The New Unified Command Plan

This study of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) reviews pertinent strategic and structural trends in the evolution of the concept of unity of command for joint forces; discusses some imperatives for change; and, examines the relevancy of current command structures. The Unified Command Plan is an evolutionary document that has been shaped over time by forces of action - military strategy and Congressional reforms; and by forces of inaction - Service parochialism and personality conflicts. An appreciation of the forces shaping this structure within the historical context of our nation's activities in peace and war is more critical today than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. The UCP as we know it today emerged as part of a significantly larger effort to reorganize the Defense Department at the conclusion of World War II. The UCP assigned geographic responsibilities to theater CINCs and established the basic organizational structures for force planning and employment. Changes occurred in the UCP in response to anti-Soviet containment strategies as well as theater peculiar issues in Korea and Vietnam. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense...
Reorganization Act mandated a biennial review of the UCP by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The last review was completed in the summer of 1991 following the coalition successes in Desert Storm. The national security establishment is now engaged in a traditional "ends-ways-means" debate. This occurs as the basic strategic and structural underpinnings of the Cold War defense establishment are being challenged and the U.S. role in shaping a New World Order is under intense debate. This study examines the relevancy of current command structures to our new National Military Strategy and concludes with a view of a new UCP that is more suited to our regional strategy, and bridges the gap between the conceptual Base Force and the military strategy.
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THE NEW UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

"It is the institution that holds up the mask of war to cover the pursuit of its self-interests, not the warriors within it. The warriors need no masks to hide behind; it is they who face the prospect of war or its consequences every day."

Carl Builder

The United States is defining its role in a multipolar world and is searching for a new grand strategy for the post-Cold War era. As the debate over the role of the military element of power intensifies, and the issues shift to the appropriate levels of ends-ways-means, the Department of Defense has put forward a National Military Strategy anchored on the concept of the Base Force and with only incremental revisions to the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The debate on force structure reductions occurs at the same time the Department of Defense is articulating a fundamentally different National Military Strategy. Missing from this dialogue is an articulation of a command structure reflecting the shift from a global to a regional strategy executed with forces that are CONUS based. This command structure should be the bridge between the strategy and the force.

This study presents the basic imperatives for a new UCP structure that forms a bridge between the Chairman’s Base Force concept and the tenets of our emerging National Military Strategy. It also argues for a more reflective Unified Command structure - one that considers the uncertainty of a specific threat and world order; a structure that has been built to
reflect a vastly reduced military force structure; an organization capable of executing far different missions of deterrence and peacetime operations; and, can quickly and efficiently transition to a regional warfighting role. By offering a more practical linkage, by way of the UCP, to the National Military Strategy, the JCS could then use more practical examples of joint force packaging, identify some well known Cold War appendages that should be dismantled, and still retain for the U.S. a viable military force that has actually been organized and sized for regional contingencies and future conflicts.

We begin by examining the evolution of the UCP from its post-World War II beginnings through the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. A common thread of institutional ambivalence and service parochialism can be traced from post-World War II through the post-Cold War period. Many parallels exist between the two periods. It is useful to examine the strategic underpinnings of the Cold War period (containment) as we design a UCP to implement a new strategy. We provide an option for a simplified and flexible new UCP that recognizes key historical trends; reflects the momentum for more efficient joint operations gained from the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986; and better complements the new tenets of our National Military Strategy.
"Separate ground, sea, and air forces are gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it...as one single concentrated effort...strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands"²

President Eisenhower

A brief review of the history of the UCP and the strategic concepts that transformed our organization for war are helpful in understanding fully the system of unified and specified commands as we know them today. (For a detailed breakdown of the organization of the individual Unified and Specified Commands, see Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, AFSC Pub 1, pages 2-24 to 2-36. For the convenience and understanding of the reader, we only present here key events or trends in the history of the UCP - knowledge of the organizational structure of the individual commands is not germane to this paper). There is merit in reviewing how we got to where we are, and understanding that there are important similarities in history that will facilitate our interpretation of our current situation. These similarities must be considered in the development of a new UCP.

The need for streamlining and reorganizing is not new. Following the American Civil War, President Grant made an attempt
at reorganization of the War and Army departments. This initiative was both ill-fated and short lived. The new Secretary of War, Rawlins, derailed the attempt. As a war fighter, Grant recognized the need for continuity and clearness of command channels, but was politically unable to sell the idea.

