Franco-German Security Accommodation: Illusion of Agreement (U)

The authors have attempted to explain the developments in the evolution of European integration by focusing on the Franco-German relationship. They argue that Paris and Bonn remain strongly committed to the concept, principally as a vehicle to overcome their collective past. A constant and, at times, irritating characteristic of this drive is their almost obsessive need to be in agreement, particularly when they are not. When stymied in attempts to initiate greater integration, the two countries invariably turn to military cooperation (e.g., the Eurocorps) to promote greater consensus. The authors conclude that Washington needs to appreciate better the rationales behind these French and German initiatives and adopt a coherent policy towards a future European Defense Identity.
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Events in Europe continue to confound outside observers. Little more than a year ago, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty apparently signalled the achievement of a significant milestone in the evolution of European integration. Yet, reservations to this agreement quickly surfaced throughout the European Community, culminating in the Danish rejection in the spring and the narrow French victory in summer 1992. Subsequent events, to include Britain’s and Italy’s withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, have only contributed to this already confusing situation.

The authors of this study have attempted to explain these developments by focusing on developments within the context of the Franco-German relationship. Given recent developments and concomitant confusion, it may be instructive to reassess the current state of the Paris-Bonn axis. The authors’ thesis is that France and the Federal Republic remain strongly committed to the concept of European integration, principally as a vehicle to overcome their collective past. A characteristic of this drive toward greater integration is the almost obsessive need to be in agreement, particularly when they are not. Moreover, when stymied in attempts to initiate and implement economic and political integration, these two countries invariably turn to military cooperation (e.g., the Eurocorps), to maintain the momentum of integration and promote greater consensus. The authors conclude by arguing that Washington needs to appreciate better the rationales behind these French and German initiatives and adopt a coherent policy towards a future European Defense Identity.

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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the debate on the future role of the U.S. Army in a post-cold war Europe.

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FRANCO-GERMAN SECURITY ACCOMMODATION: ILLUSION OF AGREEMENT

Introduction.

In and of itself, the establishment of the European Economic Community represented a significant historical achievement. More recently, members of the European Community (EC) have expressed an intent to build a more comprehensive foundation of European unity that looks toward complete economic union. Moreover, these nations seek a European political union that will further expand European integration. Naturally, discussions concerning political union have generated considerable dialogue over closer integration of security and defense policies.

Progress toward these goals initially appeared to be accelerating. The Single Economic Act (signed in July 1987), one of European Commission President Jacques Delors’ greatest accomplishments, was implemented in principle on January 1, 1993. At the December 1991 Maastricht summit, the EC heads of government agreed to the “Draft Treaty on Political Union” that laid out the planned European political union.¹

Nor has cooperation been limited to economic and political issues. At Maastricht, the EC heads of government also agreed to the goal of establishing a common defense policy and the development of the Western European Union (WEU) “... as the defense component of the European Union...”.² Moreover, in May 1992 at their summit in La Rochelle, President Mitterrand and Federal Chancellor Kohl formally announced the creation of a joint multinational corps, which, in time, could include other European participants.³ To many observers and officials, the combination of these events indicated that the long elusive objective of European integration appeared to be close at hand.

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But events have proven otherwise as EC politics have become rather messy, not to mention complicated, of late.\(^4\) For example, prior to the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in May 1992, the path toward greater Western European integration appeared clearly set. However, the Danish electorate rejected the Maastricht draft treaty in June.\(^5\) This rejection, in the words of Daniel Vernet, Foreign Editor of *Le Monde*, "...has brought into the open in many European countries a situation their governments had been trying to pretend did not exist: a crisis in foreign policy."\(^6\)

Shortly thereafter, when President Mitterrand placed the Maastricht Treaty before the French electorate, it passed only by the narrowest of margins (50.95 to 49.05 percent).\(^7\) Even the much vaunted Single Market may well not function in practice (e.g., due to lack of consumer confidence in product quality and efficiency), despite the implementation of all the necessary legal instruments.\(^8\) And, high German interest rates (due to the ever escalating costs of unification) and low British interest rates (to stimulate a lagging economy), combined to force Britain and Italy out of the EC's Exchange Rate Mechanism in September.\(^9\) Finally, the EC's inability to achieve consensus on a means to halt the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia underscored the difficulties inherent in crafting common security and defense policies.

