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CIVILIANS IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY FIELD OPERATIONS

BY

JO ELLARESA CONDRILL
United States Department of the Army Civilian

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Civilians in Support of Military Field Operations

Jo Ellaresa Condrell

Military Studies Project

15 April 1993

During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, highly trained U.S. government and contractor employees maintained complex weapons systems, issued new equipment, and in other ways supported the efforts of combat forces. The conflict could not have been fought effectively without them. All Services employed U.S. civilians in the theater but policies and procedures covering them varied. Concerns about insurance, families, and notification of next of kin persist. Military concerns about the endurance and reliability of U.S. government and contractor employees also persist. Several agencies are addressing these concerns and improving procedures. Some Army doctrine is being updated to include the civilian work force. Yet, overall our war-fighting doctrine has not clearly defined the role of civilians in a modern fighting force. This paper addresses the contributions of government and contractor employees during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It highlights the need to recognize the presence of civilians on the battlefield in Joint and Army doctrine, policy, and plans.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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ABSTRACT

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During Operation Desert Shield/Storm, highly trained U.S. government and contractor employees maintained complex weapons systems, issued new equipment, and in other ways supported the efforts of combat forces. The conflict could not have been fought effectively without them. All Services employed U.S. civilians in the theater but policies and procedures covering them varied. Concerns about insurance, families, and notification of next of kin persist. Military concerns about the endurance and reliability of U.S. government and contractor employees also persist. Several agencies are addressing these concerns and improving procedures. Some Army doctrine is being updated to include the civilian work force. Yet, overall our war-fighting doctrine has not clearly defined the role of civilians in a modern fighting force. This paper addresses the contributions of government and contractor employees during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It highlights the need to recognize the presence of civilians on the battlefield in Joint and Army doctrine, policy, and plans. This study does not include foreign nationals, host nation support or non-appropriated fund employees. Research included study of Joint Publications, Army Field Manuals, Air Force and Navy doctrine, DOD’s Final Report to the Congress, Lessons Learned, and other Service and Defense publications. Many interviews were conducted with individuals in the business of developing doctrine. Among these individuals were members of the Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Joint Doctrine Center. Concluding that there is a need for doctrinal coverage of civilians on the battlefield, the study closes with recommendations to incorporate government and contractor employees in Army and Joint doctrine.
Civilian employees, despite seemingly insurmountable logistical problems, unrelenting pressure, and severe time constraints, successfully accomplished what this nation asked of them in a manner consistent with the highest standards of excellence and professionalism.¹

Senate Concurrent Resolution 36
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INTRODUCTION

In 1973 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger adopted the "total force" policy which included active, reserve, civilian and allied personnel. Seventeen years later the Total Force Policy Report to Congress declared the "total force" a success. "There has been unprecedented integration of purpose and capability between the active and reserve components, and improved utilization of the DoD civilian, contractor and host nation support communities."²

In his January 1993 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated, "Recent experience and success in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, and in military and disaster relief operations, have demonstrated the wisdom of fully integrating active, reserve, and civilian capabilities."³

Yet, the primary focus since the "total force" policy's inception has been on the Reserve Component, leading one author to refer to civilians as the "invisible component."⁴

This was an apt description. The lack of doctrine and policy covering the civilian work force deployed during Operation Desert Shield/Storm caused a host of problems that adversely affected both the civilians and the military they supported. Since then, much has been written about the government employee's mobilization, deployment, and employment. However, the commanders' responsibilities to lead and care for government civilians and Defense contractor employees during field operations have not been adequately explored.
This study addresses the contributions of the civilian work force during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. It emphasizes the need to include the civilian role in Joint and Army doctrine, policy, and plans. The study also examines some of the problems and actions taken to correct them considering two of the Army Chief of Staff’s Imperatives: Solid War-Fighting Doctrine and Competent, Confident Leaders.

CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Operation Desert Shield/Storm highlighted military dependence on government civilians and contractor employees on the battlefield, some in forward areas. A briefing by the 22nd Support Command, which was responsible for all theater logistics, stated that forward deployed civilians were "invaluable in assisting in accomplishment of the mission."5 The Department of Defense Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War stated that by February 1991 about 4,500 U.S. civilians were employed in Southwest Asia.6

Who were these deployed civilians? They were employees of various Department of Defense agencies such as Logistics, Communications, Intelligence, and Mapping. The Army Corps of Engineers, Army-Air Force Exchange Service and other federal agencies also provided support. However, the Army Materiel Command was the principal source of in-theater civilian support. Some 1,500 government and 3,000 contractor employees in Southwest Asia were involved in new equipment issue as part of force
modernization and in maintenance of complex technical systems.

According to the report to Congress, the Air Force had approximately 200 civilians in Southwest Asia, including 44 engineering and technical services personnel regularly assigned to Tactical Air Force operating squadrons. Navy civilian personnel in theater numbered 500 to 600 with a similar number of civilian mariners afloat. The Marine Corps had the support of only 25 civilians engaged primarily in aircraft and ship repair.7

A recent Logistics Management Institute (LMI) study showed that 515 U.S. contractor employees were in the theater of operations between 8 August and 31 October 1990. The number grew to 945 between 16 January 1991 and 22 February 1991. (See Appendix.) These employees deployed to support the commodity commands and to insure that their multimillion-dollar weapon systems functioned properly in the harsh desert environment. Contractor-supported critical systems included the Bradley, M1 and M1A1 tanks, Patriot, OH-58D helicopter mast mounted sight, and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). According to the LMI study, thirty-four contractor employees went into Iraq to support their equipment. Most other employees were at echelons above corps.8 Consequently, their presence was not highly visible to corps and division commanders.

Why is it necessary to have civilians on the battlefield? One of the main reasons is that their specialized skills and expertise are not sufficiently available in the military. In some cases the capability was deliberately assigned to civilians, especially contractors, to conserve military manpower. It is
less expensive to hire a civilian than to recruit and train a soldier to do some jobs. In Fiscal Year 1991 civilian pay within the Department of Defense was estimated at 40 percent of the total compensation for personnel, excepting retired pay. In short, civilians are on the battlefield to provide expertise that is not available through uniformed service members and to make the most effective use of government resources.

Support provided by government civilians during the Persian Gulf conflict included, but was not limited to: communications, intelligence, commercial contracting, depot and intermediate level maintenance, weapon systems modification, graves registration and mortuary services. Civilians in the non-appropriated fund category provided morale, welfare and recreation programs and staffed the Army-Air Force Exchanges. Some of the civilians most experienced in field support are the Logistics Assistance Representatives (LARs). Logistics Assistance Offices have been operating overseas since 1965. One was established in Southwest Asia on 19 August 1990. Two-thirds of the 1,200 people in the Logistics Assistance Program are civilians, primarily technical representatives. These civilians are "emergency essential" and often deploy with military units. They help commanders resolve problems beyond their organic capability or responsibility.

Civilian Logistics Assistance Representatives wear uniforms similar to military uniforms and they may carry a sidearm for personal protection. Although they normally work at the
Division Support Command (DISCOM) level, some of the civilian Representatives accompanied their units into Iraq. They lived in the desert under the same conditions as the troops. Several of these employees even refused invitations to spend Thanksgiving and Christmas in the comfort of the large cities and remained with their units.13

Most civilians, however, worked in rear areas, not always a safe place as survivors of the SCUD attacks would attest. The Depot Systems Command established their base of operations at Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia. More than 1,000 people set up a major depot operation. There they provided theater-level maintenance, supply and retrograde sustainment to the forces. This group was also responsible for the "roll over" in which units exchanged their M1 Abrams tanks for the improved M1A1. Staffed entirely by volunteers, the speed with which the support group deployed is evidence of the resilience and responsiveness of the Army's organic industrial base.14

CONCERNS, ISSUES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

With a civilian work force of such magnitude operating in a theater of war without doctrine or procedures, problems were certain to follow. Some of these problems dealt with the care and training of civilians and their concerns about pay, life insurance, and family support during their absences. Other issues dealt with their reliability and the chain of command. Operation Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned and After Action
Reports, Government Accounting Office reports and the DoD Report to Congress examined many of these areas of concern.

