Research Report

THEATER STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

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by

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INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses a theater strategic estimate for RSA course requirements. As such, it will address, to some extent, three of the major components specified by JCS Publication 3-0: strategic direction, theater strategic situation, and strategic concepts. However, the remaining two elements of the traditional strategic estimate -- defining and then selecting from alternative courses of action -- seem particularly unsuited to the Latin American region, and especially to our area of focus -- the Southern Cone. Courses of action are more easily applied to regions/situations which directly threaten U.S. interests; they also tend to suggest a focus on the military dimension of national power. But, as we will see in this analysis, our strategic choices in Latin America and the Southern Cone are as much about opportunities as they are about threats. They also involve the other elements of national power -- economic, diplomatic, and social -- as much or more than the military. Thus, we will deviate from the normal format, instead wrapping our discussion, suggested strategies, and conclusion into an expanded strategic concepts section.

When we attempt to address the regional security of Latin America, we take on a big order. In virtually every dimension -- geographical, cultural, economic, governmental, military -- Latin America is a region of immense variety and complexity. From tropic to arctic; from Castro's autocratic communism to Argentina's
flowering democracy; from the poverty of Haiti to the petro-wealth of Venezuela and the booming industry of Brazil; from the heavily Mestizo population of Colombia to the Euro-transplant immigrants of Argentina; from the heavily militarized society of Nicaragua to the unique Costa Rica with no standing military -- the contrasts abound. Because of this diversity, the region defies generalized description. With some sub-regional division we can begin to make useful characterizations. For those purposes we will view Latin America in four sub-regions:

1) The Caribbean Basin: the island nations and South America's northern littoral states -- Guyana, Surinam, French Guinea, and Venezuela.

2) Central America: the traditional grouping, those states bracketed between Colombia and Mexico.

3) The Andean Ridge: Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

4) The Southern cone: Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. As our RSA course and field trip were focused on the Southern Cone, we will narrow some of our later discussion here to that sub-region.

1. STRATEGIC DIRECTION. Primary strategic direction for Latin America is drawn from the President's National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA), and CINCSOUTHCOM testimony to Congress.

A. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF NSS:
1) GLOBAL COMPONENTS. The NSS describes four primary global components of national strategy:

a) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact.

b) Maintaining a healthy and growing economy.

c) Maintaining healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

d) Promoting a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish. (14: 3-4)

Each of these national interests bears on our relationship with the nations of Latin America -- some obviously more than others. For example, Latin America clearly does not represent a direct threat to our nation's survival; yet the narcotrafficking endemic in the region does threaten our basic values.

There are several other potential threats originating in the region. They include debt and its implications for economic stability; insurgencies and political turmoil which challenge stability; environmental challenges; and the traditional and continuing challenge of military intervention in the democratic process.

2) REGIONAL COMPONENTS. We have many NSS objectives with implications for the region. Some respond to the threats cited and others derive from opportunity.

a) Strengthen democratic institutions. The "civilianization" of Latin American governments has been rapid and effective. With Chile's transition to civilian government in 1990
the Southern Cone is fully democratized. However, these democracies remain fragile and vulnerable to both external and internal instability.

b) Reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Although production is centered in the Andean Ridge nations, the whole of the region is faced with the trafficking issue. Thus, our goals are both reducing production and combatting international traffickers. For the Southern Cone in particular there is strong evidence of cross-border incursions from the Andean Ridge nations of components of the drug trade. The remote and lightly populated western reaches of Brazil, especially, offer potential for expansion of drug production facilities. The whole of the Southern Cone also presents the opportunity for expanding route structures for narcotrafficking. Thus, we must focus on working with host nations to limit the spread of drug production and trafficking.

