Toward a Stable Transition in Europe:
A Conservative/Activist Strategy for the
United States

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**Abstract:** See reverse side
At a time of extraordinary change and uncertainty in European affairs, this analysis urges a conservative/activist strategy for a stable transition to a new Europe. Believing that one must attend to dangers before taking advantage of opportunities, the authors call for conservatism in hedging against the dangers and activism in reducing apparent obstacles. Among the interests that require continued U.S. participation, the authors cite European stability in addition to continued military defense and encouragement of favorable Soviet trends, democratization and self-determination in Eastern Europe, and European prosperity. Paramount, however, is the U.S. interest in helping determine Europe’s short- and long-run futures. Adjustments in Western security must be made on the basis of observed changes, not expected changes, the authors caution. To that end, this analysis presents a tripartite strategy comprising military, political, and economic considerations. Should setbacks occur, such as the collapse of perestroika, the major advantage of this modest and realistic strategy over a detailed structure for the future is that it permits a pause for reexamination and, if necessary, readjustment. 47 pp.
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Prepared for the United States Air Force
PREFACE

As the dramatic events of the fall of 1989 changed the face of Eastern Europe and by implication that of Western Europe as well, several RAND analysts came to believe that synthesis of ongoing RAND military, political, and economic analyses on both halves of Europe could produce insights and proposals for U.S. European strategy. The range of views within RAND suggested that not one but (at least) two analyses would be necessary to do analytical justice to the richness and uncertainty of the European world.

A companion volume, Charles Cooper, Keith Crane, Thomas Hirschfeld, Jim Steinberg, Rethinking Security Arrangements in Europe, The RAND Corporation, N-3107-AF, will be published simultaneously with this Note. Neither this nor the other Note is meant to be a definitive assessment. Both unavoidably reflect a good deal of speculation and informed judgment, as well as a substantial amount of fieldwork and other research. These works are offered now because preliminary analyses are useful in a time of rapid change.

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SUMMARY

At a time of radical change and high uncertainty in Europe, both dangers and opportunities loom large. This analysis contends that a U.S. strategy for Europe should focus primarily on avoiding the pitfalls, because if these short-run dangers are not surmounted, the long-run opportunities will be squandered. Thus, what is called for is a "Conservative/Activist" strategy for a stable transition to the new Europe. The conservatism lies in hedging against the uncertain dangers, the activism in reducing major obstacles now visible.

Abandoning NATO in favor of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or some other framework as the basic structure for security in Europe would be premature.

The threat of a major Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe has disappeared, at least for now. Nevertheless, the United States retains many interests that call for continued involvement in European security matters. These interests include:

- Continued military defense against smaller conflicts and as a hedge against reversal of current favorable Soviet trends.
- Continuation of the favorable Soviet trends, in internal policy as well as external.
- European stability, political and economic as well as military, is the central U.S. interest in Europe.
- Democratization and self-determination in Eastern Europe, which is both an ideological and a realpolitik interest for the United States.
- European prosperity and an American share in that prosperity.
- A place at the table in the determination of the short- and long-run futures of Europe. This in a sense is the overarching U.S. interest.

The United States and its allies can best secure these interests in a period of uncertainty and change by preserving much of the existing Western security structure while promoting favorable developments in Europe and the Soviet Union. Specifically, the United States should seek to make adjustments in the Western security apparatus for
Europe on the basis of observed reforms in the political and economic policies and institutions of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and on observed changes in West European politics and structures, not on expected changes in either. The strategy is divided into military, political, and economic categories.

In the Military Category

- With our allies, determine viable target levels for U.S. troops in Europe. In Central Europe, U.S. troop levels might range from the 195,000 troops suggested by President Bush down as low as 50,000.
- Tailor the U.S. defense budget to the target levels, rather than the levels to the budget. Suggested levels will provide substantial savings in any case.
- Make similar determinations, with our allies, about minimum levels for theater-based U.S. nuclear weapons.
- Use the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks and the Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) follow-on as the most appropriate current vehicles for implementing conventional and nuclear reductions. This might include reductions deeper than currently contemplated under current ("CFE-1") negotiations or additional reductions in future conventional arms control talks.

In the Political Realm

Three precepts apply at the political level: Walk a fine line between competing pressures in delicate situations, don’t overestimate American political power in Europe or American capabilities for implementing sophisticated solutions, don’t react to events before they occur.

- Stand back from Soviet internal affairs. Stability does not depend on any one personality, nor can the United States favorably affect a succession in individuals or policies.
- Assist Eastern Europe to democratize, but neither play against the Soviet Union nor expect too much of the new governments. The Soviet Union remains the major potential threat to Western interests. The new societies, most of which have thin democratic traditions at best, may not always act in the democratic manners we prefer.
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- Remember the rest of Europe. Even a reunified Germany would constitute less than 25 percent of Western Europe, and U.S. interests are embedded in Europe as a whole. German views are key on many issues in addition to unification, but they are not the only views to be considered even on unification.

- Eschew a detailed long-run American "vision" for Europe. Visions are tempting and may be necessary to mobilize political support, but they can be misleading; and in any case, design of a European vision is neither an appropriate role for the United States nor a natural one for the current administration.

In the Economic Sphere

- Cooperate with the deepening and broadening efforts of the European Community (EC). How to do so is outside the scope of this analysis.

- Initiate an effort for the West and the East together to plan the revival of Eastern economies, including that of the Soviet Union, supported in part by public and private resources from the West. This is the central activist recommendation. Economic collapse in the East is a major threat to short- and long-run stability. For many reasons, including inbred cultural ones, changing command-oriented economic structures and reversing economic decline will be very difficult, particularly in the Soviet Union. However, a cooperative East/West planning and resource-support program could provide an incentive-driven educational effort that might turn the Soviet economy around. Resources would be private as well as (or more than) public; they would come from all of the wealthy developed nations.

As Germany unites, negotiate both within the Alliance and, more important, with the Soviet Union, for continuation of the Alliance and for continued U.S. troop presence in Germany; extend a continued U.S. security guarantee to Germany if the Germans still desired one. These may be possible with either a united Germany in NATO or a Germany that has formally left the Alliance.

If CFE crumbles, perhaps because of accelerated unilateral reductions or disappearance of the Warsaw Pact as a meaningful participant in bloc-to-bloc
negotiations, explore other bases for multilateral arms negotiations. Chief among these possibilities is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). CFE is preferable for a number of reasons, including the problems of negotiating among 35 nations, but if the bloc-to-bloc CFE format does not survive the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, then CSCE provides a possible alternative.

If an American vision is called for, it should be modest and realistic. One such vision might include free institutions from the Atlantic to the Urals (and beyond); an integrated system for most of Europe, including full economic and partial political integration and allowing for local cultural nationalism; and very low levels of armaments, possibly but not necessarily including some U.S. forces.

If Soviet perestroika collapses—not merely Gorbachev's downfall but his replacement either by no clear central authority or by a recentralized regime, economically desperate and militarily still strong—pause in carrying out any strategy and reexamine not only its economic but also its military and political portions. A major advantage of a strategy designed for transition rather than any detailed future structure is that it allows for such a pause.
We are surrounded by insurmountable opportunities.

—Pogo

America's possum-philosopher was rather premature in his description, but his fearful optimism fits our situation at the beginning of the century's final decade.

Our chief international antagonist of the past 40 years is faced with deep-seated failures of economic and political systems and seems prepared, even eager, to abandon many of the policies that have for so long bedeviled U.S. policymakers. This development—unexpected in its rapidity and its scope—allows us finally to contemplate moving away from the "hard, joyless peace between two armed camps" described by President Bush in a recent speech.

These new opportunities, however, have led to Pogo's policy dilemma. On the one hand, we should be able to reduce the huge investments we have been putting into military capabilities since the early 1950s, and indeed political pressures are building for the United States to cut its military forces and to abandon some manifestations of its world role. On the other hand, immense uncertainties remain about the future international environment, and when risk-averse planners would most like to hedge their bets, they are being compelled to cash in some of their chips.

Nowhere is this dilemma sharper than in Europe. Wholly new possibilities are opening up for the nations of Eastern Europe to enjoy the blessings (and frustrations) of democracy. Soviet military options in Central Europe are receding. And possibilities for expanded trade and economic activity—both East-West and West-West—are expanding. Yet the United States also risks abdication of its influence in this vital part of the world. Worse, new European security alignments could emerge willy-nilly that might make some countries nostalgic for the stability of the Cold War.

This Note suggests an approach that may appear as paradoxical as the problems it confronts: a set of policies that combines a don't-jump-too-quickly conservatism in

1 This bit of Okefenokee wisdom was set forth by Walt Kelly's original Pogo, who withdrew from the comic pages shortly after the death of his creator in 1973.
dealing with the major uncertainties that cannot yet be resolved, with a get-off-the-dime activism in attacking immediate and all too visible obstacles.

The activism here differs from another sort of activism, one that would boldly seize the perceived opportunities opened up by the ongoing radical changes in Europe. The depth of current uncertainties demands that policy concentrate more on obstacles than on opportunities; precipitate movement runs the danger of negating the opportunities. Removal of obstacles, however, *is* activism. Serious efforts in this regard are going to cost money, and that differentiates the strategy here from the conservative strategy of the Bush administration, which in foreign as well as domestic realms is willing to mount new initiatives so long as they run no risk of having to be paid for.

All this implies a time frame that focuses on the transition from the stable assumptions of the last 40 years or more to the unknown world we are moving toward. That we are in such a transition is widely recognized. Less widely recognized is the concomitant need for a strategy to help ensure that the transition and the new world it opens up are stable. We offer here a transition strategy that *hedges against destabilizing threats to promote desired changes*. Such an approach will be called for until the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe develop and gain experience with the kinds of institutions that will have to exist before the West can safely drop these hedges.

The precise duration of the transition period cannot now be specified, because developments in the East and elsewhere cannot be predicted except in the most general terms. Although proliferating uncertainties mean that planning beyond a five- to ten-year horizon would be meaningless, the continuing need for some sort of alliance to maintain Western security against instability or potential renewed hostility from the East remains clear for now. The need for such a hedge could change within the next few years, however, or it could last a generation or more. This sort of uncertainty leads us to emphasize the transition period and strategy.

This introductory section lists three sets of issues and indicates how the conservative/activist strategy may be applied to them. The next section discusses U.S. interests in Europe, then describes a desirable short- to intermediate-run state-of-the-continent that would provide time and flexibility to work toward favorable and stable longer-run outcomes. Such time and flexibility are by no means guaranteed, however, and the following analysis discusses potential deviations from the ideal stable transition. The concluding section sets forth a possible U.S. strategy for Europe that mixes conservatism and activism to promote U.S. interests on that continent.
The three sets of issues that the analysis and strategy emphasize are:

- The size and makeup of U.S. military forces that should remain in Europe during this transition period.
- Political policies, including positions in Alliance councils and "declaratory" policies about our intentions in Europe.
- The nature of U.S. economic relations with East and West Europe, and of Western relations with the East.