Additionally, reports from Logistics Assistance Offices revealed problems encountered by their staff. One civilian from Fort Carson was denied rations for the flight to Saudi Arabia because he was not listed as a member of the unit. He was the only civilian on the flight.

A more serious incident involved a civilian Logistics Assistance Representative who suffered a heart attack. He received adequate care in-theater although information concerning his whereabouts and condition was not always available. When he arrived at Dover Air Force Base after being evacuated, however, he was left on the hangar floor with the explanation that the requirement to get him back to the U.S. had been met. Although some military personnel experienced a similar fate, they were better able to use the system to proceed to their destinations.

Another government civilian was killed when he mishandled a small bomb.15

Some of these problems were due to lack of knowledge and can be resolved by better training. Certainly, training in the recognition of munitions and the hazards involved with handling them might have prevented one civilian’s death. Many of the issues and concerns, however, can be attributed to a lack of doctrine, policy, and up-to-date procedures. Four of these concerns are presented in greater detail for illustrative purposes.
Status

Are U.S. civilian employees on the battlefield considered noncombatants? The Office of the Judge Advocate General covered this issue in Operation Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned. They defined civilians operating in a combat service support role as "[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof" under provisions of Article 4A(4) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. "As such, they may carry weapons; they are lawful targets; and, if captured, they are entitled to prisoner of war status."

In another opinion, the Chief of the International and Operational Law Division in the Office of the Judge Advocate General stated: "These persons, in effect, are civilian substitutes for military personnel who would be combatants. As such, they risk: direct attack in an enemy's attack of a military objective, injury incidental to that attack, or capture."

Although this question arose during World War II, nothing in recent doctrine or literature spelled out the legal interpretations mentioned above.

Command and Control

Another area of concern that is getting less attention is the chain of command for deployed government and contractor employees both in conflict and nontraditional, humanitarian situations. Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned stated, "There was considerable confusion as to whether the military
commander or the civilian supervisor was in charge.\textsuperscript{18}
Commanders' responsibilities concerning civilians were not clear
as late as 18 January 1991 when the Army Central Command G1
questioned whether they had specific obligations for protection
of DOD civilian employees beyond reasonable care.\textsuperscript{19} The Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel had outlined obligations in a
message 4 January 1991 and reiterated that:

When assigned either permanently or TDY to areas
where hostilities are either occurring or likely
to occur commanders must provide civilian members
adequate equipment and other protection and must
not task them to perform a mission that involves
unreasonable risk of death or serious injury.
As far as practicable and consistent with the
needs of the military mission, civilian members
should be temporarily located away from the area
of immediate hostilities until hostilities subside.
The question of what constitutes "unreasonable
risk or adequate protection" must be answered by
the appropriate commander in theater.\textsuperscript{20}

These commanders' lack of knowledge may be attributable to
an absence of doctrine and policies covering civilians employed
in a theater of war. Considering the number of civilians who
will be needed to support the military on the battlefield or in
peace support operations such as Somalia in the future, a clearly
designated position in the chain of command must be addressed in
policy and doctrine.

In November 1991, the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
provided many recommendations to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Army for Procurement to improve procedures covering contractor
employees. Particularly pertinent here is the recommendation
that local unit commanders have operational control of in-theater
contractor personnel with administrative support above the corps level. The AIA also recommended orientation sessions for these employees before deployment.21

The Goldwater-Nichols Act provides that: "Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to and under the command of the commander of that command." An exception might be made for a "stovepipe" organization that carries out functions such as logistics for the Secretary of a military department. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm the Secretary of Defense did not make that exception.22

Although new policies have been written concerning the mobilization and employment of government civilians in field operations, little is written about commanders' responsibilities to lead and care for them. Should local unit commanders have operational control of government and contractor employees? Should civilians have a separate chain of command in a "stovepipe" organization?

