everyone. A counter argument to Abshire's thesis is that deterrence is not necessarily enforced by a large amount of stationed forces but by the idea that the commitment to return in the event of problems is there and believed.

In his testimony to Congress, John Steinbrunner states that, if the mission of the military forces is to wait for a major invasion mounted by some unforeseen threat, that force need only be small. Others, such as Stephen Flanagan, former Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Formulation at the State Department, insist that the solution to peace in Europe are smaller, less visible military forces. He emphasizes that large forces are identified more with the old status quo than the new realities. He states that large forces represent destabilization because they lead to quick reaction which, although good for wartime, is dangerous for crisis management situations in which "cool heads" and time to defuse the potentially dangerous situation must be the primary considerations. In their article mentioned earlier, Patrick Garrity and Sharon Weiner specifically state that deterrence is not dependent on the presence of large military forces being present in a particular theater.
to be effective. The threat or certain knowledge that the
force would be used to support a policy is just as
effective as having a force present in theater.\textsuperscript{40} A
precedent for such a thought is present in recent history.
The entire theory behind U.S. nuclear deterrence is based
on the idea that if a hostile force fires a nuclear weapon
against the U.S. or its allies, the U.S. would respond in
kind.

The fact that the U.S. made it policy that we would
respond to an attack in kind is deterrence against the use
of nuclear weapons since the capability to use the force is
there. The same can be said for our own use of such
weapons against North Korea in the Korean War. The thought
that Russia would retaliate against us if we used them
certainly played a part in the U.S. decision not to use
those weapons during that conflict. This, in effect, was
deterrence. Such stated deterrence has also been used to
prevent the perceived threat of Chinese intervention into
the Indo-Chinese theater in 1954.\textsuperscript{41} Whether or not the
threat actually prevented Chinese intervention can only be
surmised. The point is that the threat of American
reaction was present--again we had the capability to employ
those weapons, something the Chinese could not discount.
The same situation can be said about Europe or anywhere
else the U.S. has commitments. As long as we back our
promises with the possibility of action, then we have deterrence.

The second point General Powell discusses as a mission for the forward deployed base force is forward presence. For the past forty years, we have equated forward presence with basing a large permanently stationed overseas force and the maintenance of a large number of war stocks (POMCUS) in Europe. Again, Garrity and Weidner disagree with this definition of forward presence. They state that forward presence can be achieved by offsetting a smaller permanent representation forward with greater temporary participation in military exercises in which the U.S. would provide more troops for exercises, invest in foreign military infrastructure programs as is done in NATO, provide military assistance, and participate in disaster relief and other forms of humanitarian efforts. None of these are strange missions. The U.S. has participated in all of the above in one form or the other.

If, indeed, there is no chance of a massive Russian attack or any serious threat against U.S. or NATO interest, then should the U.S. maintain any force in Europe, and if so what should it be able to do? As a partial answer and suggestion, Johann Holst suggests that the future mission of the U.S. military in Europe should be to participate
within the NATO framework to work to do the following missions:

1. Provide a cadre for reconstitution of a substantial presence in the event of hostile attack
2. Provide enough capacity for US forces to be undeniably engaged in combat in the event of attack
3. Protect the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe

For these missions, he estimates that a force of only 75 to 100,000 would be needed.\(^\text{43}\)

This chapter has demonstrated that our national interest vis-à-vis Europe clearly lies in our ability to influence events on the continent. The continued development and emerging power of the Economic Community makes it critical that we maintain some form of visible presence in Europe—a presence that participation in the CSCE or the UN cannot provide us.

This chapter has also showed that the threat for which we built our defense structure, that is to contain a no notice attack by Soviet Union and Soviet supported Central and Eastern European nations, is no longer credible and has gone away. This threat has, instead, been replaced by risks. The risks include possibilities of civil war, ethnic unrest and ultra-nationalism—all problems that, if left unchecked, could spillover into otherwise unaffected areas of Europe. Such a spillover could then cause the deployment of NATO forces—forces unsuited for missions
which might be "wired"—that is peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, and crisis management.

This chapter also has shown how U.S. internal politics have mandated the restructuring of forces to be more in line with the changing economic realities, as well as how European politics have made it mandatory that the U.S. maintain a presence in Europe, albeit in a presence changed from its traditional role as a major supplier of combat troops to a presence which is ready to provide help as it is needed to cope with any problems which may occur.

Finally, this chapter has demonstrated how the four supporting questions should go into making up a new force structure for the United States for participation within the NATO alliance. The questions are: what are our national security needs; what is the changing threat that faces NATO; and what are the possible future missions for the U.S. military within NATO and the domestic politics which will provide that force?
CHAPTER 3
REFERENCES METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to map out the methodology of how the primary and secondary questions will be answered. The assumptions, definitions, limitations and delimitations to be used will be established. In addition, the criteria for selecting a new force structure will be introduced.

This type of study does not lend itself to a quantitative method of research. It does, however, allow for a qualitative model with a subjective analysis of the material included in the literature and interviews.

Initial research has yielded the following assumptions:

(1) The withdrawal of CIS forces from Germany will not be interrupted and will be completed as foreseen by 1995.

(2) The present democratization of Eastern and Central European countries will continue unabated.

(3) Central and Eastern European nations will continue rapprochement with the West.
(4) The presently established Unified Command Plan will not change.

The above mentioned assumptions are based on fact and current trends. Initial research has discovered no information that contradicts those assumptions or indicates a change in the near future.

Research has also provided some useful definitions. They are as follows:¹

(1) Forward Deployed forces: Forces deployed outside their national boundaries to participate in peacekeeping, or alliance commitments.

(2) Forward Presence: The influence one nation has on another and the national power the former is willing to use to maintain that influence.

(3) Collective Defense: The joining by several nations in a formal or informal agreement to provide for defense of both nations should those nations come under direct attack (NATO).

(4) Collective Security: The joining of several nations in a formal or informal agreement to provide a forum to discuss mutual security issues and needs. The forum may or may not have an executive agent for discussion and conflict resolution (UN or CSCE).

(5) European Pillar: Informal reference made to a separate European based military structure, which as a
body, might provide defense or security apparatus a uniquely European military structure.

(6) Central and Eastern European Nations (C&EE): The nations include all former Warsaw Pact nations plus all republics which made up the former Soviet Union. Because this project deals with such a dynamic subject, certain delimitations have been placed on the research. Those limitations deal with the time frame from which information will be drawn. Because this thesis deals with U.S. involvement with NATO after the significant changes of late 1989, research will be limited to post-February 1989. If there are any exceptions to this limitation, it will be stated.