c) Assist host nations in eliminating threats to regional security. The threats here are multi-faceted. Lingering border disputes, such as those between Argentina and Chile, still threaten security. A newer and more troublesome threat is that of narcotrafficking. Trafficking and narcoterrorism certainly threaten government stability in the Andean Ridge, and may soon do so in the other sub-regions. Another related threat — in the sense that drug trade dollars help finance arms and armies — is that of insurgencies. Notable here are the Shining Path of Peru, M-19 of Colombia, and still-active movements in Guatemala and Honduras. For the Southern Cone, relatively much
more stable than most of the region, the main threat from insurgency is the cross-border migration of guerrilla forces from neighboring nations. For the whole of the region, multi-dimensional initiative -- involving our military, diplomatic, and economic elements of national power -- represent the goal of our strategy. In this vein, initial successes of the Contadora peace plan and similar, new agreements for El Salvador both point to an important model of multi-national, regional solutions for future regional problems.

d) Supporting continued economic and social progress. This element of our national objectives, perhaps more than any other, responds both to threats and opportunities. The threats are mostly economic -- debt, inflation, poverty. The face of poverty has worsened despite economic progress; during the 80's the percentage of people in Latin America living in poverty increased from 40% to 44%. (13: 18) Even in oil-rich Venezuela, poverty has not abated. In fact, a concentration of wealth there means a growing gap between rich and poor -- clearly a potential source of instability (and a possible spark for the recent coup attempt). Nowhere is the gap more pronounced than in Brazil. (10: 5 Feb 92) The sprawling slums around Sao Paulo and Rio, along with the recent upsurge in urban crime are symptoms of social instability rising from poverty. Among the Southern Cone nations, Brazil also continues to feel the worst effects of debt and inflation -- with monthly inflation numbers in the double digits.

There is another side to the economic picture in the other Southern Cone nations, as well as much of the rest of Latin
America. There, the last few years have been a success story, with record economic growth rates, large jumps in production and exports, and successes in privatization and control of inflation. A notable example is Chile's progress under Pinochet -- privatization, inflation under 20 per cent, and quantum jumps in foreign investment. Similarly, Argentina's runaway inflation rates (6000 per cent in 1989) were down to a manageable 26% in 1990. (13: 18) Thus, our efforts should be on helping the region's nations to capitalize on recent successes and avoid the pitfalls of the past.

e) Ensure an open and neutral Panama Canal. Although the canal has less strategic significance now than in the past, it remains an important SLOC for this nation and our allies. The rapid approach of 1999, coupled with the fledgling democracy in Panama point to a demand for our multi-dimensional efforts to prepare the ownership transfer, along with the means for continued guarantees of canal access and neutrality by the government of Panama. This objective impacts the Southern Cone only obliquely, in that Chile relies heavily upon the canal for its export trade.

f) Enhance military professionalism. We will maintain a continued interest in the civilianization of Latin American governments. The region has made a widely successful transition, with only Cuba and Haiti yet failing to achieve democracy. But the historic traditions -- such as the caudillo system of strong authoritarian rule -- along with inclinations toward military government in this century, make the issue one deserving attention. Again, recent events in Venezuela show that
the military coup is not necessarily a thing of the past. In the Southern Cone, the recent emergence of democracy from military rule makes those governments potentially vulnerable to old habits if faced with instability of any form. The Argentine mutinies of 1987 are a recent example of this potential. Thus, military professionalism there is a proper focus for our national effort.

B. MAJOR COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.

1) GLOBAL COMPONENTS. The NSS cites four "fundamental demands" on our National Military Strategy (NMS):

- to ensure strategic deterrence,
- to exercise forward presence in key areas,
- to respond effectively to crises, and
- to reconstitute forces, if needed.

Furthermore the 1991 JMNA lists five additional overarching concepts of our NMS: collective security, maritime and aerospace superiority, security assistance, arms control, and technological superiority. As with the global elements of our NSS, the NMS components are affected in varying degrees from the Latin American region. Strategic deterrence and reconstitution have little current relevance. Others apply in varying degree:

a) Forward presence and crisis response. Forward presence is a small consideration here. Our forces in Panama and at JTF-B number less than 15,000. Forces devoted to security assistance and counter-narcotics operations number only in the hundreds. Unlike other key regions, our in-place forces are not envisioned in any "trip wire" capacity. Thus, we rely primarily on crisis response capability to deal with any lesser regional contingency (LRC) that could develop in the region. Prospects for a near-term major regional contingency (MRC) are
extremely low, so our current CONUS-based force structure should be more than adequate for potential regional demands.