This choice of issues in itself reflects the conservative face of the strategy. Particularly at a time of uncertainty as great as today, the emphasis should be on issues that are upon us and on decisions that should be made in the near term. In general, longer-run matters should be handled on an "if and when" contingency basis. Until more is known about future Soviet objectives and institutions, such issues as the future role of NATO need not be decided now. What is needed is a concrete transition strategy to avoid pitfalls that could close the most favorable options while seeing what paths lead where. Especially to be avoided is the premature dismantling of elements of the Western security structure that would be politically difficult to reconstruct should the need arise. At the same time, however, we must not miss a historic opportunity to consolidate the independence of Eastern Europe and the stability of all Europe. This analysis suggests a strategy that recognizes both the risks and the promises.
II. U.S. INTERESTS IN A CHANGING EUROPE

That U.S. policies should be based first on U.S. interests is a truism. Perhaps less obvious is that American interests are inextricably bound up with those of Europe. "Access" to Europe, in the broadest sense of the word, will remain an important determinant of U.S. security; it is therefore critical that the United States retain a degree of influence in European affairs. The interests of the United States in Europe may be divided into six general categories:

- Deterrence of and defense against military threats.
- Continuation of favorable trends in the Soviet Union.
- European stability.
- Democratization and independence of Eastern Europe.
- European prosperity as it contributes to American prosperity.
- A "place at the table" in Europe.

None of these interests is completely independent of the others. In some ways they reinforce one another; in other ways they compete. The purpose of a strategy is to harmonize reinforcing efforts while balancing competing ones.

MILITARY DEFENSE

In principle, the only serious direct military threat to the United States today stems from Soviet nuclear weapons. In some future era, other nations may mount credible nuclear or conventional threats to our borders, but not within any currently relevant planning period. For now, no other potentially hostile nation can directly threaten our domestic tranquility. Some have concluded from this that the United States has had no critical security interests in Europe since the introduction of the long-range bomber and the intercontinental ballistic missile. Others who had perceived that the Soviets might once have sought to undermine our security through threats to our European interests now observe that the USSR is clearly in retreat in Europe and conclude that the continent is no longer relevant to U.S. security.
Such arguments are oversimple and wrong. First of all, if the years from 1985 to 1989 have taught us anything, it is that trends are reversible. The Soviet trend to nonaggressiveness is the most promising development in the last half of the twentieth century, but the Soviet Union remains a massive power, heavily armed with nuclear and conventional weapons. So long as that is true, so long as Soviet doctrines include the potential use of force to reach their own national objectives, and so long as the United States maintains major transatlantic interests, defense of Europe against aggression or threats will remain highly relevant to the security of the United States. Arms controls and systemic reforms inside the Soviet Union can allow the U.S. and its allies to counter the Soviet military potential far more economically than in the past, but the time when Soviet power can be discounted altogether is not yet at hand.

CONTINUATION OF FAVORABLE SOVIET TRENDS

Soviet reforms constitute a necessary if perhaps not a sufficient condition for a "permanent" stable security arrangement within Europe. For this reason, the United States has an important interest in the emergence of a Soviet Union that shares Western objectives and norms. Only when Moscow no longer regards the use of force or military superiority as a tool of diplomacy among like-minded nations can the West prudently disregard Soviet forces in its security calculations. Elimination by the Soviets of capabilities for effective offensive military operations will constitute an important indication of such a change. Equally important will be the adoption by Moscow of policies consistent with the common security of all the nations of Europe. Under Gorbachev's leadership, much progress has been made in these areas, but much in the way of concrete action remains to be done.

Our direct interest is in a long-run change in the external policies of the Soviet Union. But the resiliency of external changes must depend on the success of internal reforms. A Soviet Union that remains under arbitrary centralized rule can quickly reverse any external policy. A Soviet Union that has become internally chaotic while retaining substantial military power will be a worldwide loose cannon with a nuclear load. The United States thus has a major stake in the success of internal as well as external Soviet changes.

1Or perhaps, on geopolitical and existential grounds, even after any changes in Soviet doctrine.
Of the three major threats to that success, two are matters on which we can have little influence: Soviet ethnic tensions, and the general instability that is bound to occur when a huge and diverse nation with no democratic tradition tries to liberalize rapidly. The third threat, however, economic collapse, is one with which the United States and the rest of the democratic developed world can help; such help is at the center of the activist portion of the strategy suggested here.

EUROPEAN STABILITY

European stability is central to U.S. interests; it is central to the overall strategy. Before we address the question of why European stability is so vital an interest, however, we define what stability means in this context.

What Is Stability?

Stability is:

the strength to stand or endure: . . . the property of a body that causes it when disturbed from a condition of equilibrium or steady motion to develop forces or moments that restore the original condition.²

With regard to Europe, a stable continental structure could be said to exist when three key dimensions of the situation are stable:

- *Military Stability*. The likelihood of combat among European nations is low and is perceived by the nations as being low. Large-scale investments in new military capabilities are not seen as continually necessary.
- *Economic Stability*. Trade and economic cooperation among European nations are mostly unfettered, to everyone's benefit. Interwoven interests provide strong incentives to resolve differences consensually.
- *Political Stability*. East and West Europeans are satisfied with their domestic political arrangements and with their own nation's ability to determine its policies.

All this should be resilient, with the structure tending to return to equilibrium after the inevitable surprises and shocks, rather than producing burgeoning crises.

Obviously, this definition of stability is incompatible with continuation of Soviet domination over Eastern European nations, were that still possible; it certainly does not imply any kind of Soviet-American agreement imposing such a freeze. It does suggest, however, that accelerated change in the relations among East European states, between any of those states and the Soviet Union, or—even more emphatically—among the Soviet Republics, could be quite destabilizing. If American interests in stability are as strong as is suggested below, the U.S. should tread very warily in regard to such relations, a major application of the conservative aspect of the suggested strategy.

Why Is European Stability an American Interest?

The United States is inextricably bound up with Europe. If we were to withdraw all of our forces from the old continent, we might have to return as we did in 1917 and 1944. Stability is in our interest because we do not want to be called into combat if we have stayed in Europe or called back if we have not. But beyond such a seemingly improbable military involvement, our economic prosperity is tied to Europe as it has been for many decades; were instability to halt Europe’s progress toward economic integration and openness, it would hurt our pocketbooks and standards of living. And less tangible but perhaps most important, our political, ideological, historical, cultural, and economic empathy for Europe and Europeans means that instability there may spill across the Atlantic in various unpredictable ways, both small and large. Precise scenarios would be meaningless, but what it comes to is that European instability runs the danger of becoming American instability.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION
IN EASTERN EUROPE

A pure and cold practitioner of realpolitik might argue that ideology has nothing to do with a nation’s real interests and that the democratization of Eastern Europe should be no concern of the United States. Such a practitioner would be wrong for three reasons.

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3 In this regard, see Robert A. Levine, "The strategic rationale for U.S. forces in Europe: U.S. perspective," Militaire Spectator, July 1989, particularly pp. 299–300 on "Empathy."
First, a nation's interests are what its people say they are, and the American people repeatedly have shown themselves ready to fight for democratic ideology during the twentieth century. True, the Vietnam experience raised many questions about ideology, interests, and willingness to do battle; and equally true, since the East Berlin uprising of 1953, we have made it clear that we were unwilling to go to war in the nuclear era for the liberties of those in the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe. Nor would we today, nor are we likely to have to, at least in the short run. Nonetheless, the repeated thrills that ran down many American spines in 1989, as successive members of the Warsaw Pact declared their democratic destinies, indicated that we as a nation very much want such democratization.

We will have to be wary about outcomes that irritate our sensibilities. Democracy and self-determination are not identical, and few of the nations now asserting themselves have democratic histories or traditions. The street demonstrations soon after the overthrow of the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria to continue the repression of ethnic Turks, which had been reversed by Zhivkov’s successors, were not inspiring; and they will not provide the only example. Nonetheless the emotions of Americans as they see the breakup of the “evil empire” are and will remain strong enough to legitimize a national interest, whether or not it fits within realpolitik.

Second, the realpolitiker would be wrong even by his own criteria: For U.S. interests in Eastern Europe, sound geopolitics go hand in hand with democratic sentiments. If Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are successful in building democratic political institutions, Eastern Europe would play a very different role than it has in the security calculations of NATO and the Soviet Union. Since the formation of the Warsaw Pact, NATO military planners have had to reckon with the possibility that the armed forces of Eastern European states would fight alongside Soviet forces in wartime. Obviously, in light of the changes that have swept over Eastern Europe in 1989, this assumption is already questionable. If a war were somehow to occur in Eastern Europe under present conditions, the best Moscow could hope for from its "allies" would be passive acquiescence to the use of their territories as a springboard for attacks on NATO. Within a few years, given present trends, the Soviet Union’s strategic "access" to Central Europe will be seriously compromised by long lines of communications through nations that could be expected to offer substantial resistance to Soviet military encroachment on their territories.
And finally, the United States has an interest in the democratization of Eastern Europe because, as discussed above, we have a major interest in the success of reform in the Soviet Union, and democratization—and economic liberalization—of East European nations may provide the Soviets with some role models. If the experiments ongoing in Hungary, Poland, and other East European nations show that peaceful change can establish legitimate governments and modernize moribund economies, that will strengthen the hands of those in Moscow who back similar reforms for the Soviet Union.

**EUROPEAN/AMERICAN PROSPERITY**

The economy of Western Europe is headed toward integration, a goal and process that is expected to add substantially to the productivity of the continent, particularly as it assists with the modernization of Eastern economies. At one time it was feared that an integrated West European economy would become an economic "Fortress Europe," surrounded by protectionist walls that would exclude the United States from sharing the benefits. Although these fears have not disappeared, they have faded as trade difficulties are worked out and as more and more U.S. businesses look upon the European Economic Community (EC) as a carrier of opportunities rather than threats. Members of the EC themselves apparently see openness as being in their own benefit. And because Europeans want to preserve the U.S. security contribution to Europe, they are willing to make economic concessions. Thus, although it may not fit the preconceptions of simply drawn organizational charts, our military alliance strongly supports the American stake in the European economy.