The obstacles to full implementation of these policies raises the question: Where does European integration, particularly in the realm of security, go from this inauspicious point? This is not merely a rhetorical consideration, nor is the outcome without implications for the United States. Since the 1950s, Western European political stability, consistency in general political outlook, and impressive economic growth have been, in large part, the result of European integration. These conditions have supported U.S. interests in Europe in the past and, undoubtedly, Washington will continue to have a vital stake in the maintenance of stability in Europe. At the same time, confusion over the future course of European integration has had, and will continue to have, a direct impact on U.S. and Western European efforts to reform its integrated defense
institutions to meet the new challenges of post-cold war European security.

How the EC will overcome this recent rash of highly publicized setbacks and reinvigorate its efforts to realize the goal of European Union are open to question. However, what one can contemplate with a high degree of certainty is that Paris and Bonn will be at the heart of efforts to resolve these dilemmas. The Paris-Bonn relationship has been the engine that has driven greater European integration since the late 1950s and has provided a proven means to overcome the long history of Franco-German conflict and discord. Yet, the interesting, and exceedingly confusing aspect of this Franco-German accommodation is the fact that the political necessity to maintain the appearance of consensus on their overriding objective of greater integration oftentimes papers over fundamental differences on exactly how European Union is to be achieved. Thus, the perception of agreement, particularly when there is discord, remains a constant element of their bilateral relationship.

This study analyzes the political aspects of this important bilateral relationship, particularly in reference to its implications for defense integration. Given space limitations, the study focuses on the implications of Franco-German relations on bilateral defense cooperation. While acknowledging that political and economic integration are critical to overall European integration, assessing security cooperation is important for three crucial reasons. First, efforts to expand bilateral defense cooperation have long been a convenient vehicle to manifest publicly heightened levels of cooperation during periods of discord in the political and economic sphere. Second, despite the past record of using defense cooperation to maintain momentum in overall European integration, disagreements over the particulars of security policy are currently running high. And, third, the potential emergence of a true European defense identity has become a major point of contention in Washington's attempt to redefine the U.S. role and mission in a post-cold war Europe.
Paris's and Bonn's Conflicting Vision of "Europe."

To grasp the full implications of European Defense Integration, one must first understand the political background, goals, and differences in Franco-German external policy. In the insightful words of Jim Hoagland, a noted observer of European affairs, European integration has had much more to do with overcoming the historic Franco-German conflict, than any other issue. Indeed, the slow (but not to be underestimated) progress toward fuller European integration has been largely a product of Paris and Bonn enmeshing themselves within supranational European organizations to overcome their history of bloody conflict.

Long-standing French policy has been to oppose any move by the Federal Republic to establish a national foreign or defense policy. At the same time, these policies have enabled Paris to effect a long-term rapprochement with Bonn, while simultaneously allowing France the luxury of being the only European member of NATO to pursue an independent defense policy. This latter condition also provided France with considerable independence and flexibility in its diplomacy.

This unique process of working toward historical rapprochement remained constant until the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, when the unification of Germany considerably complicated the integration process. Indeed, a large part of the current difficulty in reaching agreement on new European political and security architectures within the EC is a result of Europe coming to terms with the newly unified Germany. To comprehend better these difficulties, an understanding of French and German expectations of European integration is essential.

The unification of Germany shattered many of Paris's comfortable assumptions of European integration. The French are now unsure whether the Germans are still suitably enmeshed in the EC and, if they are not, Paris may lose the considerable influence and flexibility it previously enjoyed. In the words of Daniel Vernet, "...all of us... are afflicted with the 'German obsession.'" In short, the French are concerned about a Germany of over 80 million that will possess an
economy—once the eastern Laender have been rebuilt—that will dominate Europe.

In fact, German unification has already reduced the heretofore politely-accepted myth of French political leadership in the EC and altered the leading French role in the Franco-German relationship. Fearing an eastward-oriented united Germany, or, worse, a Germany “that goes it alone,” Paris moved quickly after German unification to tie Bonn firmly to Europe through economic, political and security linkages. Hence, the relatively quick, by EC standards, move to write and seek ratification of the Draft Treaty on Political Union. Mitterrand and Kohl’s surprise announcement at Lille in October 1991 to form a Franco-German sponsored European Corps established a similar linkage in the security arena.