The number of civilians needed to support military field operations in the future is destined to increase. Command relationships and subordinate commanders' responsibilities for civilians must be addressed in planning and doctrine, including tactics, techniques and procedures. This would support two of the Chief of Staff's Imperatives: Solid War-fighting Doctrine and Competent, Confident Leaders.
Issues concerning government and contractor employees in Operation Desert Shield/Storm are numerous. Many of them affect the morale of employees and "may hamper the ability of the Army to conduct future contingency operations." Figure 1 lists issues cited in Lessons Learned from this conflict. Each "Lesson" includes recommendations for corrective actions.

**ISSUES CONCERNING CIVILIANS**

1. Selection and identification of emergency essential positions and personnel.
2. Processing and pre-briefing of personnel to be deployed.
3. Training to survive in hostile/combat environment.
4. Civilian Management training for commanders.
5. Command and Control (C2).
7. Care and support in-country.
9. Family support for civilians.
10. Contractor support in contingency operations.
11. Mobilization planning and exercising the deployment of civilian personnel.

Figure 1

Two of the main issues that have not been clarified concern command and control and the role of contractor employees in
support of military field operations. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) has addressed many of these issues. The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution system (AMOPES) has been updated. Army Regulations on Casualty and Mortuary Affairs, and Mobilization Planning and Management have also been rewritten.

Reliability

The reliability of U.S. government civilians and contractor employees on the battlefield is of continuing concern to some military members. Indeed, a few of these employees did leave the Southwest Asia theater without authorization. In February 1991 the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel indicated that only 13 of the more than 1,000 civilian employees deployed to Southwest Asia had left without permission or refused to go. Several of the 13 cited stress or concern for personal safety. One cited unclear directions from a supervisor. Disciplinary actions were taken against four of these employees, two others resigned, and action was pending in the other cases.²⁵ No study has been conducted to determine cause and effect or to compare these events to absent without leave (AWOL) rates. There is no evidence of a mission failure due to the actions of these persons who were replaced by other civilians. Operation Desert Shield/Storm Lessons Learned stated: "There were minimal complaints of poor performance or failure to get the job done, rather, there were many success stories. . . ."²⁶

Department of Defense Directive 1400.31, Mobilization
Management of the DoD Civilian Work Force, indicates that the Assistant Secretary of Defense Force Management and Personnel is responsible for insuring rapid and effective mobilization of the DoD civilian work force. It states that this official shall: "Publish Instructions, Manuals, and Handbooks for promulgating DoD policy and implementing procedures for planning, exercising, and executing the mobilization of the DoD civilian work force." 27

Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, Emergency-Essential (E-E) DoD U.S. Citizen Civilian Employees, was updated in April 1992. This directive establishes procedures to insure that employees in positions that have been designated "emergency essential" continue to perform until relieved. It also covers employees whose positions are not designated "emergency essential" but whose continued performance is deemed necessary to support combat-essential systems. This rather comprehensive Directive includes providing civilian employees protective equipment, work related and law of war training, and training in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It does not, however, spell out a policy on command and control, nor does it cover contractor employees. 28

In 1982 the Defense Science Board, chaired by Norman R. Augustine, concluded a study dealing with systems' effectiveness if contractor employees did not remain at their duty stations during a conflict. Prior to the study some consideration was given to subjecting these employees to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The task force firmly rejected that idea.
The Board identified two types of contractor support. The first requires contractors to provide engineer and technical support until the user is capable. The second type is support of "special, sensitive systems" that could not continue to operate without contractor support. Lack of support would have severe or catastrophic impact on military operations if the system ceased to function. Among their findings still current are:

1. There is no common understanding within DOD and the military services regarding the distinction between contractor employees who are considered mission essential and those employees who are critical to sustaining military operations.