**A PLACE AT THE TABLE**

The relationship of the American partnership in NATO to the American stake in the European Community is one example of a broader phenomenon that affects many American interests: The U.S. commitment to European security—and the forces deployed there to uphold that commitment—gives us a voice in a wide variety of political and economic matters in which we have an interest, or may have in the future. Few of these can be specified in advance, but the world in general, and Europe in particular at a time of rapid transition, contains the seeds of an immense variety of potential events, each of which may be unlikely in itself, but some of which will occur and the United States will have a stake in many such events.
Ultimately, we will also have a major stake in the creation of a new security/economic/political structure for Europe. As discussed above, the conservative portion of the strategy set forth here suggests that it is far too early to map out this new structure. The same conservatism also suggests, however, that since we are sure to have a major interest in the future shape of Europe, we have a major current interest in retaining our place at the table when the game is played.

What it comes to, in this case and for all the other aspects of American interest in Europe, is that there is no return to isolationism. The United States is an important player in Europe, on behalf of a wide variety of American interests.
III. AN IDEAL TRANSITION

The major portion of this section delineates a structure and status for Europe during the current transitional period. This stress on the transition is based on the conservative philosophy that concentrates on current opportunities and obstacles, buying time and flexibility to work toward favorable long-run outcomes. The state of Europe most conducive to a stable transition has four main characteristics:

- Continuation of favorable Soviet trends, both in external policy and in the internal policy upon which it depends in large measure, and concomitant continuation of favorable trends in the rest of Eastern Europe.
- The retention of the U.S. military presence in Europe while lowering force levels through negotiations, and the continued vigor of NATO.
- Continuation of NATO membership by a reunified Germany.
- West European economic and partial political integration continuing at the pace that was established before the events of late 1989. The ultimate stability of Europe depends more on the EC than any other single institution.

FAVORABLE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN TRENDS

The U.S. interest in continuing these external policy trends and their dependence on continued favorable internal trends have been discussed. What needs to be repeated in this context may be obvious, but is crucial: A stable transition to a new Europe is possible if and only if the Soviets avoid both renewed militarism and anarchic unpredictability. Were either of these to occur, all other bets would be off. The same is true for the other East European states, although instability in most of those states is less dangerous for Europe and the United States than would be Soviet instability.

THE U.S. TROOP PRESENCE AND NATO

The basic reason for retaining U.S. forces in Europe is conservatism based on uncertainty about what happens next; the primary reason for continuing a vigorous NATO is that it is the vehicle for the U.S. troop presence. NATO is worth preserving for
other reasons: It has many intra-European as well as transatlantic functions, but these functions have potential alternative institutional homes, such as the West European Union (WEU) or even an EC expanded into the defense realm. The unique function of NATO, however, is to unambiguously express the U.S. stake in Europe through the presence of American troops. NATO will and should be restructured; U.S. and other NATO forces will and should be reduced. The termination of the Alliance and full withdrawal of U.S. troops, however, would be irreversible moves, and it is far too soon to contemplate either.

The two most general U.S. interests are *a place at the table* and *stability*. That U.S. forces provide our major stake on the European table is clear enough, and the poker metaphor is an appropriate one. We have many other connections with Europe—official ones such as our membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and, probably more important, unofficial ones summarizable as "empathy." But our *stake* in Europe is most strongly represented by our military contribution within NATO. Removal of the stake from the table would turn us into mere kibbitzers about matters that remain a major part of our own national interests.

Stability is more complicated. Stability is in part military. Current favorable Soviet trends are reversible, and were U.S. troops to leave Europe completely, it would be extremely difficult to send them back. Some day, under some military and political circumstances, the Soviet trend away from aggressiveness may be deemed so solid that we can bet on it, but that time is not yet.

More crucial than the military need for NATO or for continued U.S. forces in Europe, however, is their importance for political stability. The Alliance and the troops provide tangible symbols of U.S. security and other stakes in Europe; and for better or worse, European nations—and not only West European nations—have come to depend on both these symbols and the real involvement they represent.

Europeans remain heir to destabilizing fears that the American troop presence helps to allay.¹

¹Europeans are, of course, a very heterogeneous group, and none of the contentions that follow could possibly cover all Europeans. Countercontentions may point both to members of intellectual elites and to general populations (e.g., Germans who object to NATO aircraft falling on them) who might like to get all Americans out. The fact is, however, that both the governing and the major opposition parties in all of the West European countries favor a continued U.S. presence, and the new democratic governments to be elected in the East will very likely do so too. Gorbachev at Malta
Fear of War

Fear of war extends to conventional war on a European battlefield almost as much as to nuclear war. Western Europe’s primary interest in keeping American forces in Europe for the last 40 years has been as a connection to the strategic nuclear power of the United States, not because our allies wanted a nuclear war, but because they believed that only this massive power could be relied upon to guarantee deterrence of any war. That is why Europeans have always been less concerned than Americans with the details of conventional war-fighting and why some have feared that too great a NATO conventional capability might erode deterrence by enabling the United States to avoid nuclear decisions.²

Removal of U.S. forces, probably including theater nuclear forces, would be destabilizing because it would throw into question the ultimate American nuclear sanction. Specific symptoms of such destabilization might include the building up of existing European nuclear forces and perhaps the initiating of new ones, for example by Germany, Italy, or Czechoslovakia.

Fear of the Soviet Union

Fear of the Soviet Union is shared by all of the rest of Europe. Much of the argument runs parallel to that concerning the fear of war; it is war initiated by the Soviet Union that West European nations have wanted American power to deter. But more realistic than Soviet attack (so long as it was deterred) has been West European fear of the Platonic shadow of such an attack, “Finlandization,” which is defined as the felt need by otherwise free nations to consider Soviet security interests and military might in making policy decisions. One of the striking developments of 1989 was the fading of West European fears of Finlandization, together with the rise of East European hopes for it, a far freer status than they had enjoyed as Soviet satellites.

U.S. troops in Europe remain important as a stabilizing guarantee against Western Europe’s residual fears of the Soviet Union—trends do reverse—but also as an element weighing in favor of Eastern Europe’s independent status with regard to the Soviets.

Fear of Germany

All Europeans, including the Germans, share the fear of Germany. It is not fear of renewal of military aggression or Nazism, which are seen as obsolete in an era of nuclear weapons and of thoroughgoing and successful West German democracy. Europeans feared Germany before Hitler, and the economic and political power of the rapidly reunified Germany that is foreseen throughout Europe (least of all, however, in the Federal Republic of Germany) causes substantial discomfort in many places. The U.S. presence provides a balance; not that U.S. troops are going to combat a German militarism that does not exist anyhow, but that the United States is the only nation (aside from the Soviet Union, which for obvious reasons will not do) large enough to present an economic, political, and military counterweight to Germany. The point is more psychological than logical; American troops in Europe do not change the economic or political balance on the continent, but they do provide a symbol of the participation and interest of a nation with more than three times the population and GNP of even a reunified Germany, and that is comforting. And politics depends at least as much on psychology as on logic.

Were NATO to disintegrate, were the United States to rapidly remove its troops from Europe and with them its tangible stake, or both, the destabilizing results would probably include deceleration of European economic integration out of fear of German domination. Disarmament could slow down throughout Europe, or a new European alliance system might try to either tie Germany into the rest of Europe or possibly draw an informal cordon sanitaire around Germany.

Fear of Change

Fear of change is the summary fear: If it ain't broke, don't fix it. The steady U.S. military presence in Europe was an important factor in promoting Western Europe’s economic and political integration. The Western Europe that has developed with the American presence over 40 years has been free and prosperous, with current and prospective acceleration in both of those directions. The year 1989 was a year of unprecedented and welcome change; the American military presence in Europe certainly did not inhibit these changes, and, arguably, even helped bring them about. Perhaps all these fears, including the fear of a changed Europe without its 40-year Alliance and without Americans, are mere superstitions, and Europeans should look forward eagerly to building a bold new world on their own. But they do not, and rapid and radical change
would revive suspicions, rivalries, and reconsiderations on all of these dimensions. The most likely result would be a marked increase in European instability, and not at all in the interest of the United States.

**Preserving the U.S. Troop Presence**

None of this militates against reductions, even rapid and sharp reductions, of U.S. or other NATO forces. It does suggest that precisely because such reductions are likely to be (and probably should be) rapid and sharp, it is important that they be carried out in ways that preserve the Alliance and bottom out well above zero U.S. troops for the short to medium run. These two criteria lead in turn to several precepts for U.S. NATO policy:

- *Preserving NATO unity is more important than achieving optimal Alliance positions.* This principle has always been followed within the Alliance, *de facto.* But it is more pertinent than ever now when the geopolitical ground underneath the Alliance is shifting and when the decisionmaking agenda is chock full due to ongoing and upcoming arms control negotiations.

- *The physical presence of American forces in Europe is more important than their actual operational capabilities.* Americans have always insisted that our forces in Europe were not mere hostages or a trip wire and therefore the Alliance as a whole needed to field forces capable of a credible conventional defense of at least short duration. This remains true, but its importance fades as the Soviet military threat fades. Military detail still counts, but in general, U.S. policymakers will be well-advised not to get bogged down in minutiae to the point where they lose sight of the central point: Negotiated postures that leave room for substantial U.S. conventional forces and more than token U.S. nuclear forces in Europe help to legitimize the continued presence of those forces on the Continent.

- *The continuation of the Alliance and the U.S. troop presence in the West is more important for Western security than the rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from the East.* It is by no means clear that Soviet troop withdrawal is contingent in any meaningful way on U.S. withdrawal. Far from being an

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impediment to favorable trends in Eastern Europe, NATO's vitality has thus far encouraged these trends; and a viable NATO may be an important source of the stability needed to accelerate the withdrawal of the Red Army. Nonetheless, should a conflict arise, U.S. interests continue to reside in the West substantially more than in the East.

Just as stability is the central interest, the U.S. troop presence remains our principal instrument for maintaining that interest.

CONTINUED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

An earlier version of this Note included in the ideal stable transition a slow step-by-step reunification of Germany à la Chancellor Kohl’s "confederal structures," primarily to postpone the need for decisions about revising existing Western security structures. Reunification is apparently outrunning the Chancellor’s stages. However, it seems to be proceeding in a way that will preserve German membership in the Alliance.

The primary importance to the stable transition of membership of a unified Germany in NATO lies in the four destabilizing fears discussed above: fear of war, of the Soviets, of the Germans, and of change.

NATO members have counted on the Alliance for four decades to deter Soviet attack; although the probability of such attack is receding, West Europeans are aware of the uncertainty of the Soviet future, including the potentials for reversal and unpredictable anarchy. They find it more comfortable to have NATO available in case of change than to have to recreate it. Indeed, a strong Western Alliance will help deter Soviet reversal.

