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RESEARCH REPORT

OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES--U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD
TURKEY IN THE 1990s

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL R. SCHAFFENBERGER
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OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES -- U. S. STRATEGY TOWARD TURKEY
IN THE 1990s

by

Paul R. Schaffenberger
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

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Advisors: Dr. Mohammed E. Ahrari
Dr. David Albright

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Options and Opportunities--U. S. Strategy Toward Turkey in the 1990s

AUTHOR: Paul R. Schaffenberger, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

The rapidly changing landscape of Europe and the changes in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf war combine to shape a critical role for Turkey in the 1990s. Turkey's strategic location, her increased importance to NATO vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, her economic potential and economic needs, her potential to control critical water resources in the Middle East, and the significance of her military resources all have enormous strategy implications for the United States. Complicating these significant issues are many political sensitivities and uncertainties in dealing with the European Community, the nations of the Middle East, and neighboring states. Therefore, a cogent and consistent U. S. strategy is needed to delineate Turkey's future role as an ally of the West and a link to the Middle East.
Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Schaffenberger (M.P.A., Northern Michigan University, B.S., United States Air Force Academy) has done research in world political and military affairs throughout his career. He has had numerous articles published, particularly in the realm of the strategic nuclear balance, and was a finalist in the 1983 USAF Ira Eaker Essay Competition. His interest in the Middle East was increased through his participation in the 1984 Lebanon crisis, for which he earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal and the Air Medal, and through his participation in aerial missions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. An engineer by background, Lieutenant Colonel Schaffenberger has also published several articles in electronic journals. Lieutenant Colonel Schaffenberger is a member of the Air War College, class of 1991.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The forces of history are converging on Turkey. The demise of the Warsaw Pact has refocused Turkey's role from being the protector of NATO's Southern flank to being NATO's principal geographically contiguous front with the Soviet Union. The current Gulf Crisis has provided an illuminating example of Turkey's geostrategic position as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey's expanding military and economic might serve to strengthen its linchpin role.

The confluence of all of these factors shapes a critical post-bellum role for Turkey. While the skeptic would point to the many economic, cultural, and societal problems that Turkey faces in the next decade, the realist recognizes the increasing significance of the strategic dimensions of this geographically and culturally unique nation.

These growing strategic dimensions complement the strategic realities facing the United States in the 1990's. Declining military budgets, a smaller force structure, and an increasingly diverse, multipolar world all suggest a strategy that relies on a dispersed system of regional power centers to advance United States policy.

In developing this strategy, it is essential to recognize that the roots of Turkey's regional relationships span a millenium, and it is naive to think that these relationships can
be quickly or easily altered. It is also necessary to recognize that the enormous complexity of the forces acting upon Turkey do not lend themselves to simple analysis. Therefore, this paper will focus on those key issues and those key relationships that hold the greatest potential for advancing U. S. national interests.

The historic changes of the past year mandate a new U. S. strategy toward Turkey. This strategy is born out of consideration for Turkey's strategic significance, the changing external and internal political environment, Turkey's interests and concerns, and special issues emanating from the Gulf crisis. Formulated within the framework of traditional U. S. support of NATO, the proposed strategy proffers options and opportunities to establish Turkey's role as a key link between the West and the Middle East.
CHAPTER II

TURKEY’S STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

Turkey’s strategic significance has been strongly reaffirmed by recent events in the Persian Gulf and can be expressed in four dimensions -- the geostrategic dimension, the economic dimension, the resource dimension, and the military dimension.

The geostrategic significance of Turkey simply cannot be overstated. It currently represents NATO’s principal geographically contiguous border with the Soviet Union. It further controls waterways key to any Soviet maritime strategy—the Bosporous and the Dardanelles. It is bordered on the northwest by the potentially unstable Balkan republics. To its south are the Middle Eastern states of Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The recent war in the Persian Gulf illustrates the volatility of this region, and Turkey’s key geostrategic role. Finally, Turkey’s vital lines of communication in the Aegean Sea are bordered by historic rival, Greece.

