Defense Intelligence College

Selected Compendium of Student Research

Volume III

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**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

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All other editions are obsolete.

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE**

UNCLASSIFIED
Background: The Defense Intelligence College

The Defense Intelligence College (DIC) is chartered by US Department of Defense directive and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memorandum to provide educational and training programs to prepare military and civilian intelligence personnel for positions in the national and international security structure and to assist in their career development.

Since 1980, when Congress authorized DIC to confer the Degree of Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI), more than 400 MSSI degrees have been awarded. The College's MSSI degree is the only advanced degree in strategic intelligence granted in the United States.

In order to complete the MSSI program, students are required to satisfactorily complete either a Master's thesis or two research papers in conjunction with special research seminars offered by the College. The papers thus produced represent a potentially important contribution to the literature on strategic intelligence. They embody an impressive array of subjects indicative of the far-reaching nature of intelligence analysis.

The Compendium

The third volume of the Student Compendium includes selected unclassified student papers and theses completed during the 1990-1991 academic year. Each paper is listed alphabetically by author, including the name of the approving faculty member, date of completion, title of paper, and abstract.

The views contained in the papers included in this compendium are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policy, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Intelligence College, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

To Request Papers

Papers listed in this publication can be requested by writing to the Academic Research Center, Defense Intelligence College, DIA/DEE-4, Washington, DC 20340-5485 (ATTN: COMP3). DIC is required to obtain, for each paper, permission for release from the Office of Security, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Reality or Facade: Religious Freedom and the Russian Orthodox Church

This thesis evaluates change in the Russian Orthodox Church-Soviet state relationship since Mikhail Gorbachev. Positive change in this relationship is not yet one year old; it was therefore necessary to rely heavily on historical documentation in order to present the proper scenario against which this brief period may be evaluated.

This thesis could not be presented without recognition of the thousands of believers who died defending their specific religious beliefs in the face of severe persecution. Any positive change granted to the church by the Soviet state has to be framed against a 70-year attempt to destroy religious influence in the USSR.

Two individuals who visited the USSR in 1990 and 1991 were able to provide current local information from Moscow and Yerevan. The Russian Orthodox Church has been used as a pawn to achieve state goals since 1929. The prevailing feeling in Moscow, within Christian circles, is that this openness will close once the state has attained its goals, whatever they may be.

Intelligence Support to Technology Competitiveness

In today's international environment, open technology competitiveness is considered by many to be a key ingredient of national economic survival. As the perceived threat between the two superpowers declines, a refocusing and reassessment of the use of intelligence agencies to foster advancement and further development of national economic strength are under discussion.

The US is reputedly losing its technological edge in the international environment. The Intelligence Community and US industry can form a team to get technological and economic information needed to keep the US and its industry ahead in the international race for markets and industrial processes.

US industry and the Intelligence Community could collect, share, and analyze information through a centralized process focused on a collection requirements and reporting process. Collection requirements may be levied by both the intelligence and business communities. US business could formulate and suggest requirements through trade and professional associations to the Intelligence Community. Professional intelligence organizations could also play in this process. Once collection requirements are formulated and information collected, reporting could be in a standardized format designed to protect sensitive sources and methods. The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) is a logical dissemination point and repository for this information, as it routinely handles classified technical information. Compensation could be provided through raised DTIC fees for information used and processed.

Former Director of Central Intelligence William H. Webster stated that the Intelligence Community should focus its attention on this subject. This paper proposes one solution for meeting this challenge as it becomes more important to national economic health and survival.

Western Economic Aid to the USSR: Help or Hindrance?

The USSR has preached for decades the success of the communist economic system within their country. This "success" has been recognized by nearly everyone as a facade. Western scholars point out that the Soviet economic system has become rigid and inflexible with time and can no longer meet the demands of Soviet society. Many believe a "jump-start" is needed for the economy in the form of massive economic aid, including loans, grants, and joint ventures. This has caused a heated debate within the USSR concerning the need for aid, its acceptance, concessions to be made.
and the form aid should take. The West, to include Japan and South Korea, has been hesitant to provide necessary aid for the USSR without certain political and economic guarantees. The recent political upheaval in the USSR has only exacerbated the need for and the debate concerning Western economic aid.

This paper examines the current Soviet economic problems and covers the history of Soviet economic reforms in order to provide the reader with a historical perspective to help understand the recent internal attempts to solve the economic mess in the USSR. Soviet and Western perspectives on providing economic aid to the USSR are discussed. Massive Western economic aid will not provide immediate relief to the USSR, but rather will be only a hindrance because of the inherent problems of its current political and economic system.

Balog, Timothy G. (Morris)

JUL 1991

The Role of Intelligence in the Southwest Pacific Area’s Northern New Guinea Campaigns

Upon assuming command of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) theater, General Douglas MacArthur established SWPA's intelligence requirements, created an intelligence system to collect against those requirements, and integrated intelligence products to successfully conduct operations along the north coast of New Guinea in April and May 1944. As a result, he was able to acquire the bases and airfields that would allow him to return to the Philippines as promised.

Because the Office of Strategic Studies, OP-20-G, and the Military Intelligence Service were more responsive to the commands of officials in Washington than to military commanders in SWPA, MacArthur refused to let them operate in his theater of operations. In their place, MacArthur created the Central Bureau Brisbane, the Allied Intelligence Bureau, the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, and the Allied Geographical Section, under the direction of his G-2, General Willoughby.

Before, during, and after the Hollandia and Aitape landings, MacArthur and his SWPA staff used the intelligence these agencies provided to deceive the enemy, interdict naval convoys, decimate air forces, envelop ground troops, and repel counterattacks. In the end, the SWPA commanders and staff were successful during their New Guinea campaigns because they effectively integrated intelligence into planning and operations. This integration allowed the Allies to bypass enemy strongholds and attack the Japanese where they were weakest.

Balog, Timothy G. (Kauppi)

JUL 1991

Peasant Support as a Means of Curtailing Peru’s Sendero Luminoso

After more than 22,000 deaths and $20 billion in damages to Peru’s fragile economy, the actions of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso raise many questions. Why, given the atrocious nature of the Sendero, have some Peruvians been willing to support the very group that tortures people and destroys the country’s infrastructure, and how can Sendero Luminoso be curtailed?

The paper discusses the environment in which Sendero developed, a profile of the group, and efforts to get rid of them. Some Peruvians support the Sendero Luminoso because they are intimidated by violence, dissatisfied with the government, benefit from the activities, or see no other alternative. Some Peruvians are historically rebellious, enamored by Abimael Guzman’s charisma, or believe in Sendero’s ideology.

In developing ways to curtail Sendero Luminoso, it is equally important to understand why some Peruvians do not support the group. These Peruvians are alienated by Sendero’s practices, do not agree with or understand the ideology, support other organizations, or support the government.

For Peru to succeed in curtailing its insurgency problems posed by Sendero Luminoso, the country’s officials must develop programs based on the reasons Peruvians do or do not support the group. Unfulfilled government promises, corrupt government officials, inequitable distributions of wealth, and unpopular drug eradication programs are not the way to curtail the group. Government officials must convince the people not to support the group by removing the appeal of Sendero’s claims. They can do this by recognizing that more needs to be done about the insurgency problem, increasing representation and participation in the government, protecting human rights, providing development projects and security for the peasants, creating effective land reform programs, and putting the interests of Peru’s peasants before the interests of foreign governments.
Solutions to curtailing Sendero Luminoso based on cutting off peasant support to the group are not easy because they require a totally new outlook toward government and society; however, they are feasible. For its part, the US must realize the impact its programs, especially the coca eradication program, have on support for Sendero, and the US must respect Peru’s need to put the interests of its citizens before those of any foreign country.

Beaird, Cecil R. (Cigar) MAR 1991

US Persian Gulf Interests: A Historical Perspective of Relations with Iran and Iraq

US Persian Gulf interests began shortly after the end of World War II in an effort to contain Soviet aggression and continue the free flow of Middle East oil to the West. Although these policy concerns have remained constant over the past four decades, their implementation by President Truman and successive administrations has been quite varied.

This paper discusses US concerns within the Persian Gulf, particularly with Iran and Iraq. The focus is on historical analysis of the international factors which led the US to support the Shah of Iran, US expulsion from that country when the Shah abdicated, and subsequent US support of Iraq during the longest Middle East war of the twentieth century.

In periods of regional stability, US emphasis in the region turned to the protection of human rights. Over the past two decades, aperiodic emphasis has made a major impact on our relations with both Iran and Iraq. In dealing with Iran, it can be argued that President Carter’s emphasis on human rights had some influence on the Iranian revolution which led to the downfall of the Shah. In the case of Iraq, the US government supported Husayn for at least the second half of the eight-year war. Within months of the US-negotiated ceasefire, American emphasis, supported by an aborted sanctions bill in Congress, turned to Iraqi human rights violations.

Cordial relations with both countries are imperative toward maintaining regional stability and US goals for the region. Iran is strategically more important as a result of its size, geographic location, and history of moderate relations with Israel and the US; however, Iraq remains an important Arab state, with the world’s second largest proven oil reserves. Both countries will necessarily be a part of any future US Persian Gulf policy. Despite the outcome of the current crisis, US policymakers must remember that the governments of these countries do not change every four years, and it is necessary to build long-term Persian Gulf policy based on consistency.

Boeh, Steven L. (Parchomenko) SEP 1991

Gorbachev and Moldavian Nationalism

Soviet nationalities policy toward Moldavia prior to Gorbachev was designed to strengthen Moscow’s hold on ethnic Moldavian Bessarabia. This paper examines the sources of ethnic unrest in current Moldavia and the ways Gorbachev’s policies have influenced the development of ethnic politics in Moldavia.

Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost (relaxed censorship) and perestroika (economic and political reform) have made the current upsurge of ethnic political action possible. Gorbachev did not anticipate that glasnost would give vent to the deeply felt ethnic pressures from past policies and lead to extreme ethnic polarization. The new republican government of Moldavia is now faced with the challenge of reducing ethnic polarization in the interest of republican unity and further reforms.

Boyd, Foster Scott (Stevens) SEP 1991


The President and Congress have been faced with an ongoing Constitutional struggle over control of covert actions. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 signals a temporary truce in this battle, rejecting language contained in previously introduced bills which would have unconstitutionally restricted presidential authority over covert actions.
In reviewing the constitutional context of the dispute between the executive and legislative branches of government, the Constitution and contemporary documents show the Founders left the question of control over covert actions unsettled. Judicial cases involving the exercise of foreign affairs powers are best understood by conceptually dividing such government powers into five categories: executive enumerated powers, executive implied powers, inherent national power, legislative implied powers, and legislative enumerated powers. Most covert actions fall under the category of inherent national power, and in this area the president has broad discretion subject to legislative check.

Extreme and probably unconstitutional proposals for strict congressional control of covert actions followed both the 1970s intelligence abuses and the Iran-Contra affair, but in time, more moderate and constitutionally permissive legislation actually has been enacted. The 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act is a moderate, constitutional response to the Iran-Contra Affair which affords a temporary truce in the executive-legislative battle over covert action.

Brown, Gerald Palmer (Kauppi) SEP 1991

Insurrection in Iraq: The Kurdish Problem

The Kurdish refugee situation in northern Iraq poses long-term problems for the region and the West. These include implications for Turkey and the difficulties associated with Kurdish sanctuaries: autonomy, legal issues, and peacekeeping. Interwoven through these major themes is the common thread of instability. This study examines the issues surrounding the Iraqi Kurds as of the end of May 1991. The impasse between Saddam Husayn’s Baathist government and Iraq’s Kurdish population is unlikely as long as Husayn remains in power.

Two events led to the current problem: the post-Gulf War Shiite and Kurdish uprisings, and the subsequent mass exodus of Kurdish refugees from Iraq. To understand the Kurdish insurrection, one must review the reasons for the revolt, the rebels themselves, and the actual uprising. The refugee situation is divided into two periods, the situations before and after the arrival of Coalition forces in northern Iraq. Husayn cannot move north to reassert control in northern Iraq because of the threat from Coalition forces, and many of the Kurdish refugees cannot or will not return to Iraq until Saddam Husayn is no longer a threat.

This situation presents many problems with few solutions, including economic and political troubles for Turkey, the issues surrounding Kurdish sanctuaries (autonomy, factionalization, terrorism, and their potential use as a dumping ground for unwanted Kurds), legal issues based on the debate over state sovereignty versus human rights, and implications for peacekeeping.

