THE MILITARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS DURING LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

THESIS

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AFIT/GLM/LSM/91S-58

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THESIS

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Abstract

This research study was limited to two cases (Afghanistan and Chad) involving humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict. To explore the topic of military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict, a study of the land, people government, economy and history of each country was accomplished to provide the background for each humanitarian relief effort. These variables, along with a study of the low-intensity conflict aspect, U.S. policy goals, the actual humanitarian relief operation, and the military logistics support provided were used to answer the specific question: "What are the key elements necessary to provide successful logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict?"
I. Introduction

General Issue

Although low-intensity conflict (LIC) is not a new type of warfare, it seems to be the most prevalent type of warfare during the most recent years. Caspar Weinberger, a previous U.S. Secretary of Defense, declared in his 1987 Annual Report to the Congress for fiscal year 1988 that,

"The growing intensity with which [the forms of LIC] are pursued by our adversaries in the post-WWII era requires a commensurate increase in the attention we devote to them. Indeed, these forms of ambiguous aggression have become so widespread that they have become the warfare of choice over the last 40 years." (Linville, 1987:16)

In addition, the author of the thesis entitled Aerial Ports in Low-Intensity Conflict: Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama stated, "Difficult to define and similar in some respects to a chameleon, low-intensity conflict (LIC) is the dominant form of warfare exercised by mankind during the 30 years from 1960 to 1990" (Parker, 1990:1).

It is evident from these sources that LIC is prevalent and will, therefore, present many challenges in various areas from military logistical support to protect national
security interests, to the military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts. According to Caspar Weinberger, "Through the rest of this century, low-intensity conflict (LIC) will be the next most likely challenge to U.S. national security interests" (Linville, 1987:16).

The general topic of logistics in LIC is widespread and challenging and, therefore, important. "Policy officials and military planners are concerned about developing the appropriate responses to the challenges of low-intensity conflict" (Linville, 1987:16). This research topic of the military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC is also important because logisticians and others involved in this area must be prepared to meet these challenges successfully.

Specific Problem

There are many problems in the general area of military logistics support in LIC which deserve research. However, the main focus of this research study was the problem of how to provide successful military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict. Specifically, the question to be answered was: "What are the key elements necessary to provide successful logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC?"

Research Questions

The following investigative questions were answered at the end of each case study to find potential solutions to the specific problem:
1. What was the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?
2. Who was in charge of the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?
3. Was there a specific plan of action for the humanitarian relief effort?
4. Was there communication between the providers of the humanitarian relief and host country humanitarian relief administrators?
5. Did the host country have a usable logistics/transportation infrastructure?

The answers to these questions were used to form the basis of the cross-case comparative analysis.

Scope of the Research

This research study was limited to two cases involving humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict. To explore the topic of military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC, a study of the land, people, government, economy and history of each country was accomplished to provide the background for each humanitarian relief effort. These variables, along with a study of the LIC aspect, U.S. policy goals, the actual humanitarian relief operation, and the military logistics support provided, were used to answer the research questions.
Background

The background of this research topic was explored by first defining key terms to establish the basis for this analysis. In addition, other previous studies pertaining to the thesis topic were reviewed. There were various definitions of logistics of which a few will be presented. The Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General defines logistics as:

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materials; (2) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisitioning or furnishing of services. (IG, DODR 5000.2-L, 1987:32)

Another definition of logistics offered by a well-noted logistician is that "logistics is a system established to create and sustain military capability" (Peppers, 1988:iv). Logistics has been defined by the Council of Logistics Management as:

The process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective, flow and storage of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from point-of-origin to point-of-consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer requirements. (Stock and Lambert, 1987:7)

The final definition of logistics presented will be the definition of logistics for the purpose of this study. Logistics is "the procurement, maintenance, and
transportation of material, facilities, and personnel (The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 1974:413). This broad definition of logistics was selected for this study because it embodies all the factors mentioned in the previous definitions.

The next key term to be defined is humanitarian relief. Humanitarian relief may be defined in broad terms as providing support for public health and medical programs, technical training, industrial development, transportation, public housing, water resources, land development, electric power, and food distribution for internal development (Linville, 1987:18). In addition, humanitarian relief includes assistance in the area of post-attack support in the forms of:

- evacuating casualties and providing mortuary services; performing health and medical services;
- providing food, water, and essential supplies;
- preparing food or providing the means for food preparation; restoring utilities; handling refugees and displaced persons; assessing damages, and removing debris. (Linville, 1987:18)

The last term which needs to be defined in the research topic is low-intensity conflict (LIC). The Air Force Air University defines LIC as "an ever-expanding realm of threats and responsive measures that fall short of engagements between conventional military forces (Blank et al., 1988:165). Another definition which focuses on the multidimensional elements of LIC is provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and it is presented below:
Low intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. (Motley, 1987:16)

Finally, the definition of LIC which will be used for the purpose of this study was developed by the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) of Air University. This general definition was selected for the purpose of this study because it basically includes all of the elements mentioned in the previous definitions. LIC is defined as:

Nonnuclear conflicts ranging from coercive diplomacy through local, internal terrorism and crises to the guerrilla warfare stage of insurgencies and revolutions. Such conflicts generally involve the use of social, economic, political, psychological, and/or military actions by or against irregular armed combatants to conquer, control, or defend a population, group, or territory. Military actions are localized, generally within Third World countries, and require specialized countermeasures by host governments and their supporters. Responses by the United States and other allies usually entail not only limited political commitments, but also restricted military actions, primarily in conjunction with host countries. (Jones, 1986:9-10)

Since all key terms (logistics, humanitarian relief, and LIC) have been defined for the background of this study, previous studies related to the thesis topic will be presented next.
A study of **MAC and the Afghan Humanitarian Relief Program** was conducted by John W. Leland of the Office of History in the Military Airlift Command (MAC), during 1989. This study discussed the airlift, origins management and achievements of the United States humanitarian assistance program for the people of Afghanistan who were displaced by the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from December 1979 until 15 February 1989 (Leland, 1989:III).