A second dimension of Turkey’s strategic significance is economic. Turkey has experienced a rapid economic growth in the last twenty years. This growth has increased in significance because of the relative economic decline of neighboring states, namely the Soviet Union and the newly independent East European states. While Turkey’s economy is no match for West European economies, there are some significant factors and trends in Turkey’s economy. First, Turkey has developed solid economic
relationships in the Middle East, particularly with Iraq. Second, Turkey has seen a recent increase in trade with the Soviet Union. Turkey is thus a key economic conduit to both the Middle East and Eastern Europe. (1)

A third dimension of Turkey's strategic significance is that of resources. While not energy independent, Turkey controls one resource vital to its Middle East neighbors--water. Through vast ongoing dam projects on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Turkey will gain control by 1998 of the key water resources that dramatically affect the economic and physical well-being of her Middle East neighbors.

A final strategic dimension of Turkey is the military dimension. Turkey possesses some of the most significant military bases in NATO. The bases in Northern Turkey provide intelligence on Soviet space and naval activities. Other bases, such as Incirlik Air Base, provide a potential staging point for both logistical and/or strike operations in the Middle East. The military resources of Turkey itself are also not insignificant. Turkey possesses the largest combined armed forces in NATO. With a large population base, Turkey is able to contribute significant human resources to military endeavors. In addition to her regular forces, Turkey has a reserve force of six million. (2)
CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE

While recognizing Turkey's strategic significance, it is also necessary to evaluate the political climate in which Turkey must operate. Political relationships with Europe, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Eastern Europe, and arch-rival Greece, present a challenging political maze. An understanding of this environment is central in the formulation of U. S. strategy with respect to Turkey.

Relations with Europe

Despite its historic and cultural ties to the Middle East, Turkey, since the time of Ataturk, has clearly chosen to identify with Western Europe. With the whirlwind changes occurring in Europe today, the Europeans appear less focused on their distant cousin, Turkey, and are instead preoccupied with the more immediate and pressing social and economic problems of their nearby East European neighbors. In defending their attitude toward Turkey, West Europeans point out that Turkey is religiously Muslim and geographically Asiatic, and they question Turkey's commitment to democratic values, citing her questionable human rights record. (3)

The forces of change are creating a confusing political and economic landscape in Europe. An overarching attitude of "Europe for Europeans" seems to be evolving, an inward focus that promises dramatic changes in the internal and external relationships of European member nations.
It appears that NATO will continue to play a predominant role in Europe, though it remains to be seen whether its primary influence within Europe will be essentially military or political. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has not brought a response in kind by NATO. NATO's continued existence has been ensured through Soviet repression in the Baltics and the resurgence of hard-line tactics in other republics.

While NATO's continuing existence appears to be secure, there is a scramble among the nations of Europe to secure political, military, and economic arrangements...all of which can potentially dilute the significance of NATO. The formation of the European Community (EC) portends the creation of a solidified European trading block that will eliminate tariffs and strengthen the European economies through cooperative efforts. The Western European Union (WEU), resurrected from the former Brussels Pact, serves as a military coalition for operations that are out of the NATO area. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) seeks to increase collective security and cooperation in Europe's central region. Complementing this for the Mediterranean is the Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

Unfortunately, Turkey has not been a major participant in any of these cooperative efforts. She has applied for membership in the EC, but the application will not be considered until 1993. She was invited as an observer to the WEU proceedings only after strong pressure from the United States. She was not included in CSCM or CSCE discussions.
Relations in the Middle East

In the Middle East, the political atmosphere is largely one dominated by historic distrust. Modern Turkey still evokes memories of the Ottoman Empire, and many of the Middle East nations believe that Turkey has territorial ambitions there. (6) Furthermore, Turkey's acceptance of Western values and her relatively democratic, elected form of government do not play well to a region consisting of authoritarian as well as some religiously dominated regimes.

Relations with the Soviet Union

The political atmosphere with regard to the Soviet Union is best characterized as one of guarded trust. While the Turks still consider the Soviets the main threat to their security, there are some ironic twists in the relationship. First of all, the Turks support a degree of Soviet hegemony over historically Ottoman Turkish areas of the Soviet Union, such as Armenia and portions of Azerbaijan, since the intense social, economic and cultural problems outweigh any Pan-Turkism sentiment. (7) Secondly, Turkey is dependent on the Soviets for her supply of natural gas, and has greatly expanded her trade relations with the Soviets. (8) The Soviets are thus best described as an enemy that Turkey cannot afford to live without.

