SOMALIA: KEY OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS IN AN ERA OF PEACE-ENFORCEMENT AND FORCED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE VENTURES

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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This paper examines key operational considerations and their implications for operational art in military planning for peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance operations at the lower end of the military operational continuum between peacetime and wartime operations. It is based upon United Nations (U.N.) and United States (U.S.) operations in Somalia including U.N. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM - also known as UNOSOM I), Unified Task Force (UNITAF)/Operation Restore Hope, and U.N. Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). 

Historical background in conjunction with the concept of operations and operational plans for these missions is explored. Then, selected key Principles of War and concepts of operational design with unique characteristics which apply to operational planning and application of operational art in this region of the operational continuum are examined. These include objective, rules of engagement (ROE), unity of command, operational sustainment, and transition between major operations. The paper concludes it is more difficult to determine, understand and apply these Principles of War and concepts of operational design to peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance operations at
Abstract continued:

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PREFACE

This paper is slanted primarily towards key military aspects of peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance operations as the research and analysis focuses on U.N. and U.S. operations in Somalia. However, the findings may have considerable application to peacekeeping missions as well. Analysis is from the perspective of the operational commander and how to best plan for the use of military force in this context. Also highlighted are subtle differences in application of key Principles of War as they relate to these types of operations compared to more traditional war time military ventures.

The paper commences with an examination of both U.N. and U.S. operations in Somalia including UNOSOM, UNITAF or Operation Restore Hope, and UNOSOM II. Then it explores some essential considerations of operational planning in peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance missions. The paper concludes with an analysis of lessons learned and an assessment of critical factors which should be kept in mind for planning future peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance operations.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE NEW DIRECTION. Worldwide, the number of peace-enforcement, forced humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations has increased significantly. Since 1988, fourteen such U.N. operations have been initiated. This comprises one more than the thirteen total peacekeeping missions established by the U.N. in the entire previous forty years since the initial U.N. peacekeeping operation began in 1948. Not surprisingly, along with the increased level of U.N. involvement in these types of ventures, the degree of U.S. participation has risen dramatically. As the cost of these endeavors is usually considered minimal in comparison to the potential cost of other possible alternatives, such missions will probably continue to be a popular choice in the future. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, succinctly noted during a recent Senate Appropriations Committee hearing, "...peacekeeping funds are very well spent. They are a very good investment for the American people in avoiding the outbreak of war."¹ U.N. peacekeeping costs for 1992 totaled almost $3.0B and are estimated at approximately $3.7B for 1993. This is an extremely small sum when contrasted to the roughly $60.0B cost of the Gulf War, a regional war of relatively limited objective and duration.²

PEACE-ENFORCEMENT, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING DISTINCTION. These terms, which all have different meanings, are commonly misused
and/or misunderstood. In examining military operational considerations in peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance missions it is important to understand their distinction in order to prevent confusion. Peace-enforcement is military intervention to forcefully restore security to an area engaged in hostilities regardless of whether the parties involved desire the action or not. It is a limited offensive military operation with a concurrent objective to minimize casualties and damage to the maximum extent possible in order to maintain the greatest degree of impartiality possible. Peace-enforcement operations are conducted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter which allows for the use of whatever force is necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Peacekeeping refers to military operations conducted at the request of the parties involved in a dispute to supervise an agreement and/or keep the entities separated. It connotes a limited objective defensive military operation and includes such tasks as observation, patrolling a buffer zone or supervising elections. Peacekeeping operations are generally conducted under Chapter 6 of the U.N. Charter which provides for pacific settlement of disputes. Peacemaking, on the other hand, is solely a diplomatic process aimed at ending disputes and resolving a conflict's underlying causes through diplomacy.3

**THESIS.** Somalia Operation Restore Hope was the first U.S. regionally oriented military operation since the demise of the former Soviet Union, subsequent modification of the National Security and Military Strategies, and articulation of revised Navy/Marine Corps missions in the Secretary of the Navy's White Paper, "From The Sea". Most notably, it was a peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance mission. The
U.N. Charter has long provided measures to enforce the peace. Further, international law recognizes certain crimes against humanity, such as genocide, which allow for outside intervention despite opposition to such action. However, since the end of World War II, the cold war for the most part prevented operations outside of the arena where the belligerents requested help and/or gave permission for foreign forces to be on their sovereign soil. This was because it was difficult to obtain U.N. Security Council consensus to act. Given the recent improvement in East/West relations, and establishment of what President Bush termed the "New World Order," the U.N. Security Council has been a forum of greater cooperation, less prone to veto military operations in the peace-enforcement realm. Indeed, coupled with the "New World Order," there appears to be the rise of a greater sense of moral obligation on the part of the developed world to address some of the more desperate situations which in the past may have been overlooked or ignored. Consequently, the likelihood of greater U.S. involvement in U.N. and coalition peace-enforcement operations appears certain.