The findings of this study revealed that the inbound missions of the MAC aircraft delivered excess Department of Defense (DOD) property and other humanitarian goods donated by private voluntary organizations. On the outbound flights, the MAC aircraft medically evacuated Afghans with severe war-related injuries for medical treatment in Europe, North America and Egypt (Leland, 1989:75). The findings also revealed that other United States' sponsored humanitarian assistance programs, administered primarily through the United Nations, mainly helped the Afghan refugees who lived in 250 refugee camps in northwestern Pakistan, but the MAC humanitarian airlift also assisted the Afghans who remained in Afghanistan. According to Leland, "MAC performed the flights as Special Assignment Airlift missions to provide humanitarian assistance in a timely fashion and to accomplish national policy objectives" (Leland, 1989:75).
The researcher conducted an extensive data search relating to humanitarian relief in LIC. The literature search can be described as a review of historical studies, current periodicals, professional journals and government documents. Historical studies relating to the specific topic of the military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC were not found. However, there were a few studies relating to the general topic of humanitarian relief provided to Afghanistan and Chad.

One study of particular usefulness was accomplished by the Comptroller General of the United States entitled, Problems in Managing U.S. Food Aid to Chad. It was developed primarily from reviewing and analyzing records and from discussions with officials at the Agency for International Development (AID) headquartered in Washington, D.C. The findings presented information about:

(1) the alleged incompetence, apathy, and participation in or tolerance of profiteering on the part of Chadian officials, (2) the circumstances surrounding the airlift, including the effect of the trucking monopoly, the necessity for the airlift, and the disposition of the airlifted food, and (3) how the agency determined the level of food aid which could be effectively used by Chad and steps it took to see that the food reached those in need. (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975)

The information in this study pertained to activities of the Chad government as it existed before the April 13, 1975, coup d'état.

Periodicals provided some information on humanitarian relief efforts provided to Afghanistan and Chad and the LIC
within each area. *U.S. News and World Report*, *The New Yorker*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Airman* and the *Military Review* were valuable sources of information.

Journals gave more detailed information on the general topic areas of humanitarian relief and LIC. The journal most often used was the *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy*. Especially worthwhile was the information on military logistics in LIC.

A DOD literature search was also conducted through the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) to determine what studies were available on the topic of the military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC and again, there were no studies found on this specific topic. However, there were a few studies on the general topic of humanitarian relief and LIC.

One study of particular usefulness was a study by Timothy A. Fuhrman entitled, *Humanitarian Airlift: U.S. Response to Natural Calamity, 1960-1974*. This historical study examined four major relief efforts conducted by DOD. The operations were: (1) Chile earthquake relief, 1960; (2) Peru earthquake relief, 1970; (3) Pakistan famine relief, 1964 and (4) Sub-Sahara drought relief; 1973-1974. Each operation was examined to discover: (1) what occurrence precipitated the requirement for the mission; (2) how the operations were conceived, organized and executed and (3) the results of each operation (Fuhrman, 1981:iii).
In addition, historical reports and U.S. Air Force unit histories were found at The Air Force Historical Research Center Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. State department bulletins, government periodicals, journals, newspapers and magazines were found at the libraries of Air University, the Air Force Institute of Technology and Wright State University.

**Method of Organization**

Chapter I introduces the thesis topic, states the specific problem, lists research questions, identifies the scope of the research, and explores the background of the research topic. The background is discussed first by defining key terms and then by reviewing previous studies related to the thesis topic.

Chapter II explains the methodology that was followed to compare the humanitarian relief efforts and to identify potential solutions to the specific problem. Additionally, a review of the literature that applies to the methodology is presented, along with the justification of the approach for this particular problem.

Chapter III discusses the first case study of a humanitarian relief effort during LIC: Afghanistan (March 1986 to February 1989). In chapter IV, the second case study discusses humanitarian relief efforts in Chad (1973, 1974). Finally, chapter V summarizes the major findings of this research effort, and presents the potential solutions.
to the specific problem. Conclusions are made, along with recommendations for further study.
II. Methodology

Explanation of Method

The research question (What are the key elements necessary to provide successful military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC?) was answered using a combination of the historical research method and the comparative case study method. According to Borg and Gail, "Historical research is the systematic and objective location, evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order to establish facts and draw conclusions concerning past events" (1971:260).

Bogdan and Biklen describe a case study as a detailed examination of one setting, or one single subject, or one single repository of documents, or one particular event (1982:58). Comparative case studies are described as when "two or more case studies are done and then compared and contrasted" (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982:65).

Procedures/Justification of the Approach

Several steps were required to build a theory to answer the research question. These steps consisted of (1) selecting cases, (2) determining data collection methods, (3) analyzing data, (4) shaping the hypothesis, and (5) reaching closure (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). These steps basically describe the process of inducting theory using case studies. According to Eisenhardt, "This research
The first step consisted of selecting the cases. Although case selection will be from a specified population, it will not be from random sampling (as in other research methodologies); but, rather by theoretical sampling. The researcher’s efforts were focused on the theoretical usefulness of the cases, for case selection. Case selection was based on "those that replicate or extend theory by filling conceptual categories" (Eisenhardt, 1989:533). Each case for this research study will be based on the following criteria:

1. The case must take place between the time period of 1970 to 1990.
2. The case must provide international humanitarian relief during a LIC.
3. The case must involve military logistics support.

After case selection, the researcher used multiple data collection methods to obtain additional data pertaining to each case. Historical records, as well as archival data and other forms of secondary data were used for this research study. In addition, to obtain greater knowledge and depth of each case, notes from interviews involving key personnel involved in the cases were used. According to Eisenhardt, "multiple data collection methods strengthens grounding of theory by triangulation of evidence" (1989:533).
For the next step, data was analyzed within each case to gain familiarity with data and preliminary theory generation. In addition, the comparative case study method was utilized with a cross-case pattern search. According to Eisenhardt, the cross-case pattern search forces the researchers to look beyond initial impressions and see evidence through multiple lenses, meaning to look at the data in many divergent ways (1989:533).

The next step involved developing a hypothesis to explain the "why" of the discovered relationships. The replication of logic across cases confirms, extends and sharpens theory. Also, the search of evidence for the "why" behind the relationships builds internal validity (Eisenhardt, 1989:533).

The final step, closure, consists of pulling all of the information together into a well-developed conclusion. The combination of the historical research method and the comparative case study method provided the basis for the process of building a theory to find an answer to the specific problem.