Just as Frenchmen are “obsessed” with a unified Germany, so, too, is Bonn fixated on France. Simply stated, in German eyes, France has long held the key to German acceptance into the polite company of Western European society. Germany’s leadership will go to great lengths, even to the extent of occasional public pandering to French sensitivities, to maintain this status. One cannot overestimate the value to the Federal Republic of French assistance in guaranteeing inclusion in Western European institutions. For without this institutional entre, the legitimacy within Europe of Germany’s national economic, political, and military power would have been questioned.

Therefore, to a degree unlike any other EC member, Bonn has long favored expanded integration. Indeed, maintenance of the integrational status quo is insufficient. Integration must, however slowly, continue to expand lest Bonn be suspect in the eyes of its physically smaller, economically weaker, and militarily less powerful neighbors. Such perceived dedication to integration has obviously become even more imperative to Bonn following unification. As former Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stated, “A Germany that is firmly anchored in the EC will not be regarded as a threat to anybody. A Germany that rejects Europe would soon be very alone. It would become cold—ice-cold—around Germany.”
An interesting point, however, and, indeed, an underrated manifestation of the importance of this bilateral relationship, is that despite agreement on the criticality of European integration, Paris and Bonn do not share a common view of how this ambiguous supranational institution should be formed. For instance, Germany has long favored transferring greater power from the European Commission (and those increasingly unpopular and overpaid “Eurocrats”) in Brussels to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Highly centralized and statist France, on the other hand, has opposed this move, largely because such a transfer would give the Federal Republic—with its larger population—the largest number of parliamentarians; thus, further reducing French influence in that body.¹⁶

Germany has also advocated “enlarging” the EC through the acceptance of the developed European neutrals, as well as the newly democratizing states in Central and Eastern Europe, all of whom are clamoring for membership. From the German standpoint, good reasons exist for this policy. The entry of wealthy neutrals like Switzerland and Sweden would help finance the economic rebuilding of Central and Eastern Europe, a sine qua non of economic viability and, most importantly, long-term political stability. Moreover, increased EC membership might appear to dilute Germany’s dominant position in the Community and, therefore, dampen criticism of growing German economic power.

France, on the other hand, has traditionally seen the EC as a vehicle for balancing German power. Should countries like Poland and Hungary gain admission to the EC, the center of gravity may well shift toward Germany.¹⁷ Nor is this new French policy; it dates back De Gaulle’s opposition to British entry into the EC in the 1960s. Thus, Paris has been loath to contemplate an enlarged Community that could diminish French power, as well as allowing the EC to become a mere Zollverein, or customs union.

As these brief examples indicate, France and Germany lack an agreed definition of, and mutually accepted means to, attain their declared common objective. This lack of Franco-German consensus and concomitant drive to appear
to be making progress toward increased integration has not
gone unnoticed by their EC partners. In recent years, the
Franco-German haste to press toward the "ill-defined" goal of
integration has resulted in a series of \textit{fait accomplis} that have
increasingly irritated their EC partners, particularly smaller
members who have not been consulted on important issues.\(^\text{18}\)
Indeed, this lack of Franco-German consultation in their mutual
effort to restrain and reassure each other has helped produce
the current backlash against greater integration manifested in
the Danish rejection of the Maastricht draft treaty, the narrow
margin of approval in the French referendum, and Prime
Minister John Major's back (and front) bench revolt in the
House of Commons.

Yet, so strong is their drive toward integration that France
and the Federal Republic have refused to accept any of these
rebuffs. Indeed, these obstacles have only spurred them to
greater efforts to assuage their partners. For example, at the
emergency EC summit in Birmingham in October 1992, the
French and Germans committed themselves to introducing
more democratic arrangements into the EC process. Another
fascinating example is the widely circulated (but officially
denied) rumor that Mitterrand and Kohl agreed to consider
merging the \textit{Deutschmark} and French \textit{Franc}, and, in
consequence, their central banks.\(^\text{19}\) This option would
establish an inner circle within the EC and, in effect, make a
two-speed approach to integration inevitable. Such an option,
writes the \textit{European}, "...reflects the increasing sense of
desperation of Mitterrand and Kohl as their Maastricht vision
of European union fades."\(^\text{20}\) Thus, France and Germany
may be prepared to go it alone to achieve greater integration,
even at the risk of politically alienating some of their closest
EC partners. Such a two track option, while economically
advantageous to their EC partners, implicitly includes much
greater political and security arrangements than these EC
states heretofore have been willing to accept.\(^\text{21}\)

