Joint Commanders and Budget Authority

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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified

2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A

2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADE SCHEDULE N/A

4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
   NDU-ICAF-92-AS

6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
   Industrial College of the Armed Forces

6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ICAF-FAP

7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
   National Defense University

7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
   Fort Lesley J. McNair
   Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ICAF-FAP

9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Lawrence C. Craddock

13a. TYPE OF REPORT Research

13b. TIME COVERED FROM Aug 91 to Apr 92

14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) April 92

15. PAGE COUNT 45

17. COSATI CODES

18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

SEE ATTACHED
This paper analyzes the status of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) which was established in 1987 with the unique authority, under Major Force Program - 11 (MFP-11), to prepare its own budget and procure special forces peculiar equipment. This authority is only given to USSOCOM and no other combatant command. The other unified and specified commands are funded by the services. The process they use is the Programming, Planning and Budget System (PPBS) which allows them to input their requirements to the services via an Integrated Priority List (IPL). This process has greatly changed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. These changes are reviewed and the new process is studied using the Army system as a model. The questions answered in the study are: first - Is MFP-11 working with USSOCOM? Second - Should the other combatant commands have similar authority?
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"Excellence in defense management....depends....on adhering closely to basic, common sense principles: giving a few capable people the authority and responsibility to do their job...." (David Packard)

THE QUESTION

Within the military, the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands are the warriors. These are the commanders who will prosecute any military action within the spectrum of conflict, from low intensity conflict to total war. The recent Gulf War, so skillfully executed by the Commander of Central Command, is an example. One would think, with such an enormous responsibility, these commanders have the corresponding authority and influence to ensure the Defense Budget meets their needs. Yet, a continuing question asked by these commanders, Congress and other Defense Department budget experts is: do the war fighters have sufficient influence over the budget and procurement process? Let's see.
WHY THE DOUBT?

The doubts started to arise in the early 1980's. Prior to this time there was virtually no formal mechanisms for the CINC's to influence the budget process. In 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a review of the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS). The intent was to make changes that would broaden the strategic outlook of the process. In particular the Defense Resources Board (DRB) had its membership increased to include the Service Secretaries. In addition, the CINCs were now allowed, by invitation, to address their concerns to the board (Appendix A). All well and good except the CINCs felt this was too little too late.

The CINCs' point of view is best summarized by the following excerpt from a 21 August 1984 letter Admiral W. J. Crowe - then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) - wrote to Mr. W. H. Taft - the Deputy Secretary of Defense:

"....I'm aware of several instances where the Services, without consulting me, have made major decisions affecting my ability to execute USPACOM strategy. I learned about them after the fact during Program Objective Memorandum (POM) deliberations or in the media. It was too late then for me to have any serious influence on these issues. In essence, the Services' decisions have torqued or redirected my strategy oftentimes in an operational vacuum. While this may not have been the intent, the end result was the same nonetheless."
It would be only a matter of time before such internal problems would come to the attention of others. In 1985 a Senate staff study declared that: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not have a significant role in providing joint military input to DOD's programming and budget process." The study further pointed out: "...the responsibilities of the combatant commanders were not balanced with their limited influence over resource decisions." In short, there was an apparent need for change in the way the defense budget is formulated.

As a result of the Senate inquiries and concern from the Executive Office, a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management was formed. Established by President Reagan, this commission took the name of its chairman and is known as the Packard Commission. This report has since become a foundation document for the reorganization of the Defense Department and how it does business. The CINC budget involvement issue was not missed. The recommendations of this report (June 1986) included a beefed up involvement in the budget process by the Unified and Specified commanders.

All this brings us to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986. Although this act covers a broad spectrum of changes within DOD and the Joint Staff, it particularly addressed changes in the budget process. These changes were expressly included to increase the authority of the CINCs in this budget arena (more on this later).

One must realize not all CINCs are created equal and the differences among the commands (location, mission etc.) impact on how they do business.
Among the Unified and Specified Commands, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is unique. There is additional congressional language that not only directs the formation of the command but specifically gives that commander his own budget authority - Major Force Program - 11. This program was created by congress over the objections of the services. For the first time, a CINC was given not just control over his own budget but the ability to procure equipment. Until this time only the Services could perform this function.