Review of the Literature

The historical research method requires a heavy dependence on secondary data. According to Emory, secondary data may not meet one's specific needs for the study at hand. It may be inappropriate or out-of-date (Emory, 1985:136). Also, the historical method is frequently
subject to criticism for lack of rigor, judgmental data analysis, and uneven data synthesis (Parker, 1990:9).

Several parts of the process of building theory from case study research have appeared in the literature. Glaser and Strauss have written on the topic of grounded theory building in 1967 and again recently, Strauss in 1987. These authors describe a comparative method for developing grounded theory. This comparative method relies on continuous comparison of data and theory, starting with data collection. This method emphasized both the development of theoretical categories from evidence and an incremental approach to case selection and data gathering (Eisenhardt, 1989:534; Strauss, 1987).

Yin has described the design of case study research. He defined the case study as "a research strategy, to be likened to an experiment, a history, or a simulation, which may be considered alternative research strategies" (Yin, 1981:58). In addition, he developed a typology of case study designs and described the replication logic which is necessary for multiple case analysis.

Yin describes two approaches, the case survey approach and the case comparison approach, which should be used in applying cross-case evidence (Yin, 1981:62):

The case survey approach requires two conditions...First, isolated factors within particular case studies must be worthy of substantive attention; second, the number of case studies must be large enough to warrant cross-case tabulations....The successful application of this approach [case comparison] is not unlike more
generalized theory-building...When the lessons of each case were compared, a common explanation emerged,... (Yin, 1981:62-63)

Yin’s approach brings the concerns of validity and reliability in experimental research design to the design of case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989:534; Yin, 1984).

In 1984, Miles and Huberman outlined specific techniques for analyzing qualitative data. These techniques include a variety of devices such as tabular displays and graphs to manage and present qualitative data. Also, these techniques do not lose the meaning of the data through intensive coding (Eisenhardt 1989:534; Miles and Huberman, 1984).

Eisenhardt describes a case study as "a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings" (1989:534). In addition, she states that "Case studies typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations. The evidence may be qualitative, quantitative or both" (Eisenhardt, 1989:534). Finally, she states that "Case studies can be used to accomplish various aims: to provide description, test theory or generate theory" (Eisenhardt, 1989:535). In 1988, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt developed cross-case analysis techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989:534).

As with all research methodologies, the comparative case study method has its strengths and weaknesses. One
weakness is biases on the researcher's part. Eisenhardt says,

The danger is that investigators reach premature and even false conclusions as a result of these information-processing biases. Thus, the key to a good cross-case comparison is counteracting these tendencies by looking at the data in many divergent ways. (1989:540)

The researcher attempted to compensate for this weakness by observing the data in different ways. Historical documents were used, as well as recorded interviews, memos and reports. Another tactic used to compensate for this weakness was to note the similarities and differences between the cases. This tactic forced the researcher to look for the subtle similarities and differences between the cases. As a result of this comparison, other concepts were considered which the researcher may not have otherwise considered.

Another weakness is the intensive use of empirical evidence which can yield overly complex theory. An indication of good theory is parsimony, but due to the large volume of data, there is the temptation to build theory which tries to capture everything. This results in theory which is very detailed, but lacks overall perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989:547).

The researcher acknowledged this weakness by building a very general theory to identify the key elements necessary to provide successful logistics support of humanitarian
relief efforts during LIC. The resulting theory is not overly complex or detailed.

The final weakness to be presented is "that building theory from cases may result in narrow and idiosyncratic theory. Case study theory is a bottom-up approach such that the specifics of data produce the generalizations of theory" (Eisenhardt, 1989:547). The risks are that the theorists will be unable to raise the generalizability of the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989:547). Dr. Shane reiterated this last weakness when he stated that the case study approach is weakest in terms of external validity and that the researcher may give up generalizability with this approach (1991).

The researcher recognized this weakness of a lack of generalizability using the case study approach. This research study was based upon only two case studies; therefore, the researcher cautions the reader in using the results of this study for generalizations outside the realm of this study.

Although these are some of the characteristics that lead to weaknesses in theory building with the case study methodology, there are some characteristics that also lead to strengths. "One strength of theory building from cases is the likelihood of generating novel theory. Creative insight often arises from the juxtaposition of contradictory or paradoxical evidence" (Eisenhardt, 1989:546, Cameron and Quinn, 1988). The process of reconciling these
contradictions forces individuals to reframe perceptions into a new gestalt. Attempts to reconcile evidence across cases, types of data, and different investigators, and between cases and literature increase the likelihood of creative reframing into a new theoretical vision (Eisenhardt, 1989:546).

Dr. Guy S. Shane of the Air Force Institute of Technology reaffirms this strength of the case study method when he says, "A case study may or may not give one right solution, but it may give the organization or researcher several options to explore to obtain a solution" (Starr, 1990:7). In addition, Dr. Shane says that one advantage of the case study is that it can produce new theory (1991).

Another strength of theory building from case studies is that the emergent theory is likely to be testable with constructs that can be measured and hypotheses that can be proven false. Measurable constructs are more likely because they have been measured during the theory-building process. Therefore, the resulting hypotheses are likely to be verifiable for the same reason (Eisenhardt, 1989:547).

A third strength is that the resulting theory is likely to be empirically valid. The likelihood of valid theory is high because the theory-building process is so closely tied with evidence that it is very likely that the resulting theory will be consistent with empirical observation (Eisenhardt, 1989:547).
III. The Afghan Humanitarian Relief Program

Introduction

Military Airlift Command (MAC) cargo aircraft may transport humanitarian relief supplies to any country during any year. Humanitarian relief may be provided in response to natural disasters (floods, hurricanes or earthquakes), famine or other reasons. Typically, these type of humanitarian airlift missions may last for a few days, weeks or months. However, a departure from this pattern of operation occurred from March 1986 to September 1988 when MAC transport aircraft flew humanitarian relief missions on a continual basis to Pakistan to aid the Afghanistan people who had been displaced by the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 (Leland, 1989:1).

Background

Afghanistan is a landlocked independent republic in central Asia. It is approximately 250,000 square miles in area - about the same size as Texas. It is bordered by Pakistan on the south and east; Iran on the west, the Soviet Socialist Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan on the north; and Sinkiang in China and Hunza in Kashmir on the northeast (Collier's Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 183).

