THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) AND THE ARMY: EMERGING MISSIONS FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

BY

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United States Army

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was organized in 1978 to consolidate all federal actions concerning emergency management. This paper looks at the evolution of FEMA and the role the Army plays in domestic emergency management. It traces FEMA's background and its historical development through 1988. It then looks at the 1988-1991 timeframe when two major natural disasters accelerated development of federal planning to respond more quickly to disaster relief requirements by means of coordinated contingency plans. It then discusses ongoing actions to update the Federal Response Plan and the Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities." This includes the Army's responsibilities for emergency management and the Domestic Emergency Planning System. The paper finishes with a discussion of current challenges that confront the Army regarding war fighting force structure, and domestic assistance contingencies. It concludes by proposing specific recommendations to deal with these challenges.
USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) AND THE ARMY: EMERGING MISSIONS FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was organized in 1978 to consolidate all federal actions concerning emergency management. This paper looks at the evolution of FEMA and the role the Army plays in domestic emergency management. It traces FEMA's background and its historical development through 1988. It then looks at the 1988-1991 timeframe when two major natural disasters accelerated development of federal planning to respond more quickly to disaster relief requirements by means of coordinated contingency plans. It then discusses ongoing actions to update the Federal Response Plan and the Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities." This includes the Army's responsibilities for emergency management and the Domestic Emergency Planning System. The paper finishes with a discussion of current challenges that confront the Army regarding war fighting, force structure, and domestic assistance contingencies. It concludes by proposing specific recommendations to deal with these challenges.
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INTRODUCTION

"Good fortune will elevate even the petty minds and give them the appearance of a certain greatness and stateliness, as from their high place they look down upon the world; but the truly noble and resolved spirit raises itself, and becomes more conspicuous in times of disaster and ill fortune."

Plutarch

Our country first became involved in emergency management in 1803 following a disastrous fire in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The slow growth of federal legislation and action in the proceeding 175 years took a major step forward in 1978 when President Carter began to reorganize Federal Agencies and Cabinet Departments. Attempting to consolidate the functions of emergency preparedness and management programs that were spread over five major federal agencies, he proposed the creation of a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

SCOPE

This paper will look at the evolution of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and, more specifically, what role the Army is playing in domestic emergency management. It will briefly trace FEMA's background and historical development through 1988. It will then look at the 1988-1991 timeframe when two major natural disasters
accelerated development of federal planning to respond more quickly to disaster relief requirements by means of coordinated contingency plans. Next it will discuss ongoing actions to update the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)." This will include Army responsibilities for emergency management, and the Domestic Emergency Planning System (DEPS).

The paper will conclude with a discussion of current challenges that confront the Army regarding war fighting, force structure, and domestic assistance contingencies. It will offer recommendations to deal with these challenges and identify which areas may require further study for resolution.

THE EVOLUTION OF FEMA

President Carter envisioned a federal organization for emergency management that had responsibilities based upon four principles. The first was to anticipate, prepare for and respond to major civil emergencies with one official responsible to the President. The second was to broaden the scope of the civil defense system to be organized, resourced, and prepared to cope with any threatening disaster. The third principle was to coordinate and plan for the emergency deployment of routine federal resources in support of catastrophic events. The fourth was to closely link federal hazard mitigation with emergency preparedness.
Following Congressional approval in September 1978, President Carter created the Federal Emergency Management Agency in March 1979. However, two problems plagued the organization from its inception. First, the new reorganization of federal responsibilities was incomplete. Several agencies clearly retained operational control of their responsibilities. This left FEMA, in effect, "with the responsibility for coordinating the plans and resources but with little authority for getting the job done."

The second problem was a leadership void that saw the top eight headquarter's positions of FEMA occupied by 37 different managers within the first two years. This period of time was marked by such national emergencies as the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, the eruption of Mount St. Helens, the Love Canal environmental disaster, and the Cuban refugee problem. An additional area of confusion was added in that FEMA lacked a mission statement. Instead, it drew its role from among 15 laws and 15 executive orders. Clearly the agency was off to a challenging start.

Finally, after three years, FEMA developed and had approved a mission statement in 1982 that put its responsibilities on a level more equal with its intent. It then began to move more effectively to organize and control the functions under its authority.