Relations in Eastern Europe

The political atmosphere in the newly-independent states of Eastern Europe is one of both competition and distrust of Turkey. Some neighboring states, such as Bulgaria, base their distrust upon historic animosities with the Turks. Other Eastern European
states feel that they are in competition with Turkey for economic stature and for the prize of EC recognition and/or membership.

**Disputes with Greece**

Any discussion of the political climate surrounding Turkey must include a discussion of Greece. Traditional animosities between Turkey and Greece have been exacerbated in recent years by disputes over Cyprus, differences about airspace and territorial claims in the Aegean, and disputes over militarization of various islands in the Aegean. (9) While Turkey tends to downplay its differences with its neighbor, Greece takes a very aggressive attitude in highlighting the problems and differences. This aggressive attitude on the part of the Greeks has a negative political impact on the Turks, as the Greeks are members of the United Nations, NATO, and the European Community, and use these forums to air their grievances with Turkey. This rhetoric tends to deprecate Turkey's goal of identifying itself with Europe.

**Summation**

To reduce the complex political environment to a simple statement, it can be said that Turkey is viewed as too repressive and culturally remote by the democracies of Western Europe, viewed as too democratic and secular by the authoritarian and/or religious regimes of the Middle East, and hamstrung by historical animosities with other countries. In the context of multilateral relationships, this often has left Turkey as the "odd man out". As a result, Turkey increasingly relies on bilateral relationships to fulfill national objectives. (10)
CHAPTER IV

TURKISH INTERESTS AND CONCERNS

The formulation of United States strategy toward Turkey must consider Turkey's interests and concerns. These fall into several general categories. The first category is Turkey's relationships with European allies. A second and related area is economic concerns. Third, Turkey is concerned about issues with its neighboring states. Fourth, Turkey has clear military concerns. Finally, Turkey has several internal issues that affect strategy formulation.

Formal European Relationships

In viewing Turkey's formal relationships with European nations, there is one relationship that it values above all others--its membership in NATO, and one that it covets above all others--its membership in the EC.

As its singular most important link to Western Europe, Turkey attaches great importance to its membership in the NATO alliance. (11) Turkey points with pride to the fact that she contributes a higher percentage of her gross national product to defense than any other NATO member, and that her standing force of 800,000 represents the largest force in the alliance except for that of the United States. (12) Turkey willingly participates in NATO exercises, and strongly supports NATO decisions. This was evident in the recent Gulf crisis, in which Turkey played a major military, economic and political role.
Changing Threat to NATO

While Turkey strongly supports NATO, changes in Eastern Europe have heightened security concerns in Istanbul vis-a-vis the Soviets. Instead of occupying the southern flank of the East-West battlefield, Turkey can arguably state that she now bears the brunt of the Soviet military might on her borders. (13) While the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement lessens the overall risk of confrontation in Europe, it does, in effect, transfer much of the risk to the Turks.

In a positive sense, however, the CFE agreement will afford Turkey modernization of its armed forces through cascading of modern weapons systems that will be removed from the Central Region. Under the harmonization plan, both Turkey and Greece stand to benefit qualitatively and quantitatively in their weaponry.

The Prize of EC Membership

With the same intensity that Turkey supports NATO, it covets membership in the European Community. For the Turks, EC membership would mark an acceptance by Europe of Turkey's claim to be a Western nation. In addition, Turkey sees EC membership as an opportunity to bring its economy up to a level with the rest of Europe. (14) In rejecting Turkey's membership in the EC, members point to Turkey as a largely agricultural state that poses a potential drain on the community's overall economy. Turkey, however, sees the rejection for EC membership as a cultural or even racial slur. (15)

While Turkey's application for EC membership is to be considered in 1993, the Turks also express concern over being
left out of other developing relationships in Europe in the meantime, such as the CSCE, CSCM, or WEU meetings. Despite the resolute military support of NATO, the Turks feel rejected in the political and economic spheres in Europe.

Economic Issues

Trade Issues

Central to Turkey's desire for economic integration with Europe is the issue of free trade. Of particular concern are trade barriers to Turkish textiles by the European community. Although efforts are being made to eliminate textile tariffs, the protectionist sentiment in Europe makes that prospect unlikely.