The Land. Afghanistan occupies a plateau with an average elevation greater than 4,000 feet. The Hindu Kush mountain range extends across the country from east to west.
This mountain range is highest in the east, and in the
Wakhan Corridor there are several peaks with elevations
greater than 20,000 feet. The Kunar and Kabul rivers
originate at the southern area of the Hindu Kush, and the
Kabul river eventually joins the Indus. The Safid Kuh
mountain range branches off from the southeastern area of
the Hindu Kush and extends into Pakistan. The Safid Kuh
mountains are the most fertile and densely populated area of
the country (Collier’s Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 183).

The Hari River waters the fertile Herat region and
flows northward into the Soviet Union. The Helmand River
originates in the southwestern area of the Hindu Kush and
flows southwest into the Sistan Basin. The Sistan Basin is
basically a barren clay and gravel desert with a few oases.
Rigestan is a great sandy area, south of the Helmand River.
The semiarid steppes of Afghan Turkestan are where many
small rivers descend from the northern slopes of the Hindu
Kush. Most Afghan rivers become trickles during the long
dry season and have large volumes of water flow only in the
spring, when the winter snow melts in the mountains
(Collier’s Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 183).

Afghanistan has great variations in temperature. The
highest temperature recorded was 128 degrees fahrenheit in
Afghan Turkestan and the lowest temperature recorded was
minus 15 degrees Fahrenheit in the Hindu Kush. At Kabul,
annually the average temperature is 32 degrees Fahrenheit in
January and 72 degrees Fahrenheit in July. Days are usually
clear and nights may be cool or cold. The country’s annual average rainfall is approximately eleven inches. Most of the precipitation falls as snow in the mountains. The rainy season is between October and April; however, in parts of Sistan, there is virtually no rain (Collier’s Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 183).

The People. Afghanistan’s first national census was taken in 1979 during a period of rebellion. That census estimated a population of 15.5 million and included approximately 2.5 million nomads (Collier’s Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 184). Afghanistan is an Islamic tribal society, consisting of approximately 22 different ethnic groups and hundreds of tribes and subtribes (Barth, 1987:189).

The largest ethnic groups is the Pushtun or Pakhtun. The Pushtun account for about 50 percent of the population. The Pushtun speak Pashto (or Pushtu) which is one of the official languages of Afghanistan. The other official language of Afghanistan is Dari (or Afghan Persian). The Pushtuns are divided into tribes of which some are nomadic. Pushtun tribal affairs are conducted by an ancient code of conduct called Pushtunwak. The Pushtun controlled most government posts and the Durrani tribe supplied the ruling family, until the monarchy was abolished in 1973 (Collier’s Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 184).

The second largest ethnic group is the Tadzhik, or Tajik who live in the northeast and north-central areas. The Tadzhik are most often farmers, merchants and
bureaucrats. The Hazara people of the central ranges are most often farmers, sheep herders and urban laborers. The Uzbek and the Turkoman are the most numerous Turkish ethnic groups north of the Hindu Kush. The Uzbek and Turkoman people engage in farming, herding and carpet-making. The Nuristani people live relatively isolated lives in the mountains north of the Kabul River (Collier's Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 184-185).

Approximately 76 percent of the people of Afghanistan are farmers who live in small villages or as members of tribes that have settled on the land. Approximately nine percent of the Afghanistan people lead nomadic or seminomadic lives (Collier's Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 185).

Even before the Soviet invasion in December 1979, life in Afghanistan was hard as evidenced by a literacy rate below 10 percent and an infant mortality rate of 182 per 1,000 live births. The average Afghan life expectancy is 42 years (Leland, 1989:2). Due to the fact that the Afghans have no outlet to the sea and the inhospitable terrain of mountains and desert, this country evolved as a nation of inward looking settlements. An Afghans first loyalty is to the village, tribe and family. The isolation caused by geography, climate, and topography has historically led to Afghanistan's thousands of villages resisting any moves toward a central government (Leland, 1989:2; Arnold and Klass, 1987:135-137).
Government. During the last 100 years territorial-wide political institutions have been superimposed over the agglomeration of tribal societies. Afghan rulers obtained international recognition and the military arms needed to solidify power over the tribal societies by exploiting the competition between the Russian empire in central Asia and the British empire in India (Wilber et al., 1986:Vol 1, 185).

The only legal political party and the country’s official guiding force is the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP considers itself as the party of the workers and working class. The PDP members are divided between two factions: The Khalq and the Parcham. The Khalq (masses) faction is the largest and it is predominant among party members in the officer corps of the armed forces. The Parcham (flag) faction controls the government. There are many small rebel groups who are devoted to the Islamic revolution and opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, these small rebel groups are not united on personal, tribal and ideological beliefs. Some of the small rebel groups joined the Islamic Revolution Liberation Front which was formed in 1980 and some of the other rebel groups joined the Islamic Unity of the Mujahideen which was formed in 1981. These alliances have not been effective in moving toward a central government (Wilber et al., 1986:Vol 1, 186).
Economy. Agriculture is the pillar of Afghanistan's economy and over four-fifths of the population live in rural areas (Noorzoy, 1987:83). Approximately 12 percent of the land is suitable for crops; however, only 1 percent is under permanent crops. Nine percent of the land is permanent meadows and pastures. Most of the cultivated land is owned by small farmers who engage in subsistence farming. There is a very close relationship between nomads and farmers. Usually villagers will permit the nomads' flocks to graze over freshly reaped fields because the flocks will gain nourishment and the fields receive needed fertilizer in the form of manure (Collier's Encyclopedia, 1986:Vol 1, 186).

History. For approximately two centuries before the 1917 Russian revolution, the Tsarist autocracy planned to get a foothold in Afghanistan because it was thought to be a logical stepping stone to the Indian Ocean (Leland, 1989:4). However, in the nineteenth century, Great Britain opposed the Russian advancements through frequent military confrontations with the Russians on the northwestern frontier of British India which is now part of Pakistan. Rudyard Kipling coined the phrase, "The Great Game," when referring to the Tsarist pursuit of access to the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and Britain's resistance to the attempts (Leland, 1989:4; Klass, 1987:1).

