AD-A249 596

(2)

STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING - OR LACK OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING - AND THE "DRUG WAR"

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Cook
United States Army

DTIC
ELECTE
APR 29 1992
S D
D

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 1992

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

92-11260

92 4 27 421

Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Root Hall, Building 122 Carlisle, PA 17013-5050	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

Campaign Planning - or the Lack of Campaign Planning in the "Drug War"

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

LTC Stephen K. Cook

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Individual Study	FROM _____ TO _____	1992 April 13	27

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The war this nation is now embarked upon, the "War on Drugs," is one of the greatest threats confronting America. Drugs are the cancer of the Americas. Over 30 Federal Agencies and a multitude of State agencies are engaged in day to day armed conflict with drug users and traffickers. This battle has drained America of resources and productivity. DoD finds itself in an unenviable position--having been thrust into a war with no leader, competing demands, competing agencies and a blurred end state. That blurred end state is caused by politics and parochialism. How can the confusion, complexity and lack of unity be overcome? The answer lies in utilizing campaign planning process. A critical review of the campaign planning process from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to JTF-4 clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding and use of the campaign planning process. This process coupled by initiatives already in place and stronger mandates by Congress to bring Jointness (amongst federal agencies) into play will result in a clearer definition of this nation's end state and more effective and efficient conduct of this war.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL COL William W. Mendel	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (717) 245-3721/4404	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCAC

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING - OR LACK OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING - AND THE "DRUG WAR"

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Cook
United States Army

Colonel William W. Mendel
Project Advisor

Accesion For
NTIS CRA&I ☑
DTIC TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐
Justification
By
Distribution /
Availability Codes
Dist | Avail and / or Special
A-1

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Stephen K. Cook, LTC, USA

TITLE: Campaign Planning or The Lack of Campaign Planning and The "Drug War"

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: Pages: 27 Classification: Unclassified

The war this nation is now embarked upon, the "War on Drugs", is one of the greatest threats confronting America. Drugs are the cancer of the Americas. Over 30 Federal agencies and a multitude of State agencies are engaged in day to day armed conflict with drug users and traffickers. This battle has drained America of resources and productivity. DOD finds itself in an unenviable position--having been thrust into the Drug War by Congressional mandates. DOD has been thrust into a war with no leader, competing demands, competing agencies and a blurred end state. That blurred end state is caused by politics and parochialism. How can the confusion, complexity and lack of unity be overcome? The answer lies in utilizing campaign planning process. A critical review of the campaign planning process from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to JTF-4 clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding and use of the campaign planning process. This process coupled by initiatives already in place and stronger mandates by Congress to bring Jointness (amongst federal agencies) into play will result in a clearer definition of this nation/s end state and more effective and efficient conduct of this war.

Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the following for their assistance in obtaining research and developing my approach to this paper: Col. Al Maestes and LTC(P) Rich Hall. I would also like to acknowledge Rich's wife, Mary, for her invaluable support in typing this project. Additionally, without the help of the following officers I would not have been able to conduct the numerous interviews at JCS, CINCLANT, JTF4 and C3I East: LTC Bob Dodson (USMC), LTC Bill Perrish (USMC), Maj. Bruce Dickman (USA) and LT CDR Al Sine (Coast Guard).

INTRODUCTION

Today, the United States is engaged in a war that will not be terminated easily. It is the war on Drugs. The Department of Defense has been thrust into this war to assist the thirty plus federal agencies. There seems to be over thirty different means of bringing this conflict to termination, and no one agency seems to have all the answers. The purpose of this paper is to critically review the campaign planning process from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down to a specific theater of operations, the Bahamas. It will be shown that campaign planning is a process that will allow federal agencies the ability to bridge the gap from planning to implementation of that plan (prosecution of the war). However, research and interviews indicate this process is only one of the tools available to the military and other federal agencies. Each of those other tools will be discussed. Yet, in the end this war and the prosecution will be futile unless there is a clear unity of effort amongst all federal agencies. Congress and the President must establish a lead agency to bring this war, the planning and execution together. Then all the resources must be given to that agency to achieve the U.S. National goals in this conflict.

Background - The Problem

> The danger that drugs pose to our nation needs little elaboration. A report by a congressional subcommittee headed by Congressman Nicholas Mavroulas concluded - "The chief threat to our national security in the 1990s may well come from the hordes of red tomato cans filled with cocaine, (an actual smuggling technique) rather than the hordes of Red Communists.[1]

Drug use and drug related crimes of violence are straining the United States economically and socially. The United States legal system and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) are strained to the limit while the prisons and courts are bursting at the seams. The last two Presidents have declared a "War on Drugs." President Bush recently published the 4th iteration of the National Drug Control Strategy. He has stated that the "survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure" is the nations major national security interest. He further stated "that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs."[2] That is because of the far reaching effects of drugs - economically and socially.

"The President's Strategy advances a vigorous argument against what some would say is the continuation of largely reactive, uncoordinated, and piecemeal efforts of past anti-drug "Campaigns."[3] Is this just a bunch of political bantering or is there a real problem? Is there a unified effort to combat drugs? These are not simple questions to answer. However, a review of the tenets of campaign planning and the campaign planning process will demonstrate a lack of planning and a lack of unity of effort in the "Drug War." Not that there have not been some herculean efforts initiated by individuals or some successful operations. Overall, the effort is still piecemeal.