Notwithstanding their economic, political, and security
differences, conflicting policies, and divergent national
interests, both countries are intent upon pressing forward,
perhaps blindly, toward creating a unified Europe. Indeed,
within this bilateral relationship, the French and Germans have evolved an ideology whereby they must be perceived as continuously making progress toward European unity, and are always in agreement. The latter point becomes even more imperative during instances when Paris and Bonn do not agree. One can sympathize, therefore, with France's and Germany's EC partners, who have become increasingly frustrated by what they see as a Franco-German abuse of the delicate process of decrementing state sovereignty within a greater European super-state in order to solve what are basically mutual French and German suspicions.

That EC states have been willing to accept these ambiguities reflect their interest in promoting stability in Central Europe, and their belief that "integration," particularly in the field of security, has not been framed within the context of a zero-sum game, i.e., at the expense of NATO. However, the point has been reached where difficult decisions in this sensitive area need to be made. Moreover, European concerns and efforts coincide with Washington's attempts to redefine the U.S. role in European security.

**European Defense Identity: Defined, Redefined, Undefined.**

If striving to create closer political structures in the EC that are mutually acceptable to all member states were not complicated enough, trying to reach accord on European security structures has been even more challenging. No matter how EC countriesthinks contemplate future European security integration, the relationship between the United States and NATO must be addressed. With the significant exception of France (arguably based on interpretation, vice stated French policy), all EC states are convinced that NATO and the United States must continue to play a key leadership role in the maintenance of security and stability in Europe. Moreover, French reasoning behind their dissent from this consensus flows from an unusual, if not deterministic, rationale. As Claire Trean of *Le Monde* explains, France's current position toward NATO is based on two key assumptions. First, the United States is in the process of withdrawing from Europe and,
therefore, the EC requires unified security structures to face an uncertain future. Second, it is simply inconceivable that the EC countries can discuss effecting political union without making provisions for creating an independent military capability.\textsuperscript{22}

This reasoning does not imply, however, that France favors the dissolution of NATO or the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Europe. On the contrary, French policy has long supported the political existence of NATO and a U.S. military presence in Europe.\textsuperscript{23} French cooperation over the years and into the future is evident in many areas.\textsuperscript{24} But French policy is currently at odds with NATO on two key points. First, the French believe NATO should be led not by "les anglo-saxons," but by the "Europeans" (read: "les français"). Second, NATO should not enter into new activities which might detract from its most important mission, collective defense.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, from this aspect, one can better understand French opposition to either the establishment in December 1991 of NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council and its mission of consulting with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries,\textsuperscript{26} or the expansion of NATO’s mandate to include supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{27}

The problem with current French policy toward NATO is twofold. First, as German commentator Guenther Nonnenmacher notes, "One has the impression that the French government thinks that relations between NATO and the EC are defined in the context of a zero-sum game. This is, perhaps, a fundamental error."\textsuperscript{28} Second, according to French commentator Pierre Lellouche, French policy does not adequately support French national interests and fails to comprehend the changing European security system.\textsuperscript{29} For example, it is incongruous for France to maintain an independent national defense policy while promoting increased European security integration and coaxing allies to expand defense integration.

The apparent confusion within the French government concerning NATO compounds these discrepancies. This confusion stems in large part from the nature of the Fifth Republic, where the President exercises \textit{de facto} control over
foreign and defense policies. Officials in the French military and Ministry of Defense have long endorsed closer ties with NATO, however, the Elysée (Presidential Palace) and, particularly, the Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Office) have opposed strengthened ties. In November 1991, for instance, Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe stated that French policy would seek to remove the ambiguity in France's relationship with NATO. The Elysée subsequently denied that Joxe's statement marked a change in French policy. In more recent speeches both Joxe (to an official gathering of international security experts in Paris) and Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, called for a greater degree of French participation in NATO consultative bodies. But again, the Elysée remarked that French policy had not changed.

