The Role of Deterrence in America's European Strategy

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Marc Dean Millot

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PREFACE

This is the first of two Notes recording the results of the Deterrence Workshop.\footnote{See also Marc Dean Millot, Preston Niblack (eds.), The Deterrence Workshop: Summary of Discussion and Selected Papers, RAND, N-3236-AF (forthcoming).}
The research on which this Note is based was performed under the project entitled "The Deterrence Workshop" for the National Security Strategies Program, under the auspices of Project AIR FORCE, a federally funded research and development center. The objective of the workshop, sponsored by the Air Staff's Directorate of Plans and Operations, was to reexamine basic assumptions underlying U.S. concepts of deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons in furthering that critical national security objective. The effort entailed reexamining the requirements of an adequate nuclear deterrence strategy and force posture for today and the future and revisiting debates concerning the mechanisms of deterrence threats. Workshop sessions were held between March 1988 and October 1989. The project complements other PAF research on nuclear deterrence and contributes to Air Force strategic force planning and doctrinal development.

As might be expected during a period of rapid and fundamental change in the international system, a wide range of views has emerged with respect to the nature of changes and resulting prescriptions for U.S. policy. This divergence is as evident at RAND as anywhere. The purpose of this Note is to stimulate critical thought about the nature of international developments and prescriptions for U.S. policy, not to represent a consensus.\footnote{For other views on these issues, see Robert Levine and David Ochmanek, Toward a Stable Transition in Europe: A Conservative/Activist Strategy for the United States, The RAND Corporation, N-3106-AF, August 1990; and Charles Cooper et al., Rethinking Security Arrangements in Europe, The RAND Corporation, N-3107-AF, August 1990.} This Note represents the project leader's views and draws on the results of the workshop. The relevance of deterrence to American security interests is examined in the context of a review of American grand strategy.

This Note should be useful to Air Force officers and defense officials concerned with the development of national strategy and military operations, as well as to students of U.S. national security policy.

This Note was written between October 1989 and April 1990. The events in Eastern Europe that began in November 1989 continued throughout that period and...
beyond. Consequently, this Note may be dated in certain respects. Nevertheless the discussion offers important insights into both the enduring and the changing elements of America's deterrence strategy. The discussion may be particularly useful as policymakers and defense analysts consider the implications for U.S. national security policy of changes in Europe and the Soviet Union.
SUMMARY

The relevance of nuclear deterrence to U.S. interests has not generally been questioned from the late 1940s to the present time. Given the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its intention to dominate Europe, the weak position of our own West European allies in the aftermath of World War II, and the limits Congress would place on the number of U.S. troops stationed in that region, deterrence of Soviet aggression by the threat of nuclear retaliation seemed the best solution to our European security problem. In combination with a diplomatic strategy of collective security and an economic strategy of European reconstruction, the defense strategy of deterrence supported a larger grand strategy of containing Soviet power.

Over time, the economic and diplomatic strategies faded in importance. Deterrence became the principal component of containment. The policy became difficult to sustain in light of Soviet military developments, West European doubts about America's commitment, and disagreements at home about the necessity and wisdom of containment and deterrence. But the strategy was worth sustaining as long as the Soviets maintained capabilities and persisted in their intent to dominate the European continent.

Today, we have good reason to believe that Soviet capabilities and intentions in Europe are undergoing radical change. There is a real chance to reverse the circumstances in Europe that required containment and made deterrence so relevant to the pursuit of national interests. If the old problem of European security was the protection of Western Europe from Soviet attack, coercion, or subversion until our allies could stand on their own, deterrence was the essential component of grand strategy. Deterrence cannot achieve containment's longer-term objectives—to promote a mellowing or disintegration of the Soviet Union in order to promote self-determination in Eastern Europe and negotiate the reunification of Germany and a stable European security regime. These goals need a reemphasis on the diplomatic and economic instruments of policy. The success of containment means that it must be replaced with a new grand strategy.

Beyond containment lies disengagement from the Cold War, requiring a revised defense strategy that emphasizes a conditional and long-term withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces from Eastern and Western Europe. In combination with a diplomatic
strategy of inclusion and an economic strategy of engagement, controlled withdrawal can help create the basis of a stable European order and encourage the creation of strong democratic institutions in Eastern Europe. Deterrence is not irrelevant to U.S. grand strategy, but it is no longer of central importance.
This Note is the result of the author's participation in the Deterrence Workshop as project leader and moderator of the workshop's seminar series. It is by no means intended to summarize the consensus or majority view of the workshop's participants; many of the ideas explored here were brought to the author's attention by members of the group. A particular intellectual debt is owed to Preston Niblack, whose insightful summaries of workshop sessions focused attention on the relevance of deterrence to emerging security concerns. Other RAND colleagues who have contributed to the development of the Note in workshop seminars, private conversations, or comments on earlier drafts include James Winnefeld, James Quinlivan, Don Henry, Paul Hill, Thomas Glennan, Timothy Webb, Robert Lempert, James Bonomo, Bruce Pimie, Peter Stan, Allan Vick, Joseph Alt, Dean Wilkening, James Thomson, John Schrader, James Dewar, Russell Shaver, David Ochmanek, and Robert Levine. Major Steven Cullen (USAF) also commented on the draft. John Lund contributed a thoughtful review. Shirley Lithgow typed and retyped the manuscript. The views expressed in this Note, as well as any errors or omissions, are the author's sole responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A workshop designed for the express purpose of reexamining our basic assumptions about nuclear deterrence cannot avoid assessing the most fundamental of all assumptions: that deterrence of the Soviet Union from the use or threat of force against Western Europe is of paramount importance to American interests and objectives.¹ For the past 40 years, the U.S. counter threat, to employ nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in defense of American interests, has been the central feature of a grand strategy of containment concentrated particularly on Europe. Nuclear deterrence has assured our own national security by protecting our European allies from Soviet domination. Today, in the face of revolutionary changes in the Soviet bloc, the containment strategy is viewed as a success, but policymakers and the public alike wonder if it is still appropriate.

To many observers, U.S. foreign and defense policies appear to be in a state of suspended animation. No one seeks a return to the Cold War, but can we afford to change those elements of American strategy that have guaranteed our security, including not only the concept of nuclear deterrence, but the troops in Europe designed to make the policy credible, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under whose auspices those troops have been deployed?

Nuclear weapons are an instrument of military strategy, which is itself part of a larger defense strategy serving a still higher political or grand strategy designed to further basic national objectives. Nuclear deterrence is a defense strategy, as opposed to its alternatives—preventive war, conventional defense, or even retreat. We should not simply assert that the institutions developed as vehicles of our grand strategy are necessary to our national security. Strategies must be periodically reassessed at every level to assure that they meet national goals. The relevance of nuclear deterrence to European security depends on the applicability of the higher policy of containment to

¹This Note was the last in a series of papers written for the Deterrence Workshop in PAF's National Security Strategies Program. An earlier version was presented to the European Security Symposium held at the RAND headquarters in Santa Monica in January 1990. Selected workshop papers and a summary of group discussions can be found in Marc Dean Millot and Preston Niblack (eds.), The Deterrence Workshop: Summary of Discussion and Selected Papers, RAND, N-3236-AF (forthcoming).
European security depends on the applicability of the higher policy of containment to American interests and objectives. The pertinence of containment can be assessed only through an examination of the basic assumptions on which the grand strategy was designed and a review of the extent to which those assumptions accord with current realities.

This Note assesses the relevance of deterrence in the context of an exploration of American grand strategy. Section II describes the assumptions that underlay the strategy of containment devised in the decade following World War II. It explains containment's subsidiary diplomatic, economic, and defense strategies. Section III outlines the requirements of deterrence in terms of the perceptions of three audiences—the Soviets, our European allies, and the American public—as represented in the Congress. It then describes the efforts of successive administrations to implement the defense strategy as realities evolved. In Sec. IV, the current situation in Europe is analyzed in the context of containment's long-term objectives. From the new assumptions developed in Sec. V a new grand strategy is developed. Section VI discusses defense strategy and assesses the relevance of deterrence. Section VII summarizes the argument for a new grand strategy.
II. THE GRAND STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT

THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND CONTAINMENT

In the years immediately following World War II, policymakers in Washington, specifically those in the Executive Branch, gradually became convinced that the Soviet Union was intent on dominating the Eurasian landmass. Although the United States opposed the extension of Soviet power to Eastern Europe and later China, these regions were not considered vital American interests. Of signal concern was the potential Soviet domination of Western Europe. Moscow had not yet overtly threatened our Western allies, but Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and occupied Germany, followed by pressures on Turkey and Finland and support for subversive elements in Greece, France, and Italy, convinced Washington that the Soviets would try to subjugate Western Europe if they could. The slow pace of Soviet demobilization was evidence that they had the military capability to attempt or threaten invasion.

The hard-learned lesson of World Wars I and II was that the United States could not allow any power to control the European continent. The Soviets held Eastern Europe. Control of Western Europe from Moscow would create a base of industrial and military might equal to America’s, and leave us an isolated democracy. Policymakers in Washington assumed that our own national security began on Western Europe’s border with Eastern Europe. That border cut through a Germany divided, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated after the Berlin crisis of 1948, because of a Soviet “attitude that it would not relax its hold on any way whatever on any territory which it controlled.”

Behind the Western border, the industrial centers and economic infrastructures of Western Europe were devastated. Although victorious in war, the governments of our West European allies were battered and demoralized; democracy was threatened with defeat on the home front. Italy and Western-occupied Germany, our former adversaries but soon on their way to parliamentary government, were even worse off. Across Western Europe, economic collapse was imminent. Food, clothing, and shelter were in short supply. Unemployment was high. The people were psychologically debilitated from war. Governments were threatened with collapse and internal subversion. And with their centers foundering, the West European empires began to disintegrate. To

1Dean Acheson, "Remarks by Secretary Acheson on the Conference" [of Foreign Ministers in Paris], in Dallek, 1973, p. 504.
Washington, it seemed that Western Europe was in no condition to defend itself. Without outside assistance, the Western democracies might be unable to resist Soviet pressures.

By contrast to Europe, the American position was enviable: U.S. troops occupied parts of Germany and Austria and all of Japan. A global military presence had been established, although it was being rapidly dismantled. We were in sole possession of the atomic bomb and about to acquire means to deliver it from intercontinental range. Our massive industrial and agricultural bases were intact and thriving. Washington policymakers believed that America had the wherewithal to maintain substantial overseas defense commitments.

At the same time, most Americans wanted to "bring the boys home" and return to the pursuit of happiness. World War II was supposed to be the war that would finally end all wars, not the prelude to a permanent military presence around the world. From 1945 to 1947, the U.S. armed forces went from 12 million to 1.6 million men. While policymakers in Washington believed that only America could contain Soviet expansionism, they also suspected the American public, and specifically Congress, would have to be shocked and frightened out of what they feared was a return to isolationism.

CONTAINMENT'S SUPPORTING STRATEGIES

Washington's response to these circumstances was the gradual development of a grand strategy of containment. From roughly 1947 to the end of the Korean War, policymakers in the Executive Branch formulated a cohesive national strategy encompassing all instruments of American national power. This larger strategy incorporated subsidiary diplomatic, economic, and defense strategies, directed not only at the Soviet Union and its satellites, but also the putative victims of Soviet expansionism, particularly Western Europe.

The diplomatic strategy was the creation of multilateral institutions to promote interests shared by Western Europe and America and strengthen a sense of mutual commitment. The collective economic interest was promoted under the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the collective financial interest under the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the collective defense interest under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These institutions gave life to the concept of an "Atlantic Community." Following a brief attempt at inclusion, the Soviet Union and its satellites were excluded from these institutions.
The economic strategy was the reconstruction of Western Europe through the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, other aid such as the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, and the promotion of West European economic integration. Strong West European economies were considered a basis for the political stability and military power necessary to resist Soviet subversion, coercion, and attack. After early attempts to extend aid to the East, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Bloc became one of quarantine. The Soviet Union and its satellites were excluded from postwar international economic institutions. Trade with the East was tightly regulated through such mechanisms as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Technology Export Controls (COCOM) and the National Defense Assistance Act of 1951, which provided for the immediate denial of American aid to any state knowingly transferring goods or technology of U.S. origin to communist countries. Behind these barriers, the Western economies would thrive.

The defense strategy was nuclear deterrence. It was not the only option considered. The United States had neither the will nor probably the capability to wage a "preventive war" against the Soviet Union. Such an option was seriously discussed in Washington. It was, for example, "one of four possible courses of action" that Paul Nitze had proposed with NSC-68 in 1950. But the alternative was rejected in that document. It was also explicitly ruled out by both Truman and Eisenhower. In his farewell address, Truman declared that "starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men."2 During the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, Eisenhower explained the U.S. rejection of preventive war:

It has been consistent U.S. policy, without regard to political party, to seek an end to this situation [the Soviet military occupation of Eastern Europe] and to fulfill the wartime pledge of the United States that these countries, overrun by wartime armies, would once again know sovereignty and self-government.

We could not, of course, carry out this policy by resort to force. Such force would have been contrary to both the best interests of the Eastern European peoples and to the abiding principles of the United Nations.3

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2Herken, 1985, pp. 94–95.
A "conventional" defense of Western Europe was also gradually dismissed. The West Europeans could not afford to match the Red Army. Policymakers knew the American Congress would not be willing to raise and deploy large ground forces to the continent. Instead, the United States committed its nuclear weapons to the defense of its allies. In essence, Washington proposed that if the Soviet Union were to invade any Western European ally of the United States, the United States would go to war with the Soviet Union, if necessary, with nuclear weapons and against the Soviet Union itself. It was hoped that with time and economic recovery, Western Europe could assume primary responsibility for its own defense. In the meantime, the American nuclear threat would keep the peace.

Over time, the economic and diplomatic strategies supporting containment faded in importance. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), intended to foster a close economic partnership between the emerging European Economic Community and the United States, failed to develop into a strong institution. As the economies of Western Europe grew less dependent on American aid, their governments' views on trade with the East became more independent of Washington.

The diplomatic dimension of containment succeeded. However, once the common "Atlantic" interest was expressed in the formation of collective political, economic, and military institutions, those forums tended to become vehicles for the pursuit of individual national interests. NATO, the OECD, and the IMF became avenues for the expression of each member's own foreign policy, which was not identical to "Atlantic" or collective policy. The pursuit of U.S. positions competed with the original goal of maintaining the institution as a demonstration of allied unity.

The economic and diplomatic tools of containment continued to play a role in U.S. national security policy, but they were focused more on the Third World, where the creation of NATO-like security institutions (CENTO, SEATO) and U.S. economic aid programs, such as "Point Four," became U.S. tools in the contest for the "hearts and minds" of former colonials. By default, nuclear deterrence evolved into the central element of containment in Europe.
III. DETERRENCE: THE DEFENSE STRATEGY

Over the past 40 years, U.S. defense policy has focused on the maintenance of a credible deterrent strategy. Successive U.S. administrations have simultaneously addressed three audiences: The Soviet leadership, whom we sought to deter from efforts to dominate Europe; the West Europeans, who had to be assured of our commitment to their defense if they were to stand up to Soviet coercion; and the Congress, which had to provide the resources and demonstrate the domestic political backing necessary to implement the strategy. Toward Moscow, Washington has sought to implant and nourish the impression that the United States would use nuclear weapons to prevent a Soviet military occupation of Western Europe. Toward the West European capitals, American policymakers have attempted to assuage fears that the United States would not defend their vital interests and contended with European views of the Soviet threat that were increasingly divergent from those of Washington. Finally, the Executive Branch has tried to persuade the Congress that U.S. efforts to so convince the Soviets and Europeans were affordable, legitimate, necessary, and worth the risks. The policy proved successful but gradually became less workable and more difficult to manage.

THE SOVIET AUDIENCE

American efforts to make deterrence credible to the Soviets involved, first, a sustained commitment of resources to atomic weaponry; and second, the presence in Western Europe of enough American soldiers to force the United States into any war the Soviets started. Demonstrations of American resolve were also required whenever the Soviets took action short of direct aggression to test our commitment. In an article in Life magazine, several months before the 1952 election brought Eisenhower to the presidency, John Foster Dulles, who became Secretary of State in the new administration, described what would come to be known as "brinksmanship":

Obviously, we cannot build a 20,000 mile Maginot Line or match the Red Armies, man for man, gun for gun, and tank for tank at any particular time or place their general staff selects. To attempt that would mean real strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere.
There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red Armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing. (emphasis in original)

The principle involved is as simple as that of our municipal police forces. We do not station armed guards at every house to stop aggressors—that would be economic suicide—but we deter potential aggressors by making it probable that if they aggress, they will lose in punishment more than they can gain by aggression. . . .

Today atomic energy, coupled with strategic air and sea power, provides the community of free nations with vast new possibilities of organizing a community power to stop open aggression before it starts and reduce, to the vanishing point, the risk of general war. So far these weapons are merely part of national arsenals for use in fighting general war when it has come. If that catastrophe occurs, it will be because we have allowed these new and awesome forces to become the ordinary killing tools of the soldier when, in the hands of the statesmen, they could serve as effective political weapons in defense of the peace.¹

The policy preceded Dulles and was continued after he left office. For example, in several Berlin crises, American presidents and other senior U.S. officials, by actions and statements, threatened nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In 1948, Truman ordered what were advertised as nuclear-capable bombers to Britain as well as the airlift of supplies to Berlin. In 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that nuclear weapons would not be ruled out as a means of defending U.S. interests:

Question: Well do you mean to imply that you would then use nuclear weapons in connection with the Berlin situation?