As stated before, the issue of drugs/drug control strategy is not a simple issue. However, it is an issue that must be developed and looked at economically, socially and politically both in the

United States and in the producing countries. Drug abuse can be considered the cancer of democratic societies. It eats away at a nation affecting the economy, social development and racial/ethnic classes.

A look at some statistics will clearly demonstrate the drain on the economy of the United States.

Illegal Business Profits:

Cocaine	-	$ 25 Billion
Heroin	-	$180 Billion
Marijuana	-	$110 Billion[4]

That is over $300 Billion that is not productive to the United States. A large portion of it will be taken from the United States and spent elsewhere. That which remains will not be taxed and will not be used for the public good. This money could clearly help in development of a sound economy, future development in industry or technology. What is the cost to the businesses of the United States?

Business Cost: $75 Billion

^Health Care
^Workmen's Compensation
^Sick leave
^Theft to firms[5]

The total cost to the taxpayers, the government and industry is phenomenal. However that is just one aspect of the problem. A study conducted by the U.S. Postal Service found drug users had a 61% higher absence rate and about a 40% greater chance of being fired. This costs the government $17 million over three years. The government is not alone. General Motors says that $400 is

added to the price of every car because of substance abuse and Bell South estimates 65% of its health care costs are directly linked to substance abuse.[6]

The problem is further exacerbated by an over-worked and over-crowded judicial and penal system. The end result is criminals placed back into the community and more violence. Yes, there is a real problem! One that is robbing America of wealth, initiative, creativity and a superior work ethic. The 99th Congress took action to direct the President to submit a comprehensive program designed to interdict aircraft, vessels and vehicles carrying illegal drugs into the United States and a comprehensive drug strategy.[7] These initiatives at that time seemed to be politically expedient (carrying weight with voters). While the initiatives have created at least as many problems as they looked to solve by failing to provide adequately for unified participation in the planning and interdiction and by providing a lure of money as the incentive for quantitative measures of effectiveness.[8]

"The President has stated that this may be one of the toughest challenges we've faced in decades. And it is a challenge we must face, not as Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives, but as Americans."[9] The key is a coordinated, united effort. The president announced a strategy with four basic tenets:

1. Enforce the law.
2. Look beyond our borders.
3. Place appropriate concern for drug treatment.
4. Stop illegal drug use before it starts.[10]

A unified effort built on these tenets will decrease demand and reduce production. However, as a nation - we are not there!

Background - Another Perspective

As stated earlier, the problem of drug trafficking and a "War on Drugs" is not a simple issue with a simple answer. As a nation, we have tried to simplify it by putting emphasis on interdiction - 70% of the CN (counter-narcotics) budget is being spent on interdiction and yet that was only one leg of the Presidents' strategy. The United States' view on Latin American and Caribbean involvement in drug trafficking is a jaundiced view and this does not hesitate to complicate the problem. "The current focus on drug trafficking, serious though it is, must be seen against the inherent instability in Latin America (and the Caribbean). There is social and economic instability that provides a fertile medium for the growth and spread of international narcotics trade."[11] What is the United States doing to change this fertile medium; or as a nation, is it focused only on one major issue--interdiction of drugs?

> "People struggling against starvation, ignorance and disease value political ideology only to the extent that it affects their own desperate condition. Likewise, the evils of the drug trade are relative. Peasants, struggling to put food on the table for their children, see income from coca leaf production as their salvation. . . . The consequences . . . are a North American Problem."[12]

The problem is a multifaceted issue with political, social and economic ramifications. The United States is waging a different kind of war with no sovereign enemies, no preeminent instruments and no direct military threat. It is a war that cannot answer one issue (drugs) without looking at other issues of demography, debt and destabilization.[13]

Background of Military Involvement

The current level of military involvement in the counter-drug effort began (in earnest) when the Fiscal Year 89 Defense Authorization Act empowered the Department of Defense (DOD) as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking into the United States. DOD was directed to develop a Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) architecture linking DOD and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs).[14] Funding was initiated and provided for an enhanced drug interdiction and enforcement role by National Guard in support of their respective state plans. "Military support comes from all components of the Department of Defense. It is categorized in three areas: Title 10 forces (Active Duty and Reserve forces), Title 32 (National Guard), and logistical support through regional offices."[15] DOD developed its mission statement to fulfill its responsibilities:

Mission:

- Detect and monitor the aerial and maritime flow of illegal drugs to the United States.

- Facilitate a substantial reduction in the flow of illegal drugs by supporting LEAs, host nations, and transit nations.

- Coordinate timely passage of real time data (intelligence).[16]

In the United States, there are over 30 Federal agencies involved in the counter-drug effort, and thousands of organizations at the state and local level. In the drug control arena, DOD acts as a supporting player, whether using National Guard or Active Services, working with LEAs and Host Nations in their CN efforts. Interagency working groups draft strategy (although some agencies may question this) and policy initiatives for submission to decision makers for approval. It is a challenging environment with many decisions being made on a consensus basis.[17] The Director of ONDCP, the Drug Czar, is nothing more than a facilitator and advisor.