Instability in Iraq and possibly the entire region lies in the future. Such danger is rooted in Kurdish history, Husayn’s unsavory record, and the events of the uprising. The Husayn-Kurdish impasse will be extremely difficult to resolve. The continuing situation in Iraq may serve as a catalyst for instability, disrupting peace to the detriment of the nations which make up the Persian Gulf.

Burgess, Gregg James (Harris) JUN 1991

The Atlantic Alliance in the 1990s: Toward a Policy of No First Use

NATO’s flexible response doctrine holds that any aggression will be met with appropriate levels of force. NATO reserves the right to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet-led conventional attack. First use was adopted by the West in 1967 to offset conventional force disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with US nuclear superiority. Given current Soviet capabilities to respond to any Western first use and the dangers associated with nuclear defense of Western Europe, a NATO no first use doctrine warrants discussion and serious consideration.

This paper explores the continuing debate over the utility of nuclear weapons in West European deterrence and defense strategy and the growing argument for a no first use policy. It examines the policy dilemma of deterrence versus defense in maintaining peace in Europe, the role of NATO conventional and nuclear forces in light of cost factors, first use deterrent credibility, and public opinion about defense issues in Germany and other Alliance nations. American and West European thinking on this topic is viewed through the writings of observers, military analysts, and political statesmen.
NATO doctrine has resulted in a dilemma caused by the desire to create the highest possible level of deterrence by threatening a nuclear response to even conventional attack, on the one hand, and the dangers of following this doctrine on the other. This dilemma raises questions about the credibility of a first use strategy and the rationality of defending Western Europe with nuclear weapons. It also highlights the need for adequate conventional defenses that could provide the basis for a no first use policy.

Given the changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the 1990s could offer NATO an excellent opportunity to open a dialogue about the advantages of a shift to no first use. Conventional instead of nuclear forces would constitute the backbone upon which West European security doctrine is based. Despite the possibility that a doctrinal change to no first use could result in some degree of lessened deterrence, deterrence would remain high. This tradeoff would benefit the Alliance by reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, increasing the credibility of West European security strategy, and fostering continued European public support for NATO.

Burke, Thomas F., III (Harris)  
JAN 1991

To the Oder and the Neisse: The People’s Polish Army and the Repolonization of Pomerania and Silesia, 1945

Poland’s takeover of German Pomerania and Silesia in 1945 significantly changed the geopolitical map of Central Europe and has been the central issue in Polish-German relations ever since. This study examines the role of the Polish military during the early period of the establishment of Polish control over Germany’s eastern border provinces. As the vanguard of the communist-controlled Polish government, the People’s Polish Army was the first to establish a Polish presence in the areas that had been awarded to Poland by the Allies. To further its policy, the Polish government was forced to rely on its army to engage in activities that, in some instances, went far beyond normal military operations. An examination of the army’s actions in Pomerania and Silesia during 1945 reveals much about the process of their forced repolonization and the extent to which the Polish state acted to quickly and firmly establish its control over territories that were predominantly German in their ethnic character.

The paper relies mainly on data from Polish-language sources. The officer-historians of the People’s Polish Army have written extensively, and since little relevant information on the subject of the army’s role in the repolonization of Pomerania and Silesia is available in English, they must be considered the authorities on the matter for the present.

The topical discussion focuses on seven main areas: the wartime development of the People’s Polish Army; the political background to Poland’s acquisition of the German border territories; Polish combat operations in Pomerania; the army’s civil affairs activities; the establishment of a secure border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers; the expulsion of the native German population; and the military settlement campaign along Poland’s new western border. The People’s Polish Army was the key instrument of the Polish state in the early stages of the repolonization of Pomerania and Silesia. Through its extensive operations on the fronts of war, civil affairs, border security, German expulsion, and Polish settlement, the army had a significant, immeasurable, and enduring impact on the future of Poland and its relationship with Germany.

Carney, Donald J. (Swenson)  
AUG 1991

Estimating the Dissolution of Yugoslavia: A Deductive Approach

By the spring of 1991, events in Yugoslavia indicated that the collection of republics in Yugoslavia would not remain intact, and federal unity and authority were collapsing. While the demise of the state was clearly apparent, the future shape of its successor or successors was not. Coping with this future-oriented, multi-dimensional problem is the subject of this seminar paper. Specifically, it develops an estimate of the most likely course of events in Yugoslavia in the near-term (late 1991) by evaluating scenarios using deductive logic, also known as the critical method.

To understand the breakdown in Yugoslavia, one must understand the factors that have led to this situation, including history, religion, nationalism, geography, recent events, important personalities, and institutions. Isaac Ben-Israel’s critical method is applied to the situation in Yugoslavia. Four case studies illustrate potential scenarios on the basis of
an inductive accumulation of facts. Information refuting these hypotheses allows a comparative estimate of the likelihood of each outcome. The critical method also tends to lead an analyst toward an enhanced intelligence collection strategy to satisfy an increased level of analytical scrutiny.

Cocca, Vivian A. (Blake) AUG 1991

Institutional vs Investigative Models of Oversight: An Evaluation

The Intelligence Community developed from a small, professional, and familiar group of experienced men. Because of this and the rather "murky" nature of intelligence operations, Congress developed a trusting yet reluctant attitude toward involvement in oversight. Contributing to this underlying attitude was the fact that there was a broad-based consensual attitude among Congress that the President was the authority for US foreign policy. As a result, oversight practices were conducted in an informal manner, "buddy to buddy," with only a few well-established individuals controlling and knowing what CIA was doing. While this situation functioned initially, the growing intelligence bureaucracy began to get out of control.

Both the international and domestic situation in the early 1970s created a rift between the public and the executive. The Bay of Pigs, Watergate, and Vietnam generated within the US a complete distrust of the executive branch and intelligence agencies. Congress investigated the Intelligence Community in the form of two committees: the Church and Pike Committees. Because these were formed as a result of allegations of illegal activities, Congress launched its investigations with the intent of exposing CIA. The public's outcry for a scapegoat, combined with CIA's reluctance to divulge secrets to Congress, established a new, adversarial relationship between the legislative and executive branches.

The results of the investigations caused not only a change in attitude, but also a change in procedures. Permanent select committees for intelligence were created, greater control over the intelligence budget was established, and agendas for oversight of covert actions were established. This greatly increased controls over intelligence activities. After decades of decided congressional ignorance concerning the activities of the Intelligence Community, public distrust of the executive and illegal CIA activities forced the revamping of oversight procedures. In the process, the relationship between the Intelligence Community and the Congress changed considerably. From the "buddy system" where trust is inherent, they went to general mistrust of each other's activities. Two models of oversight developed through this process: institutional and investigative. After an evaluation of the problems inherent in the oversight process, a determination is made as to the best model to apply to future oversight activities.

Cocca, Vivian A. (Harris) AUG 1991

Libya's Chemical Facility at Rabta: Why Does Germany Continue to Export Dual Use Technology?

Although German export laws are perhaps the most stringent in Europe, they are most ineffective. Decentralized management, lax enforcement, and a "business is business" German philosophy combine to create an environment unsupportive of proactive export control measures. Without full support and a change in attitude of the business community and government, any law will prove ineffective.

Libya's current chemical capability exemplifies the German attitude. As early as 1985, the German government had information implicating German firms in Qadhafi's quest for chemical weapons. The government had issued export licenses to several firms involved. There were also indications that the businesses involved knew what the technology was building.

The German government did not feel the issue was a priority until the US increased political pressure and US and German media sensationalized the story. The ensuing investigation concluded that no German laws were broken. Continued domestic pressure brought on by the press forced further investigations on the state level, and only then did the government choose to prosecute.

This incident highlighted the weaknesses in German export law and the laxness with which it is enforced. Several other incidents involving arms and technology are indicative of the unchanging German attitude that "business is business." Since 1960, when the international community pressured Germany into formulating export law, the trend has
continued. Germany continues to sell equipment and expertise to embargoed nations including, most recently, Iraq. It was instrumental in supporting Iraq in its quest for biological weapons and missile technology. The German attitude has not changed despite a 30-year history of violations of international standards, international recriminations, and modifications to governing export laws.

Germany will continue its current selling practices. With reunification and its associated costs, it will view its export business as the priority to generate revenues. Any laws limiting that priority are likely to fail. International pressure will produce short-term effects, but those results will not be effective unless the Germans themselves support views which would generate modifying business practices. This prospect is highly unlikely.

Copeland, Roy S. (Parchomenko) SEP 1990

Emergence of the Radical Political Movement in the Gorbachev Era

This paper surveys the emergence of the radical political movement within the Soviet Union since Gorbachev’s accession to power, focusing in detail upon the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It also analyzes the implications of the growing radical reform movement for Soviet domestic politics. Radical reformers within the CPSU, fueled by glasnost and the Gorbachev regime’s cumulative political reforms, have emerged as a dynamic, driving impetus of continued Soviet political change.

Creighton, Craig C. (Swenson) AUG 1991

Collective Security and the GCC: Prospects for the Future

This paper examines the security needs of the six Arab countries that comprise the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These states face myriad security challenges because of their strategic location and vast oil reserves.

Regional stability in the Persian Gulf directly affects US and other Western strategic interests. Comprised of the economic giants in the area, GCC plays a critical role in defining the character of any new regional security arrangement. It is the juxtaposition of economic power and military deficiency of GCC members that creates a unique strategic security dilemma.

Despite several common interests that form the basis of GCC unity, three scenarios threaten individual and collective security. Domestic insurrection by radicals and a politically alienated citizenship is a constant concern of the GCC dynastic rulers. Another regionally based threat comes from neighboring Arab states that resent GCC’s oil wealth. An extra-regional threat emerges from major powers in the world community seeking to secure their own interests in the region.

GCC will experience certain problems as it tries to implement a collective security plan. These problems include a lack of weapons interoperability, no common foreign policy, manpower shortages, and challenges in maintaining national sovereignty. In formulating a judgment on how far GCC has progressed in its efforts to achieve regional security, this paper will offer justifiable alternatives for GCC security in the post-Desert Storm Persian Gulf.

Creighton, Craig C. (Parchomenko) AUG 1991

Shalom Comrades: The Thawing of Soviet-Israeli Relations

This paper examines the fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy toward Israel. Politically estranged since 1967, the tempo of Soviet-Israeli interactions since 1985 has increased significantly as a result of the political ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev, glasnost, and the relaxation of East-West tensions. As diplomatic efforts continue, it becomes apparent that the two countries have much to gain from normalizing ties.
The paper analyzes Moscow's 40-year association with Tel Aviv and addresses the relationship between the two countries from four levels of analysis: international, regional, bilateral, and domestic. The paper assesses the problems facing both countries as Moscow attempts to reestablish normal relations with Tel Aviv and the benefits both countries can expect from the restoration of diplomatic ties. While continued progress toward normal relations is likely, the road ahead is problematic. Neither country is apt to achieve the full measure of its expectations, particularly the USSR's desire to serve as a power broker for Middle East peace.

Currie, Amanda Sue (Liptak) JUN 1990

Using Counterinsurgency Tactics in the War on Drugs

Currently, the national counternarcotics strategy focuses primarily on interdiction of the inbound supply of illegal drugs and the outbound flow of illegal profits. Demand reduction is a poorly integrated, but arguably more essential, third element required to make real progress in the War on Drugs. This thesis suggests that counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has application in the development of a counternarcotics effort that will fully integrate demand reduction into the overall US national drug-control policy.

The escalation of drug-related violence in urban America warrants an examination of domestic narcotic-trafficking organizations (NTOs), concentrating on domestic gang-oriented groups, from an unconventional warfare or low intensity conflict (LIC) perspective. A LIC approach can provide a broader and more productive demand reduction strategy and counterbalance the current drug control strategy, which focuses heavily on supply reduction.

To this end, this thesis compares domestic NTOs with nascent insurgent groups using a LIC-oriented theoretical framework developed by Bard E. O'Neill and examines the extent to which they share certain intrinsic characteristics. In addition, the psychosocial similarities between insurgent groups and domestic NTOs are presented. The examination of parallels between insurgent groups and domestic NTOs establishes the basis for exploring the feasibility of applying a particular set of COIN tactics, known as "population control," to the domestic War on Drugs.

Population control tactics form the foundation of COIN strategy, are effective against insurgency in the developing world, produce rapid results with minimal cost to the government, and can be adapted for use in urban areas. This thesis critically examines possible applications of two types of population control tactics, physical security and self-monitoring, includes their drawbacks, and makes recommendations for the use of selected tactics as tools for combating domestic NTOs in the War on Drugs.