While attempting to compete equitably in the Western market place, Turkey has also sought to expand to new markets. This has led to a 68.9 percent increase in exports to Eastern Europe from 1988 to 1989 and a 40 percent increase in two-way trade in 1990. Turkey's largest trading partner in Eastern Europe has been the Soviet Union, with bilateral trade approaching one billion dollars. (16)

Energy Issues

The increased trade with the Soviet Union is the direct result of Turkey's greatest economic concerns—the need for energy resources. Turkey must import about 80 percent of its energy requirements, and the Soviets provide needed natural gas. (17) Oil has been obtained from the Middle East, primarily from Iraq, but the Gulf crisis has resulted in Turkey's voluntary
cutoff of these supplies. This vulnerability to energy supply
disruptions is of obvious concern to Turkey as an emerging
industrial power.

A related energy issue is the Southwest Anatolia Dam
Project, in which Turkey will construct 21 dams by 2005 to
increase energy production and expand industrialization of the
southern region of Turkey. (18) A further benefit will be the
regulation of it's own water supplies through a system of
reservoirs; however, this network of reservoirs also provides
Turkey the leverage to control water resources to neighboring
states in the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.

Turkey's Industrial Base

Turkey's rise as an industrial power depends not only on
energy sources, but also on expansion of its industrial base.
Turkey's leadership has consistently placed a high priority on
modernizing and enlarging this base. Such an emphasis has
resulted in joint ventures in recent years, particularly in the
aerospace realm. These include coproduction of F-16 fighter
airframes with General Dynamics, F-16 engine coproduction with
General Electric, and F-16 radar coproduction with Westinghouse.
Among other projects are coproduction of a light military
transport aircraft with Aeritalia, an Italian firm; the
development of a helicopter production facility; and several
joint ventures with the Soviets, which include the procurement of
Soviet passenger aircraft. Turkey's expanding industrial base
has encouraged foreign investment and has yielded a trade surplus
over the past two years. (19)
Relations with Neighboring States

Along with its economic concerns, Turkey perceives increasing area political concerns. These concerns include building trusting relationships with Arab neighbors, dealing with the Kurdish problem, and settling Greek/Turkish differences.

The themes of confidence building and regional interdependence are repeatedly used by high-ranking Turkish officials as a means to promote security in the region. Prior to the Gulf war, Turkey had developed a strong trade relationship with Iraq, and it has pointed to economic interdependence as a means of averting future crises in the region.

The Southwest Anatolia project is being touted by Turkish President Turgut Ozal as one such project that will enhance the peace and stability of the region, however, the water situation may instead prove to be a source of conflict among Turkey’s neighbors in the coming years. Turkey’s dam project has immediate consequences on the water availability in Syria and Iraq, but has indirect effects as far south as Jordan and Israel. This is because Syria, to ensure her own water supply in the face of Turkey’s potential control of the Tigris and Euphrates waters, is planning a dam project on the the Yarmuk River, a main tributary of the Jordan River. (20) Jordan’s Crown Prince Hassan has warned that the struggle over water may provoke the next Middle East war. (21) While Turkish President Turgut Ozal has called for a conference on water in the Fall of 1991, tensions over this issue are likely to remain high.
Turkey's stated desires for peace and stability in the region are also undermined by the perception of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors that it has territorial ambitions. President Ozal has repeatedly stated that Turkey has no territorial ambitions in the region, but even Turkey's conduct in the Gulf war has done little to ease deeply-rooted fears among Arab neighbors.

Another political concern that Turks share with their Middle Eastern neighbors is the Kurdish problem. Nomadic Kurds occupy portions of Syria, Iraq, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Turkey. A Kurdish separatist movement, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), has conducted terrorist attacks within Turkey, with the apparent support of Syria. This has had a backlash effect in Turkey against the Kurdish minority, with accusations of repression and human rights violations. (22)

Turkish officials have stated that they consider the Kurdish issue a separate problem of each of the individual nations. They bristle at the suggestion of an independent Kurdish state, and have indicated that they would militarily oppose such an action. They instead see the solution to the problem as being economic in nature. They point to the Anatolia Dam Project as a source of economic development in the Southern region that will provide jobs and a higher standard of living which, in turn, will help integrate the Kurds into Turkish society. Studies seem to support this claim, citing a net growth of 600,000 agricultural jobs, as well as numerous jobs associated with the project infrastructure. (23)
Turkish/Greek Relations

Another concern of Turkey is the contentious issues with Greece. The main ones are Cyprus, and territorial claims in the Aegean. Despite centuries of animosity, the Greeks and Turks have coexisted without going to war in recent years. While the issues have serious repercussions for both Turkey and Greece, the two sides have clearly articulated their positions, and each knows where the other stands.

