UNITED GERMANY, NATIONALISM AND MILITARISM:
POSTSDAM AND THE MAINTENANCE OF TRADITION

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**UNITED GERMANY, NATIONALISM, AND MILITARISM: POTSDAM AND THE MAINTENANCE OF TRADITION**

The rise of a united Germany has spawned fears in the United States of a return of traditional German nationalism and militarism. The present essay analyzes historical dimensions of this problem with reference to the example of the historical symbolism of the town of Potsdam. Long a symbol of the Prussian-German military past, Potsdam as a symbol can no longer be understood in traditional terms. The report explores the connections between the meaning of Potsdam as a symbol and the debate in German society about the military and society.
Since the people of the former German Democratic Republic threw off the bonds of communism and breached the concrete of the inner-German border, American interest in Germany has grown steadily. While most opinion polls in the period 1989-1990 indicated an overwhelmingly positive American attitude toward the unification of Germany, the breathtaking events connected with the transformation of Europe were accompanied in the United States by lingering doubts among certain members of the political class about the revival of German power and the reappearance of the xenophobia that had been so dominant from the Wilhelmine era on. Tellingly, those Americans anxious about nationalism in a united Germany described their fears with words and images drawn almost exclusively from the world before 1945. Scarcely a year passed after unification, before this process led some Americans to reflect with anxiety on the apparent historical meaning of Potsdam.

In the summer of 1991, as the descendants of the Hohenzollern dynasty and the inhabitants of Potsdam prepared to re-inter the remains of King Frederick II at Sanssouci, a correspondent of the New York Times discovered "troubling signs of resurgent nationalism in the newly united nation [of Germany]." (1) Unsettling for this most
respected of US newspapers was the question of "how should the nation honor a long-dead Prussian emperor [sic]?"] The "ornate and lavish" ceremony, replete with "attendants in period uniforms," as well as German army officers, a police orchestra, and a crowd of thousands might well arouse unhappy memories of the "traditions of prussian militarism?" Worse'still, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the architect of German unity planned to be among the tens of thousands. The article equated his intended presence beside Frederick's grave with the disastrous US-German spectacle of 1985, when President Ronald Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl laid a wreath at a military cemetery at Bitburg in the Eifel. The creators of the Bitburg ceremony had hoped to underscore solidarity among NATO allies and to express gratitude to the Federal Republic of Germany for its steadfastness in the storm of the Intermediate Nuclear Force deployments of 1983. But all too quickly, in the eyes of American critics, this organized television symbolism of alliance cohesion became nothing less than a means to honor the dead of the Waffen-SS, and by implication, to excuse the death's head warders of Auschwitz.

The ease with which the correspondent of the New York Times could juxtapose the two ceremonies underscores how difficult many critics find the "uses of the Prussian heritage for today's political purposes." Such a politically inspired use of the past, the article concluded, might well encourage "the wrong kind of German patriotism." All too quickly and with a depressing superficiality, an American publicist linked the ideal of Potsdam and Prussian virtues
with national socialism and the executors of its most reprehensible policies. Most important for the subject of this essay: the link between the glories of the Prussian past and the evils of Nazism remains the catch-phrase "Prussian militarism."

Reflection about Potsdam as a historical force at the end of the 20th century confronts an American observer of Germany with oversimplified images of the past still deeply scarred by the Nazi manipulation of what all too many see as a unitary Prussian-German tradition. The unification of Germany in 1990 has revived cliches in the United States about Potsdam and the Prussian-German past that had dimmed with the years since 1945. In this narrow view, the Prussian-German past stretches back in time as a long and bloody preparation for the coming of Adolf Hitler. Those attributes of the Prussian heritage that its defenders associate with Potsdam—simplicity, modesty, conscientiousness and self-sacrifice—are really nothing more than the naive qualities that, in the hands of militarists, enemies of democracy, and national socialists, allowed them to unleash their disasters. One cannot escape the odd feeling that the sights and sounds of Josef Goebbels' "Day of Potsdam" are only a few months old, and the correspondent of the New York Times accepted at face value the propagandistic attempt of the national socialists to seize the myths and legends of Frederick's Prussia for their own. This caricature reduces to absurdity the complex process of alliance formation between German conservatives and national socialists from 1930 until 1933; further, it makes nonsense of the
dynamics of this alliance as applied to the Reichswehr for which Potsdam symbolized a unifying ethos of military professionalism. (2)