This, in itself, did not fully achieve the desired result of consolidating all federal responsibilities for
emergency management. It was six more years before an Executive Order was issued that clearly aligned the multiple federal responsibilities and authorities. With President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12656 in November 1988, FEMA was able to begin to consolidate all federal planning and responsibilities for emergency management activities.

This action, however, had no effect on the challenging administrative organization of FEMA's top management. The Director and the top seven positions continue to be Presidential appointees, accountable only to the President and not necessarily beholden to the Director. This was a result of President Carter's desire to take the management of FEMA out of the hands of the Washington bureaucracy and make it more directly accountable to the President (Figure 1).
Unfortunately, the position of Director was vacant once more in the spring of 1989. It was not to be filled again until August 1990. In the interim, the country experienced two of our more devastating natural disasters that challenged the federal government's organization and ability to respond in a fast, effective manner with disaster relief.

**HURRICANE HUGO AND THE SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE**

Unfortunately, nature's unpredictable events continued to press a need for more detailed and coordinated actions in support of natural disaster relief operations. Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta (San Francisco Bay area) earthquake of 1989 brought home the need for more detailed, advance preparations and planned responses.

Hurricane Hugo in 1989 exceeded everyone's dire estimations of damage and disruption of services along the Atlantic seaboard. In South Carolina alone, "the South Carolina National Guard responded to Governor Campbell's call with the largest mobilization for a natural disaster in history."  

Additionally, civil disturbance broke out on St. Croix and the US Virgin Islands, requiring the Governor to request federal military forces to assist the Department of Justice in reestablishing control. Following this, the Washington D.C. National Guard was deployed to St. Croix where it conducted its annual training with the island guardsmen.
The scope and extent of damage from the San Francisco Bay area earthquake in October 1989 outstripped the state and local governments' ability to cope with disaster relief from the onset. Federal assistance was provided by local federal commanders on both an immediate and long term assistance basis. Assistance ranged from immediate needs such as traffic control, search and rescue, bedding and light equipment, and electrical power, to extended support in the form of helicopter and fixed wing transport, aerial infrared reconnaissance, food, supplies and services, debris removal, shelters for the displaced, and billeting at the Presidio of San Francisco and aboard the USS Peleliu in San Francisco Bay. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers performed dredging operations, conducted inspections of dams, levees, and buildings, and made hydrographics surveys and gave geologic assistance.  

All of this took more time, however, than was desirable. Despite a tremendous reaction of federal and military support, it was clear that better advanced planning at the overall federal level would expedite aid to supplement state resources.

**ARMY RESPONSIBILITIES**

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Directorate of Emergency Planning, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, is the entry point for emergency management policy. The Secretary of the Army has
been designated by the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent within DoD for all national disaster emergency management actions since 1968. National security emergencies are handled separately by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Ch, JCS). While the DoD Directorate of Emergency Planning serves as the policy maker for all DoD emergency management, all operational requests for disaster assistance go directly to the Executive Agent for national disaster emergency action.

The Army, in support of its Secretary, has recently intensified its efforts over the past several years to further define specific responsibilities and contingencies with regards to civil disasters. The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) staff provides support from within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) to assist the Secretary with this mission. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) provides the coordinating staff for the Secretary to support the DoD Executive Agent mission.

The DOMS is a an ODCSOPS Army major general who has the DOMS mission full-time as one of his major responsibilities. A senior Air Force officer from the Air Staff serves as his deputy. The Army provides five additional officers, headed by an Army division chief (colonel). Like the major general, the division chief has other duties beyond the DOMS mission. The four DOMS Action
Officers who work for him do not.

The Air Staff provides two officers upon request to serve as functional support. The Navy Department has designated three officers, one civilian, and one Marine officer, as DOMS representatives. Hence, the supporting staff is functionally organized while continuing to be multi-service and multi-agency.\(^7\)

It must be noted here that the Secretary of the Army is responsible only for peacetime support actions. In the event of war or an attack against the nation, the Secretary of Defense may assign the mission and functions of the DOMS organization to a unified/specified CINC. It is envisioned that the DOMS staff officers would transfer to the Joint Staff to provide continuity of operations. The transfer of DOMS staff officers to the Joint Staff would create both a staff integration challenge and a shortfall within the Army ODCSOPS. The other functions that ODCSOPS DOMS personnel currently perform would have to be addressed.