This hedge against Soviet reversal differs from NATO’s role with regard to Germany, which is not deterrence, but inclusion. Despite various grumblings and mumblings, NATO members trust their Alliance. Much of that trust is based on the common experience in working together to develop a security structure over a period of decades. The structure has not been a fragile one, at least not in recent years, but now it must change and the change is so rapid as to be rather unnerving. If Germany were to set off on its own course, either economically or militarily, it would greatly complicate efforts to manage European-American affairs. A united Germany outside of the EC, for example, might pose unwelcome challenges to the economic sovereignty and well-being
of other European nations. Under such circumstances, it might prove difficult to maintain, let alone extend, the free trade regime that prevails in the West today.

Should Germany abandon the Atlantic Alliance, the Germans would feel strong pressures to acquire their own nuclear weapons. It is difficult to imagine such a powerful European state as Germany being content with a security arrangement that left it without a "nuclear guarantee." A fractionation of NATO could also prematurely terminate efforts to reduce military forces in Europe, as some nations might feel compelled to provide forces for their own defense against former allies. Continuation of existing structures helps calm them and stabilizes the transition.

WESTERN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Western integration under the EC is important for the purely economic reason of accelerating European and world economic growth, but for many Europeans, including Germans, its importance is augmented greatly as it provides a basis for a long-run solution to the German question.

Modern fears of a reunified Germany (or even a powerful Federal Republic) are not military, but rather political and economic. They center on a potent German economic engine whose leaders—private, public, and in between (the Bundesbank)—make the economic decisions for all of Europe. Since economics frequently dominates politics, Germany would become almost the de facto ruler of Europe.

To some extent this is inevitable: The economy of the FRG is the most powerful in Europe; European nations can never return to national autarchy, and the most powerful economy will naturally dominate. Some non-German businessmen even welcome the prospect, believing that it can impose necessary German discipline on non-German firms. Nonetheless, the foreboding it conveys to many Europeans should be well-understood by Americans who fear the (much less real) prospect of a Japanese takeover of our economy. And the added strength and political unpredictability of a prospective unified Germany exacerbate the doubts.

A possible solution lies in economic integration and the "deepening" of the EC into political integration. Germany may inevitably dominate the European economy, but even a fully unified Germany would provide only one-quarter or so of the population and therefore of the political representation in a unified Western Europe. Addition of newly democratic and free-market East European countries would dilute German strength even
further. The economies and polities within democratic industrial nations play off against one another in varying ways—the United States is very different in this regard from Japan, for example—but in every case there is some degree of tension between the two. A political Europe powerful enough to extend some control over economic Europe could go a long way toward satisfying fears of German domination through economics.

In 1989, the issue arose of such political "deepening" of EC versus its "broadening" by taking in first Austria, then the democratizing and liberalizing nations of the East. The revolution in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) changed the calculus, potentially bringing it into EC as part of a unified Germany rather than on its own. In any case, broadening versus deepening may be overblown as a controversy: The events of the fall of 1989 seem to have set it aside, and where and how new members to the east will fit into or around EC will be decided in due time as structures shift throughout Europe.

Not all of this is directly relevant to a U.S. security strategy for Europe in the short to intermediate run, but it becomes relevant in conjunction with the concerns over stability and German unification. A measured pace toward reunification is politically central to stability, and a matching pace toward integration can both help control the rate of unification and independently calm destabilizing European fears of Germany.

These four points—Soviet and East European stability, retention of the U.S. military presence in Europe, German unification in NATO, and movement toward European economic and political integration—describe a Europe in which Europeans themselves, and Americans, can have a chance to work out in a measured way adaptations to the new situation that has arisen in the wake of the rapid changes that began in the East.

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4 The other current applicant in addition to Austria is Turkey. Acceptance of the Turkish application seems unlikely for other reasons, ranging from EC’s lack of desire to bring in another poor member to some degree of poorly concealed racism. The issues here are profound and may affect NATO, but they are not directly relevant to this discussion.
IV. DEVIATIONS FROM THE IDEAL TRANSITION

The difficult takes time; the impossible can happen overnight.

—The Economist¹

The stable transition described in the last section is not merely an attractive but unachievable ideal, in its general outlines it is possible, perhaps even likely. Nonetheless, it is far from certain. In this time of sudden surprises, both the main line and the branches are subject to the Economist’s apothegm: The strategy is designed for the events we can think of, but the impossible—threatening or favorable—can “happen overnight.”

The major potential digressions include:

- Pressures from the Soviet Union for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany or Germany from NATO.
- Pressures from Germany to leave NATO or oust U.S. troops.
- Pressures from the rest of Europe on Germany.
- Budgetary pressures from the United States or other NATO nations.
- Loss of patience with what is perceived to be the West’s sluggish rate of change in response to rapid changes in the East.
- Economic or other collapse of the Soviet Union or, as a lesser threat, of other Eastern nations.

PRESSURES FROM THE SOVIET UNION

In the next several years, the Soviet Union will very likely withdraw its troops from all of the other Warsaw Pact nations. This will not come about as a result of explicit Western pressures; ongoing Western policy is far too cautious for that. It may happen because of East European pressures, plus the fact that the Soviets will see no function for their force presence in nations whose independence they have encouraged. In addition, the withdrawal is a plausible part of a resource-saving strategy.

¹The Economist, January 6–12, 1990, p. 16.
Indeed, this has already begun in several of the current "host" countries. The Soviets have agreed to withdraw from Czechoslovakia and Hungary; they have no forces in Romania or Bulgaria, so that leaves only the two most crucial hosts, Poland and East Germany.

Poland depends on Germany in two contradictory ways. First, because the Soviets are no longer using their stationed troops to maintain control over the other Pact members, the only reason for troops in Poland is to maintain lines of communication to Germany. Were the Soviets to remove their troops from Germany, they would not need troops in Poland; withdrawal from Germany thus implies withdrawal from Poland. Second, however, the failure of FRG Chancellor Kohl to be forthcoming on the issue of the German-Polish border has exacerbated deep-seated Polish suspicions of Germany, particularly a united Germany, suspicions that will now not be calmed easily even when the border issue is settled. Thus Soviet withdrawal from Germany may encourage the Poles to want retention of some Soviet troops in Poland—for protection to the West. These contradictory pressures have led Polish Prime Minister Taddeusz Mazowiecki to favor retention of Soviet troops (at least for the time being), while *éménence grise* Lech Walesa wants to oust them.

The real threat to the Western position in West Germany, however, comes from possible Soviet attempts at political manipulation of German public opinion and government, using their potential withdrawal from the Eastern portion. Such Soviet withdrawal would create no *logical* necessity for equal withdrawal of U.S. forces; the United States and other NATO nations wanting to retain American troops in Europe can find ways to get around the "requirements" of surface symmetry. If they wanted to, however, the Soviets could use their potential withdrawal as a bargaining chip to negotiate for American withdrawal, or they could make a virtue of necessity if they were being forced out anyhow. This would create a very different situation from that suggested by the symmetrical "logic" of mutual withdrawal. It would put Germany in the position of being asked to pay the price of U.S. withdrawal in order to obtain the full freedom of the East. Such a price might be paid. If it were, it would shatter the stable transition.

All this is possible, but unlikely. First, in shattering the stable transition, it would also shatter the picture of a benign, reasonable, and non-"mischievous" foreign policy that the Soviets have been cultivating (quite probably sincerely) since 1985. And that, in
turn, would halt the progress toward the active détente that is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the success of internal Soviet perestroika. Second, it is by no means clear that the Soviets even want the full withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Their rhetorical opposition to German unification in NATO notwithstanding, it is difficult to see how the Soviets could welcome the prospect of a Germany divorced from its Western allies and forced to provide for its own security.

PRESSURES FROM GERMANY

Soviet pressure to force the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany, or Germany from NATO, by using Soviet withdrawal as the bait would operate through German politics. Other pressures for major change in West European security structures could originate within Germany.

One of these is political and short run. The current governing coalition in the Federal Republic—Chancellor Kohl’s Christian Democrats (CDU, plus their Bavarian counterpart, the CSU) and Foreign Minister Genscher’s Free Democrats (FDP)—favors continued membership in NATO and continued U.S. military presence in Germany. The opposition Social Democrats (SPD), however, are ambivalent. At a minimum, they want a restructuring of NATO, with the content of the restructuring not specified. Beyond that, however, some segments of the SPD advocate an end to NATO and to the presence of American forces. This is based partly on grounds of their evaluation of the changed situation in Europe, partly on political grounds in an election year when party prospects do not look bright.

We believe it unlikely that most Germans will demand, in the near to mid term, an end to the deployment of foreign troops on their soil. Western troops have been a fact of life for a long time; and aside from certain specifics, such as low-flying air maneuvers, they have not been viewed as an irritating army of occupation. Indeed, forthcoming reductions in their numbers will be a mixed blessing at best to the areas where they have provided a major portion of the underlying economic structure. Nor should Germans come to regard integration into the West as onerous constraints on their national independence. In the economic realm, the EC provides Germany with far more opportunities than constraints, and in any case is evenhanded across Europe rather than singling Germany out. Remaining "singularizing" security constraints such as the eschewal of nuclear weapons and even potential new ones limiting the size of the Bundeswehr do not constrain activities many Germans want anyhow.
Rather, what could be more dangerous in the transition period—to the German role in EC even more than in NATO—would be an inturning of a unified Germany to purely German concerns. In particular, as the real difficulty of rebuilding the East economically becomes clearer, Germans may be less willing to contribute public and private support, as well as political support, to the economic integration of Europe. German toleration of constraints imposed by the EC and enthusiasm about political integration may both decrease.

The major impetus to rapid reunification has been the hope that it would stem the hemorrhage of population movement from East to West. But political unification will not provide a full solution to the migration dilemma, and continuing disappointments may cause major repercussions. What unification may do is to slow down that part of the East-West migration that is based on migrants’ now-or-never mentality. Unification _per se_ can do little to ease the immense difficulties of raising to Western standards the East German economy, with its crumbling public infrastructure and its obsolete—not to say archaic—industrial base. Reconstruction will impose great burdens on the West German economy, and in the meantime the costs of public benefits—already shocking to West German taxpayers—will be essentially the same whether they are extended to Easterners in the East or the West. German economists and authorities will be faced with the choice—already manifest in the question of immediate movement to a single currency—between raising Eastern wages to near-Western levels and thus making East German industry completely noncompetitive, or keeping Eastern wages down and thus continuing a major incentive to migration. Migration may slow naturally, however, with or without unification, as housing shortages and related disincentives increase.