The prospect of applying COIN population control tactics may be repugnant to the US judicial system, civil libertarians, and the American public, in part because these measures are drawn from military strategies. Potential legal, educational, and fiscal obstacles to implementing COIN population control tactics are addressed. Suggested solutions to potential problems and ways to make COIN population control tactics more palatable are presented.

Daskal, Steven E. (Parchomenko) DEC 1990

The Evolving Structure and Functions of the Supreme Soviet

This paper discusses the new Soviet Parliament, specifically focusing upon the Supreme Soviet, its functions, structure, and manner of election. Three major aspects of the reform process are considered: socialist pluralism, socialist legality or the rule of law of state, and the role of checks and balances. Research indicates that while significant reforms have occurred, there are still weaknesses in the structure in terms of safeguarding constitutional rights, the powers and limitations of the branches of the All-Union government, and between the All-Union government and the constituent republics.
Japanese-Soviet Relations Since 1985

This paper evaluates the state of Japanese-Soviet relations between 1985 and early 1991 from a historical perspective. Japan and the USSR have been traditional rivals for territorial influence in the region since the late nineteenth century. There has been great continuity in the relationship since 1945, with the two nations having correct but cool relations since the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956.

The Gorbachev Era has not had any significant impact on the relationship. Little "new thinking" entered the relationship during the height of the reform period (1986-1990). By the April 1991 summit, neither Gorbachev nor Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu were in a position of domestic strength from which they could initiate a viable compromise. The result was a generally uneventful summit dominated by an inability to overcome the outstanding issues of Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories and the resulting lack of a peace treaty.

Sino-Japanese Political and Economic Relations Since 1978

Sino-Japanese political and economic relations have been extensive since the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) in August 1978. The chronological development of this relationship will be traced, and the prospects for the continuation of Sino-Japanese relations will be explored. Focus is on this relationship, its benefits, its prospects of continuation in view of the major problems suffered in the development of political and economic relations between the two countries, and the relationship as it affects the major powers in Northeast Asia.

China emerged from the Cultural Revolution and diplomatic isolation to face a massive Soviet threat on its borders and a shattered economic system. Relations with Western countries were needed in order to counter this threat and pull the country out of the economic devastation of the Cultural Revolution. The process of normalization with Japan began in 1972 with the Zhou-Tanaka joint communique and culminated in 1978 with the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. With the normalization of relations, China received massive amounts of financial and government aid from Japan to help achieve modernization and also achieved a political and psychological victory over the USSR. Japan gained a legally binding framework for trade and other types of stable relations with China. Though both countries have benefitted from the relationship, problems such as the rise of Japanese militarism, trade imbalances, and relations with Taiwan have caused considerable strain.

Relations among the US, China, and Japan continue to flourish, and since 1985, normalization of relations between China and the USSR is an ever-increasing possibility. As with Japan, there are trade problems between the US and China, as well as the Taiwan issue. In 1988, the USSR made significant progress in solving the obstacles that hinder Sino-Soviet relations.

Sino-Japanese relations will continue as long as China requires Japanese technology and financial assistance to achieve its modernizations. The leadership in both countries have stressed the importance of the relationship, but the problems that have surfaced in the past remain and will need to be resolved.

Counterintelligence on the Eve of World War II

Prior to the advent of World War II, there was no mandate for a US Government agency to collect intelligence information on a continuing basis. In June 1939, President Roosevelt issued a Presidential Directive mandating that the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation work together to collect and process intelligence information necessary for protecting US national security. Initially, Roosevelt focused the intelligence function of the US on the collection of counterespionage and countersabotage information.
A viable mechanism for analysis of this information at the national level had not been created. The lack of a continuous intelligence capability between World War I and World War II significantly limited the US Government’s ability to analyze counterintelligence data collected between 1936 and 1941.

Despite the mandate for interagency coordination, the level of cooperation among counterespionage agencies was neither consistent nor equitable. Within each organization’s headquarters in Washington, DC, individual command requirements preempted efforts to develop interagency assessments of the threat to the US.

Liaison at the tactical level was much better, although there were still problems. Coordination among the military services and the FBI played a key role in identifying Japanese activities in Hawaii, including espionage. Counterintelligence investigations in Hawaii and California independently provided indications of Japanese intentions vis-à-vis the US. The absence of national-level counterintelligence analysis and inconsistent reporting from headquarters elements neutralized their efforts to adequately protect US national security.

Doherty, Theresa J. (Stevens) APR 1991

Peru’s Sendero Luminoso: Its Appeal to Ethnic Indians and Its Impact on the Political Stability of Peru

The estimated population of Peru is 20 million people. Close to 80 percent of the population is pure Indian or mestizo, a mixture of Indian and European, principally Spanish, blood. Most of the Indians do not speak Spanish, communicating in native Indian dialects. The majority of the population is concentrated in the Andes Mountains. Because the rugged terrain makes communication between the Indian communities and the government difficult, there is still a great deal of rural isolation.

Genuine government efforts to integrate rural Indian communities into the “national system” and improve Peru’s economic and political stability have been obstructed by Sendero Luminoso operations. Ethnic diversity has never been a significant national problem threatening Peru’s political stability. Even during the days of Spanish dominion, there were attempts to incorporate Indian customs into state procedures.

Sendero Luminoso, in trying to re-create the Inca state, is trying to make ethnic division a national problem. Senderistas methodically target government social and economic projects, assassinate key political figures on the local and national levels, and kill foreign advisors and tourists. They are also conducting operations which appear to be designed to bring to power their dominion over the rural Indian and mestizo communities to the total exclusion of governmental assistance in the "new Peruvian state." Because of its indiscriminate violence against the Indian communities, however, Sendero has not been able to translate ethnic division into a cause sufficient to rally the Indians against the government.

Edwards, Jack Earl (Vernon) MAY 1991

Post-Chernobyl Effects on the Soviet Nuclear Power Industry

Prior to the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 26 April 1986, the Soviet nuclear power industry was entering a period when growth was to be 5,000 to 8,000 MW of capacity per year. The Soviet electric power industry was to become more dependent on nuclear-derived electricity, especially in the key European republics. The Soviet electric power industry has been severely affected by this accident. There are few viable alternative energy sources available to replace nuclear power. Analysis of post-Chernobyl effects on individual nuclear industry and power industry sectors must be done.

Despite a 15-year slowdown in original development objectives brought about by a strong post-Chernobyl antinuclear movement, nuclear generating capacity will continue to increase slowly through the year 2000. Thermal power plants will continue to be forced to carry an increased burden in achieving national electricity production objectives until a new, safer version of the pressurized water reactor (VVER 88/92 model) can be developed. Serious electricity shortfalls will most likely occur after 1995 due to the cancellation and suspension of nearly 70,000 MW of nuclear capacity and the reduction of capital investment in this critical sector. Analysis of the nuclear power industry is necessary to determine its role in the overall electric power system.
System analysis was used to develop an electric power data base and analyze power system building blocks such as energo, OES, and YeES. There are approximately 94 energos in the USSR. These energos are local power systems based on republic, oblast, or other administrative boundaries and thus are quite stable. OES is a regional power system comprised of a group of energos, with 11 OESs in the USSR, nine of which are connected to the national power system known as the YeES located in Moscow. Dispatching centers located at each level control the operations of member units and are responsible for transfers of power between organizations. With an understanding of these units, it is possible to determine how they interact.

Gaither, Richard James (Ingersoll) APR 1991

The Seeds of Revolution: Origins and Evolution of Leftist Organizations in El Salvador

During the 1980s, much was written regarding El Salvador’s Marxist insurgency. Accusations of Soviet and Cuban support for the guerrilla in El Salvador were widespread as the Reagan administration charged that leftist violence was the result of communist intervention. While there was some truth in this, the situation in El Salvador and the origin of its chronic insurgency are much more complex. The roots of the conflict which has gripped El Salvador for almost three decades can be traced to socio-economic pressures and peasant revolts of the late nineteenth century.

Although the unity of Salvadoran leftist forces was influenced by the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979, their formation transcends contemporary events. It was El Salvador’s long history of violent repression and sociopolitical domination by the wealthy elite dating back to the late 19th century that planted the seeds for revolution. Central to the present-day conflict was the 1932 communist-led peasant uprising and La Matanza. The government’s massacre of an estimated 10,000 peasants following the failed rebellion set the tone for the repressive military dictatorships that would rule El Salvador over the next four decades and for the rise of leftist organizations in the 1970s.

This thesis analyzes the basic historic causes of chronic revolution in El Salvador from the late nineteenth century to the unification of armed leftist organizations under the Cuban-sponsored Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the early 1980s. Key social, political, and economic events also are examined, and their influences on the evolution of leftist organizations are assessed. Although supported by Cuba, the revolutionary movement in El Salvador was indigenous in nature, driven by decades of gross economic and social inequalities between the rich and the poor.

Gianino, Frank W. (Cigar) DEC 1990

Soviet Ideology, Terrorism Policy, and the Palestine Liberation Organization

For many, the USSR is seen as the primary patron of international terrorism. How accurate is this perception, and, if it is true, what are the motivations for the Soviets in providing support to these ruthless organizations? Is ideology the source of this support, or is there a deeper reason?

This study examines the Soviet relationship with what is commonly held to be the premier terrorist organization in the world today: the Palestine Liberation Organization. Methodology examines the basis for terrorist support in Marxist-Leninist ideology and scrutinizes how this ideology was developed into Soviet policy by the Brezhnev and Gorbachev regimes. Differences in how these policies are put into practice by the two Soviet governments in their dealings with the PLO are examined as well as Soviet motivation to support terrorism.

Guill, Manuela (Harris) MAY 1991

Portugal: Atelier of Socialist Revolution

At 20 minutes past midnight on 25 April 1974, the strains of the popular melody "Grândola, Vila Morena" radiated from the Catholic radio station in Lisbon, Radio Renascença. Exactly 17 hours and 45 minutes later, a communist coup had installed in Catholic Portugal a Soviet-style government, a fulcrum for creating five new communist states, a new
threat to the security of the US, and a quandary for NATO. This was the 14th Marxist revolt in Portugal, two of which had achieved success. The leaders of the first 13 uprisings had openly declared against the Catholic Church. The 1974 revolution had employed Church infrastructure to execute a bloodless coup with razor-sharp precision.

Portugal, as a Roman Catholic state, expanded and secured its national territory under the aegis of papal crusades. As a nation where Church and state were united, Portugal charted the unknown Ocean Sea, established a worldwide trade empire, and by means of Royal Patronage, extended the Church to Africa, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and Japan. Western in outlook, Portugal adapted Church and State to the cultures of those world regions now identified as the Third World.

From the 1870s, Marxists used Portugal and its overseas empire as a testing ground, an atelier, to derive the optimum means for socialist revolution in a totally Catholic nation. From this testbed have come the tenets of secular theology, political theology, and liberation theology, moral tools of violent revolt in the Third World. From the crucible of Portugal have come the initial techniques of Church infiltration and use of the Church for political cell formation, transfer of funds, action coordination, and propaganda. These theological formulations and operative techniques can be measured by communist successes, not only in Portugal and its former territories, but also in Catholic India (Kerala), the Philippines, and Latin America. The current creation of base communities, a new name for Marxist political cells, throughout Portugal and the Portuguese diaspora forewarns of a possible test of New Marxism in the era of a disintegrating communist state system.

Guinn, Kellye Renae (Zulauf) JUN 1991

Institutional Change in the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs

Soviet forces traditionally involved in internal security are the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Committee for State Security (KGB), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The primary responsibility for maintaining public order, from rallies and demonstrations to riots or any violent confrontations, lies with the MVD. The composition, organization, training, equipment, recruiting, and responsibilities of the internal security forces have changed as the USSR has had to deal with rapidly changing conditions. The initial focus of the MVD was to improve its efficiency in fighting crime. The rise in the number of demonstrations and the deteriorating economic situation caused the MVD to create an organization, the OMON, specifically oriented at dealing with demonstrations and civil unrest.