In order to accomplish its basic mission of detection and monitoring DOD is organized around five Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCLANT, CINCNORAD, CINCPAC, CINCSO, CONCFOR), each executing their counter-drug mission within their geographical area of responsibility. Three CINCs (CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCFOR) have developed and formed Joint Task Forces (JTF - 4, 5, 6). The aforementioned CINCs and JTFs make the best use of existing command

structure, intelligence gathering systems and take advantage of the existing regional structure of the Federal LEAs.

The DOD counter-drug strategy is one of a "defense in depth" attacking the flow of drugs at every phase--at the source, in transit and at the border. The first line of this active defense is in the source countries. DOD provides assistance and operational support to Host Nations in the form of training teams, intelligence data and equipment. In providing this support DOD has established meticulous procedures to obtain Host Nation approval for any and all actions to insure Host Nation sovereignty. The second line of the active defense is the detection and monitoring of drugs in transit. Flexibility is key here in order to respond to sophisticated narco-traffickers who constantly change routes, and tactics, using the most advanced technology. The last line of this defense is to support interdiction efforts within the U.S. border. Emphasis is placed on the support of federal, state and local LEAs, together with enhanced use of National Guard under state control.[18]

Total Quality

Professor W. Edwards Deming says:

> "Management," - (Executive and Congressional leadership or lack thereof) - "for the most part in the Western World has abandoned their responsibilities delegating their responsibilities to other people, focusing their efforts on outcome."[19]

Deming has demonstrated to the Japanese, and now to Americans, that management (leadership) cannot abandon its responsibility to lead. Organizations that depend on reports will become totally reactive. A look at current LEA procedures clearly demonstrates that overall, as an entity, the LEAs fall into this trap and they are as reactive as Congress tends to be. Historically, LEAs have justified their budgets and articulated their effectiveness by parading arrests, seizures and prosecution statistics before Congress, as well as the public.[20] Any interview with a law enforcement officer concerning counter-narcotics will eventually lead to a discussion of arrests, seizures and prosecutions. Everyone in LEAs is doing their best. But for what? Where is a statistical analysis of drug bust leading? Has there been any reduction in use? Has the street value of drugs become too exorbitant for the user? If this is the best measure of effectiveness in the "Drug War" then why has not the U.S. Military been given a larger role by Congress?

The importance of these statistics are ingrained into the values of law enforcement officers. From an officer's indoctrination into the law enforcement arena, he is taught to investigate crime, make arrests and seize contraband. The ultimate goal is to achieve the prosecution of criminals. Are these values synchronized with strategic objectives established in the National Drug Control Strategy? How are the national objectives synchronized with the tactical initiatives of thousands of different law enforcement offices? Which organization is the

"operational commander?" Which organization is responsible to synchronize operation plans of a myriad of federal and state agencies? How are these measures of effectiveness synchronized with the DOD strategy of defense in depth and deterrance?

DODs strategy of defense in depth and deterrence conflicts with LEAs measures of effectiveness. DOD does not need a change in laws (Posse Comitatus) to give it more authority to become more effective. DOD resources provide a viable threat to drug traffickers--if used properly. One of DOD's aim is to stop the drugs before they cross the border by raising the perceived risk to the potential trafficker (this is more commonly known as deterrence). This can be demonstrated simply by conducting training exercises along vital drug trafficking routes.

A look at DOD and LEA funding will again demonstrate another area of the lack of synchronization. The DOD budget is vulnerable to being a bill payer for the "Drug War", particularly in light of budget reductions throughout federal agencies and the often mentioned "Peace Dividend." In a 1989 House Armed Services Committee hearing a member inquired as to why DOD was waiting on the commitment of $308 million (not yet appropriated but certain to be) when DOD had $300 billion with which to get started.[21] It is that sort of thinking that pervades Congress in many cases and undermines coherent planning and in the end preparedness.

Inter-agency cooperation should be greater in this war, albeit a different kind, than in any other. Every operating agency of the executive branch has a piece of the budget action and therefore a

role to play in the "Drug War."[22] The office of National Drug Control Policy now sits at the head of a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy to which there is no workable alternative. There appears to be an ever growing web of coordinating groups, policy committees and working groups that could stifle if not enforce gridlock on effective and efficient prosecution of the "Drug War." The very nature of federal and state agencies creates a degree of parochialism and a sense of self-preservation (that I noted throughout my travels and interviews). Since no one operating agency with sufficient authority to force cooperation and coordination sits atop of the Drug War (order of battle) the potential exists for continued lack of coordination or unity of effort.

Campaign Planning - The Bridge

"Clausewitz, emphasizing the need for a plan of campaign, cautioned planners . . . not to take the first step without considering the last."[23] Whether the U.S. government has committed this error will not be known for years. However, the nation and DOD have found themselves thrust into a war. Planning has become more paramount than ever as the myriad of Federal agencies fight for limited resources.