2. Contractor employees have an outstanding record of reliability during crisis and actual combat.

The Board also commented, "positive action needs to be taken to indirectly motivate civilian employees to remain at hazardous locations and assignments in time of tension or hostilities." People perform better when they feel included, part of a team, not an "outsider." Inclusion of the civilian component in doctrine can foster an attitude of acceptance that may be later translated into battlefield competence, reliability, and unity of effort.

The DOD Final Report to Congress on Operation Desert Shield/Storm stated that some problems may have been caused by a failure to recognize the role of civilians in the Total Force. It presented several shortcomings, but identified only one "issue." Although DOD and the Services assumed some responsibility, the issue of the extent of
responsibility, rights, adequate guidelines for deployment, and administration of contractor personnel needs clarification for future deployment.

As of 1 March 1993, this issue had not been addressed. In a Memorandum thru the Chief of Staff for the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Subject: Contractor Support of Military Contingency Operation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel indicated frustration with the lack of emphasis given to these issues. Responsibility for developing Army policy covering contractor employees rests with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research Development and Acquisition). This issue has been surfaced at the General Officer Mobilization Review Board but it is not making progress.

ON-GOING STUDIES

In addition to the efforts of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, several studies concerning civilians in support of military operations are underway. Three major initiatives are:

a. Logistics Management Institute (LMI) Contractor support during Operation Desert Shield/Storm

b. Rand Corp Employment of civilians on the battlefield

c. Total Army Culture Executive Planning Board "Total Army Culture" Deployment of civilians Dual coding military/civilian, TDA/TOE

The recently completed Logistics Management Institute study identified contractor support during Operation Desert
Shield/Storm. Only contracts over $100,000 which had personnel managing, moving, or maintaining Army materiel were included. LMI pinpointed contractors in the Southwest Asia theater of operations. The Appendix to this paper contains a copy of the map they produced showing the dispersion of contractor employees during the last days of the conflict. Their observations noted that contractors performed an essential and vital role on the battlefield, although there was a widely perceived lack of command and control over them.33

The Rand Corporation study is to determine laws, policies, and procedures needed to protect interests of civilians and the government while facilitating participation of civilians in military operations. This study is expected to be completed in June 1993.34

The Total Army Culture Executive Planning Board is studying some of the same issues addressed by the Defense Science Board in 1982, including whether or not civilians should receive a direct commission while serving in a theater of war.35

The establishment of a "Total Army Culture" is an initiative stemming from the 1985 Army Inspector General Inspection of Civilian Personnel Management which indicated that Army leaders failed to lead and care for civilians. A Civilian Leader Development Action Plan (CLDAP), approved by the Chief of Staff in April 1990, recognized the need to integrate civilians into a "uniform corporate culture."

15
No study or plan will inculcate a new culture into the Army, however, until it is supported by senior level officials as well as the Chief of Staff, imbedded in doctrine, woven into Programs of Instruction and taught at all levels of military training, and included in the deliberate planning process.

CIVILIAN WORK FORCE IN ARMY DOCTRINE

Doctrine (is) every action that contributes to unity of purpose. . . it is what warriors believe in and act on.36

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN

Doctrine sets out the fundamental principles to guide the actions of military forces in support of national security objectives. Why do we need to incorporate civilians, a small segment of the force, in war-fighting doctrine? There are three very important reasons. First, civilians are part of the total force. Second, though small, the potential for harming the overall military effort is great if the individual is not properly indoctrinated and assimilated into the total force. Note some of the critical systems previously mentioned which these individuals support. Third, overall, Department of Defense civilians make up 23 percent of the total force. They should not be overlooked.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL
(As of 31 December 1991)

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*Direct Hire only (Does not include foreign nationals or non-appropriated fund personnel)
**Includes Marine Corps civilians
Source: 92 Defense Almanac