This report will review the status of USSOCOM since its activation in April 1987. We will see what changes and challenges the command was faced with on its path to assuming budget independence - is this arrangement working? Secondly, we will study the changes (since the 1984 Admiral Crowe letter) in the PPBS structure as it relates to the other CINCs and ask ourselves whether they should have authority similar to USSOCOM?

I worked on the Army staff during the creation of MFP - 11 and personally was involved in the transfer of a large number of programs and dollars to the new command. Many of the opinions found in this paper are based on those experiences. Additionally, I interviewed a large number of individuals from the USSOCOM staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff. The interviews were conducted on a non-attribution basis. Their comments and views were very candid. I will not mention names or specific offices for obvious reasons.
CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

"At budget-cutting time, it was claimed, Special Operations Force (SOF) programs already suffering from lack of intensive management were easy targets for delays or eliminations." (Ludvigsen, 43)

BIRTH OF A NEW COMMAND

On 24 April 1980, the President authorized the beginning of a hostage rescue attempt in Iran called "Desert One." The operation was a dismal failure. Eight lives were lost along with five Navy helicopters and an Air Force C-130 aircraft and no hostages were rescued. This was a mission especially suited to Special Operations forces. There was no central focus for such forces, at the time, and so the mission was spread across the services. The lack of training, command and control and equipment suited to the mission became obstacles too great to overcome. This single event had more to do with the creation of the United States Special Operations Command than any other act.

For years the SOF community had been complaining of lack of Service support in procuring specialized equipment and in obtaining the needed
budgets for training and operations. The dollars involved with SOF were usually small in comparison to other programs and suffered from lack of support during the budget process. SOF simply had no champion and after Vietnam the SOF community was on the decline.

After Desert One, SOF was suddenly getting attention again. Although there were changes within the Services, each trying to improve its own special operations capability, there still was no unified effort. In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was passed. This act opened the door for strengthening the JCS and the role of the unified and specified commands. With this new act on the street it was only a short time before Congress used the new authority to take the next step. The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1987 (printed on October 14, 1986) amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and section 136(b) of Title 10 United States Code by adding the following:

"With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of the title a unified combatant command for special operations forces. The principal function of the command is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions."

This authorization act further established the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
The mission of this new office was to provide oversight of policy and resources for special operations activities.

USSOCOM is unique among the combatant Unified Commands and was singled out by Congress for special attention because of the highly specialized training and equipment used in their mission. We will not attempt to describe the details of these missions since they range from direct action (blowing up specific target) to counterterrorism and strategic reconnaissance. Those details are not pertinent to our study.

It is important to understand that this is a joint command and includes forces from the Army, Air Force and Navy. Briefly the Army provides the Special Forces units (Green Berets), Rangers, psychological operations, civil affairs and special aviation units. The Air Force has provided special operation aircraft, combat control teams and pararescue units. The Navy forces include special boat units and the Seals. The critical fact is that these forces are actually assigned to the CINC for training and equipping with special operations unique items. The CINC has to budget for this - the service no longer will.

MAJOR FORCE PROGRAM - 11

The budget authority exercised by USSOCOM comes form the same Defense Authorization Act of 1987. Section 167 2 (c) of the act says:

"The Secretary of Defense shall create for the
special operations forces a major force program category for the Five Year Defense Plan of the Department of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, with the advice and assistance of the commander of the special operations command, shall provide overall supervision of the preparation and justification of program recommendations and budget proposals to be included in such major force program category.”