The Spanish-American War provided another example of the need for change in America's defense establishment. With numerous examples of the inability of the Army and the Navy to work together, the President appointed a commission to investigate the roots of the problem. The end result of the commission's work was the creation of the general staff of the Army and the Navy. This joint effort remained in effect until it was dissolved officially on September 30, 1947. However, this effort was destined to fail from its inception. While it was the first official coordinating agency for the armed forces, it could not compel action on the part of either the Army or the Navy. (In fact, President Truman, looking back at Pearl Harbor believed "that the tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which provided for no unified military command, either in the field or in Washington, as it was any personal failure of the Army or Navy Commander.") The concept of "unity of command" was adopted specifically to remedy this shortcoming.
However, problems still existed. During World War II, two major theaters of war (Europe and Pacific), each with major combat operations and headed by strong military leaders, competed for resources with equally strong civilian leadership. The compromise that carried the United States through the war included building a unified command structure that divided the theaters of war into Europe (under Eisenhower), and the Pacific. It further subdivided the Pacific theater into the Southwestern Pacific Area (under MacArthur) and the Pacific Ocean Areas (under Nimitz). This arrangement was typical of many such poor compromises driven more by personalities and personal styles than by operational requirements or wartime military strategy. As the war progressed, the command structure in the Pacific evolved to the point where, during the Philippines campaign, MacArthur was finally given control over the land and air operations (recall the Air Corps was still part of the Army), with a supporting fleet assigned for specific campaigns in the theater.

At the end of the war there was no problem with establishing and maintaining the unified command system in Europe. The JCS had a more difficult time dealing with the Pacific. The Chief of Naval Operations lobbied for a single naval command over the entire Pacific area, excluding Japan, Korea, and China - which were to stay under MacArthur and the Army. The JCS could not agree and, in an attempt to solve the deadlock, President Truman approved a compromise Outline Command Plan. This plan
established seven Unified Commands: Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic, Caribbean, and European. However, no specific geographic boundaries were set for these commands.

Some of the more salient provisions of this Outline Command Plan were to give the JCS strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces; have the JCS assign forces to the unified commands; allow the JCS to prescribe missions and tasks for the commands; permit services to retain operational control of all forces not assigned by the JCS (a situation that would remain until the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act); and, assign a service chief to act as executive agent for the JCS over each unified command. At the same time, the strategic air forces, defined as those air forces not normally based overseas, were by separate provision put under the control of the JCS. (The U.S. Air Force proposed a similar arrangement for its new Air Combat Command in the fall of 1991).

The Korean War provided the first wartime test for the new command structures of what by then was called the Unified Command Plan. The National Security Act of 1947 had basically provided for a single theater commander who would have command authority of component commands of air, land, and sea. While there were three component commands of the Far East Command at the start of the war, General MacArthur did not organize his command in precisely that manner. He chose to serve as his own Land
Component Commander (as did General Schwartzkopf in the Persian Gulf); and, used his own theater headquarters staff to perform the functions of a Component Staff. This arrangement forced the air component command to operate in an independent manner. As the conflict evolved so did the command structure, and a more joint approach was taken to the integration and coordination of theater assets, land, sea, and air.

The United States moved into the war in Vietnam with a command structure that reflected the experiences of World War II and Korea. In addition to these experiences, JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF) was in existence, providing guidance, on unified operations. However, rather than follow this guidance a new organization (MACV) was developed to prosecute the war in Vietnam. The three services disagreed on the exact nature of MACV - unified command on its own merit, or under the already established Pacific Command. As it turned out, MACV remained under the Pacific Command as a sub-unified command.

The next effort to improve the UCP came about as a discussion of larger issues of Defense Reform and in response to a string of military operations that demonstrated a confused and archaic command structure. As early as 1975 the sensing that changes were needed began to appear, but it was not until 1985 that the political mandate for reform took hold. The Staff
Report to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in October of 1985 succinctly summarized the key trends impacting on the U.S. operational command structure. 17

- **Substantial Broadening of Missions:**
  -- considerable adverse impact on the adequacy of the structure.
  -- archaic organization and command arrangements.
  -- growing irrelevancy of the structure to increasing non-Soviet inspired threats.

- **Proliferation of Threats to Western Interests:**
  -- decreased likelihood of global war.
  -- increased likelihood of and intensity of regional conflicts.
  -- Third World nations more heavily and lethally armed.
  -- increasing global economic interdependence make the free flow of raw materials and trade of significant importance.