As the size of these economic costs and issues becomes apparent, they are likely to dominate German economics and politics for years to come. And the effect of such inner direction on Germany’s role in the future European security structure is quite unpredictable. In any case, U.S. or other Western policy can have very little to do with these pressures within Germany. Rather, they must be considered among the many uncertainties that make flexibility to cope with the "impossible" events that may happen overnight a necessary hallmark of a sound transition strategy.
PRESSURES FROM THE REST OF EUROPE

The remainder of Europe, outside of the Soviet Union and Germany, wants to retain current Western security structures, at least for the time being. European nations retain some nervousness about the Germans as well as the Russians. The other nations of NATO have been clear about their desire to retain the Alliance and the U.S. presence. Perhaps more surprising, some member nations of the Warsaw Pact have also favored a continued American presence, in opposition to expressed Soviet views. Poland has been unambiguous in this position; President Havel of Czechoslovakia has expressed a desire to end the bloc system in Europe, but he is in no hurry and seems quite content for the United States to remain during an indefinite transition.

All this reinforces the ideal stable transition. Where it might go wrong, however, is if the continued expression of European doubts about Germany upsets the Germans to the point where their own unhappiness with "singularization" causes them to assert their independence at the cost of existing structures.

This is unlikely to be the primary determinant in German decisionmaking or politics, but it could exacerbate other factors. German sensitivities about the issues of sovereignty, the end of guilt for the Nazis, and perceived subjection to a second-class status within the West antedated the collapse of the East German regime. As the Eastern collapse made reunification a real possibility, these sensitivities grew; and they focused on the right of Germans, East and West, to decide on the goal and pace of reunification by themselves. In the fall of 1989, several events rubbed on these sensitivities: Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti's spontaneous anti-German remarks in response to President Bush's mention of unification at the post-Malta NATO meeting in Brussels; French President Francois Mitterrand's joint statement with Gorbachev in Kiev, warning about going too fast on unification; and, in particular, the three Western powers' acceptance of the Soviet invitation to a Four Power meeting on and in Berlin.

The Four Power Berlin control group had not had a formal meeting in some time, and the Germans believed (probably correctly) that the meeting was a not-very-subtle attempt to remind the Germans that they did not in fact have full legal sovereignty, at least in Berlin. German reaction is characterized by a headline in the popular Bild-Zeitung that

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translates "With Friends Like These . . .". 3 For many reasons, including Secretary of State James Baker’s speech of December 12, 1989, endorsing self-determination, reunification, NATO, gradualism, and stability, 4 which apparently hit the right note at the right time, the United States avoided German displeasure, which was directed toward Britain and France.

The other European members of NATO have received corresponding irritations from the FRG: The first step was Chancellor Kohl’s announcement of his three-phase unification plan without consulting the FRG’s allies (and of course, the Germans were irritated by allied irritations on this issue). Subsequent to that, and even more important, was the chancellor’s refusal to finally and formally recognize the German-Polish border, upsetting Poland greatly, of course; his attitude reminded many of the bad old days. Beyond that, the acceleration of reunification caught other Europeans (as well as the Germans) unawares and made them very nervous. They had expected the slow pace of Kohl’s initial "confederal structures" to give them time to adjust to other structures, and they were not getting it.

Such mutual irritations and fears tend to feed on one another. 5 Operationally, the two main points here are first, that in a sensitive Germany such irritations provide one factor that may make more difficult the reasoned transition of security and other structures; and second, that in an alliance of democratic nations with free speech and with political leaders who want the support of electorates, mutual irritations are going to occur. An appropriate strategy will contain exhortations, both against extending irritations and in favor of their dismissal by the receivers. Exhortation is not a strong political weapon, however.

BUDGETARY PRESSURES

It is certain that unless the Soviets reverse their current trends toward more cooperative policies and reduced military capabilities, the U.S. defense budget is going to be cut sharply over the next several years. It is equally clear that a substantial portion of the cuts will be taken from U.S. forces in Europe.

3 December 1989.
5 See Levine, 1990, pp. 225 and 334–335 on "negative resonance."
None of this implies that U.S. forces in Europe will be cut to zero—a course with remarkably few American advocates—nor even that they will be cut at a faster rate than will be negotiated in the rounds of CFE. And cuts within the CFE process, or under a successor process under the CSCE, would be quite compatible with the stable transition.

The dangers lie in budget-impelled cuts going beyond the negotiating processes and going more rapidly. If budgetary pressures cause the United States or a major ally, such as the Federal Republic, to cut deeper or faster than the negotiations warrant, that is likely to set off a competitive spiral among the allies, with no clear end. The European members of NATO, like the United States, are subject to the joint pressures of budgetary stringency and doubts about the need for substantial NATO forces in the new era. If the United States were to give in to its budgetary imperatives, many of our allies would follow suit, resulting in a helter-skelter process that might well end up with full U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Were a European ally, particularly Germany, to give in first, the “burdensharing” pressures stemming from the U.S. Congress and public would quickly bring us into the competition. Whichever way it began, a competitive budget-cutting spiral of this nature would break up the stable transition.

LOSS OF PATIENCE

The last months of 1989 were almost as exciting to many leaders and citizens throughout the West as were the heady days of victory in 1945. The end of World War II was more definitive. It was seen as the end of an era and led the United States and the rest of the Western nations as they got back on their feet to a desire to get away from the excitement and back to “normalcy.” By contrast, 1989 has properly been seen as a beginning.

With the Soviets’ external empire in Europe crumbling within one autumn season, it is difficult to see how events could avoid slowing down thereafter. That would be true even without the decelerating implications of the stable transition. But slowdown is dull after heady excitement. Because 1989 was only a beginning, some tendency is likely, perhaps less among politicians or electorates than among impatient intellectuals, to say “Let’s get on with it, regardless of pitfalls imagined by the faint-hearted.” The pitfalls

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6Formally, CSCE is the umbrella organization covering both CFE and the follow-on to the earlier Stockholm Conference on Security Building Measures (CSBM), but in fact it performs only the latter function.
are real, however, and too much of the "Let's get on with it" spirit could endanger the stable transition to the free and prosperous future that East and West Europeans want and deserve.

The readiness in some quarters to abandon the European "blocs"—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—in favor of the 35-nation CSCE or some other framework as the basic structure for European security is premature. Such a nonbloc security system for Europe may well be appropriate some day, but the West would be ill-advised to jump too quickly. As Europeans learned in the 1920s and 1930s, the sine qua non of an effective collective security arrangement is a commonality of interests among its members and a willingness to respect certain "rules of the road." Absent such underlying conditions, it is quite unlikely that a 35-nation security apparatus could cope effectively with crises, particularly those involving the central interests of its largest members, the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United States.

The stubborn reality of divergent national interests will take time to erase. It cannot be done away with by simply allowing NATO to atrophy while breaking in a new mechanism. To pretend otherwise would be to fall victim to Bertrand Russell's critique of metaphysicists who "like savages, are apt to imagine a magical connection between words and things."7

SOVIET OR EASTERN COLLAPSE

If too-rapid German reunification is the major challenge to the ideal transition stemming from the West, Soviet collapse provides a concomitant threat from the East. The European opportunities of the 1990s were initiated by Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, as he broke the ice pack of 40 years of intransigence in Soviet external policies. It took several years for the West to believe him, but in spite of cumulating internal failures, Gorbachev's external policies have developed steadily in directions favorable to peace, stability, and Western interests.

The stable transition probably does not depend on the political survival of Gorbachev as an individual. Even if he were to fall, the internal problems of the Soviet Union are likely to keep his successors preoccupied. Neither the "conservative" nor the reactionary Russian alternatives, let alone the "liberals" ("right" and "left" lose definition), advocate a return to external aggressiveness. Such a turn is possible and must

be hedged against; perhaps if the Army or the KGB were to take power, the turn would be in that direction, but not inevitably. In spite of common stereotypes, in neither the East nor the West are armies inherently aggressive; quite to the contrary in many cases, they know the flaws in their own fighting capabilities and the enormous risks associated with warfare.

Indeed, the danger lies less in the accession to power of any successor to Gorbachev than in the accession of no dominant successor. Were the Soviet Union to collapse into a system of indeterminate power or multiple powers warring with one another, still with powerful armies and tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the danger could be substantial not only to the stable transition, but to the security of the West and the world. Similar collapse in other parts of the Warsaw Pact (or in Yugoslavia) could have similar effects—many European wars have started in the Balkans—but at least those countries are not armed with nuclear weapons.

"Collapse" can best be defined in terms of the ways in which it might come about. For the Soviet Union, and by analogy for the rest of the East, the major threats come from two directions, ethnic unrest and economic collapse.

**Ethnic Unrest**

Ethnic pressures to break the "Union" of Soviet Socialist Republics appear tremendous. They have manifested themselves in two ways. One example comes from the Baltic Republics—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. There, the forces for secession from the Soviet Union are strong but basically nonviolent. Following the path of nonviolence, the Lithuanians have seemed willing to take their time and go in peace, hoping for reluctant acceptance from Gorbachev and the Union. If their departure were to destroy Gorbachev politically, well too bad for him; for the West, stability depends primarily on an orderly transfer of power from Gorbachev, and that would be possible. Indeed, the prospect of a Soviet Union peacefully divided into its constituent parts should not necessarily be unattractive to the West. True, the Soviet Union might reverse itself and use force to prevent secession, but the leadership—and not only Gorbachev—has promised not to, and the danger to the Soviet position in the West of such forceful suppression suggests not.

A perhaps more dangerous case lies to the south. The ethnic war between the Christian Armenian and Muslim Azerbaijani republics provides no winning opportunities for Gorbachev or the Soviet Union as such, and it has been anything but peaceful. Nor
have the lesser disturbances in Georgia and Turkestan been gentle. The religious aspects of these conflicts may bring into play Muslim hostilities to the Union. Further, the bloody southern wars have pulled the Soviet Army into direct action. Here lie the seeds not for peaceful secession, but for civil war, and that could be a model for conflict in other parts of the Soviet Union.

**Economic Collapse**

Economic collapse has loomed at least as large as ethnic unrest. In many ways Gorbachev’s revolution resembles Franklin Roosevelt’s in the United States. Both leaders set out to save a crumbling system, and both did so as master politicians, not ideologues; both depended heavily on their own personalities and their faith in themselves; both made firm decisions on the basis of *ad hoc* pragmatism. And neither, in his first five years, brought about the newly prosperous economies they had promised; until World War II, the United States remained in what must be regarded as a continued deep depression. The crucial difference, however, is that FDR turned the economy around in his first year: 1933 was better than 1932, 1934 was better than 1933, and so on at least until the election of 1936, which he won overwhelmingly because the electorate saw him as having turned things around and was willing to give him time to complete the job.

After five years, Gorbachev has failed to make the turn. His popularity has apparently dropped sharply, and the failure to turn will mean that economic decline may well accelerate. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov’s economic "reform" program to bring in immediate consumer goods at the cost of postponing fundamental restructuring may put off the reckoning but make it worse. With or without the ethnic struggles, widespread worsening of economic conditions may spell the end of Gorbachev as well as Ryzhkov. It is not clear that any leader can combine the strength, the knowledge, and the legitimacy to exact the necessary further sacrifices from the Soviet people to turn the system around. And historically, revolutions and civil war have started from bread riots and strikes as well as ethnic rivalries.