Given the considerable ambiguity in French policy, it should be no surprise that despite the supposed close integration of Franco-German policies regarding European security integration, conflicts sometime occur. German officials continue to argue on a number of points that NATO must be maintained as a stabilizing influence in Europe, and, most importantly, a legitimizing vehicle for a continued U.S. military presence in Europe. First, if for no other reason, a strong NATO and continued U.S. presence in Europe eases acceptance of Germany within an integrated Europe. Second, the NATO and U.S. nuclear guarantee, so long dismissed by France, allows the Federal Republic to continue to abjure obtaining nuclear weapons. Third, German defense planning acknowledges that the Bundeswehr will have serious structural and capability limitations for many years to come, not the least of which are in the area of operational control structures. Thus, NATO and U.S. capabilities can compensate for German shortcomings. Finally, even the economically powerful Germans realize that it is simply financially unfeasible to expect the members of the Western European Union (the organization designated to become the security organization of the EC), to duplicate structures that already exist in NATO.

Despite being at odds with Paris over details of European integration, Bonn does not see any contradictions in its approach to supporting both the continuation of NATO and the
creation of a European Defense Identity. This same opinion is not necessarily held by some in Washington who view recent Franco-German efforts, particularly the Eurocorps, with a great deal of suspicion. As a result, while Bonn, Paris, and their European allies have been discussing the creation of European security structures, apprehensive U.S. officials have been issuing démarches criticizing the Franco-German initiative. These critiques stem largely from concerns that such initiatives will negatively affect NATO, the organization that gives Washington both an institutional pied à terre and leadership role in Europe.\textsuperscript{38}

Indeed, nowhere is the U.S. concern over the future course of the European Defense Identity or confusion over policy more evident than in the proposed Franco-German Eurocorps. Since Mitterrand and Kohl announced the initiative following their October 1991 summit in Lille, the Eurocorps has symbolized the Franco-German preoccupation with being seen in agreement in principle even when they diverge on details. Subsequent to the announcement of this formation, German officials have taken great pains to affirm that the proposed Eurocorps would not exclude NATO and that Bundeswehr contributions (all of three brigades and German contributions to the Franco-German Brigade)\textsuperscript{39} will remain dual-hatted under NATO. Moreover, the Eurocorps will be available for NATO contingencies and will fall under NATO operational control.\textsuperscript{40} The French position has ranged from the predictable "Quai d'Orsay" gloating that the Eurocorps represents the first step toward creating a true European defense structure outside of U.S. meddling, to more moderate voices, such as Joxe, who has long argued that the corps will fall under NATO command in the case of aggression.\textsuperscript{41}

Notwithstanding these contradictions in approach, Paris and Bonn have good reasons to propose this structure. From the French perspective, the creation of such a corps, based in Strasbourg, France, lends legitimacy to the continued stationing of the 1st French Armored Division in Germany. This issue takes on added importance in the wake of Mitterrand's faux pas following the London Summit in 1990, where he speculated in public (apparently without consulting the
Germans and after German officials had signalled they wanted French forces to remain on German soil) the total withdrawal of French forces from Germany. Moreover, as a multinational European formation, the Eurocorps conforms to the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept that recognizes future military contributions to NATO will be based on such multinational units.

For the Federal Republic, participation in such a formation is even more important. Given the strong pacifist feelings in Germany, a “European” body, detached from NATO and the United States, offers a strong legitimizing rationale to support the commitment of German forces in military operations outside the now tranquil Central Region. For example, such a multinational formation could simplify German participation in UN humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Or, integration in the Eurocorps could be used to legitimate German participation in so-called “out of area” operations under the auspices of the WEU. Finally, the political left in Germany recognizes that cooperation in the Eurocorps reinforces the close political relations with France, a relationship the Social Democrats see as key to binding the Federal Republic to integrated Europe.

Wider acceptance of the proposed corps centers around three principal sticking points. First, many of France’s and Germany’s European allies have expressed reservations that the corps could encourage American estrangement from Europe at exactly the time it is least desired. For example, Britain’s predictable opposition to this “European” initiative has found unwavering support from Italy and the Netherlands.