- **A Diffusion of Political, Military, and Economic Power in the World:**
  -- rise of regional powers capable of exerting considerable influence at the expense of the superpowers.
-- an increase in Third World nationalism and potentially destabilizing religious ideologies.

-- overall reduced potential for any one country to exercise control over the whole system.

Effect of Improved Communications Capabilities on Command and Control Centralization:
-- improvements in communications leading to operational centralization.
-- altered role and organization in many Unified Commands.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 amended the National Security Act of 1947 by showing the "intent of the new law was to establish a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense, with the JCS as the Secretary's operational staff." The Staff Report provided a strikingly clear picture of the failures of the UCP to reflect the changing non-Soviet related strategic realities.

Now that the Cold War and Soviet threat have disappeared, we need an evaluation of the UCP to make it more responsive to the trends that are currently shaping our National Security and National Military Strategies.
We stand at the beginning of 1992, with an appreciation of the striking similarities between now and 1946. Today, as after World War II: we are victorious in a major war; we are faced with the challenge of drawing down a large standing military force; new technology (stealth) and new weapons (extremely accurate precision guided munitions) are available to our armed forces; there does not appear to be a single, overwhelming external threat to the United States; the public (Congress) questions the need for a large standing military; and, perhaps most important, the U.S. is once again molding a new national security strategy. A clear picture of the direct correlation between the evolution of the strategy and the marginal structural adjustments to the UCP is necessary as we embark on a new National Security Strategy and revised UCP.

At the conclusion of World War II, the forces of asymmetry and strategic strong points that shaped the era of containment set the stage for a new kind of conflict - a confrontation between ideologically implacable super powers. For the past four decades, the Soviet Union provided U.S. military planners with a geographical, doctrinal, technological, and ideological benchmark against which they determined the appropriate organization of U.S. forces. Virtually the entire industrialized world belonged to, or was counted by, one camp or the other. Our national security structure achieved an uncharacteristically strong unity of effort and purpose as the western powers rebuilt the
devastated economies of Germany and Japan. A single threat, strong alliances to confront the threat, and a consistent application of resources were the common threads of our containment strategy. Likewise, one can see the same trends in the evolution of the Unified Command Plan during this period. As the nation made several mid-course strategic adjustments in the balance between conventional and nuclear strategies, the concepts embodied in theories of extended nuclear deterrence dramatically shaped the Unified Command Plan. The post-World War II operational commands reflected security threats which were clear and relatively few in number. The more complex threat posed by the Soviet Union produced complex command arrangements around the globe that took on a distinctly anti-Soviet geographical orientation.
TRANSITION FROM CONTAINMENT: THE NEW WORLD

"Glaciers, when they invade a continent, not only obscure its topography but, through the weight of accumulated ice, literally press its surface down into the earth's mantle. Retreats of glaciers, when they occur, cause old features of the landscape slowly to rise up again, sometimes altered, sometimes not."23

John Lewis Gaddis

The strategic environment has forever changed. The grand strategy of containment epitomized an era24 in which NATO developed theater plans to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. An era in which the U.S. Navy focused on resupplying Europe in wartime, dominating the oceans, and building a maritime strategy to strike the Soviet flanks. The U.S. established three basic response tiers:25 a ring of military bases in allied and friendly countries; naval and air power; and, reserves of manpower, supplies, and equipment to sustain forward deployed forces. This was all in support of a strategy predicated on global war with the Soviets. That strategy is now obsolete.

Today, the U.S. attempts to return to the breadth of strategic thinking that in another period led to the Marshall
Plan and the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance. The first step in this process is to describe the world of 2000.

Marvin Cetron and Owen Davies describe a multipolar world, where the political and military structures that gave order to the old world have been swept away with no "final" or enduring arrangements yet in control. In this new era, the traditional world powers have been replaced by powerful regional economic blocks. Nations, now more than ever, act by consensus on matters of common interest. The European Community (EC) bloc wields the most global power, closely followed by a North American alliance of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico joined together in the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). The Pacific Rim revolves around a united China that "looks and acts more like Hong Kong than itself." A weakened Japan is forced to focus internally to satisfy an exploited and politically resentful citizenry. The Middle East, because of the world's continued reliance on a secure flow of oil, retains much of its wealth and poorly regulated influence.