Turkey's concern over the contentious issues has been supplanted by a greater concern for how the Greeks orchestrate these issues to the international community. (24) The Greeks wield tremendous political clout relative to the Turks by virtue of the 3.5 million-strong Greek lobby in the United States, as well as by Greece's membership (e.g. veto power) in the EC. (25) The Turks consider the escalation of Greek-Turkish issues to the international arena to be an unnecessary nuisance to be avoided if possible, while the Greeks use the issues as leverage against the Turks and avail themselves of every opportunity to showcase them to the international community.

The Cyprus Issue

A long-standing point of disagreement between the Greeks and the Turks has been the issue of Cyprus. The Turkish minority and Greek majority there have been at odds for centuries. The current dispute began when Turkey intervened in 1974 to protect the Turkish minority from repression by the Greek-supported elements that overthrew the Makarios regime. Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey had been signatories to a treaty that made
them guarantors of Cyprus' independence in 1960. When Great Britain did not send troops to protect the Turkish minority, Turkey dispatched 30,000 troops of its own, which remain today. For her part, Greece has continued to support the Greek majority, and has exacerbated the situation in recent years by modernizing the weaponry of the Greek Cypriot forces. Nonetheless, an uneasy peace has been maintained. (26)

Greek/Turkish Aegean Issues

There are three primary issues in the Greek/Turkish disputes regarding the Aegean. These involve the territorial seas, the continental shelf, and international airspace. The territorial seas issue focuses on Greece's desire to extend its territorial waters around its Aegean islands from six to twelve miles, in accordance with the 1972 Law of the Seas Treaty. This would have the effect of making the Aegean a Greek lake. Turkey is not a signatory to the treaty and claims that any attempt by Greece to extend her territorial waters would be a cause for war. (27)

The continental shelf issue has to do with conflicting claims concerning the Aegean continental shelf. Turkey claims half of the continental shelf, while Greece claims a continental shelf area for each of its islands--effectively giving Greece control of the entire Aegean seabed. Both sides offer differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea Convention and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. This issue is further complicated by the discovery of oil in the Turkish claimed area, and by Turkey's continuing mineral exploration in its claimed area. (28)
The third issue is that of airspace. The two primary areas of contention are Greek claims of ten nautical miles airspace around each of its Aegean islands, and disputes over the boundary between the Athens and Istanbul Flight Information Region (FIR). (29)

Although the Greek-Turkish disputes have largely degenerated into a war of words, with the Greeks expending most of the ammunition in recent years, they are a cause for Turkish concern, for the Aegean represents a vital link for Turkey to commercial and military relationships with the Western world. While this animosity already limits Greek participation in NATO exercises, any further escalation of the disputes could have serious economic and military repercussions for Turkey. (30)

Military Issues

Although Turkey recognizes that economic and political instruments of power can bring some degree of stability to the region, she also realizes that security requires capable, well-equipped armed forces. The reorientation of the Soviet threat resulting from the CFE agreement has heightened Turkey's need for more modern equipment, particularly against a ground threat. Through the cascading process, however, Turkey will gain first-line tanks, such as the M-1A-1, to replace older tanks. In addition, it will also gain modernized artillery and armored personnel carriers.

The Gulf War has also heightened Turkey's concerns about defense against intermediate range missiles. The Iraqi Scud attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the war highlight
Turkey's vulnerability to this type of attack. For this reason, the Patriot ballistic missile defense systems that were delivered during the Gulf War will remain. They should afford Turkey protection against this type of threat.

The larger concern that relates to force modernization is the Turkish leadership's lack of confidence in the readiness of its forces. Although there were political reasons for not committing Turkish troops in the Gulf War, government officials confide that there are genuine concerns about the armed forces' readiness on the battlefield. (31) The prospect of converting to more sophisticated high-tech weapons systems after CFE implementation serves to increase these concerns.