In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin replaced Noor Muhammed Taraki as the prime minister in a new government. However, Amin was more radical and resistant to compromise
than Taraki and rebellion grew among the people. The Soviet Union, which was aiding the government, tried unsuccessfully to get it to moderate its policies.

In 1978 approximately 110,000 men were in the Afghanistan armed forces. However, in the next few years most of the soldiers deserted the Afghanistan armed forces. Some of the soldiers became Islamic guerrillas to fight the pro-Soviet government and the armed forces were reduced to approximately 20,000 to 30,000 men (Wilber et al., 1986:Vol 1, 186).

Initially, the Soviet Union only provided military equipment and arms to the Afghan government for use against the Islamic rebels. However, when this failed to end the insurgency, the Soviet Union sent advisors and then in December 1979 the Soviet Union resumed "The Great Game" with a sudden invasion of Afghanistan with combat troops (Wilber et al., 1986:Vol 1, 186; Leland, 1989:4).

All did not go as planned for the Soviet Union because the opposition of thousands of Afghan freedom fighters were so fierce and resolute it led the largest deployment of Soviet military forces outside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since World War II (Leland, 1989:4). In 1981 approximately 85,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan and an additional 30,000 were near the border (Wilber et al., 1986:Vol 1, 186). To destroy the Afghan resistance, the Soviet Union launched a military campaign against the Mujahideen (holy warriors) and civilian population with

To help mitigate the enormous suffering the war inflicted upon the Afghan people, the United States government, the DOD and MAC, conducted one of its longest ongoing humanitarian airlifts since the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), the command's predecessor, had flown in the Berlin Airlift in 1948-1949. (1989:5)

**Low Intensity Conflict Aspect**

The Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan began in April 1978 when the Communist elements of Afghanistan's armed forces seized control of the government in a coup d'etat and proclaimed Afghanistan as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The revolutionary government soon signed an economic and military treaty with Moscow and thousands of Soviet advisors were integrated into the government and armed forces (Klass, 1988:925-926). The new government started a course, despite the warnings of Soviet advisors, which outraged almost every element of Afghan society. For example, the regime replaced Afghanistan's national flag which is green, black and red, with a red flag. In addition, the new government abruptly started coeducation into the male-dominant Islamic society and set legal limits on the size of dowries. This new regime imprisoned between 15,000 to 20,000 political prisoners and secretly conducted mass executions (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:59). By the winter of 1978-1979, thousands of armed mujahideen (holy warriors) had taken up arms in Afghanistan
and launched a "jihad" or holy war against the puppet government (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:59).

On 24 December 1979, Soviet airborne troops landed in Kabul, using the pretext of being invited by the communist regime to safeguard Afghanistan from some unspecified threat. Three days later the Afghan president, Hafizullah Amin, was murdered. Amin was replace with Babrak Karmal who was considered to be a communist more responsive to Moscow's control (Klass, 1989:925-926). Leonid Breshnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party stated that the combat troops were sent to Afghanistan because the civil strife within Afghanistan posed "a...serious danger to the Soviet state" (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:60).

By 27 December 1979, the Soviet Army had 5,000 troops in Afghanistan (Whitehead, 1986:1). By the end of six months of occupation, the Soviet military force had grown to 80,000 men (Dept. of State Bulletin, 1980:62). The Soviet armed forces were to the borders of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and within striking distance of the Persian Gulf. Some analysts interpreted the Soviet invasion as a fresh Soviet attempt to obtain a warm-water port by first seizing landlocked Afghanistan in preparation to conquer Iran or Pakistan (Poullada, 1987:37).

After the invasion, Soviet forces became involved in a guerilla war with the mujahidœen who had been fighting the communist government since 1978. At the end of January 1980, Soviet military forces were located throughout
Afghanistan. The Soviet forces were involved in daily confrontations with the freedom fighters (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:59). Some observers believed that Moscow had expected the invasion and occupation to be for a short time period; just a symbolic show of force to strengthen the morale of the Afghan puppet government (Bodansky, 1987:239; Klass, 1983-1984:926). However, the Soviets underestimated the freedom fighters' bravery, skills and dedication because the Soviet Army's occupation became the driving force that increased the members of the guerilla groups to 80,000 full-time warriors by the end of 1980, who were equipped with modern weaponry (Dept. of State Bulletin, 1980:62). The Afghan resistance was a broad national movement which included almost the entire population of Afghanistan, Afghan refugees who were living in Pakistan and Iran, and Afghan nationals who were exiled throughout the world (Special Report No. 173, 1987:7).

Since the Soviets discovered that the mujahideen was a formidable adversary, the Soviet military forces waged a war to break the morale of the mujahideen and halt the insurgency (Special Report No. 173, 1987:11-12).

Soldiers looted homes, burned villages and crops, and murdered civilians. They carpet-bombed villages, airdropped anti-personnel weapons napalm, killed livestock with land mines, and strafed civilians as they fled to Pakistan. The many serpentine trails winding over the mountains into Pakistan were strewn with booby-trapped toys and mines. (Leland, 1989:9; Malhuret, 1983-1984:426-435)
Many times lethal bombs were in the form of butterflies, dolls, balls, toy trucks and little jewelry boxes (Malhuret, 1983-1984:426-235).

It seemed that in this war as in any war, the children suffered the most (Leland, 1989:9). Jerry Laber, author of the article entitled, "Afghanistan’s Other War," wrote the following statement about the situation of the children of Afghanistan:

Virtually every crime is taking place there, and on a scale so vast it defies imagination. Children are among the victims. They are bombed in their schools, locked in their homes and burned alive, shot while fleeing to caves in the mountains or enroute to refuge in Pakistan. (1986:3)

Adults were maimed by explosives, as well as children. Explosives were hidden in pens, watches, cassette recorders, and cigarette packages that were placed around the villages and surrounding areas after Soviet military attacks. The Soviet military forces hid mines and grenades along the paths leading to fields and near plants, bushes and trees that the Afghans used for food and firewood (Malhuret, 1983-1984:430). This was a low-intensity conflict based on terror because Soviet military commanders believed that a wounded person caused more inconvenience to the mujahideen and required more care than a dead person. This belief was based on the premise that freedom fighters had to withdraw from battle to care for the injured (Malhuret, 1983-1984:430).
The Soviet Union’s war against the mujahideen resulted in a mass exit of Afghans from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. By the end of 1981, 2.5 million Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:65). According to a Department of State Bulletin, 1.5 million Afghan refugees were living in Iran at the end of 1981; however, approximately 850,000 had been working in Iran before 1979 (1984:78). Approximately 470,000 Afghans lived in refugee camps inside Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion. After declaring war on the communist government in 1978, the mujahideen moved family members to locations of safety. The majority of the Afghan refugees left Afghanistan in 1980 and 1981. The number of registered Afghan refugees in Pakistan increased by less than 500,000 from 1981 through the end of 1988 (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:65).