U.N. and U.S. operations in Somalia are contrasting examples of extremely poorly and very well planned and executed endeavors. The question is why was there such a disparity in performance between the two, and what can be learned and deduced from the mistakes and successes of both as applied to peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance operations in the future? Operations in the middle of the military operational continuum (Figure 1), especially those involving armed conflict, require the epitome of operational art in operational planning in order to maximize chances of success. The on-scene military commander often must simultaneously
conduct combat operations while attempting to maintain a moral high ground and degree of benevolence, frequently under conditions where it is difficult or impossible to distinguish the belligerents. This makes certain aspects in the nature of these types of operations ambiguous. Consequently, these aspects acquire added significance in operational planning because of their potential impact on the attainment of the objective. From strictly an operational planning point of view, these selected Principles of War and concepts of operational design increase in importance as compared to others in this region of the operational continuum.
OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

Level of Violence

Peacekeeping

Peace - Crisis - Regional Conflict - Global War

Probability of Occurrence

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Peace

Crisis

Regional Conflict

Regional War

Global War

SOURCE: CLASS SLIDE - MODIFIED

FIGURE 1
CHAPTER II

SOMALIA: U.N. AND U.S. OPERATIONS

SOMALIA BACKGROUND. Somalia is a poor country of approximately 637,000 square kilometers located in the middle of the east coast of Africa known as the "horn" (Figure 2). It has a long coast line about equal in length to the U.S. eastern seaboard. It is hot and dry with seasonal monsoons. The northern terrain is hilly while the central and southern areas are relatively flat. The population of about 6.7 million is comprised of numerous tribes and factions. However, ninety nine percent of the people share the Sunni Muslim religion.

Somalia gained independence in 1960 from the United Kingdom and Italy respectively, joining the northern and southern parts of the country forming one republic. For the next ten years the country endured significant turmoil, including an attempted coup, under a mostly democratic system of government. In 1969, shortly after the assassination of elected President Al Rashid Shermarke, General Mohammed Siad Barre assumed power in a bloodless coup. General Barre remained in power until January 1991 when he was forced to flee the country by one of several warring factions trying to overthrow the government and usurp power.

For the next two years a bloody civil war ensued between the many warring factions as well as supporters loyal to General Barre. By the summer of 1992, as many as 4.5 million of Somalia’s 6.7 citizens were on the brink of starvation. Further, some 800,000 had taken refuge in neighboring states to escape the plight at home. An
estimated 300,000 people had been killed by fighting, disease or starvation since the
overthrow of General Barre. In the year following General Barre's fall from power,
every single government office, national institution, and the vast majority of the country's
infrastructure, including the military and the police, ceased to exist. Filling the complete
leadership vacuum were several self-anointed warlords, some of whom had helped to
overthrow the former government. Significant fighting between the warlords and various
factions was prevalent throughout the country but especially in the central and southern
regions. In short, total chaos prevailed and the populace faced famine and starvation.
Somalia had been relatively self-sufficient in terms of feeding its population prior to the
fall of General Barre's government in 1991. In early 1992, the U.N. started looking at
the problems in Somalia with increasing concern and eventually authorized the
peacekeeping operation UNOSOM to assist the humanitarian relief effort.

UNOSOM. UNOSOM was a total disaster. It is an outstanding example of how
not to devise and execute an operation. It was ill conceived, poorly planned, even less
well supported, and a dismal failure.

The U.N. never developed a clear concept of operations for UNOSOM. U.N.
strategy was pieced together based on reports by the Secretary General, Mr. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, and his Special Representative to Somalia. These evolved into what
became a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions designed to help alleviate Somalia's
bleak predicament of disjointed civil war and famine. While the U.N. accurately
identified the problem, and saw it was becoming worse on a daily basis quickly growing
into a human tragedy of monumental proportions, they did not address the underlying
causes or identify the necessary requirements to remedy the situation. They failed to
develop adequately any clear policy, strategy, concept of operations, military objective or
operational plan.