As the economic situation in the USSR continued to deteriorate and the republics became more assertive, the MVD required additional forces. The Internal Troops' role in unrest was increased. Another effort to gain more forces for internal security and to increase their effectiveness came in the proposal to develop a voluntary, contract force in the Internal Troops. By 1990, Gorbachev appointed Pugo and Gromov to the MVD, and his emphasis seemed to shift to order at the expense of law. He authorized the participation of the military in maintaining public order through joint patrols with the MVD and a new militia law which specified duties the military could perform in assisting the militia with unrest. The increased activity of the military was seen in both the joint patrols and in participating with the MVD in disarming illegal formations. The addition of military servicemen to an official internal unrest role also reflects the seriousness with which the central government views the worsening internal crisis.

Hagigh, David M. (Blake) NOV 1990

The Issue of Political Assassination as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Political assassination has been an important part of the intelligence relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government. It is an undeniable part of past US intelligence covert action policies and is well-documented in open literature. The acrimonious public debate over this issue during the 1970s between the White House and Congress forever changed the intelligence relationship between the two.

This paper addresses this relationship and the past and present US role in political assassination. It argues that though assassination is recognized as an illegal covert activity, the issue has not been permanently settled due to growing problems in the Third World. It also suggests that the assassination ban has been violated in the recent past and might have to be in the future.
This project is based on numerous books, articles, and interviews with several retired and active intelligence experts from both branches of government. The paper is not a legal or historical investigation of political assassination but an attempt to examine assassination as one form of covert action and the conflict it continues to generate.

Holmes, Robert J. (Marsh) SEP 1990


The Persian Gulf has historically attracted the attention of numerous nations due to its geostrategic location and, more recently, its economic significance. Since World War II, the region has been one of the battlegrounds of the Cold War, and the US and USSR have been the primary players. As the bipolarity of the post-war world dissolved, however, other players have appeared, claiming interests in the area. The most prominent among them is the People's Republic of China (PRC), which now has vital interests in the Gulf to rival those of the superpowers.

This paper examines the evolution of Communist China's interests in the Persian Gulf from the establishment of the PRC to the end of the 1980s, providing a chronology of significant milestones in that evolution. A discussion of factors which have influenced the evolution, such as Communist Chinese perceptions, regional and global objectives, and limitations, provides a framework for better understanding the evolution.

PRC interests in the Persian Gulf evolved slowly over a period of 40 years. From strictly ideological interests based on the struggle between communism and Western imperialism, the Communist Chinese developed political interests based on struggle for recognition as the legitimate government of China. The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s gave rise to Chinese security interests in the Gulf based on the double threat of Soviet adventurism and Western interventionism. Chinese economic interests developed in the 1970s, a period which also heralded an end to Communist Chinese ideological radicalism. In the 1980s, the Persian Gulf became vital to the PRC as a source of hard currency for financing China's own development.

The PRC is now a major force in the Persian Gulf, providing an alternative for the Gulf States to overdependence on superpowers. Most significant is China's penetration of the arms market. Chinese sales of inexpensive arms in the Gulf have strengthened its position there politically and economically. Those sales may have also introduced a new catalyst of instability which may one day threaten China's interests.

Jaworowski, Mark Edmund (Harris) SEP 1990

The Oder-Neisse Problem

The problem of the Oder-Neisse region, German land seized by Poland after World War II, has affected German-Polish relations for over four decades. The Yalta and Potsdam conferences vaguely dealt with the westward shift of Poland's borders and put off a final settlement until Germany was united and Poland free. Now that these conditions are being met, the border issue has resurfaced. Germany is in a better position now to negotiate a fair settlement of the Oder-Neisse issue, given its economic might and the near-desperate situation of its eastern neighbor.

This paper discusses the history of the transfer of the Oder-Neisse territories to Polish administration, the economic and political crisis in Poland, lobbying by influential German conservative organizations in early 1990, and a solution likely to be acceptable to both the Polish government and expellee lobby. Research relies on arguments made by Friedrich von Wilpert in The Oder-Neisse Problem, numerous articles in the Polish and Western press, the influence of the League of Expellees, and conversations with Professors Jankowski and King of the German departments at Georgetown and George Washington Universities.

The end of the Cold War and the waning of superpower influence in Central Europe will leave a void likely to be filled by Europe's greatest economic power, Germany. Already, the Germans are gaining considerable economic influence with the countries of East Europe, and it is very likely they will use this leverage to negotiate a more favorable agreement with the Polish government regarding the status of the Oder-Neisse region.

The new noncommunist government in Warsaw, waging a struggle to revive an economy wrecked by 45 years of Marxist mismanagement, is in desperate need of economic credits, loans, and technology transfers. Germany, ironically, is Poland's best prospect for aid. The model of the new European Community offers a solution. In exchange for German
aid, Poland can grant immigration rights and compensation to those relatively few former inhabitants wishing to return to their homes. Such an agreement would placate the German right and go a long way toward getting German-Polish relations off to a good start in the post-Cold War era.

Johnson, Perry C. (Blake)  
AUG 1991

Unauthorized Policy: The Process of Leaking

In 1779, the Second Continental Congress formed a committee of five members to handle matters they did not wish to become public. These men swore to never divulge committee information. One of these sworn men, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Thomas Paine, later resigned for disclosing secret information. In the years since, leaks have been a critical problem in Washington.

This paper examines the belief long-held by the military services that the US Congress is the uncontrolled source of leaks. Congressional leaders such as Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-IL) agree with this belief and have pushed for reforms like the Secrecy Oath recently passed by the House of Representatives. At the end of his career, Senator Goldwater believed that most leaks came from the executive branch.

This paper examines the basis of congressional oversight of intelligence and its relationship to leaking. Are all leaks bad, or is there an occasion when a leak is in the public interest? The primary solution for the congressional part of the problem is reducing the number of persons with access to classified information. This could be accomplished by enacting the proposal for a Joint Select Committee on Intelligence. This would reduce the number of congressional members and the currently large number of staff members with access to classified information. The belief exists, however, that leaks have become an integral, essential, though unofficial, part of US government policy process. Without leaks, the federal government’s processes would be impeded.

Johnson, Perry C. (Swenson)  
SEP 1991

A United Germany: Problems and Promises in Central Europe

Germany’s geographical position has given it a long history of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. This position caused a defeated, divided Germany to continue to be important even after World War II. Now, a reunified Germany raises many questions about her future and the future of what must be a German-influenced Europe and world.

This paper explores the background of the German reunification problem, analyzes the current dynamic situation, and synthesizes the two into a forecast of the most likely outcome of the reunification process for the balance of the twentieth century. Because of the experience of the Third Reich, Germany’s military future continues to be of concern. An accurate picture of reunification involves not only the military, but also the cultural, socio-economic, and political dimensions of the two Germanys.

From the present situation, three possible scenarios emerge for the remainder of the 1990s. In the first, all goes well, as Germany and its military join a stable Europe without significant problems. In the second scenario, all goes too well, and Germany becomes a feared power in Europe once again, flexing its military and economic power to exert preponderant influence throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In the third, little goes well, and the military integration has many problems reflecting greater problems in the reunification process itself.

The most likely is the third scenario. A deductive approach, in which events thus far are used to try to disprove each scenario, eliminates one and two. Scenario one fails, for example, because the West is already complaining of new taxes to finance rebuilding the East, while the East is complaining of unemployment, rising costs, and loss of security in living under capitalism. Scenario two fails because of the above reasons as well as the military constraints of the Basic Law and Germany’s pre-unification pledge to remain non-nuclear.
**Part-Time Regulars? The Reserve Intelligence Programs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force**

In this time of reduced military spending, the Reserve Intelligence Programs offer a cost-effective way to augment their active duty counterparts with minimum outlays. These programs additionally provide production of actual finished intelligence, usable and desirable by the active military, during their normal, peacetime, demobilized training periods. However, each of the services has vastly different ideas on the structure, management, and roles of those intelligence programs.

The availability and quality of sources for this paper varied as much as the service structures. Specific instructions from each service on official policy were used along with the various laws enacted by Congress. Interviews were conducted with the senior program managers, commanding officers, and individual component members.

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**Thwarting Iraq's Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Warfare Program: The Efficacy of United States Foreign Policy**

This paper examines US policy toward Iraq's nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) warfare program as delineated in international agreements and treaties to which the US is a signatory, the conduct of its bilateral relations with Iraq, and the domestic export regulations devised to control the transfer of sensitive NBC-related materials or technology.

Expedient solutions will not address a phenomenon which has been distinguished up to now by its stubborn persistence. Iraq’s NBC ambitions are a long-term enterprise born of enduring interests. Any analysis of policy failures which contributed to the present crisis and their attendant rectifications should only follow from an analysis of the underlying causes which gave birth to Iraq’s NBC program. Such a study would reveal that Iraq is gripped in an institutional paranoia inherited from longstanding border conflicts as well as its involvement in the Arab struggle against Israel. To Iraq, these problems constitute a compelling rationale for possessing weapons of mass destruction.

An examination of US policy reveals other inherent limitations to constraining Iraq’s NBC progress. One important lesson to be derived from our erstwhile anti-proliferation strategy is the relative failure of unilateral action, compared to measures achieved through more difficult international cooperation, in effectively controlling sensitive material and technology transfer. Domestic export controls must be matched with equally comprehensive measures from other arms exporting countries.

A second, and perhaps more bitter, lesson is the belated recognition of a mutually supporting relationship between the aforementioned export controls and the moral climate in which they are enforced. Herein lies the US’s greatest shortcoming, for its very silence at evidence of Iraq’s NBC intentions only served to further that country’s surreptitious ambitions, and its mild protests against Iraq’s recourse to chemical warfare (CW) could have been construed as condonation. Indeed, short-term interests, dictated by antipathy and economic relations with Iraq, compelled the US to turn a blind eye toward Iraq’s wartime transgressions, and later in its putdown of the Kurdish uprising. In effect, Iraq was allowed to open a CW Pandora’s box which the US only now is seeking, perhaps vainly, to reseal.

In order for the US to redress its past policy failures, it not only will have to tighten regulations governing NBC-related commerce, but also reclaim the international moral leadership which it forfeited during the Iran-Iraq war. Export controls, no matter how stringent, cannot effectively address NBC proliferation without international cooperation and, indeed, universal abhorrence of weapons of mass destruction.
Can Soviet Agriculture Be Privatized?

The failure of Soviet agriculture is the single most important domestic economic issue facing the Kremlin leadership. The lives of the entire Soviet population are affected. The causes of the problem are complex, interrelated, and deep-seated, having grown into their present state over the seven decades since the revolution. The Kremlin's challenge is to make the system work and to do it before the Soviet people run out of patience.

Privatization, according to virtually all outside observers, is the key to any reform of Soviet agriculture. It is a critical step for any scheme that involves creation of a market economy, and as such, will have a lasting effect on Soviet citizens as well as outsiders doing business in the USSR.

This paper addresses the prospects for privatization of Soviet agriculture by examining the problems that led to the current situation. Objectives of privatization are then discussed. What sort of environment should privatization create in order to make Soviet agriculture productive? Soviet attitudes toward private property are examined, as are the legal constructs built by the government to accommodate those attitudes. Obstacles must be properly surmounted, or privatization and agricultural reform may fail. Approaches showing promise are discussed, drawing on practical experience in Poland and theoretical discussions by Soviet experts. Finally, the outlook for Soviet agriculture is assessed.

Soviet Activities in the Middle East Since the 1973 War

This thesis examines Soviet policy and activities in the Middle East since the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Soviets backed the Arab coalition in both the 1967 and 1973 wars and resented US and Israeli success in the region. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the USSR continued to heavily arm the radical Arab states of Libya, Syria, Iraq, and the Yemens while attempting to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to hurt US-Arab relations. Extensive Soviet arms shipments and military training have been the principal entry for Moscow in the Mideast since 1973, as political, economic, and cultural ties with the Arabs have traditionally been lukewarm to poor.

The paper reviews Soviet interests in the Mideast since World War II, assesses Soviet involvement in several key events/wars over the last 20 years, and evaluates the changes in Soviet foreign policy toward both the Arab states and Israel since Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985. With recent Soviet-American cooperation in foreign policy matters, especially in the volatile Middle East, opportunities for constructive Soviet involvement in the region have improved. Under Gorbachev's leadership, Soviet diplomatic ties with the moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have improved, and formal relations with Israel could occur in the near term.

In the past, Moscow's Middle East problems have derived from backing the Arab states in losing wars, having no relations with Israel, and having little economic cooperation with the region. Moscow is now in the process of improving its relations with the Arab moderates and Israel while reducing support for radical states. Future cooperation with the US on Mideast peace initiatives could benefit the Soviets in the Mideast, and improve US-USSR relations and prospects for receiving additional US economic aid. Whether or not Gorbachev remains as Soviet leader, Moscow will likely continue its current initiatives in the Middle East.