Figure 2

**Historical Reference**

During World War II the Army recognized the importance of government contractors to the war effort. In September 1942 the War Department published a Basic Field Manual to provide guidance for the employment of civilians on the battlefield. This 6-page, pocket-size manual, FM 30-27, Regulations for Technical Observers and Service Specialists Accompanying U.S. Army Forces in the Field, defined a technical observer as any person officially accredited by the War Department in time of war to observe and report on the operation of mechanical equipment or armament under field conditions, or assist in the maintenance or repair of such equipment. These technical personnel were employed by firms doing business with the government (contractors). FM 30-27 covered essentials such as: status (noncombatants subject to
military law), privileges, agreement, uniform, transportation, and discipline. The number of technical personnel authorized to be in the theater of war was to be kept to "an absolute minimum" and controlled by the Commanding General, Services of Supply.38

In August 1944, FM 30-27 was updated to include government employees and renamed, Regulations for Civilian Operations Analysts, Scientific Consultants, and Technical Observers Accompanying U.S. Army Forces in the Field. This 11-page manual added information on the assimilated rank and grade for analysts, consultants and technical observers. It stated that if captured they were entitled to the same treatment as commissioned officers, provided they were in possession of a properly authenticated Noncombatant’s Certificate of Identity. Another section added to the manual required covered personnel to "report to the agency concerned with their assignment for indoctrination in the special features pertinent to their assignment."39 Such indoctrination might mitigate the problems associated with employees leaving their place of duty in a theater of war.

In 1948, the Secretary of Army’s Annual Report expressed the importance of civilians to the force:

In every phase of its operations the Army is dependent to a great extent upon the support of its corps of civilian workers. From manufacturing to the highest policy-making these man and women--"soldiers without uniform"--are engaged in fundamental tasks of the Army.40

Following the war, however, the Army’s strategic vision and plans did not include civilians.
Current Army Efforts

If the current level of interest continues, the omissions following World War II will not be repeated and the civilian component of the "total force" will be included in future plans. A review of current doctrine revealed interest by the Army and the Joint Staff in incorporating government and contractor employees in doctrine and policy. The Pre-Publication issue of FM 100-1, The Army, December 1991, includes civilians in the section covering "The Total Army." This document, currently under revision, will expand the statement on civilians.

A significant effort is underway to update Army Personnel, Logistics, and Mobilization doctrine to correct some of the issues noted in Lessons Learned. FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine, is currently being revised. The Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) has begun to incorporate references to civilians on the battlefield in logistics doctrine. Among Field Manuals to be updated are: FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, FM 54-23, Materiel Management Center, Corps Support Command; FM 54-40, Area Support Group; FM 63-3, Combat Service Support Operations, Corps; FM 63-4, Combat Service Support, Theater Army; FM 100-16, Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, was recently developed. Describing rapid force projection requirements, it states: "These forces must be in carefully tailored combinations of active units, reserve components (RC), civilians, and industry." Rather than devoting a separate section on government and
On the other hand, it includes these components, as appropriate, throughout the document.

The Final Draft of FM 100-5, Operations, January 1993, includes civilians in its description of "The Total Army." This sentence follows: "The Army conducts operations as a total force with reserve and active components as fully integrated partners in America's defense plans." There is no further reference to civilians here. The section "Total Mission Awareness" should include awareness of the availability of contractor support for critical equipment such as MSE, Bradleys and M1A1." FM 100-5 is the capstone document for how the Army functions. Can it be complete if does not incorporate 16% of the Total Army, government civilians, and contractor employees? Efforts are underway to further refine this document and with more recent input it should more fully include the role of the civilian work force.