Another of Turkey's security concerns is the changing political climate in Eastern Europe. Separatist movements in Yugoslavia may be a harbinger of an overall trend in the Balkans. Instability in the Balkans may rekindle historic rivalries, and Turkey may find herself facing threats on several different axes. Given Turkey's increasing economic involvement in Eastern Europe, such instability presents a complex challenge with no straightforward solution. (32)

**Internal Concerns**

While the economic, military, and political concerns of Turkey are predominantly outward-looking, Turkey has some concerns that require her to look inward. One pressing issue is the seemingly gravitational pull of Islamic fundamentalism on Turkey. Originating primarily on the college campuses, the Islamic fundamentalist movement has made notable gains in the
last five years. Support for the movement is the most visible in the veiling of women on campuses, but there also have been several acts of political violence, including a number of assassinations of secularist middle-class Turks. This violence has shaken the confidence of many of the Westernized secular elite, who denounce the violence but recognize that dialog with the resurgent Islamic movements may be necessary. Such dialog, however, may prove to be a Catch 22, for one of the stated goals of the Islamic movement is to eliminate secular and Western values from Turkish politics. (33)

The Islamic fundamentalist movement is partially an outgrowth of another internal problem in Turkey -- the repression of human rights. From the time of Ataturk, the imposition of a secular Western-style government in Turkey has been at the expense of political, religious, or cultural freedom. Until recently, political activity by Islamic fundamentalists was illegal. In December 1989, 300 members of the Turkish Communist Party were rounded up and detained without trial until February 1990. Prohibitions against Kurdish language and culture have been eased only recently. These examples of repression are indicative of the political malaise in Turkey, but are also of great concern to the leadership. (34) They cast Turkey in an unfavorable light in the eyes of the Western world of which she so desperately wants to become a part.

Another internal concern is the extreme cultural diversity in Turkey. Although overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, the country contains a wide variety of religious sects, including Christian
and Jewish. Its cultural groups range from nomadic tribesmen to urban professionals, but it is in most respects technologically backward, with nearly one-fourth of the population involved in agriculture. (35) The small numbers of educated technocrats face enormous challenges in dealing with a technologically immature society. Nepotism and political favoritism further complicate the problem. One U. S. executive working for a large joint venture project expressed reluctance to turn authority for the project over to the Turks because of his concerns that the management positions would be assigned in light of political or family considerations rather than based on the competence of the individual. The Turkish leadership recognizes that to be accepted as a Western power, many of these cultural hurdles will have to be overcome, but the process will be slow.
CHAPTER V

SPECIAL ISSUES EMANATING FROM THE GULF CRISIS

The Gulf crisis has placed Turkey in a spotlight role. It has had immense economic, political, military, and diplomatic impacts on Turkey and has set new precedents in Turkey's relations with her allies and with the United States in particular.

Economic Impact

Of all of the ways that the Gulf War has affected Turkey, the economic impact has been the most severe. The United Nations embargoes required Turkey to turn off the oil pipeline from Iraq and to cease trading with a country that had traditionally been her largest trading partner. In an interview in October, 1990, Turkish President Ozal assessed the cost of these sanctions at $3 billion. (36) Depending on the length of time the sanctions continue in effect, some Turkish government officials estimate the cost will be as high as $7 billion.

Political Risks

The decision to support the allied war effort in the Gulf was not without political risks. Polls showed that only 40 percent of Turks supported pipeline sanctions against Iraq, and 61.4 percent felt that Turkey should remain neutral in a Gulf conflict. Decisions by President Ozal to increase U. S. presence and to allow U. S. forces to use Turkish bases to conduct offensive operations resulted in the resignations of the Defense Minister and some members of the Turkish General Staff. (37)
In addition to the internal political impact, the Gulf crisis has altered Turkey's political relationships with its neighboring states, particularly Syria. Syrian support for the PKK had previously strained relations between Damascus and Istanbul. The Syrians' desire to play a role in the anti-Iraq coalition, combined with their need for Western technology as a result of the increasing loss of Soviet support, has made a tenuous partnership between two otherwise strange bedfellows. To the south, pledges of postwar economic support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait promise Turkey with potentially strengthened relationships with these moderate Arab regimes. (38)

**Precedents**

Among the precedent-setting activities during the Gulf war was the use of Turkish NATO facilities for out-of-area operations. This included employment of radar facilities for ballistic missile defense. While this was done tacitly, it represents a significant departure from any previous Turkish activity in support of NATO.