The initial effect of this law was consternation on the part of the Services and dismay at USSOCOM. Obviously the new command could not immediately begin to build a budget, in the pure sense, and it was not expected to. The law did freeze the funds within the Service budgets which could be identified as special operations specific. From 1987 through 1989 there was an ongoing battle between the special operations fans and the Services as to what money would transfer to MFP - 11 and what would stay. During this time Congress found it necessary to remind the Services on numerous occasions that they were to support MFP - 11. Within the Pentagon, during the frequent budget cuts, action officers had to continually cite the Congressional language creating MFP - 11 in order to save program dollars. Throughout this period USSOCOM, ASD SO/LIC and the Services wrestled with the identification of the programs to be transferred to MFP - 11 and those that supported SOF but should remain funded as they were.
On 1 December 1989, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Atwood, published a letter providing "Guidance for Developing and Implementing the Special Operations Forces Program and Budget." This letter formally directed that USSOCOM would, starting with the FY 92-97 budget, program and execute the budget for selected SOF programs. All other SOF related programs were to be executed by the Military Departments where they were currently located. Additionally, Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) were to be completed between the Services and USSOCOM outlining the procedures for the budget realignment. This letter set the tone for USSOCOM to proceed with its budget authority but reduced the duplication of effort with the Services.

The second aspect to MFP - 11 was the associated Head of Agency authority. The CINC was in the same league as the Service Chiefs when it came to procurement of special operations peculiar equipment. The CINC could now (as Service Chiefs do):

- validate and prioritize special operations peculiar requirements
- determine procedures for acquisition
- enter into agreements with other agency heads to delegate procurement functions
- direct research and development in response to special operations peculiar requirements
- since the forces are actually assigned to the command, the CINC could perform force development duties (such as change the organizational structure of units)
Two examples of this head of agency authority illustrate the two options opened to the CINC. The Joint Advanced Special Operations Radio System (JASORS) is a special operations unique program from the bottom up. It is being designed to meet the requirements for team communications with low probability of intercept and detection. The CINC validated his own requirement and then entered into agreements with the Army (another head of agency) to conduct the research and development and follow on procurement. The V-22 Osprey, tilt-rotor aircraft, is the second example. Here the requirement is not unique to special operations and in fact, the Marines have attempted to procure a far larger number of the aircraft than USSOCOM. Here USSOCOM would budget for the quantity desired and simply be a customer to the Marine Corps buy. The V-22 also illustrates the lack of buying power found in USSOCOM. A program like the V-22 is in trouble. The Secretary of Defense does not want production to start. The battle for the aircraft rests with the Marine Corps which accounts for the majority of the potential buy. USSOCOM can lend support to the Marine Corps but only as a secondary player.

HOW DO THEY DO IT?

USSOCOM had an enormous job facing it when given the green light for conducting Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A). Literally hundreds of programs already started by the Services were deferred to USSOCOM for either total control or for monitoring. The latest count now stands at 310 individual programs. Even today, many of the programs
suffer from the neglect of several years of budget cutting within the Services.

"Critics charged the dedicated programs for SOF-peculiar items were so small in numbers and/or total funding that they barely registered on the computer screens of harried service acquisition executives...driven by expensive strategic systems and big-ticket developments for conventional forces." (Ludvigsen, 43)

The reworking of programs to make them healthy again and the start up of new programs such as JASORS has not been easy. To this end, the command has received outside help (Congress) and has undertaken significant organization changes on its own.

Congress has from the start, felt that USSOCOM existed only because of their interest and that the Services and the Department of Defense had to be ordered to accept the idea. Congress continued to aid the new command not just with moral support but with money. Two significant instances of USSOCOM's budget being fixed by Congress took place during 1989 and 1990. In the Fall of 1989 several large programs (large for SOF) were in trouble having been underfunded by the Services. There was a need for immediate research and development dollars to spread over a number of new programs, the AC-130 Gunship was underfunded as were ammunition and military construction. Congress approved an additional $1.36 billion for the FY92-97 POM. Then in the summer of 1990 another $1.06 billion
was approved through OSD in what was called "out of court settlements" with the Services. These dollars made up for shortfalls in spares and repairables not yet transferred from the Services.

This was a wild time for budget officers both in USSOCOM as well as on the Service staffs. The following personal story is typical of the Congressional power and determination. In the Fall of 1989 I was the SOF communications staff officer for the Army. I was directly involved with the transfer of a large number of programs to MFP - 11. One day a Congressional Staffer called me directly and asked how much money would I need to fix SOF communications for the current fiscal year. I told him $37 million (a gut feel). Two weeks later the amended authorization bill had an additional $108 million added to SOF communications. Such special interest caused hard feeling among the Services and in many ways made the MFP - 11 transition more difficult. The dollars given to SOF were funds that should have been there all along and in the end still did not amount to very much. One battleship would have funded everything SOF ever hoped to buy.