McNamara: I definitely do. We will use nuclear weapons whenever we feel it necessary to protect our vital interests. Our nuclear stockpile is several times that of the Soviet Union and we will use either tactical weapons or strategic weapons in whatever quantities, wherever, whenever it's necessary to protect this nation and its interests.²

The need to demonstrate our willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of Western Europe also caused the United States to threaten their use in crises far removed from Europe. Time and again when U.S. conventional forces or diplomacy could not secure our objectives, the threat of nuclear weapons was employed. For example, in his

²WPNA video.
now infamous "Massive Retaliation" speech, given while the United States was still in negotiations with North Korea, Dulles provided strong hints to the Chinese allies about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea should conflict be renewed. This may have played a role in the conclusion of that war.

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.

Let us see how this concept has been applied to foreign policy, taking first the Far East. In Korea, this administration effected a major transformation. The fighting has been stopped on honorable terms. This was possible because the aggressor was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and means he had selected.\(^3\)

Policymakers in Washington were willing to move toward the brink of nuclear war in the late 1940s, throughout the 1950s, and during the early 1960s because while they believed the United States was conventionally inferior to the Red Army, they most often considered the United States an overwhelmingly superior nuclear power. And despite the initiation of a substantial civil defense program, it is difficult to believe that most American leaders or the American public appreciated the real effects of even a small nuclear attack on the United States.

The policy of "brinksmanship" came to a climax during the Cuban Missile Crisis: U.S. strategic forces went to a high state of readiness in response to the Soviet emplacement of nuclear missile sites in that country. President Kennedy promised a "full retaliatory response" against the Soviet Union if any missiles were fired from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere. Under this threat, preparations for an invasion of Cuba, and a naval quarantine, the Soviets withdrew the missiles.

Although we believed we had left the Soviets with an honorable way out of the crisis, the Soviets apparently vowed they would never again be at the mercy of American atomic threats. Perhaps they could accept U.S. nuclear threats to deter incursions against Western territory as in Berlin and South Korea. But Cuba may have caused them to believe we would be willing to use nuclear forces as instruments of coercion directly

against their bloc. Although the Soviets began what would become a massive buildup in strategic forces before the crisis, the experience may very well have strengthened their resolve to complete it.

One interpretation of the missile crisis suggests that the Soviets were motivated to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba to be able to strike the homeland of their principal adversary, just as the United States was able to attack the USSR. With the intercontinental missile, they achieved that goal. The possibility that the Soviets might acquire an ICBM force substantially larger than that of the United States by the mid-1960s raised a new debate in the U.S. defense community. The possibility of a "missile gap" and its significance often revolved around technical issues and quantitative analysis, but the debate could only diminish American leaders' self-assurance that nuclear deterrence was a credible response to the threat of Soviet aggression against Europe:

[From the standpoint of America's contribution to the security of the NATO area, the very terms of the debate about the purported gap were more revealing and more disturbing than the assertions and counter-assertions about the technical data involved. From this standpoint, the most significant aspect of the debate was that it was waged, on both sides, almost entirely in terms of America's ability to deter a direct assault upon the United States (that is in terms of "passive deterrence"), to the virtual exclusion of any consideration of America's ability to deter aggressions upon her allies (which is the objective of "active deterrence").

There could be no more convincing indication of the serious depreciation of the credibility of America's strategic power as a means of responding to aggressions in Western Europe, even in the eyes of the government that still proclaimed its determination to meet such aggression with nuclear retaliation. For in defending the adequacy of America's strategic nuclear striking force, the American government defined the requirements of this force entirely in relation to the objective of passive deterrence, which depends upon a second strike capability and thereby implicitly conceded that this striking force was not designed to meet... the far more demanding requirements of active deterrence, which depends upon a first strike capability.]

By the late 1970s, the extent and pace of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs appeared to reflect a drive for nuclear superiority. Successive U.S. administrations would become more and more concerned about the Soviet nuclear threat. Indeed, in the 1980s, American defense officials came to believe that the Soviets

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4Osgood, 1962, p. 176.
seriously considered it possible to achieve national objectives through nuclear war; and for many decades they have feared that the Soviets' nuclear capabilities would deter our own efforts to deter them in Europe.

In a highly influential article, Paul Nitze laid out the fears of many American defense officials and strategists that the Soviet Union was on the verge of denying the United States the means of deterring Soviet efforts to dominate Western Europe. Although Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's statement "What in the name of God is the meaning of strategic superiority?" reflected U.S. leaders' increasing belief that the credibility of American nuclear threats was in serious decline, Nitze believed that in Soviet ands superiority could mean a great deal:

The defense problems of the United States and the Soviet Union are quite different. The United States must be able to project its power over many thousands of miles to support allied defense structures on lines close to the concentrations of Soviet power. The Soviet basic defensive task is much simpler: that is to maintain military preponderance on the exterior lines of its relatively compact landmass.

For many years, U.S. strategic nuclear preponderance has made it possible to offset Soviet military superiority at the periphery and to deter its offensive employment. It has also made it possible for the United States confidently to use the seas for projection of its supporting power despite the Soviet Union's always very real sea denial capabilities.

An imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union in the strategic nuclear relationship could reverse these factors.5

Harold Brown expressed the concern that the Soviets took nuclear "warfighting" seriously in his Annual Report to the Congress of January 1980:

The purposes of this large Soviet military buildup remain ambiguous. . . . We had hoped that well-balanced, secure, second-strike strategic nuclear forces would satisfy the security needs of the Soviet Union in that area. They have gone well beyond such a capability, however, in the design and deployment of strategic offensive systems and active and passive defenses. They appear, indeed, to be aiming toward some sort of war-winning capability with these forces . . .

[S]ome things Soviet spokesmen say—and, of even more concern to us, some things they do in their military preparation—suggest they take more seriously than we have done, at least in our public discussion, the possibility that a nuclear war might actually be fought. In their discussion

of that prospect, there are suggestions that if a nuclear war occurred, the
time-honored military objectives of national survival and dominant military
position at the end of the fighting would govern and so must shape military
preparations beforehand. . . .

What must trouble us . . . is the heavy emphasis in Soviet military doctrine
on the acquisition of war-winning capabilities, and the coincidence (in one
sense or another of that word) between their programs and what have been
alleged as the requirements of a deliberate war-winning strategy.\textsuperscript{6}

If American leaders came to believe the Soviets had resolved to obtain strategic
nuclear superiority and to develop a doctrine of nuclear warfighting, U.S. policymakers
moved in quite the opposite direction after the Cuban crisis. In essence, the United
States came to doubt the efficacy of its own nuclear threats. As Secretary McNamara
later told an interviewer, "You cannot make a credible threat of an incredible action, and
massive retaliation by the early 60s was an incredible action."\textsuperscript{7} McNamara apparently
told President Kennedy and later Johnson that he would never recommend the use of
nuclear weapons.

Despite the efforts of U.S. nuclear specialists throughout the 1970s and 1980s to
develop various doctrines and capabilities for the conduct of a protracted nuclear war,
the United States would not emphasize nuclear threats in future crises. After the missile
crisis, the United States would only once take actions that even remotely threatened
nuclear war to resolve a crisis.\textsuperscript{8} Washington renewed efforts to control the arms race. In
1963 at American University in Washington, President Kennedy offered to renew
negotiations over a nuclear test ban. Secretary McNamara increasingly moved toward
arms control as well. These efforts led eventually to the Glassboro Summit, Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I and II, and the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
(START).

Thus, by the 1980s, as U.S. policymakers were unconvinced of the political utility
of nuclear weapons and more convinced of the need to control the threat, they also came
to believe that the Soviets were preparing to use those threats against us and that we

\textsuperscript{7}WPNA video.
\textsuperscript{8}In 1973 at the height of the October War as the Soviets were on the verge of
intervention, U.S. commands worldwide went to Defense Readiness Condition
(DEFCON) 3. As a part of DEFCON 3, SAC began to generate the strategic bomber
force. Bruce L. Blair, "Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War," in Carter, Steinbruner,
might become vulnerable. The combination of beliefs would lead President Ronald Reagan to reject nuclear deterrence as the preferred U.S. defense strategy on two occasions—first to pursue the vision of near-perfect ballistic missile defenses and later at Reykjavik when he very nearly embraced the utopian vision of complete nuclear disarmament. Washington’s efforts to make nuclear deterrence credible to the Soviets by threatening nuclear war in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s had only succeeded in making the strategy increasingly incredible to administrations of the 1970s and 1980s.

THE AUDIENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE

The strategy of deterrence also required Washington to assure and reassure Western Europe of our sensitivity to their security concerns. If West Europeans did not believe the United States would defend their interests as our own, they might succumb to Soviet pressure before they could regain their economic, political, and military vitality. Efforts to convince the Soviets that we would fight a nuclear war to stop their invasion of Europe would be pointless if our allies did not believe it. An outright attack would not be required; the Soviets could achieve their objectives by other means. For deterrence to work, Western Europe had to resist intimidation as well as outright attack.

The history of reassurance is one of American responses to West Europeans’ fears that the United States was not committed to their security. Repeated American efforts to address particular expressions of this concern seemed only to call forth the fear in a new form. Perhaps it was inevitable that our West European allies would doubt the U.S. nuclear commitment and continually call on America to demonstrate its allegiance—but never be quite convinced of Washington’s effort. Geography alone might account for this. The Atlantic Ocean is a considerable physical barrier to allied solidarity. But an equally important reason for our allies’ paranoia was the general perception that Western Europe was utterly dependent on America for its security.

Of course, it is somewhat presumptuous to talk of the attitudes of "Western Europe" as if it were a homogeneous entity. The region is made up of different nations, with unique histories and world views. And each nation is itself a mix of political and cultural forces. But this only reinforces the argument that our allies could not be assured. American efforts to reassure Western Europe could not succeed precisely because of the heterogeneous nature of the region. As long as the United States kept responding to its allies’ expressions of concern, the assurance problem could be managed, but there could be no ultimate solution.
In response to concerns that the United States would leave Western Europe prostrate and defenseless in the wake of World War II, Washington proffered a loan to Britain in 1946 and later the Marshall Plan. The goal of financial aid was to get Western Europe on its feet economically so it could defend itself militarily—and psychologically. When Europeans questioned if our commitment was limited to treasure, the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Washington soon found that a signature was not sufficient; in 1951, four divisions of ground forces were deployed to Western Europe as the U.S. contribution to a multinational command structure under American military leadership. With an ongoing war in Korea, Americans and Europeans alike felt the need for a strong U.S. military presence in Europe.

American policymakers only gradually appreciated these early concerns of Western Europe, as Dean Acheson, a leading architect of the containment strategy, later explained. To protect European recovery, the primary objective of American policy, the United States had to offer security guarantees to the West European countries:

When the Marshall Plan went into effect . . . there was a quick response—from a very low gross national product in the war-torn countries to something like 60 or 65 percent of their prewar production. Then the forward momentum stopped. It stopped because there was not enough confidence in Europe to convince businessmen to repatriate their funds. . . . It was something that had not been foreseen by any of us, but it turned out to be a fact.

[The Prime Minister of France] said if there is nothing between us [the West Europeans] and the Russian divisions which are stationed in East Germany, we won't be here to be liberated, therefore we must have some assurance that the United States will come to our help.

At first it was thought a mere political commitment would be enough and this was our first idea in proposing the Treaty and presenting it to the Senate.

In 1950, the French took the lead in pointing out that that was not enough; again, that it would be too late if one waited until there was an attack before getting together to meet it . . .

Therefore . . . in December 1950, President Truman sent me to the meeting in Brussels with proposals which included the creation of a Unified Command, the creation of forces-in-being to be stationed in positions in
Europe, ... a common staff, and provision for the forces to be turned over, in the event of hostilities, to the command of the supreme commander.9

George Kennan, another architect of containment, underlined that NATO existed primarily to protect the economic revitalization of Western Europe:

NATO had, as a military alliance, its part to play; but I think everyone of us hoped that its purely military role would decline in importance as the curse of bipolarity fell from the Continent, as negotiations took place, as armies were withdrawn, as the contest of ideologies took other forms. The central agency in this concept was not NATO but the European Recovery Program; and none of us dreamed at that time [when NATO was formed] that the constructive impulses of this enterprise, which looked to everyone so hopeful in those days, would be overtaken and swallowed up in the space of a mere two or three years by programs of military assistance.10

American political leaders saw NATO as a political instrument of deterrence. Military officials believed that an effective defense of Western Europe required substantial conventional forces. Both agreed the bulk of these forces should not come from the United States. From the outset, U.S. Supreme Commanders of NATO and the American military establishment insisted that Western Europe become responsible for the burden of NATO's conventional defense. The United States would provide the nuclear deterrent. In July of 1950, only one month after the outbreak of the Korean War, General Omar Bradley, the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined to the Congress Washington's concept for NATO's integrated defense:

First, the United States will be charged with the strategic bombing. We have repeatedly recognized in this country that the first priority of the joint defense is our ability to deliver the atomic bomb.

Second, the United States and the Western naval powers will conduct essential naval operations, including keeping the sealanes clear . . .

Third, we recognize that the hard core of ground power in being will come from Europe. . . .

10George F. Kennan, cited in Osgood, 1962, p. 36.
Fourth, England, France, and the closer countries will have the bulk of short-range attack bombardment and air defense.\textsuperscript{11}

American political leaders did not expect NATO's conventional forces to be capable of conducting a successful defense of Europe against a determined assault. Acheson, in particular, recognized that the costs of developing a conventional defense capability satisfactory to the American military could jeopardize European recovery. In 1949, he provided a far more limited deterrent role for NATO's conventional forces:

We do not believe that to discourage military aggression it is necessary to create West European defense forces which are by virtue of their size capable of resisting an all-out attack. What is required is, rather, sufficient strength to make it impossible for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy victory.\textsuperscript{12}

The Alliance has never developed the conventional forces military officials believe necessary to defend Western Europe in time of war. From Eisenhower on, every Supreme Allied Commander of NATO's forces in Europe (SACEUR) has complained that NATO's conventional forces were inadequate:

Eisenhower 1952: "At this time the forces assigned to SHAPE are not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of an aggressor."\textsuperscript{13}

Rogers 1982: "Alliance conventional capabilities today are clearly inadequate to meet the growing Warsaw Pact conventional threat."\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the entry of West Germany in 1954, NATO's West European members proved unable to field adequate conventional forces. Expense was a factor. Adequate conventional defenses for war were generally perceived in Western Europe to place peacetime economic and social recovery at risk. But more important, our allies feared that a conventional war in Europe would devastate their homelands. West Europeans


\textsuperscript{12}State Department Bulletin, August 8, 1949, cited in Osgood, 1962, p. 43.


\textsuperscript{14}Rogers, 1982, p. 1152.
sought to deter war by making it, in the words of then West German Defense Minister Franz-Joseph Straus, "as terrible as our fantasy can imagine it." They preferred to threaten rapid escalation to nuclear war. Again, the United States obliged.

Eventually, the shortfall in soldiers was made up for with theater nuclear weapons supplied by the United States. NATO Deputy Supreme Commander Field Marshall Montgomery explained in 1954 that the alliance was committed to a nuclear defense of Western Europe:

I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our own defense. With us it is no longer: "They may possibly be used." It is very definitely: "They will be used, if we are attacked." In fact, we have reached the point of no return as regards the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war.

Washington adopted a policy of Massive Retaliation, which implied that any attack on Europe would leave the Soviet homeland open to nuclear attack. Secretary of State Dulles revealed the extent of nuclear dependence to NATO Foreign Ministers in 1957:

The major deterrent to Soviet aggression against NATO is the maintenance of a retaliatory power of such capacity as to convince the Soviets that such aggression would result in their own destruction. . . . The shield of NATO ground, sea, and air forces is also an integral part of the deterrent. Therefore, NATO should continue its efforts to strengthen the shield, which should increasingly include a nuclear capability. United States forces in Europe—ground, sea, and air—now have such a capability, and this capability is being extended to other NATO forces.

In a series of East-West crises in Europe and around the world during the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the early 1960s, Washington practiced a policy of brinksmanship, designed not only to convince the Soviets of our willingness to threaten nuclear war, but also to demonstrate to the West Europeans the credibility of our nuclear commitment to their defense. American efforts to protect the overall credibility of its deterrent strategy

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15 VPNA video.
by manipulating the threat of nuclear war in crises outside of Europe incited concerns that Western Europe might become embroiled in a nuclear war not of their making.

Simultaneously, these crises suggested an American preference not to employ nuclear forces should war with the Soviets actually occur. The atomic power of our communist adversaries did play a role in the U.S. decisions to conduct "limited" wars in Korea and Vietnam that nevertheless devastated local economic and social infrastructures. The message did not escape our allies. American nuclear deterrence was no guarantee against Western Europe's falling victim to a highly destructive conventional war.

The result of our efforts to manage European concerns with this strategy of nuclear deterrence has been to put the United States in the impossible situation described by Robert Osgood:

NATO's nuclear dependence ... has undermined allied confidence ... in two ways: First, the allies suspect that the United States will not resort to massive retaliation against a less-than-massive aggression in Europe at the staggering cost of a thermonuclear assault upon the United States itself. Second, they fear that the United States will resort to massive nuclear retaliation against limited aggressions (inside Europe or outside), which NATO cannot effectively counter by less drastic means, and that, therefore, American retaliation will plunge them into a war of annihilation.¹⁸

Partly in response to our allies' fears of nuclear escalation, the United States initiated strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union as part of a broader effort to stabilize the superpowers' global competition. The objective of these talks, beginning with the Glassboro Summit of 1967, was to develop treaties on strategic nuclear force structures that would limit the arsenals of both sides and reduce the incentive for either side to employ nuclear weapons.