This caricature of German history is clearly evident in William L. Shirer's script for Frank Capra's "Why We Fight" film of 1945. It posits continuity between the Hohenzollerns of the 18th century, the wars of German unification, the Day of Potsdam and the second world war. This generalization is also true of Shirer's magnum opus of three decades ago, the Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, which embodies this caricature of Prussian-German history and is still a widely read book in the United States.(3) These generalizations are to be found in yet another work with origins in psychological warfare, A.J.P. Taylor's Course of German History, which portrays the development of Prussia and Germany in similarly bleak and pre-ordained terms.(4) Perhaps more daunting for a contemporary American historian of Germany, Shirer's revised afterword for his Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, published in May 1990, suggests that, despite more than forty years of democracy, a united Germany may prove little better than the Third Reich and the world should keep this new Germany in check with the threat of thermo-nuclear annihilation. (5)

One can only agree with the exasperated judgment of Professor Michael Geyer of the University of Chicago, who argues that the American view of Prussia remains deeply shaped by a bizarre combination of the theatricality of William II, on the one hand, and, on the other, by William's shadow in Eric von Stroheim (an Austrian-
trained officer turned director/actor) whose film roles caricatured the Prussian-German officer in the golden years of Hollywood.(6)

The revival of war-time ideas about Prussia and Germany contained in the *New York Times* article described above reflects the persistence of these stereotypes among certain quarters of US society. This fact is especially troubling when one considers the thriving community of scholars of Germany in the United States, the intensity of intellectual exchange between the Federal Republic and the United States, and the thousands of college students who study about Germany. One would hope that the sum of these efforts would overcome such stereotypes with a more sophisticated understanding of the origins and consequences of national socialism in the past and present. The persistence of such simplistic views of German history and its symbols says rather less about the past than about the stresses and strains of post-cold war America's attempt to come to grips with a changing world.

The present essay is concerned with this phenomenon of historical misunderstanding as it pertains to the meaning of Potsdam. What follows describes not so much the history of Potsdam itself, but how over-simplified images of the military past accord poorly with the full complexity of historical reality. Potsdam long appeared to many outside of Germany as the cradle of the Prussian-German military heritage. Therefore, the political debates about the meaning of competing versions of the military heritage in the Federal Republic have important implications for the image of Potsdam as a historical force in a united Germany and a changed world. These lines contain
an analysis of how this image in the past and present raises questions about the long-term effects of the maintenance of military tradition in today's world. This issue also has implications for the future of the German-American relationship. Many Americans remain transfixed by an image of German history confined to a very rudimentary understanding of the events from 1933 until 1945. They poorly comprehend the German process of democratic consolidation since 1945. This enterprise is, of course, anything but static and has entered a new phase with the absorption of the citizens of the former German Democratic Republic. The following lines on the question of military tradition in the recent past and the debate about the meaning of this term are but part of this process of democratic consolidation.

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The fractures and divisions in German society after 1871 have reappeared in the attempt of later generations to agree about the image of the past and its political meaning in the present. The current (February 1992) phase of Vergangenheitsbewältigung connected with the ethical, intellectual and cultural demise of the German Democratic Republic only underscores this generalization; this most recent episode has antecedents in which Germans have held deeply divided views about the meaning and the uses of the past. Amid the discontinuities that have marked German politics since the wars of unification, certain members of society have naturally tried to highlight features of national life that assure continuity and legitimacy amid a world that has seen the rise and fall of regimes since 1871. This creation of traditions out of turmoil has sparked a
seemingly unending debate as Germans have confronted the upheavals of state and society in 1918, 1933, 1945, and 1989. They have faced a constant choice about the valid and invalid aspects of the past.