In the introduction of Mendel and Mungers' "Campaign Planning and the Drug War" a question was presented by the Commandant of the War College as to whether the gap between National Drug Control

Strategy and law enforcement tactical actions could be bridged by military campaign planning.[24] I believe that campaign planning can bridge the gap. However, I'll have to concur with Maj. Michael Rampy in his article, Campaign Planning: Paradox or Paradigm, that from JCS on down, DOD has lost the art of campaign planning. Each service within DOD as well as the JCS has worked so hard on the deliberate planning process that they can plan for contingencies and single large operations, very well.

> . . . a plan of campaign provides an analytical framework for applying forces and resources, in a logical sequence in time and space within a theater of war (or operations) to achieve strategic aims.[25]

It seems as DOD was thrust into "taking the first step without considering the last."

In the SOUTHCOM Theater of Strategy, Gen. Joulwan is very emphatic about the linkage between strategic, operational and tactical integration of strategy. Why is this the only theater with a true campaign plan? In the Southern Theater the operational commander described a concept that envisions the accomplishment of strategic and operational missions. At this level the campaign plan serves as a bridge between operation plans that the CINC developed in response to JCS guidance and the progressive employment of forces over time.[26] The operational commander, whether it is a CINC or a Federal agency, must be constantly interacting with the strategic level. Even as he begins to overcome his adversary and determines how to use his tactical

forces to accomplish a sequence of actions.[27] Strategy is the key to operational level of war. Gen. Joulwan has gone through the process of analysis of strategy, looking at assessments, threats and opportunities, to develop a theater strategy and campaign plans. These strategies and campaign plans have the necessary goals, objectives, tasks, priorities, methods of engagement and measures of effectiveness that have been closely synthesized with each countries plans.[28] "A viable campaign plan considers diplomatic, economic and military perspectives within a coherent framework to achieve strategic aims."[29] Obviously, this process should be the guide for all CINCs.

However, as Clausewitz states, "no one should go to war (this is what politicians have declared the battle against drugs) without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."[30] What is the end state? Who or what organization in each theater of operation is that operational commander that is needed to link/synchronize all aspects of the Drug War? Is the U.S. strategy and end state such that one organization could pull together the fractional elements of this piece-meal conflict? I believe so!

Who is in Charge

In Mendel and Munger's publication on drug war campaign planning they dismiss the notion that "no one's in charge" as pointless. I cannot agree with that point. Throughout my travels

to JCS, DA, CINCLANT, JTF-4 and C3I that one simple question permeates everyone's mind. There is no question that the "buck stops with the President." However, does he have the ability to fight a war twenty-four hours a day. In conventional wars the theater commander has supreme authority over all the forces allocated within his AOR. What we have in the hierarchy of the drug war is the office of National Drug Control Policy which develops, coordinates and administers drug strategy. That office, however, lacks the political and statutory clout to overcome inertia. Who has supreme authority over all resources to fight drugs within JTF-4 AOR - no one other than the President. Mendel and Munger's book recommends yet another level of command and control in the form of cabinet level drug board chaired by the President to ensure cooperation among several involved agencies. Although this is a step in the right direction, serious consideration should be given to appointing one federal agency to be in charge of all drug operations. Presidential directives could be issued effectively cross attaching certain resources to the lead agency. Such actions would eliminate a lot of the confusion, lack of coordination, inefficient use of resources, and interagency friction. Such a move would lay the seeds necessary to develop Regional (AOR) Campaign plans using a process similar to that which is used in Southcom. Additionally, all funds dedicated to the "Drug War" could be apportioned out according to the priority established by national and regional plans.

As good as these changes may look there will be plenty of draw-backs. However, these draw-backs will be due primarily to parochialism and political games played not to win a war but win votes.

JCS - Counter Punch

July 1991, the Chairman JCS initiated the National Counter-Drug Planning Process (NCDPP). This was initiated to try and overcome the lack of coordination between agencies and the identified weaknesses in the CN planning process. It was apparent to many within the CNOD-J33 that there was consistent disagreements over the threat analysis. This coupled with piece-meal approach to requesting support from DOD showed that the bureaucracies and planning process lacked flexibility and was unresponsive to real needs of this war. Without a coherent national CN plan, one could only see continued lack of coordination.

The proposed planning process called for the formation of a National Joint Planning Group that would come to a consensus on the national threat assessment (NTA), formulate national strategy for the development of a coherent CN plan. The end product of the National Joint Planning Group would be a Regional Operations Order. The process consists of three phases:

- National Threat Assessment
- J-3 Quarterly Planning Conference
- Regional Joint Planning Conference

The National Threat Assessment would be published under the auspices of the ONDCP, semi-annually with quarterly updates. The NTA would incorporate inputs from every conceivable agency that had intelligence to give. This would be published the first month of the quarter and it would allow CINCs/LEAs sufficient time to review NTA. The CINCs would meet in the first week of the second month to develop CN proposals for the upcoming/succeeding quarters. The Regional conferences would follow similar type agenda. However, the details of that agenda are up to the CINC and LEAs. This conference plans for the upcoming/outgoing quarter.[31]

The NCDPP finally formalizes the CN planning process. It allows the operators to plan from timely NTA while integrating LEAs, USCG, and DOD into a single planning process. However, like all other inter-agency co-ops, it must have the support of the separate LEAs. While at CINCLANT I asked about the Regional planning conference and was told there is nothing that requires LEAs to attend - and sometimes LEAs are not present. The entire NCDPP process should have been directed by Congress or the lead agency in planning. Is there a lead agency? NO!