What is possible in the Soviet Union is also possible in other parts of the East: Ethnic problems may break up Yugoslavia before the Soviet Union; bread riots in Poland may precede those in Russia, and strikes in both countries seem to proceed apace. But the major dangers lie in Soviet collapse.
Soviet collapse going much beyond a simple change of personalities is likely to mean an end to the stable transition, because it will be the end to the principal premise upon which the transition has been based. It will force the West, and the non-Soviet East, to reconsider their directions; for one thing, it is likely to slow down or halt the arms reductions that seem so possible in the stable transition. Dangerous new uncertainties are likely to—and should—bring about greater Western prudence, including a desire to set up hedges against potential new threats. Less likely, Soviet collapse might also slow down Eastern liberalization. In any case, for the United States and for the rest of the world, life will be much less pleasant than the one we can look forward to now.

Neither the United States nor the West as a whole can substantially affect all of the potential deviations from the ideal transition, but we can affect some. In the Soviet case, the ethnic problems seem beyond our reach; the economic problems are not, and if they are solved in time, perhaps the ethnic issues will fall into place.
V. THE STRATEGY

This analysis has already suggested many of the basic elements of a strategy consistent with the perspectives laid out above. Strategies are defined to help orchestrate resources—political, military, and economic—in the pursuit of particular objectives. American objectives are to secure the interests outlined in Sec. II. But many times national interests can run counter to one another. For example, the United States properly supports the right of Lithuanians, Estonians, and Latvians to liberty and self-determination. Yet we also wish to see peaceful, steady reform in the Soviet Union. One cannot pursue both of these goals simultaneously and with equal vigor, at least under current conditions. Thus, another function of strategy is to strike a balance among competing objectives, setting priorities and making choices as necessary.

In addition, a sound strategy must be suited to coping not only with anticipated conditions but also with unexpected events, particularly unfavorable ones. Sections III and IV sketched out both a fairly benign transition path for Europe and a series of possible diversions from that ideal scenario. The strategy offered here will take account of both sets of possibilities. It provides not only recommendations intended to maintain the stable transition that is its central objective, but also contingency recommendations for what should be done if some of the basic premises are undone. The strategy is not an inviolate structure that must be followed in every detail; it is a branching set of "what ifs," the only kind of strategy that could possibly make sense in such a time of many and large uncertainties.

As has been stressed throughout, the strategy is both conservative and activist. The conservative aspect of the approach is simply stated: The United States should seek to make adjustments in the Western security apparatus for Europe on the basis of observed reforms in the political and economic policies and institutions of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and on observed changes in West European politics and structures, not on expected changes in either. This does not mean that no adjustments are in order now. Clearly, very substantial favorable changes have already taken place in the East, and more are in the offing. One major result is that reductions in NATO's costly military forces are now appropriate and, indeed, necessary.
Nor does the conservative approach imply that we in the West must be passive bystanders with respect to the process of reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we can and should try to promote this process to help ensure that the transition to a new order is as stable as possible and to speed the day when a truly cooperative security system can be established. In fact, that is the primary thrust of the activist aspect of the strategy: the need for rapid, coherent, and substantial action on the part of the West, to avoid the economic collapse in the East that creates one of the major threats to the stable transition. What must be avoided, however, is the discarding or evisceration of institutions and arrangements (in particular, NATO and the U.S. military presence in Europe) that facilitate cooperative Western action and that would be difficult or impossible to recreate should the need arise.

The strategy is divided into four sections. The first three set forth recommendations for U.S. European policies in the military, political, and economic spheres. The fourth section addresses options for coping with unfavorable contingencies.

**MILITARY**

1. *With our allies, determine viable target levels for U.S. troops in Europe.* This analysis has avoided reference to the now clearly obsolete threat that has been used to size and posture NATO and U.S. forces in Europe for the last 40 years—the massive Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. As put by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, "It doesn't make a lot of sense to spend a lot of time worrying about the Polish Army or the East German Army actively participating in an attack on Western Europe."1

While the likelihood of such an attack has been quite low for many years, that threat did at least provide a basis for determining force size based on some rationale. None of the reasoning presented here specifies any size for the forces representing American interests in Europe. It is clear that they need not be as large as they are now. CFE, if it is completed, will specify a ceiling on U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe that neither side will probably want or be able to meet over the long term. Budgetary and political pressures in the United States already are likely to drive the U.S. troop presence in Central Europe below the ceiling of 195,000 proposed by the administration.

One approach to force-sizing has the advantage of bearing some relationship to the political requirements for the troop presence, but the disadvantage of having the least

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military logic. The basis for two other approaches tends away from the political and toward the more specifically military. It may be possible to build a viable force size and rationale by combining all three.

- Choose a number of U.S. troops that would represent a "serious" American presence, in the perceptions of the Europeans and ourselves. Suggestions for such a number range from the 225,000 suggested by President Bush down to as few as 50,000. Some number around 100,000, divisible into appropriate "division slices" (or brigades) and air squadrons, suggests itself.

- Continue to plan a NATO defense against some Soviet threat. Assuming a more or less complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe (including Germany), NATO will want to deter the reentry of Soviet military power into the region (a difficult task given that Eastern European nations will not be members of NATO) and defeat Soviet forces at the Oder-Neisse or beyond, should deterrence fail. Such a scenario suggests some sort of mobile defense capable of rapid reinforcement of threatened sectors, and effective antiarmor operations. Rapid reinforcement from the United States would also be important, since we and our allies might find it difficult to react decisively to early indications of Soviet mobilization. Thus, a large portion of the U.S. force contingent in Europe might need to act as a reception cadre to facilitate reinforcement from North America.

- Think of U.S. troops in Europe as a mobile expeditionary force, based there in some measure for European military as well as political purposes, but also as a means of power projection into such areas as the Middle East and Africa. This would recast NATO into an alliance about the world rather than about Europe alone, and the European members have resisted such a revamping in the past. As the world changes, however, and North/South issues become more important relative to East/West, European thinking may change, particularly if the need is felt to create a new rationale to retain the American troops.

Both of the last two rationales would be likely to require major changes in the current mix of American forces in Europe.
2. Having set the target level for U.S. troops in Europe, tailor the defense budget to that level, rather than further tailoring the level to the budget. Some set of considerations and rationales like those above should govern the size of the U.S. military presence in Europe. Force levels similar to those suggested here—from 25 to 50 percent of current forces—will provide substantial budget savings in any case. Additional savings, if needed, should come from other parts of the defense budget. Pressures already exist within the Alliance for national reductions, with Belgium, for example, hinting strongly at moves in this direction. Were the United States, still the leader, to initiate a process of budget-driven unilateral reductions in Europe, it could rapidly cascade out of control.

3. Make similar determinations, with our allies, about minimum levels for theater-based U.S. nuclear weapons. The aim here is to prevent reductions below theater-based "minimum deterrent" levels for U.S. weapons, not necessarily forever but for now. The definition of such a minimum for Europe is a rather tricky process. The level must not only deter the Soviets, in large measure by providing a plausible connection to U.S. strategic forces, but perhaps even more important, it must also convince our allies that deterring the Soviets is sufficient. Clearly, deep reductions in U.S. theater-based nuclear weapons will be appropriate if and when asymmetries in NATO and Soviet conventional forces are eliminated.

Historically and currently, U.S. nuclear forces have been a major force binding the Alliance together. Should the binding force become centrifugal, as it may under changing circumstances, then the in-theater minimum itself will change, perhaps down to zero. This has not happened yet. The U.S. theater-based nuclear force remains a major contributor to NATO unity and a strong factor in German considerations with respect to their future nuclear status.

NATO is committed, upon successful completion of the current CFE talks, to open talks on reductions of strategic nuclear forces (SNF). SNF negotiations will presumably cover four classes of American nuclear weapons:

- Short-range missiles are almost certainly going to expire with the crumbling of Lance, or before. The Follow-on to Lance is a dead issue politically in Germany and should not cause one more American charge against European windmills.
• Nuclear artillery along the inter-German border is likely to disappear as the border itself erodes, and for many other reasons.

• NATO-dedicated nuclear ballistic-missile or cruise-missile submarines, whether or not they are "dedicated" to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, do not have the kind of visibility that makes land-based weapons the symbol to our allies of the continued U.S. deterrent commitment. Nor do they assure that the risks of escalation are widely borne.

• That leaves air-delivered weapons. The objective should be to keep some such weapons based in Europe so long as our allies, including the Germans as represented by their government, want them there. If possible, the delivery vehicles should include air-launched short-range missiles, among other reasons because the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact reinforces the point that NATO's TNF ought to be able to reach the Soviet Union. The political purposes of theater-based weapons, however—the reassurance of our allies in particular—may be fulfilled even with gravity bombs of the current type.

In general, however, the principle suggested in regard to U.S. forces in Europe applies even more strongly to nuclear weapons: Reversibility will be very difficult. Once land-based weapons are withdrawn, their redeployment will be very difficult short of war.

4. Use the CFE talks and the SNF follow-on as the most appropriate current vehicles for implementing conventional and nuclear reductions. The sudden crumbling of the Warsaw Pact and the impending unification of the two German states seem to have prompted Moscow to reevaluate its attitude toward CFE. Thus, the negotiations may bog down or may result in less sweeping reductions than had been hoped for.

What is important for stability is not the ultimate level of forces in Europe (so long as it is above zero for U.S. troops) nor even the speed with which it is reached. Rather, two other matters dominate. The first is the need for a negotiated rather than a unilateral process. And indeed, the negotiations within NATO are as important as those between the East and West. The intra-Western negotiations are likely to make explicit that neither side of the Atlantic is aiming for full withdrawal of U.S. forces; they will also help avoid the kind of self-reinforcing, Alliance-weakening competitive reduction process that could come about through unilateral actions by member nations, all of which will experience
strong budgetary pressures. In so doing, those West-West negotiations can bind a unifying Germany into NATO.

Whatever becomes of CFE, the 2+4 talks, involving the two Germanies and the four powers with residual postwar rights in Germany (the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France), are not an appropriate negotiating forum for setting force levels. Setting Germany's force levels within 2+4—particularly determination of German levels—would singularize Germany for special treatment in a way likely to cause long-run negative political reverberations among the Germans.