b) Collective security. Collective security is indeed a factor for Latin America; the OAS and Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) are in-place mechanisms formalizing our interest in collective regional security. The Rio Pact, although damaged (some would say fatally) by our support of Great Britain in the Malvinas conflict, also still stands as a means for combined actions.

c) Maritime and aerospace security. Our crisis response forces are designed to gain and maintain maritime and aerospace 'superiority' in the event of a regional contingency. Collective 'security would also be a key factor in doing so quickly in the early stages of any conflict.

d) Security assistance. Security assistance is potentially a very effective element of our military strategy in dealing with nations of the region. Direct assistance and IMET represent the "carrot" to exert suasion there. The reality, however, is that our national inclination and funding for these programs are both running low.

e) Arms control. Arms control is an ongoing issue with all regions, and Latin America is no exception. First and foremost is the possibility of nuclear proliferation. Both Brazil and Argentina have nuclear programs. But, under a recent agreement they've opened up their nuclear sites to IAEA inspection. A related issue is the development of ballistic missile technology in the same two nations. Other conventional arms control concerns
in the region exist at two levels. First, is the potential purchase of destructive weapons such as chemical, biological, and advanced technology munitions. And second is their manufacture and sale. In this regard, Brazil especially has become a strong contender among other NIC's in the area of home-grown arms industries.

f) Technological superiority. Despite recent advances in regional weapons technology and arms production, our technological superiority is not at issue relative to Latin American capabilities. Indeed, our relative technology advantage makes the U.S. an important potential ally in regional economic development, and thus points more to the potential for cooperation than to competition — especially relative to the Southern Cone nations.

2) REGIONAL COMPONENTS. Regional components of our NMS are, in one sense, direct extensions of the global components discussed above. As we saw, elements such as security assistance, arms control, and collective security hold direct applicability for our role in Latin America. Other regional components stem from both our NSS and NMS guidance. These prioritized regional components are: 1) nation assistance — where the military component is part of a multi-dimensional effort; 2) counter-narcotics (CN) efforts; 3) counterinsurgency (CI); 4) treaty implementation — planning for transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999; and 5) guaranteeing continued access — to resources, markets, and SLOC's.
a) Nation assistance. Security assistance and advisory work to assist host nation efforts to restructure institutions, improve security capabilities, and nurture democratic processes are all part of multi-agency U.S. involvement. This element has much less broad applicability for Southern Cone nations than for countries such as Bolivia, Peru, and Panama.

b) Counter-narcotics (CN). Again, in concert with other agencies such as DEA, we must assist host nations in disrupting the drug flow. With Southern Cone nations, the focus here is on preventing the spread of drug production and trafficking.

c) Counterinsurgency (CI). This element involves assistance to host nations in developing and improving CI capabilities. Civic action assistance will also help eliminate underlying causes of insurgencies. In the Southern Cone, CI initiatives will center upon assistance in eliminating cross-border incursions and on denying potential use of remote regions of those nations as sanctuaries by guerrillas from other nations.

d) Treaty implementation. SOUTHCOM will play a key role here. Actions include planning for departure of U.S. forces and insuring that implementation plans guarantee continued access to and neutrality of the Panama Canal.

e) Regional access. The military element of our power serves primarily as a deterrent to nations who might attempt to deny access to critical sea lanes or to the possibility of a regional hegemon attempting to control exportation of strategic minerals. On a more regional level, our military to
military contacts serve as one part of national resources which can help sustain friendly relations -- the best guarantor of access to resources and markets. With the Southern Cone nations, resources -- especially Brazil's strategic minerals -- are a key issue. Open markets are increasingly important as those nations build their industrial capability. And, of course, sea lanes -- notably the Straits of Magellan and the Beagle Channel -- are crucial to the U.S. and our allies for shipping too large for Panama Canal transit.