Second, while the Germans and French have averred that the corps would fall under NATO operational command and control in a time of crisis, exact conditions and circumstances have not been articulated. For example, the corps itself was initially presented by its supporters as a “European” military force, but with little explanation of the conditions under which political organization it would fall (i.e., EC, WEU, NATO?). Clarification of operational command arrangements of the Eurocorps had to wait until the end of November 1992 following protracted negotiations at the Franco-German working group
level. As of November 1992, the French and Germans have agreed, in principle, to the subordination of the Eurocorps to NATO. The exact details of the conditions and command arrangements remain to be negotiated between France, the Federal Republic and the Supreme Allied Command, Europe.47

Third, should control of the corps pass to NATO, the French are not part of NATO's integrated military structure. This condition is no small matter since numerous interoperability problems could hinder close cooperation at the tactical and operational level. Moreover, considerable confusion exists within the French government surrounding the issue of "foreign" command of French forces which traditionally has been a politically sensitive issue in France.48

Finally, Washington's reaction to the Eurocorps has been negative and confusing. Shortly after Kohl's and Mitterrand's announcement of the creation of the Eurocorps in May 1992, for instance, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft IV, stated that "Undermining the alliance's integrated military structure in the uncertain process of developing a European security identity would be the height of folly," without explaining how the Eurocorps might contribute to such a dire result.49 Yet, at the same time, U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated that the United States would not object to the corps as long as it were subject to NATO.50

This small episode manifests a larger problem; that is, the United States must come to terms with an eventual European Defense Identity. Nowhere is the contradiction in U.S. attitudes better summarized than by Jenonne Walker:

...successful administrations have voiced support for European political as well as economic union, but also objected vehemently when European discussed security issues 'behind Washington's back.' Once some form of EC unity on security issues seemed possible, the U.S. tried to straddle that contradiction by a misguided focus on the organization charts so dear to bureaucratic hearts (e.g., opposition to a formal EC-WEU link) and by ultimately futile efforts to pin down allied agreement on the precise roles and responsibilities of NATO and the EC, including what could and could not be discussed outside of NATO.51
Moreover, Washington’s strenuous objections to Germany over the Eurocorps, in particular, and the European Defense Identity, in general, have placed Germany in a most uncomfortable position. In short, Germany is caught in the middle between its two principal allies. On the one hand, the Germans must address considerable U.S concerns over the European Defense Identity, particularly perceptions that Franco-German initiatives may undercut NATO; ensure the retention of a U.S. military presence in Germany; and maintain the close relationship that has been carefully cultivated over the past 40 plus years. These concerns have resulted in the Germans taking steps to calm the United States that pull Germany away from France.

On the other hand, the Germans must also satisfy their French allies. And, because of Franco-German differences over the details of implementing European integration and Bonn’s craving to soothe French fears, Bonn is being pulled toward Paris. But, public comments made by otherwise reasonable French officials on the eve of the French referendum on Maastricht (e.g., Michel Rocard: the treaty must be ratified to save Germany from its “demons”) have infuriated German officials. That said, the truly historic rapprochement achieved since the 1950s between France and Germany means no government in Bonn would be willing to sacrifice its special relationship with Paris.

Thus, German policy appears to be all things to all people and, therefore, fully satisfies no one. But, so long as France and the United States largely define security arrangements in zero-sum terms, German policies will remain dominated by the need to play the “balancer” between its two principal allies, and observers will likely continue to see mixed signals from Bonn. Thus, placing Bonn in a position where it must choose between Washington/NATO and Paris/European Defense Identity, therefore, is simply counterproductive. If Washington continues to reduce its forces in Europe, and particularly in Germany, U.S. policy will be increasingly viewed as hypocritical. “Sniping” at the proposed creation of the European Defense Identity, while reducing forward deployed U.S. forces, will only erode support for U.S. policy issues in
Europe (e.g., support of NATO). In sum, U.S. interests in the Federal Republic will suffer if the Germans perceive that the United States opposes effective European integration.