In January 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 733, its first
regarding Somalia, which established a total arms embargo designed to eliminate arms
supplies to the warring factions.\textsuperscript{7} This was followed in March 1992 by U.N. Security
Council resolution 746 which supported the U.N. Secretary General’s proposal to
dispatch a technical team to investigate the state of the situation and develop a plan to
deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need.\textsuperscript{8}

On 24 April 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 751 which
established the UNOSOM operation under the supervision of the Secretary General and
the direction of a U.N. Special Representative to Somalia. A force of 50 observers was
to be dispatched immediately to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and a security force
of 500 was to follow to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{9} However, it was not
until 23 July 1992 that UNOSOM observers finally arrived in Somalia, followed on 12
August 1992 by 500 peacekeepers. Deployment of the peacekeeping force was delayed
until consent of the leading Somalia warlord in Mogadishu, General Mohammed Farah
Aideed, was obtained, as is normal in U.N. peacekeeping type operations. UNOSOM
forces were supplied by Pakistan. The U.N. Security Council then passed Resolution 767
at the end of July 1992 which did nothing but reiterate the concerns of the previous
resolutions, again stressing the need to observe the cease fire, continue the arms
embargo, and accelerate the humanitarian relief effort.\textsuperscript{10}
In mid August, President Bush ordered a stepped up military airlift to supply food to the starving Somali people. This was largely driven by press reports and commentary from the U.N. Secretary General regarding the dismal situation continuing in Somalia despite U.N. actions to date. With food still not getting through to those in need, and as much as ninety percent being siphoned off by the various armed factions as a sort of payment by the humanitarian relief organizations to attain security for storage warehouses and relief convoys to pass road blocks, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 775 on 28 August 1992. This resolution provided authorization for an additional 3,500 U.N. troops for UNOSOM in order to enhance peacekeeping efforts and allegedly provide adequate security to get relief aid through to those in need.\textsuperscript{11}

However, at the time the U.S. led UNITAF operation commenced in December 1992, some four months later, none of these forces had yet been committed to the UNOSOM operation.

UNOSOM’s concept of operations was totally inadequate, almost non-existent. Without a clear policy, strategy or concept of operations, effective operational plans were extremely difficult to develop at the military level in country. Operational plans crafted under these circumstances were put together more or less in a vacuum and never reflected a coherent strategy. Consequently, it is not surprising the UNOSOM operation failed miserably.

\textbf{UNITAF/OPERATION RESTORE HOPE}. In direct contrast to UNOSOM, UNITAF was a well planned, supported and executed operation. Policy and strategy were clearly articulated, overarching military objectives established, and detailed
operational plans with clearly defined phases crafted to achieve a realistic end-state.

Operation Restore Hope was a U.S. led U.N. coalition force to provide humanitarian assistance in order to prevent mass starvation in Somalia. U.S. strategy, articulated in President Bush's address to the nation on 4 December 1992, was to create a secure environment, get relief assistance moving, and then turn the operation over to the U.N. to be run by a regular U.N. peacekeeping force. With this policy and strategy in mind, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) developed the concept of operations, including operational objectives and an operational plan to achieve the goals established by the President. The objective was to establish a secure environment and then provide assistance to the humanitarian relief organizations to get relief aid moving. The plan was designed in four phases as follows:

Phase I - Introduction of Forces
Phase II - Establishment of Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS)
Phase III - Stabilization
Phase IV - Transition to UNOSOM II/Redeployment

Driven by the U.S., the U.N. Security council approved resolution 794 which authorized operation Restore Hope as U.N. operation UNITAF under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Chapter 7 provides for the use of whatever force necessary to achieve the mandate, making the operation a peace-enforcement vice peacekeeping mission. The plan was essentially executed as conceived. However, as a U.N. operation, all U.N.
member nations were encouraged to, and in fact a total of 24 did, contribute military
forces. This created a delicate command, control and coordination situation for the
UNITAF operational commander.

CENTCOM, in conjunction with General Robert B. Johnston, the U.S. Joint Task
Force Commander and Coalition Force Commander in Somalia, outlined the concept of
operations and developed the detailed plan for Operation Restore Hope. Phase I
commenced with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) landing in Mogadishu to establish
a safe haven for the air and sea ports in order to bring in follow-on forces. Once enough
follow-on forces were on the ground and could safely move out of Mogadishu, the task of
establishing security in the countryside commenced. After security was established,
coalition forces were integrated into the operation as they arrived in country.