Our principal allies in Western Europe also learned that although the United States expected its European allies to see their security interests as identical with America's in such places as Korea and later Vietnam, the United States would not necessarily reciprocate outside of Europe. In Suez, Britain and France found that the United States did not fully appreciate the European security problem as they saw it. Undoubtedly, this reinforced British and French beliefs in the need for independent nuclear deterrent threats.

The strategic arms control process, designed in part as a response to our allies’ fears of nuclear escalation, would give rise to new concerns—specifically that the superpowers might cut a deal adverse to West European interests or that the strategic nuclear threat extended by Washington on Europe’s behalf would be invalidated. President DeGaulle foreshadowed these fears about the credibility of America’s commitment in his arguments for the French force de frappe in 1959:

No doubt the sort of equilibrium that exists between the atomic powers of the two camps is for the moment a fact of world peace. But who can say what will happen tomorrow....

Who can say that if in the future... the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world?

Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others?¹⁹

Skepticism toward the plausibility of America’s nuclear guarantees; recognition of conflicting American and French views of the Soviet Union’s nature and purpose; concerns about America’s growing preoccupation with Southeast Asia; and a belief that France had recovered the military, economic, and psychological strength lost in World War II caused General DeGaulle to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military structure and out from under the American nuclear umbrella. His government’s policy was explained in a memorandum delivered to NATO representatives in March 1966. France would remain a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, but it believed that participation in NATO would “no longer correspond... to the conditions prevailing in the world at present, which are fundamentally different from those of 1949”:

Indeed, the threats weighing upon the Western world, particularly in Europe, which motivated the conclusion of the treaty, have changed in nature. They no longer present the immediate and threatening character that they previously assumed. On the other hand, the European countries have reestablished their economies and have thereby recovered their means.

France, in particular, is equipping herself with atomic weapons, the very nature of which preclude her being integrated.

¹⁹WPNA video.
Thirdly, the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and United States, replacing the monopoly wielded by the latter, has changed the overall conditions for the defense of the West. Lastly, it is a fact that Europe is no longer the center of international crises. The center has moved elsewhere, notably in Asia, where all the countries of the Atlantic alliance are obviously not involved.

These developments in no way lead the French government to call into question the treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. . . .

This being unequivocally affirmed, there arises the problem of the organization, that is, of all the agreements, arrangements and decisions made after the signature of the treaty, either in multilateral or bilateral form.

The French government considers that this organization no longer corresponds to what appears to it necessary. 25

Not only did West Europeans doubt American efforts to reassure them of the U.S. commitment to their security, they also questioned America's perception of the European security problem. From apparent unity in the late 1940s, West European and American views of the Soviet threat gradually evolved in separate directions. The view of Moscow from Western Europe had always been more complex than that of Washington. Washington's perspective was based on ideology and military calculation. In World War II, the Soviets were our military ally, in its aftermath they became our principal adversary. And with the exception of the period of alliance against facism, communism was always considered an insidious threat to the American way of life. To our European allies, the Russians have been enemies, allies, neighbors, partners in business and trade, and part of a common European heritage. Moreover, although the United States tended to treat the Soviet Union and its East European satellites as a monolithic bloc, West European governments were more likely to treat each country of East Europe on its own terms.

With the decline of a common perception of Soviet intentions, America and Western Europe drifted apart on their foreign policy toward the East. When Western Europe regained economic strength and with it political vitality, the more complex view of the Soviet bloc reemerged. The United States generally attempted to restrict and control trade and other forms of social and cultural intercourse with the Soviet Union and its satellites, but Western Europe became reengaged across the full range of relationships.

Perhaps the West German policy of Ostpolitik was the most visible manifestation of Western Europe's new policy toward the East. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Bonn entered into a series of treaties and other arrangements normalizing relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was accompanied by similar Eastern policies on the part of West Germany's European allies. The United States encouraged these policies and eventually followed suit with its own detente in the 1970s, but Washington was always far more suspicious than its European allies of Soviet intentions. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, detente ended between Moscow and Washington. Nevertheless, West European ties with the Soviet Union solidified and continued to expand.

Following the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1967, the focus of America's reassurance efforts shifted to West Germany. In 1977, on the verge of a second major Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt expressed concerns similar to those of DeGaulle almost 20 years earlier:

> Changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe, this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear, tactical, and conventional weapons. . . .
>
> We are not unaware that both the United States and the Soviet Union must be anxious to remove threatening strategic developments from their relationship. But strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.²¹

Schmidt's remark focused on removing the conventional force disparities, preferably through Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiations, but if necessary through Western conventional force improvements.

Although Chancellor Schmidt did not explicitly discuss potential Soviet theater nuclear advantages arising from SALT, he and West German defense officials were

worried that such Soviet forces as the BACKFIRE bomber and SS-20 ballistic missiles, capable of striking Western Europe from the Soviet Union and not covered in the agreement, could undermine deterrence in Europe. These systems filled a perceived gap between nuclear weapons able to strike from Eastern to Western Europe or vice versa, and the strategic intercontinental forces. Contemporary allied defense planners believed:

NATO had to maintain a complete spectrum of deterrent options so that the Warsaw Pact should not be able to escalate a conflict to a level where the Alliance would have no credible response. (In other words, if NATO had no nuclear capability between U.S. strategic systems and medium-range theater nuclear forces (MRTNF) capable of striking only the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, Soviet leaders might conclude that they could launch widespread nuclear attacks against Western Europe from a sanctuary within the Soviet Union.) On the basis of this argument, maintaining an effective LRTNF (long-range theater nuclear forces) capability was therefore necessary to couple the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe.\textsuperscript{22}

To improve its general defense capabilities in the European theater, NATO embarked on both a long-term defense plan for conventional forces and the deployment of nuclear systems able to reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe. While NATO’s conventional force improvements program languished, the alliance went ahead with nuclear force deployments.

The United States answered its allies’ call to supply NATO with nuclear forces of sufficient range and numbers to threaten the Soviet Union from bases in Western Europe. The United States eventually provided these nuclear forces in the form of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. In his 1981 \textit{Annual Report}, Secretary of Defense Brown explained the U.S. deployment in terms meant to reassure Europe of America’s continuing commitment:

\textit{It remains essential . . . for NATO to maintain, or as necessary acquire, the flexibility to leave the Soviets under no illusion that some way exists by nuclear means, to gain military or political leverage on the alliance. . . .}

\textit{We must . . . be able to counter the SS-20s and BACKFIREs from the theater, and place at risk Pact forces and assets deep in Eastern Europe and the Western military districts of the USSR. As one example, we cannot permit a situation in which the SS-20 and BACKFIRE have the ability to}

\textsuperscript{22}Legge, 1983, p. 36.
disrupt and destroy the formation and movement of our operational reserves, while we cannot threaten comparable Soviet forces.

Against this background... we are proceeding with the development of two longer-range, more mobile missiles: the more accurate PERSHING II and the Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM).... We have agreed with our allies on a program for the deployment of these missiles in Great Britain and on the European continent.²³

Yet in certain segments of the West European political spectrum, these deployments only increased fears that nuclear war might be confined to Europe, leaving the United States a sanctuary. In anticipation of this fear (demonstrated by the earlier reluctance of West German citizens to support deployment of the so-called "neutron bomb," a tactical battlefield weapon with enhanced radiation effects that were widely perceived to "kill only people while leaving buildings intact"), NATO adopted the plan to deploy these new forces only if arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union failed to remove or reduce the systems the Pershings and GLCMs were designed to counter. Following a difficult effort to simultaneously plan for their deployment and elimination, what came to be called intermediate nuclear forces (INF) were withdrawn from Europe and destroyed by the United States under an agreement with the Soviet Union. For the most part, only short-range U.S. nuclear weapons remained in Western Europe.

Instead of reassuring our allies that the risk of nuclear war was reduced, the INF treaty only focused fears that nuclear war might be confined to European soil. West Germans of all parties recognized that in the process of eliminating INF the United States had weakened the links between conventional conflict in Central Europe and the vulnerability of the Soviet homeland to attack. They saw it as more likely now that a nuclear war in Europe could be confined to their territory and that of East Germany. In response, the United States agreed to postpone NATO decisions about the modernization of the short-range nuclear weapons remaining in the Federal Republic, particularly a short-range missile known as LANCE.

The credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence was at low ebb. Few responsible officials in Europe could feel confident that the United States would initiate strategic nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union in response to a conventional defeat in Europe. Few American officials could believe that NATO would use theater nuclear weapons to halt a Soviet advance into West Germany.

²³Brown, 1980, pp. 94–95.
As of 1988, Allied military authorities did not believe NATO’s conventional forces could meet a full-scale Warsaw Pact invasion. In fact, successive SACEURs maintained that they would be forced to request the use of tactical nuclear weapons within hours or days. General Rogers explained that “in the event of large-scale conventional aggression, even with adequate warning and timely political decisions, our posture might at best be sufficient to allow NATO only the time and security necessary to deliberate and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.”

The divergence of views on the Soviet Union also affected reassurance. American efforts to convince its allies of a more sinister Soviet Union appeared strident to many in Western Europe. With the thaw of East-West tensions in Europe throughout the 1970s and as economic and cultural relations with the East became widespread and institutionalized in the 1980s, many in Western Europe came to doubt the necessity of nuclear deterrence.

The prospects for war became increasingly incredible to many in Europe. The relevance of deterrence was being called to question. Many West Europeans came to doubt their leaders’ calculations concerning the risks and benefits of nuclear deterrence. Today’s restrictions on Allied forces’ field exercises, the postponement and reduction of the annual Return of U.S. Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise, and flight training in West Germany, for example, reflect a belief that war is not likely and that the costs of preparing for it are therefore excessive.

**THE DOMESTIC AUDIENCE**

The defense strategy of deterrence also had to be sold to the American people in general, but more specifically to the Congress. The credibility of our threat to the Soviets and our commitment to Europe did not depend solely on the willingness of successive administrations to manipulate the threat of nuclear war in peace and in crisis. It also required creation and sustainment of domestic support for the policy. Americans had to be convinced that the Soviets threatened U.S. national security when they threatened Western Europe. They had to be convinced that the Europeans could not stand alone against the threat. And they had to be convinced that the wisest course, the most appropriate American response, was to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear war should the Red Army invade Western Europe.

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24Rogers, 1982.
The situation facing the Truman administration in its efforts to convince Congress of the urgent need for the United States to assert a leadership role in the defense of Western Europe and the administration's approach to obtaining Congressional consent is perhaps best summarized by one who observed what is now considered to be the pivotal meeting in the forging of a bipartisan consensus on the containment strategy. Joseph Jones, then a senior official with the State Department's Office of Public Affairs, describes a meeting he observed in February 1947 between the president, his principal foreign policy advisors, and senior members of Congress on the extension of aid to Turkey and Greece against Soviet pressures. In that meeting, Dean Acheson overcame the legislators' isolationist tendencies by expressing U.S. interests in Europe in stark terms and in the context of a global Soviet threat:

At the request of the President, Secretary Marshall led off in the presentation of the problem. In dry and economical terms, he gave the Congressional leaders the facts about the imminent withdrawal of British support from Greece and Turkey, the situation those countries were left in, vulnerable to Soviet domination, and the recommendations for aid that had been agreed upon [in] the executive branch.

There is no question that the Secretary understood thoroughly the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey, but somehow his summary and cryptic presentation failed to put it across to his listeners. In fact, he conveyed the overall impression that aid should be extended to Greece on grounds of loyalty and humanitarianism, and to Turkey to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle East. This did not go down well with some of the Congressional leaders whose major preoccupation at that moment was reducing aid abroad and taxes at home. Their initial reaction was later described as rather "trivial" and "adverse." The immediate questions asked were: "Isn't this pulling British chestnuts out of the fire?" "What are we letting ourselves in for?" "How much is this going to cost?" Answers only took the discussion farther off the main track.

Things were going very badly indeed, and Acheson was greatly disturbed. Leaning over to Secretary Marshall... Acheson asked in a low voice, "Is this a private fight or can anyone get into it?"... Acheson was given the floor...

The Russians had any number of bets Acheson went on. If they won anyone of them, they won all. If they could seize control of Turkey, they would almost inevitably extend their control over Greece and Iran. If they

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25 Jones coordinated and drafted portions of both President Truman's March 12, 1947, speech before a Joint session of Congress where the "Truman Doctrine" was announced, and Secretary of State Marshall's June 5, 1947, commencement address at Harvard that led to the "Marshall Plan."
controlled Greece, Turkey would sooner or later succumb, with or without war, and then Iran. . . . Their aim, Acheson emphasized, was control of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. From there, the possibilities for penetration of South Asia and Africa were limitless.

As for Europe, Acheson continued, it was clear that the Soviet Union, employing the instruments of communist infiltration and subversion, was trying to complete the encirclement of Germany. In France . . . the Russians could pull the plug any time they chose. In Italy . . . it was growing worse. In Hungary and Austria, the communists were tightening the noose. . . . If Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean should fall to Soviet control, the material and psychological effects in the countries that were so precariously maintaining their freedoms and democratic institutions would be devastating and probably conclusive.

[It] was clear that the Soviet Union was aggressive and expanding. For the United States to take steps to strengthen countries threatened with Soviet aggression . . . was not to pull British chestnuts out of the fire; it was to protect the security of the United States—it was to protect freedom itself. . . .

When he finished, a profound silence ensued . . . . It was broken by the voice of Senator Vandenberg. . . . Vandenberg said he had been greatly impressed, even shaken, by what he had heard. . . . He felt it was absolutely necessary that any request of Congress for funds and authority to aid Greece and Turkey should be accompanied by a message to Congress, and an explanation to the American people, in which the grim facts of the larger situation should be laid publicly on the line as they had been at their meeting there that day. . . .

The question has often been raised as to why the matter of aid to Greece and Turkey was presented to Congress and the American people enveloped in a statement of global policy that picked up the ideological challenge of communism. The February 27 meeting at the White House holds part of the answer. . . . At the meeting with Congressional leaders, Acheson discovered that he had to pull out all the stops and speak in the frankest, boldest, widest terms to attract their support for a matter which in parliamentary democrats without a tradition of isolationism would have been undertaken quietly and without fanfare. This time, the frank and bold approach, far from shocking Congressional leaders into timorousness, paid off. They were deeply impressed and felt that on that basis they could go before their constituents. It was Vandenberg's condition that made it possible, even necessary, to launch the global policy that broke through the remaining barriers of American isolationism.26

Acheson's arguments formed the basis of the "Truman Doctrine" announced by the president in the very speech Senator Vandenberg insisted upon:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation.\

Since that time, it has proved ever more difficult to persuade Congress that American security was directly threatened in Western Europe, that our European allies could not defend themselves, and that nuclear deterrence was the best U.S. strategy.

In the 1950s, the perception of a communist threat from within the United States, combined with Soviet moves in Eastern Europe and elsewhere overseas, provided strong motivation for large military budgets to defend Europe. Soviet attempts to steal the secret of the atomic bomb, their efforts to coerce the Western Powers in Berlin, the invasion of South Korea, and support for guerrilla wars demonstrated the global threat. But the country soon found that McCarthyism was probably a greater threat to domestic tranquility than the communist conspiracy. And, of course, the Soviets never did invade Western Europe. This evidence caused policymakers to applaud the success of deterrence, but it led many in the Congress to doubt its necessity, or at least to doubt the severity of the threat as portrayed by various administrations.

The economic and social circumstance of Western Europe are no mystery to Congress. In the 1950s, it was fairly easy to convince legislators that the defense of the West depended on temporary assistance from the United States. And it was in the spirit of a temporary need for U.S. aid that the Congress extended funds for European recovery and allowed the deployment of American troops to the continent. In April of 1951, as the first American troops dedicated to NATO were readied for deployment to Europe, the Senate passed a resolution explaining its expectations concerning the relative contributions of the United States and its European allies. In the end, the Senate conditioned American aid on West European "self help":

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Resolved, That . . .

2. it is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces . . .

4. it is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties . . . are giving, and have agreed to the full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 . . . that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as combat units is concerned. 28

As Europe recovered, it was more difficult to sustain the belief that Europe could not play an increasing role in its own defense. Congress first considered withdrawing large forces from Europe in the 1960s but eventually chose to cap our commitment in the expectation of an eventual agreement with the Soviets on conventional force reductions. The Congress also became ever more demanding about an accounting of our Allies' contribution to their own defense and less willing to accept what it considered the administration's apologies on Europe's behalf. And as the Europeans began to trade with the Soviet bloc, and described an assessment of the Soviet threat less stark than our own, many in Congress began to wonder if the United States was not subsidizing its rich allies or if the threat was as serious as administrations seemed to assume.

There should be no mistaking that top American policymakers, even military men, strongly desired an end to our conflict with the Soviet Union. They fully recognized that the cost to America of "a world in arms" was enormous, not only "in spending money alone," as President Eisenhower put it in 1953, but also in the neglect of important domestic needs:

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.

It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.

It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8000 people.