Progress comes more slowly to the Third World but it moves more quickly under the new resource and commercial priorities than it did under the ideological competition and military domination of the Cold War era. An exploding population rate and the modern day plague of AIDS are in full swing with unknown geoeconomic and social consequences. Europe is an economic
powerhouse but remains fractured by nationalistic and ethnic rivalries. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) includes all members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. The CSCE provides the international umbrella for European security and NATO supplies the troops for a quickly evolving European Army. This becomes the continent's answer to its military obligations.

The continued U.S. presence in Europe is less than one-half of the 1992 levels and pressures at home will likely reduce this forward presence to planning staffs only by the year 2000. The U.S. military presence in Korea has been dramatically reduced as the two Koreas finalize plans to unite.

The U.S. is committed to maintaining regional balances of power with the goal of international equilibrium and unhindered economic access to the world's markets for all responsible player states. The balance of power continues to be a contest between the forces of integration and fragmentation. The political, economic, religious, technical, and cultural barriers that historically separated people compete with the more powerful fragmentation barriers of nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and protectionist economics. These more basic "real world" concerns have replaced the competing ideological visions of the Cold War; and, are in themselves, more violent and more difficult
to control. Regional balances of power are imperiled by more
general threats that fall into two categories.\textsuperscript{30}

- **Regional:** the resurgent threat of nationalism and the
  unchecked spread of Islamic Fundamentalism is
  acute. The Middle East and African littoral are
  particularly threatened by these unstable influences.

- **Internal:** the debate within the U.S. over intervention
  continues to place isolationist pressures on the
  allocation of resources, and continues to hinder
  formation of a consensus on a grand strategy.

The threat to U.S. vital interests is the possibility of
nuclear armed terrorists or "irrational actors" with nuclear
and/or ballistic missile capabilities.\textsuperscript{11} The temptation of pre-
emptive conventional strikes threatens regional peace. Many
Third World would-be nuclear states are involved in stubborn
regional confrontations.
"We seek no territory, we desire no hegemony in any region, but we cannot ignore our responsibilities to help lead the world community along the path of peace and prosperity." \(^{12}\)

CJCS General Colin Powell

The "National Military Strategy, 1992" has been published and incorporates: the concepts found in President Bush's speech at Aspen on 2 August, 1990; General Powell's speeches on the rationale for the Base Force; and the National Security Strategy Report to the Congress in August 1991. \(^{33}\)

As soon as the President opened the debate on his new National Security Strategy, the U.S. had to respond to a regional crisis requiring near global mustering of resources, and with little regard for existing geographical boundaries. While this paper does not intend to provide any detailed lessons learned from Desert Storm, the crisis highlighted at least three significant problems for the emerging National Military Strategy. First, the conflict ratified our suspicions that the U.S. military is both politically and logistically dependent upon friends and allies in a conflict of this size. Secondly, there is still the increasingly difficult problem of obtaining domestic legitimacy; and, finally, there is now a very genuine concern
that the 25% reductions in the force over the next five years will produce a military force that may not be able to accomplish what the U.S. military did in the Gulf War. That is to say that there may need to be a fundamental change in the relationships between the UCP boundaries (geography) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (force apportionment) as we shift to a fundamentally different relationship between "supported" and "supporting" CINCS. In view of the previous discussions, we would add the requirement immediately to tailor our existing command structure as a means to bridge the gap between declining structure and a fundamentally different, CONUS based, force projection strategy.
"What we need are not merely reductions... but restructuring"34

President Bush
Aspen Speech
August 1990

If the Base Force is the conceptual force in "hedging" or controlling the build-down, then the UCP should be the command structure for a changing military strategy. The primary challenge is how to adjust the global capability that has been built for Europe to a more regional capability. A secondary challenge is to bring relevancy to our organization for war while ridding ourselves of Cold War appendages.

One of the most difficult paradigms to break, with the end of the Cold War, will be the focus on Europe. Now, the U.S. is faced with the high likelihood of low-level, or "brush fire" wars;36 and other forms of unconventional wars waged by guerilla or, perhaps, even criminal organizations. This contrasts with a more familiar form of modern warfare as experienced in the Gulf War - third world "irrational" states with large armies that are fully mechanized and motorized with supporting air forces and navies. These interstate conflicts may even replace the "wars of liberation" so common in an earlier era of superpower ideological competition.37
In any case, the overriding characteristic of these regional wars will be their limited nature. The objectives, duration, intensity of fighting, and perhaps their very outcomes will be governed by a delicate balance between political necessity and military requirements. The forces engaged in these regional conflicts (the means), will be restrained in both time and space by objectives (the ends), which will be established in support of very limited war aims. The U.S. organization for war must be constructed with different assumptions on force projection than we plan for currently under global scenarios.