C. OTHER NATIONAL SOURCES. Other sources of strategic direction in the region emanate from the diplomatic and economic elements of our national power. Their specific components tend to be less well defined than our NMS. This fact is partly due to a long history in our foreign relations in which much of Latin America has met with official "benign neglect" on our part. Thus, we find those strategies sometimes administered on an ad hoc basis, with little overall regional coordination. Nevertheless, the focus of those multi-agency efforts in each nation is the ambassador and his country team. The individual country plans are an essential part of our overall strategic effort.

D. ALLIANCE OR COALITION COMPONENTS. As mentioned previously, the Rio Pact an in-place (although admittedly damaged) regional alliance. However, the peacetime applicability of the alliance in pursuit of our regional strategy is essentially limited. While the OAS and IADB are established fora for regional discussion, they exercise little actual sway in day-to-day policy decisions. This is not surprising. Unlike our NATO alliance,
the partners commit few resources to the common end. And, perhaps more importantly, we have not shared a half century of competition with a very real and very powerful potential foe. Thus, at this juncture, alliance considerations have only limited usefulness for our strategic direction.

2. **THEATER STRATEGIC SITUATION.** Here we deviate somewhat from the standard strategic estimate format because, in many respects, Latin America is a theater unto itself. First, unlike other theaters, it does not hold implications for our primary national interest -- survival. And secondly, it is less tied to and interdependent with other theaters. Geography and distances are a large factor here, as are diplomatic traditions and the "Monroe Doctrine syndrome" -- where other great powers have been dissuaded from regional military interaction. Thus, global implications are few and will not be explored. Host nation intelligence, logistics, and C-3 considerations, while part of our contingency forces detailed planning, obviously vary from country to country and do not merit a 19-part assessment at this level of analysis. In-place U.S. force capabilities here are extremely limited, except in Panama. Suffice it to say that our strategy relies on robust capabilities within the CONUS-based crisis response forces. Finally, host nation personnel estimates are open source -- and, again, an exhaustive coverage in not appropriate here. We will look at host nation capabilities to some degree in our area of focus -- the Southern Cone -- as we assess both regional theater characteristics and those of the Southern Cone sub-region.
A. REGIONAL OVERVIEW. The Latin American region is, in the words of General Joulwan, "a region in transition and conflict, where instability is more the rule than the exception, where enormous human and resource potential exist, and, most importantly, where U.S. commitment and cooperation are both necessary and vital." (6: 204) Although no Latin American nation poses a current direct threat to U.S. interests, the region poses tremendous challenges to our ability to apply effective strategies for both bilateral and regional cooperation. An obvious challenge is the size and diversity of the theater. The SOUTHCOM AOR constitutes one sixth of the world's land mass, stretching some 6000 miles from north to south. With 19 nations, over 325 million people, and a myriad of diverse cultures, geography, and climate, it is a "mosaic of extremes". (7)

U.S. interests in the region are amplified by several factors. Some of the obvious are our geographical proximity, traditional ties, and the abundance of strategic resources -- notably oil in Mexico and Venezuela and some 15 vital minerals in Brazil. (10: 5 Feb 92) U.S. trade and investment is another key factor. Exports to Latin America amounted to $43 billion in 1988 -- about 20% of total exports. Direct investment is also over $40 billion. (12: 96-97) The emerging influence of both Brazil and Mexico as regional and economic powers is an increasingly important consideration. And perhaps the most important current interest is our shared common threat -- the drug trade.

That drug trade is first among a set of "enduring problems" in Latin America which constrain, complicate, and in many
cases, define our regional strategy. Insurgency -- a second problem -- still plagues the region. Currently Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru face serious insurgencies. Instability and the related issue of civil-military relations is another enduring problem. Along with the nations facing insurgencies, Bolivia is a nation beset by turmoil and ineffective institutions. Haiti and Venezuela are the two most recent examples of resurgent military involvement in attempts to change governments. Border disputes, environmental concerns (from the Antarctic to the Amazon), and population growth -- along with often worsening social and economic conditions -- all shape the region's operational environment. And within this regional environment, each sub-region and in turn, each nation, faces its own set of derivative or additive problems -- problems that must be part of our strategy equation.