The first portion of this chapter covered the definitions, delimitations and limitations to be used to define the scope of research and writing. The following portion will discuss the methodology to be used to evaluate the recommended force and command structure which should be placed in Europe.

Methodology

Whatever the force and command structure selected, they must be able to meet four criteria. First, the force and command structure must support the national security goals and national interests of this nation. Second, the force must be tailored to meet the threat foreseen by both
U.S. and allied planners. Since the U.S. has articulated its support for a European defense identity within NATO, the U.S.'s force structure must be able to support the Alliance's new roles and missions. The U.S. European deployed force, then, should bolster NATO's capabilities to operate independently of major U.S. ground forces. Fourth, the new force and command structure must be capable of supporting U.S. unilateral military action while still meeting the needs for reduction of the overall size of the U.S. active duty military strength.

The proposed solution will be arrived at by subjective analysis of the primary and secondary source material already discussed in Chapter 2 and the analysis of that material to be presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will describe the three options for recommended force structure and the two recommendations for the command structure. Chapter 5 will also make the recommendation as to which force and command structure would best suit the U.S. requirements for the near future based on the above mentioned criteria. In addition, Chapter 5 will also outline some recommendation for future studies.

This chapter also has discussed how I will research information to answer the primary and secondary questions. It has also described the assumptions governing the thesis. This chapter has defined terms certain terms to be used throughout the chapters. Limitations and
delimitations governing the thesis research have also been outlined.

Also described in this chapter are the criteria to be used in developing and evaluating the recommended force and command structure.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Chapter 2 of this thesis concentrated on providing a survey of the literature on what has been written about the four questions used to support the primary question. This chapter will analyze the information provided in terms of answering the primary question, which is: What forces should the U.S. contribute to the future NATO?

Evaluation of the former and present administration policies and statements on security and national interests makes it clear that both administrations agree as to the implications of the change in world security environment. Both administrations agree that the demise of the Soviet Union has changed our security interest focus from a single direction based on the need to contain Soviet expansionism to the need to counter a number of smaller problems caused by regional instabilities.

Where the sides disagree is how to handle the change and how to focus on their new security strategy—strengthening our economy. The Bush administration was in favor of continuing an active role in European affairs by maintaining a large presence, therefore exerting a greater
influence in the way the Europeans do business. This approach would help the U.S. influence EC policies which could be detrimental to our ability to market our goods in Western Europe. The Clinton administration seems to favor partial disengagement to concentrate on its plan to revitalize the economy through infusion of funds on the domestic scene. Such a plan might help alleviate some of the more pressing domestic problems but it might reduce our ability to influence the EC.

The possible withdrawal of substantial U.S. presence in Europe begs the question of why we saw a need to get more directly involved in European affairs than we already were immediately after World War II.

The greatest concern immediately after termination of hostilities was how quickly the American armed forces could be demobilized and brought home. This lack of concern for the post war events in Europe pushed Britain and the USSR together as the great gatekeepers of European security. As events turned out, this situation of peaceful coexistence did not last.

Conditions in post war Europe were rife with the conditions for civil unrest. The Soviet Union took advantage of these conditions and started supporting civil wars in Europe by bolstering communist inspired revolutions wherever it could exploit civil unrest. Not even on receiving George Kennan's "Mr. X telegram," a State

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Department memorandum outlining the steps that should be taken to deal with Soviet expansionist ideas, did the U.S. government concern itself with how to deal with growing Soviet aggression in Europe. It was not until the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, precipitated by Britain's abandonment of Greece and the later recantation of its assumed responsibilities as the guarantor of Western Europe's freedom, that the U.S. came to terms with its new role as the guarantor of European security.

Up to and including the Greece and Turkish civil wars, the U.S. role in helping the beleaguered governments was generally fulfilled in the role of advisor and money provider--functions amply demonstrated by the Marshall Plan and the deployment of advisors to Greece and Turkey. That role was forced to change, however, as a result of the first Berlin Crisis in 1948. At that time, the passive measures used to help Western Europe were virtually abandoned. A policy of active confrontation, a policy which would evolve into containment, became our new way of dealing with the Soviet threat. This policy was determined to be the only useful method to hold back Soviet expansionism. With that, the Washington Treaty of 1949, a treaty based on the already existing mutual defense Brussels Treaty signed by the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands, became the basis for NATO. The key ingredient was Article 4. This article stated that an attack on one
would be considered an attack on all. This article guaranteed that the U.S., with its vast resources, would be involved in European affairs, thus forging the Trans-Atlantic link. This treaty completed what the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had started—the direct involvement of the U.S. in European affairs. Thus, the American commitment to deterrence and containment has been, since 1949, its one overriding defense concern and Europe its major focus.

Prior to the fall of the Soviet Empire, the U.S.'s national security interests were directly challenged by the overwhelming military threat represented by the Soviet Union and its allies. Now that the threat is gone and the U.S. is likely to take a more "laid back" attitude in European affairs, it must not give the impression that the government no longer believes our interest lies on the well being of the continent. As mentioned earlier, both the Bush and the Clinton administration indicated that, although the U.S. fully realized the implication of a reduced threat in Europe and elsewhere, it was still in the U.S.'s interest to support the development of new and emerging democracies in the C&EE nations.

The reasons for support of those emerging nations in their effort to achieve stability are fourfold. Two are purely political reasons, the third is economic and the fourth is a combination of the two.
The first reason for support of those emerging nations in their effort to achieve integration is to prevent the rise of conflicting economic, defense, and political alliances which might pit one group of nations against another. Such a situation could lead to a return of conflicting alliances which might, in turn, well serve as a repeat of the same situation which precipitated the continent into its First World War.  

In view of the above stated need to integrate all of Europe, why should the U.S. take the responsibility to ensure that effort to achieve stability? The partial answer is the second reason why we must remain engaged in Europe. In our last three major involvement in European affairs, we have not let ourselves get entangled in intra-European disagreements. In fact, we have encouraged a greater autonomy for our Western European partners. This attitude has helped build a certain amount of credibility which gives the U.S. a neutralist appearance. This neutral stance has placed us in a position as the only honest broker in Europe. Our only wish is to guarantee our security and pre-empt the need to return to Europe in a situation which would not be beneficial to the U.S..  

The third reason why we need to stay in Europe is purely economic. Nations of Western Europe are, as a group, our largest trading partners. If they were single entities
then we could deal with them on a bilateral basis. They
are not however. Western Europe has bound itself in a
community of nations which unites all of their individual
economies into one economic power, the EC. It is an
organization in which the U.S. has no voice except through
NATO. The potential markets of the emerging nations also
make it imperative that we maintain a significant presence
in Europe.  