DOMS functions in peacetime as the Action Agency for the chain of command for any natural emergency FEMA mission. As such, it responds to mission taskings from a presidentially appointed Federal Coordination Officer (FCO) who is specifically designated as the President's representative and the responsible federal official for each natural disaster.

In the past, the FEMA FCO usually requested specialized
items of equipment or supplies in support of its operations. These included such items as helicopter support, communications equipment, or engineering support for damage survey reports. However, current Office of Management and Budget (OMB) restrictions prevents the services from specifically stockpiling assets and earmarking them for disaster relief, even such low cost items as sandbags, blankets, or basic medical supplies. While these items can be made available from service stocks on hand, they must come from wherever they happen to be located. In the end, however, all incremental military costs are reimbursed to the services by FEMA from an appropriated emergency fund.

As a result of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake, however, both FEMA and DOMS have moved aggressively to develop new plans and to create capabilities that can respond to national emergencies or natural disasters in a more timely manner.

**FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN**

**DODD 3025.1. MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES**

In 1988, Public Law 93-288 was amended and retitled the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. This act provides authority for the federal government to respond to natural disasters, civil emergencies, or other incidents "in order to provide assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property."
As of December 1991, FEHA has developed, staffed, and published a Federal Response Plan (Draft) for 27 federal agencies that details their roles and responsibilities for emergency support functions. The purpose of this plan is to fully coordinate and integrate federal agencies in support of emergency management for all natural disasters or civil emergencies. Under this plan, the Director of Military Support (DOMS), with the authority of the DoD Executive Agent, tasks CINCs, the Army Corps of Engineers, defense agencies, and the services to provide any and all needed assistance.

In anticipation of the approval of the Federal Response Plan, DOMS and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) have been working to update DoDD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), to be able to carry out the Department of Defense responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan.

The purpose of updating MSCA is to consolidate policies and responsibilities into one document. This document will constitute a single system for all DoD components for planning, responding to, and dealing with requests from civil government agencies for military support. It also will define policies and responsibilities by which DoD responds to major disasters or emergencies in accordance with the Stafford Disaster Relief and emergency Assistance Act. It also redesignates the Secretary of the Army as the
DoD Executive Agent for HSCA. Conceptually, "HSCA planning will stress centralized direction of peacetime planning with civil authorities, with decentralized planning by DoD Components with civil agencies where appropriate and decentralized execution of approved plans in time of emergency." (The italics are mine.) Stated another way, HSCA provides a mechanism that facilitates continuous and cooperative civil and military planning and preparedness to mobilize and employ all resources and capabilities to meet emergencies in the most timely manner possible.

Of important note, HSCA does not apply to foreign disasters, does not integrate contingency war planning, and does not include military support to civil law enforcement. As in previous policy, all state and local resources must be applied before federal assets can be requested. Further, military operations have priority over HSCA. Desert Shield/Desert Storm presented several instances where federal military assistance was requested (e.g. helicopter support) but was unavailable due to its deployment or military mission.

**ARMY ORGANIZATION**

HSCA directs DoD Components to give greater attention to the manning and training of current staff structures, organizations and agencies which are in place and available for planning and coordination.
The Army command with the greatest responsibility and who serves as principal operating agent for MSCA is Commander in Chief, Forces Command (CINCFOR). He is responsible for most Active and Reserve Army forces in the continental United States. Equivalent responsibilities are delegated to Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), and Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), for their geographic areas of US territory.

"Historically, the military commands have relied to a large extent on Reserve officers in several job categories, who have gained extraordinary knowledge and experience for planning and emergency response with the civil agencies. The individual Reservists train each month with federal emergency management structures coordinated by FEMA, with the states, and with the military commands and installations of their respective services."

To better facilitate close coordination and cooperation, the Director of FEMA has a full-time liaison officer to CINCFOR at Forces Command headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia.