B. SUB-THEATER STRATEGIC SITUATION -- THE SOUTHERN CONE.
The Southern Cone nations -- Chile, Argentina, and Brazil -- along with their buffer or satellite nations, Uruguay and Paraguay (which will not be explored in any depth here), stand apart from the whole of Latin America in many respects. Yes, they do share some of the enduring problems of their northern neighbors: the drug trade, social and economic instability, civil-military relations, and fragility of new democracies. But, in most respects, the problems are less severe. Moreover, the Southern Cone nations seem poised closer to opportunity -- opportunity to overcome and move beyond today's set of problems.
1) CHILE. That opportunity, perhaps more apparent by its rapid materialization, is evident for example in Chile. The most dramatic recent event in Chile is its economic transformation under the unlikely leadership of the autocrat Pinochet. With his impetus, Chile overcame economic stagnation and hyperinflation. Pinochet and his "Chicago Boys" brought debt under control, began the move to industrial privatization, and produced a favorable trade balance. Now, with their equally dramatic shift to democracy, the Chileans under President Alwyin continue on a course toward economic success.

In this economic sphere, the U.S. remains important to Chile, accounting for some 20% of both their export and import trade. Important bilateral issues include U.S. economic protectionism, the drug trade, and (now that the Kennedy-Harkin Amendment has been lifted) military cooperation. The U.S. also seems to be important to Chile as a "sponsor" in their recent moves away from diplomatic isolation and toward a normalized role in the international sphere. Despite this warming relationship, a high ranking U.S. official in Chile observed recently that the Chileans retain a "cynicism about the American attention span."

Perhaps for that reason the Chileans can be expected to maintain their cautious approach toward normalization of sub-regional relations. Numerous conversations during our AWC February visit confirmed that the Chileans still see a potential threat in their old territorial competitors, Argentina and Bolivia.
Indeed, the strongest potential source for military conflict in the Southern Cone is the territorial rivalry between Chile and Argentina.

2) ARGENTINA. From the Argentine view (again based on AWC visit observations), the military threat from Chile seems a much lower national priority. On a regional scale, Argentina maintains a substantial military force, but is actively engaged in substantial defense cuts. The most pressing national issue for Argentina is the economy. Although hyperinflation is under control and debt is down, the Argentines have a long way to go toward regaining even a partial measure of their (fondly recalled) former status among the world's economic leaders. In their pursuit of economic health, the Argentines view the U.S. as an important ally and trading partner. Indeed, we have been the beneficiary of Argentine moves under President Menem toward a deepening alignment with the West (evidence Argentina's naval participation in the U.S.-lead embargo of Iraq).

Menem's efforts are also evident in the Southern Cone sub-region. In fact, he has emerged as the leading force in sub-regional economic integration, championing the economic agreement, along EC lines, between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay. The agreement, scheduled to take effect in 1995, is expected to eventually include Chile. In other relations with Chile, Menem signed a protocol to settle several frontier conflicts. Another important bilateral Southern Cone effort for the Argentines is the recent agreement with Brazil to allow mutual inspection of nuclear facilities under IAEA auspices. Menem has
also agreed to sign the Tlateloco Treaty to keep Latin America free of nuclear weapons. (15:32)

Those nuclear agreements are an important step for Argentina toward resolving bilateral issues with the U.S. But their role in proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear reactor technology is still a concern. Likewise, our over-cautious reluctance to sell older model F-16A/B aircraft is a concern for the Argentines.

3) BRAZIL. Of all the Southern Cone nations, Brazil holds perhaps the most opportunity, but also is faced with the greatest challenges. Latin America’s largest nation, with by far its biggest population, Brazil also holds claim to plentiful strategic minerals, an agricultural export trade second only to the U.S., and a burgeoning weapons industry. Yet, its economy in still beset by monthly inflation rates in double digits (the Brazilians see these, on a relative scale, as manageable) and by the burden of still-large external and internal debt.