The last reason why we need to stay engaged in
Europe is the resurgent feeling of mistrust between the
European powers. This situation is best described in an
anonymous article published in the November 1991 National
Review. This article, describes how the Franco-German
Corps may be reviving some age-old rivalries between the
three major European powers--Germany, France and Great
Britain. The article suggests that Germany's reemergence
as the leading economic and military power in Europe will
place it in position of dominance in the EC. This tends to
make the French, Germany's principal rival, apprehensive.
This situation could lead to a lack of trust among the
allies at worse and dominance of the EC by one power at
best. This situation would probably serve to make the EC a
less capable organization for either control of its markets
or for its capability to become the European pillar of
defense.
If this is permitted to continue, the situation could lead to instability in Western Europe. This would be disadvantageous to the U.S. Although the EC has been discounted as a major player in possible European defense organization, its potential as an economic block is the single most important reason why the U.S. needs to remain engaged in European affairs. In the preceding paragraphs, national interest was equated with the need to maintain stability in Europe since this stability was needed to conduct business. Another ingredient needed to conduct business is access to markets. For this purpose, these markets are those with our traditional trading partners and those potential new markets opening up in the emerging C&EE nations. For this purpose, although it is not likely to be an effective defense block, it does not remove the fact that the EC ties Western European nations together as a single market block. This block makes Europe the single largest economic competitor the U.S. has. It is an organization in which the U.S. has little opportunity to influence except for the common participation in both NATO and the EC by many EC members. If the disagreement we have had with the EC over trades and tariffs are any indication, we will not be able to assert any influence in Europe through the EC channel.

It is essential then, that we maintain a presence in Europe.
In order to understand why it is importance to maintain a presence in Europe, it must first be understood that since ours is a nation based on a market economy which depends on free and open markets, we must guarantee those markets in order to survive. Survival as a nation depends on a stable, prospering environment in which to conduct business.

The future potential of markets is not the only reason why we must maintain presence in Europe. If history is to be believed, it is evident that European instability can cause regional conflicts which, with the slightest provocation, can throw the entire continent into turmoil. This turmoil could well draw us into those same continental conflict. The years between the First and Second World Wars serve to remind us of what can happen if the U.S. removes itself from active participation in European affairs. By maintaining a presence in Europe, we then help to maintain stability for the emerging nations of the C&EE. An added benefit will also be our ability to influence policies and events going on in the EC which even now is emerging as our greatest competitor. This presence and influence can only be maintained through an active support of NATO.

The preceding sections have shown that participation in NATO is critical to support our national interest in view of the growing influence of the EC. NATO was,
however, an organization born of necessity to provide for the mutual defense of its members against a large conventional invasion. It has become more and more difficult to justify the large expenditure of resources to support an organization whose members see little chance of ever being used for its original purpose.

The next question is, if there is no threat, why keep NATO around?

Before discussing the potential risks facing NATO, it is useful to understand the difference between threats and risks. Francois Huisbourg defines a threat as a nation with a capable military force that has an unfriendly intention towards its neighbor.\(^\text{10}\) Using his definition it is clear that no nation in Europe is a threat to NATO.

Using Huisbourg's definition of threats is not to say that there are no risks, however. As already discussed in Chapter 2, Europe abounds in risks which must be controlled if the emerging C&EE nations are allowed to develop into the democracies we (the United States) want them to be. These risks include ethnic unrest, ultranationalism, traditional border disputes, religious persecution, and Islamic fundamentalism. These risks have replaced the traditional threats on which the Alliance has oriented. The problems described in the preceding paragraphs are, to be sure, real concerns. They also
present a problem in terms of stability if they are not kept under control.

There is one remaining risk to European security which must also be taken into consideration—the surviving Russian Army. While true that NATO planners discount the possibility of aggressive action on the part of Russian forces, forces still present a certain risk of uncertainty, especially if Russia is not able to solve its economic problems. On this subject, Otto von Bismarck's admonition, "Russia is never as strong nor ever as weak as it seems," means that as long as Russia maintains its place in the world as a nuclear and conventional power, its position should never be discounted. As such, it is to the benefit of the Europeans to keep the U.S. engaged in European affairs. This engagement will serve to offset Russian strength.

The preceding paragraphs have discussed the fact that the situation requiring NATO's large standing military force, that is, the danger of imminent invasion from the East, has largely gone. The danger of general conventional war has been replaced by dangers brought about by emerging nations who, for the first time in forty years, can vent frustration at the suppression of traditional problems which have been controlled by artificial means. The danger is not that instability from the emerging nations will spill to Western Europe but that the spawn of revolution,
that is starvation and disease, could lead to mass and uncontrolled migration towards the west. This could give rise to ultranationalism in the West. Ultranationalism, some of which has already occurred in NATO nations like France, Germany, and Belgium, has made it possible for right wing factions to gain popularity.

Should these right wing groups be allowed to develop any type of power base, there exists a real danger that the political and economic liberalism which is necessary for the U.S. to operate, could be replaced by European governments which could become even more protectionist in their attitudes towards free markets. 12

The preceding portion of the chapter has focused on the need of the U.S. to safeguard the liberalism which exists in Europe. This liberalism is key for a growing economy which will, in turn, guarantee our way of life. That is why maintaining a conflict-free Europe is in the national interest and critical to national security. The way for the U.S. to guarantee that safeguard, then, is through presence in Europe beyond what can be done by bilateral relations with the EC nations. We must have a way to influence the major economic powers in Europe. The vehicle to do that is NATO.

Because NATO is so important to our interest, it is critical that the U.S. act to maintain NATO’s viability as the alliance of the future.
When questioned on this subject by Congress, General Powell, CJCS, answered that the Alliance's new mission was the same as its old one—that is, to provide for the security, stability, and the defense of a "community of nations" with common values and interests. To be sure, this is true, but it is a narrow view which appears not to take the new strategic realities of Europe into account.

General Powell's answer assumes that the status quo remains the same and that the Alliance can continue its old way of doing business without looking at the changes in the European security needs. Such a limited view of the Alliance's future will probably doom it to obsolescence since domestic politicians, eager to collect on the ever-elusive peace dividend, will not allow continued spending for a large military force whose effectiveness against the risks described earlier is suspect.

The Alliance's mission, simply put, still remains the defense of Western Europe. What must be realized, however, is the fact that the Alliance's way of doing business must change. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Empire, NATO's defended its members by maintaining a large military force poised at the border ready to defend against a conventional invasion from the east.