CINCLANT/JTF-4 - Strategy to Campaign Plan = ?

Following the process demonstrated by SOUTHCOM, CINCLANT should be able to analyze the strategic objectives established for the AOR and synthesize country plans with different federal agency plans to develop a Campaign Plan for CINCLANT and JTF-4. However,

that has not occurred. The process, one would guess, would be similar throughout. However, it is not. Again, as Maj. Rampy so poignantly illustrated, in the military we seem to have "lost the bubble" on Campaign Planning.[32]

CINCLANT staff has initiated a process to come up with a coordinated plan. That process includes a review of the following during Atlantic Command's Regional Joint Planning Meetings (conducted quarterly as directed by JCS.): international initiatives; ONDCP policy; Federal Agency requirements; DOD requirements; lessons learned National threat assessment; current operations; the current environment.[33] Although, the requirement set out by JCS seems to be a step in the right direction. There is no guarantee that Federal Agencies will send representatives to the CINCs quarterly CN planning meetings. I found this to be true at CINCLANT. There are no statutory requirements directing federal agencies to attend these conferences.[34]

Most of the staff working CN operations of CINCLANT were waiting for JCS to publish their National Military Strategy. Afterwards they would begin a viable Campaign Planning Process. Even though, the staff personnel did not seem to have the insight on how to develop a time phased plan, i.e. a campaign plan. They did have some long-term goals for the Caribbean Island Nation and the Caribbean Littoral Nations:

<u>CN Goals</u> for <u>Caribbean Island Nations</u>

Basing rights (ports and airfields, aerostat sites, fixed sensor sites)

Expanded regional CN initiatives (security assistance, Combined operations, support for developing democracies

CN intelligence and information exchange

Coordinate regional CN initiatives

Deny Narco-traffickers unchallenged use of regional air and sea traffic routes[35]

CN Goals for the Caribbean Littoral Nations

Enhanced bilateral and multi-national host nation military cooperation

CN intelligence and information exchange

Interagency cooperation

Support of developing democracies

Access to territorial seas and airspace in support of CN operations[36]

The national strategy is there. The national military strategy has not been published. The goals for the AOR have been defined. A strategy of defense in depth has been articulated by both CINCLANT and JTF-4 Commanders. What is the Strategic Campaign Plan (CINCLANT) or Operational Campaign Plan (JTF-4)? Should the lack of a published national military strategy stifle the initiative of real campaign planners? The answer should be - no.

The concept for detecting and monitoring drug smuggling involves a defense in depth: detecting as early as possible, alerting DOD assets and LEAs that a smuggler is in transit, then

monitoring the smuggler while he is in transit. Finally, positive handoff to law enforcement agencies is conducted so that they can intercept and apprehend the drug smuggler. In order to accomplish this, Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4) was established 22 February 1989. JTF-4 was assigned the following mission:

> 1. To conduct operations to detect and monitor aircraft/surface vessels suspected of smuggling illegal drugs into the United States. To accomplish this, JTF-4 was to utilize assets assigned by DOD and other agencies (Coast Guard).
>
> 2. To integrate effectively into the existing anti-drug (CN command, control, communications and intelligence network.
>
> 3. To coordinate detection and monitoring activities of other Federal agencies.[37]

The JTF-4 Commander has a mission, the CINC's guidance, and resources allocated based on his concept of operations. Now, can he accomplish the mission? Let's look at the organization, problems and how JTF-4 works.

a. Organization:

* JTF-4 is organized along traditional lines, but with a significant difference. The twenty-four (24) hour watch center is a Joint operations and intelligence watch and is the main focus of efforts. In fact, 83% of JTF-4 personnel are those who man the Joint operations command center. There are both intelligence and operations people serving side by side

to understand the total operation. Together they formulate daily plans and transmit them via the Joint Visual Integrated Display System (JVIDS).[38] The system developed to link all agencies, is handled carelessly by civilian counterparts. During visit to C3I-East, no one was monitoring JVIDS terminal.[39]

* Diagram of organization:



b. Problems

A major problem for JTF-4 is the complexity of effort in detecting and monitoring narco-traffic an area that is vast and rich in targets. The Caribbean is roughly 2400 km from the Yucatan Peninsula to the Lesser Antilles and 900 km from the coast of South America to Cuba. CINCLANT/JTF-4 also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Florida Straits, Bahamas and the Atlantic. Trying to blanket the entire area with radar energy becomes an almost impossible task. Then trying to sort valid targets from all radar contacts is even more of a problem, due to the tremendous volume of air and sea traffic.[40]

Looking at the wiring diagram and concentrating on the JOCC, one would conclude that coordination is paramount and happens almost instantly. That conclusion, however, would be erroneous.