Surely relevant for the meaning of Potsdam has been the debate that troubled the body politic about the divided heritage of professional German soldiers. With the experience of victory, defeat, damnation, and rehabilitation, the professional soldier has struggled intensely in post-war Germany with the attributes of his ethos and self-image that have been in the midst of constant change since the start of this century. All too many West and East Germans looked upon the conditions of soldierly life in the cold war with skepticism and distrust; post-war Germany saw none of the enthusiasm for arms that marked the era prior to the world wars. This phenomenon of the world after 1945 fostered a constant and at times heated debate about the impact of the past on the political present and the utility of the maintenance of tradition in a modern, pluralistic, industrialized society. While this set of questions now deserves a careful analysis for the German Democratic Republic and its Nationale Volksarmee, chief emphasis here must remain on the Bundeswehr. The meaning of military tradition emerged in the Federal Republic of the 1950s and 1960s as a barometer of the health of West German democracy as it struggled with the unwanted military burdens of national existence in the cold war: the armament of the Federal Republic of Germany and the integration of the FRG into the NATO alliance.
One of the most difficult problems connected with the soldierly heritage is the belief among its devotees that there exists a single body of military tradition that reaches back to the distant past. While all military institutions share certain core values, ideas, and customs handed down from one generation to the next, too many observers of military life see armies as hide-bound by tradition; soldiers appear locked in monolithic organizations that resist all change. Adherence to this cult of the past assumes a kind of unity of military tradition that reduces to insignificance the diversity and dynamism that are present in armies in the past and present. A vulgar example of this phenomenon is to be found in the belief of some Americans that the Nationale Volksarmee of the GDR was "more traditional," and "more Prussian" than the West German military because it retained certain customs and militaria of the soldier before 1945. The Bundeswehr, where the ideal of a functionalist, streamlined army took hold in the 1950s, appears to its American critics as devoid of tradition and cut off from the life-giving roots to the past visible in symbols, ceremonies and formal discipline. That is to suggest, that the essence of the Prussian tradition can in some magic way be reduced to such rituals and symbols as the parade march and the changing of the guard before Neue Wache in Berlin. In fact, however, military tradition encompasses vastly more than merely silver braid on field-gray cloth and a Schellenbaum on parade. It concerns the heart and soul of military institutions and the process of continuity and changes in the values, customs and ideas that underlie these institutions as well as the men and women who constitute them.(7) Perhaps one view of this unitary, yet tragically broken tradition as it
applies to Potsdam, can be found in a small autobiography, entitled appropriately enough, *The Spirit of Potsdam*, by Kurt Hesse.(8) This book proved popular among certain officers of the Bundeswehr in the late-1960s. Hesse came to prominence in the mid-1920s as an author on the psychological aspects of military professionalism, the legacy of the *Fronterlebnis*, and the desire for a "peoples' community" among the ranks of younger Reichswehr officers.(9) His *Spirit of Potsdam* of some four decades later reflects a conservative view of military tradition and recalls his attempt in the Third Reich to publish a kind of catalogue of sources of "soldierly tradition."(10) Within his pages, Potsdam appears as the leitmotif of his own military life and his ideal of military professionalism. This identification with Prussian ideals of military service was, for better or worse, rather out of style in the Federal Republic of 1967. Hesse's military and historical ideals emerge in his description of his adolescence in Wilhelmine Prussia and Potsdam; these images, experiences and personalities reappear through the various stages of his career in the Prussian army, the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. Hesse's evocation of Potsdam portrays to the reader of 1967 a vanished and vilified world, misused by the Nazis, bombed by the western allies, banned and dismembered by the victors, abused by the communists (they were about to tear down the ruins of the Garnisonkirche) and treated with indifference and apathy by young west Germans. (11) The richness of the symbolism and beauty of Potsdam are all the more poignant, because the spirit that moved within its places and personalities experienced its final and sublime expression in the attempt on Adolf Hitler's life on the 20th of July 1944. Thereafter, the combination of Roland
Freisler's Volksgerichtshof and allied bombs reduced these Prussians and their lovely setting to ashes and ruins.