Another precedent-setting event in the Gulf War was that the seven to ten ratio, established by the United States Congress under pressure from the Greek lobby as a ratio between U. S. military aid given to Greece and Turkey respectively, was not maintained. (39) During the Gulf War, that ratio dropped to as low as 5.5 to ten while Turkey was being equipped to support the war. This development is significant because it creates a precedent that decouples Turkey from the seven to ten military aid ratio limitations and orients military aid to the threat during crisis periods.
CHAPTER VI

U. S. STRATEGIC OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Central to the formulation of a U. S. strategy with respect to Turkey is a discussion of the future roles of Western relationships, specifically NATO. With the eventual political unification of Western and Eastern Europe probable, many experts believe that NATO is likely to assume an increasing political role and a decreasing military role. (LO) In the confusing maze of political, military, and economic organizations emerging in Europe, one must question whether NATO, or any other nascent European alliance, could achieve a consensus to react rapidly to a future Gulf crisis. One must also question whether an increasingly inward-focused Europe will be able to mold the collective political resolve to conduct out-of-area operations.

The decisive coalition victory in the Gulf war offers both the United States and Turkey unique options and opportunities to use the political, economic, and military instruments of power in the advancement of mutual national interests. Turkey played an extremely valuable role in the successful conclusion of the war, made heroic economic sacrifices to support the coalition, and took internal political risks to meet its commitments. In the flush of victory, the United States should resolutely recognize and praise Turkey's key role in the conflict, particularly with the NATO allies.
Political Opportunities

The U. S. policy should reflect both the significance of Turkey's role as a staging base in this conflict and the critical role Turkey can play in future Middle East crises. It should be equally clear that the geostrategic position of Turkey and the nature of the threat obviate the seven to ten ratio in time of crisis.

Territorial Issues

U. S. policy should also reflect Turkey's concern for confidence building in the Middle East. Any postwar political settlement should take account of both Turkish and Middle East concerns for territorial integrity, and therefore should not result in any Turkish territorial expansion.

Recognizing the significance of water as a future source of conflict in the Middle East, the United States should offer technical advice and assistance in the development of a Middle East water plan. The United States should use its historic close relationship to guarantee that an equitable flow of water from Turkey to Middle East neighbors is maintained.

Another closely related issue is the Kurdish problem. There have been some suggestions that the oil-rich Mosul area of Iraq be made into a separate Kurdish state. (41) While current U. S. policy does not support this suggestion, Turkey has been thrust into the forefront in the recent Kurdish refugee crisis and may attempt to take the lead in resolving the overall Kurdish issue. Given the multi-national dimensions of this problem, such a prospect may undermine any potential solution to this vexing
problem. U. S. policy should instead support internal solutions, through cooperative efforts among those nations with Kurdish minorities, to expand economic opportunity and afford basic human rights to this group.

Greek/Turkish Tensions

The Greek/Turkish animosity is so strong and highly charged that active attempts by the United States to resolve the problems between the countries may be counterproductive. The success of the Gulf coalition, however, may provide a window of opportunity to solve one of the most volatile issues between Greece and Turkey—Turkish troops in Cyprus. The United States should build upon the consensus achieved in the war to develop support for a coalition force on Cyprus to replace the Turkish force, as a means of reducing Greek/Turk tensions. Finally, Turkey's highly successful involvement in the Gulf War may provide such a windfall of Western support to Turkey that Greece may see political advantage in actively seeking Greek-Turk cooperation.

Counterbalancing Interest

Turkey's successful Gulf involvement and faithful support of NATO should be given consideration as we develop political ties with the emerging nations of Eastern Europe. U. S. policy should favor our trusted ally and friend over those newly independent nations that were only recently in our adversary's camp. Such treatment of Turkey should also bolster her political prestige as a European nation while serving to counterbalance the European preoccupation with Eastern Europe.
Economic Opportunities

In addition to the political realm, the economic realm offers intriguing possibilities for the United States and Turkey, in terms of support for EC membership, free trade, and Middle East reconstruction efforts. The United States should support Turkey's membership in the European Community; however, any direct plea by the United States is likely to be viewed by EC members as outside meddling in an internal issue. Therefore, the United States should take an indirect approach by working to strengthen Turkey's economy through increased investment and cooperative efforts.