This... is the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.29

This recognition of the domestic social, economic, and psychological costs of our defense strategy—and the desire for a better world—was an important force behind our longstanding desire and commitment to negotiations with the Soviet Union. As Acheson pointed out in 1950, the architects of containment understood that the American willingness to negotiate must be constantly demonstrated to help bring about change in the Soviet position, to capitalize on change when it occurred, and to justify the costs of containment:

In this field [our relations with the Soviet Union], as in our relations with the free nations, we have the machinery of negotiation at hand. In the United Nations we have a dozen or more conference tables at which our differences could be thrashed out, where unfortunately the Soviet chair stands empty at the present time. We shall go on trying to find a common ground for agreement, not perfect or eternal agreement, but at least a better arrangement for living together in greater safety. . .

We do not propose to subvert the Soviet Union. We shall not attempt to undermine Soviet independence. And we are just as determined that Communism shall not by hook or crook or trickery undermine our country or any other free country that desires to maintain its freedom. That real and present threat of aggression stands in the way of every attempt at understanding with the Soviet Union. For it has been wisely said that there can be no greater disagreement than when someone wants to eliminate your existence altogether.

If, as, and when that idea of aggression, by one means or another, can be ruled out of our relations with the Soviet Union, then the greatest single obstacle to agreement will be out of the way. As the results of our actions become clear and the free world becomes stronger, it will, I believe, become progressively easier to get agreements with the Soviet Union.30


If it was difficult to sustain support for the notion that the Soviets were bent on domination of Western Europe and that our allies were unable to defend themselves, it was even harder to uphold the idea that the United States must place itself at the risk of annihilation in a nuclear war to meet its defense obligations. Moreover, other events, most significant among them the Vietnam War, caused many on Capitol Hill to doubt that the Executive Branch knew what was best for the country and could be trusted with a free hand in foreign and defense policy.

The war in Vietnam ultimately and irrevocably shattered the domestic consensus behind containment. It split both the group of men responsible for the design and maintenance of the strategy and the Congress that voted the funds necessary to sustain the global defense commitments the strategy required.

Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas describe a meeting every bit as pivotal in the evolution of the containment strategy as the 1947 session quoted at length at the start of this subsection. During his presidency, Lyndon Johnson had regularly consulted with the architects of containment—such men as Acheson, Harriman, and Lovett, who had served Presidents Truman and Eisenhower—"The Wise Old Men." Until the Tet offensive, this group had unanimously supported the deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In March of 1967, in the aftermath of the offensive, the elder statesmen of American foreign policy divided. Again, Acheson took center stage, but this time his views represented the end of bipartisan consensus:

At the lunch with the President, Mac Bundy, the youngest Wise Man, reported on the group’s earlier deliberations and summarized its views. There had been a significant shift since the last meeting of the Wise Men in November, he told the President. Acheson had best stated the new majority view of their meeting that morning when he had remarked, "We can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must take steps to disengage."

Acheson, sitting erect at the President’s right hand, spoke up. By late summer, he flatly declared, the U.S. had to begin the process of withdrawal.

Acheson’s voice was firm, clear, and unemotional. His language was spare and to the point. He showed none of the rhetorical flourishes, none of the passion that he flashed on a February morning 21 years before, when he had taken the White House floor to plead that unless the U.S. supported Greece and Turkey, the Communist infection would spread from one country to the next . . .

Johnson went around the table soliciting comments, but the dominant force was Acheson. When Abe Fortas, who remained hawkish, protested that
Bundy’s summary did not accurately represent the group’s view, Acheson cut him off. It represents my view, he said. . . .

At one point, (CJCS) General Wheeler [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] . . . took exception to Acheson’s characterization of the Pentagon as "bent on military victory." Not so, said Wheeler. He realized that a "classic military victory" was not possible. Acheson regarded him coldly. Then what in the name of God do we have five hundred thousand troops out there for? . . .

One can imagine how he [Johnson] felt . . . with Acheson leading the way, ripping up the roots of U.S. involvement, telling him, in effect, that the era of global containment was over. "They were intelligent, experienced men," Johnson wrote in his memoirs. "I had always regarded the majority of them as very steady and balanced. If they had been so deeply influenced by the reports of the Tet offensive, what must the average citizen be thinking?"

As a unified group, Acheson and his peers had been able to convince Congress that the Executive Branch held within itself the knowledge, good judgment, and skill necessary to conduct a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union that could lead to nuclear war. Vietnam, as Godfrey Hodgson wrote in Foreign Policy in 1973, "fatally impugned" this elite’s "reputation for wisdom and the cachet that comes from a past record of uninterrupted success; and it is on these that the influence of any such elite ultimately depends." Once the elite divided, Congress began to rein in what had become, in historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s words, the "imperial Presidency."

One of the issues that divided the foreign policy elite on the Vietnam war was whether the deepening U.S. commitment would draw America’s attention away from what all believed to be the primary security interest—Europe. Secretary of State Dean Rusk believed that fidelity to South Vietnam demonstrated the credibility of our general commitment to Europe. Under Secretary of State George Ball argued that the U.S. government would become preoccupied with Southeast Asia and neglect the complex management of NATO.

But while the elite was divided on this question, they remained firmly united on the importance of NATO to U.S. interests. From the mid-1960s on, it appeared that Ball might be correct in his fears. Public sentiment against Southeast Asia spread to a more general distaste for the military. The "dollar gap" in foreign exchange, caused in part by the drain on American resources to meet its commitment in Vietnam, drew attention to

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the $1.5 billion spent annually in defense of Europe. Beginning in 1966, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana unsuccessfully sought to attach to various bills amendments that would reduce U.S. forces in Europe.

In 1971, it appeared that the Mansfield Amendment might pass. The elite, still deeply divided over the Vietnam war, nevertheless supported President Nixon in an effort to kill the amendment. The Wise Old Men rallied; the Amendment was defeated. But in retrospect, what then appeared to be a victory also represented the beginning of a permanent decline in Congressional support for the commitment to NATO. Had it not been for Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's sudden interest in the U.S. offer for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, the Mansfield Amendment might well have prevailed. The Nunn Amendment, which ultimately replaced the reduction Mansfield had sought to impose, capped U.S. forces in Europe at roughly the 300,000 level. From this point on, successive administrations would fight a constant battle with the Congress over Western Europe's contribution to its own defense to the point of submitting annual reports on the problem. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, support in the Congress for the military commitments to sustain containment and deterrence in Europe would be the subject of intense controversy and debate.
IV. THE LONG-TERM GOALS OF CONTAINMENT

The immediate goal of containment was to halt the advance of Soviet influence in Europe through the development of West European democracies that could resist subversion, coercion, or attack. But containment had two other, and longer-term, objectives. The second was to moderate Moscow’s expansionist intentions such that the Soviet Union would be willing to engage in serious negotiations over the issues arising from the fall of Nazi Germany that led to the Cold War, in particular the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and German reunification. The ultimate objective of the strategy was the establishment of a just and stable peace in Europe based on the right of national self-determination and security guarantees.

The first goal required immediate American action and received primary attention. It motivated the Marshall plan, NATO, and the extension of nuclear deterrence to Western Europe.

A critical if longer-term objective of America’s containment strategy was to foster change in the Soviets’ aggressive attitudes. It was believed that this goal could best be pursued by example. As Kennan explained in his "X" article, the success of U.S. policy in modernizing Soviet attitudes would be a by-product of actions designed to meet immediate needs:

It is . . . a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping with the problems of its internal life and the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin’s foreign policies.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power. But the United States has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlets in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet
power. For no mystical, Messianic movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.¹

Since World War II, the ultimate American objective in Europe has been a peace based on principles spelled out in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Of particular importance was "respect [for] the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and [the] wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."² In the American view, this included not only the peoples overrun by the Axis powers, but the people in those Axis countries as well, who had been deprived of their rights by facism. This position was clearly stated in the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed to by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta in 1945:

They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.³

Thus, following what it hoped would be the change in Soviet attitudes resulting from the ultimate success of containment, U.S. leaders expected two specific objectives: freedom in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany.

FREEDOM IN EASTERN EUROPE

In 1953, Congress passed the Joint Resolution on Captive People submitted by President Eisenhower as a means of expressing America's long-term objectives in Eastern Europe. The Senate and House joined with the President, proclaiming:

²"Declaration of Principles, Known as the Atlantic Charter, By the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, August 1941," in Goldwin, 1953, Vol. II. p. 164.
The hope that the peoples who have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace; that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to them in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter.

Eisenhower reiterated U.S. goals in Eastern Europe in 1956:

After World War II, the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe governments of Soviet choice—servants of Moscow.

It has been consistent United States policy, without regard to political party, to seek an end to this situation and to fulfill the wartime pledge of the United States that these countries, overrun by wartime enemies, would once again know sovereignty and self-government.4

Containment did not call for the United States to roll back communism in Eastern Europe by force of arms. Rather, it was to be the result of a change in Soviet attitudes. Even John Foster Dulles made it clear that U.S. policy was not to liberate Eastern Europe by invasion or by fomenting revolution. In testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Resolution on Captive People, three years before the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Secretary of State explained his administration's objectives in terms consonant with those Kennan described above:

[O]ur nation should reaffirm its awareness that the struggle in the world today is, above all, a moral conflict. We propose to attest our fidelity, without compromise or vacillation, to the principles of honor and political freedom upon which the nation was founded and which have made us always the dread of the oppressor and the hope of the oppressed. We propose, in the spirit of the early days of the Republic, to do what we peacefully can do, in order to revive the hopes of those now enslaved.

This resolution is no call to bloody and senseless revolution. On the other hand, it is no idle gesture. It is an act of great historical importance and many consequences will stem from it. As its purpose becomes more and more widely understood, it will, over the coming years, revive the inherent longing for freedom which persists within the captive peoples so that longing becomes a mounting spiritual power which will eventually

overcome the material power of Soviet dictatorship to rule what it has, or to subjugate more. . .
What the President seeks is a solemn act of dedication for the future.5

GERMAN REUNIFICATION

The right of Germans to a unified state based on democratic government has also been an important tenet of U.S. policy, one that American leaders believed should be pursued as the Soviet leadership mellowed. The principle was enshrined in Article 7 of the 1954 Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the new West German State:

1. The Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim of their common policy is a peace settlement of the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation for a lasting peace. They further agree that the final termination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

2. Pending the peace settlement, the Signatory States will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic and integrated within the European Community.6

U.S. policymakers did not expect the Soviets to renounce their security concerns about a united Germany as part of a general settlement. Indeed, U.S. policymakers believed those concerns to be legitimate and offered to create a European security framework around German reunification that would keep in permanent check any future potential for German aggression. They did not expect a reunified German state would

necessarily remain a part of NATO, but they believed this decision should not be imposed by outside powers. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and the West German government clearly stated these positions in the Four Power Declaration on the Unification of Germany in 1957:

6. There should be no discrimination against a reunified Germany. Its freedom and security should not be prejudiced by an imposed status of neutralization or demilitarization. Its government should be free to determine its foreign policy and decide on its international associations. It should not be deprived of the right recognized in the Charter of the United Nations for all nations to participate in collective measures of self-defense.

7. Re-establishment of the national unity of Germany in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the German people would not in itself constitute a threat to Germany's neighbors nor would it prejudice their security. Nevertheless, so as to meet any preoccupation which other governments may have in this respect, appropriate arrangements, linked with German reunification, should be made which would take into account the legitimate security interests of all the countries concerned.

8. The Western Powers have never required as a condition of German reunification that a reunified Germany should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It will be for the people of a reunified Germany themselves to determine through their freely elected government whether they wish to share the benefits and obligations of the Treaty.

9. If the all-German government, in the exercise of its free choice, should elect to join NATO, the Western Powers . . . are prepared to offer on a basis of reciprocity, to the government of the Soviet Union and the government of other countries of Eastern Europe which would become parties to an European security arrangement, assurances of a significant and far-reaching character.7

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Whether or not a unified Germany chose to remain in NATO, reunification would be part and parcel of a new security regime for Europe that would, in effect, constitute an end to the Cold War:

11. The reunification of Germany accompanied by the conclusion of European security arrangements, would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Conversely, if a beginning could be made toward effective measures of partial disarmament, this would contribute to the settlement of outstanding major political problems such as the reunification of Germany. Initial steps in the field of disarmament should lead to a comprehensive disarmament agreement which presupposes a prior solution to the problem of German reunification. 

AMERICA'S INTERIM GERMAN POLICY

Until such time as a general peace settlement could be reached with the Soviet Union, the United States sought to build a democratic Germany bound to the West. Three lines of policy were pursued to achieve this goal: constitutional reform within Germany, political and economic integration with Western Europe, and, later, military integration within the Western security structure.

Washington led the way in devising and nurturing domestic political institutions that would discourage militarism in the West German state. The United States supported both the more conservative Christian Democratic and more liberal-left Social Democratic political parties, as well as the Christian Socialists and Free Democrats, to create a strong multiparty system. American policymakers also emphasized what in the United States would be called "states rights," to prevent an excessive concentration of power in the central government. Secretary of State George Marshall emphasized this approach in his statement of March 21, 1947, on the nature of a provisional West German government.

Under the Potsdam protocol, the Allies undertook to decentralize the structure of the German state and to develop local responsibility. Accordingly, the United States within its zone [of occupation] has sought to give vitality to local and municipal governments, and to endow appropriate Laender authorities with a larger measure of autonomy in accordance with constitutions ratified by the people. . . .

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8Ibid.
The time has now come to authorize the Germans to establish a provisional government to deal with matters of nation-wide concern which the states cannot adequately handle.9

A proposed directive for the Allied Control Council, drafted by the State Department, which followed Marshall’s statement, established the U.S. government’s criteria for acceptance of a West German constitution. American policy required the new German state to hold "elections at frequent intervals," allow "freely competing political parties," guarantee "basic rights of the individual," and assure that people are "protected from arbitrary arrest, search and seizure." In addition, paragraph 5(B)3 of the directive established real limits on the central government’s powers.

In the distribution of functions between the state and central governments it shall be provided that the central government is one of limited and carefully defined powers in matters where national action is required; such powers as police, internal security; culture, education and religious affairs shall not be delegated to the federal government. The authority of the states [Laender] to raise appropriate revenues shall not be impaired.10

Washington also encouraged revitalization of the German economy as part of an integrated and interdependent West European economy. In a speech that led to an invitation from Secretary Marshall to join him as an adviser to the 1947 Moscow Conference (where the victors of World War II discussed the political and economic future of Germany), John Foster Dulles argued that the industrial potential of the Rhine river basin should be harnessed to the economic recovery of all Western Europe. In his view, this could best be accomplished by incorporating a politically unified Germany into a politically unified European state. Germany could then contribute to economic prosperity without dominating Europe politically.11

This principle of integration was established in the November 1949 agreement between the Western powers of occupation and the new West German Federal Republic.

11Jones, 1964, p. 220.
[The signatories'] primary objective is the incorporation of the Federal Republic as a peaceful member of the European community and to this end German association with the countries of Western Europe by means of her entry into the appropriate international bodies and the exchange of commercial and consular representation with other countries.12

This element of U.S. policy later found expression in America's administration of the Marshall Plan, advocacy of European Coal and Steel Community and, later, support for the concept of a European Economic Community.

A third element of U.S. policy was the integration of West Germany with Western Europe's security arrangements. While the United States initially opposed the creation of any German army or air force, fear of the Soviet threat to Europe caused the United States to embrace German rearmament. To begin to meet the military threat to Western Europe posed by the Red Army, German manpower was essential to Western defense planning and deterrence in Europe. General Eisenhower emphasized this point in his first report as Supreme Allied Commander:

Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless West Germany can be counted on the side of free nations.13

West Germany became a NATO member in 1954, but the arrangements to harness German military might to Western objectives were as much European as Atlantic in their nature. Robert Osgood explained:

In order to make the participation of a German army acceptable to France, the old Western Union of the Brussels Treaty was revived, linked with NATO, and expanded to include Germany and Italy in a West European Union (WEU), which was empowered to fix the maximum force levels of its members on the recommendations of NATO's military authorities. Germany was to become a member of NATO after all signatories had ratified the new Brussels treaty and a convention providing for the continued stationing of allied forces in West Germany, subject to German consent. The allied forces on the continent were placed under the Supreme

Allied Commander in Europe (except those recognized by NATO as being properly under national command). These forces were to be located, deployed, and supported logistically by SACEUR according to NATO's strategy and were forbidden to be redeployed or used operationally without SACEUR's consent, subject to "appropriate political guidance" from the North Atlantic Council.

In a unilateral declaration of self-denial Germany undertook (a) not to manufacture atomic, chemical, or biological weapons and (b) not to manufacture guided missiles, magnetic and influence mines, warships, or long-range bombers, except on the request of SACEUR, approved by a two-thirds majority of the Council of WEU.

As a further restraint upon Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and France agreed that any recourse to force which threatened "the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes" would disqualify the offending government from enjoying its rights "to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols." As a counterweight to German power, Great Britain promised to continue to maintain on the continent the four divisions and the tactical air units already assigned to SACEUR and not to withdraw them against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels powers (subject to the qualification of "acute national emergency" or "financial strain").

West German forces were incorporated in NATO planning under a broad set of arrangements that constrained Germany's ability to become an aggressive power. Moreover, American, British, and French forces remained in Germany where they could restrain any overt movement toward militarism. Together with its positions on West Germany's internal political structure and external economic and diplomatic relations, Washington's policy on Germany's role in collective defense was intended to affiliate the new German state with the democratic values of its Western partners. If and when reunification occurred, Washington intended that values of the West would dominate the unified German state.