Phase II instituted a total of eight HRS each assigned to the various coalition
forces (Figure 3). Once security was established in an HRS, humanitarian relief
convoys commenced and relief aid was distributed by normal humanitarian relief
organizations assisted by the military forces assigned to the HRS. Phase II concluded
once all eight HRS were established.

Phase III was a period of stabilization to allow time for the relief operation to
alleviate the famine. It was also designed to allow time for the planning, development of
support, and execution of UNOSOM II, the follow-on U.N. operation.

Phase IV was the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The concept
provided for UNITAF to retain control of each HRS until secure, and once secure
transfer would be made to UNOSOM II transitional forces. This would create an
extended transfer period between UNITAF and UNOSOM II in order to better achieve continuity of operations. Once transition of all HRS to UNOSOM II forces was complete, operational control would be shifted from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. As relieved by UNOSOM II troops, U.S. and coalition forces not committed to the UNOSOM II operation would redeploy.\(^7\)

UNITAF’s phases did not have a specific time line. Shift between phases was situationally dependent. However, considerable delay was encountered in moving the U.N. bureaucracy to get the follow-on UNOSOM II operation set up. This effected the UNITAF commander because it extended phases III and IV beyond what was required based strictly on military considerations.

A total of 38,301 military troops from 24 countries were involved in UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope at its height in January 1993. They were deployed only in the lower half of Somalia below the horn in the areas hardest hit by famine. The operation covered a total of 40 percent of the country’s land mass. According to staff officers on both the Joint and CENTCOM staffs, Operation Restore Hope went essentially as planned.\(^8\)

**UNOSOM II.** U.S. diplomacy and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff drove U.N. strategy, policy and planning for UNOSOM II.\(^9\) Based on these efforts, the Secretary General developed and reported his assessment of the situation, proposed concept of operations, and plan for UNOSOM II to the U.N. Security Council in his letter of 3 March 1992.\(^20\) Pursuant to this letter, the Security Council passed resolution 815 on 26 March 1993, authorizing UNOSOM II as a Chapter 7 operation.
UNOSOM II provides a substantial U.N. force of 28,000 total troops including 8,000 logistic and support personnel. Unlike UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II is driven by an overarching policy and strategy laid out by the Secretary General and backed up by a well thought out concept of operations with specific operational phases. The overall U.N. strategy involves three stages. Stage I, achieved through the U.S. led UNITAF operation, restored a secure environment. Stage II comprises rehabilitation of Somalia, rebuilding the institutions of government and infrastructure. UNOSOM II is designed to accomplish this objective. Stage III completes reconstruction of Somalia through the indigenous offices and institutions of legitimate Somali government. UNOSOM II is designed in four phases as follows:

Phase I  - Transfer of control from UNITAF to UNOSOM
Phase II - Consolidation and expansion of security
Phase III - Transfer of control to civilian institutions
Phase IV - Redeployment of UNOSOM II forces

UNOSOM II concept of operations begins by expanding U.N. coverage to the entire country vice maintaining a more limited scope as in UNITAF. This is based on the fact that reestablishing the Somali government should apply to the entire country. UNOSOM II envisions using personnel from UNITAF to the maximum extent possible in order to achieve the greatest degree of continuity and smoothest possible transition between the operations. This also serves to maximize efficiency through cost reduction.
by minimizing training requirements for new personnel. The U.S. will initially provide logistics support for UNOSOM II along with a quick reaction force designed to respond if security degenerates where UNOSOM II forces cannot handle the situation.22

The reason 28,000 troops are deemed sufficient in UNOSOM II to cover the entire country of Somalia, when it took some 38,000 personnel in Operation Restore Hope to establish stability, is because security has now improved - thanks to UNITAF. Also, intelligence, or information resources in U.N. terms, is now adequate in theater to allow for moving and tailoring forces to meet the threat wherever it arises. Further, the Somali Police Force, although in its infancy, has nevertheless been reestablished and is capable of making a contribution to security. Most importantly though, the U.S. will still underwrite the operation through the Quick Reaction Force. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force will start off in-country. When security and stability permits it will become a sea-based force, and ultimately it will move back to the U.S.23