Brazil’s economic troubles go hand-in-hand with social problems — unemployment and the have/have-not gap (the world’s largest) breed crime and corruption. That environment has also brought Brazil squarely into the core of the drug problem — cross-border Amazon drug operations from neighbor Andean Ridge nations are now merely a small part of Brazil’s narcotics problem. Now, extensive jungle runway complexes (the Brazilian commander of the Amazonian air force region estimates 1,000 such fields is his
region alone), major trade routes to Europe through Brazilian cities, police corruption, money laundering, and widespread drug use by the urban poor are all part of the problem.

Clearly, Brazil's growing role in narcotrafficking is a major concern for the U.S. Other bilateral issues include our weapons proliferation concerns (especially with regard to missile technology), Brazilian violations of our intellectual property, and the potential fragility of Brazilian democracy in the face of economic and social instability. From the Brazilian side, bilateral concerns include perceived U.S. economic protectionism and lingering memories of our misguided paternalism. As a potential regional leader, Brazil seems careful to chart an independent course -- and to remain distanced from U.S. policy. At the same time, however, the Brazilians also seem reluctant to seize that leadership role. As a senior U.S. consular official in Rio noted in February, Brazil remains a very "introspective society."

4) Challenge and opportunity -- the Southern Cone nations share much in common. "Recovering" economies, newly installed democratic institutions, spreading narcotrafficking, and the strong potential for regional leadership are common to the "big three" of the Southern Cone. U.S. interests there center in many respects on these characteristics. Additional foci are continued access to markets and to southern SLOC's, as well as "professionalization" of regional militaries and concerns over human rights.
3.1 STRATEGIC CONCEPTS: THE SOUTHERN CONE SUB-REGION. Those U.S.-Brazilian bilateral issues, along with our bilateral concerns with Chile and Argentina, are closely related to our strategic concepts for the Southern Cone sub-region. We will address those concepts in the context of USSOUTHCOM sub-regional objectives: 1) limit the spread of narcotrafficking, 2) strengthen democratic institutions, 3) support continued economic and social progress, 4) guarantee U.S. access (markets, resources, SLOC's), 5) enhance military professionalism, and 6) strengthen bilateral relations. These objectives form the outline of a near-term, sub-regional strategic concept. Some thoughts on each follow:

A. LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NARCOTRAFFICKING. Current U.S. regional cooperative efforts are primarily directed toward the Andean Ridge and Caribbean. In the Southern Cone we can and should offer more assistance. Especially in Brazil, the sheer size of the area exploited by the traffickers makes detection and interdiction an impossible task without modern technical means. Unfortunately, the Southern Cone will not gain much capability with the 1993 completion of a ground-based regional radar network -- the focus is further north. Potential U.S. counter-narcotics (CN) assistance (beyond shared C3I and Tactical Analysis Teams) could include AWACS deployments (possibly under OAS sponsorship), use of E-2C aircraft in conjunction with port visits and naval exercises, and technical assistance in developing an AWACS-derivative radar detection aircraft. Assistance with developing a space-based capability could also be part of future efforts. Regardless of the technical means used in the CN effort, cooperation among the Southern Cone
nations will be essential in reaching an effective, long-term CN strategy rather than a mere stopgap.

B. SUPPORT CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. That same sub-regional cooperation will be important here also. The 1995 joint political-economic alliance among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay will create a Southern Cone common market. It also represents a superb opportunity for the Bush administration's Enterprise for the America's Initiative. The Southern Cone clearly represents a logical sub-region for a follow-on to the North American Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico. Sub-regional agreements are the preferred course toward Bush's vision of a hemispheric free trade area. Such an agreement with the Southern Cone also could serve as an incentive for those nations toward finding and solidifying other shared interests. In other words, shared economic goals could be an important confidence building measure in our pursuit of limitations on proliferation of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles by Brazil and Argentina.