5. Do not eschew participation in modest all-European security arrangements, but do not regard them as adequate in themselves. The Soviets and some Westerners are talking increasingly of the need for a series of novel cooperative security arrangements in Europe. These include, to date, jointly manned centers for crisis management, arms control monitoring, and even air space control in Europe. Moscow apparently sees these, in part, as a means of obscuring the fact of their military withdrawal from Europe. At their most ambitious (and mischievous), such schemes might legitimate an otherwise illegitimate Soviet military presence in Central Europe. Assuming that Soviet foreign policies continue to be broadly benign, we should consider their more modest proposals favorably. It will take time to build effective security organizations, and we should begin now to gain experience with them. Proposals that seriously impinge on German sovereignty, however, should be rejected. Moreover, we must make it clear that, for the time being, there can be no substitute for NATO and continued German participation in it.

POLITICAL

Three general precepts apply here: Walk a fine line between competing pressures in delicate situations; don't overestimate American political power in Europe or American capabilities for implementing sophisticated solutions; don't react to events before they occur.

1. Stand back from Soviet internal affairs. Our ability to affect the increasingly turbulent internal Soviet political dynamics is virtually nil. Our ability to make enemies by attempting to get involved is substantial. And while we should not abandon our long-held and principled positions with respect to the status of the Baltic republics, direct U.S. efforts to affect the situation there directly may do harm from good.
A possible exception is the major economic recommendation below, intended to help stave off the very clear and present danger of Soviet economic collapse. That is not intended internally, however, to "save" Gorbachev, if indeed he were still in power by the time it could be implemented. Rather it is because within the relevant time period, any Soviet Union beginning to recover economically is far less dangerous to the United States and the West than any Soviet Union descending into anarchic chaos. It is conceivable, to be sure, that some day the Soviet Union may turn around again to combine the external policies of a Stalin with the internal economic capabilities of Ludwig Ehrhardt's *Wirtschaftswunder*, but not soon.

We should continue to treat Soviet external policies as coming from a government, not a faction, but a government that could change. This means that verification and enforceability remain relevant to arms control and other agreements; good will and hope are not enough. The rule should be the common sense one—not to aspire to catch or punish every error or sin, but to ensure against gross reversals or deceptions that could endanger our security.

2. Encourage and assist Eastern Europe to democratize, but neither play against the Soviet Union in this nor expect too much of the new governments and societies. The ongoing course for the East European republics is gradual separation from Soviet domination, communist ideology, and the Warsaw Pact. The first two of these have been actively encouraged or at least tolerated by the Soviet Union, and Soviet acquiescence to the third would not be surprising.

The longer Moscow permits these liberalizing trends, the more difficult it will be for the current or any future Soviet regime to reverse them. Thus, the United States and the West should provide political and economic assistance to the processes, but try to do so with a light touch. We must avoid the appearance of pushing either reform or Soviet withdrawal at a rate faster than the centrist elements in Moscow are comfortable with. As put by Lech Walesa: "It is better to tickle the bear than pull on his whiskers."

Further, the most crucial Eastern change for the West is the separation of the other nations from Soviet dominance; internal democracy is important ideologically and otherwise but should remain secondary, within some broad limits. Obviously, we should not encourage or support fascism, antisemitism, or renewed disguised communism. But free elections can produce majorities and governments unappealing to Western democracies, particularly in countries without much in the way of democratic traditions;
we should be willing to go a long way before assuming that they will not produce their own correctives.

3. **Remember that the rest of Europe exists.** The focus is and should be on Germany; it is the most central of our allies, both literally and figuratively, and it is currently much the most volatile. But even a united Germany will constitute less than one-quarter of Western Europe's population and less than one-third of its gross domestic product. U.S. political and economic interests ultimately depend upon the whole of Europe. Should Germany opt out of NATO or the EC, our interests will be even closer to those of the other West Europeans. Thus, the United States must consider the interests and positions of Europeans other than Germans, a point that is sometimes missed.

4. **Eschew a long-run American "vision" for Europe.** Recommendations like those set forth here may not be enough. They are not politically inspiring—prudence seldom is—and perhaps a vision of the longer-range future of Europe and the world is also necessary for the United States to continue its leadership of the West.

The changes in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe have stirred Europeans, East and West, as they have not been stirred since 1945. Some fears persist, but the fears of Soviet aggression that have motivated policy and politics throughout the cold war are fading. This is true particularly among younger Europeans, not just the proverbial "younger generation," but among those whose memories begin after the postwar traumas that had ended by the mid-1950s—even those approaching the ripe age of 40. Led by this generation, Europeans see a new Europe of the future: neither afraid of Soviet military power nor dependent upon American power, democratic, prosperous, liberal, peaceful and mostly disarmed, culturally diverse but not destructively nationalistic, governed at proper levels from the quartier through the continent, depending upon function. And this writ will run from the Atlantic to the Urals, or at least to the eastern border of Poland.

Such a vision is attractive to Americans as well as Europeans, but it is a long and tricky way from here to there. Whether the United States should put forth a vision depends on the answers to two questions: Is such a vision necessary to inspire electorates and governments to move through the prudence still needed now? Should the President of the United States pronounce that vision?

As set forth, the two questions imply their own answers: A vision probably is needed because prudence and political expediency will not suffice to inspire democratic
electorates and their governments to do the things necessary to move in the right direction. Prudence may be intolerable in a time of high romantic change, particularly because the kind of strategy outlined here will require some near-term economic and personal sacrifices—e.g., postponement of both full potential cuts in defense budgets and an end to conscription, and Western economic contributions to the East.

As for the United States, American articulation of the vision may be needed precisely for us to support our stake in Europe.

Why not offer such a vision, then? First, visions can be operationally misleading. The new Europe over the horizon, for example, will be armed far more lightly than it is today. But a vision of radical disarmament could push the process in the West too fast and too soon, to the point of danger either from an unstable East or from other threats.

Perhaps a well-crafted vision could transcend issues, but then the next one remains: Should—or can—such a vision come from the United States? What of the apparent contradiction between a vision of a Europe that, standing on its own, has shed American leadership and the articulation of that vision by the American leader? And beyond that contradiction is the question of whether the United States can be skillful and subtle enough to build a vision that would inspire Europeans who are inclined anyhow to look down their noses at American visions. In particular, can our current president, who clearly feels uncomfortable with "the vision thing," present an American vision convincingly? Mr. Bush is good at accomplishing and articulating the kind of problem-solving deal of May 1989 that joined together new positions on conventional and theater-nuclear arms control both to put CFE on a fast track and to resolve (or postpone for several years, which is almost as good) some very sharp conflicts within NATO. He is less good at long-range visions, and we should recognize that.

Perhaps some sort of vision is needed in and for Europe. If so, the United States should participate, consult, and even sign off on the development of such a vision. But we should avoid the appearance of originating it. That is up to the Europeans themselves, through the EC, WEU, or whatever organization seems appropriate.

**ECONOMIC**

It must be made clear that in seeking to retain a healthy Western Alliance, we are not seeking to exclude a reforming Soviet Union from the Western economic and political system. Activist and forthcoming economic policies are one obvious way to
communicate this, not by trying to buy the Soviets off somehow, but rather to facilitate the very process of reform that will have to precede their full integration into the system. The following are some specific recommendations:

1. **Cooperate with the deepening and broadening efforts of the Economic Community.** This is a deliberately bland recommendation. It is in the economic interest of the United States for the EC to succeed in further integrating West European economies, and in ultimately incorporating East European economies into the Western trading system. Political integration of Western Europe is very much in the common interest of all, in part to include reunified Germany in a larger whole. It is also in the American interest for the European economy to remain open to us. All this is true and none of it is trivial, but how to go about it in general and the appropriate U.S. role in particular lie outside the scope of this analysis.

2. **Initiate an effort for the West and the East together to plan the revival of Eastern economies, including that of the Soviet Union, supported in part by public and private resources from the West.** This is the activist recommendation and it may be the most crucial of the lot. Much advice has been proffered, and a fair amount of actual activity undertaken, to provide Western assistance for the newly transforming economies of the non-Soviet Eastern nations. This has been done nation by nation, however, with no overall plan to relate the new economies to one another. More important, it has not by and large included the Soviet Union, where Westerners, and not a few Soviets, tend to throw up their hands in despair.

   Yet if there is a danger to the security of Europe and the rest of the world, it does not come from Sarajevo, it comes from Moscow. It is still Moscow that commands the armies and the nuclear weapons. Stability in the Soviet Union is crucial, not only for European security and stability, but for the world.

   The United States and the West can do little to help the Soviets with their ethnic issues. Perhaps we can help with their economic problems. The Marshall Plan is a much abused analogy. Because it is ordinarily misinterpreted, it is misleading; yet understood as it actually was, it provides a rich heuristic for examining current needs.

   The Marshall Plan was not a program to provide U.S. resources to war-devastated Western Europe to prevent starvation or to invest in promising situations. Such immediate relief programs were needed, and many were mounted, before the 1948 European Recovery Program (ERP), the official name for the Marshall Plan. ERP,
however, deliberately set out to plan the ways in which resources should be allocated to return the European economy to its own self-sustaining prosperity. The United States set initial planning parameters (in consultation, of course, with European authorities); the nations themselves worked out the plans, including allocation among recipient nations (in consultation, of course, with American authorities). Then the resources went out according to the plans. The resources were significant—the United States spent on the order of $5 billion a year—2 percent of gross national product (GNP)—for four years on economic and military aid, the bulk of which was for the ERP. Not everything worked, nor was the planning rigid; had it been, nothing would have worked. But overall, the Marshall Plan worked magnificently, fully achieving its objectives.

The analogy to current needs is multifold, the two most important similarities being the need for comprehensive cooperative planning involving both recipients and donors and the need for resources that are substantial but not huge relative to the supplying economies. The 2 percent figure, applied to the GNPs of the strongest industrial nations of the free world meeting at the annual summit of the "Group of Seven,"\(^2\) comes to about $200 billion a year, and of course nobody has proposed that much, either for Eastern Europe or for worldwide assistance.

An additional similarity lies in the fact that both the Western Europe of 1948 and the Eastern Europe of 1990 were well supplied with both natural resources and populations with good basic and technical educations. Also similar is the distance to be traveled. The huge task of rebuilding the Soviet economy is frequently commented upon; the huge task of rebuilding a Western Europe reduced to rubble by World War II is frequently forgotten.

The real differences, however, remain great. The core need is to convert the Eastern economies to free market systems. Ostensibly, this is almost universally agreed to, even by Soviet authorities and economists. It was not Friedrich Hayek but Mikhail Gorbachev who said: "The market, of course, is not omnipotent, but mankind has not been able to devise a different, more effective and democratic mechanism of market management."\(^3\) For the Soviets, however, the understanding apparently goes no deeper than the words. The West European nations of the 1940s had market traditions; so do most of the non-Soviet Eastern nations today—stronger, indeed, than the democratic

\(^2\)The United States, Canada, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

\(^3\)Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1989, Section 1, p. 9.
traditions in most of them. But the Soviet Union has virtually none, a fact that is manifest both in the failure of even the best and most liberal of Soviet economists to understand the needs of conversion, and in the failure of Soviet citizens to pick up the enriching possibilities of market freedom, anywhere near as well as even Chinese peasants. Nor do the Soviets have the private capital markets that existed in postwar Western Europe; nor, in spite of their good overall education, do they have the training in productive skills.