NEW REALITIES

The defense strategy of deterrence was difficult to sustain. But it was also worth sustaining so long as the Soviets were an expansionist power. Containment was an appropriate grand strategy for the circumstances of its time; indeed, it has been appropriate almost until today. Soviet actions in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of

World War II demonstrated an intention to dominate Europe. The United States was unwilling or unable to prevent the extension of Soviet power to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the rest of Eastern Europe, but these events convinced decisionmakers that Soviet goals were inimical to our own objectives. It was in our vital interest to defend Western Europe—whether or not our allies were able or willing to do so themselves. And neither the Europeans nor our Congress would support a credible conventional defense. These facts made it necessary for successive administrations first to persuade the Congress to support a defense strategy of nuclear deterrence and later to fight with the legislature to continue the strategy.

Despite the problems of policy management described above, nuclear deterrence "solved" the problem of West European security for many years. It certainly allowed the United States to maintain its position in West Berlin through several crises. Nuclear deterrence may have kept the Soviets from directly threatening Western Europe with military force, if they intended to do so. With the deployment of ground forces to West Germany and subsequent American efforts to respond to the concerns of its European allies, deterrence was sufficiently reassuring to West Europeans to permit their economic and psychological recovery. It formed the basis of a bipartisan foreign policy that gave the president substantial freedom of action for several decades.

But if the United States has won the "Cold War," it was not without cost. In the diplomatic, economic, and defense arenas, the United States gradually emerged victorious from a war of psychological attrition. The Soviets' communist system proved unable to sustain the expenditure of political will, resources, and military power necessary to compete with the United States. However, it cannot be denied that the United States paid a heavy price in self-confidence, allied solidarity, and domestic unity.

Containment succeeded, but the policy has worn thin. And now, in addition to the changes in the strategic balance, in Western Europe, and at home that have made the defense strategy of deterrence more difficult to sustain, we must take into account alterations of the threat. The evolution of Soviet policy and the revolution in Eastern Europe have made the grand strategy of containment far less relevant to the pursuit of U.S. national interests. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe demonstrated expansionist intentions and created the geographic conditions necessary for an invasion of Western Europe that required the United States to defend Western Europe by deterrence. Current events promise to reverse those circumstances radically.
THE SOVIET UNION’S POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Containment was not considered a grand strategy for all time, rather it was a course of U.S. policy to be enforced until such time as the Soviet Union either mellowed or disintegrated. If and when either of these two conditions were met, East and West could reconsider the desiderata of World War II and negotiate a just and lasting peace. While many have hoped for more than reform in the Soviet empire, for an overthrow of communist regimes and the development of a western style government in Russia, those who devised containment rejected this goal and stated more realistic criteria. The requirements were probably stated best by George Kennan in 1951.

Kennan rejected as "the sort of Russia we may not look for... a capitalistic and liberal democratic one, with institutions closely resembling those of our own Republic." In place of what he considered this unrealizable goal, Kennan stated three aspects of the Russia the United States could "reasonably expect" before it considered a fundamental reconciliation:

[A] Russian government which, in contrast to the one we know today, would be tolerant, communicative, and forthright in its relations with other states and peoples. It would not take the ideological position that its own purposes cannot finally prosper unless all systems of government not under its control are subverted and eventually destroyed. . . .

[T]he exercise of governmental authority will stop short of that fairly plain line beyond which lies totalitarianism. When a regime sets out to enslave its own working population . . . it requires . . . so vast an apparatus of coercion that the imposition of the Iron Curtain follows almost automatically. . . .

[I]t will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have an instinct and capacity for national self-assertion.¹⁵

In effect, these conditions constitute a reversal of the very Soviet policies applied to Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War II that had led Washington to devise the strategy of containment. They were the beginnings of a just settlement of the European security problem, and they are being met today in the Soviet bloc.

Today, every Eastern European state is somewhere along a road headed toward parliamentary democracy and independence from Moscow. In the case of Bulgaria, we see what we hope are the first tentative steps. Poland and Hungary are well on their way.

¹⁵Kennan, 1951, pp. 137–139.
In Romania, the despotic communist government was overthrown and democratic elections have been scheduled. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, progress toward freedom has been rapid, even dizzying. Even the Soviet Union is undergoing a process of political reform that undermines the formerly unquestioned totalitarian authority of the communist party. In March 1990, Moscow rejected the one-party rule as the communist parties in the Baltic republics did earlier in the year. These and other changes in the Soviet Union's domestic political scene, including increased authority for the Supreme Soviet, suggest the possibility of evolution to a more open government subject to checks and balances and the rule of law.

A Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe is now implausible. The Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies would almost certainly not participate. Nor could those Soviet forces remaining after the withdrawal of forces announced by Gorbachev in 1989 count on secure lines of supply through Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland are discussing with Moscow, or are actually implementing, the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from their countries. Without East European forces, forward bases for Soviet forces, and secure lines of supply, a Soviet invasion of Western Europe would almost certainly fail. A conventional arms control agreement in Europe would reduce the threat even more.

The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact have renounced the right to intervene in the affairs of East European states and deplored their 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Throughout Eastern Europe, Soviet troops remained in their garrison as the puppet governments installed by Moscow fell. Moreover, by allowing the disintegration of their empire in Eastern Europe, the Soviets are demonstrating—in the clearest possible terms—their intention not to dominate Western Europe. Today, the Soviets do not need to be contained, because they are no longer pursuing an expansionist policy.

What of the Soviet Union itself? How much reform within the Soviet Union is necessary before the United States can have confidence in a lasting peace in Europe? More specifically, to what extent should we insist on an extension of self-determination to the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia, and other states held by force within the USSR? Kennan suggested that although the United States could expect the Soviets to withdraw from Eastern Europe, Washington should exercise more tolerance toward Moscow and reserve judgment when considering the exercise of self-determination within Soviet borders:
Americans should be extremely careful in committing their support or encouragement to any specific arrangements in this sphere. . . . How can we know whether a given national group will require an independent status, or a federal status, some special brand of local self-government, or no status at all until we know something about the psychological climate in which these arrangements would operate? There are peoples of non-Russian ethnological character on the borders of the Great Russian family whose economic existence is intimately bound up with that of the Great Russians. The future should see a minimum of disruption of these economic ties, and that in itself would normally warrant a close political connection. But its nature would always have to depend on what sort of attitudes prevailed on both sides of the line: on the degree of tolerance and insight which the peoples involved (and not only the Russian people) might be able to bring to the establishment of these relationships.

We are all agreed, for example, that the Baltic countries should never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples into any relationship whatsoever with a Russian state; but they would themselves be foolish to reject close and cooperative arrangements with a tolerant, non-imperialist Russia, which genuinely wished to overcome the unhappy memories of the past and to place her relations to the Baltic peoples on a basis of real respect and disinterestedness. The Ukraine, again, deserves full recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and for the requirements and possibilities of its development as a linguistic and cultural entity; but the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the adjustment will have to be made?  

The United States is vitally interested in the liberation of Eastern Europe because of the implications for West European security, but beyond the loosening of totalitarian rule, the internal politics of the Soviet Union should be of less concern to Americans. To restate Kennan:

These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal authority of government, and that she abandon . . . the ancient game of imperialist expansion. . . . If she is prepared to do these things, then Americans will not need to concern themselves more deeply with her nature and purposes; the basic demands of a more stable world order will have been met.  

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16Kennan, 1951, pp. 140–141.
17Kennan, 1951, p. 143.
Are these criteria sufficient? Certainly the military dimension of the Soviet threat cannot be excluded from any consideration of the kind of Russia we can "reasonably expect." But a Soviet Union that meets the criteria established by Kennan—or that goes a long way toward meeting them—is a state that would demonstrate its changed intentions with changes in force structure and deployments. Demonstrations of progress in the areas of internal policy and foreign aims are best made by a willingness to continue the process of Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe now underway. For it is these withdrawals that reduce and remove the actual military threat to Western Europe and the implied intent to politically dominate America's allies. But it is because of the changes in Soviet goals and objectives implied by Kennan's criteria that they should be willing to reduce their military presence.

PROBLEMS FACING EASTERN EUROPE TODAY

The current situation in Eastern Europe—so radically different from what prevailed during the formulation and implementation of containment—requires some review and analysis. The prospects for independent and democratic East European governments and the possibilities for an end to the division of Germany must be considered.

The emerging threat to West European security derives, in part, from the specter of reversal, the prospect of Tiananmen Square on a continental scale, but in the longer term the more pressing concern is a failure of Eastern Europe to develop strong democratic institutions. Disintegration of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe does not guarantee the creation of independent democratic regimes in the countries the Red Army leaves behind. Military withdrawal must be followed by programs to develop strong democratic institutions and economic vitality.

Although communist credibility in Eastern Europe is at low ebb, it is still the most organized political force. Communists retain a real bargaining power over the makeup of future governments—the ability to resist reform by force and plunge their countries into chaos. Throughout Eastern Europe, the parties remain in the power structure. Even if they have been badly defeated in recent elections, some party members are likely to retain a role in any new government—in police, security and military functions. Moreover, communist parties in opposition will be in a position to blame the reform party in power for the problems and real hardships that will accompany economic
transformation. For example, the unemployed will be reminded that under communism they had jobs. The subversive history of communist parties suggests they will remain a threat to democracy in Eastern Europe for some time—a threat that must be managed from within by the new governments. Combined with a continued Soviet military presence, communist parties of Eastern Europe represent an intolerable threat to internal stability and local independence.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe is therefore a necessary condition for the creation of independent East European states. Soviet forces that remain in the country will act as a coercive influence on any government. They can block or reverse reform by threatening or acting to support a coup d'état by the remnant communist party, remove the government on their own to install a Quisling, or secure critical defensive points in prelude to a larger invasion.

The development of strong democratic institutions is necessary for the creation of stable East European governments. Without a representative legislature, a free press, strong political parties, and an independent judiciary, the countries will be open to anarchy or totalitarianism. Unstable East European governments are a threat to European security.

Vital economies are required if there are to be strong democratic political institutions. People must have their basic needs met and opportunities to better themselves. If Eastern Europe proves unable to develop vital economies, responsible reformists may find support dissipate and wane as extremists promise more radical outlets for popular aspirations. A failed economy could give rise to the nationalism, irredentism, internal strife, civil war, even facism that plagued the region in earlier times.

Nationalism, now a potent force for independence in the Soviet bloc, could develop in more dangerous directions. In virtually every case in Eastern Europe, the state does not encompass the nation. In the aftermath of World War II, the borders of Poland were moved nearly two hundred miles west. Poles remain in the Soviet Union. German populations reside in Poland and Czechoslovakia and even the Soviet Union. Hungarian populations live in Czechoslovakia and Romania, Romanians in the Soviet Union. Eventually, nationalist leaders may not confine their attentions to the populations within the borders of the existing states. Ethnic fears and animosities run deep in Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, a reformist regime has attempted to liberalize policies toward the Turkish minority oppressed under the previous government. Ethnic Bulgarians have
protested loudly. The Polish government recently complained to East Germany about discrimination against Polish workers in that country. In Romania, the Hungarian minority is expected to press for regional autonomy and it is not clear how this will be resolved. In Czechoslovakia, communist authorities have tried to play on old German-Czechoslovak animosities by denouncing President Havel's call for a national apology to ethnic Germans for the country's treatment of them in the aftermath of World War II. If the East European economies fail to reform, and perhaps even if they do reform, popular sentiments may support strong irredentist and separatist movements.

If current events lead not to the establishment of strong democratic institutions, because of continued economic failures, but rather to political instability, an independent Eastern Europe may present a threat to Western security. Political instability in Eastern Europe may cause the Soviet Union to fear a return of facism, or the further spread of extremist nationalist tendencies to the Soviet Union itself. The extension of implied or formal political guarantees to fledgling democratic governments by the West, combined with Soviet fears stemming from political instability in those same countries, could enhance the plausibility of war in Europe.

RESOLVING THE GERMAN QUESTION

Certainly, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has been a major source of conflict and tension in Europe. But even if the Soviet Union rejects this objective, as demonstrated by its current actions and its increasing willingness to withdraw military forces from Eastern Europe, the future of a united Germany remains a divisive and potentially explosive issue. Events in East Germany over the last months of 1989 reopened an old problem of European diplomacy—the German Question. The realization of Germans' longstanding desires for unity is now quite plausible.

Separated or united, the status of Germany has been a source of anxiety to the East or the West, or both. The separation of the two Germanys did not reduce German hopes for unification; and the hopes of Germans are—in varying degrees—its neighbors' anxieties. A unified Germany bound to the East, the fear of Western policymakers in the 1950s but a most unlikely option today, would provide the Soviet Union with the economic, industrial, and technological prowess sufficient to renew plans to dominate the whole of Europe. In the West a fear remains that a neutral Germany cut off from the West could eventually side with Russia, as it did in the period between the two world
The prospect of a unified Germany bound to the West has caused Moscow concern about the potential revival of a historic threat to Russian security. Alternatively, Europeans, Americans, and Soviets alike express worries that an independent Germany might eventually dominate Europe. Indeed, there are still some who hint that Germany is not immune to a revival of its Nazi past and could even cause a third world war.

Whether or not formal reunification occurs quickly, as it now seems to be happening, the demise of Soviet control over East Germany caused German reunification in fact—economically and politically. Chancellor Kohl's 10-point program of November 1989 for German reunification made it clear that major economic assistance from the West would follow real political changes in the East. Subsequent events demonstrate that in the perception of German citizens, the security of East German reform is seen as a matter of vital interest to West Germany, a view likely to be encouraged by the vast majority of Germans in the East. East Germans see de jure unity with the West as the key to their own prosperity and security, even if they are nervous about the economic and social costs of a transition.

If the United States were to renege on its longstanding promise that German unification is a matter for the German people to decide—without preconditions regarding the unified state's military alliances—it would place the stability of Europe at risk. When West Germany joined the Western community and NATO in 1954, it was with the understanding that she was entitled to the same rights of self-determination, including the right of association, granted to other states. West Germany has played by the rules; it held to its side of the bargain. For 40 years, West Germany has been an outstandingly responsible member of the community of nations. It buried the hatchet with France, it wedded itself to the Atlantic Community, it became a major factor of economic growth and stability in the European Economic Community, it has served as the forward outpost of West European defense, it has been a solid ally of the United States.

While the Western powers reserved rights to participate in negotiations leading to solution of the German problem and to protect their own interests in such talks, they reserved little in the way of power over the West German state's policy on the matter. The United States, United Kingdom, and France did retain their right to occupy Berlin, according to the 1954 Convention on Relations, and to station troops in West Germany. But as noted in the Four Power Declaration of 1957, their intent was to leave unification to the "freely expressed wishes of the German people." British, French, and U.S. troops
stationed in West Germany were, along with the West German Army, there for the protection of Germans and the citizens of other NATO members from invasion. Should the West German government ask the Western Powers to leave, the 1954 Convention suggested they would not demand a right to stay:

**Article 2.** In view of the international situation which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement. The rights and responsibilities retained by the Three Powers relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany . . . are dealt with in [Article] 4.

**Article 4.** . . . The Federal Republic agrees that, from the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defense Contribution (to NATO), forces of the same nationality and effective strength (of the U.S., U.K., and France) as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic. . . . The three powers do not desire to exercise their rights regarding the stationing of armed forces in the Federal Republic, insofar as it is concerned, except in full accord with the Federal Republic.18

Henry Kissinger warned of serious consequences if the Western Allies did not support German reunification:

The Federal Republic would suffer a perhaps irreparable blow if its allies accepted its present frontiers as final even if they seemed to accept them by not advocating unification. The division of Germany may be unavoidable, but for the West a great deal depends on demonstrating what makes it so . . . If the Federal Republic is persuaded that it cannot achieve reunification through its ties to the West, it may attempt separate dealings with the East . . . Alternatively, there may be a resurgence of virulent nationalism. The argument will gain credence that close ties with the West having failed, Germany must pursue a policy of pressure and nationalistic advantage . . .

It is sometimes argued that whatever its frustrations, the Federal Republic would soon discover that its scope for separate dealings was severely limited . . . By the time the Federal Republic would have realized how

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circumscribed its area of maneuver really is, Western cohesion would have been wrecked. ¹⁹

Unless they combine with the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies cannot prevent German unification. In this regard, Secretary of State Baker's requirement that a unified Germany remain in NATO eventually could be perceived as a cynical collusion with Moscow to prevent the formal recognition of unification by the occupying powers and indefinitely postpone a termination of U.S. occupation rights. For no Soviet government could readily accept a unified Germany with an expanded military fully integrated with the kind of NATO that has existed up to now. If the process of unification stalls on this point, it might not be long before Germans begin to suspect that a deadlock is precisely what the victors of World War II want.

The Soviet leadership has admitted the utter failure of virtually every aspect of the communist system imposed on the Russian state in 1917. The one success they can rightly claim—and use as a means of identifying with the Russian people—is the victory over Nazism and the breaking of German military power. It is difficult to see how Soviet leaders can allow Russia's historic adversary to recombine and align itself with the West without substantial restraints on Germany's actual and potential military power.

Regardless of the current reduction in tensions between East and West, NATO is a symbol of the military threat to the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders cannot afford the public perception that they allowed a unified Germany to add its military power to that threat. Soviet intransigence on this point could easily delay the full return of German sovereignty for years. This intransigence may amount to more than mere foot-dragging. Given that the Soviets have no place in the USSR to house the forces now occupying East Germany, they may have no choice but to keep the troops where they are. With the current shortage of housing, there is literally no place to put them or their families within the USSR. Even under more favorable domestic circumstances than exist today, the legitimacy of Soviet leaders will be severely undermined if Soviet forces return home without concrete restraints on German military power.