Hesse's ghostly recollection of his life as a young man, set against a devastated Potsdam of 1946, is, on one level, highly compelling; in a way, the tone of the book anticipates the revival of wide interest in Prussia that took hold in the Federal Republic at the end of the 1970s and which also spread to the GDR. But on another level, the book is somewhat misleading with its suggestion of continuity across the disjunctions of modern German history. For following generations to regard Hesse as a lyrical exemplar of the "spirit of Potsdam" is to misjudge the radical and innovative quality of his conception of military professionalism in the 1920s. His ideas about the meaning of military service and the requirements of peacetime training and education diverged sharply from the code of the early Reichswehr leadership. The publication of his work in 1925 on the ideals of a "young army" led to an outspoken response from Friedrich von Rabenau, the later head of the military archives, and Hans von Seeckt's biographer. That is to say, the figure who posed as a custodian of tradition in 1967, was himself in another, earlier context, seen by the guardians of tradition in the Reichswehr as an iconoclast. Such a generalization is all the more true when one reflects that Hesse closes his book with an extended citation from Clausewitz's "political declaration," (12) which, one hardly need add, was anything other than traditional when its author composed it amid the turmoil of 1812 and his impending break with the Prussian court. (13) All too many Americans who speak of the Prussian
tradition foolishly place Clausewitz in a kind of continuity with such a figure as Frederick II. In reality, the experience of Prussian-German arms reveals far more variety, diversity, and conflict than those who appeal to tradition would often have one believe.

But Hesse's work may have been finally more important for its impact on certain west German military officers. This fact also suggests, on closer analysis, how difficult it is to speak of a unitary image of military tradition in contemporary Germany. Hesse's book was apparently required reading among a circle of men who looked with veiled suspicion on a senior German officer of the time, who also appealed to the spirit of Potsdam in a somewhat different context: Wolf Graf von Baudissin. As a leading figure associated with the ethical reform in the Bundeswehr of the 1950s and 1960s, Baudissin had before the war been an regimental adjutant in the elite Reichswehr Infantry Regiment Number 9 of Potsdam, where the maintenance of the lineage and honors of the Prussian Guard regiments of the old army formed an important feature of garrison life. But Baudissin's career after 1950 revealed him to be anything other than a blinkered devotee of military tradition; rather, he argued that the new army must embrace an enlightened ideal of service and discipline, all of which recalled Prussian ideals visible in the reform movement of the early 19th century and the resistance to Hitler. Baudissin's role from 1951 until 1958 as the chief spokesman for the young Bundeswehr to a very skeptical west German press brought him into constant conflict about the meaning of the soldierly past; this role also aroused the rage of veteran officers who felt their
honor besmirched by a younger generation of officers. Many conservative younger officers, also skeptical of Baudissin, read Hesse's lines with pleasure. They interpreted his ideals of tradition to defy those critics in West German society who detested the military as a remnant of an authoritarian past. An appeal to tradition in this context offered a refuge from the conditions of military service in a hostile society; this reality suggests why the subject of military tradition has remained controversial in modern German society.

This debate about tradition in the Bundeswehr began in the mid-1950s and, despite the passage of time, seems to be no closer to resolution as of this writing. The list of those who have wrestled with this issue reaches from Baudissin in the early '50s to his successors of today. By the early 1960s, events compelled the military thinkers in the Bonn's Ministry of Defense to spell out some kind of code of military tradition for the young army. Colonel Hans Meier-Welcker, the first head of the military historical research office, and veteran of the Reichswehr, Wehrmacht and Bundeswehr was one of the many who grappled with the interplay of history and tradition in the 1960s. His writings in this context well exemplify the difficulties that apply both to a historical understanding of Potsdam and its role as a symbol in the present. At issue at the time of his effort was an attempt within the Ministry of Defense to draft a compact and unitary "image of history," to be issued within a ministerial decree on the meaning and contents of tradition. Such an "image of history" would form an intellectual bridge between the historical-political professional ideals of the military world before 1945 and the civil-
military compromise at the end of the Konrad Adenauer era; this was a ministerial enterprise with little prospect of success.

In a memorandum to the command staff regarding the intellectual pitfalls of this official policy of the Bundeswehr towards the soldierly heritage, Meier-Welcker highlighted the fundamental conflict between the requirements of tradition on the one hand, and those of history on the other. Tradition, in its essence, is "unchanging, continuous and free of problems."(14) Tradition is exclusively positive in what it says to the present and future. The advocates of tradition eradicate the discrepancy between historical reality and the ideals of tradition, the latter of which are adapted to the ideals of the moment. The person who adheres to tradition takes from old and antiquated ideas as much as he or she likes; they are thus conservative. In addition, however, the traditionalist imposes his ideas and those of his own time on the past. In doing so, he creates an unbroken picture of "authentic" soldierhood, "authentic" comradeship, and "authentic" soldierly virtues.