COORDINATED EFFORT



JOCC--JTF-4 JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER

Coordination between JTF-4, the Coast Guard and LEAs is critical. As JTF-4 is designed LEAs are supposed to be involved from the beginning in the planning process. While visiting JTF-4 only one of four LEAs LNOs was present for coordination - and after a critical briefing with the Deputy Commander his first instinct was to notify his higher what was going on. I questioned where this individual's loyalty was. Day to day coordination is accomplished by means of JVIDS. This is a dedicated computer system to facilitate coordination between JTF-4 and all LEAs--when they monitor the system. It represents a graphic presentation of on-going operations, allowing for almost real time communications. Shared intelligence up and down the JVIDS system and JTF-4s flexibility to respond and react are supposed to improve changes for success. What a substitute for Campaign planning.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING TENETS

Let's look at the tenets of campaign planning, in theory a campaign plan:

- Orients on the center of gravity of the threat. JTF-4 and CINCLANT have been given an unenviable task of fighting a portion of war (the Drug War) with an ill-defined center of gravity. The Center of Gravity for this war has been identified as American public (demand) and the drug cartels (suppliers) in SOUTHCOM's AOR. Since, JTF-4 has only a portion of the war, it must focus on the narco-traffickers means of moving drugs air and ocean-going

vessels. Not quite the Center of Gravity since most (90%) of the drugs are smuggled in containers.[41] Are the air lanes and sea lanes that DOD monitors strategic for the cartels? No other avenues will be explored in order to meet demand. One area that has not been identified as a potential center of gravity in JTF-4 AOR is the abundance of international banks on the Caribbean Islands that are used as fronts to launder drug money. These banks provide the medium to launder money and either hold the money for the cartel or transfer it into South American banks. These funds are necessary to sustain continued operations.

- Provides concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives. As I understand the CINCs and JTF-4 strategy and how they intend to detect and monitor smugglers, they have a viable strategy and concept of operations. The question then arises as to whether the concept is sustainable. In discussions with JTF-4 personnel, this is one area that has not been given adequate attention. As a matter of fact, on the JTF-4 staff the J-1 is dual hatted as the J4. The concept of operations could achieve the strategic objectives established if all operations within the CINCLANT AOR were coordinated.

- Displays the commander's vision and intent. The strategy of defense in depth is well thought out and at CINCLANT and at JTF-4 each staff is fully aware of how they will fight. However, I never saw a written vision or commander's intent. I believe this is due to all key personnel understanding the commander's concept of operations. Yet, without one person being totally in charge and

coordinating all operations, the idea of having a vision that is different then LEAs could cause confusion, as well as, fear among federal agencies.

- Provides the basis for subordinate planning and clearly defines what constitutes success. Strategy and concept of operations provide broad guidance so that subordinates can plan and react. However, the measures of effectiveness and therefore success are not clear and they conflict totally with LEAs MOE and thought process. Once DOD assets under CINCLANT subjugate themselves to LEA measures of effectiveness, they will never be able to plan effectively, but rather will become totally reactive.

- Phases a series of major operations and tactical actions. Without a viable Campaign Plan, one finds himself reactive. In the war in CINCLANT's AOR each federal agency, Coast Guard and so on have their own ax to grind. What should be a Joint effort on all agencies and DOD part is in fact "DIS-JOINTED." DEA runs operations that are not coordinated with JTF-4. Customs runs detection and monitoring programs and intercept operations which are in no way coordinated with JTF-4. I was briefed on four incidents where customs violated airspace allocated for Navy Night Vision Goggle Operations. While attending to interviews with personnel at C3I East in Miami, a Customs aircraft was forced down in Venezuela, having violated Venezuelan airspace and on an uncoordinated effort. Again an example of dis-jointedness rather than unity of effort.

- Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates. A campaign plan should do this. Operation plans do meet these requirement.

- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships. Plans made by CINCLANT and JTF-4 do and do not do this. All assets provided CINCLANT fall under this tenet. However, there are DOD assets attached to DEA and other federal agencies in the AOR who fall under the purview of the FORSCOM Commander and not CINCLANT. That is an odd arrangement. DOD assets working in the Bahamas for DEA report right back to FORSCOM commander for support, as well as with operational information.

An End State

All the systems are there for the CINC and JTF-4 to achieve their goals within the AOR. However, until unity of effort in the "Drug War" is brought about, agencies will compete for dollars as parochialism remains paramount. The Campaigning process and the NCDPP can provide a structure and sense of direction which encourages cooperation.[42]

> "If the nation is really serious about drug interdiction, and not just the appearance of activity without measurable results, then the combined assets of all the potential participants must be brought to bear on the problem."[43]

This is a "war" where there will be no clear quick victory. Americans are fond of declaring war on things. Americans have

declared wars on poverty, crime, hunger, racism and inflation. Success has ranged from muffled declarations of victory to quiet obfuscation by other events. What will the American public or Congress do if the military is less than fully successful (whatever successful means)? Indeed, what is the culminating point and how much does this nation want to invest in reaching it?