USSOCOM is a combatant command. As such, the command is largely staffed, as are all combatant commands, with field/operations experienced people. There is little expertise in the areas of budgeting and acquisition. Given the responsibility of budget formulation and RD&A, USSOCOM had to add to the normal CINC structure. There was no other CINC with this unique authority so the Services (where the same duties are performed) provided the only example. The difference here was that
USSOCOM even with personnel increases, had individuals performing functions that were done by entire service staffs.

Two offices were created that greatly enhanced the commands capabilities. One office, the Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC) was established at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida (adjacent to the command's headquarters). The second office was one in the Pentagon (the Washington office).

When the command was first formed, the duties of budgeting and program oversight was given to the J-8 comptroller. As any J-8 this office was primarily staffed for handling the command's internal budget and certainly not for preparing the POM or doing any RD&A functions. Additional personnel were authorized and on 1 February 1991 the SORDAC was opened for business. Here RD&A is the primary mission. The center was given approval to increase, by 1995 to 87 people. The head of the center was and still is a member of the Defense Department's Senior Executive Service (SES) with RD&A experience. The head of the center is authorized to function as a program executive officer (PEO) would for the services. The signing of MOAs with the services and conducting program milestone reviews are all part of what SORDAC does.

The Washington office provides another critical function. Originally this office had a General Officer as its head. Over the last two years the requirement for a flag rank officer was eliminated, as the command got its feet on the ground. The office now has a colonel as the ranking officer.
The other members include civilian and military budget experts and a congressional liaison officer. As anyone knows who has worked in the PPBS, budgets are made or lost in the Pentagon. USSOCOM has found it invaluable to have their own people there to do the leg work during the POM process. Such an office is essential given the time/distance factor the CINC would otherwise have to deal with.

USSOCOM has taken on the dual roles of a unified command and a service. As shown above, the command builds its budget and conducts RD&A just as a service would do. Yet the command must still function as any other unified command. A prime example is the Integrated Priority List (IPL). This is a document each CINC submits to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to highlight budget priorities for their respective commands. The services then address in the POM how these priorities are to be funded. USSOCOM submits an IPL just like the other commands but also is an addressee for the other commands IPLs. Since USSOCOM has the same budget authority for SOF items as the services do for conventional items, USCINCSOC must address in the POM those IPL items he is responsible for.

THE GOOD AND THE BAD

The people interviewed for this report all expressed the feeling that the program was working. That is not to say there are not problems and certainly much still remains to be accomplished as the command matures.
It appears that the command has made it through those first few years and now is able to stand on its own. In fact, this year's budget submission was the first one fully developed by the command. Each year the ASD SO/LIC becomes more comfortable with its role and acquires more experienced people. Each year the Services become more familiar with MFP - 11 and accept their role with USSOCOM. And, each year USSOCOM matures and gains experience. All this combines for a favorable future.

However, there are problems. Most of the problems are minor in appearance and probably will be worked out, but in the interim they can still have serious effects.

SORDAC is undermanned. With over 300 programs to monitor, each system acquisition manager must oversee 20 to 30 different programs. Even though most are monitored for service execution, the task is almost impossible. With the current budget and manning reductions going on in defense, it is doubtful any near term increases in personnel are possible.

In the budget arena there were several issues raised during interviews. The ranking of the civilian leaders was brought up. The J-8 does the POM preparation and the senior civilian is only a GS-13. It was felt that the position should be a GM-15, a rank more in keeping with the authority and responsibilities. The command, as stated before, is manned by mostly field officers. These officers rotate quite regularly. The services get around the problem by having a more permanent senior level civilian staff as a mirror to the military staff. USSOCOM does not. A Deputy Director
for the command apparently has never been addressed. Several members of
the command thought it would be a good idea.