As early as 1983, Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran constituted the world’s largest group of refugees (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1987:10; Rogers, 1987:418). According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, five million refugees were living outside Afghanistan by 1987. Official Pakistan registration lists reported approximately 2.9 million registered refugees in Pakistan and an additional 400,000 refugees awaiting registration. The refugees lived in tents and makeshift shelters in approximately 250 camps in rural areas along the border, primarily in the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Approximately 25 percent of the refugees were
elderly men, 28 percent were women and 47 percent were children (Special Report No. 173, 1987:19; Bonner, 1987:82). By the end of 1987 the government of Iran estimated there were approximately 1.9 million Afghans residing within its borders (including the pre-1979 workers). The refugees in Iran lived mostly among the general population rather than in camps (Rubin, 1987:351).

There were several hundred thousand more internal refugees inside Afghanistan who had fled from fighting to the mountains, mountain caves and the country's few urban centers. It was thought that the urban centers were made relatively safe by the presence of Afghan government forces and Soviet troops. Many of the internal refugees went to Kabul and by the end of 1983, Kabul's population had increased from its prewar size of 600,000 to almost two million (Rubin, 1987:351).

The Soviet Union kept between 105,000 and 120,000 military troops in Afghanistan and kept an additional 30,000 troops across the northern Afghanistan border in the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union outnumbered the mujahideen, the Soviets suffered many battlefield losses. From 1979 through the end of 1987, Soviet casualties were between 33,000 and 38,000 with more than a third attributed to battle fatalities. Thousands of soldiers who died from various diseases where not included in these estimates (Rubin, 1987:351).
After Mikhail Gorbechev succeeded Yuri Andropov as General Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party in 1985, the Soviet Army increased its use of special commando, counter-guerilla units (referred to as Spetsnaz troops) to attack alleged mujahideen strongholds and helicopter gunships to combat the resistance and the mujahideen supply caravans going between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:66). The helicopter gunships were well-suited to the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and inflicted heavy damages on the mujahideen, until late 1986. In 1986 the mujahideen began receiving the British-made "Blowpipe" and American-made "Stinger" surface-to-air missiles to launch counter-attacks against the helicopter gunships (Karp, 1987:38).

The Soviet Union invasion did not end the insurgency of the Islamic rebels. In fact the insurgency produced the opposite affect by bringing hundreds of guerrilla bands into a loosely organized national front of military resistance (Leland, 1989:13). By 1988 approximately 1,500 field units had 150,000 Islamic mujahideen equipped with a well-stocked arsenal of modern weapons. Although not centrally commanded, the mujahideen was a large army inspired by Islam. Although drawn from all tribes and ethnic groups, most mujahideen remained loyal to local commanders and fought in local home provinces or districts (Ahmad and Barnet, 1988:66,75).
By 1987, many of the resistance groups operating from Pakistan had become affiliated with one of seven major political organizations. Four additional major political organizations were based in Iran. The seven political organizations were headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan and belonged to a single organization called the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen (IUAM). The IUAM was formed in May 1985 to dispel the Russians from Afghanistan. The seven political organizations overlooked their differences about the type of government that would replace the present regime until the Soviet forces had returned to the Soviet Union and the refugees returned to Afghanistan (Special Report No. 173, 1987:7; Karp, 1986:1042).

U.S. Policy Goals

The United States' policy goals remained consistent for Afghanistan throughout the years of Soviet occupation. President Carter and President Reagan insisted upon the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the safe return of the refugees to Afghanistan. In January 1980, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution "calling for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, a recognized independent and nonaligned status for Afghanistan, self-determination for the Afghan people, and the return of the five million refugees in safety and honor" (Leland, 1989:14). The General Assembly renewed the resolution each year thereafter (Special Report No. 173, 1987:22-23).
Of greater importance than the annual resolutions were the United Nations diplomatic initiatives for a Soviet withdrawal and repatriation of the refugees. In February 1982, the United Nations Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, appointed Diego Cordovez, a United Nations Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs, as a special representative for Afghanistan (Klass, 1987:927-928; Special Report No. 173, 1987:22-23).

By 14 April 1988, United Nation’s Secretary Cordovez’s diplomacy paid dividends as representative of Pakistan and the revolutionary Afghanistan government signed three bilateral agreements which provided for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces, return of the refugees, and the terms of future relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. These agreements became effective on 15 May 1988 and are known as the Geneva Accords. On 18 May 1988, the first group of Soviet troops departed Afghanistan. According to Soviet government reports, half the Soviet military force had withdrawn by August 1988 (Klass, 1988:922-925; Barnes, 1988:72).

By 15 February 1989, in accordance with the Geneva Accords, the Soviet Union withdrew all of its military forces from Afghanistan. During this eight year war, 1.24 million Afghans were killed (Humphrey, 1988:8). For comparative purposes, using comparative populations, the 1.24 million Afghans would equate to 20 million Americans or
proportionally a greater number of war dead than the Soviet Union lost during World War II (Kaplan, 1988:128).

The Humanitarian Relief Operation

Because of its geography, Islamic culture, and ethnic ties to Afghanistan, Pakistan became the central point for the humanitarian relief that the United Nations and the United States sent to the refugees (Leland, 1989:16). Although Pakistan is a developing nation with limited resources, it shouldered the responsibility for the Afghan refugees living within Pakistan. Pakistan paid the refugees cash allowances, administered United Nations relief programs, and provided the transportation that delivered food, medicines and other life sustaining supplies to the refugee camps (Bonner, 1987:82-83).