It is these facts that lead many Westerners to despair of Soviet conversion to free markets. They may well be right. The question, however, is whether a cooperative planning process involving Westerners, Easterners, and Soviets, can be used as a corrective educational process. The planning itself, potentially reinforced by resource-backed incentives, may find ways that Western economists and authorities believe could work to create free market economies and that Eastern economists and authorities believe could be implemented within the East, including the Soviet Union. At a minimum, such an effort would show promise for the non-Soviet East, and at one more remove, perhaps for the Soviet Union itself. Without it, Soviet economic prospects seem near zero, Soviet economic and political collapse a substantial possibility.

The other issue raised is that of resources. Assuming that the planning is promising, resources will be called for. The percent GNP comparison with the Marshall Plan suggests that needed resources could be raised, even for an economy as large as that of the Soviet Union. This is particularly true because since the 1940s the world economy has learned many lessons about how to leverage private resources with public ones. Public resources from supporting nations could go primarily for typically public supports for the market economy (e.g., roads), and the major support for the conversion of production to market determination could come from private sources, motivated by publicly supported incentives and guarantees.

All this must come from the planning process, however. In any case, public resources will certainly be needed in addition to private. This is bound to raise questions

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4 One question that is raised is what Soviets; is this a support for particular Soviet political tendencies, or should it be? U.S. policy clearly supports Gorbachev, but what if he were to go, or to turn from his current liberal directions? The answer here is that this process should continue with any Soviet regime that at a minimum continues the retreat from Soviet external aggressiveness, does not return to egregious forms of internal political repression, and, of course, wants to participate in this process, moving toward a market economy.
in all democratic countries, probably in the United States more than others. Some American leaders have asked: Why a Marshall Plan for the communist world, when the needs of the American underclass and other white and black poor are so urgent? The question is unanswerable; so are questions about the relative urgency of more funding for U.S. education, the physical infrastructure of the United States, even the competing demands of other parts of the world. And the need to reduce the budget deficit to make the United States more competitive in the world and thereby reduce the foreign trade deficit provides its own imperatives.

The only possible answer lies in a reevaluation of the demands of the private and public sectors of the American economy—the financing of public needs through public taxes, presumably much less than the $100 billion a year that would represent the 2 percent share of the U.S. economy. The Bush administration has set its lips on this issue, so this recommendation may be unachievable. If so, the strategy as a whole may be rolled up starting with its weakest flank. Surely its conservative, hedging aspects will become more important as the prospects grow for prolonged turmoil and instability in the East.

CONTINGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. If the Soviets were to insist on German neutrality or the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Germany as the price for withdrawing their forces, what would happen next would depend primarily on the German reaction.

   If the Germans stand fast on remaining in NATO:

   - Efforts should continue to reconcile the Soviets to inclusion of a unified Germany within NATO. Retention of a sizable Soviet troop presence surrounded by an increasingly hostile populace would be a very untenable situation indeed. What seems unacceptable for the Soviet Union would be movement of U.S. and other foreign troops east from the Elbe to the Oder-Neisse. Moreover, the Soviets are likely to insist on the imposition of strict controls on the number and nature of German forces in the eastern portion of a united Germany. Clearly, there is much room for compromise here. NATO could consider forsaking the deployment of offensive forces, such as large, heavy armor units and ground attack aircraft. Accelerated reductions or
elimination of nuclear weapons and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and even economic incentives, could also be offered.

If the Germans succumb to a Soviet offer to trade Soviet withdrawal for American, however, U.S. interests in the continued stability of Europe and the continued German tie to the West suggest that the United States should still continue to extend some variety of security guarantee to Germany, assuming, of course, that the Germans still want one. This may be done by:

- **Withdrawal of Germany from NATO, or even an end to NATO, but continuation of some variety of U.S. troop presence within Germany under other auspices.** It is not out of the question that some arrangement of this nature, such as a purely U.S.-German bilateral arrangement, could be negotiated.

- **Continuation of a "rump" NATO without foreign troops on German soil.** One possible variation here would continue Germany within NATO in much the same "nonintegrated" relationship as with France now, conceivably even with the military connection symbolized by the current Franco-German brigade. Lesser versions could include Germany outside of NATO but the United States in, with conventional and probably nuclear forces elsewhere in Europe; or a NATO with American troops returned home, but perhaps with U.S. materiel and supplies remaining in Europe to symbolize a continued commitment.

Reaching points like those at the end of this sequence would mark the defeat of the kind of strategy outlined here and should force a thoroughgoing reevaluation of American policies. In particular, because many of the U.S. interests in NATO and in Europe depend on keeping Germany in, and on economic relations with a European economy dominated by Germany, the question must be asked, particularly for the last two cases, whether our remaining interests support our commitments and expenses. Those European nations where U.S. troops might remain should, and undoubtedly would, ask themselves similar questions.

2. If the CFE framework were to crumble. What is of concern here is not the collapse of CFE because of renewed East/West hostilities. That unlikely but still possible
development would have many ramifications more important than its effect on CFE. The more likely possibility is a Soviet refusal, already evident in foot dragging by Soviet delegates at Vienna, to complete the CFE treaty in light of the impending disappearance of the Warsaw Pact. Why, Moscow could argue, should Eastern European forces be counted against the ceilings applicable to Moscow when those forces are unlikely to be willing to fight alongside Soviet forces?

The recommendation for this contingency would be to find another negotiating vehicle, probably CSCE. Although CSCE has bequeathed reduction issues to CFE, it is flexible enough to provide a vehicle for numerical negotiations if necessary. The important distinction is that CSCE involves negotiations among 35 nations compared with the NATO/Warsaw Pact format of CFE. CSCE would provide several benefits: Principally it might be used to avoid the issue of whether and how to count Polish, East German, Czech, etc., forces for the Warsaw Pact in future CFE rounds; and it could break the precedent equating U.S. and Soviet troops in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals arms control negotiating zone. And CSCE, like CFE, includes both the United States and Canada.

The disadvantage of CSCE, in addition to the difficulties of negotiating numbers among 35 nations, would be that that vehicle might hasten the collapse of NATO and the potential removal of U.S. troops from Europe. Since the cornerstone of stability and U.S. policy is the troop presence as such, CFE seems the better vehicle unless it begins to fall apart for other reasons. At least some of those who argue for replacement of CFE by CSCE do so because they expect or favor an end to NATO.

3. An American "vision" of Europe is nonetheless called for.

Generate a vision that is sufficient to provide Europeans with an honest and realistic view of where we think the old continent would be heading as the result of the stable transition. The following is an example of one such:

The events of the past year in Europe, along with trends elsewhere in the world (such as the emergence of robust capitalist economies in the Far East), appear to represent the success of the strategy of containment. We and our allies have held the Bear at bay until the internal contradictions in the communist/totalitarian system became unavoidable and until the nations surrounding the USSR—many of them laid low by the war—recovered.
The transition to a new world will be difficult and tricky, and the dangers should not be discounted. If we look beyond this transition, however, should present trends continue, it is reasonable to envision a world in which all of the advanced industrialized states, including the USSR and perhaps China, are governed by democratically elected authorities and share essentially the same national objectives. In this world, effective collective security arrangements can supplement and eventually replace "balancing" as the basic approach to ensuring national security and stability.

We might, for example, be able to create the kind of collective security organization President Roosevelt had in mind when he sought to build on the wartime cooperation among Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other allies in the fight against fascism in World War II. Such an organization could formulate an international code of conduct, stressing guarantees of borders, renunciation of force, and mutual support in resisting military threats. Members would also have to meet defined standards of domestic conduct, ensuring the protection of their citizens' basic human rights.

Of course, all this has been tried before in the United Nations and, before that, in the League of Nations. But by restricting membership in a new organization to truly like-minded states, effective collective action might be more feasible than has proven the case in the ideologically, politically, and culturally diverse United Nations.

In such a world, NATO and the Warsaw Pact could be dissolved, although some American forces might remain in Europe under the aegis of the new organization's security arrangements. Member nations might earmark military units to participate in collective security actions on behalf of the organization. Presumably, most of these actions would be to protect the rights and interests of the organization's members from encroachment by nonmembers.

For Europe, the vision would include:

- Free institutions from the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond to Eurasia's eastern littoral.
- Levels of armaments sufficient for policing and emergencies and, to be realistic, for intervention outside of Europe.
- A low level of American military presence if desired by the Europeans, but without its being a major issue one way or the other. There would probably be no U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil.
• Economic institutions throughout Europe sufficient to support and manage a dynamic economy.

• A Europe-wide federal or confederal system with:
  — A parliament and executive with the powers to make central decisions where necessary, particularly in the economic realm, including monetary and fiscal policy, regulation, and regional balance and subsidies.
  — "National" decisionmaking on such matters as social regulations and remaining security functions, including police.
  — Cultural freedom and self-control for entities desiring such control, ranging in size from Germany to Wales.

This decisionmaking apparatus would not solve all problems within Europe—Northern Irish might feel compelled to continue murdering one another, for example—but it would go a long way by placing decisions and controls at the appropriate levels.

Such a vision should be attractive to Americans: In many ways it resembles the ideal picture of the United States, although it is perhaps more like Canada. But it should be for Europeans to decide, not for Americans to impose.

4. Collapse of Soviet perestroika—not merely the downfall of Gorbachev, but his replacement either by no clear central authority over government functions (including military), or by a recentralized regime, economically desperate and militarily still strong: Pause in carrying out any strategy, and reexamine not only the economic but also the military and political portions of the strategy. A major advantage of a strategy designed for transition rather than for any detailed future structure is that it allows for such a pause. Indeed, such a strategy stresses the retention of precisely those instruments that would be of greatest use in such an eventuality.

This Note contains a good deal of speculation about what could go wrong in Europe over the next few years. Doubtless, many will regard this as an artifact of "old thinking," believing that the edifice of Western security is now obsolete or, worse, an impediment to the emergence of a freer, less militarized Europe. But the very fact that we were all surprised by the events of 1989 argues against a single projection of developments in Europe. We cannot be certain that events will continue to break our way. And an uncertain future argues for a carefully hedged transition strategy.

Surely, it is not too soon to begin thinking about "new security structures" in a world in which the Soviet Union (or its successor) is no longer a threat and the Bug River
no more significant than the Rhine. Adaptations to the existing security structures are called for. Failing to recognize the continuing need for both NATO and U.S. forces in Europe increases the risk that we will fail to reach the world in which they are no longer required.