**Joint Doctrine**

Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ national military power to achieve the nation's strategic objectives. It is developed through the combined efforts of the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commanders, and the Joint Doctrine Center. The Joint Staff relies heavily on the Services to propose new doctrine and changes to existing doctrine. A review of Joint Publications revealed scant reference to government and contractor employees. Using the Joint Electronic Library (JEL), twenty Joint Publications were
found which contained the word "civilian." Most of these referred to civil affairs, civilian merchant mariners, and foreign nationals. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, refers twice to civilians. In the Preface it includes "our supporting civilians" as members of the joint team of the US Armed Forces. Again in the Afterword, referring to "the Persian Gulf crisis and conflict, 1990-1991," it refers to the "superb morale and professionalism of people--American fighting men and women and the civilians who participated in and supported the effort. . . ."42

Joint Pub 4.0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, includes references to the provision of supplies for civilians and civilian supply sources.43 In future revisions it would be helpful to have a definition for "civilian" included in the Definition section of the Glossary. Civilians that may be involved include: government contractors, U.S. government civilian employees, civilians providing host nation support, foreign nationals working for the U.S. government, and indigenous population. It also would be appropriate to include references to civilians, especially the reliance on government contractors, in Appendix B, Organization and Functions of Combatant Command Logistic Staff (J-4) and Functions of Joint Logistic Centers, Offices, and Boards. Most civilians involved in military field operations provide logistic support. Therefore, Joint Pub 4.0 should broaden the coverage of the role of civilian work force.

Joint Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and
Procedures, Appendix B, J-1, Personnel, quotes Joint Pub 0-2 concerning responsibilities. These include "the formulation of personnel policies and supervision of the administration of personnel of the command (including civilians under the supervision or control of the command or prisoners of war)." No further reference is made to civilians here. A specific policy statement should be included about government and contractor employees. Annex A to Appendix B, JTF J-1 checklist, addresses local, indigenous labor, but not U.S. civilians. Even though contractor and government employees work for a specific Service, their inclusion on the checklist would help obviate the shortcomings cited in the DOD report to Congress.

The March 1992 issue of Joint Pub 5-03.2, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System, Volume II, includes U.S. citizen civilians in the format for Personnel reporting, Annex E. Indications are that as Joint Publications are updated, the incorporation of civilian employees is being given some consideration. However, simply to mention "civilians" is not enough. Consideration must be given to the role they play in support of the military.

The government and contractor employee contribution, both in theater and in CONUS, cannot be denied, but it is often ignored. Civilians will continue to support U.S. military and peace support operations in the future. Therefore, we must raise the level of awareness of commanders and personnel at all levels of their responsibilities for government and contractor employees.
Revising Joint Doctrine

Assuming that the role of civilians in support of military field operations needs to be incorporated in current doctrine, how does it happen? Joint Pub 1-01, Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Development Program), provides guidance for submitting changes to existing publications. Recommendations to change a publication must be sent through Army channels to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000. Organizations should submit the recommended change with a proposal to change the document. In other words, spell out the change recommended and send a cover letter with it through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Concepts, Doctrine and Force Policy Division (DAMO-FDQ), 2C549, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310.

Since the Army has the greatest need of the civilian work force and since the Army has taken the lead in developing policy and procedures, it should pursue avenues to incorporate Army philosophy in Joint doctrine. Rather than ignoring historical lessons learned, now is the time to begin to further update our Joint concepts and doctrine.
Civilian Work Force in the Joint Strategic Planning System

The Army should state the role of civilians in military operations as an issue for the Joint Strategic Review, the beginning of the strategic planning process. This review is currently underway with a product expected in summer 1993. While such action may require a political decision by the Army leadership, it is time to increase the visibility of the civilian component and the Army’s reliance on them. This is especially true as we head into further cuts in the force structure.

The 1993 Joint Military Net Assessment expressed concern about the Defense Industrial Base. It cited a need to define critical industrial capabilities and develop mechanisms to monitor the capabilities. Although this concern focuses on manufacturing, it should be expanded to include the vital role Defense contractor employees play in support of military field operations. The Net Assessment does not mention government civilians.