Soviet Land Reform Laws and Their Possible Effect on Soviet Agriculture

The effect of recent Soviet land reforms on Soviet farmers and the USSR's food production and distribution are difficult to accurately predict for the near future. Two primary Soviet dilemmas in the agricultural reform process are whether to allow the private ownership of land and how to dismantle the unprofitable state and collective farms. These issues are not fully addressed in the newly enacted land reform laws.
General Secretary and President Mikhail Gorbachev is in support of many economic and agricultural reforms, but he can push through only limited legislation with such a large number of communist hardliners still in control of key government positions and policies. Even worse, the political appointees and governmental agencies resisting changes (because they fear for their own jobs) are the ones assigned to implement many of the initiatives.

The thesis covers the current Soviet agricultural situation, the history of Russian/Soviet control of the land, land reform laws and their goals, and Gorbachev's past and current positions on land reforms. Also addressed is the plight of one group of peasant farmers who recently obtained their own farmland, the problems of land-leasing that was enacted in 1989, and an examination of Azerbaijan's new land reform laws.

Gorbachev hopes to remain in power by utilizing support from the Soviet people, reformers, and even Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, thus outlasting hardliners still desiring a command economy, large state and collective farms, and no personal land ownership. With Gorbachev's two 1991 Decrees on Agriculture and his formal pleas for economic and agricultural aid from the West, he has indicated to all that the USSR has deep economic problems.

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Loneman, David R. (Belbutowski)  
SEP 1991

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in the 1990s: What Course and Speed?

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is rated by many naval analysts to be the world’s fifth, or by some accounts, fourth, most powerful maritime force. The political changes occurring throughout the world in the early 1990s probably will lead to change within Japanese foreign policy and specifically in how Japanese Self-Defense Forces are utilized.

JMSDF is a true blue-water navy with certain constitutional limitations severely restricting its power projection capability. With the current US security guarantee, this adequately meets Japan’s maritime needs. By the late 1990s, however, Japan will come to realize the need for certain "power projection tools," specifically aircraft carriers, and for an expansion of its maritime power.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party will build a consensus for maritime expansion among the public and the Diet. The economy of Japan is too fragile and too dependent upon seaborne imports to be left inadequately defended. Japan will defend its economic interests, alone or with the US.

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McCarthy, Susan A. (Vanderburg)  
DEC 1990

Countering Air Terrorism: A Matter of Intelligence or Security?

Acts of terrorism are intended to achieve political goals and are often directed against nations. Over the last 20 years, these acts have often involved sabotage of commercial aviation. The history of air terrorism has escalated from the disturbing but non-fatal hijackings of the 1960s to the deadly bombings of the 1980s. Even though airline security measures have increased during this time, not all acts of air terrorism have been prevented.

Americans abroad are potential targets wherever they may be and are far and away the most attractive targets. The most recent act of air terrorism against the US refocused attention on terrorism against civil aviation. On 21 December 1988, Pan American World Airways Flight 103 bound for New York from Frankfurt, Germany, with 259 passengers and crew exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all passengers and crew and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie.

The first line of defense against civil aviation terrorism is the collection and dissemination of accurate and timely intelligence concerning intentions, capabilities, and actions of terrorists before they reach the airport. To effectively use terrorist threat information from the US Intelligence Community, it must be transmitted to those responsible for security measures. Successful and consistent intelligence gathering and analysis are needed if there is to be any prospect of preventing terrorist operations.

While intelligence is the first line of defense in preventing a terrorist attack, the failure or success of an actual attack against aviation will be due to security, the last line of defense. Areas that impact on security include baggage and passenger screening and the qualifications and training of security personnel. These areas were found lacking in the review of Pan Am 103. The disaster was due more to a lack of security than a failure of intelligence. Experts in the security field have stated that when terrorists succeed, it is not because of their cunning and skills, but often because
security has failed. No one particular security device or measure can be exhort as the sole preventer of air terrorism. All factors of security must reinforce, support, and overlap to ensure the safety of air travel. Intelligence and security are intertwined, but security must always be on guard, whether warnings have been received or not. Intelligence can enhance security but may not always be available. Intelligence can be successful only when adequate countermeasures are implemented.

McCarthy, Susan A. (Wardlaw)  JUN 1991

Reversion of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China:
Will the 1997 Mandate Cause a Triad Exodus?

In 1997, the People’s Republic of China will reclaim the province of Hong Kong and its associated territories after more than 150 years of British rule. With the advent of this change, the Triad Societies, oriental groups whose origins date back to the seventeenth century, undoubtedly will give careful thought to what changes affecting their interests may occur once the PRC controls Hong Kong. The Triad Societies, particularly the individual Triad members, reputedly control the world’s heroin market, dominating the heroin cultivated in Southeast Asia.

The Triad Societies evolved as a political entity dedicated to the overthrow of the Manchu government (the Ch’ing Dynasty). Their organization is one based on utmost secrecy and dedication at all costs, including one’s life. Through the centuries, they attracted many criminal elements among their membership. In the civil war in China (1945-1949), the Triads supported the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT), led by General Chiang Kai Shek, against the communists. The defeat of the Nationalists in 1949 led many Triad members to flee China or face death by the communist government. A majority of the Triads fled to Hong Kong. Their proximity to the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) is especially beneficial. This region is responsible for the majority of the world supply of heroin.

The Hong Kong Triads have established criminal infrastructures in major cities throughout the world, including San Francisco, New York, Vancouver, Amsterdam, and Singapore. While the Triads may not directly control Chinese organized crime throughout the world, they are very influential and maintain a working relationship with them. Should the PRC execute a crackdown on their activities in Hong Kong after 1997, the Triads have laid the necessary groundwork to move their bases of operations elsewhere. They have become prevalent throughout the Chinatowns in major cities and have many options.

China has agreed to continue Hong Kong’s capitalist economy and lifestyle for at least 50 years. The Triads would most likely prefer to remain in Hong Kong since their criminal entity has been entrenched there for so long, but they will closely monitor events within the PRC that may provide clues as to whether the PRC will initiate a Triad crackdown or not adhere to the 50-year promise. Currently, the PRC is concerned that the Triad network has again spilled into China, and approximately 50 percent of the heroin entering Hong Kong transits Southern China.

Regardless of whether the Triads move their base of operations, they now have established criminal branches throughout the world and pose a serious threat in the heroin trafficking market.

McCleskey, Edward R. (Swenson)  MAY 1991

Applying Deception to Special Operations Direct Action Missions

Deception is a military tool dating back to earliest warfare. Although used quite successfully, especially by the Allies during World War II, deception methods used in conventional warfare may not apply to special operations. These two warfare types are doctrinally different. The objective in conventional warfare is often to seize and hold ground in a massive assault; in special operations, small units often operate in denied territory without support. This is especially true in “direct action” missions, short-duration raids intended to inflict damage in enemy territory.

This thesis examines how doctrinal variance affects the application of deception. Deception is defined and characterized in terms of its relationship to intelligence stemming from a revision of taxonomy developed by previous authors. The special operations environment is discussed, considering the doctrinal differences that may affect deception’s application.
One hundred direct action missions are examined for their success in using deception, showing which methods used in conventional warfare were used (or not used) and providing anecdotal examples from specific operations which can be adapted to future missions.

Direct action does not lend itself well to the use of large-scale camouflage, decoys, or electronic deception. It is often best to disguise either personnel or equipment. Diversions are also used successfully to draw the attention of defenders from special operations forces. Many units have used false orders, documents, flight plans, and other administrative means to cover actions.

The study showed that it is worthwhile to use deception. Over 85 percent of the operations that used deception were successful, compared to 73 percent without. This thesis also tried to determine if specific deception methods are more useful than others based on the type of mission. The missions in the data base were grouped into like categories and examined on this basis. There seemed to be no correlation of deception method to type of mission, with one exception: in all attacks on military logistics nodes, disguise was successfully used.

Only a small portion of special operations have employed deception. It is a tool which has not been sufficiently examined by the special operations community. This thesis is intended to help special operations planners by highlighting deception and determining the manner in which it should be applied in direct action missions.

Melvin, Virginia A. (Cigar)  
JUL 1991

To Be or Not To Be: King Hussein and the Gulf Crisis

The Gulf Crisis is exacting an extraordinary toll from Jordan. The costs associated with the losses of export income, expatriate worker remittances, and foreign aid are estimated to total $1.2 billion in 1991 and $2.4 billion in 1992. Its economy virtually dismembered, Jordan also has alienated most of its foreign benefactors, particularly the US and Saudi Arabia. The prospect for King Hussein facilitating a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issues has dimmed with the retrenchment of Israel into an increasing defense posture and the enthusiastic Palestinian support for Saddam Husayn. Jordan’s utility as a buffer state between Israel and its Arab foes is being questioned as is King Hussein’s stance as an important player in the region.

Why did King Hussein act as he did, risking the chance of losing Jordan? With the economy in shambles and steadily declining and Palestinian nationalism on the rise, King Hussein’s very survival was being threatened. He did not have the power to survive opposing the will of his people and supporting the Coalition. In a no-win situation, he managed to survive, emerging alive from the political quagmire by adroitly maneuvering in and around the political agendas of not only the Coalition members but also of every player in the Middle East game. By following his people, he shored up his domestic legitimacy and now enjoys unprecedented popular support. He ensured the immediate survival of the nascent Jordanian democratic political system by providing a position which all factions could support.

Morgan, Thomas W. (Belbutowski)  
AUG 1991

The Fall of the Yi Dynasty, 1860-1910: The Knell of Traditional Confucian Political Society and the Genesis of Mass Opposition Movements in Korea

Within a 50-year period (1860-1910), Korea witnessed the death of its 500-year-old Confucian political culture and the birth of organized mass opposition. Political factionalism and tension between aristocratic rulers and vocal opposition groups, and between urban elite and rural poor, characterized the failing Yi dynasty era. This paper analyzes key aspects of the Yi dynasty’s passing that marked the end of the traditional Confucian political order in Korea and the beginning of mass opposition movements. Early Yi Korean politics were governed by Confucianism, which dictated that human relationships, in and out of government, be based on the virtue of filial piety. On this foundation, four distinct socio-economic classes acted out their roles in an attempt to create a harmonious society.

In the late nineteenth century, however, rampant corruption among and peasant exploitation by aristocratic yangban government officials stimulated sporadic peasant uprising. Reform attempts by Korea’s last effective ruler, the Taewon’gun (Prince Regent), between 1860 and 1873 proved unsuccessful, and peasant usury became more oppressive during the tumultuous reign of Queen Min and her clansmen (1874-1894).
The politico-religious Tonghak (Eastern Learning) movement was the first to organize a large membership into a powerful opposition force. Tonghak attracted almost one-half million lower-class followers with the hopeful message of an alternative way of life, challenging Korea’s traditional political hierarchy. The politico-religious group’s activities culminated in the Tonghak Rebellion of 1894, which, although a military failure, forced Korea’s leaders to recognize popular discontent and implement limited reforms.

Within the milieu of rising international tensions in Asia, Korea’s intellectual population mobilized the country’s first voluntary political association, the Independence Club (Tongnip Hyophoe). After achieving modest initial goals, the club introduced new opposition tactics, such as public debate, protest rallies, and direct dialogue with Yi leaders. However, its failure to gain rural support and pursue radical reforms led to the group’s demise after only two years.

By the turn of the century, pro-Japanese elements emerged as Korea’s most vocal opposition force, and a weak Yi government was the target of the Japanese-sponsored Ilchin-hoe (the Advancement Society). Possessing the elements of a vast financial support network, well-attended rallies, and a successful political lobbying campaign, Ilchin-hoe has the distinction of being Korea’s first political party. Finally, the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 officially ended the rule of a dynasty almost twice as long as any other in world history.

Moultrie, Ronald Steven (Marsh) JUN 1991

Japanese Rearmament: The Implications for Japan’s Asian Neighbors and the US During the 1990s

Few nations have displayed more wanton aggression or total disregard for neighbors than did Japan with Asia from the late 1800s to the mid-1940s. The Japanese military, spurred by the belief that Japan’s greatness lay in a vast empire, threatened or attacked almost every country in the Asian region, eventually launching an attack on the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The Pearl Harbor attack brought the full fury of the US industrial and military base to bear on the Japanese, culminating in the use of the first atomic bombs in August 1945.