CINC access to Congress is a continuing problem. ASD SO/LIC personnel
mentioned that it is not uncommon for the CINC to go straight to Congress
on a variety of matters (especially budget), bypassing their office. Besides
the obvious animosity raised, this practice can undermine efforts by the
ASD SO/LIC and the Services. Part of the problem is the past willingness of
Congress to treat USSOCOM as a favored project. That situation may be
ending as Congress is being pulled in other directions and SOF appears to be
going well.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) continues to follow up on
previous requirements of the command. In the beginning there were
numerous negative reports dealing with SOF programs. These were
programs, as mentioned before, that had funding shortfalls under the
Services. For example, in February 1990 the GAO published a report titled:
"Special Operations Forces - Army Plans to Buy More MH-47E Helicopters
Than Needed." Some of these problem program still exist and need to be
worked, and they are. The GAO is now concentrating on the MOAs between
USSOCOM, the Military Departments, and other DOD Organizations. As late
as February of this year the GAO submitted a report claiming that 11 such
agreements were still incomplete. The report also gave credit for more
than 20 other MOAs that have been completed. Again nothing terribly wrong
but shows work still remains.
CHAPTER III

THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

"This overall process works well to ensure that priority CINC requirements are deliberated at the highest level of decisionmaking within the Defense Department throughout the programming and budget phase. My consultations with the combatant commanders indicate that their needs are being served and modifications to the existing process is not necessary." (Admiral Crowe, CJCS)

IMPACT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was meant to change the way the Department of Defense did business. The intent was made clear in the Congressional News Release, announcing the signing of the Act. The news release stated the new law would be "the most far-reaching reorganization of the United States defense establishment in almost 30 years." The basic change was to focus on the joint functions of defense and to "overcome the weak inter-service cooperation that has hampered our military operations from the Spanish-American War to the operation in Grenada."
Congress saw the need for strengthening the authority of the joint elements of the Department of Defense. The law affected the duties of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and even the way officers are assigned to joint billets. As broad as the scope of the law was, it specifically mentioned strengthening the authority of the "warfighting commanders in the field." The problems cited by Admiral Crowe in his 1984 letter to Mr. Taft were well known in Congress. The law forced DOD to write new directives/regulations which by 1989, had Admiral Crowe (now the CJCS) writing the response quoted at the start of this chapter.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (Sep. 25, 1987) is the key document which compelled the JCS and the services to address the budget and acquisition requirements of the CINCs. The central change to the directives was that the CJCS would "advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands." The Military Departments were on the hook now.

HOW DOES IT WORK?

As mentioned earlier, some changes had already been enacted (prior to 1986) increasing the involvement of the CINCs in the budget system.
Since 1986 the PPBS and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) have been formally linked. An overall picture of the process is at Appendix B.

This is a very complicated maze which many say they understand but few really do. Let us take a look at the Army system touching on the highlights of the process to see how the CINCs' initiatives are considered and incorporated. Each service does it a bit different but accomplishes the same results using different titles.

In the early fall the Army starts to build the POM. By this time the services have received the Defense Planning Guidance and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), along with the other service chiefs, has already sat on a planning Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB). Yes, this use to be called the DRB. Throughout the Army Staff all requirements for new programs, continuation of old programs, and anything else that requires money is being championed by someone trying to get into the POM. So the budget is already taking shape but to this point the Army has not considered any proposals from the CINCs.

Since early summer the CINCs have been preparing their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). Usually in June, the Assistant Secretary of Defense sends a memorandum to the CINCs telling them to submit their IPLs and reminds them of the importance of the document. The guidance for this year's IPL submission was very clear - "...the IPLs themselves must remain a sharp statement of your most important concerns, coupled with your suggestions for the type and size of programmatic solutions to those concerns. To enhance the value of IPLs in the programmatic process, you
should strive to be as specific as possible." Through these IPLs the CINCs' needs are made known. Each CINC should rank his critical warfighting requirements, highlight issues which require Secretary of Defense attention and select those key service and other DOD programs which affect his theater of operations. If the CINCs are vague as to what they want than the services have an exceedingly hard time supporting their request.