Other documents that should incorporate the civilian component are the theater campaign plan and other plans which spell out the commander’s concept. It is most important that the logistics concept includes civilians since this is where the bulk of their numbers operate. The argument may be given that they are individuals, not units, and it is not necessary to address their role in such documents. However, if they are a vital component of the total force, as Joint Pub 1 says they are, to ignore them is to produce an incomplete concept.
CONCLUSION

The "invisible soldiers without uniform," U.S. government and contractor employees, are an essential component of the "total force." Operation Desert Storm could not have been successful without them. The absence of policy, planning and doctrine led to problems that adversely affected both the civilians and the military they supported.

The Army is moving forward in updating policy and doctrine to include more fully the civilian component. Work remains to be done: designating the chain of command for civilians, determining commanders' responsibilities to lead and care for U.S. civilians during military field operations, and developing policy covering contractor employees. While it may take some time for developers to fully understand the civilian role and incorporate it in all capstone doctrine, the Army leads other Services and the Joint Staff.

Joint doctrine and policies also need to be updated. The Army should take the initiative and propose changes to Joint doctrine since most civilians in support of military field operations work for them. These efforts should result in the incorporation of the civilian work force in the Joint Strategic Planning Process.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Army and Joint policy, doctrine and plans need to define clearly the role of U.S. civilians in support of military field operations. Although several efforts are underway to correct shortcomings, much remains to be done. The following recommendations are offered to more completely incorporate the civilian component in the "total force":

1. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel and Operations (DCSPER and DCSOPS) must promote a better understanding of Army policy and doctrine concerning civilians in support of field operations.

2. All senior leaders must promote the "total force" culture at every opportunity to encourage unity of effort.

3. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must insure that the civilian role on the battlefield and in peace support operations is fully incorporated in all Army capstone doctrine.

4. DCSOPS should take the lead to insure that the position of U.S. government and contractor employees in the chain of command is designated clearly in operation plans.

5. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) should develop policy and procedures covering contractors deployed in support of military field operations.

6. ODCSOPS (DAMO-FDQ) should propose changes to include the civilian work force in Joint Doctrine to JCS J-7.

7. DCSPER should monitor all efforts regarding the civilian work force to insure consistent policies and doctrine.
8. TRADOC must include training on government and contractor employee roles in Service schools at all levels to help change the corporate culture to one of inclusion rather than exclusion.

9. The DCSPER should lead the Army Staff in developing a Combat Commander's Handbook on Government and Contractor Personnel similar to FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence with contents similar to the 1942 FM 30-27.

10. DCSPER and DCSOPS should develop a statement concerning the role of the civilian work force supporting military operations in the field and forward it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for inclusion in the on-going Joint Strategic Review and subsequent documents of the Joint Strategic Planning System. This would help insure coverage of the civilian component in operation plans.

In summary, the "invisible" civilians are coming into focus. A sincere effort is being made to incorporate them in policy, planning, and doctrine. The Chief of Staff's Imperatives, Solid War-fighting Doctrine, and Competent, Confident Leaders, demand that we persist in this endeavor.
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ENDNOTES


3 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Department of Defense (Washington, D.C. December 1990), 49.

4 James M. Philpott, Total Force 2000: Reshaping the Civilian Component of the Army, (Carlisle, PA, 1992), ii.


6 Final Report to Congress, 599.

7 Final Report to Congress, 599-601.

8 Information obtained from material presented at LMI Briefing for the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 9 March 1993, briefing slides.


10 Final Report to Congress, 599-600.


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30 Final Report to Congress, 604.

31 Thomas P. Carney, LTG, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel "Contractor Support of Military Contingency Operation," memorandum for Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, 1 March 1993.

32 David Snyder, HQ Department of the Army, Interview by author, 5 March 1993, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

33 Information obtained from material presented at LMI Briefing for HQ DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 9 March 1993, briefing slides.

34 Information obtained from material presented at Rand Corporation Briefing to Army Staff representatives, 12 March 1993, briefing slides.


36 Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN, Fleet Tactics, as quoted in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, November 1991, 5.


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