The next concept in the emerging military strategy that will ultimately require changes in the UCP is the new reality of extended conventional deterrence. Robert Haffa succinctly states the issue: "...a strategy of effective conventional deterrence must be: decoupled from nuclear threats, asymmetrical in threat and application, intense and overwhelming in its threat, offensive with a capability for punishment as well as denial and extended globally through new technologies and weapons systems." 39

Unlike the Cold War years, when nuclear weapons were the keystone of deterrence, now the credibility of extended deterrence for potential regional conflicts may rest entirely on the threat of the use of conventional forces - the implications on U.S. strategy and command structure are many. Of particular
interest will be to ensure that the warfighting CINCs have the
capabilities - forces, projection capability, and requisite
forward presence operations - to present a credible level of
conventional deterrence; and be able to effect a quick transition
to a conflict posture with forces that must deploy from CONUS.
The lead elements of most of these forces will be the same for
each CINC.

In the Cold War years the "...U.S. focused on the global
deterrence of a single adversary on a regional basis, and now, in
a new world order, is attempting to transition to a regional
deterrence of multiple actors on a global basis." In other
words, we are seeking a conventional deterrence capability that
is strategic rather than regional. U.S. forces will be based
primarily in CONUS and must have a credible capability for global
reach within a very precise window of time.

The final element affecting our organization for war is our
approach to collective security. In 1991 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff indicated that collective security agreements must "...rely
on the coordination of common interests, the codifying of
commitments and responsibilities, and provisions for an
integrated command structure." Additionally, the use of
coalitions, as opposed to collective security measures, as ad hoc
arrangements for rapid response to emerging crises will be
required. Our command arrangements, therefore, must take into
account potential regional crises that will be more fluid, as opposed to the concrete and dependable geographical alliances of the Cold War.

Our warfighting structures in place now were configured with forces and plans in response to a strategy predicated on global war with the Soviets. Not only must the forward deployed staffs be streamlined to reflect a much reduced forward presence, most of the redundant allied headquarters in NATO and to some extent in PACOM must be reevaluated under a completely new and emerging framework of regional economic alliances and military coalitions that may only take substantive form in the face of a growing crisis. The geographic boundaries of the current UCP represent Cold War asymmetrical attempts to block Soviet expansion. Lines must now be adjusted to integrate potential hot spots; for example, India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, Israel and the Arab countries, and an entirely new look at the Eastern European nations and Russia.
"When one CINC has a problem in his theater and he has to go to war, every CINC goes to war with him.""^{14}

CJCS General Colin Powell

This quote from the Chairman's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1992 may, on the surface, be interpreted as a gratuitous reference to jointness. In fact, this deliberate statement from the architect of our new national military strategy summarizes quite well the intent to focus overwhelming support and force, if required, to deter, fight, and win any regional war: In this respect, the Gulf War approach was not an anomaly. He also summarizes the basic challenge to any new UCP: how to execute effectively a global conventional deterrence strategy that requires a forward presence (forces, exercises, prepositioning); aggressive forward presence operations (peacetime engagement); and, yet, can quickly convert CONUS based warfighting structure to a regional warfighting force.

As we reviewed earlier, the U.S. now possesses an "artifact of glaciation": a UCP designed from the geographically oriented theaters of operations of World War II. The institutional focus has been to respond from an asymmetrical strategy standpoint and
make adjustments around the margins. The primary focus has been "who's in control?"; with little attention given to the constituent parts of the individual Unified Commands. It is interesting to note that the adherence to strict geographic boundaries that we accept as the norm today, evolved from a pre-Cold War plan with no formal geographic boundaries. While there is no question that the current boundaries were satisfactory, perhaps we need to explore a notion of boundaries set up to complement the emerging lines for day-to-day peacetime operations and develop a separate force projection CINC with no geographic boundaries but capable of regional operations on a global basis.

Now is the time to complement our military strategy and the tenets of forward presence, crisis response, and force projection with a UCP reflective of that strategy. Several Unified Commands now cross all geographic boundaries - Transportation Command, Space Command, and Strategic Command. The remaining Unified Commands - Pacific, Atlantic, European, Southern, and Central must be restructured. Four of the five owe their existence to, and focused their entire efforts on the Soviet global threat.
THE NEW UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

As the United States adjusts its focus and determines its role in the emerging world the atmosphere is right in the Department of Defense for the articulation of a new unified command structure. This new command structure must recognize and address the shift from a global to a regional strategy executed by forces that primarily are CONUS based. In the end, this new command structure will provide the bridge between the military strategy and a more responsive force apportionment.