Now, a new way must be found for NATO to defend against the risks earlier discussed. Key to accomplishing these missions is the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.
The concept, adopted in November 1991, is based on the idea of changing the structure and missions of NATO's forces from a static defense based on the need to defend against a single, theater-wide threat to a more flexible, mobile and multi-directional response with multi-national forces. This new concept is designed to be able to respond to the risk outlined in the preceding paragraphs.\textsuperscript{15}

General Powell's assessment is true--NATO's mission is to guarantee Western Europe's freedom through mutual defense. What is different is the way in which NATO must guarantee that freedom.

That guarantee, some suggest, will come from three ways. The first will be in its traditional role of deterring any remote possibility of attack. The second will be by providing for a forum for crisis management and the establishment of closer ties between NATO and its former adversaries. The last mission will be the use of NATO's forces for peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{16}

First, on the issue of deterrence, Johann Holst described deterrence as a psychological phenomena which does not remain constant but changes over time.\textsuperscript{17} The security environment in Europe is a good example of change over time. In order to deter, you must have a threat. It has already been shown that NATO's planners no longer consider Russia or Ukraine capable of launching an unwarned attack against the west. If that is the case, then, the
maintenance of a large standing force is a useless drain on every member's resources.

When the Soviet Union had a large armed force ready to cross the border to attack the West, a large standing military force ready to defend against that force, bolstered, no doubt, by the large nuclear umbrella guaranteed by the U.S., may have deterred the potential Soviet aggression. Now that the threat has been replaced by varied risks, does the same force provided the same amount of deterrence? The answer for NATO is that such a large force may be more of a liability than an advantage. Although true that a large force provided deterrence against a Soviet conventional attack, that same force may actually lead to instability in the new Europe. This perception evolves from the fact that NATO's forces although smaller in number, still represents a deep strike capability. This capability could lead to the perception that NATO has not adjusted to the realities of the new situation. This perception could push former Pact nations to mistrust NATO's peaceful intentions and might push those former C&EE nations into defense structures which could, by their very existence, lead to renewed mistrust between Western and Eastern Europe.18

There is no question that one of NATO's missions remains to deter aggression. The question is how to deter in view of the changing environment. The way to do this is
for the Alliance’s military structure to become less visible.

Less visibility can be achieved by the idea of the Non-Offensive Defense or NOD for short. This concept, initially advocated prior to the demise of the Warsaw Pact, sought a way to reduce the threshold of war between the two alliances by adopting a doctrine which would render neither side capable of launching a sustainable attack onto the others territory. 19

The success of this concept under the old defense paradigm was, at best, dubious since it would require both sides to trust the other to reduce their forward deployed forces. Since the situation has now changed and the C&EE nations are looking for ways to reduce fear of attack, NOD may be an idea whose time has come.

The second mission NATO should be able to do in the future was suggest by then Secretary of State James Baker in 1990. Realizing that the status quo would need to change, he suggested a new security architecture for the new era upon which Europe was entering. He specifically called for giving NATO a structure that would be able to accomplish two missions. One, the Alliance would have to be in a position to help overcome Europe’s forty years of division by being responsible for new programs such as arms control verification and responsibility for dealing with
regional conflicts. He also proposed that the CSCE should increase its activities and responsibilities.20

Baker's recommendation to expand the Alliance's role to include verification would not be difficult. Such operations would require little additional cost since the verification teams needed to support this mission could be placed in Brussels or SHAPE where the infrastructure is already present.

Along with verification, an additional role envisioned for NATO's future was articulated by the NATO Heads of State and Ministers in Rome in 1991. At that meeting, the heads of state clearly outlined two paths for a NATO of the future. The first required the Alliance to facilitate the liaison relationship between NATO and the C&EE nations by inviting them to participate in expanded meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). These meetings, held at regular intervals invite heads of state or their representatives to sit in on expanded meetings of the NAC. Those meetings, North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), are designed to provided the C&EE nations a forum in which they can voice their concerns over issues which concern all of Europe.

If Secretary Baker's verifications and peacekeeping responsibilities were accepted by NATO, the forces required to do those missions are much different than what is available to them now. For the purpose of treaty and
disarmament verification, the structure to support this mission is not a combat force but teams made up of technical experts with an infrastructure capable of deploying and supporting them.

Acceptance of Baker's second suggestion, peacekeeping, is more controversial. If it chooses to so, however, how can NATO contribute to peacekeeping missions? If requested to do so by bodies responsible for collective security such as the UN or the CSCE, NATO, as an Alliance, could use its well-trained soldiers and modern equipment for such missions.

Although the new administration has not specifically addressed these new NATO roles and missions, President Clinton's belief, as stated by both him in various speeches and Secretary of Defense Aspin in his confirmation hearings, indicates that he would support these new functions and missions if it would require more allied participation.

Prior to getting involved in such a mission, however, several problems must be overcome. The first is that NATO cannot, on a unilateral basis, deploy to Europe's troubled spots. Such a deployment could be perceived as aggressive ambition on NATO's part on territories of the C&EE nations. This perception could provide C&EE nations who fear hegemonic intentions on the part of NATO countries on their territory an excuse for conservative hardliners to
reestablish themselves in power. It is critical then, that before NATO can get involved in peacekeeping mission in Europe, it must do so under CSCE or UN auspices.

The second problem that must be overcome is the reluctance of some NATO countries to get involved in military operations outside of NATO territories. Indeed, Germany's constitution forbids such a military operation. In order for the alliances out-of-area operations to be successful, all nations must agree to participate to their capabilities.21

As for the peacekeeping force, there are several advantages to NATO playing a major role in such activities. First, again, the logistics infrastructure needed to support such an operation is already in place. Second, the command and control requirements, like the infrastructure, is already in place. Third, the Alliance's political decision-making body is, like its military structure, also in place. This would allow for faster action should the Alliance be requested to participate in peacekeeping. The force to be used would be the Allied Command Europe's (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

The second result of the Rome Summit was the articulation of the New Strategic Concept and the creation of an ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. This multi-national force, made up of units from various members of the Alliance, commanded by a British officer, is to be NATO's
multi-national force, designed to be flexible, mobile, and lethal.22

The force is made up of ten divisions plus other combat support and CSS units. It is with this force that NATO initially would defend itself or, if the Alliance members wish do so, deploy to out of area locations. Such locations could include areas where it is in the Alliance's interest to conduct peacekeeping operations.