Command and control of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force will remain under U.S. CENTCOM, but will support the U.N. commander. Command of U.S. logistics forces will remain under U.S. CENTCOM, while control will be subordinated directly to the U.N. commander. The U.N. chain of command will follow their normal procedures for peacekeeping operations, running from the U.N. military commander on-scene to the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative in-country who is authorized to take whatever action deemed necessary to carry out the mandate of the Security Council resolution. From there it passes to the U.N. Secretary General, and finally the Security Council.24 UNOSOM II officially took control of operations in Somalia on 4 May 1993.
CHAPTER III

KEY OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

While all of the Principles of War and concepts of operational design apply to operations in the realm of peace-enforcement and forced humanitarian assistance ventures in the middle of the operational continuum, analysis of the recently completed Somalia operations, UNOSOM and UNITAF, and the plans for UNOSOM II, highlight five key axioms with unique characteristics. These include: objective; rules of engagement (ROE); unity of command; operational sustainment; and transition between major operations. To improve the likelihood of mission success, these five axioms should be given extra attention in operational planning for these types of endeavors. UNOSOM is an excellent example of failure where these principles were not adequately considered in planning. UNITAF, on the other hand, is a model for how to apply them correctly to achieve the desired objective.

OBJECTIVE. Development of a clear operational objective, which can be articulated to subordinate operational commanders, is perhaps the most important issue. From this almost all other operational considerations stem. The problem is that in the middle of the operational continuum the objective is more difficult to determine.

U.N. Security Council resolutions usually provide little in the way of coherent overarching policy and strategy, or desired end-state, for the operational commander to use as a vehicle for establishing a reasonable objective, especially when the paucity of resources normally provided by the U.N. are taken into account. Resources, upon which
the U.N. must rely on member nations to provide, are more often than not inadequate to accomplish lofty Security Council mandate objectives. If all the diplomacy the U.N. could muster could not resolve the chaotic situation in Somalia, then it is hard to understand how 550 peacekeepers could have much impact on 6.7 million people in an enormous country with numerous warring factions, no government and no infrastructure. Thus, it should not be surprising UNOSOM I was a complete failure. The lack of resources alone muddied the waters in defining a realistic objective.

To complicate matters further, peace-enforcement operations will probably commence while the international community is trying to sort out its policy and develop a strategy. It is not easy in the international forum to get disparate nations to agree on a course of action. When they do agree, the language will most likely be vague, in a form which each nation can interpret slightly differently, putting their spin on it, in order to serve individual national interests. None of this helps the operational commander deduce operational objectives. However, establishing a reasonable objective remains the essential task if success is to be achieved.

Whatever the military operational objectives are determined to be, they must be established so they are achievable given resource constraints. This may mean falling well short of a U.N. Security Council mandate. Further, success must be measured against the military operational objective and not the broad tenants of the Security Council mandate. For example, in Operation Restore Hope, the Security Council resolution envisions a Somalia which is a fully functioning, peaceful nation. Operation Restore Hope clearly did not achieve this altruistic objective. However, Operation Restore
was enormously successful and masterfully attained its operational objective.

It should be noted that the U.N. really did not develop an overarching Somalia strategy until the Secretary General laid it out in his letter to the U.N. Security Council on 3 March 1993, well after the U.S. led UNITAF operation had commenced in December 1992. Further, if the U.S. had not pushed the U.N., the recent transition to UNOSOM II probably would not have occurred. According to U.S. News and World Report, "United Nations Secretary General ... privately asked the United States to extend its command of the relief operation in Somalia beyond last week's scheduled transfer of command to the U.N. However, Pentagon officials say that the U.N. chief's request was swiftly turned down because U.S. leaders had grown impatient with the cost and logistical problems of the operation." This is not to say the Secretary General's concern about the U.N.'s ability to manage these types of operations is not valid. The U.N.'s past record would indicate such apprehension is justified. To develop a useful operational objective, however, a clear understanding of the end-state is important. Operation Restore Hope's end-state was plainly articulated in President Bush's policy speech before the operation commenced unlike the circumstances in UNOSOM.

**ROE**. ROE is a major consideration in planning any military operation. Conflict in the center of the operational continuum may lack the same degree of clarity of objective compared to more traditional military interactions. Further, the enemy is likely to be more difficult to discern, perhaps being just a small portion of a basically homogeneous population operating in the same arena as friendly forces. This is certainly the case in Somalia where the warring factions are only a small segment of the general
populace. In larger contingency operations, the enemy usually occupies different
territory with a relatively well defined front, and/or has different physical, cultural or
language characteristics distinguishing them from friendly or neutral military forces or
civilians.