A major difference that must be accommodated by the new UCP is the dramatic change in the size of the U.S. military - a change fostered by the rapid demise of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. military force built for global war with the Soviet Union will find itself in a new role; not poised against a single monolithic threat, but rather against regional contingencies. The military command structure must be viable, responsive and provide continuity and simplicity in command structures.

We now are seeing powerful regional economic blocs come into their own around the world - the European Community, the Japan-Korea region, the Southwest Pacific area, and the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region, to name a few. History has shown that as regions changed economically a military alliance often developed. The Western European Union is but one of the latest examples of
this phenomenon. The new unified command structure must recognize these realities. As a minimum, now perhaps more than ever, we must take these economic blocs into consideration as we begin to realign our command structure along far different geographical boundaries.

This Unified Command Plan recognizes the need for functional and regional interests. Functionally, the Transportation Command, Space Command, and Strategic Command should continue as now organized. Under this structure they continue to support the needs of the other CINCs and enjoy the benefits of centralized control with decentralized operations. Likewise, because of its nature, the Special Operations Command remains as organized.

The most dramatic changes to the UCP come in the changes to the remaining five unified commands: Atlantic, Pacific, European, Southern, and Central. These changes reflect the national military strategy, drawdown of U.S. military forces, and the emerging world order. Rather than five separate unified commands covering specific geographic areas, the new UCP addresses the world in terms of the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean environments. Under each of these commands are sub-unified commands, as appropriate and as needed. Forces assigned and apportioned to these commands are not in the scope of the UCP.
This UCP recognizes a world that emerged in the last years of the twentieth century. No longer is the U.S. forced to see the world as a zero sum gain against a Soviet world power. U.S. national interests are now the governing factor of military power. Old command alignments can give way to the next evolutionary step. This step in the UCP must adjust to the realities of the new world by addressing the world in terms of the emerging economic blocs.

Additionally, some countries of the world may not be addressed specifically in the UCP. This is by design, rather than oversight, in that it reflects national interests. For example, U.S. interests in that part of the former Soviet Union from the Urals to the Pacific are low. Therefore, that region does not appear under a specific command. That part of the former Soviet Union west of the Urals is important to the U.S. and is, therefore, included in a specific command. Under the broad aegis of Atlantic or Pacific orientation, emphasis on a particular country can be easily accomplished. Further, the biennial review of the UCP allows for changes as appropriate.

**ATLANTIC FORCES (LANTFOR)**

To distinguish between the old and new UCP's, the new UCP replaces LANTCOM/PACOM with LANTFOR/PACFOR. This should not be construed to mean force packages.
The U.S. Atlantic Command in the new UCP is comprised of the geographic region currently assigned USLANTCOM, plus parts of the current European and Central Commands. The new UCP reflects world changes and emerging world orders into the twenty-first century.

In Europe, the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is given over to a European country; reflecting both the drawdown of U.S. forces stationed permanently in Europe and the increased role of Europeans in their own defense. With the demise of the Soviet Union the role of EUCOM has shifted more to a crisis management role than that of a force poised against the Soviet threat. Planning for U.S. military responsibilities for Europe are met through a sub-unified command of LANTFOR, oriented to Europe. Its area of interest extends east to the Urals and south to the Mediterranean. Turkey is included in this sub-unified command area reflecting its continued contribution to NATO and U.S. interests. The U.S. continues to participate fully in NATO and retains the role of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

While U.S. military forces stationed permanently in Europe are reduced, a planning headquarters will remain. This headquarters will be comprised of staff members from the current European Command. Maintenance of this regional planning headquarters in Europe displays U.S. interests and meets the
current defense and political commitments to Europe. This command also ensures that the Europeans do not see a total decoupling by the U.S. from its historic ties to Europe.

To the south, sub-Saharan Africa is addressed by a sub-unified command with a headquarters on the continent. The part of the current European Command which deals with Africa forms the nucleus for this command. The key point in this command is to ensure that a U.S. presence and U.S. interest in the region is evident. This area of the world has long been neglected by the U.S. and by being included in the current European Command has taken a back seat to its bigger neighbor to the north. A small investment in Africa now may be in the best interests of the United States.