The ARRC came into being in October 1992. It is to be NATO's force for rapid reaction and contingency missions within ACE area of responsibility. As such, it is to be the land component of a rapid reaction force under control of SACEUR.23

The significant difference between the old corps level organization which existed in NATO prior to the formulation of the New Strategic Concept is that, before, individual members of the Alliance were responsible for providing the corps structures, equipment, C2, and personnel. Under the new structure, the nation charged with the formation of the new corps, in this case Great Britain, is responsible for providing 60% of the corps headquarters structure versus 100%. The UK will provide all C2 assets down to divisions slated to make up the corps. Member nations providing divisions will provide their own logistics, C2, organizations and equipment below the division level.24
During non-crisis times, the corps organization will be made up of two multi-national divisions and two UK divisions. The U.S. does not provide any peacetime forces for the two multi-national divisions which make up the ARRC's peacetime configuration. It has committed itself, however, to providing one of the six divisions which would round out the corps' combat power during times of crisis. Because of the rapid deployment nature of the ARRC, the division would presumably come from the forward deployed V Corps.

A key aspect not fully discussed for the corps is the question of its air support. The air component for the ARRC is a German responsibility. As of October 1992, however, it was running about six months behind in organizing itself.\textsuperscript{23} Even if the Germans are able to solve their organizational problems, there is still the issue of the force's capability.

The future Rapid Reaction Force (AIR) must be able to perform three functions in support of the ARRC. The first is that it must be able to gain and maintain air superiority if not supremacy over the potential deployment area. The second is that it must be able to perform close air support (CAS) and battlefield interdiction (BI) missions (deep strike), and the third is that it must be able to provide theater lift for troop transport to the deployment area and sustainment for those forces.
However, the three air functions discussed above present some significant problems for the force. The first problem is the force’s ability to gain and maintain air superiority. Presently, the European air forces are equipped with third and fourth generation air forces better suited for air interdiction than air superiority. The French do possess a very capable aircraft in their MIRAGE 2000 C. The problem with the French aircraft is that it has, so far, not been bought by any other NATO nations. Given the reluctance of the French to entangle itself in NATO military operations, the availability of that platform is questionable. The closest airframe available in terms of air-to-air capability available to all NATO nations is the F-18 fighter. Britain has the capability to deploy its TORNADO F-3 air superiority fighter but, like the F-16, it is neither the newest nor the best available aircraft for air superiority missions. Germany does not presently have a modern western designed air defense fighter capable of countering possible adversary aircraft such as the MIG 29, an airplane available to most former Warsaw Pact nations. Germany’s own fleet of MIGs require logistic support from a nation which could very well be supporting the opposition in future military operations.26

The European answer to its lack of a modern air superiority fighter is the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). The problem with this aircraft is that it has not yet been
flight tested and presumably will not be ready for field
deployment until well after the U.S. built F-22 is
operational.27

The second mission the Rapid Reaction Force (AIR)
must be able to perform is close air support and
battlefield interdiction. In this area, the European are
in better shape. The UK, Germans and Italians have a very
capable airframe in the TORNADO strike fighter. Several
other nations have F-16s capable of performing limited
(daylight/clear weather) BI and CAS missions. In addition
to fixed wing aircraft, attack and observation helicopters
would be used in the deep strike and CAS missions.28
Although European air forces have attack helicopters in
their inventories, those are severely handicapped by
adverse weather and limited visibility.

The third function the NATO air component must be
able to perform is theater-wide airlift. Again, although
many NATO nations have a limited lift capability in their
C-160 and C-130 fleets, those aircraft are limited in
number and are incapable of carrying oversize cargo.

The last problem which the Europeans have vis-a-vis
airpower is their lack of stealth and EW capability. In
addition, except for NATO, French and British AWACS, the
Alliance has very limited airborne C3 capabilities.

The Alliance's air component is key to the ARRC's
ability to fight and sustain itself in combat. Yet it has
several potentially crippling shortcomings which must be solved prior to that force being a capable, sustainable combat force. The answer to NATO's problems lies in two possible solutions. The first is that NATO nations belonging to the ARRC--specifically Britain and Germany spend a tremendous amount of resources to build the capability they need. The second is that NATO must make every effort to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe by taking advantage of the air capability the U.S. can offer to the Alliance.29

The final consideration to be looked at in designing our contribution to NATO is what will the remaining U.S. force structure look like? The answer to this question can be gleaned by understanding the Congressional emphasis on force reduction discussed in Chapter 2. Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev initiated Soviet unilateral force reductions and the demise of the Warsaw Pact have made the threat against the U.S. less likely, Congress has wanted to reduce the size of the force--a force which is seen as useless in view of the lack of a credible threat due of its non-deployability.

The primary consideration of the size for the future military force is for a smaller, more readily-deployable force. This is confirmed by Les Aspin's statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee when he stated that the military of the future should be "flexible enough to do a
large number of simultaneous smaller contingencies."\textsuperscript{30}

Earlier, while writing in Reserve Officer Association National Security Report, he stated that he did not believe the American people were willing to spend $250 billion a year for a military which, he did not believe, was incapable of operation in "all but the most extreme contingencies" meaning, generally, a large conventional war.\textsuperscript{31} This statement indicates an unwillingness to fund a large force whose primary focus is fighting a large conventional war—a war which is not likely to come. His statement makes it clear that future missions will depend more on the ability of light forces which can rapidly deploy, conduct forced entry and rapidly redeploy. Such missions would depend more on the Marine Corps’ embarked Marine Amphibious Brigades and the Army’s 101st and 82nd divisions.

These suggestions are a clear indication that the active duty heavy forces will be reduced in strength and a greater emphasis will be placed on heavy forces in the national guard and reserve for sustained combat operation.\textsuperscript{32} The question is by how much, and what effect will that have on the forces dedicated to Europe?

Some experts suggest that the active force can safely be reduced to ten active divisions—seven of which would be army units and three would be Marine Corps. The total Air Force active strength could be as low as 10
Using these figures, as a worse case basis, it can only be surmised that the three Marine divisions, along with the Army's 82nd Division and the 101st Division would be the nation's contingency force. These units would be charged with rapid deployment and forced entry missions. These light, quickly deployed forces would then be augmented by the remaining heavy divisions based in the U.S.

The final question, then, is with smaller forces likely to remain, what should we contribute to the NATO structure?

To recap then, Chapter 4 demonstrated that U.S. vital interests for the future remains tied to a stable Europe. This stability is required for the U.S. to be able to maintain its European markets. In turn, European stability depends on maintaining an atmosphere in which free and liberal trade practices are encouraged. Although such practices are present in Europe at this time, events have demonstrated that work must be done to preserve that environment and that preservation of that atmosphere must be our number one priority. Such must be the case because the EC is our chief rival, a rival in which its members can form an economic block against the U.S. economic block—a block in which the U.S. has no way of influencing since we have no formal representation except for the common
membership of many EC nations with NATO. For this reason, the U.S. must remain a viable and active member of the Alliance.