Designing ROE in these circumstances to achieve the objective without putting
friendly forces at a considerable disadvantage is difficult. In Operation Restore Hope,
ROE was well managed. Although actual ROE is classified, observation of the conduct
of the operation through open sources sheds light on this element of the operational
plan. While it appears to have included authorization for the use of force in some
limited circumstances beyond self-defense, self-defense was the undergirding factor.
According to New York Times correspondent Jane Perlez, ROE instructions on the day
the operation commenced were, "...to shoot only in self-defense, but in the edgy
environment of chaotic Mogadishu, ...(soldiers) will have to judge each potential
confrontation carefully." Further, when soldiers over stepped their bounds they were
held accountable. Consequently, non-combatants were generally not interfered with.
This served to convince the general population that the U.N. forces were indeed serving
their best overall interest.

In developing ROE, the mission objective is extremely important. UNITAF’s end-
state was very well defined, despite the potentially fuzzy nature of the operation. The
objective only called for restoration of adequate security to allow for humanitarian aid to
flow to those in need - peace-enforcement for humanitarian assistance. Consequently,
disarming the populace or the warring factions was not an objective unless those arms
were actively being employed in preventing humanitarian assistance. This was a very
good call as it probably reduced resistance to U.S. and coalition forces. If an aggressive
disarmament policy had been pursued, particularly if it had been announced prior to the
operation, the warring factions would have had a lot less to lose if they fought since their
principle resources, their weapons, would have been confiscated anyway.

Others would argue, however, including the U.N. Secretary General, without
disarmament real security does not exist. This is akin to "the chicken or the egg"
argument. Does the problem stem from availability of the weapons or the people who
have the weapons? Operations in Somalia have shown peace can be enforced without
confiscating weapons. However, given the mentality of the Somalis, and the disposition
of the warlords, there is a degree of truth to the contention that in the long run the
weapons must be removed and the people disarmed except for legitimate military and
police forces under the control of authorized civilian leadership if true stability is to be
achieved. Then, if the weapons are not eliminated, probably only the presence of a large
external force will be able to maintain peace and security.

Another ROE consideration stems from the way the U.N. Security Council
authorizes military operations. Security Council resolutions are extremely vague and
generally allow whatever means necessary to carry out the mandate whether peace-
enforcement or peacekeeping. To the degree there are limits imposed, they are based
more on the physical constraints of size and types of forces, and weapons authorized. In
UNOSOM, with only 50 observers and 500 troops committed, their ability to carry out
the U.N. mandate, given the threat, did not in reality permit the necessary freedom of
action. Due to the ratio of belligerents to peacekeepers, even though the U.N. Security Council resolution authorized use of whatever means necessary to carry out the mandate, force would have meant virtual suicide against a vastly superior belligerent both in numbers and weapons.

Thus, the operational commander must not only decipher and understand the Security Council mandate, but then without clear guidance determine the operational objectives which will achieve the mandate given the resources provided, and craft ROE to provide subordinate commanders the direction necessary to carry out their assignment. Add to it the complexity of these types of situations in determining the belligerent, and the importance of maintaining the moral high ground due to the nature of these operations, designing effective ROE is truly a challenge. The results of the Operation Restore Hope lend it considerable credibility as the model for future operations at this place on the operational continuum. Well constructed ROE can significantly help in attaining the objective. Poor ROE can make the task substantially more difficult.

UNITY OF COMMAND. In coalition warfare, unity of command is a major issue. Depending on the forces involved and the commander, it could very possibly be the major issue. In large operations, such as UNITAF with 24 different countries providing forces, the operational commander is faced with the unenviable task of coordinating many extremely diverse organizations to achieve unity of effort and a common objective. Issues associated with unity of command must be addressed and resolved or the entire operation may find itself in jeopardy. In the more hostile environment associated with peace-enforcement as opposed to peacekeeping operations, the criticality of adequate
coordination for unity of effort, or unity of command, is elevated to an even higher level.

In Operation Restore Hope, unity of effort was achieved through aggressive coordination with each nation providing forces, and by the leadership of an extremely strong lead state in charge of the endeavor. Although not directly under the command of the U.S. Joint Operational Commander, coalition forces essentially subordinated their forces to his direction. However, diplomatic and political considerations do have a significant effect on unity of command. If they are not accounted for, their potentially negative effect could jeopardize the objective.