As the principal Army subordinates of CINCFOR, the commanders of each Continental US Army (CONUSA) tie in with each presidentially-appointed FEMA Regional Director within their geographic areas of responsibility. "Therefore, CINCFOR appoints a "Principal Regional Military Emergency Coordinator" (RMEC) at each region for responsibilities
delegated to CINCFOR by the Secretary of Defense; and RHEC Teams function under the direction of the four CONUSAs, which are correlated to ten FEMA regions.  

This national network of Regional Military Emergency Coordinator (RMEC) Teams ties in with FEMA’s ten regions. Each team contains active duty Reserve officers and defense civilians. Their mission is to be prepared to perform any necessary emergency management or planning that the federal government may require at the region level.

Historically, the RMEC Teams were first formed in the early 1980s for wartime emergencies. However, their role has evolved into that of planners for natural disasters or civil emergencies in times of either peace or war.

Learning from the experiences of 1989, the Secretary of the Army and CINCFOR have encouraged each CONUSA to predesignate and train a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) for each state. Their role is to assist the earlier mentioned Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who is appointed by the President as his representative for all federal actions in support of a national disaster. Figure 2 summarizes this organization and the Army’s major responsibilities.

Key to overall, effective, decentralized execution is the Army and Air National Guard forces. They have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to their state and local agencies. The Army has an agency within
each state to plan and coordinate emergency management. Upon its activation, the Army National Guard State Area Command (STARC) becomes the focal point for the HSCA mission.¹³

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**MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES**

**DOMS**
- Act for the DOD Executive Agent.
- Develop policy.
- Monitor employment of DOD resources.
- Establish and maintain liaison with FEMA.

**CINCFOR**
- Delegated authority of DOD Executive Agent.
- Support CINCFOR as directed by DOMS.
- Coordinate and direct employment of all DOD components in CONUS.
- Report to DOMS.
- Establish and maintain liaison with FEMA.

**CONUSA**
- Plan and conduct disaster relief operations.
- Appoint a DCO as directed by CINCFOR.
- Coordinate requests for military assistance to FEMA.
- Coordinate and direct DOD resources in the disaster area.
- Provide Defense Coordinating Element to DCO.

**SERVICES: CINCFOR MACOMs**
- Support CINCFOR as directed by DOMS.
- Take action in local imminent serious situations.
- Provide resources for disaster relief on request.

**U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS**
- Establish and maintain disaster relief liaison with DCO.
- Coordinate all military engineering and construction tasks through District Engineer.
- Execute statutory responsibilities for emergency response and recovery.

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CINCFOR/FEHA/DOHS Joint Command Readiness Program (JCRP)
Situation Manual

**Figure 2.**

"The STARC is a semi-mobilized emergency planning and management headquarters, supported by DoD funding, which operates every day under state control in disaster response, civil disturbance, and counter-narcotics missions. STARCs are Reserve Component headquarters of about 300 people. Some key individuals are employed in each STARC as full-time federal technicians, and Guardsmen assigned to the STARC often work as civilians in the state military department or other state agencies."¹⁴ There is a STARC in each of the 50
state capitols and Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the District of Columbia.

"The STARCs and other National Guard units plan continuously with state and local civil authorities for all forms of disaster. National Guard forces also respond to emergencies under state orders long before federal forces are authorized to act." 15

CINCFOR is responsible for the planning and training of the STARCs. In time of war, STARCs would not deploy but remain as US Army headquarters within each state. The three service departments would provide Reserve liaison officers to coordinate service planning with the STARCs.

**TRENDS**

There is a clear trend to move away from the 1950s and 1960s attitude of a civil defense mentality of bomb shelters and massive nuclear attack. While there is still a cautious recognition of that possibility, it is viewed to be far more remote than in previous years.

The thinking now is to take the Civil Defense infrastructure and put it to use in support of the Federal Response Plan. Key to this thinking is the recognition that we need realistic contingency plans on the shelf, ready to be executed upon any disaster or emergency.

To this end, the CINCs have been working with DOMS to develop what is best described by the Forces Command name of a Domestic Emergency Planning System (DEPS). DOMS is,
likewise, working to formalize this process through the publication of DoD Manual 3025.