Chapter 4 has also demonstrated that the primary purpose for NATO, the threat of war caused by an expansionist Soviet Union has disappeared. As such, they are no longer a threat against the Alliance. The single monolithic threat represented by the former Soviet Union has been replaced, however, by a number of risks, which if not dealt with, could prove as dangerous to the well being of western Europe and, therefore, U.S. interests.

These new risks include the dangers of civil wars in the newly emerging nations caused by ethnic and religious unrest, traditional border disputes kept under control by communist governments and wars caused by the sudden change of economic systems. These acts of violence and their root causes are dangerous in themselves, but they do not have the chance of spreading to the richer more stable western nations. The danger represented by these wars is that mass migration of displaced populations could immigrate to those western nations. These migrations could cause the emergence of right wing ultranationalist groups in traditionally liberal Western European nations. These movements could precipitate a movement away from the economic liberalism which has characterized Europe since the end of the Second World War. Such a move would serve
to isolate the U.S. even further from the access it needs to European markets.

Chapter 4 has also demonstrated that the remaining size of the Russian and Ukrainian forces, although incapable of launching a surprise attack against the west at this time, still retains enough conventional and nuclear forces to make them the largest European military power. These facts make it essential for the U.S. to remain engaged in European affairs—to aid in working towards an answer towards stability for the C&EE nations. It is also advantageous for the Europeans to keep the U.S. engaged in European affairs to help offset the Russian and Ukrainian forces.

The third factor in determining the role and missions of U.S. forces in the NATO of the future will be the Alliance future roles and mission. Again, this chapter showed that NATO's past raison d'être, that is the defense of Western Europe against the massive invasion from the East, is gone. With the disappearance of that danger has come the question of what can the Alliance do in the future. That question has partially answered by James Baker who outlined three main missions the Alliance should be in position to do are deterrence, treaty verification and crisis management, and peacekeeping. Obviously, the force required to complete those above stated missions are far different then the force required to fight a large
scale conventional war. The Alliance's refocus from the fighting a large war to its new missions is articulated in its new strategic concept as outlined in the Rome Summit of 1991.

Also identified earlier is the vehicle the Alliance will use to enforce its new concept—that is, the ARRC. One of the key concepts to the rapid reaction force must be its capability to rapidly deploy and fight once deployed.

Finally, the last factor that was examined in Chapter 4 which will have an impact on our contribution to NATO forces must be the availability of U.S. forces.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the atmosphere in the administration is that financial constraints combined with the lack of a viable threat will make it difficult to support a large force permanently stationed in Europe. This belief will cause a substantial downsizing of active duty forces. With the majority of those remaining forces stationed in the U.S. versus forward deployed in Europe.

Taking the above questions, concern and facts into consideration, what should be the role, size and command structure to support NATO be?

In conclusion, it is evident that the national interest of this nation lies in its capability to maintain free and open markets to sell its goods. It is also clear that one of the larger markets available to us lies in
Europe—a Europe which is tied to its own economic system from which we are excluded. The existence of the EC and the new potentially great markets which exist in the emerging democracies of the East make it essential that we insure the maintenance of a stable Europe. This stability can only be achieved if we support NATO as it evolves into a structure designed to deter aggression against its members or its C&EE neighbors. The vehicle in which to do that will not be the traditional military structure designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact but a new Multi-National Corps guided by the new Strategic Concept.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to select a European deployed U.S. force for the future. Whatever the force and command structure selected, that structure must support the four specific criteria outlined in Chapter 3. The forces that will be discussed are primarily Army and Air forces. Navy and Marine forces afloat are excluded from the total count because those forces are not permanently assigned to U.S. forces stationed in Europe.

Those criteria are: The force must be capable of safeguarding U.S. national interest and continue to provide for the national security; the force must be a credible deterrent against an attack on NATO; it must support the theater CinC's efforts to maintain stability in Eastern Europe; and the force must be able to work within the framework of the NATO's new Strategic Concept. At the same time, it should provide the additional assets the new ARRC will require to be an effective combat force. Finally, that force must fit within the constraints established by Congress and the new administration—that is, it must be smaller and therefore cheaper.
The first issue to resolve then is what is the smallest force we can deploy in Europe and still be assured of continued safeguard of our interests in Europe? What should the minimum capability of that force be? The answer is that the force needs to be large enough to allow the U.S. to make a contribution which is perceived as equal to or greater than any single other of our allies or it must be of sufficient capability to be seen as critical to the Europeans ability to maintain a credible military structure without any further resources.

Since all evidence suggests that the military forces will undergo severe downsizing in the near future, the obvious solution to maintain an effective voice in NATO will not depend on the deployment of overwhelming U.S. forces but will depend on the U.S. ability to provide the Alliance certain capabilities which they are not able to provide themselves without substantial financial costs. These capabilities unique to the U.S. would be used to help the European nations overcome their critical shortcomings and lack of capabilities described in Chapter 4.

As discussed in Chapter 4, Europeans do not have the capability to deploy, in the near term, an all-weather attack and observation helicopter capability which can be found in the U.S. divisional and corps level aviation brigades. By deploying a corps level headquarters with its subordinate attack aviation brigade, the U.S. would be able
to provide those attack and observation capabilities needed for the ARRC to be an effective force.²

Another asset critical to the ARRC's deep strike missions envisioned for the ARRC is the ATACMS. The ARRC's requirement for this system suggests that the U.S. could either sell the missiles to the British which, again, would require expenditure of resources on their part, or the U.S. could make units equipped with MLRS available for use by the ARRC. In addition to army combat assets the U.S. could provide certain CS and CSS assets. Those assets would help alleviate other shortcomings such as EW and C3I systems in the European force structures. These army assets are found in the corps' MI brigades in the form of airborne electronic collection and jamming systems. All of these assets are normally found in brigade size units at the corps level.

If the U.S. were to make these critical assets available to the NATO ARRC, then we could be assured that our continued participation in European affairs would be welcomed. This would insure that we could maintain our influence in NATO therefor Europe.

In addition to supporting the ARRC, the forces deployed in Europe must be able to perform four essential missions. First, they must be able to deploy out of theater to places such as the Middle East or any other out of area region to support the CJCS plans and contingencies.
They must be able to take part in the ARRC as per the U.S. commitment to support the Corps with a division. They must also be able to support the theater CinC by providing the capability to conduct combat operations independent of other NATO forces, they must be large enough to maintain credible forward presence, they must be able to protect U.S. citizens, and they must be able to take part in the military contacts program as envisioned by the London Conference. Finally, they must be able to receive reinforcements from the U.S. in a time of crisis if a return to Europe is called for. Again, the size of this force suggests a corps size element since such an organization has all of the structure needed to be able to fight independently, providing it is supported by the EAC elements at some points.