As a result of the war, the US stripped Japan of its military might and drafted a constitution mandating the Japanese Empire renounce the right to use the military to settle international disputes. Because nations like the USSR, China, and North Korea were developing into bastions of communism, however, the US entered into a peace treaty with Japan that blanketed the country under America’s protective nuclear umbrella.

Much has occurred in the five decades since the beginning of World War II. Communism has declined, and many countries have turned to economic alliances for security instead of traditional military pacts. Japan must be considered one of the world’s most economically powerful nations. The US, once the world’s biggest creditor, is now the world’s biggest debtor.

In an attempt to ease budgetary problems, the US has asked the Japanese government to assume a greater share of its own defense budget. This request has confused the Japanese people, who perceive the US as asking them to violate the very constitution that was forced on them less than five decades earlier. More importantly, many Asian nations are alarmed about a possible revival of militarism in Japan. These countries seek reassurances that Japan will never again attempt to force its will on nations in the Asian region.

Moultrie, Ronald Steven (Heymann) MAR 1991

US Private Sector Prospects in the USSR: A Case Study of the USSR-Chevron Joint Venture in the Caspian Sea Region

During the 1980s, the USSR produced, consumed, and exported more barrels of oil than any other nation. The USSR, which contains one of the world’s largest proven oil reserves, has used its vast petroleum resources to earn hard currency to bolster the sagging Soviet economy.

However, the latter part of the decade brought about a significant downturn in Soviet oil production. Because of inefficient extraction techniques, a lack of high technology, and poor quality equipment, many of the USSR’s most productive fields exhibited signs of premature aging and oil depletion. In an attempt to compensate for lost productivity, the Soviets embarked on a program to explore and develop new oil reserves.
Lacking the technological expertise and superior equipment required to exploit newly discovered oil reserves, the Soviets have recently turned to the West for help. Several joint ventures are being formed to cooperatively develop large Soviet oil fields. One joint venture in particular, involving the Chevron oil company, has attracted the interest of US and Soviet political and business leaders and economists. These individuals see Chevron’s attempt to develop the giant Tengiz oil reserve in the USSR’s Kazakh Republic as a test case for future joint ventures. A successful venture could open a new chapter in US-Soviet economic relations while a failure could close the book on large-scale joint economic operations.

This paper documents the events and circumstances that have led to the current oil production crisis in the Soviet Union. After an explanation of what drove the Soviets to seek the assistance of Western firms, the paper details the obstacles to implementing a joint venture in the USSR. The paper concludes with an assessment of the utility to Soviet and American interests of establishing joint ventures, and the prospects for future economic cooperation between US private corporations and the USSR.

Mulligan, Kevin (Zulauf)  

Confronting the Military: The Role of Soviet Civilian Think Tanks in Shaping Defense Issues

This paper traces the development of Soviet think tanks and addresses the manner in which they have changed under the Gorbachev regime. During the 1980s, policy research institutes evolved from essentially consultative organs into powerful institutions in their own right, expressing opinions on defense issues through academic journals, the press, and direct input to policymakers.

Civilian defense specialists at these institutes also have access to the general public and leadership circles through spin-off institutions such as the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against Nuclear War, and most importantly, as advisors to the new legislative committees within the revamped Supreme Soviet. This paper examines the manner in which the think tanks support, and sometimes lead, the work of these committees.

Confrontation between civilians and the military in the debate over defense issues in the USSR is inevitable. To capture the range of views in the debate, this paper focuses on two key participants. Georgij Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, serves as a convenient paradigm of the conflict. His public polemic with Marshal Akhromeyev, former Chief of the General Staff and later military advisor to Gorbachev, very neatly encapsulates the institutional conflict. This paper also assesses the likely future of think tanks in the Soviet Union.

Munro, Steve (Kauppi)  

Democracy and the Kurds of Turkey

The January 1991 decision by the Turkish Government to lift a longstanding ban on the Kurdish language is one concrete example of the transformation currently underway in the seven-decade conflict between the government of modern Turkey and its large Kurdish population. This transformation stems, in part, from an increased proliferation of democratic ideals throughout Turkey resulting from the 1983 election of a stable, civilian government. Self-determination in Eastern Europe and the Iraqi Kurds have compounded the speed and extent to which this transformation is occurring. The Turkish government may be forced into changing its policies toward the Kurdish population. Thus far, the government has stopped short of enacting the meaningful reforms which would attack the fundamental causes of the Kurdish insurgency.

To assess this conflict and understand the current transformation, Alexis de Tocqueville’s analysis of the struggles inherent to the spread of democratic ideals provides an interesting paradigm. Understanding the distinction between “equality” and “freedom” is useful in this conflict where the Kurds are politically “free” but socially, politically, economically, and culturally “unequal.” Similar circumstances were fundamental factors in the 1789 French Revolution. Equality for the Kurds is fundamental and can be achieved through the transformation of the Turkish political elite from a caste structure into one which promotes equality.
Transformation has been seriously hindered by a history of repression, an established governmental structure of elitist rule, and violence. Mechanisms to promote perceptions of equality are limited when military intervention is required to maintain order in the volatile Kurdish region of Turkey. Rising levels of violence have resulted in calls from conservative Turks for even greater repression in the region. The government has currently taken the more moderate stance of allowing limited ethnic rights while maintaining strict controls. Neither of these approaches, however, addresses the fundamental problem of equality.

Mechanisms to promote equality include freedom for Kurdish interest group formation, increased educational opportunities for Kurds, free press, and a middle-business class among the Kurds. The intent is to expand the elite to include Kurds. In this way, Kurdish interests for both personal and cultural advancement become linked to the success and stability of the Turkish Government.

Munro, Steve (Heymann) APR 1991

The Soviet Defense Industry: Prospects for Conversion

Mikhail Gorbachev has placed great hope in the prospect of redirecting the "mighty" Soviet defense industry toward the production of civilian goods. Recognizing that domestic discontent is based in part on a frustrated population, Gorbachev is attempting to capitalize on his transformations in foreign policy by directing the military-industrial complex to produce more for the Soviet people and less for the Soviet Armed Services.

The conversion plan is based on a common assumption within the Soviet Union that the defense industry is a highly productive and efficient sector producing quality products based upon high technology and high standards. Unfortunately, this is a flawed misconception of an economic sector that is actually uneconomical. The Soviet defense industry is a protected, isolated, economic sector which for decades has been granted immediate access to superior resources. Having been built on this misconception, the current conversion plan is structured in such a way that it will reinforce the monopolistic inefficiencies of the defense sector, hinder developments toward real market reform, and aggravate resistance movements against reform programs. The conversion plan in the present form, is, therefore, unlikely to lead the economy toward meaningful economic reform.

There are alternative conversion programs that could, but probably will not, be adopted. Encouraging private, independent small enterprise at the expense of government industry, increasing production of intermediate goods to saturate the market with common industrial inputs at the expense of producing end products, and funneling closely guarded high technology toward new private enterprises are all suggestions that are simply unacceptable to the present Soviet power. Unfortunately, despite the desires and hopes to the contrary, economic reform cannot be achieved through the defense industry.

Mustapich, Charles A. (Cigar) NOV 1990

Japanese-Middle East Relations: A Foundation With Cornerstones of Oil

Will Japan continue its current conservative approach to the Middle East? Japan will not become more assertive in the region, as evidenced by the historical relationship with the Middle East, the overwhelming dependence upon Middle East oil, and the role Japan has assumed in the current Persian Gulf crisis sparked by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The dichotomy of cooperation versus competition which exists between the United States and Japan in the Middle East is also discussed in this paper. The Middle East will continue to remain vital to both Japan and the United States for the foreseeable future. The challenge for these two symbiotic superpowers is to overcome their competitive differences and forge a mutually beneficial approach to the Middle East independent of the trade frictions existing on both sides of the Pacific.
Policy Options for Dealing with the Nationalities Problem in the USSR

This study reviews the history of nationalism in the non-Russian republics of the USSR including factors affecting language, religion, and cultural identity. The present political situation is discussed and possible solutions to the problem of nationalism are evaluated. Solutions in this context will be defined as courses of action that can reconcile with the concerns of the Soviet government the demands of nationalists for substantial political and economic independence or for their own state.

The major question concerns the possible solutions to the nationalities problem in the USSR. To answer this, one must review the history of the nationalist movements in each major geographical area, dominant root causes for nationalist unrest, and factors which have arisen recently due to the widespread changes in the political structure in the USSR, the Warsaw Pact countries, and the European community. The possibility of a return to repression exists, but it is unlikely as an overall policy.

The Baltic States and Moldavia probably will secede and become independent. Byelorussia, Georgia, and Armenia will become members of a new Russian confederation. Ukraine will also accept membership in the confederation, but unrest in its western part could lead to a split in the republic. Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics will at first become members of a new Russian confederation; however, nationalism over the long term will very likely lead to their secession.

History and Legislative Control of Domestic Electronic Surveillance by Department of Defense Intelligence Organizations Since 1960

Domestic surveillance by DoD organizations is strictly controlled by current legislative and judicial rulings. The US Army and the National Security Agency conducted extensive domestic surveillance programs in the 1960s and 1970s in support of counterterrorism, drug interdiction, security for government officials, and anti-civil disturbance. These activities were authorized by the executive branch and were thought to be legitimate under the president's constitutional authority to protect national security. By the early 1970s, these activities were under increasing attack by citizens and organizations claiming civil rights violations. Several Supreme Court rulings tended to support this view, and the legislative and executive branches were forced to respond to the rulings.

After years of legislative and executive debate, several laws were enacted to ensure that domestic surveillance of US citizens was strictly controlled and that the use of information gathered for national security reasons was tightly protected. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) enacted in 1978 is still the major piece of legislation controlling domestic electronic surveillance activities. The Court has consistently held that FISA adequately protects Fourth Amendment rights of US citizens.

Recent attempts have been made to increase the use of intelligence information in law enforcement activities. The Administration cites both increased terrorism and drug trafficking as reasons to justify its proposals. To date, there has not been a significant increase in domestic surveillance by DoD intelligence organizations, nor have there been any legal changes passed by Congress which would allow such an increase. The current system is viewed as addressing both national security needs and individual Fourth Amendment rights adequately and should not be changed significantly.
Hong Kong Reunification: Possible Outcomes and Opportunities for the United States

Reunification of Hong Kong with China will occur on 30 June 1997, ending over 150 years of British colonial rule. Negotiations to ensure a peaceful and prosperous reunification were begun in 1979. Major factors affecting reunification are the economic strength of Hong Kong and China, emigration from Hong Kong, democratization of Hong Kong, and the internal political climate of China. Dramatic developments in any of these areas will affect reunification.

Reunification offers many opportunities and challenges to the US. Since World War II, the US has reacted to international events using the Cold War strategic policy of containment. With the ending of the Cold War, US strategic policy is evolving as well. President Bush has often used the phrase "new world order" to describe the post-Cold War world. US reaction to reunification of Hong Kong will depend on the shape of this new world order concept.

To date, three key points of this strategy appear to be world political stability, economic reform, and non-tolerance of military aggression. US reaction to reunification events will certainly be guided by these principles. Considering past and present US policy toward China, US reaction to any reunification scenario will be mild unless a protracted internal power struggle develops when Deng Xiaoping must be replaced. If this does not occur, reunification will be peaceful and according to agreements between the British and Chinese. The US has the opportunity to strengthen economic ties with China and possibly use China to balance Japan. US interests will not be permanently damaged regardless of the outcome of Hong Kong reunification.

Winds of Change: Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Southeast Asia

Since assuming power in the Soviet Union in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has launched a diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia aimed at enhancing Soviet influence in the region. The emphasis of this new policy is on building good relations with the geopolitically significant Southeast Asia states regardless of their political orientation. As such, Gorbachev's policy is a reflection of strategy proposed by Karen Brutents and Aleksandr Yakovlev which argues that closer Soviet ties with geopolitically important states like Thailand and Indonesia will expand Soviet influence in the Third World at the expense of the US. This strategy is peaceful Soviet-US competition in the Third World. As a result, Gorbachev's strategy suggests his Southeast Asian policy constitutes a tactical rather than a strategic shift in Soviet regional aims.