Similarly, Germans may skeptically interpret the idea put forward by National Security Advisor Scowcroft that 195,000 U.S. troops in Central Europe is the minimum number necessary to meet U.S. defense requirements in the region even if the Soviets withdraw entirely from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and what is now East Germany. Should

this state of affairs come to pass, many Germans might wonder about the extent to which U.S. forces stationed in their country were forces of occupation rather than defense.

In the long run, an American policy that becomes fixated on the need for restraints on German military power is a prescription for Germany’s becoming aloof from the Western Community and possibly even resentful of its former allies. It is bound to be considered a slap in the face to a West German state that believed itself an equal partner in the Atlantic Community and not a vassal of the Western Powers that defeated Hitler’s Third Reich. If the Soviets are somehow forced to leave East Germany quickly, the domestic pressures within Germany for a withdrawal of Western Forces will mount rapidly.

Germans are likely to consider more respectable and acceptable the proposals of such German Social Democrat politicians as Oscar LaFontaine, the party’s candidate for Chancellor in the 1990 election, barring foreign troops and withdrawing from NATO’s integrated command. Even if the Social Democrats do not come to power in the West German elections, which may encompass a unified Germany, the conservative parties will have to recognize the legitimacy of popular desires to be rid of foreign forces. If they cannot point to a Soviet military threat, Christian Democrat and Christian Socialist political leaders will find it ever more difficult to win votes on the basis of their support for a continued American military presence.

In these circumstances, it is increasingly implausible that the United States, France, or Britain will be asked to stay in West Germany indefinitely or in larger than token deployments, or that they will remain against the wishes of the new German state. But there will be a great deal of ill will if leaders in Washington, London, and Paris are forced to back down from publicly expressed desires to leave forces in Germany or if leaders in Bonn—or Berlin—feel compelled to openly request the departure of those forces. Instead of becoming a stabilizing factor in Europe, Germany might then see itself as without real friends in the West and strike out on an independent course. At best, opportunities to build on the very real community of interests the Western powers share with Germany may be lost. At worst, the new power might once again try the traditional German strategy of playing East off West. It is from such basic conditions that the circumstances leading to another world war could arise.
THE NEW MOOD IN AMERICA

Over the long run, efforts to sustain the strategy of deterrence at home may have had a corrosive influence on the national sense of direction in foreign affairs. Deterrence is essentially a negative strategy. As the central element of our containment strategy, it spelled out who and what we opposed. But particularly as the economic dimension of containment faded with its success in achieving the goal of European reconstruction, containment lacked a clearly stated positive goal. In 1949, Archibald MacLeish, a noted essayist and former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, warned Americans of how an essentially negative strategy could eventually sap America's moral strength and perception of self-worth.

What is happening in the United States under the impact of the negative and often frightened opinion of these years is the falsification of the image the American people have long cherished of themselves. . . . A people who have thought of themselves for a hundred and fifty years as having purposes of their own for the changing of the world cannot learn overnight to think of themselves as the resisters of another's purposes without beginning to wonder who they are. A people who have been real to themselves because they were for something cannot continue to be real to themselves when they find they are merely against something . . .

No one in his senses denies that Russian fraud, Russian lies, Russian militarism, Russian imperialism, Russian stupidity and fanaticism and greed left us no choice but to rearm. But no one in his senses can deny either that we have made of this necessity the excuse for a failure to achieve a policy of our own. That failure may well turn out to have been the costliest blunder of our history.20

Today, we can see all around us the domestic price of that policy. The result of 40 years of containment, dominated by a defense strategy of deterrence, is that many Americans, perhaps most—even those charged with policy—have little sense of our national purpose in the face of a collapsing Soviet threat. The appalling situation is clear in the debate and discussion we hear about the role of the United States in world affairs if the Soviets are no longer our adversary. The effects of this uncertainty in the United States are real. Mr. Gorbachev has set the diplomatic tone and agenda in Europe more than Mr. Bush. And the American people are in danger of adopting a narrow and isolationist view of the U.S. role in world affairs, particularly demonstrated by the

palpable rise in protectionist sentiment. The U.S. defense program is being set more by the forces of Gramm-Rudman, pork barrel politics, and service inertia than as the result of any defense strategy.

With the decline in the Soviet threat and the ending of America's role in collective security, differences—particularly trade-related differences—could dominate U.S. relations with Western Europe. A former National Security Council staffer and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs underlined this concern that East-West rapprochement will bring with it the end of Atlantic Community. He noted that reconciliation of trade differences between the U.S. and Western Europe can no longer be attained—as it was during much of the Cold War—by citing the need to avoid undermining Alliance unity. Recent polls in the U.S. suggest that Americans believe that their security is jeopardized more by competitive economic threats from allies... than by the Soviet Union.21

Something must replace the unifying power of the Soviet threat if the American Congress is to pay more than lip service to the concept of an Atlantic Community.

It may be that the domestic mood in the United States no longer supports the large defense expenditures necessary to maintain the containment strategy. In an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times, conservative columnist Kevin Phillips summed up the growing sentiment for a shift in government spending from military to economic and social concerns:

The current predicament is clear. Since World War II, U.S. policymakers, rightly fearful of Moscow, committed huge resources to protect Europe and the North Atlantic (some set the U.S. taxpayer burden as high as $150 billion a year) as well as the North Pacific environs around Japan and South Korea (this may cost $50 billion a year). But with the 1990 ebb of the Soviet threat, coupled with diminishing resources, the time has come to shift two-thirds of these dollars to America's decaying cities, inadequate housing, pockmarked highways, crumbling bridges, deficient electrical grid, boarded-up small towns, neglected children, semi-literate workforce, and failing schools...

Majorities of Americans are already ready—if we can trust the polls—to spend large additional sums on education, homelessness, drug prevention, infrastructure needs, and the like. The logical caveat is that working-class and middle class Americans don't want to pay for it with a tax increase—thus the importance of getting money by folding the expensive U.S.

military umbrella over countries such as Japan and West Germany. They have become rich creditor nations and Goliath-scale exporters in part by avoiding major defense outlays.\textsuperscript{22}

The more liberal \textit{New York Times} editorialized a very similar argument:

The peace dividend . . . is tangible, and for the President to recoil from it is baffling. It is not bleeding heart liberals who urge Mr. Bush to be the Education President; that's his own ambition for himself. It is not elitist ecologists who label him the Environmental President; that's his own title for his own aspiration. Why, having pinned himself between a desire for progress and a pledge not to raise taxes does he shrink from the windfall? Should not he, on his own terms, embrace it? By dismissing it, the President is twice mistaken. The peace dividend is real, and realistically achievable. And the best way to spend it is to promote productivity and growth.\textsuperscript{23}

The national mood has spread to Capitol Hill. In early February of 1990, as the administration began to present its Fiscal Year 1991 defense budget, it became clear that even those legislators who had traditionally been viewed as strong supporters of the defense establishment were now skeptical of the continuing need for many elements of the buildup initiated by President Reagan in the 1980s. Important Senators and Congressmen sensed that the administration had no coherent strategy or rationale for the budget they presented. They no longer accept the rationale for American troops in Europe contained in the 1951 Senate resolution described above. They believe the administration is pushing policies and programs that our allies reject and that the Europeans should be able to defend themselves. As a result, there is a risk that domestic economic and electoral considerations will guide Congressional decisionmaking on the inevitable cuts.

The administration's proposed 1991 defense budget of roughly $300 billion constitutes a 2 percent cut from the previous year, when inflation is taken into account. Congress has found it difficult to identify the strategic logic of the small reduction. In the absence of a clear statement of revised U.S. defense requirements in the new international political situation, there might be no intellectually defensible floor on


defense expenditures. Senator Cohen, Republican, of Maine, laid out the basic political problem facing those legislators who want an intelligent "downsizing" of the budget:

We want to know what is driving the strategy. . . . Is there a conceptual rationale to support why we arrived on a 2 percent cut? If there's not, we're going to have trouble on the Senate floor because some will argue, if you can accept 2 percent, why not 4 percent?24

On probing defense officials about the rationale, many in Congress disagree with the administration's positions. For example, the administration has argued for 195,000 men as a permanent floor on U.S. deployments in Central Europe, regardless of Soviet deployments in the region. In his exchange with Secretary of Defense Cheney, Senator Albert Gore, Democrat, Tennessee, recalled the original reason for U.S. ground forces in Europe. If that reason disappeared, the Senator questioned the need for deployments:

"The ideal outcome," said Cheney, "is one in which the Soviets are gone from Eastern Europe, NATO continues, and the U.S. stays." He added, "There's no moral equivalent between Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and U.S. forces in Western Europe."

Sen. Albert Gore, Jr., Democrat of Tennessee, politely protested: "With all due respect, this is not an issue of moral equivalence." If there's no more threat and no more basis for the division of Europe, Gore said, "the rationale for . . . even those levels of forces, is going to be difficult to maintain."

That was when Nunn jumped in and said, "I hope the Secretary and the Chairman listen to this."25

There is also concern that the administration is wedded to a defense strategy that is no longer relevant to the requirements of deterrence or reassurance in Europe. An example of this was the administration's insistence on plans for modernization of the short-range Lance nuclear missile to be deployed in West Germany—a position President Bush finally reversed in the spring of 1990. Many Germans opposed the missile on the grounds that it is suitable only for killing Germans as it is able to reach only into East Germany. With the looming prospect of unification, it was doubtful the system would ever be deployed. Nevertheless, as late as February 1990 the administration maintained

25Kaplan, 1990, p. 3.
that the "follow on to Lance" (FOTL) system should be deployed. In an exchange with Egon Bahr, a prominent defense specialist in the West German Social Democratic Party, Senator Cohen stated the Congress would deny the administration’s request:

Bahr: We won’t shoot at each other.... The short-range missiles can only shoot other Germans. We won’t accept them.
Cohen: Let me assure you—Congress will not pay for it.26

Legislators are also ever more convinced that the West Europeans will be able to carry on their own defense as Soviet forces are withdrawn from Eastern Europe and dismantled. Moreover, as Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota explained during testimony by U.S. Ambassador to NATO William Taft, there is a perception that the American public also believes this is true:

Pressler ... asked how he could explain to his constituents why they had to pay for keeping troops in Europe, where there were many prosperous ... countries after the Soviets had withdrawn.
Mr. Taft said U.S. ground forces "are an expression of the American commitment to the security of Europe, ... a visible manifestation of our strategic commitment," the willingness to use strategic nuclear arms to defend Europe.
"So that I can tell my constituents that we’re going to keep our troops in Europe as a visible sign of our commitment?” Mr. Pressler asked.
"This is the visible linkage of the alliance,” said Mr. Taft.
"I have a hard time seeing in the long run that we have to have visible soldiers walking around Europe," said Mr. Pressler. “That’s going to be hard for me to sell in South Dakota.”27

Even aside from the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Congress would have imposed cuts to the defense budget submitted by the administration. Deficit reductions required under Gramm-Rudman lead inexorably to a smaller defense budget. But with the changes, defense becomes an attractive target for deep cuts. The basic assumption of administrations that defense budgets might be nibbled but not slashed because it was on the whole politically damaging for legislators to appear "soft on

26 Moore, 1990, p. 22.
defense" no longer holds. Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser summed up the new attitude to Secretary Cheney:

We've got to find $37 billion (in cuts) to meet this year's deficit reduction targets. . . . I don't think there is a chance in the world that Congress is going to give you the kind of budget you have presented here.28

Because of a growing perception that the administration has not presented a clear foreign policy rationale, economic and electoral considerations may dominate Congressional deliberations on how to cut the defense budget. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin illustrated one likely consequence:

Mr. Aspin said it would be difficult to persuade Congress to accept the notion that 195,000 is a "floor" for American troops in Central Europe because "the troops in Europe are the logical place for Congress to look to make some cuts. . . ."

Mr. Aspin said that sharp reductions in American troops were "a way to get cuts without triggering base closures at home. . . ."

The House Committee chairman added that many members of Congress believe that the Soviet bloc threat to NATO has "collapsed" because of changes in Eastern Europe.29

**AMERICA'S ENDURING INTEREST IN EUROPE**

The case for an active American role in European affairs has been based on idealism and power politics. Both arguments have been enduring elements of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. The idealistic argument is that freedom and peace are indivisible; if threatened anywhere around the world, but especially in the European countries from which our liberal traditions sprang, our own liberties are at risk. The argument of realpolitik is that any power that dominates Eurasia can cut the United States off from sources of trade and resources and eventually strangle us if not actually invade the Western Hemisphere.

The idealistic argument for U.S. involvement in Europe was well stated by Charles Burton Marshall, a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning

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28Tyler, 1990, p. 10.
Staff, in the *Limits of Foreign Policy*. He maintained that American values laid down in the Constitution could be protected only by an active foreign policy:

The government of the United States is founded on some general propositions set down in the Preamble of the Constitution. These are the purposes for which the American people gave their consent to be governed.

The first is the perfection of the Union. That expresses the idea of a nation growing in internal strength and concord.

The second is the establishment of justice. That means the subjection of power to antecedent standards ensuring against the employment of power as an end in itself.

Third in the enumeration comes domestic tranquility—meaning a nation at peace with itself, permitting the resolution of issues by reason and compromise.

Next comes the common defense. That means the protection of the nation against penetration by its enemies.

The promotion of the general welfare is listed next. That expresses the idea of a government serving the interests of, and accountable to, the community at large rather than being merely the instrument of the interests of a dominant group.

Finally comes the securing now and henceforth of the blessing of liberty, a situation permitting the individual to choose freely for himself and his children regarding the modes of their lives, their religion, and their thoughts.

Those values prosper in a climate of security. They would wither under the blight of dread. The goal of our foreign policy, enduring until death or defeat, is to preserve in the world a situation permitting the survival of these values as political realities in the United States... [O]ur aspiration must be to do whatever we can to lift the burden of fear from the world so as to give free institutions and usages the best attainable chance to survive and to strengthen.\(^{30}\)

What he once termed the "naked elements" of America's geopolitical circumstances were laid out by Walter Lippman in 1944. In his book, *U.S. War Aims*, he argued that for reasons of power politics America could not guarantee its own security in isolation from Western Europe:

The interdependence of France, Britain, and North America is a demonstrated fact. Two tremendous wars are a demonstration which ought to be sufficient to convince anyone who will learn from experience rather than consult his prejudices. France could not stand without Britain. When France fell, the British Isles were in mortal peril. Britain could not stand without North America. If Britain had fallen, the Western Hemisphere would have been laid wide open. Had the Western Hemisphere been wide open, the United States would have had to defend itself in the Atlantic before it could have thought of resisting the Japanese.

The Atlantic Community is no figment of the imagination. It is a reality. We ignored and neglected it at our peril. Twice we had to restore it at prodigious cost.\(^{31}\)

In his 1957 book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Henry Kissinger combined the idealistic and power political arguments for an activist foreign policy. The pragmatic rationale he articulated represented a justification for an activist American policy toward Europe that encompassed a wide range of political opinion in the United States:

We have a strategic interest in Europe... the geopolitical fact that in relation to Eurasia the United States is an island power, inferior at present only in human resources though eventually even in industrial capacity. Thus, we are confronted by the traditional problem of an island power... that its survival depends on preventing the opposite land mass from falling under hostile control.

If Eurasia were to be dominated by a hostile power or group of powers, we would confront an overpowering threat. If the United States were ever confined to "Fortress America"... the Western Hemisphere would be confronted by three-quarters of mankind and hardly less of its resources and our continued existence would be precarious. At best, we would be forced into a military effort incompatible with what is now considered the American way of life. At worst, we would cease to be the masters of our policy.\(^{32}\)

In *The Necessity for Choice*, published in 1960, Kissinger went beyond these traditional arguments for American activism, arguments based on a fear that Europe might fall to a hostile power. Still combining idealism with *realpolitik*, but looking beyond containment, he expressed a positive purpose for a close involvement with our European allies:

\(^{31}\)Lippman, 1944, pp. 66–67.

\(^{32}\)Kissinger, 1957, pp. 269–270.
An even stronger reason for North Atlantic cohesion is that it is a prerequisite for realizing opportunities for constructive action. It is beyond the capacity of either the United States or our European Allies to deal individually with all the concurrent revolutions of our time. No one nation has sufficient intellectual or material resources to assist the development of the new nations, keep up in the technological race, help work out a new set of relationships, and realize its own opportunities. If our hopes for a world based on the values of freedom and human dignity are to be realized, the closest cooperation between North America—indeed, the entire Western Hemisphere—and Europe is essential.

Justification for the U.S. interest in Europe transcends the Cold War. American security and prosperity are inextricably bound with Western Europe. The course of European security, politics, and commerce will have enormous implications for our own well-being, just as American policy is bound to affect Europe’s future. We have a stake of the highest order in each other’s destiny. Even if the Soviet threat were to disappear, this would constitute a compelling case for the United States to pursue an activist role in Europe.

V. TOWARD A NEW GRAND STRATEGY

THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND A NEW GRAND STRATEGY

With changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, U.S. grand strategy has become obsolete or at least is fast becoming so. Containment must be replaced with a national security strategy appropriate to our needs and means. Diplomatic and economic strategies must be reshaped. U.S. defense strategy must be realigned. A wholesale reformulation of U.S. foreign policy is required.