**To Integrate or Not To Integrate: What Was the Question?**

Defining and working to achieve a European security structure, therefore, has not been a neat exercise in logical policy making. Uncertainties over the future role and mission of the United States in Europe and the evident lack of consensus within the EC as to how political and defense areas should evolve have led understandably to a confusing state of affairs. Clearly, France and the Federal Republic need to be more open in their efforts to create European security structures, if for no other reason than to garner greater consensus among their EC and American partners. If not, countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, already suspicious of French and German motives in the security sphere, are unlikely to support any initiative that would risk diminishing NATO or alienating the United States.

Therefore, as European political and security affairs continue their confused evolution, how will France and Germany orient their policy to achieve the illusive goal of a European Defense Identity? While events and proposals will change with the times, a number of constants can be discerned. First, both France and Germany will continue to use "Europe" (however "defined" at the moment) as a vehicle to maintain close bilateral ties. Both countries have vital interests in maintaining this marriage of historic and geographic necessity. Second, whenever political and economic integration become stalled, the security "option" as a modality to maintain or further closer relations, or, at least, give the appearance of tighter bonds, will likely be used (e.g., the Eurocorps).

Finally, the easy options for European integration have long ago been adopted. Future options (e.g., monetary union, political union, defense identity) strike at the very heart of the concept of state sovereignty and are issues that many states
are loath of compromise. While France and the Federal Republic may have national reasons to press ahead toward a still undefined European future, many other EC partners are unlikely to acquiesce. Hence, while officially denied and opposed by many in the EC, the “two-track,” or “Europe à la Carte,” option for the EC may very well become the only viable alternative to meeting the objectives of EC members and other European states wishing admittance into the Community.

This issue lies at the crux of the future European Defense Identity, as well. Europe must reach agreement on the overarching concepts of political union before coherent policies on its European Defense Identity can be hammered out. If nations adopt the all or none approach to integration, it is unlikely that a political agreement will be reached. Thus, a rational defense structure will be difficult to fashion. On the other hand, the “Europe à la Carte” approach offers considerable flexibility and permits a gradual evolution of the political, and hence security, system.

Conversely, adoption of the all or none approach to political union will adversely affect the development of the European Defense Identity. Because nations are unlikely to agree quickly on such politically sensitive issues, the Franco-German imperative to foster the appearance of continued deepening of integration may drive nations to tinker with the security sphere before they agree on the political bases necessary to underwrite defense policy have been agreed. Such conditions argue for increasing confusion and frustrations over defense and security issues that would only complicate the process of political integration, as evidenced in the recent historical example of the Eurocorps.

Implications for Washington: “Europe” Calling.

Despite the fits and starts of European integration and resulting frustrations, the United States must actively support the integration process. Put simply, the process will go forward whether the United States likes it or not. Therefore, from even a narrow assessment of U.S. interests in Europe, it is more
profitable for our European allies to see a cooperative United States. Moreover, active U.S. support can be translated into future participation in an integrated Europe that will still allow the United States to make its voice heard. Opposition to European integration, whether overt or subtle, only risks U.S. exclusion from European decision-making bodies. And, after all, surely one of the most important interests Washington has regarding Western European security is for its European allies to maintain as much force structure as possible. If "justification" of forces require the creation of a "European corps," clearly the value of maintaining these forces in-being overrides the predictable ambiguity in any ensuing command and operational control arrangements.

One also should not forget that stability in Western Europe has been a long-standing U.S. interest, and increasing European integration over the past four decades has served that end quite successfully. Given the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the increased integration of Western Europe can only contribute to a larger, more stable Europe. Thus, support of integration initiatives in Western Europe will further overall U.S. interests in that critical region.

Similar logic applies to U.S. support of the European Defense Identity. Again, a defense identity will emerge with or without U.S. blessing. If the United States desires to exert positive influence over the development of the European Defense Identity, then it behooves the United States to provide de facto support to bolster its long held declaratory policy of support. Carping from the sidelines about the details of the emerging security identity will only alienate key allies and damage long-term U.S. interests in the region. If the United States is to influence the development in ways that support U.S. interests (or at least does not harm them), then the United States must support the efforts of its European allies to establish a coherent and capable defense identity.

Nor should the formation of the Eurocorps overly concern the United States. First, the small numbers of units presently envisaged in the Franco-German corps are not significant. Second, the Germans and the French have agreed that the corps will serve under NATO operational control in time of
crisis, albeit details remain to be resolved. Third, regardless of the eventual size and scope of the Eurocorps, U.S. assistance will still be required to provide capabilities that the Europeans lack (e.g., airlift, intelligence, etc). Thus, the United States will likely be involved with planning and execution and will be able to influence both activities.