Access to resources and raw materials from sub-Saharan Africa could, by the turn of the century, be critical. Inherent in this structure is the implication of additional commitments to Africa. The nature and depth of these commitments must be considered carefully.

The third sub-unified command under LANTFOR will focus on the Middle East. The Mediterranean littoral countries, plus that part of Africa that is now Central Command will comprise this command's area of interest. This will provide a clear
opportunity to deal with countries having the common element of religion.

This command headquarters will be comprised of those parts of the staff from the existing Central and European commands which focus on the Middle East. As with the headquarters for the African forces, this command's headquarters needs to be located in its area of interest.

PACIFIC FORCES

Turning to the Pacific area, a similar division of interests is needed. The overall unified command remains as Pacific Command. Under PACFOR are subunified commands to focus on the blocs that emerged in the 1990s. One subunified command meets the American commitment in Korea. A change in the structure results in the Combined Forces Command being commanded by a Korean, with an American deputy.

In Japan, a reduced presence evolves, yet there still is a need for a command to meet U.S. commitments. This command is separate from Korea and scales down as Japan picks up more of its own defense needs. The American influence is maintained by port visits of U.S. Navy ships, forward basing of rotational Air Force assets, and a ground presence in Okinawa.
In the southwest Pacific/Asia region a subunified command focuses on India, Pakistan, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the bloc of economic powers rising in the region. A headquarters staff is located in a host country, possibly Singapore, which already is allowing a U.S. Navy logistics function and U.S. Air Force visits, to show American interest and resolve.

Since the U.S. is moving to a policy of forward presence vice forward deployed, fewer troops will be permanently stationed overseas. Those returned to the U.S. and remaining in the force structure will be assigned to a unified command for planning, training, and resourcing. The unified command, as necessary can further reassign those troops to a subunified command for more tailored training. This reassignment would allow the subunified commander to know his troops and be active in their training and readiness. The troops would have the benefit of knowing the precise region for which they were training.

This arrangement retains the necessary joint framework for all commands (unified and subunified) and provides a stable structure of service components. The commanders can then participate fully in the training, preparedness, and deployment of their forces. Further, the regional orientation will prevent the ad hoc approach to crises response which has existed in the past.
CONTINGENCIES

With the majority of U.S. military forces now CONUS based, new command arrangements are required to deal with worldwide contingency operations. Responses to these contingencies will be the mission of a new contingency, or readiness, command. These all purpose forces will deploy to a region to augment forward presence forces and to respond to crises. This force will be task organized and as "geographically" tailored as possible. While these forces are operating in a specific theater they will be supported by the appropriate geographical CINC but will be employed by a subunified CONUS-based commander. If the crisis continues to the point that the contingency force cannot handle the mission, reinforcing forces from CONUS will be deployed and appropriate command lines can be expanded to include the entire region or theater as required.
CONCLUSIONS

The Unified Command Plan is one of two documents which affect the establishment and clarity of chains of command in the Department of Defense. This paper has dealt with the need to make changes to that document. The historical events that shaped to the current UCP have been examined, with major differences and similarities considered in the proposal for a new UCP. Likewise, the changing political, military, and economic realities of the post-Cold War era have been considered to complete the thinking on the proposed UCP.

Changes as noted here are dramatic and far reaching. These recommendations cut deeply into many "sacred cows" and "rice bowls". These changes will not easily be made. Perhaps the changes posed here will evolve more slowly; not made in a single leap. However, with the changing strategy, force structure reductions, and fiscal constraints changes will be made. In fact, changes are required.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is clear in its intent to have a military force that is capable and reflective of the country's needs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to submit a report, not less than every three years, recommending changes in the roles and missions of the armed forces. This report shall consider changes in the threat,
unnecessary duplication of effort, and changes in technology. It is painfully obvious that, in light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all three of those criteria exist, and exist in dramatic difference to the Cold War era.

Further, Goldwater-Nichols requires the Chairman to review, the UCP at least every two years. This review is to focus on the combatant commands and recommend changes, as may be necessary, to the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command. The UCP as proposed here addresses the criteria described above, and offers a plan that meets the definitions and requirements given in the reorganization act. The Department of Defense now stands in a position to effect such changes. History gives us a guide, the new strategy gives us a mandate, and the fiscal and political climate give us a sense of urgency.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid. p.7.