This essence of tradition, Meier-Welcker further wrote, stands in contrast to the nature of history. "History...is full of problems and criticism." History tries to grasp events and personalities in their contemporary reality. It seeks to comprehend problems in their own time, neither as symbols nor as spiritual and moral values. It does not support tradition, rather it destroys the simple unity of its ideals. History and historical consciousness, on the one side, and traditional consciousness, on the other, lie at two different levels. Each has its own purpose and value, but if they are placed in relation to each
other, then they contradict one another. (15) Put another way, one can characterize Meier-Welcker's words as a denial of the intellectual honesty of attempts in the German past and present to order an image of history from above. This sin had been committed by those Wilhelmines who dictated a Borussian image of the history of the fatherland, and by those national-socialists who ordered a pure and idealized germanic-aryan past; most recently it has been propagated by those SED ideologues who created an idealized set of traditions for the state of workers and peasants -- all of these "official histories" are now objects of political rancor, historical curiosity and scholarly debate.

Similarly, the attempt to package an "image of history" for the Bundeswehr ended in failure in 1961; no German soldier since then receives a little handbook -- like the pocket-sized song books of the Wehrmacht -- that contains an officially sanctioned version of the German past. In the three decades since, the Ministry of Defense has faced a constant effort to adapt the image of the soldierly heritage to the conditions of a changing German society, an effort that has stirred renewed controversy in Germany at the time of this writing about the legacy of the professional soldier in the two German dictatorships of the 20th century. (16)

How do Meier-Welcker's generalizations apply to Potsdam as an historical force in the present? This process of historical self-examination, of which this 30 year old memorandum is but a tiny part, reflects a healthy body politic; it is an inevitable phenomenon of a pluralistic society that is in the flux of change. Such change,
perforce, leads to a continual re-examination of the past; as a consequence, groups in society inevitably appeal to the legitimizing "lessons of the past," which contemporaries in turn often describe as traditions. As such, there exists, one might suggest, a necessary conflict between the essence of historical reality on the one hand, and the partisan and instrumental use of the past for political ends in the present that proceeds under the banner of the maintenance of tradition, on the other. Those men and women who today would restore aspects of a static or overly partisan tradition around Potsdam are flirting with danger. They would do well to avoid the temptation described by Meier-Welcker to pick and choose carelessly from the past, thus blinding themselves to its complexity and cross purposes. The foregoing looms all the more important because there is much of worth in the Prussian past that has endured despite the partisan distortions of the late 19th and mid-20th century centuries; it is ridiculous to dismiss much of Prussian history as the remnant of a "pre-democratic" past that in some way endangers the substance of the German democracy of today. Indeed, the challenges of constructing a new, democratic Europe across the divide of war and ideological struggle require the Prussian qualities of selflessness, thrift, self-sacrifice, duty, candor. as well as the ideal of service rooted in ethics. Those who today appeal to these virtues connected with richness of Potsdam's past are anything other than Prussian militarists, German nationalists, or neo-Nazis. One can take pleasure in the return of the carillon to the site of the Garnisonskirche, and, upon hearing Mozart's theme: "Ueb' immer Treu und Redlichkeit," distinguish this tone from the echo of diving Stukas and the barked
commands of SS guards in a concentration camp. At the same time, one should be repulsed by skin-heads and neo-Nazis who slash and burn foreigners while hoisting aloft the war flag of the German empire. A balanced and thorough knowledge of the past, free of the ill-effects of pernicious political symbolism, should allow one to distinguish continuities and discontinuities in the German present and future.

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Those Americans who are anxious about the re-burial of Frederick II in Potsdam as a harbinger of integral nationalism in Germany should direct their attention to how Germans have confronted the political, social, and ethical consequences of dictatorship twice since 1945. The events in this process, little known in the United States, fail to fit into the familiar stereotypes described earlier in this essay; nowhere are to be found roaring crowds, marching columns, or fluttering banners. What one might describe as a double \textit{Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung} has become a painful and bitter process of historical discovery and self-examination. It forms a principal feature of German political life; plainly, those who fail to understand the dynamics of this process little comprehend the reality of present-day Germany. What violent nationalism does remain in Germany -- visible in the disgusting outbursts of skin-head and neo-Nazi violence -- cannot be explained solely in terms of a revival of the personalities, ideas, and circumstances of the world before 1933; rather, these events seem to fit within a European-wide revival of
integral nationalism that affects most of the nations of western and central Europe, as well as those of the collapsed Soviet empire.