How successful has Gorbachev been in expanding Soviet influence in Southeast Asia? Has Gorbachev changed his game plan since 1985 or is he still pursuing the longstanding regional goals of his predecessors? Major Soviet policy statements on Asia and the changes made in foreign policy apparatus were examined to gauge the general emphasis of Gorbachev's policy and to look for consistency in Moscow's approach toward Southeast Asia. Three major issues have surfaced: resolution of the Cambodian conflict, reassessment of relations with the socialist government of Vietnam, and the Kremlin's diplomatic effort to woo the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and especially alter ASEAN's close ties with the US. Moscow's handling of these issues is the best indicator of both the direction and success of Gorbachev's regional aims. This paper concentrates on ASEAN in general and on the three member states with which Moscow has most diligently pursued close relations: Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

There is little doubt in 1990 that Gorbachev has been successful in expanding Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, but all has not gone as planned. Gorbachev has been singularly unsuccessful in his attempt to alter ASEAN's relations with the US. This failure is a reflection of Moscow's traditionally minor role in Southeast Asian affairs and the fact that the USSR is not an economic power but is attempting to influence a region in which politics and economics are inseparable. With his own economy in chaos, Gorbachev has little to offer ASEAN as a substitute for its ties with the US. Consequently, it appears Gorbachev has reached the limits of his ability to expand Soviet influence in the region, and Moscow can only wait and hope that some future event will open yet another door for the Soviet bear to come in.
The Azerbaijan Popular Front

This paper examines the role of the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) in the USSR's ongoing nationalities problems. It examines the APF organization and agenda and speculates whether APF is likely to achieve its stated goals. The issue of secession for Azerbaijan has subsided for now, but the relationship with the center remains ill-designed and nettlesome. Moreover, Azerbaijan is providing Moscow useful leverage to coerce Armenia to remain a part of the USSR.

Continuing Perestroika of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Since Gorbachev came to power, there have been changes in the organizational structure and a major turnover of leadership personnel within the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). MFA's organizational and leadership changes that occurred through 1987 have been well-documented elsewhere. However, changes have continued to occur, especially among the MFA leadership elite. Those continuing changes are the subject of this paper.

This paper generally parallels the survey methodology and analytical structure of an earlier work, Perestroika of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs During the Gorbachev Period, by James P. Nichol. This methodology facilitates comparison between changes observed during the first two years of perestroika and those observed in 1990. The results of the study address the key question of whether the renewal among MFA's leadership elite is designed to buttress Gorbachev's political support or build a cadre of professionals who can constructively contribute to foreign policy development and professionally implement that policy in its activities with foreign governments.

The Environmental Movement in the Soviet Union: Atomic Energy as the Catalyst

The environmental crisis in the USSR has evolved over many years, although it is only recently that citizens have confronted the government. The Kremlin has had to abandon its policy of ecological neglect, particularly in the atomic energy program. The Soviet environmental movement is obtaining unprecedented influence on an atomic energy program accustomed to undisputed expansion. Trade-offs between energy and the environment, however, impose large economic and political costs which will be difficult to bear.

Primary sources used in this study centered on environmentalism and atomic energy. Prior to 1986, the year of the Chernobyl accident, rarely were the two discussed jointly in the USSR. Soviet environmentalism received extensive coverage by the media on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Chernobyl, with special emphasis on the impact of the disaster upon the Soviet atomic energy program. FBIS, JPRS, and Radio Liberty reports were also helpful in providing Soviet reactions and efforts in the environmental arena, although they dealt primarily with the environmental problems as a whole without specific reference to atomic energy.

US agencies and special interest groups were also able to provide insight into Soviet atomic and environmental issues. Atomic energy statistics were obtained from the US Department of Energy. Information on the growth of the Soviet environmental movement was drawn from Greenpeace USA and the Nuclear Resource Information Service. Greenpeace USA activists have had much contact with Soviet environmentalists and appeared to be well-informed.

Research was aimed at the evolution of environmentalism and its impact on Soviet atomic energy development leading up to Chernobyl in 1986. Technical information on atomic energy was examined, as was the impact of environmentalism on this economic sector. It also meant trying to forecast how the environmental movement might impact on the energy program in the future; this was not an easy task in a country that has historically maintained tight security over its nuclear programs and where awareness of environmentalism is elementary. The research nevertheless reveals that tremendous changes have occurred in both areas.
Strategic Issues in Antarctica

This paper examines Antarctica as a repository of resources, surveying attendant geopolitical issues, including the military and political environments. The Antarctic Treaty System and territorial claims are also examined. Since Antarctica is a relatively unknown theater without the common base of knowledge shared by the populated regions of the world, the approach is descriptive, with subsequent commentary on strategic implications.

Two themes emerge: opportunity (for cooperation and for resource exploitations), and threat (disagreement and conflict mostly over resources). Central concerns include uncertainty regarding the existence of an accessibility to resources, potential instability in the Treaty System, and marginal military problems affecting chokepoints and the control of sea lanes.

There are no centrally important strategic issues for the US in Antarctica, but the continent does offer an enduring series of minor strategic problems (a minerals exploitation regime, access to the continent, and preservation of the Treaty System) that warrant continued monitoring by the intelligence and policy communities.

Colombia: Extra-Legal Violence and United States Policy

The US Government insists that the flow of illegal narcotics into the US, the international narcotics trade, and narcoviolence all threaten national security. In support of this position, two US presidents (Ronald Reagan and George Bush) publicly declared "wars" on terrorism, insurgencies, and the illegal narcotics trade. The US Government regards all three phenomena as examples of "low intensity conflict" (LIC) threats. The US continues to combat LIC situations primarily through the provision of military aid and paramilitary assistance.

Colombia has the national misfortune to possess both types of extra-legal organizations which the US considers threats: political insurgencies (or terrorist movements) and narcotics cartels. In keeping with its characterization of the three phenomena as examples of LIC, the US Government contends that all extra-legal organizations exist and use violence because of identical motivational factors, and that they uniformly endorse the radical transformation of the political and societal status quo.

This study demonstrates that the US Government's characterization of the problem is fundamentally inaccurate for two reasons. First, the application of an objective criterion to evaluate extra-legal organizations' motivations demonstrates that the two phenomena exist for radically different purposes. Second, the position overlooks the fact that both political violence and extra-legal organizations are firmly rooted in Colombia's political history. The Colombian government regards the problems presented by its extra-legal narcotics organizations as law enforcement problems, not military threats. Consequently, this study contends that the US Government is utilizing improper tactics to deal with the problems presented by extra-legal organizations in Colombia.

Intelligence Operations by OSS Units in North Africa

During World War II, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sponsored covert military operations against Axis forces worldwide. OSS was formally established in June 1942, replacing the Coordinator of Information (COI) which had been organized in July 1941. Even before the formation of COI, the US sent agents to North Africa to organize resistance to the Axis powers and collect intelligence.

The focus of this paper is on the operation of those agents in North Africa in support of operational objectives there. The archetype for OSS strategic collection in North Africa was the gathering of information in support of Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa. OSS personnel collected information on identification, composition, and
disposition of Axis units in North Africa. Additionally, they collected data on such nonmilitary targets as the economic and political forces at work in the region. Because of the unhindered transportation between North Africa and Vichy France, North Africa was also a good collection base for the European Continent.

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Schneider, James Allen (Zulauf)  
JUN 1991

Perestroika and the Soviet Space Program

During the last five years, much has been made of the revolutionary concepts of perestroika and glasnost. These go beyond the English concepts of restructuring and openness. Soviet political, economic, and social structures have been turned upside down. Industrial output is being converted from military to civilian orientation. One of the major concentrations of technical expertise and industrial energy in the USSR is found in the space program. Like most research and development programs in the USSR, the space program was driven by military needs and directed by the quest for political prestige. With heavy military involvement came a high degree of compartmentalization and secrecy. Although much of the manned space program was publicized for the prestige, the remainder of the space program, including portions of the manned segment, were and to some degree still are classified.

With the advent of perestroika, much has changed. A large number of the space programs, including some heavily classified sectors, have come under civilian control. Soyuzkarta, for example, now markets photography from photoreconnaissance satellites. Glavcosmos sells the launch capacity of SL-12 boosters to other countries. Although Soviet space technologists have publicized their plans, it remains for the analysts to divine the gold from the dross.

The time frame for this paper is limited to the period since the creation of the Congress of Deputies, since this was the body responsible for legislatively many of the reforms of perestroika. Research was limited to open-source literature, specifically FBIS/JPRS listings. With the advent of glasnost, open debate has resulted in open-source reporting.

From a technical perspective, the space program is of singular importance. The technology derived from space experimentation, as well as the technology developed to achieve space goals, can be used to develop weapons systems. Remote sensing is currently being used in reconnaissance missions over US targets, and the Soviets are continuously improving the techniques and hardware involved.

The perestroika movement in the USSR has a far-reaching effect on every facet of Soviet life. Technology-intensive programs are expensive, and pressure is being placed on such programs as space operations to show a return. Frequently, it is difficult to demonstrate such a return if the program is heavily classified or involves arcane research not clearly understandable to the average member of the Congress of People's Deputies. This paper will, therefore, clarify the direction some of these programs are going to take.

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Schulenburg, David G. (Heymann)  
JUL 1991

The Specter of Unemployment in the USSR: Evidence of an Emerging Policy

This paper examines the initial and radical economic reforms instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev to find evidence of an emerging unemployment policy. It traces the actions by the government from the post-World War II years through the mid-1980s to maintain a stable and productive labor force. It then details the impact of perestroika on both workers and the state. Previously, Soviet workers and the state maintained a social contract that provided workers job security and social benefits, but radical economic reform policies increasingly nullified these benefits and created the specter of unemployment. Perestroika discredited the party-state apparatus in the eyes of the workers due to its inability to formulate and execute an effective policy on employment. Radical reform threatened the conservative faction in the leadership, which used the unemployment issue to try to halt the reform drive.

Despite their imperfect knowledge of a market economy and the opposition of powerful conservatives, Gorbachev and his reformers are cautiously devising an unemployment policy. Rather than a unified version or single program, it is evolutionary in character and reflects the reformers' reactions to events as they arise. It is a sincere and strong effort to provide social maintenance, retraining, and job placement services for unemployed workers during the USSR's transition to a market economy.
Soviet Informal Groups and the Rise of a Civic Society

This paper examines the role of informal groups in the development of a civic society in the Soviet Union. By reviewing the economic, demographic, and political factors that shaped President Gorbachev’s reform policies, the emergence of informal groups and the rise of political parties are discussed. An analysis of the structure and dynamics of these parties and their success in fostering a civic society according to criteria is presented by both Soviet and Western analysts. While the development of a civic society is quite possible, serious challenges, particularly in the short term, lie ahead.

Secret Activities and Congressional Leaks: Who is Directing Foreign Policy?

Secret activities to ensure the stability of the US have occurred since the founding of this nation. However, as the US has grown into a world leader, foreign relations have also become more complex. With the growth of the US came the increasing need to undertake covert operations in support of national security objectives.

The National Security Act of 1947 was implemented to form an organized intelligence apparatus. As the Intelligence Community grew, the ability to control every activity decreased. In the 1970s, the Intelligence Community came under fire, and allegations made by the Pike and Church Committees sparked both presidential restrictions and congressional oversight. One of the biggest points of contention between the branches of government has been over who should direct foreign policy, specifically covert activities that involve the US. Leaking information in support of or against specific policy has been a way of doing business in Washington.

The Constitution charges the executive branch with responsibility for formulating and carrying out foreign policy. However, appropriations of money originate in the House of Representatives. Congress also has the power to declare war. When the executive branch undertakes activities that do not have congressional consent, it is bound to lead to leaks and micromanagement. Two recent examples were the Iran-Contra affair and the Sandinistas.

The president must acknowledge that a foreign policy of covert activity cannot be followed without the consent of Congress, which has a legal and moral responsibility to its constituents and the Constitution. By no means does this justify leaks, but partisan politics is a political reality. Therefore, it is preferable that policy differences be settled through regular channels, not through leak and counter-leak. Secret activities can be successful only with the consent of Congress, because when they fail and Congress is not aware of the operation at hand, it only further hinders the whole community. If a consensus does not exist, out-voted opponents will resort to micromanagement and leaks.

NATO in the Nineties: America’s Uncertain Future in European Security

For 42 years, NATO has protected Western Europe, promoted and protected US interests, and maintained US influence in Europe. Now, however, as the perceived military and political threat to Western Europe diminishes along with the Soviet ability to threaten the democracies there, NATO’s role is being questioned. In the face of the vastly reduced Soviet military threat, NATO for the first time in 42 years finds itself without a clearly defined role in the defense of Western Europe.