7. Ibid. p.46.


9. Ibid. p. 16.

10. Ibid. p.16.

11. Ibid. p. 19.

12. Ibid. p. 16.

13. Ibid. p. 21.


15. Ibid. p. 44.


19. After the victory of World War II the United States began the process of getting back to business as usual. However, the events of the preceding few years were such as to thrust the U.S. into a central leadership role in world affairs. In the spring of 1991, the U.S. stood in a similar position, having led a coalition which had defeated the fourth largest military power in the world. The Soviet Union had supported these efforts and later was to disintegrate, thereby removing the major threat seen to the U.S. While relations with China were strained, there appeared to be no military threat to the U.S. and the Department of Defense saw a need, and an opportunity, to restructure. Actually this need was seen earlier, in August 1990, when the President made his Aspen speech. In this speech, the concept of the base force was espoused and allusions made to a restructured Unified Command Plan. The Gulf victory and the dissolution of the Soviet Union kindled the fire that called for drawdowns of the U.S. armed forces. As after World War II there appears to be no military threat to the U.S., so why do we need such a large standing military? The history of the U.S. is replete with examples of making such drawdowns after major victories; drawdowns which, in time, led to the debacle of Task Force Smith at the opening of the Korean war. The call now receives large support from the Congress, which is eager to apply the peace dividend to the country’s ails. This peace dividend is sought through the reduction of the active armed forces. Those who defend the need for large active forces are assuaged by Congress saying there will still be a large reserve component to meet the call, as in Desert Storm. The smaller the size of the active structure, the more necessary becomes a reflective unified command structure. As we move from a posture of forward deployed to forward presence, and regional combatant command headquarters are resident in the United States, clearer is the need for a dramatic revision to the UCP; a revision which effectively employs the armed forces in support of the military strategy. The dramatic close of World War II was brought about through the advent of nuclear weapons - technology never before seen was used. For years after, discussions on defense needs revolved around the use of nuclear weapons to quickly end wars they could not deter. With such technology why do we need large standing forces? The same question is posed today. Stealth technology and precision guided munitions so effectively used in the Persian Gulf are often seen as the answer to our defense needs. Often the case has been forwarded that stealth bombers, based in CONUS, could fly to a trouble spot, drop their loads of precision guided munitions, and return. Why then do we need forces overseas? The concept of forward presence, vice forward deployed forces, attempts to answer that question. The question of affordability looms large as we face higher prices for military weaponry in the face of declining resources. The short term view overtakes the long term view as Congress calls for
large force reductions in an effort to garner quick paybacks. Lacking in these arguments is the realization of the even higher costs of force buybacks to meet unplanned for events. Large forces which have had a history of numerous problems with coordination, cooperation, and jointness are quick to fall to the axe. This was especially true in the Pacific after World War II and is hinted at in recent articles on the differences between Schwartzkopf (CINC) and Franks (Corps Commander), as well as disagreements over the use of naval and air forces and their roles in the Persian Gulf. Although the armed forces individually did well, their command echelons did less well. These memories die hard in the Congress. The new weapon from World War II was the nuclear device; the new weapon from the Persian Gulf is precision guided munitions: laser guided bombs, television guided weapons, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles all played significant roles in the decisive air campaign in the Gulf War. The success of these munitions, and the air campaign, has led some to question the need for land forces. The biggest challenge facing the defense establishment is determining the threat against which to plan military preparedness. Do we need a threat based force or a capabilities force? After World War II we did not see an external threat to U.S. security; the same quandary exists today. In the shadow of the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union we do not see a single, external threat against which to plan. All indications point to a smaller force - from the concept of the base force to more dramatic proposals being considered by Congress. Regardless of the size of the force it must be responsive to U.S. security needs. Key to ensuring responsiveness is a viable Unified Command Plan that reflects the emerging new role and new strategy of the United States.


21. Ibid. This is an oversimplification for illustrative purposes. The complex dynamics of balancing ends-ways-means cannot be viewed without some detachment, certainly not the case during the early years of containment. See Gaddis' discussion of this issue at pages 160-165.


24. Gaddis, Ch. 2.


27. Ibid. Ch 4.

28. Ibid. p. 36.


30. Ibid. pp. 27-34.


32. From the unofficial testimony of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, before the Senate Armed Services Committee for the FY93 Defense Budget hearings, 31 January 1992.


35. From a speech given by President Bush at Aspen, Colorado, 1 August 1990.


37. Ibid. p. 6.

38. Ibid. p. 8.


40. Ibid. p. 9.


42. From the unofficial testimony of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, before the Senate Armed Services Committee for the FY93 Defense Budget Hearings, 31 January 1992.
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