The DEPS is a collection of both new and updated contingency plans that are developed by J-5 Plans within these commands in response to known contingency missions. These plans are then issued by the J-3 Operations Staff to the Continental Armies or appropriate commands that are assigned specific missions in support of future operations. For example, in April 1990, CINCLANT issued a plan dealing with domestic disaster relief operations within his Caribbean area of responsibility. Similarly, within the past year, CINCFOR has issued several plans that deal with contingencies ranging from postal augmentation to animal disease eradication to catastrophic earthquake response for urban search and rescue. And although not under FEMA auspices, there are also fire fighting plans for Army support to the Boise Interagency Fire Center.¹⁶

Perhaps more importantly, field simulations at the Army command level are being conducted to determine the completeness and validity of these plans. "Response 91-A" was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted by FEMA, FORSCOM, 3d Army, and other appropriate civilian agencies in August 1991 at Nashville, Tennessee. It simulated a major earthquake that is predicted to occur along the New Madrid Fault near Columbia, Missouri.¹⁷ "Response 91-B" was similarly conducted in October 1991 at Seattle with 6th
Army participation. It simulated a major earthquake in the Pacific Northwest.\(^1\)

Both of these exercises are giant first steps toward working out interagency command and control (C2) procedures and responsibilities, detailed concepts of support, and standard operating procedures that need to be developed. They have also identified or verified current capability shortfalls that must be assigned, funded, and developed if the federal government is to successfully execute future catastrophic relief operations.

**COMPETING MISSIONS AND DECLINING FORCE STRUCTURE**

"The 10 Traditional Values of American Culture" as stated by Congressman Newt Gingrich, R-6-GA, Minority Whip

1. National Security
2. Personal Safety
3. Family & Community
4. Working
5. Saving
6. Investing
7. Learning
8. Health
9. Environment
10. Honesty & Trust

There is a clearly articulated national requirement to support disaster preparedness and emergency management.

As stated in the *President's National Security Strategy* (August 1991), "Our civil defense program is still needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while also providing important capabilities to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes."
This has caused the Defense Department to redefine Civil Defense so that it includes all hazards to the nation. One need only consider the difficulty of detecting a terrorist chemical attack against a major U.S. city to see the potential for catastrophe. Then consider the challenge and vulnerability of our computer-based, technological society to severe social service disruptions of disastrous proportions caused by nature, accident, or deliberate action.¹⁹

Part of the challenge is that civil authorities have traditionally tried to rely more heavily on military support as opposed to paying to develop their own capabilities. Yet, "Civil resources are far more extensive in nearly every category - and unique military resources may not be available during international crises."²⁰ The current year serves as an example of the effects of tight budgets across the country. The Presidential Disaster Assistance Fund is historically used about 25 times each fiscal year in support of national disasters. As of January 1992 of this year, it has been used 44 times.²¹ Constrained state budgets will increase political pressure to use federal assets, and specifically the Army, to achieve needed support in times of natural disaster, and reduce or avoid costs at the state and local level.

Clearly, federal funds have, and will continue to, become more constrained as annual deficits grow and payments
to the national debt continue to assume a larger percentage of each year's fiscal budget. The Army must compete for funding within this environment for its programs and total end strength. And personnel costs account for the greatest share of the total Army budget.

Clearly, our end strength and Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) balance has become a major contention between DoD and the Congress. The Army has been implicitly accused of looking only at near-term concerns while Congress has "to always take the long-term view of Defense decision-making." There is a strong, clear, and stated desire by the Congress to make "greater utilization of Reserve forces as the cornerstone of a new strategy." This will mean a larger percentage of Reserve Component (RC) forces to Active Component (AC) forces than we have had over the past decade.

This is said to lay the groundwork for later thought and observation. However, it must be stressed now that the Army must take care and assess the impact of assuming non-traditional roles as it struggles for a share of the defense budget. It would be tempting to volunteer for increased roles and missions as a means of saving force structure and funding. But, we must not lose sight of our primary mission - war fighting.

Clearly, there are strong beliefs in this arena. As former Army War College Distinguished Fellow and military columnist Colonel Harry Summers (USA, Retired) stated in
January 1992, "Some today within the U.S. military are also searching for "relevance" with draft doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely prewar and post-war operations equal weight with war fighting. This is an insidious mistake."