Pakistan paid half the cost of the refugee relief effort. The relief effort cost 360 million dollars annually. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided most of the food and other life sustaining supplies; however, Pakistan handled the distribution of the supplies. For the time period from 1980 through 1986, more than 40 percent of the UNHCR’s annual budget bought food for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The United States helped fund the United Nations (UN) relief effort and contributed 551 million dollars to the program by the end of 1988. From a different perspective, throughout the 1980’s the United States financed 30 percent of the humanitarian assistance
the UNHCR sent annually to Pakistan for the Afghan refugees (Leland, 1989:16-17; Special Report No. 173, 1987:20).

The Reagan administration was committed to the cause of the mujahideen, and during the latter part of 1983 events began to happen that furnished a new method of providing humanitarian relief to the Afghan refugees. The process which was to start the new method of providing relief began when the National Security Council (NSC) asked the Department of Defense (DOD) to suggest ways the DOD could provide more humanitarian assistance worldwide. In response to the National Security Council's request, in January 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger appointed a DOD Task Force on Humanitarian Assistance to explore ways to provide humanitarian aid to qualified recipients. The task force explored how DOD could provide humanitarian aid in the areas of civic action, international disaster relief, medical programs, transportation and surplus property disposal (Leland, 1989:17).

The task force came to the conclusion that "the United States foreign assistance program was missing a golden opportunity by not donating excess, noncombatant government property to deserving, developing nations" (Leland, 1989:17). Such action would promote international goodwill and advance American foreign policy objectives. This idea was perceived to be favorable because when DOD sold excess property on the market, it normally received prices between two and four percent of the original cost. Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Richard Perle, found the task force's findings favorable and recommended to Secretary Weinberger that DOD notify interested congressional representatives to sponsor legislation authorizing the distribution of excess DOD property for humanitarian purposes (Leland, 1989:17).

In June 1984, Secretary Weinberger approved the Humanitarian Assistance Task Force report. As preparation for a larger DOD role in humanitarian aid projects, Secretary Weinberger assigned General Richard G. Stilwell, Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the responsibility of coordinating all future DOD humanitarian assistance projects. General Stilwell appointed his special assistant, Dr. Robert K. Wolthius, to head a new DOD organization named the DOD Office of Humanitarian Assistance (Leland, 1989:18).

Congress acted favorably upon the DOD task force's recommendations in 1985 and 1986, giving DOD a major role in humanitarian projects. An amendment that Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) sponsored to the fiscal year 1985 Defense Appropriations Act specified DOD's authority to use appropriated funds for civic action and humanitarian projects during U.S. military training exercises around the world. Although the Stevens Amendment did not help the Afghans, it allowed the supported host countries to benefit from programs like small-scale repair projects, veterinary care, road building, minor construction and medical
assistance. The Stevens amendment was especially beneficial to countries in Central America where United States forces frequently conducted military exercises (Leland, 1989:18).

When Senator Jeremiah H. Denton, Jr. (D-AL) sponsored an amendment to the fiscal year 1985 Defense Authorization Act, another new DOD humanitarian assistance authority was created. This amendment permitted the transportation of privately-donated, humanitarian cargo on U.S. military ships and aircraft to Central America on a space available basis at no cost to the donor (Leland, 1989:18, Kuntz and Shuey, 1987). Another humanitarian amendment, sponsored by Senator Denton and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), was enacted as part of the fiscal year 1986 Defense Appropriations Act. This latest amendment expanded Senator Denton's 1985 amendment by authorizing DOD transportation of privately-donated, humanitarian cargo on a space-available basis at no cost worldwide. This privately donated cargo had to be nonlethal, nonperishable and was prohibited from paramilitary groups (Leland, 1989:18-19; Kuntz and Shuey, 1987).

During the fiscal year 1986 budget cycle, Representative Bill McCollum (R-FL) proposed a two part amendment to the fiscal year 1986 Defense Appropriation Act to use excess DOD property to help the Afghan people. This amendment became law on 8 November 1985 (Public Law 99-145). Section 1454 authorized the Secretary of Defense to make nonlethal DOD excess property available for humanitarian
relief worldwide. This amendment's authority was used to send excess DOD property to aid Afghan refugees. Section 1454 also stipulated that excess supplies approved for humanitarian assistance would be transferred to the Secretary of State whom the amendment gave overall responsibility for this program (Leland, 1989:19; Kuntz and Shuey, 1987).

It was noted that the legislation to give excess property to developing countries would be ineffective unless Congress appropriated the funds to transport the property. Accordingly, this was the basis for the second part of Representative McCollum's amendment. Section 305 of the fiscal year 1986 Defense Appropriations Act authorized an appropriation of ten million dollars from the Air Force Operations and Maintenance account to airlift excess DOD property and privately-donated goods to Afghans displaced by the war. Cost of the air transportation was at the lowest rate which the Military Airlift Command (MAC) charged DOD customers. Sections 1454 and 305 of the fiscal year 1986 Defense Appropriations Act became known as the McCollum Amendment (Leland, 1989:20; Kuntz and Shuey, 1987).

The House and Senate conference committee which reviewed the McCollum Amendment added a provision which stipulated that war-wounded Afghans, who had injuries too severe to be fully treatable in Pakistan, could receive U.S. military airlift from Pakistan to obtain specialized medical treatment in other areas of the world (Leland, 1989:20;
Authority for the distribution of excess property and the arrangement of transportation for Afghan patients was vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. Richard L. Armitage, on 20 December 1985. On a daily basis the operational management of the program was under the control of the Director of Humanitarian Assistance, Dr. Robert K. Wolthius (Leland, 1989:20).

The McCollum Amendment created the Afghan Humanitarian Relief (AHR) program. The AHR program was different than the United Nations humanitarian assistance programs for Afghan refugees. According to Leland,

> While U.S. monetary assistance through the United Nations helped the refugees living in the camps in western Pakistan, the objective of the AHR program was to improve the lot of war victims inside Afghanistan. Life there was exceedingly difficult, as the shrunken population tried to cope with inadequate food, shelter, medical care, and social services. Excess property and privately donated supplies channelled to the population inside Afghanistan eased their daily struggle, thereby, bolstering the morale of individual Afghans as well as the morale of the collective resistance movement. (1989:20-21)

The McCollum Amendment did not prohibit excess, nonlethal property from going to military or paramilitary groups or organizations (Leland, 1989:21).