President Bush quantified a series of two and ten year objectives to measure success of the "Drug War." These objectives are no more than random sampling of the youth throughout the United States. However, these objectives (which are goals set in the decline in use amongst America's youth) and the successive National Drug Control Strategies are only one step in the direction of winning the "Drug War."[44]

> Clearly . . . it is within the United States power to reclaim the moral high ground in Latin America (and the Caribbean, and at home in the War on Drugs) by concentrating its resources on eradicating the poverty, ignorance and disease . . . that give rise to revolution and the drug culture.[45]

Designing a viable and workable strategy that includes all the elements of power and establishes a unity of effort amongst the many varying federal agencies is likely to be one of the most difficult tasks this nation has undertaken in this century. Concurrently designing tactical strategies and needed campaign plans for this war - when you do not hold the cards - is as difficult. The mechanisms and systems are present to conduct viable campaign planning and campaigns in each region designed to destroy the economic base of the drug lords, while decreasing the demand at home. The key to success in this war is <u>unity of effort</u>. To achieve unity of effort the President and Congress must break the current paradigms and political 'grid lock' in establishing one agency to be responsible for this war. One agency to develop regional plans and objectives with all other agencies supporting that effort. That single agency would be responsible to the President, Congress and the people to wage a unified war to reduce the demand for drugs and the supply of drugs. This mandate that must come from the President and Congress must be as sweeping as the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to the military.

> Now the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms will be needed; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are; but a call to bear the burdens of a long twilight struggle - a struggle against the common enemies of man - . . . tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.[46] - <u>the "Drug War.</u>

ENDNOTES

1. Dale E. Brown, "Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military," Parameters, VOL XXI No A (Winter 1991-92), p 51.

2. The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States," August 1991, Washington, 1991, p 3.

3. Henry T. Richter, "The Use of U.S. Military Forces in the War on Drugs," USAWC, 15 October 1990, p 3.

4. Prof. William E. Jefferds, Statistics were acquired from a slide he presented on the cost of drugs in the United States, 30 January 1992.

5. Ibid.

6. Robert M. Stutman, Can We Stop - Drug Abuse in the Workplace?, USA Today, July 1990, p 19.

7. Frank Ault, USN(Ret), "Drug Interdiction - Performance or Politics?", Armed Forces Journal International, January 1987, p 42.

8. Ibid.

9. George Bush, Speech delivered to the American People, Washington, DC, Sept 5, 1986, "National Drug Control Strategy - We Need Your Help," Vital Speeches of the Day, Oct. 1, 1989, p 738.

10. Ibid, p 739-740.

11. P. Wayne Gosnell, Col(ANG), "A Time to Build - U.S. Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean," Military Review, June 1991, p 43.

12. Ibid, p 43.

13. Gen. George Joulwan, Information obtained from SOUTHCOM slides presented to JCS-J33-CNOD on SOUTHCOM Campaign Plan and Theater Strategy. I obtained copies of the slides during my interviews on 18 Nov. 1989.

14. CDR Steve Weinhardt interview conducted 18 nov 1991 by myself at JCS-J33 the Pentagon. CDR Weinhardt has worked in Counter Narcotics Operations Division (CNOD) for 18 months.

15. Brown, p 52.

16. CDR Steve Weinhardt interview, 18 Nov 1991.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Mary Walton, The Deming Management Method, Putnam Publishing Group, New York, 1986, p 247.

20. Maj. Craig L. Carlson (USA), "Measures of Effectiveness - The Key to a Successful National Drug Control Strategy," Military Review, August 1991, p 72.

21. Congress, House, Committee of Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, Military Role in Drug Interdiction, 101st Congress, 1st Session, Feb. 22, 1989, Washington, 1989.

22. The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States," August 1991, Washington, 1991, p 140.

23. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1976, p 584.

24. William W. Mendel, Col., and Murl Munger, Campaign Planning and the Drug War, Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, February 1991, p xi.

25. Maj. Michael R. Rampy, "Campaign Planning: Paradox or Paradigm," Military Review, Aug 1990, p 43.

26. Gen. George Joulwan - slides obtained from his command briefing on Strategy and Campaign planning.

27. "Warfighting Study Group," The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict, SSI U. S. Army War College, 1 Feb 1987, p 6.

28. Gen. Joulwan - slides.

29. Rampy, p 49.

30. Clausewitz, p 579.

31. Slides obtained from JCS-J33-CNOD interviews conducted 18 Nov 1991.

32. Rampy - conclusion drawn from the content within this article.

33. Slides taken from interview with LTC Bill Parrish, CINCLANT CN Cell. Interview conducted 25 Nov 1991 by LTC Steve Cook at CINCLANT HQS.

34. Information gained by interviewing members of CN Cell at CINCLANT on 25 Nov 1991.

35. Taken from unclassified OPLAN that basically outlined goals and possible threats that would be faced in the Caribbean. Information obtained by interview conducted at CINCLANT 25 Nov 1991.

36. Ibid.

37. Information was obtained from slides and interviews conducted at CARBROC on JTF-4, 8 Dec 1991, by LTC Cook.

38. Ibid.

39. Information gained through personal experience while conducting interviews and monitoring operations on 4 Dec 1991.

40. Information gained through interviews and slides presented with command brief on JTF-4 by Maj. Pam Rolf, 3 Dec 1991.

41. Information obtained through interview with Mr. John Thompson, Customs Liaison Officer to JTF-4, 3 Dec 1991. This face was again stated by numerous Coast Guard personnel.