Seen within this current struggle for democracy, the Day of Potsdam recedes into the shadows, and the revival of Potsdam as the capital of the state of Brandenburg in a united Germany assumes yet greater importance. As of this writing, the people of Brandenburg along with much of the rest of Europe suffer with the political, moral, and ethical consequences left by those who promised utopias in the 20th century. Outstanding in this process are not so much the revival of the causes of national socialism, and its supposed "Prussian roots," but the legacy of national socialism in eastern Germany and the human wreckage of total political control over 17 million Germans. The process of constructing a democracy out of the ruins of dictatorship takes place under the gaze of central and eastern Europeans who face perhaps even greater physical and ethical hurdles than do the Germans. Their joint task will continue for years to come and vitally affects the prosperity and welfare of all Americans.

One might suggest, in conclusion, yet another historical meaning of Potsdam, that of the meeting of the great powers in Cecillienhof in July 1945, has greater importance today than the Day of Potsdam in March 1933. During this writer's lifetime, the victors' summit stood at the beginning of what for so long was the "present era"; it had signified the onset of the bi-polar division of Europe and the dismemberment of Germany, all of which seemed to have become permanent features of the international system of states. The passing
of this unnatural and yet familiar world heralds the onset of profound changes in the relations between the major powers. This generalization applies particularly to the statecraft of the United States and a United Germany. Both nations must find a new modus procendi in a multi-polar international system of states, where the advantages of supra-national consolidation and integration collide with the dangers of economic dislocation and social turmoil. This conflict between supra-national integration, on the one hand, and retrograde integral nationalism, on the other, has sharpened since 1990-1991. The outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Central Asia, as well as rising economic discord among the major powers reflect this worrisome trend. But one thing that really should little concern Americans today is the role of Potsdam as the breeding ground of old-fashioned militarism and nationalism. The appeal to military tradition described in this essay reveals a historical force far more complex and varied than many a newspaper correspondent would have contemporary readers believe; but above all else, it is a spent historical force. All those attentive to the requirements of citizenship and statecraft in this tumultuous world would do well to examine more closely the winged-words that accompany political debate about the great themes of the moment. The complexities of Potsdam, military tradition and modern democratic Germany might well stand as a reminder and warning to those Americans who continue to see the German present solely in terms of a propaganda-laden past. A successful German democracy can safely honor the kings of Prussia in Potsdam, while it confronts the challenges of
national reconstruction and European integration at the beginning of the 21st century.
ENDNOTES


(2) On the Day of Potsdam, 21 March 1933, see Manfred Schlenke, "Das 'preussische Beispiel' in Propaganda und Politik des Nationalsozialismus," in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 3 July 1968; a revealing discussion of historical imagery and symbolism in Prussia and Germany is: Peter Paret, Art as History: Episodes in the Culture and Politics of Nineteenth Century Germany (Princeton, 1988); on the military aspects of the above, see Gustav-Adolf Caspar, et al Tradition in deutschen Streitkraeften bis 1945 (Herford/Bonn, 1986).


(8) Kurt Hesse, Der Geist von Potsdam, (Mainz, 1967).

(9) Kurt Hesse, Von der nahen Aera der 'jungen Armee' (Berlin, 1925; also see his, Wandlung des Soldaten: Versuch einer Begrundung des deutschen Berufssoldatentums (Berlin, 1931) as well as his: Die deutsche soldatische Tradition: Zeugnisse deutschen Soldatentums aus fuenf Jahrhunderten (Frankfurt, 1936).


(14) This discussion is drawn from this author's *Reforging the Iron Cross*, p. 195. A copy of Meier-Welcker's memorandum is to be found in Zentrum Innere Fuehrung, Zentrales Unterrichtsarchiv-Dokumentationsstelle, 3.1.2.2. "MGFA I, Az 35-08-07 an BMVg Fue B I mit Anlage 'Grundgedanken zur Bearbeitung des Traditionserlasses'" 16 November 1961.


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