When dealing with a western coalition which has probably worked together before and has at least some general similarities in culture, procedures and equipment, unity of command is difficult enough. How to coordinate all the vastly different forces characteristic of a truly multinational U.N. operation presents all sorts of additional problems. For example, can personnel of one religion be intermingled with those of another without causing cultural problems? Are any of the forces historic enemies with other axes to grind? If one country's forces feel slighted, significant diplomatic problems could be generated as well. This is not the type of thing a force commander needs to deal with while trying to pay maximum attention to a dangerous and complex military operation. However, it is something the operational commander must be prepared to handle or else risk disruption of military activities. A well conceived plan, anticipating unity of command problems and developing work-arounds in advance, minimizes both the chance of mission disruption and the time which must be spent resolving differences once operations commence.
Unity of command considerations lend support to selecting a major power to lead a combined operation, particularly when it is a complex operation which involves open hostilities, such as those with peace-enforcement mandates. A major power probably has more experience dealing with joint and combined operations and the problems associated with them in the first place. In addition, a powerful leader is more likely to be able to subordinate others for the good of the whole. Weaker powers may have a more difficult time achieving unity of command from this perspective.

UNITAF operations in Somalia are an excellent model for how to construct a plan with sufficient flexibility to achieve unity of effort in a diverse multinational force. By dividing the area into eight HRS sectors, there was enough latitude in the operational plan for every force to be assigned with other forces with which they could get along and compliment. Further, every nation felt it had a stake in, and was making a contribution to the operation.

**OPERATIONAL SUSTAINMENT.** Sustainment is essential in any operation. Inadequate logistic support is more likely to cripple an operation faster than any other factor. Well supported forces are generally capable forces. Well supported forces probably can err yet recover. Logistics support problems are, however, complicated by the multinational nature of peace-enforcement operations. Every country's forces have their individual logistics train required to support their unique equipment. Depending on the cultures involved, food requirements may vary significantly. If one unit runs short of something it may not be easy to divert surpluses from the first available unit. To the maximum extent possible, operational plans should account for differences and
similarities between forces. Placing forces together which share a high degree of equipment interoperability, and whose cultures allow for easy assimilation, reduces sustainment problems. Once again, the UNITAF operation is an example where these problems were minimized due to the way the operational plan was crafted.

However, this did not stop forces just showing up to UNITAF without logistics support and expecting the U.N. to provide it. The U.N. generally supports forces committed by member nations through direct reimbursement or civilian contracts, none of which were in place in Somalia and many of which could not be implemented in the local area, due to lack of infrastructure. A general characteristic of peace-enforcement type operations is the host country infrastructure for logistics support is gone or not accessible. As noted in the New York Times on the eve of the UNITAF operation, "...(the) troops have to bring in everything they need from electrical generators to refrigeration equipment to water to road repair supplies."^{27}

Further, since the U.S. was leading UNITAF, some of the coalition forces expected the U.S. to provide logistical support for their operations. At any rate, they looked to the U.S. to fill any gap left by the U.N. Many forces from smaller nations do not have the resources to provide their sustainment requirements in U.N. operations. Their defense budgets simply cannot afford it. This caused some confusion at the beginning of UNITAF.

Operation Restore Hope was supported by Maritime Pre-positioned Ships (MPS) at the commencement of the operation. In addition, much of the U.S. Army's support equipment was moved by TRANSCOM through the Military Sealift Command on
contract vessels. Some of these ship's drafts were too deep to allow access to Mogadishu harbor, significantly complicating the arrival of support equipment. Further, some of the ships were not configured with roll-on/roll-off (RORO) capability or indigenous cranes. There were no cranes at Mogadishu capable of off-loading large ships.

The U.S. has been called upon to continue logistics support in UNOSOM II primarily because there is no other country with the capability to support such a large operation in an area with so little infrastructure. Without logistics support the entire UNOSOM II operation will fall apart. Since the U.S. has already committed so much to this operation and consequently has so much at stake in its successful outcome, there is little choice but for the U.S. to continue logistic support to UNOSOM II.