There is no need to practice a strategy of containment or to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear devastation to prevent them from invading and occupying or coercing Western Europe when this is not within their capability and no longer their intention. Although they might retain a theoretical capability to mobilize and concentrate their remaining forces and conduct an offensive operation on a limited front, Soviet forces can no longer credibly threaten a European-wide campaign. In fact, a Soviet Union that is genuinely renouncing its expansionist goals may perceive efforts to reinforce or emphasize the credibility of our nuclear threats as having a coercive rather than a deterrent objective. It is now time for policymakers in Washington, and particularly the Executive Branch, to examine the state of European and American security interests afresh. We need to develop a set of assumptions about threats, allies, our vital interests and objectives, and our own will and resources that is congruent with the new realities.

The Soviets are becoming incapable of posing a credible military threat to Western Europe and have abandoned any intention to dominate that region. They are in the first stages of withdrawing the Red Army from Eastern Europe and appear willing, even eager, to continue the process. They have lost their political grip on their former satellites and have acted as if they are willing to let their influence decline still further. The Soviet Union itself is in danger of political disintegration and economic collapse. Communism holds little interest as a political or economic system, even in "communist" countries. For the next decade, perhaps longer, the Soviet Union is likely to be absorbed by the problems of maintaining a multinational state, revitalizing a stagnant economy, and reforming a totalitarian political system. There are certainly possibilities for a reversal of these trends, a reassertion of totalitarian rule abroad and at home, but the
forces at work today are extremely powerful. Efforts to reimpose on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe the internal and foreign policies of the Stalinist, or even the Brezhnev, era would be costly and time-consuming, if not doomed to failure. We must guard against reversal and provide ourselves with options to deal with such an occurrence, but U.S. grand strategy should not make assurance against the prospect of reversal its fundamental premise.

The second assumption is that Western Europe could defend itself against the much reduced Soviet threat in Eastern Europe. Western Europe now possesses sufficient economic power, political unity, manpower, and—probably even before a START agreement, but certainly afterward—nuclear weaponry to defend itself against a Soviet invasion unsupported by the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. An agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe would further reduce the Soviet military threat to our European allies. Within a brief period, possibly less than a decade, Western Europe could become psychologically able to stand up to the remaining Soviet threat—the specter of reversibility. Continuation of the present defense partnership with America, including some number of American troops on European soil, is probably necessary in the short run, to support the transition to a West European defense identity. But beyond a symbolic presence, U.S. troops are probably not necessary to guarantee Western Europe's security against the prospect of Soviet aggression. Eventually, even the symbolic deployment may not be required. In the long term, Europeans are likely to recognize that American dominance of their defense is an obstacle to progress toward political unity within their continent. They may also judge the value of a strong relationship with America in terms other than the military dimension.

Some thoughtful European analysts, as well as responsible European political officials, most notably the French, are beginning to come around to the view that Western Europe can defend itself. Francois Heisbourg, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, argued for Anglo-French cooperation on a new intermediate range ballistic missile able to reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe as one "means to provide a reliable organizing factor in the emerging post-post-war European order. Franco-British nuclear cooperation in close consultation with the other West European countries, notably West Germany, would provide a basis for unity in the strategic
arena."¹ According to Reuters, French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement said that "peace in a new politically-changed Europe could be guaranteed by French and British nuclear forces on one side and a reduced Soviet arsenal on the other."² Around this core Western Europe might assure its own security.

The third assumption is that the physical frontier of U.S. national security has moved from Western Europe's border with Eastern Europe to Eastern Europe's border with the Soviet Union. It has been U.S. policy and is now in the American interest to see Eastern Europe become an area of independent governments with vital economies, governed by strong democratic institutions and enjoying a stable regional security environment. Moreover, the best means of assuring the security of Western Europe—an American objective based on idealism and realpolitik that transcends the Cold War—is an independent Eastern Europe free of Soviet forces. Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and even Bulgaria are moving rapidly in that direction. But just as Western Europe could not assure its own political, economic, and military security in the aftermath of World War II, Eastern Europe requires massive amounts of outside help. If it is in America's interest to see the people of Eastern Europe succeed in their efforts to create independent democratic states, it is also in America's interest to contribute to those efforts. The United States cannot guarantee the establishment of democratic governments by its own actions, but it can foster many of the necessary conditions. Our abiding interest in Europe demands that we do so. Our European allies could come to see American interest and action in assuring the promotion of democracy and free enterprise in Eastern Europe as a demonstration of American resolve every bit as tangible as the presence of U.S. troops is today.

With the rise of the West European economies, it is unreasonable to expect that the United States should shoulder the burden of aid to Eastern Europe. West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the other members of the European Community (and possibly Japan as well) have the resources and experience in dealing with the local economies necessary to manage and fund a program of economic assistance to Eastern Europe. A fourth assumption is that although the United States has an interest in contributing substantial funds to and otherwise participating in such an enterprise, leadership of the effort should fall to the Europeans.

A fifth assumption is that the security of Europe will be at risk unless German reunification proceeds in ways that do not jeopardize the legitimate security interests of all the involved parties. The prospect of a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe reopens a question of vital interest to the whole of Europe, to the Soviet Union, and to America. Without the communist system, and that has surely collapsed even before the Soviets withdraw, East Germany can make no claim for separation from West Germany. Powerful forces are already at work in the German nation—on both sides of the inner German border—for unification. German aspirations cannot be forcibly contained without jeopardizing Western unity as well as reform in Eastern Europe. Yet there are fears in the Soviet Union, based on reasonable, historical concerns, about the prospect of German reunification. To some extent, East European states, notably Poland may share these concerns. All worry that reunification may evolve into a policy of expansionism that calls into question the validity of Eastern Europe’s current borders. The United States and Western Europe are also concerned. German reunification may be unstoppable, but its form and process will profoundly influence the future possibilities for political stability and peace in Europe.

A final assumption is that a positive purpose of U.S. foreign policy must be clearly stated if the administration is to reverse or even halt a decline in Congress’s interest toward a partnership with Western Europe. American troops may well be able to return home as the Soviet threat recedes from Europe. But a premature U.S. withdrawal might provide the Soviets with less incentive to continue their own retreat. Unless the administration can show that the American military purpose in Europe is not merely to deter attack but also to promote positive change in the region, many legislators will be eager to declare victory in Europe, finally "bring the boys home," and allocate whatever resources may be saved from a drastically reduced military presence to reducing the budget deficit or other domestic concerns. With the decline in the Soviet threat and in the salience of collective security, differences—particularly those related to trade—could dominate U.S. relations with Western Europe. This outcome would not be in our country’s interest, but it is quite likely if the negative justification of deterrence is not replaced with more positive goals.
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE COLD WAR

The containment of Soviet power is no longer the most important security problem facing the United States in Europe. Today, the Soviets have neither the intention nor the capability to invade and occupy Western Europe or to credibly threaten to do so. Smaller attacks to obtain more limited objectives in Western Europe might be possible but become ever less plausible as Soviet forces are withdrawn from Eastern Europe and reduced at home and as the Soviet Union itself disintegrates. The more pressing problems are to assure the removal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe, to foster the development of strong democratic institutions in the former satellite nations, and to resolve the German Question in a way that stabilizes European security. Containment of the Soviet Union should be supplanted by a grand strategy that addresses the new problem of European security.

The objective of containment was to strengthen and bolster Western Europe until such time as the Soviet Union was willing to arrive at a just settlement of the European security problem. The ultimate objective of a new grand strategy—diseangagement from the Cold War—is a balance of power in Europe supportive of continued change in Eastern Europe, an end to the division of Europe into opposing blocs, and the development of the common European home. The immediate goal is the creation of a framework for a stable transition from containment and Cold War to this new European order.

The new strategy should not and cannot be implemented overnight, but the new vision should be set forth as a means of guiding the near-term policy decisions we face in defense programs, arms control, and aid to Eastern Europe. Military and political safeguards must be put in place to assure a smooth transition to the new world we seek and to maintain the option of returning to containment should that new world not prove possible, but they should not be raised as obstacles to change.

As a grand strategy, disengagement contains component diplomatic, economic, and defense objectives and strategies. The diplomatic objective is to develop international institutions that will foster independent parliamentary democracies in Eastern Europe; the economic objective is to create thriving market-oriented economies in that region; and the defense objective is an environment of military security and stability within which Eastern Europe can develop politically and economically.
Disengagement's component diplomatic strategy should be the development of European-wide institutions to foster and reinforce shared interests and thereby discourage and deemphasize those things that separate East and West. Collective arrangements of the Western powers, which once excluded the Soviet Union and its satellites, should be replaced with mechanisms that encompass all parties. These institutions should include both the United States and the Soviet Union, as both have vital interests at stake in Europe, but their leadership should come from within Europe. In the field of security, this regime should eventually supplant NATO and the Warsaw Pact in importance, although the existing alliances will not disappear overnight.

In the economic sphere, the new regime should allow the incorporation of both market and centrally planned economies. Here, the East shows every sign of wanting to join the institutions that now exist for international finance (IMF) and trade (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT). But the requirements of economic restructuring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the need for Western aid will require the development of a wholly new collective institution, possibly along the lines of the OEEC under which the European Reconstruction Program was coordinated.

The most important element of the diplomatic strategy is the negotiation of a new security regime in Europe. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) might be an appropriate forum for the pursuit of these goals. One element of the new European security system would be some type of treaty combining a pledge of nonaggression with a guarantee of collective security. The United States and Soviet Union as well as the states of Europe would belong. The nonaggression pact would prohibit any party from using coercion against any other. Under the collective security arrangement, the signatories would treat an attack against any as an attack against all.

Peace in Europe ought not to depend solely on the good intentions of the involved parties. Practical measures must be devised that inhibit the potential for instability caused by aggressive intent. Limits on national forces and prohibitions on their foreign stationing provide such inhibitions. Geopolitical arrangements arrived at through diplomacy can also promote a stable balance in Europe.

Whatever the mechanism, this new structure should gradually make both NATO and the Warsaw Pact obsolete as instruments of regional defense by meeting the security requirements of all concerned parties, although the previous treaty arrangements may continue to play a political role. This security structure will probably require the eventual and conditional withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from Europe.
Indeed, the foreign stationing of forces may be prohibited except where all parties to the security arrangement agree to token forces. The two alliances' local command structures would probably be dismantled as well, leaving only limited national forces sufficient for local defense deployed within the European countries. If the alliances are to play a residual role, it would be as a clearinghouse for intelligence exchanges relevant to verification and strategic warning and as a means of coordinating contingency plans for mobilization and reinforcement. Such alliances would, of course, be the result of self-determination by independent states.

The new arrangement will also have to incorporate German reunification and the extension of security guarantees to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that counter very real anxieties born of two world wars. Such guarantees might involve some form of German military separation from NATO and, probably more important, constraints on the size of a new Germany army. All parties, including Germany, would have to freely agree to any such arrangement. United Germany could be limited by agreement to armed forces sufficient only for local defense under the strict military constraints of the European-wide arms control agreement discussed above. A unified Germany might also agree to the continuation of a small, temporary Soviet military presence in the East and a limited American deployment in the West. Such forces might reassure Germany's neighbors against revanchism.

In this regard, we should not underestimate the success of America's postwar German policies. Washington's emphasis on democratic political institutions has led to a succession of stable, responsible West German governments, reflective of and responsible to an electorate committed to individual freedom and liberty. The U.S. policy of fostering West German economic recovery in the context of European political and economic integration has undoubtedly made it extraordinarily difficult for Germany to unilaterally adopt anything like the Third Reich's military economy and expansionist foreign policy. In light of this success and the decline of the military threat to Western Europe, the importance of Germany's arrangements in NATO must surely be less than in the past. Moreover, a unified Germany could remain tied directly to the Western military security structures by a reaffirmation of the West German state's membership in the West European Union, something the Soviets have not protested.

Finally, for many years, the new Germany is likely to be preoccupied with managing the inevitable internal economic, political, and social problems associated with
unification. Energies that might conceivably be directed at expansion will be readily absorbed at home.

Properly managed, German reunification could be the means of persuading the Soviets to withdraw from Eastern Europe and dissuading them from returning. A Germany tied firmly to the Western economy through the European Economic Community, possibly a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, possibly even involved in intelligence sharing and contingency planning, but like France outside NATO’s integrated command, could serve as the central element of a post-containment security structure.

Under the formula described above, a unified Germany might become another cornerstone of European security, rather than the threat to regional stability commonly perceived. The Soviets would be dissuaded from intimidating their East European neighbors because it would almost certainly draw Germany back into more intensive Western military arrangements, including a revival of NATO’s formal arrangements. The Soviets would be assured that Germany would not be encouraged to join the West militarily, because that might create tensions leading to Soviet political pressure or even a reoccupation of Eastern Europe. Unified Germany would be restrained from extending its remaining military influence to Eastern Europe by strict limitations on its armed forces and because such moves would bring a quick Soviet response. Within this equilibrium, peace might be maintained in Europe.

The economic component of the grand strategy of disengagement is paradoxically one of engagement. First, embargo should be replaced with free trade. The countries of Eastern Europe cannot be said to have joined with the Western community until their foreign commercial relationships are on the same terms that govern trade, for example, between Western Europe and America. But Eastern Europe will require more assistance than a removal of Western trade barriers if domestic economic reform is to succeed. The precise nature of the restructuring program is unclear at this time, but the need for Western aid is compelling. Without direct financial assistance from the West, restructuring of the East European economies may be theoretically possible but probably politically infeasible. If the pace of economic progress in the East is too sluggish, political instability will almost surely follow.

Few precedents for this sort of economic transformation come to mind. In 1947, with the Marshall Plan the United States confronted the enormous devastation of Western Europe’s economic infrastructure wrought by war, but the institutions and talents of a
market economy were intact. Today in Eastern Europe, the infrastructure, while obsolescent, is intact, but the mechanisms and knowledge of a free market are virtually nonexistent. This suggests that Western aid must be combined with a healthy dose of skepticism about the application of Western economic models to the East. The unique political and economic history of each East European country must be taken into account if Western financial aid is to work. At this time, the most and best the United States can do is to make clear its willingness to provide assistance as part of a multilateral program managed by the mutual consent of the donors and the recipients of aid, and led by Europeans.

If military withdrawal from Europe is politically difficult, putting together a credible aid program for Eastern Europe and selling it to Congress seems impossible. In fact, the withdrawal of U.S. forces may enable the Congress to support aid. In the 1950s, the United States could afford to underwrite both European defense and economic reconstruction. In the 1990s, it cannot. Without substantial reductions in American defense expenditures, funds will not be available for the kinds of obligations necessary both to assure Western Europe of America's commitment to European security and to provide Eastern Europe with the tools required for economic development. Moves by the Bush administration to aid the economic development of Panama and Nicaragua with funds found by reducing defense expenditures are an important precedent.

It is not the purpose of this Note to develop overall goals for the U.S. conventional force posture. Although the Soviet threat to Western Europe is in decline, U.S. political leaders may find it necessary to respond to new threats elsewhere in the world. The net effect of these changes is not foreseeable.

However, sizable savings may be possible. According to estimates prepared by RAND colleague Kevin Lewis, roughly 50 percent of current total U.S. defense expenditures are attributable to our defense of Europe—almost $120 billion. That percentage matches average annual expenditures from fiscal years 1946 through 1988. If U.S. defense spending were to return to the 1946 level, which it might be able to do during the period of mutual withdrawal, some $60 billion might be made available annually for other national purposes. But even very large cuts in the U.S. defense expenditures for Western Europe do not translate directly into an American aid package for Eastern Europe. At least two domestic concerns compete for the money—the federal

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3Lewis, 1989, pp. 18–19.
deficit and a wide range of social programs. In addition, at least some of the U.S. forces supporting the defense of Europe have also been assigned responsibilities for contingencies in other regions of the world. A reduced emphasis on European defense would not eliminate the need to maintain these dual-assigned forces. Nevertheless, if only a quarter of the savings were made available for aid to Eastern Europe, the U.S. contribution would be substantial. The administration must convince Congress that objectives of disengagement are in the American interest and can be met only if the defense strategy of withdrawal from Western Europe is combined with a credible strategy of economic advancement for Eastern Europe.

A U.S. grand strategy of disengagement from the Cold War should not be confused with a policy of retreat and isolationism in world politics. Having rejected as our primary role in international affairs an essentially negative goal of resistance against Soviet purposes, we have an opportunity to put forward our own positive objective—the international development of strong democratic institutions and individual rights. Containment was adopted because those American values were once at risk in Western Europe, the major home of democracy and freedom outside of our own continent. The United States could not enjoy its freedom in a world where all other men were not free. The Soviet threat presented an intolerable risk to our own liberties. The end of the Soviet threat does not eliminate the potential constraints on our freedom. We have a self-interest at stake in Eastern Europe as well as a moral obligation to ensure the development of democracy and individual rights.

IMPLEMENTING DISENGAGEMENT: THE NEW AUDIENCES

We must now convince the Soviets that we are not threatening their legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe. Just as we could not allow Western Europe to fall under the sway of Soviet expansion, the Soviets cannot tolerate hostile regimes on their own border. Real independence may require nonalignment or neutrality in the foreign policies of East European governments. And German unification will be stunted if it upsets Soviet perceptions of an acceptable balance.