One area in which this cooperation is already being manifested is in the removal by the United States of trade barriers on Turkish textiles. Tariffs will be reduced by 50 percent this year, and will be removed completely in 1992. The United States should capitalize on its leadership by example to encourage the European community to respond similarly.

Economic measures can further be used for confidence building for Turkey in the Middle East. The United States should make every effort to use Turkey as a conduit for rebuilding the Middle East. U. S. firms involved in the reconstruction of Kuwait should be given incentives to conduct operations in a cooperative venture with Turkish firms. Once the trade embargo is lifted on Iraq, U. S. policy should support significant involvement of the Turks in reconstruction efforts.

Military Opportunities

There are also excellent opportunities for the United States to enhance the security of the Middle East and NATO's southern
flank through the military instrument of power. Three distinct areas warrant discussion: force modernization, military aid, and an expanded military-industrial base.

**Force Modernization**

Force modernization through CFE and as an outcome of the Gulf war will significantly upgrade Turkey's defense capability. This modernization of equipment, however, is an empty shell without trained personnel. U. S. policy should support an expanded training effort to upgrade Turkish technical capabilities in operating and maintaining the new equipment. Since Greece is obtaining essentially the same upgrade, the possibility of forging future improved relationships through joint Greek-Turkish training sessions should also be explored.

**Mobility Focus of Military Aid**

The U. S. military aid package should reflect Turkey's linchpin role in the Middle East, and should also recognize the potential for instability in the Balkans. While the Soviet threat should not be minimized, aid should increase focus on mobility, deployment, and sustainment resources and activities.

**Military-Industrial Mideast Link**

Finally, expansion of Turkey's military industrial base could be potentially beneficial to the Turkish economy while helping the long-term stability of the Middle East. With the USSR's decreased influence and the poor showing of its weapons systems in the Gulf war, a lucrative Western arms market may be opening in the Middle East. The United States should encourage the coproduction of stabilizing, defensive weapons with Turkey.
for marketing in the Middle East. A perfect example is the Patriot missile system. It is relatively old technology, it provides proven defense against widely available offensive terror weapons like the SCUD, and it poses no offensive threat to anyone. Production of defensive systems for distribution in the Middle East would bolster Turkey's image as an industrial power, enhance confidence-building measures, increase area interdependence, and provide economic advantages to both Turkey and the United States.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The United States and Turkey share common political, economic, and military goals. With the decreasing U. S. military budget, what once may have been a marriage of convenience is becoming a union of necessity. To establish and protect that union, a coherent U. S. strategy is necessary.

Turkey's precedent-setting actions in the Gulf war shape a key role for Turkey in future Gulf conflicts. A U. S. strategy that promotes an economically strong, politically stable, and militarily capable Turkey serves the interests of both the United States and the European Community in the Gulf region.

Having successfully concluded a war in the Middle East in partnership with Turkey, the United States must anticipate how partnership with Turkey might preclude a future war in the area. Significantly, the issue of water as a source of conflict must be fully comprehended and a U. S. policy must be articulated.

Europe's increasing self-focus may find the most powerful nation on earth and the former "sick man of Europe" ironically sharing the "odd man out" status. The United States, like Turkey, may be tempted to resort to bilateral relationships to attain national objectives. The United States, however, should recognize that NATO provides a common thread between Turkey, Europe and the United States, and any strategy with respect to Turkey should be developed under that umbrella.
Turkey has proven to be a strong and reliable NATO partner. With the support of an effective U.S. strategy, Turkey can actualize its role as an indispensable member of the European Community and a critical bridge to the Middle East.
NOTES


2. "Mobilization Assets Total 6.5 Million Reservists." The Officer (July 1990), p. 70.


5. Ibid., p. 7.


12. "Mobilization Assets Total 6.5 Million Reservists." The Officer (July 1990), p. 70.


17. Ibid., p. 42.


27. Ibid., p. 12.


29. Ibid., p. 15.

30. Ibid., p. 33.


34. Ibid., p. 110.

35. Nash, p. 119.


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________. "Wary of Western Involvement." The Middle East (October 1990), p. 30-31.


"Turkey Wants Its Due." The Middle East (December 1990), p. 18.