The IPLs are sent to the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS. Information copies are sent to the services. Usually the services receive their copy around November or December. This fiscal year has been tracking on schedule. The IPLs were in the Pentagon in December. While conducting interviews in January of this year I found the Army staff hard at work trying to address the IPLs. Within the Army Staff the Program, Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PAED) has been given the mission of reviewing and "working" the CINCs' issues.

Each of the CINCs' IPLs are reviewed and the individual issues are analyzed to determine if it should be addressed by the Army or another service. Sometimes the issues are multi-service in nature. PAED will get with their counterparts in the other services to work out the details and make sure the Army responsibilities are met. More often than not the initial IPL is not specific enough or is not in detail. The Army Component Command under the CINC will often be tasked to prepare a 1 page IPL narrative for each issue. Hopefully when the CINC prepared the IPL the component command was involved and so knows what is going on.
Once the narratives are prepared (now its January or February) the appropriate Major Command (MACOM) executing the specific program or budget item relating to the IPL issues will determine how to support it. The MACOM will prepare a 1 page narrative showing the title, the budget line supporting it, a description of the program and any special notes as required. The special note would be for new program starts or major changes caused by the CINC's requirement. If a new start of major program change is needed then it is declared an unfunded requirement (UFR) and a potential bill payer (another existing program) must be identified. This is when the fun begins for the staff officers. The bill payer complains, of course, and a special Program Evaluation Group (General Officers) meet to decide if money should be moved to support the CINC. If the decision is yes, than the money moves. If the answer is no, then the CINC must be notified and told why. The CINC now has to decide if he wants to make an issue out of it to go to the DPRB for final resolution. At least no one is pulling any punches and all the information is on the table.

Obviously there are numerous meetings and decision briefs within PAED and the rest of the Army Staff is involved including the CSA before the decision to not fund a CINC requirement. Finally the POM is finalized with a CINC volume describing the budget support of each IPL issue. An example format is found at Appendix C. The service POMs are briefed to the Secretary of Defense level and issues are developed for the DPRB for final resolution. Each CINC has the opportunity to submit issues for consideration by the DPRB and can request to appear in person to present
his case. The final check of the process is the never ending series of Congressional testimony on the budget. CINC IPL issues may be brought up again if there is Congressional interest in the particular program.

THE GOOD AND THE BAD

We briefly looked at the system for addressing the CINCs' IPLs. We really did not do the system justice. The amount of work involved in preparing the POM is absolutely enormous. I interviewed a lot of very frustrated staff officers who were wrestling this process to the ground. Addressing the CINCs IPLs is one of the more frustrating parts of the POM.

The first problem is the structure of the IPL. The GAO has claimed that the lack of formal IPL structure is a continuing problem. This year is no exception. Even the instructions from the Assistant Secretary of State won't hold the CINCs to a format. The instructions specifically said: "....and adapt the document's format to fit your particular situation." There is no need for this. Some IPLs arrive number 1 thru X others lettered A thru X and some not numbered or lettered, with little initial explanation as to priority. The service staff officer now must go back and take time to find out what the CINC really meant to say.

The instruction, remember, said to i.e "as specific as possible" and "suggest the type and size of programmatic solutions." Many IPL issues do not meet this criteria. An example is this year's supposed number one
priority for the Commander of the European Command - "To enhance he quality of life." If you were a staff officer responsible for deciding where and how to fund this issue what would you do. Does he need more family housing, clubs, commissaries health facilities? Should this be an Army issue or an Air Force issue? Not very specific, is it?

The time distance factor is a problem. Some of the CINCs have a liaison office in the Pentagon but they are glorified mail drops. Except for USSOCOM (as mentioned earlier) the CINCs have no budget experienced people in the Pentagon to speak on their behalf or help explain IPLs to the services. All follow-on actions are done by mail, fax or phone.

The CINCs have to prepare another report separate from the IPL called the Preparedness Assessment Report. This report (an operations report not budget) goes to the JCS and highlights many of the same requirements found in the IPL. The only problem is that they are in different priority. Obviously people start to ask questions like "why?" This weakens the CINCs' position and waters down the IPL impact.