42. Slides obtained through interviews conducted with JCS-J33-CNOD and confirmed with slides and interviews conducted.

43. Ault, p 42.

44. George Bush, The National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, January 1990, Washington, p 117-121.

45. Gosnel, p 42.

46. John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address: Jan 1961," The Little Red, White and Blue Book: A Collection of Historical Documents, Ed World Almanac, New York, 1987, p 60.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Ault, Frank U. S. Navy (Ret), "Drug Interdiction - Performance or Politics?", Armed Forces Journal International. January 1987.

Brown, Dale E., "Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military. Parameters. Vol XXI, No. 4, Winter 1991-1992. Carlisle, PA.

Bush, George. National Drug Control Strategy. Washington D.C.: The White House, 1989, 1990 and 1991.

Bush, George. National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington DC: The White House, 1990 and 1991.

Carlson, Craig L. Major, US Army. "Measures of Effectiveness - The Key to a Successful Narcotics Drug Control Strategy." Military Review. August 1991, Leavenworth, KS.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, Princton, NJ 1976.

Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee. Military Role in Drug Interdiction. 101st Congress, 11st Session, Washington, 1989.

Gosnell, P. Wayne, Col (ANG). "A Time to Build - US Policy for Latin America and the Caribbean". Military Review. June 1991.

Isenberg, David. Military Options in the War on Drugs. A Special Section of Solutions - The Deadly Dilemma. "USA Today", July 1990.

Joulwan, George General US Army. Command Briefing slides obtained during interviews conducted in the CNOD-JCS-J33.

Kennedy, John F. "Inaugural Address - Jan 1961". The Little Red, White and Blue Book: A collection of Historical Documents. Ed. World Almanac. New York, Pharo Boxs. 1987.

Kitfield, James. Drugs: The Military's New Unwinnable War. Government Executive.

Munger, Murl D. and William W. Mendel. Campaign Planning and the Drug War. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Washington 1991.

Rampy, Michael R. Major US Army. "Campaign Planning: Parodox or Paradigm." Military Review. August 1990.

Reuter, Peter, et al. Sealing the Borders, The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction. Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, R-3594-USDP. The Rand Corporation.

Richter, Henry J. LTC US Army. "The Use of US Military Forces in the War on Drugs". Paper completed for USAWC requirement. 15 October 1990.

Stutman, Robert M. Can We Stop - Drug Abuse in the Workplace. "USA Today". July 1990.

Walton, Mary. The Deming Management Method. Putnam Publishing Group. New York, NY 1986.

Warfighting Study Group. "The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict". Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Carlisle, PA 1987.

Interviews

CDR Paulette Nesheim (USN) JCS-J33-CNOD-RM. Interview conducted by Col Al Maestes 3 October 1991.

LTC Mark Pizzo (USMC). Interview conducted by Col Al Maestes 3 October 1991.

Col Jerry Segars (USA) JCS-J33-CNOD-RM. Interview conducted by Col Al Maestes 3 October 1991.

LTC Linda Brown (USAF) JCS-J33-CNOD-Current Operations. Interview conducted by author 18 Nov 1991.

Col Carlson (USA) Dept. of Army - DCSOPS - CN Current Operations. Interview conducted by author 18 Nov 1991.

LTC Bob Dodson (USMC) JCS-J33-CNOD-Current Operations. Interview conducted by author 18 Nov 1991.

LTC Bob Leicht (USA) DA-DCSOPS. Interview conducted by author 18 Nov 1991.

Maj Doug Penn (USA) JCS-J33-CNOD-RM. Interview conducted by author 18 Nov 1991.

CDR Steve Weinhardt (USN) JCS-J33-CNOD-Host Nation. Interview conducted by author 18 Nov 1991.

LT CDR Charlie Fleschman (USN-Res) CINCLANCT-CN-CELL. Interview conducted by author 25 Nov 1991.

LTC Bill Parrish (USMC) CINCLANT-CN-CELL. Interview conducted by author 25 Nov 1991.

Maj Bruce Dickman (USA) CARBROC/JTF-4. Interview conducted by author 3 Dec 1991.

Maj Kahoun (USA) JTF-4/J2 Army intelligence officer. Interviewed by author 3 Dec 1991.

Cpt Mike McKernan (USCG) J3 Current Opns JTF-4. Interview conducted by author 3 Dec 1991.

Maj Pam Rolfs (USMC) JTF-4. Interview conducted by author 3 Dec 1991.

Mr. John Thompson - JTF-4 Customs liaison officer. Interview conducted by author 3 Dec 1991.

Mr. Ed Denmat (Customs) Deputy Director of Customs Air Operations C3I East. Interview conducted by author 4 Dec 1991.

CDR Nick Garcia (USCG) Deputy Cdr C3I East. Interview conducted by author 4 Dec 1991.

LCDR Alan D. Sine (USCG) C3IE Executive Officer/Operations Officer. Interview conducted by author 4 Dec 1991.