Since the need of a theater deployed corps has been identified, does this corps need to have its combat elements at full strength? Chapter 4 identified two reasons why it does not. The first reason why the corps does not need to be at full strength is that the risk of needing a full-up corps is presently nonexistent since there is not a threat of imminent attack against NATO. The only reason why the U.S. needs to maintain any decisive units in Europe, then, is because of our commitment to provide a division to the ARRC. The second reason why we should reduce the strength of the corps combat units is
because of the belief that such a full-up corps can be deemed as offensive in nature by the C&EE nations.

These reasons indicate that there is no requirement for a full-up corps to be permanently deployed in Europe. Because there is not reason for a full up corps, the U.S. should proceed to reduce that structure.

According to U.S. planners in NATO Headquarters, there are three possible ways to reduce the force. The first is by deactivating one division in the European based corps along with the CS and CSS assets which would support that division. The second is to reduce one brigade per division. The third would be to disestablish division headquarters and leave separate brigades operating as separate units under a corps headquarters.

However, none of these solutions offer a perfect answer, and all need to be examined for their separate advantages and disadvantages.

The first recommended solution has four major advantages.

The first advantage is that the U.S. maintains a corps headquarters in Europe. This would give the U.S. a credible presence in Europe thus assuring us a "place at the table" and the ability to influence events and decisions both at NATO and, in an indirect way, the EC.

The second advantage would be to give the U.S. the C3I capability needed to rapidly redeploy ground forces in
theater if needed to support any contingencies which might occur.

The third advantage to this organization would be that essential capabilities needed to support the ARRC, that is, attack aviation and artillery brigades, units capable of participating in ARRC deep strike missions, would be readily available. Also forward deployed to support either the theater CinC or the ARRC would be aviation assets from the corps's MI brigade which would be capable of providing electronic warfare.

The fourth advantage to this structure would be the manpower savings. With this structure, corps strength could be reduced by approximately 23,000 personnel.

The major disadvantage would be that USAREUR would be unable to meet its commitment to provide a division to a German corps. This problem can easily be resolved however, by earmarking a follow-on division from the U.S. 3d Corps to be part of that German Corps.

The second solution, the deactivation of a brigade from each division offers no major advantage over the previous solution except the ability to provide an anemic division to a German corps while the U.S. corps would retain control of a division.

Savings in manpower, approximately 6000 soldiers per division, would not be enough to justify the reduced capabilities of the remaining divisions.
The third solution is to disestablish divisions and have only separate brigades in theater.

Like the first solution, there are several advantages to this solution. The first is that by reducing the divisional middle man, substantial manpower savings would be realized. Another advantage would be that the force could be tailored to meet the situation as it existed at the time -- that is, you could add or take out brigades relatively easily. Related to the last advantage is that the brigades would not need to be permanently deployed to Europe; they could be rotated on a semi annual basis. The redeployment of these units could exercise our sea and airlift capabilities on a continuing basis.

Some of the disadvantages to this organization are that the U.S. would no be able to meet our commitment to the ARRC, that is a full up division, without substantial redeployment of forces from CONUS and train up time to reach the proper degree of proficiency for those divisions to be an effective fighting force. This solution would neither support the ARRC's mission of rapid deployment nor the CinC's requirement to have an effective fighting force at his disposal.

Another disadvantage to this concept would be the organization for combat required for the separate brigades would not be present. That is, the combat support and combat service support organizations needed to support
those maneuver brigades might not be the habitual organizations needed for effective combat operations. This would harm the effectiveness of the units. Command and control would also suffer since the span of control needed to command as many as six maneuver brigades, three aviation brigades, three artillery brigades, plus numerous CSS units would probably be beyond the capability of the standard corps headquarters. The headquarters would require augmentation. This requirement would, of course, drive up the numbers of personnel in theater. Since the primary objective of reduction is to maintain capability while reducing strength, this solution would not be acceptable.

Regardless of the solution recommended, the army structure should then be organized as follows. The ground component commander should be dual hatted as both the Theater Army and Corps Commander for peacetime and operations short of war only. Under his command would be the standard corps organization for combat with the following exceptions. The first exception would be the replacement of the armored cavalry regiment with an air assault brigade. The second change would, of course, be the reduction of divisional level combat strength.

The replacement of the cavalry regiment with a separate air assault brigade with all of its lift assets would provide the corps commander with the ability to deploy the brigade separately as a peacekeeping force if
that mission were prescribed. In addition, that air assault brigade could, with minimum support, deploy nearly anywhere within ACE at a moment's notice. An alternative to this proposal would be to replace one of the division's heavy brigade with an air assault brigade.

The next area to be discussed is the air component of U.S. forces deployed to Europe.

The U.S. air component's mission in Europe would be, like the ground component, directed towards two directions. It should support the ARRC's air component mission, that is, the force must provide for air superiority, tactical and strategic lift, and provide EW and airborne C3—all missions the ARRC's air component cannot do for itself. The U.S. air assets deployed overseas, then, must be able to provide all of the above support plus have the capability to provide CAS and BI in support of the theater CinC.

Fortunately, the recent reorganization by the U.S. Air Force into the composite wing concept is ideally suited for the mission of supporting not only the ARRC but also the U.S. corps. The problem is that the mission requirements for these two purposes require different airframes.

As already discussed, the requirement to support the ARRC's mission is more for air superiority and jamming than for the deep strike missions and BI. The composition of
the wing should then be heavily oriented on air superiority and EW type aircraft. These would be F-15/EF-111/F-16 type aircraft. Their purpose would be to provide an air umbrella to the allied aircraft who would perform the actual deep strike mission. The wing deployed to support the U.S. CinC's mission would have to be more robust since it would be required to be both air-to-ground and air-to-air missions. Such a wing would be heavily dependent on multi-role capable aircraft such as the F-15Es and F-16Cs. This wing would also have its normal compliment of jamming and C2 aircraft.

These two wings would be the major air force combat power in Europe. Since wings have between 4,000 to 5,000 personnel in them (depending on the orientation of the wing; i.e., ground attack vs. air to air) the estimate strength of tactical air forces strength in Europe would be approximately 10,000. Admittedly, this number of aircraft and personnel seems small. However, it should be remembered that these forces are forward deployed to deal with contingencies. The rapid deploying nature of air power makes it less essential that a large number of aircraft be kept on permanent station overseas than army forces.

The above described strengths for the Army and Air Force are for units at the tactical level and below. Since there is a demonstrated possibility to reduce the amount of
forces in theater, then the command structure which exists in theater could also be changed.