At the action officer level some of the CINCs' staffs have raised the old concern that they were still behind the service interest when it came to funding. This complaint was raised as late as November 1991 during a Unified Command Financial Management Conference. CINCLANT and CINCPAC (the two funded by the Navy) raised the concern. CINCCENT and CINCSOUTH felt they were treated fairly by the Air Force and Army (CINCEUR did not attend). As explain by a J-8 representative, those
commands with experienced budget people seem to have fewer problems and less complaints. Usually the CINCs are staffed with operators and few specifically have budget experience.

Another issue raised at the conference was the lack of a point of contact in the Pentagon. As stated before, the CINCs don't have their own people in the building like USSOCOM does. With the reduction in forces going on it is doubtful they ever will. J-8 took the issue to study. Their question is should the J-8 assume the role? There was no resolution to the question as of the writing of this paper.

The final problem is the contingency mission. The CINCs do not have specific contingency funds. The last two years have brought this problem out. CINCLANT had to handle the hurricane disaster relief on the island of St Croix in the fall of 1989. CINCSOUTH had to deal with the aftermath of Operation Just Cause in 1989-1990 and CINCCENT had Operation Provide Comfort dealing with the Kurds in Iraq, which is still on going. Unless Congress appropriates more funds, as it did for Provide Comfort, the expense is born by the services involved. That means some other program suffers. But with the declining funds for defense there will not be a special pot of money for contingencies. This will remain a problem and each case will have to be handled separately.

Given all the problems, the consensus from the interviews and my own opinion, is that the system is working. The lower staffs may have concerns, but the CINCs like the flexibility of the process. They can pick the battle and the time and place to fight it. Admiral Crowe's comments are still valid.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

"If a commander of a combatant command at any time considers his authority, direction, or control...to be insufficient...the commander shall promptly inform the Secretary of Defense."

(Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986)

We have looked at USSOCOM with its unique mission and special budget/procurement authority. The command is still getting settled. This year's POM is the first they've developed from the start. Up until now they were still depending on the service POMs. The sensing from the command and OSD is that as each year passes the experience level will grow and the process will be more efficient. It is working.

We also saw how the other combatant CINCs still rely on the services for budgeting and procuring those programs needed in their respective theaters. With the changes precipitated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act this system also is working.

This is one of those cases where if it ain't broke don't fix it. USSOCOM is so unique compared to the other commands that similar authority just
would not work. USSOCOM has its forces actually assigned for force
development, training, equipping as well as fighting. The other commands
have forces aligned not assigned. Many forces such the 82nd Airborne
Division and most of the Air Force's C-130s, C-141s etc are aligned to
support more than one CINC. In the last fiscal year the 82nd Airborne
Division fought in Just Cause under CINCSOUTH and Desert Shield/Storm
under CINCCENT. No one CINC can possibly provide the appropriate funding
for that unit when it has to fight in environments so different from each of
the CINCs. The Army can take all those missions and impartially fund the
unit to meet the requirement.

For a CINC to have its own budget authority the need for the Washington
office is absolute. We saw that with USSOCOM. Combined with the other
structural increases such as USSOCOM's SORDAC, the other CINCs would
have to drastically expand their staffs with professional
budget/procurement personnel. The people and the funds are not available.

The CINCs are four star generals with enormous power. The combat
operations over the last two years have greatly increased, in Congress and
the Department of Defense, the awareness of the CINCs' responsibilities.
We know who the warfighters are. Given the parameters of the current
budget process, the CINCs enjoy a great degree of flexibility and they are
not afraid to exercise it. A bit more formality with the IPLs would improve
the system but given the fiscal constraints of today not much else could be
improved.
APPENDIX B
### CINC Volume to Army POM

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**Description:** How do Army programs in support of IPL issue provide capability required by CINC?

- 1-pg Narratives define (by MDEP) IPL-support programs
- ABS funding level = requirement (i.e., executable program level)

*CINC Volume tells OSD how Army supported Highest-Priority CINC programs*


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