C. GUARANTEE U.S. ACCESS. Likewise, a free trade agreement would clearly mean better access to resources and markets. Other strategies might include less restrictive FMS policies, along with co-production and technology sharing. It seems obvious that these methods represent natural converging interests. As our defense acquisition budget shrinks, overseas markets should be an important element in helping to sustain some measure of an industrial base. In the FMS equation, more liberal policies, such as selling older F-16's -- essentially surplus
aircraft -- would be a financial windfall and a solid "confidence builder" (re. our limited "attention span") among Southern Cone nations. They are otherwise likely to turn to Europe for similar advanced technology aircraft and weapons.

D. STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. This is an area deserving great caution. The flowering of democracy in the Southern Cone does not also signal a waning of feelings of national sovereignty. Any unilateral U.S. initiatives here are likely to backfire -- triggering memories of our "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, Carter's misguided idealism, or Kennedy-Harkin style paternalism. We should avoid falling victim to our ethnocentric ideas of what a democracy must be and letting those beliefs lead to "all or nothing" diplomacy such as we've recently displayed in reaction to President Fujimori's actions in Peru. The new democracies are likely -- in fact, almost certain -- to have some rough edges now and then. Extreme problems are not always best handled in classic Jeffersonian democratic tradition (evidence our suspension of civil rights of Japanese-American citizens in World War II). Overreaction to similar temporary measures (such as Fujimori's) may serve to drive nations further from democracy.

In supporting Southern Cone democracy, multilateral measures will thus be more effective and much less likely to trigger permanent resentment. The OAS trade embargo of Haiti is a notable example of such measures.

E. STRENGTHEN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM. This objective is really a subset of the preceding one. The same cautions apply. We must recognize the historical and cultural factors which incline
the Southern Cone militaries toward a more active role in government. Continued military to military contacts, both bilaterally and regionally, are a strong tool here. Increased IMET and, again, more liberal FMS sales could help lead to converging interests and shared values. A broadening of the role of the IADB -- perhaps specifically with regard to CN efforts -- is another potential avenue. This approach could help build shared values, while also presaging a greater regional leadership role for the Southern Cone.

F. STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS. Yes, but ... ! Better bilateral relations should grow from our application of concepts discussed with the above five objectives. They should be by-products rather than specific goals. In this respect, the nature of our country team structures is a potential trap. Each ambassador's interagency group works only one slice of a set of threats or opportunities which tend to be regional (or at least sub-regional) in nature. In their bilateral focus, these teams can easily work at cross purposes. In the Southern Cone, an integrated (not just interagency) approach toward policy and strategy is clearly in order.

G. TOWARD THE FUTURE. How do we insure such an integrated approach? Current structures at State, DOD, CIA, et al are meant to do this. CINCSOUTHCOM also plays such a role. However, short of wartime, the CINC supports the country team. And when it comes to many critical choices, does a Washington desk officer or the ambassador hold sway? If the trend and the hope for achieving strategic objectives is through sub-regional or regional
integration, isn't it time to realign our foreign policy structure to match?

Without speculating on the shape of such a structure for our future dealings with the Southern Cone, let us suggest that this might be a good region to mark as a starting point or test case for the use of such an "animal". Argentina, Brazil, and Chile together offer the best hope for stable regional leadership. By first working toward sub-regional cooperation and integration in addressing problems and opportunities -- with vehicles such as Enterprise for the Americas and combined CN military operations -- we can take some strong first steps toward establishing those nations as stable and viable leaders for future progress in the whole of Latin America.