Fourth, the full establishment of this organization will require substantial time, and events will undoubtedly result in considerable fits and starts that will shape future developments. It makes little sense to expend significant political capital now to influence a concept that may be considerably altered by future events—perhaps in directions the United States desires.

Finally, the United States needs to keep the issue of European integration in perspective. The intent behind European integration is not to freeze out the United States. To the contrary, Europeans recognize the importance of keeping the United States engaged in Europe. European integration is about promoting European stability in general, and, in particular, putting an end to Franco-German animosities that have frequently overturned that stability. The United States must not get caught up in architectures or wiring diagrams and lose sight of the critical issue of promoting European integration to sustain the stability gained at such tremendous cost.
ENDNOTES


8. See, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Muenchen), October 29, 1992, for a report of an EC-sponsored study by a group of experts, led by former Irish EC Commissioner Peter Sutherland, pointing out the many shortcomings in the Single Market.


12. See, Vernet, p. 658.


15. Quoted by Theo Sommer in Die Zeit (Hamburg), June 12, 1992.


18. See Theo Sommer’s excellent commentary on this point in, Die Zeit (Hamburg), June 12, 1992.


21. It is interesting to note that despite French and German efforts to create common European security arrangements, there has been an increasing lack of consensus among EC member states over foreign policy issues, if measured by, for instance, their stance in the U.N. General Assembly. One source cites a significant decrease in uniformity on EC members’ voting on General Assembly resolutions; from a 65.3 percent conformity in 1975, to 44.2 percent in 1990. "If the Europeans are keen to give the Community an army as if it were a 19th-century state writ large, then the first step would have to be a foreign policy made and implemented in common." See, David Buchani’s article in, The Financial Times (London), October 18, 1992.


24. For example, according to Jacques Isnard, France has agreed to examine the possibility of participating in a NATO air operations network. See, Le Monde (Paris), June 27, 1992.


28. Nonnenmacher is the chief of the foreign affairs section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine. This particular quotation is taken from an article he penned for Le Monde (Paris), June 23, 1992.


34. For a short, but excellent assessment of this issue see, The Economist (London), October 3, 1992, p. 34.

35. For a recent example, see The Washington Times, November 7, 1992.


40. See Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruehe's comments following the La Rochelle Summit in *Handelsblatt* (Duesseldorf), May 27, 1992 in FBIS-WEU-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 15.


43. "Integrate and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence." See, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Rome, November 7-8, 1991, Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991, para 54.

44. See comments attributed to CDU/CSU Faction spokesman on foreign policy in Guenther M. Wiedemann's article in *Koelnner Stadt-Anzeiger*, May 22, 1992.


46. For example, at La Rochelle, French Presidential spokesman, Jean Musitelli noted that the corps would be open for membership to all members of the WEU and that the forces would defend NATO territory. See, AFP (Paris), May 21, 1992, in FBIS-WEU-92-099, May 21, 1992, p. 27. Recent discussion within the EC and WEU that the WEU will evolve as the defense arm of the EC further complicates the issue. For elaboration on the WEU’s role as the defense arm of the EC, see “Petersberg Declaration of the Western European Union.” Information letter from the Assembly of the Western European Union, No. 12, July 1992, pp. 12-13.


48. French participation in the recent Gulf War provides the most recent example. To be fair, the command and control difficulties were predominantly at the political, not military levels. For background on command and control of coalition forces during the Gulf War, see


53. See Holger Mey’s excellent essay on this point in Europaeische Sicherheit (Herford), July 1992, p. 369.


56. The lack of information on the Eurocorps made available to France’s and Germany’s allies can only be assessed as having been appalling. See, The Times (London), June 27, 1992.

57. “Europe à la Carte would allow countries to choose from a menu that offers differentiated degrees of integration within various policy areas....As long as the concept of L’Europe à la Carte is understood as a menu of transitional options, it may well be an ingenious response to the multiple challenges that Europe faces—in particular to the dual pressure of widening and deepening.” See, Reinicke, The New Germany and the New Europe, p. 208.

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