Three possible considerations for a command structure exists. The first is the present structure. This structure calls for a theater in which the CinC’s three components commanders are also four star officers with the appropriate level staffs.

The second command structure which could be in place to support the reorganized forces would be based on the Korea model. In this scenario, the CinC’s headquarters would continue to be in overall command of the theater and all assigned forces but planning responsibilities would be delegated to a sub-unified commander. In the case of Europe where the CINCEUR also fills the role of Major NATO Commander (MNC), the responsibility for planning for national missions would come under control of the DCinC. This is the situation which exists in Europe today. In the case of this model, the component commanders would be the senior service commanders in theatre. Using this description, the army/corps commander would become the ground component commander. He would also fill the role of 7th Army commander.

The air component commander would, like his Army counterpart, be the overall senior air force commander in theater. Whereas the position is presently held by an Air Force 4 star officer, this position would be reduced to a
three star office. He would be in command of the combat wings described above.

The navy component commander would be, like the present situation a four star billet. This is due to the peculiar nature of the European theater in respect to NATO. Because the naval component commander is also a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC), in this case AFSOUTH, the planning and command responsibilities are delegated to his subordinate, a three star office. This would, in effect, make all services equal.

The third model for command structure would be based on the SOUTHCOM structure in a peacetime environment. In this case, the CinC would have direct responsibility for planning and executing all missions in support of national and Alliance missions. He would have control of all Army, and Air Force units in theater. This structure would only be applicable if the U.S. were to be replaced in its position of SACEUR.

Because of the unique nature of the dual command structure which exists in Europe, that is the NATO planning and execution portion under command of the SACEUR who doubles as the CINCEUR, the best command structure for the situation is clearly the second choice, that is, a modified Korea Model where national planning and execution is conducted by someone other than the theater CinC.
Using the reduced tactical and operational forces described in this chapter, the forces stationed in Europe would then look as follows. The army corps would be between 50 and 55,000 permanently assigned personnel. The air force would have approximately 10,000 permanently assigned personnel. The navy would have about 5,000 personnel assigned to support the 6th fleet operations in the Mediterranean. The total strength in Europe in terms of operational units and their supporting headquarters would be approximately 70,000 personnel.

In conclusion, it is clear that in order to meet the criteria for a viable force in Europe as described in the methodology section of Chapter 3, the U.S. should adopt the following Army and Air Force structure in Europe.

The army should reduce the size of its Corps by one division. Such a reduction would provide a manpower savings of approximately 16,000 soldiers. Further savings could be realized if the size to the Corps's support command were reduced by the appropriate number of personnel required to support that deactivated division.

In addition, the Corps's organic armored cavalry regiment should be replaced by an air assault brigade with all of the organic lift capabilities normally associated with such a unit. This exchange would better provide the corps and theater commander the capability to quickly react to any requirement for Army forces to handle operations.
other than war. These light forces would be particularly well suited for peacekeeping type missions as evidence by the deployment of the 10th Mountain Division to Somalia.

Corps combat support units should be kept at full strength so as to support the ARRC missions as well as other deployments requiring CS and CSS support versus combat troops. Echelons above Corps units should be maintained at an appropriate level so as to support the in-theater forces and be able to support the arrival of new units if such a return of U.S. forces to Europe was warranted.

The Air Force should permanently station two composite wings in Europe. One wing should be primarily equipped with F15C and F16C type aircraft dedicated to air superiority missions in support of the ARRC. This wing could be removed from theater once the EFA or a suitable replacement were deployed.

The second wing would be equipped with F15E type aircraft. It would be dedicated to providing the theater commander with adequate battlefield interdiction and deep strike capabilities while still provide adequate air-to-air capabilities.

Should it be required, these two wings could be reinforced by Navy strike and air superiority aircraft operating from carriers in support of the theater CinC.
The command structure in Europe should also be modified as follows. The service component commanders should be reduced from four to three star commanders. This is certainly appropriate in view of the greatly reduced force structure permanently stationed overseas.

Reducing the force structure as described above and modifying the command structure would fulfill all of the requirements for a force structure as described in Chapter 3. That is, the force would help maintain our influence in European affairs by providing a force capable of rapidly deploying anywhere in Europe. Maintaining a Corps headquarters with its robust combat support element with two very powerful and capable air wings assures that the U.S. will maintain an influential voice in Alliance affairs.

This smaller force, less focused on an imminent invasion from the east, would also alleviate the fear that NATO forces are offensive in nature. This would help foster a feeling of trust, and, therefore, maintain stability in the C&EE nations by reinforcing the idea that NATO has no design on their territory.

The recommended solution would also be ideal to help NATO in its new roles and missions by providing substantial intelligence, C2, CS and air power to the ARRC. This same force is still capable of supporting the CinC with any unilateral U.S. mission he might be assigned to accomplish.
Because the force is still of substantial size, the message that the U.S. is remaining engaged in European affairs is present—thus deterrence is achieved.

Finally, the force is smaller. This fits into the scenario of having smaller active forces which must still contend with world wide instabilities which require the capability to deploy world wide.

Recommendations for Further Studies

Recommendations for future studies could go into three different directions. The first is cost analysis. The second is force structure estimates for a military operation in operations other than war. The third would be based on a changing situation in Europe.

Because this study was based strictly on the military-political requirements outlined in the methodology section of Chapter 3, the cost in terms in money for maintaining a forward deployed force was not taken into consideration. Further research could center on which force structure would be best using the additional criteria: "How many dollars would such a force cost?"

The force structure recommended in the previous section of this chapter is for a force which would primarily support the ARRC in conducting missions such as peacekeeping or even peacemaking. The recommended force could be used as a point of departure to determine how much
reinforcement from CONUS would be needed if the U.S. were to conduct such a mission on a unilateral basis. The present situation in Bosnia could be used as a situational model. A different force structure could be recommended as a result of such analysis.

The third direction for future study is based in the subject of this study itself. The conclusions and recommendations reached above are a result of the criteria established by articulated national security goals and requirements. Should any of those goals and requirements change, the recommendations for the specific force structure outlined in the previous section may no longer be applicable. These changes might then require a change in the recommended structure. This would be particularly true if the new administration were to articulate fundamental differences in our position vis-a-vis our relations with NATO.
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1 These definitions are the author's. They are based on his understanding of the terms used throughout his research.

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Figure 2
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   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

2. Mr. William Connor
   Department of Joint and Combined Operations
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

3. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, VA 22314

4. Mr. John W. Douglass
   Rm 228, Russell Senate Office Building
   Washington DC, 20510

5. LTC Kenneth Osmond
   Center for Army Tactics
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

6. LTC James Swartz
   3801 West Temple Avenue
   Pomona, CA 91768-4083