Stated another way in October 1991 by Colonel Maxwell Alston (USAR, Retired), Deputy Director for Emergency Planning, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, "Defense of the homeland will always be the ultimate "reason for being" of the Department of Defense... "Military support to civil authorities will be an ancillary role, regardless of the "threat."

RECOMMENDATIONS

Four recommendations are proposed to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness.

First, eliminate a layer of bureaucracy dealing with emergency management and disaster assistance within the DoD organization. The Secretary of the Army has been appointed by the Secretary of Defense as the DoD Executive Agent (Figure 3). Consolidate all emergency management policy and operational responsibilities within this office. The Directorate of Emergency Planning, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, adds nothing to the process that the Executive Agent does not or could not already do. Elimination of this added layer would rightly consolidate all functions and authority in a sole Executive Agent, the Secretary of the Army. This reduces a
layer of bureaucracy, retains civilian control of policy for military support, and maintains political responsiveness.

EXECUTIVE AGENT RELATIONSHIP

Figure 3

Second, rescind Office of Management and Budget restrictions on the stockage of specific items that could be used in a more timely manner. These include such simple items as sandbags. Current bureaucratic restrictions make it difficult to respond rapidly to requests for assistance and stay within OMB guidelines. A "common sense/reasonable man" approach at the lowest levels of organization must be allowed for the stockage of logical items.

Third, assess the effect on the Army Staff of losing all DOMS personnel to the Joint Staff in the event of war. While Action Officers may be solely responsible for emergency management actions on a daily basis, the major general and division chief have other duties that would have
to be rapidly assumed by others within the Army Staff.

Lastly, the Army will likely receive an eventual Congressional directive to maintain a larger role for and percentage of Reserve Component forces within the total end strength. It is recognized that this runs contrary to current Army planning. However, it may be unavoidable.

An alternative to make better use of these RC forces that would not have a mission is to make them engineer, military police, medical support, or other desirable units that could be located in every state or region to support disaster assistance operations. These units would be welcomed by every state governor and could be appropriated special funding by Congress for their equipment and training. While current law prevents the establishment of federal units solely for disaster relief, that would not be their primary mission. Their war fighting and combat/combat service support capability would be particularly beneficial to the Active Component for either reconstitution or reinforcement.

CONCLUSION

"At that time the kingdom of heaven will be like ten virgins who took their lamps and went out to meet the bridegroom. Five of them were foolish and five were wise. The foolish ones took their lamps but did not take any oil with them. The wise, however, took oil with them. The bridegroom was a long time in coming, and they all became drowsy and fell asleep.

"At midnight the cry rang out: "Here's the bridegroom! Come out to meet him!"
"Then all the virgins woke up and trimmed their lamps. The foolish ones said to the wise, 'Give us some your oil; our lamps have going out.'

"'No,' they replied, 'there may not be enough for both of us and you. Instead, go to those who sell oil and buy some for yourselves.'

"But while they were on their way to buy the oil, the bridegroom arrived. The virgins who were ready went in with him to the wedding banquet. And the door was shut.

"Later the others also came. 'Sir! Sir!' they said. 'Open the door for us!'

"But he replied, 'I tell you the truth, I don't know you."

"Therefore keep watch, because you do not know the day or the hour."

Matthew 25: 1-13

Care must be given to the organization and manning of offices, headquarters and units having disaster assistance responsibilities. Redundancies must be eliminated and standard procedures developed and practiced in support of standing contingency plans.

Force structure benefits, potential additional Congressional funding, and state and Army National Guard support could be obtained by careful selection and stationing of Reserve Component units that could have an alternate mission of disaster assistance.

Recognizing that the primary mission and focus of the Army is war fighting, it still has a disaster assistance support role that it can and should perform. The Army can, and is, doing a better job of preparing for emergency management and disaster assistance. It is improving its
planning efforts and organization at all levels to be better able to coordinate the employment of Army assets in support of state and local governments during times of disaster assistance.

Let us not be unprepared and wait for disaster to strike again to bring forth our best efforts. Our efforts should be planned and coordinated now to ensure that they are, indeed, our very best.
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2. Ibid., p. 9.

3. Ibid., pp. 10-14.


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6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


10. Ibid., p. 4.

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