**TRANSITION BETWEEN MAJOR OPERATIONS.** Transition between major operations, such as between UNOSOM, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, presents some of the biggest challenges to operational planners and offers some of the most critical considerations for peace-enforcement type undertakings. Hostilities do not materialize out of thin air without prior deterioration of circumstances and some degree of warning. As an adverse situation develops, considerable effort to resolve the problem peacefully through political, diplomatic, economic and military operations short of hostilities normally takes place before forces are committed to combat. Consequently, it is very likely a peacekeeping mission will be underway in the trouble spot when it becomes necessary to transition up a level on the operational continuum to peace-enforcement operations. This was the case in Somalia with UNOSOM. It also may be the current situation in the former Yugoslavia.
The crux of the matter is that when military forces are introduced in a combat situation, it is very difficult to keep them from not being viewed as a belligerent by one side or another. The introduction of a U.N. peace-enforcement contingent on top of a U.N. peacekeeping force can put the peacekeeping force at risk since they are both identified with the same organization. However, the peacekeepers mandate would not have inserted them in an adversarial relationship (they would have been neutral), and consequently their forces almost certainly would not be structured for such operations. Thus, the peace-enforcement operational commander must provide for this circumstance.

In such a case, the peacekeeping force may be able to be withdrawn first, but that will more than likely cause significant diplomatic problems. A natural tendency is to hope things will work out peacefully. Since the peacekeeping force is probably making some contribution to that effort, the inclination will be not to extract it until the last possible moment when all other options have failed. Then, of course, it is too late and the peace-enforcement operational commander must deal with the problem.

Since peacekeeping forces most likely will not be withdrawn first, plans to reinforce them or get them out quickly after a peace-enforcement force arrives must be a priority operational consideration. This dilemma makes it more difficult to obtain consensus for peace-enforcement operations from the nations with forces committed in the peacekeeping contingent. In Somalia, this was not nearly as significant a problem as will be encountered in the former Yugoslavia if the transition is made to some kind of peace-enforcement operation in that crisis. In UNOSOM only 550 peacekeepers were on the ground all from one nation and located in Mogadishu where the coalition forces
were to come ashore.

Transition from peace-enforcement to peacekeeping operations carries less military risk but is also complicated. The operational commander must structure the peace-enforcement effort to compensate for U.N. bureaucratic delays in getting a follow-on peacekeeping operation set up. If peacekeeping is warranted, the nature of the situation is not urgent, thus encouraging procrastination. If the situation deteriorates, the peace-enforcement operation would be continued instead.

Also at issue for the operational commander is how to orchestrate a smooth transition between the peace-enforcement force and the peacekeeping force so as not to lose stability gains in the process. A detailed transition plan, anticipating difficult spots and providing for continuity, indoctrination and training of replacement forces is essential. If the transition between major operations does not go well, a lot of effort may have been sacrificed for naught.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

Operation Restore Hope was a superb military operation. It accomplished the objective restoring security to Somalia and reestablishing the flow of humanitarian aid. Due to U.S. and coalition effort, mass starvation in Somalia has, for the moment at least, been eliminated. Operation Restore Hope is a model for future operations in the middle of the operational continuum. The plan masterfully integrated disparate forces, retained the moral high ground thereby diminishing resistance, and achieved the objective with expediency.

Combatant involvement of U.S. forces in peace-enforcement missions appears to be on the rise in today's world. Adaptive planning is key to preparing for the numerous scenario variations at the lower end of the military operational continuum. As operations UNOSOM and UNITAF in Somalia show, a good operational plan is the precursor for success. Without it, victory is very unlikely. In peace-enforcement operations the elements of objective, ROE, unity of command, operational sustainment and transition between major operations, have unique characteristics applicable in these types of multinational military ventures which should receive extra consideration in operational planning. Their neglect increases the risk of failure in comparison to other types of military operations.

In our complex world, a strong agent state is probably the only realistic vehicle for leading international U.N. peace-enforcement operations. Whoever leads peace-
enforcement operations is likely to need the capability to go it alone as obligations from other nations may evaporate depending on political developments and realities. If an operation has the potential to fall apart if one or a few of the participating nations pull out, then the chance of success is reduced unless a strong state which can rely on its ability to go it alone, although operating in coalition, is leading the operation.

Contention as to what the right thing to do will more than likely be greater in peace-enforcement operations than in less adversarial peacekeeping operations, making consensus in such cases even harder to achieve and maintain. As the only military superpower remaining, such operations may well fall at the feet of the U.S. if they are to be done at all. While politicians will continue to determine where and when to commit U.S. forces, given today's trends, the military will likely find itself routinely engaged in peace-enforcement type operations in the middle of the operational continuum.

Consequently, consideration of the unique factors affecting these types of operations is essential in future military deliberate and crisis planning.
NOTES


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16. "Logistics Concept for UNOSOM II," Overhead Transparency Presentation to the
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18. LTC Rod Peil, CENTCOM Staff, telephone interview, 22 April 1993.

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