3.2 STRATEGIC CONCEPTS: REGIONAL OVERVIEW. As we saw, the sub-regional strategic concepts offer a vehicle for coherent application of national and alliance efforts. The commonality of challenges and shared experience of the Southern Cone nations mean a more specific and useful set of concepts than for the region as a whole. But that sub-regional course of action also offers a focus for the regional future, as we'll see in this analysis. As in the Southern Cone analysis we will dispense with the traditional breakdown of individual dimensions (military, economic, etc). Instead, it seems more useful to focus on the regional goals and then look at the various elements of each goal together -- just as they should be applied together in practice. These goals are near-term and long-term; near-term goals: 1) promote a common
perception of the threat from narcotics; 2) assist host nations in CN and CI efforts; 3) promote and support democratization; 4) protect strategic line of communication; 5) foster economic growth and stability; and 6) build alliances. (5: 217)

A. PROMOTE A COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE THREATS FROM NARCOTICS. In general, the peoples of Latin America do not regard narcotics as a serious threat (in Columbia and Peru, beset by often drug-related violence, perceptions may conform more to ours). Instead, they tend to see the drug trade as a U.S.-driven problem -- we supply the demand -- or as a source of foreign capital. Here, military to military contacts (IMET especially) should be part of a broad diplomatic effort to convince governments and their peoples that the long-term prospects of an expanding drug trade mean increased regional instability. The OAS/IADB fora should take the lead in this effort.

B. ASSIST HOST NATIONS IN CN AND CI EFFORTS. Again, regional action is the only viable, long-term answer to this regional problem. At this level we should strive to put teeth into the OAS/IADB partnership. Meanwhile, we can also continue bilateral, multi-agency work to improve host nation operational training, intelligence support, C3I infrastructure, and detection and surveillance capability.

C. PROMOTE AND SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION. Bilaterally, this element should be high on the order of business for our country teams. We can do more regionally to provide the "carrots" to these fragile democracies. Trade preferences and FMS flexibility on our part would go a long way toward signalling our
continuing commitment to those governments. Military to military contacts are a vital aspect, especially on the issue of "professionalism".

D. PROTECT STRATEGIC SLOC'S. We've already looked at this element in regard to the southern passage. The other key element is our coming seven years of preparation with the Panamanian government to insure continued access and neutrality for the canal.

E. FOSTER ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY. Our Southern Cone concepts are the obvious answer here also. This is true for two reasons. First, the Southern Cone nations have found a path out of economic chaos. Brazil is still beset by inflation -- but, as in Argentina and Chile, production is up and privatization and industrial growth are on an upsurge. More importantly though, the Southern Cone has taken some first important steps toward regional economic integration. This move toward integration (perhaps in concert with our Enterprise for the Americas Initiative) is the best focus for our regional efforts -- the EC 1992 model could easily become an Americas 2000 plan.

The second reason for applying the Southern Cone economic concept to the region is to capitalize on the existing stability and success there. Brazil in particular (because of its size; resources, and potential), and the Southern Cone in general, are the natural sources for regional leadership -- both now and increasingly in the future.

F. BUILDING ALLIANCES -- MOVING TO THE FUTURE. That regional economic leadership can -- and should be -- the nucleus of
much more, a cornerstone of our long-term, regional strategic concept. Strongly held regional sentiments about the dependency and sovereignty issues vis a vis our nation, along with recollections of the "high-handed" actions of the Carter administration limit the extent and dilute the final effectiveness of our attempts at bilateral efforts toward our regional goals. Nor do we have the resources or political will to undertake a U.S.-financed "Marshall Plan" for Latin America. Development of a more robust alliance structure and capabilities is the way around this set of problems. For our part, we can encourage and nurture sub-regional integration in the Southern Cone as an important first step toward a region-wide approach to common problems, shared values and goals. Thus, our vision for the long term -- for 2000 and beyond -- should be a vibrant and democratic alliance. It should be a full and robust alliance in all dimensions -- economic, social, diplomatic, and military -- lead by the strong and stable "big three" of the Southern Cone.

In working toward this long-term vision we need a structure to deal effectively with the alliance. Our long-term strategy will work best when multi-dimensional, multi-agency efforts are focussed by a structure charged with overall coordination of national efforts. Such a structure could spell the end to the tradition of "benign neglect", while matching the robust capabilities we envision for our Latin American alliance partners.


5. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: testimony of CINCUSSOUTHCOM, 8 Mar 90.

6. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: testimony of CINCUSSOUTHCOM, Apr 91.


10. Ludwig, Armin, Lectures to AWC Latin America RSA course.