NATO is going through a transition period as the newly liberated Eastern European countries experience their first tastes of freedom and democracy and Western European allies seek greater independence from the US with an eye toward European union in 1992. Many Europeans feel that NATO has done its job well over the last 42 years, but has become an anachronism since the end of the Cold War.
From an American point of view, however, NATO remains a viable organization with a continuing role to play in the defense of Europe. As long as the US continues to have vast economic concerns in Europe, NATO will continue to represent the best opportunity for the US to maintain influence in European affairs, and also the best forum through which to guarantee the well-being of these concerns.

This paper examines from an American viewpoint the rationale for the formation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and the reasons for its continuing success over the last 42 years, continuing American interests in Europe with an emphasis on security concerns, alternatives to NATO, and the reasons why NATO continues to represent the best means of securing Western Europe and ensuring American participation in European affairs of mutual concern.

This paper, while examining the issue from an American point of view, attempts to provide valuable insight into why from any standpoint NATO continues to provide the best guarantee of continued peace and economic security in Western Europe.

Terry, Neri G. (Slater) OCT 1990

Selected Intelligence Issues from the Falkland Islands Conflict of 1982

This study examines four separate intelligence issues from the South Atlantic conflict of 1982: indications and warning; mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G); area experts; and advance force ground reconnaissance operations.

Indications and warning failed the United Kingdom because the UK failed to provide defense forces in keeping with the short warning time available. Warning time must be adequate for the defenses available, or deterrence will be a hollow concept. MC&G requirements had not been planned for, but mapping institutions successfully accomplished most missions through ingenuity and hard work. Most importantly, years of research were on the shelf and readily available.

When an operation takes place without warning, intelligence officers must use ingenuity in seeking unusual sources of information. Useful material is available on almost any subject; the problem is finding that gold mine. Intelligence must seek out that person or organization expert on the area in question.

Today technical systems are thought of as the primary means of intelligence collection. The ancient technique of sending a man to see with his own eyes will long be with us, though. The Falklands proved again that intelligence users at the lowest levels will probably be required to provide much of their own intelligence collection. Only through advance force ground reconnaissance was the commander able to see the battlefield.

Thomas, Daniel L. (Gross) SEP 1990

The Grasshopper Rebellion: Israeli and Palestinian Strategies and the Intifada

Before 1987, the international community focused almost exclusively on the external side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1987 this situation suddenly changed when the Palestinians rose against the Israelis, threatening control over the territories like no other event since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. What had previously been overlooked suddenly became the nucleus of the struggle between Palestinian and Israeli.

This shift in focus requires a reexamination of past Israeli and Palestinian policies to determine their impact on the current situation. In light of the rebellion, past actions of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders take on new significance. The effectiveness and results of these strategies determine, and will continue to determine, the direction of this new dimension in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A thorough examination shows that Israeli and Palestinian strategies contributed to the cause of the Intifada and continue to drive its course today. In fact, Israeli policy was the single largest contributor to the factors that led the people to revolt. The Palestinian strategy served to raise hopes and desires of the Palestinian people and channelled their frustration into a nationalist framework. Without these increased expectations, the Intifada would never have occurred. The Palestinians also built an infrastructure of front organizations that eventually became the organizational framework of the uprising leadership. This infrastructure also enabled the people to mobilize once the Intifada began.
The Israeli and Palestinian strategies in response to the uprising have achieved mixed results. The Israelis have found ways to control the uprising, but they have not yet found a way to end it. In fact, many of their efforts probably perpetuate the conflict in the long term. The Palestinian strategy has kept the uprising alive, but the internal fragmentation of the resistance movement threatens to disrupt its successful efforts.

Tribble, Margaret A. (Marsh)  
MAR 1991

New Guinea’s Latent Cocaine Capabilities

International trafficking in illicit drugs is a major threat to the security of the United States. Although progress is being made in the effort to stem the flow of drugs from the cocaine source countries of Latin America, there is evidence of cocaine trafficking in the Pacific Basin. The Pacific Basin contains the world’s second largest island, New Guinea, inclusive of Papua New Guinea, Indonesian West Irian, and hundreds of out-islands. This region can support the cultivation of coca and the processing and trafficking of cocaine. Presently, there is marijuana growth, consumption, and transshipment on the island.

An examination of New Guinea’s potential to become a cocaine source country is made in this paper. Overviews are provided on the cocaine marketing process, coca growth environment in New Guinea, cocaine in Latin America, drug trafficking, and international criminal organizations. The viability of New Guinea as a source country is examined through a comparative analysis between New Guinea and the Latin American cocaine producing states. Topography, vegetation and climate, rivers, mineral and agricultural resources, soil types, cash crops, and transportation infrastructures are compared. Also, comparisons are made of societal diversities, economies, and political stability of the states.

Because similarities can be found in all elements, New Guinea can support cocaine production and trafficking. Additionally, a review of the drug-trafficking criminal organizations indicates that the Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuzas have the potential to cultivate and finance a cocaine industry on the island of New Guinea.

Wald, Beth S. (Zulauf)  
AUG 1991

Perestroika and the KGB

The impact of perestroika on the Committee for State Security (KGB) appears minimal with regard to its structure and operations. The KGB has, however, undertaken an intense public relations effort to demonstrate that it has become a "kinder and gentler" committee. Despite any apparent change within the KGB as an institution, however, its role in Soviet society and within the Soviet government has changed. Of the three traditional pillars of the Soviet Union (the Party, the military, and the KGB) the third has fared the best under perestroika. The power of the Party has faded considerably. The military is undergoing a restructuring and a reduction in size, and ultimately may actually prove to be leaner but tougher. Only the KGB seems to have weathered Gorbachev’s restructuring unharmed. In fact, some have observed that the KGB wields unprecedented power.

This study determines what if any changes the KGB has actually undergone, and whether those changes are purely cosmetic. The KGB has been granted certain new responsibilities, including the realm of economic sabotage. Its mission of acquiring new technologies from the West has also likely assumed a new urgency, given the Soviet lag in the high-tech arena. This report examines the new role the KGB enjoys in the USSR and explores how far its powers extend.
Romme and the Use of Intelligence:
The War in North Africa, February 1941-January 1942

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is recognized as one of the great battlefield commanders in modern military history. His reputation was built on his daring, audacious conduct of maneuver warfare, primarily in North Africa. An aspect not often discussed is the role intelligence played in his battle planning. During his first year in the desert, Rommel had access to intelligence provided by the three main intelligence disciplines: imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and human intelligence. By studying Rommel, one can gain an understanding of the role of intelligence in warfare and how it is best used by military commanders.

After arriving in Tripoli in February 1941, Rommel put his intelligence assets to work. Based on intelligence provided him, Rommel began offensive operations to drive the British and Commonwealth forces out of Cyrenaica. By the end of April, he had reached the Egyptian border and laid siege to the coastal city of Tobruk. A lack of information hampered his initial attempts to reduce the fortress city. Based on tip-offs, he was later able to defeat British relief attempts in May and June.

During the summer of 1941, his intelligence personnel kept active and by October built up an information database on Tobruk to allow planning for a November attack. Due to a combination of poor weather and good British communications security, however, Rommel was caught off guard by Operation Crusader before he could launch his attack. This British action resulted in Rommel's withdrawal to his original starting locations by the end of December 1941.

While Rommel's use of intelligence was not perfect, his battle planning demonstrates the influence of intelligence on operations. Good intelligence enabled him to defeat the British in every instance except Crusader. The British victory in that operation appears to be due to Rommel's personal biases rather than a lack of information.

Weaver, Randy Alan (Wardlaw)

The Community Counternarcotics Board (CCNB): Application of a Successful Model

Despite early objections, a national architecture of counterterrorism organizations was gradually built within the US counterterrorism community through adaptation of existing agencies, policy initiatives, and department directives. That architecture and the enhanced cooperation fostered between agencies as a direct result of its existence have led to a well-coordinated, largely successful US antiterrorist policy supported by a quality intelligence apparatus. The manner in which the counterterrorism community is capable of a coordinated, intensive campaign against terrorism is best illustrated by the virtual absence of terrorist attacks on the part of Middle Eastern terrorist groups during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

There is similar resistance to a "super organization" within the US counternarcotics community. There can be little argument that the drug problem in the US has achieved crisis proportions. Media critics have charged that the community is "an army without a general." The drug problem directly affects many more Americans each year than does terrorism, but the community is, in fact, without a leader. The counterterrorism community is racked with turf battles and parochial bickering. The position of Drug Czar was ostensibly created to fill the leadership gap in the community. Political considerations, however, have ensured that he has authority over nothing but his own staff.

The President has included the Drug War in his National Strategy. According to many polls, Americans consider the drug problem the greatest problem facing America today. Some critics of the effort have proposed the direct involvement of the US military. The imperative exists to create an organization that will begin to address the many problems within the counternarcotics community.

This paper proposes the creation of such an organization based upon the model established by the US counterterrorism community. It examines the need for such an organization and provides recommendations for the composition of a community hierarchy, with specific emphasis on intelligence and policy branches, and it compares the problems of terrorism and drug trafficking and analyzes the groups involved.
The Future European Security Landscape: A Look at the Options

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and apparent demise of communism have ushered in a new era. As Europe seeks its place in the multipolar world, it must have security mechanisms capable of meeting new threats which are vastly different from those of the Cold War era. Current security mechanisms, including NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United Nations (UN), and eventually the European Community (EC), will contribute to European security in the near term. However, as Europe moves into the twenty-first century, a solely European defense community will emerge to provide for European security needs. It will be complemented by the CSCE, which ensures a continued US presence in Europe.

Legislative Reform and the Intelligence Oversight Process

Tension between the executive and legislative branches of the US Government are inherent in the Constitution. As it applies to intelligence and the Intelligence Community, that tension is centered on the oversight process. The mechanisms for congressional oversight of intelligence have evolved through years of response to congressional perceptions of its role. Currently, responsibility for intelligence oversight resides in two congressional intelligence committees, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).

Over the years, many of the changes in the way intelligence oversight was conducted have occurred because of congressional disagreement with the executive branch’s handling of certain foreign and domestic situations. This led to the perception that activities undertaken by the Intelligence Community needed closer scrutiny. In turn, the executive branch has, at times, been a reluctant participant in the congressional oversight process, particularly in light of leaks by the legislative branch of sensitive information gleaned during the process.

One of the more noteworthy proposals that could increase executive and legislative confidence regarding intelligence oversight is the merging of the current Senate and House intelligence committees into a joint intelligence committee. In order to address the merit of this proposal, as well as place it in context, it will be helpful to examine the history of the legislative oversight process. Additionally, a clear understanding of how legislative oversight works, why reforms to it are deemed necessary, and the arguments for and against the formation of a joint intelligence committee will permit a more accurate assessment of the legislative oversight process.

Radiomaskirovka and Communications Intrusion

*Radiomaskirovka*, loosely corresponding to the Western term "communications intrusion," is a sophisticated Soviet military concept too little studied in the West. It lies at the junction of two sets of Soviet military concepts which are, by themselves, extensively studied. Not enough rigorous analytical work has been done concerning how these two sets of concepts interrelate.

One of these central sets of concepts in the Soviet view of modern combat is *radioelektronnaya bor'ba*, or radioelectronic combat (REC). Electronic warfare (EW) is the closest corresponding Western term to REC; however, the Soviet concept of REC includes a wider range of activities than are included in EW, from radio silence to disruption, using techniques dating from the beginning of radio engineering as well as techniques on the cutting edge of Soviet technology.

The other central set of concepts is *maskirovka*. The closest corresponding set of Western concepts is cover, concealment, and deception. Maskirovka is much more pervasive and all-encompassing and apparently operates in nearly all areas of Soviet military operations.
Radiomaskirovka as a bridge between REC and maskirovka has received little attention. Most analysis of the inter-relationship between maskirovka and REC concentrates on radar deceptive countermeasures, such as decoys. Further, most of this work has been done on ground forces. This study of radiomaskirovka will, therefore, address the issue of employment of radiomaskirovka in the Soviet Navy, defining the necessary terms and spelling out the background of radiomaskirovka as a part of both REC and maskirovka. Similarities and differences between Soviet and Western concepts will be clarified. Navy organization for radiomaskirovka will be compared with the already known national-level organization for REC and maskirovka. Examples of possible radiomaskirovka operations will be offered, as well as conclusions on the naval radiomaskirovka mission.
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