No strategy holds certainty of success, nor can it be known if success was caused by strategy or some other factor. We cannot know if the strategy of deterrence caused the Soviets not to invade Western Europe. We can reasonably judge that had they wanted to invade, the threat of nuclear annihilation presented a compelling rationale for
not doing so. Similarly, we cannot be sure that a strategy of U.S. military withdrawal from Western Europe will further the trend of positive change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But we can be reasonably sure that not withdrawing presents good reasons for the Soviets not to implement plans to reduce the military burden placed on the societies of the Eastern bloc. And we can design our proposed withdrawal so as to provide some insurance against a return to the circumstances that required an emphasis on nuclear deterrence.

The East Europeans require assurances that the United States will work to create external conditions necessary for the success of internal reform. At the diplomatic level, that consists of American assurances that conventional arms control arrangements in Europe will not legitimize a continued occupation of their countries by the Soviet troops that remain. At the economic level, it means that following the lead of West European allies, the United States will make sufficient financial and technical resources available to allow Eastern Europe to develop productive and internationally competitive industries.

We must be especially mindful of the Germans, both East and West. Their aspirations for some form of unification are real. Germans must be assured that the United States will not stand in the way of whatever approach they take to bind their divided country, provided that the new Germany is bound to the Western economic system and presents no threat to a stable European military and political balance. These qualifications are not trivial and will place restrictions on German freedom of action. Germans must recognize the legitimate security concerns of its neighbors and of the superpowers. But the United States must also recognize that the universal right of self-determination, including the right to join or leave alliances, cannot be withheld from the German people without creating potentially dangerous animosities.

Western Europeans still require assurance that the United States is committed to their security. They must be convinced that nuclear deterrence is no longer the most crucial demonstration of this intent. West Europeans clearly realize the opportunity to improve their security is inherent in moves within the Soviet Bloc, and in particular Eastern Europe. We must convince our allies that we also recognize the chances for a more stable peace in Europe.

The American people and Congress must be convinced that the new administration's vision of Europe is accurate, that the overall political strategy it proposes the United States adopt is appropriate, and that the subsidiary military strategy is feasible and prudent.
VI. CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE ROLE OF DETERRENCE

For Eastern Europe to obtain economic stability, democracy, and independence, the United States must act to induce the withdrawal of Soviet forces, provide the resources necessary to support economic restructuring, support the East Europeans' own efforts to create and sustain democracy and become part of a European-wide security structure. Nuclear deterrence cannot solve the new problem of European security. Today's challenge is not to defend Western Europe against a Soviet Union bent on expansionism and armed with a credible military threat poised in Eastern Europe. We continue to be vitally interested in preventing the extension of Soviet influence to Western Europe. However, in achieving that goal, we should be less interested in deterring an attack on Western Europe than we are in maintaining and strengthening the current situation where such an attack is infeasible and implausible. Soviet forces are being reduced in Europe, and the East European States, the former Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact, will not join in or support an invasion.

The adoption of a withdrawal strategy does not mean the United States should announce a specific timetable for the return of American forces. Rather, it suggests a change in emphasis, from a presumption that we must stay in Europe to prevent Soviet aggression, to an assumption that we can remove our forces given a Soviet willingness to remove itself from Eastern Europe and reduce the Red Army. Deterrence will continue to play a role as insurance against reversals in Eastern Europe. NATO will for some time be the principal political vehicle by which deterrence is made credible. American troops in Western Europe will continue to play an important role in demonstrating our commitment to allies. But the United States must be careful to assure that its defense policies do not act either to brake changes in Eastern Europe or to legitimate a continued Soviet military presence in those countries.

The purposes of nuclear deterrence in Europe will now be to induce the Soviets to continue a process of withdrawal from Eastern Europe; to provide insurance against a sudden reversal of Soviet intentions, and assure our European allies that the U.S. commitment to their security is changing in form but not in priority.
PROVIDING CONTINUING INCENTIVES FOR THE PROCESS OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

The crumbling of the Soviet empire does not necessarily imply the complete or rapid withdrawal of the Red Army from Eastern Europe. We are now seeing how difficult it is for the Soviet Union to house returning troops. The ongoing disintegration of Soviet hegemony does make withdrawal a plausible, if eventual, outcome. We must now consider how to assure that current events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe lead to the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the creation of stable democratic political institutions. The terrible threat of nuclear annihilation cannot further this objective except insofar as the American forces provide the Soviets with incentives to continue the process. Indeed, we may find that the best way to achieve a rapid departure of Soviet forces is to build housing for them in the Soviet Union.

In current circumstances, the principal objective of our defense strategy must be to eliminate any future prospect that the Soviets could invade Western Europe. The first round of conditional withdrawals under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement in negotiation in Vienna should result in roughly equal forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. To further reduce the Soviet capability to threaten or invade Western Europe, we must be willing to gradually withdraw those U.S. forces that reinforced and underlined the credibility of nuclear deterrence in Europe. These withdrawals might well lead to no U.S. or Soviet troops in Western or Eastern Europe or, when all involved parties (including the proposed host nation) can agree, to token deployments. We can do this because our West European allies can handle the much reduced political-military threat to their security. We must do this to remove the most important impediment to East European independence.

Of course the possibility that the Soviets might be induced to accept some token number of U.S. troops in Western Europe while they withdraw completely from Eastern Europe, including East Germany, holds great appeal to Western leaders. Such an agreement would be tantamount to a Soviet acceptance of the proposition that the superpowers are not morally equivalent—that U.S. forces are in Europe at the express request of the nations in which they are based, while the Soviets are occupying countries against popular desires. The arrangement would also enable the United States to retain a permanent and visible military presence in Europe, providing some justification for a continuation of NATO's integrated military command structure, forward support for
American reinforcement in the event of crisis or war, and tangible justification for an active American role in military and security planning on the European continent. The Soviets, however, are unlikely to accept this proposition without significant compensation, precisely because the admission of moral inequivalence is so damning. For domestic reasons, they will also find it difficult to accept a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe without an American withdrawal from Western Europe. The Soviet system has failed its citizens in all save the security dimension. For over 40 years, the Red Army has justified its hold on Eastern Europe as a bulwark against the Western military threat. To withdraw from Eastern Europe leaving NATO intact, and possibly even adding the power of a unified Germany, would be to admit failure in the one arena Soviet leaders could point to as a success.

Thus, both the United States and the Soviet Union have an interest in employing their forces in Europe as an incentive for the other to withdraw. Each can use the other to assure that a stable transition of European security arrangements protects the military interests of each, even as at least one side uses the process to save face.

INSURANCE AGAINST REVERSAL

Although we have never been as close to a reconciliation with the Soviet Union as we are today, it is possibly also true that we have never been as close to major disorder in Europe. While the Soviets will find it difficult to return to Eastern Europe regardless of who sits in the Kremlin, the future of Soviet intentions still depends to a great extent on the strength and success of a single man and his policies. If we are concerned about the development of strong democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, we must be at least equally concerned with the institutionalization of Mr. Gorbachev’s outlook and objectives in the Soviet Union. This is by no means predestined. Nor is it apparent that the United States has the ability to assure a continuation of positive trends in the Soviet Union. The gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe may provide Mr. Gorbachev with the winning argument for a vast reduction of the military burden on Soviet society, but U.S. military power may also be essential to deter a renewed Soviet threat should Gorbachev or his policies fail.

Deterrence must contend with a potential enemy’s capabilities as well as his intentions. During the period of withdrawal, remaining Soviet forces will retain certain, albeit limited, capabilities to threaten and attack Western Europe. Even after they are
withdrawn, they will be capable of reoccupying and thus intimidating Eastern Europe and, indirectly, Western Europe. Consequently, the United States must maintain its deterrent threat to ensure against temporary reversals of Soviet policy during the transition, although the nuclear and conventional forces that provide the capability to implement the threat will be reduced proportionately to Soviet withdrawals. Modest, perhaps only token, American forces might be required for some years as a forward presence to convince the Soviets that the United States would return to Europe if required. And undoubtedly, the United States must retain programmatic options to build up its conventional and nuclear forces and to improve the sophistication of its weapons should conditions in Europe warrant a reconstitution of America's military presence.

SUPPORTING THE TRANSFORMATION OF REASSURANCE

To foster independent democracies in Eastern Europe, the Red Army must be withdrawn to the Soviet Union and destroyed and the Warsaw Pact dismantled in fact, if not in name. The price of total withdrawal of the Soviets from Eastern Europe and an end to the Pact will almost certainly be an eventual withdrawal from Western Europe of all but perhaps symbolic American forces. It might also mean an end to NATO as we know it today. This may not be as damaging to U.S. interests as some fear. A dismantling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or of its integrated command structure does not also mean abrogation of the Treaty itself. The alliance might continue to function in verification, mobilization, and contingency planning, even without a fully functioning operational command under SACEUR. Even if the United States were to completely withdraw its military forces from Europe, other relationships and common values justify the continuation of an Atlantic Alliance. Those ties might be strengthened by a common effort to foster democracy and economic prosperity in Eastern Europe. But if the Soviets withdraw from Eastern Europe, no such ties exist. If the Soviet objectives of the 1940s and 1950s toward Europe were revived, the United States has some good reason to believe the West Europeans would welcome the return of U.S. forces and a reconstitution of NATO's defenses, but East Europeans would almost certainly resist the reappearance of Soviet forces in their countries. This is the true meaning of the assertion that there is no moral equivalence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
During the process of withdrawal, the United States must retain visible symbols of its commitment to the Western allies. In particular, the U.S. military presence must not disappear before Western Europe becomes comfortable about the new security arrangements. Consequently, U.S. air and ground forces should be reduced only over a long period and in parallel with Soviet withdrawals. This means that U.S. forces will remain on the European continent for some years. It is also possible that for many years token U.S. and Soviet forces will remain in a unified Germany. And even after their withdrawal, American naval and air power should remain capable of rapid support for Europe at some level. Negotiations and planning for mobilization and deployment to support the reestablishment of allied defenses in the event of a reversal might be an important residual role for NATO. Finally, if the credibility of a continuing commitment to West European security is to be maintained, the U.S. military technology and mobilization bases cannot be allowed to wither. It is on the basis of its role as an arsenal of democracy that the United States will contribute to Western Europe's, and its own, military security.

The influence of American withdrawal from Europe on reassuring the Western allies of Washington's abiding interest in their security depends on what the United States does to replace its military presence with a new symbol of commitment. The United States can remain engaged in a common enterprise with Western Europe, the pursuit of freedom and democracy throughout all of Europe, but the focus and means of the joint endeavor must evolve. Participation in the new European security regime may gradually supplant, and perhaps eventually supplant, NATO as the principal political instrument of U.S. military guarantees to Western Europe. Most important, even as the Western powers enter into an arms withdrawal agreement with the Soviets, an equally binding agreement should be instituted among the Western powers to support the economic vitalization of Eastern Europe, perhaps under the guise of a reborn OEEC or a revitalized OECD. The gradual but dramatic withdrawal of American troops made possible by events in Eastern Europe must be accompanied by an equally dramatic and gradual U.S. advance of resources to support continued reform in that region and fill the political vacuum caused by the collapse of Soviet power. In the past 40 years, U.S. policy emphasized the collective military defense of Western Europe from Soviet aggression. In the next 40 years, America can act jointly with Western Europe to create politically independent democracies in Eastern Europe. And the next decade should see us transforming the old enterprise into the new.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES

If the new European security problem—the establishment of stability in Europe of independent states, including a unified Germany and democratic East European governments—can be supported only if the U.S. defense strategy of nuclear deterrence in Europe is deemphasized, what are the implications for the U.S. military establishment? In particular, what are the implications for our nuclear forces?

It is not the objective of this work to develop precise figures for U.S. forces under the new strategy, or to devise the exact process by which forces now in Europe should be reduced. These must be the product of quantitative analysis and diplomatic negotiation. But it would follow that U.S. conventional forces could be reduced to zero or near-zero in Europe as Soviet forces are withdrawn. The exact timing and pace of these withdrawals ought to be as quickly as the Soviets can agree, but no more quickly than our European allies can tolerate, if we are to manage reassurance. As our conventional forces are withdrawn, West European governments will very likely press for the return of American theater nuclear forces to the United States as well. Should tensions or war return to the region, the allies would probably not desire a situation where the United States might fight a nuclear war limited to Europe.

The significance of disengagement for the design and development of U.S. nuclear forces is enormous. Although in the parlance of deterrence theory and nuclear strategy the deterrence of Soviet nuclear attacks on the physical territory of the United States is considered "central," the cardinal issue of our defense strategy has been deterring the Soviet threat to Western Europe. Fear that the Soviet Union would threaten America with nuclear attack has had practical importance only in the context of a European war. Few, if any, American policymakers or defense analysts have argued that the Soviet Union would confine its aggression to a nuclear strike on the United States. Even as the first event of a superpower conflict such attacks have been considered plausible only in the company of an invasion of Western Europe.

The strategy to threaten nuclear use to prevent the Soviet occupation of our allies led the United States to fear that the Soviets would invade Europe only after they neutralized the American nuclear threat, including that based in the continental United States. Without the emphasis placed on extended deterrence, the deterrence problem would be amenable to the fairly straightforward solution of a secure retaliatory force sized to destroy the Soviet Union as an organized society. As a first step, U.S. strategic
nuclear war plans can be modified to fit the new political realities in Eastern Europe. The facilities housing Soviet forces in the former satellites can be dropped from target lists as the Soviets withdraw. In addition, the national military and economic establishments of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria can be eliminated. It would be important to retain some flexibility in the targeting of those forces and to maintain the ability to destroy many types of targets, including strategic and conventional military forces. Nuclear weapons will continue to be a necessary component of U.S. defense strategy so long as other nations have or can obtain them—in short, forever. And nuclear weapons will be an essential element in deferring the aggression of other, possibly nuclear-armed states in the turbulent world beyond Europe. However, the extensive range of attack options and, in particular, the large number of nuclear weapons to assure the simultaneous destruction of Soviet power projection, conventional and theater nuclear capabilities in the Soviet Union, and the transportation infrastructure in Eastern Europe could be reduced considerably.
From the late 1940s to the present time, defense strategy in general and nuclear deterrence in particular held center stage in American grand strategy. It might be argued that a greater and more sustained emphasis should have been given to containment’s diplomatic and economic aspects to assure the development of binding ties that would sustain solidarity in the Atlantic Community in the absence of a compelling Soviet threat to Western Europe. Nevertheless, the defense strategy of nuclear deterrence did squarely address America’s European security problem, and did bind Western Europe and the United States tightly together for 40 years.

Containment was a grand strategy appropriate to its time, but its initial objectives—to secure Western Europe from Soviet domination until such time as our allies gained economic and psychological strength and the Soviet Union mellowed or disintegrated—have been met or are coming to pass very quickly. Emphasis on a defense strategy of nuclear deterrence was necessary to achieve these goals, but the policy was costly. Deterrence was debilitating psychologically to American leaders, a source of anxiety that undermined relations between the United States and its European allies, and a cause of domestic tension within the American body politic.

As containment’s central component, deterrence has been providing the United States with diminishing returns. In the emerging era, deterrence may provide negative returns if overemphasized in American grand strategy. The basic elements of our current defense strategy—NATO, U.S. forces in Western Europe and especially in West Germany, and rhetorical emphasis on nuclear threats against the Soviet Union—are not only becoming unnecessary to assure the security of our allies in Western Europe, they may threaten America’s ability to obtain its long-term objectives in Europe.

As long as Soviet forces remain in Eastern Europe, the United States will not be assured of self-determination for the countries of that region. The Soviets may withdraw completely and unilaterally from Eastern Europe at the request of their former satellites. More likely, the Soviets will insist that a total withdrawal from Eastern Europe be accompanied by an American evacuation from Western Europe. They are least likely to withdraw from East Germany in the absence of an American withdrawal from West Germany, where most of our forces in Europe are located. American intransigence on
this point will delay and perhaps prevent the establishment of independent democratic states. Similarly, American insistence that a unified Germany be a member of NATO may well complicate German reunification under stable political conditions. In that case, American insistence on the defense strategy of the last 40 years will deny an essential element of progress toward our long-term goals in Europe as a whole.

Europe faces unprecedented opportunities for independence, stability, and security, potentialities that may be realized only if the United States pursues a grand strategy of mutual disengagement from the Cold War. In this new grand strategy, U.S. diplomacy and economic policy are far more important to the achievement of our goals in the region than is U.S. defense policy. Indeed, the grand strategy of disengagement requires that defense strategy be concretely deemphasized.

Although the current grand strategy may be obsolete, it will not be easily changed. The U.S. government and the governments of its European allies (even the government of the Soviet Union) have a great deal invested and at stake in containment and nuclear deterrence. The stake is not primarily one of money, but more of national will and organization in what has become a predictable system of international relations. Moreover, two generations of American leaders have invested their careers in this system. NATO, the American military presence in Europe, and the rhetoric of nuclear deterrence can outlive their usefulness, can indeed become harmful, but remain in existence simply because the size and history of the investment make change painful.

It may be that change will come about gradually, that the forces for change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are beyond the power of the U.S. government to appreciably delay or advance, and that consequently NATO, the U.S. presence in Europe, and nuclear deterrence will simply fade away. If, however, we believe that a timely recognition of these trends provides the United States with opportunities to push for advantageous changes in European security, then the U.S. government must act.

Coherent change in our national strategy must originate in the Executive Branch. Congress must be convinced and ratify the new strategy, but the president and his closest advisors must first propose it; 535 legislators cannot devise a coherent plan of action. In the decade following World War II, a handful of men in the Executive Branch were able to devise a policy that was relevant to U.S. national interests for 40 years. It should not be beyond the ability, indeed it is the responsibility, of this Executive to do the same.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