The AHR program was regarded as a means to get humanitarian relief supplies to the Afghans quickly because the U.S. government-donated items came from existing Department of Defense stocks. The McCollum Amendment allowed the humanitarian airlift to strengthen the ability
of the alliance to provide humanitarian aid to Afghanistan’s resident population (Leland, 1989:21).

The aeromedical airlift provision of the McCollum Amendment allowed some war-wounded Afghans to receive medical treatment in hospitals outside Pakistan. This provision of allowing aeromedical airlift to war-wounded Afghans was also a cost saving measure because after delivering humanitarian cargo, military aircraft did not depart Islamabad, Pakistan empty. Based on a letter dated 26 February 1987, from the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan to the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Leland wrote,

> The morale of the mujahideen and the general Afghan population who supported them was undoubtedly lifted by the knowledge that advanced medical treatment was available to at least a few of the most seriously wounded. (1989:21)

In addition, the aeromedical airlift of war-wounded Afghans demonstrated the commitment of the United States and the Western European countries to the Afghan people, when the patients received medical treatment in the United States, Canada and Europe (Leland, 1989:21).

In fiscal year 1987 the airlift of DOD excess property and privately-donated goods received strong congressional support with greater authority and increased appropriation. The fiscal year 1987 Defense Appropriations Act renewed Sections 305 and 1454 of the fiscal year 1986 act and appropriated 17 million dollars for transportation of the humanitarian cargo to the Afghans. However, of the 17
million dollars, seven million dollars was obligated fiscal year 1986 money that Congress designated for Afghan relief in fiscal year 1987. Only three million dollars of the original fiscal year 1986 appropriations of ten million dollars had been used to fund nine airlift missions to Islamabad, Pakistan during the first fiscal year. Also, during fiscal year 1986 one sealift mission was paid for to transport 110,888 pounds of humanitarian cargo to Karachi, Pakistan. Karachi is one of Pakistan's major seaports on the Arabian Sea (Leland, 1989:22; Kuntz and Shuey, 1987).

The fiscal year 1987 legislation differed from that of the fiscal year 1986 legislation because 3 million dollars of the 17 million dollars was to be used for the transportation of humanitarian cargo to Cambodian refugees in Thailand. In addition, the 1987 legislation added a clause to stipulate that the transportation funds for the AHR program "could be used for worldwide humanitarian relief as authorized by law" (Leland, 1989:22).

During fiscal year 1988 Congress appropriated 13 million dollars for the AHR program keeping the 1987 provision that these transportation funds may be used for worldwide humanitarian relief. In addition the fiscal year 1988 legislation required the Secretary of Defense to report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs the cost of the airlift, the number transportation missions and a description of excess
government property given to the humanitarian aid recipients (Leland, 1989:23).

According to Leland, successful operation of the AHR program was dependent upon the joint effort and cooperation of the Department of State, Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development (AID). The Agency for International Development is a U.S. government agency which administers U.S. economic and technical assistance to developing countries. As with any foreign assistance program, the Department of State maintained overall policy guidance for the Afghan humanitarian relief program and negotiated all of the diplomatic arrangements with the government of Pakistan. AID maintained field administrators in Islamabad to help administer the program. The Department of Defense managed the airlift and the logistics of identifying excess supplies and transporting them to the aerial port of embarkation at Andrews AFB, Maryland. The government of Pakistan established the guidelines for the American operations in Pakistan (Leland, 1989:24).

Patient airlift and the transportation of excess property and privately-donated goods were the basic kinds of relief provided during the Afghan Humanitarian Relief program. Through the Office of Humanitarian Assistance, the DOD coordinated the transportation of excess property and privately-donated goods. Items no longer needed by any DOD component were considered excess property and excess
property usually had considerable wear or use remaining (Leland, 1989:24).

The excess property most often requested by the Afghans were clothing, blankets, parkas, ponchos, sleeping bags, sweaters and other similar type items. Excess property also included food items which had to be free of pork or other animal fat to remain in compliance with Islamic law. The type of food items included freeze dried fruits and vegetables, canned or dried fish, powdered milk and eggs, peanut butter, soda crackers and multiple vitamins. Other excess food items which were favorites of the Afghans included applesauce and beans in tomato sauce (Leland, 1989:24).

The excess property that MAC transported to the Afghans came from facilities of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), headquartered at Cameron Station in Alexandria, Virginia. The DLA has two major depots in the United States at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania and Ogden, Utah. The Mechanicsburg depot served as the major assembly point in the U.S. for excess property airlifted to Pakistan. The major inspection and repackaging facility for DOD property in Europe was at Kaiserslautern, West Germany. The DLA operated many receiving and distribution centers throughout the U.S. which are referred to as Defense Property Disposal Offices (DPDO). The DPDO warehouses stocked the excess property that the Office of Humanitarian Assistance claimed
for the Afghan Humanitarian Relief program (Leland, 1989:25).

The type of property that MAC airlifted depended on the type of excess property that was available at the Defense Property Disposal Offices. Because the Defense Property Disposal Offices were not supply facilities from which any type of humanitarian goods may be requested or ordered, the AHR was driven by what excess supplies were available. The Office of Humanitarian Assistance could only claim items which had been declared excess to DOD requirements. After a DOD organization declared property as excess, the property went through a computer managed screening process for 21 days during which any DOD organization could claim the property to support a valid requirement. After the 21-day period expired, the Office of Humanitarian Assistance could claim the property. Once property identified for the AHR program was delivered to a depot, it was inspected to ensure that there was no damage (Leland, 1989:26).

According to Leland in an interview with Captain Andrew F. Michaels III of the DOD Office of Humanitarian Assistance, project officers at the Office of Humanitarian Assistance educated the staffs of the Defense Property Disposal Offices about the Afghans' needs. Defense Property Disposal Office managers were asked to inform the Office of Humanitarian Assistance when humanitarian goods needed by the Afghans had been declared excess. Once excess property had been formally transferred to the AHR program, the Office
of Humanitarian Assistance arranged for it to be transported to the depots at Mechanicsburg, Ogden or Kaiserslautern for palletization and delivery to Andrews AFB, Maryland or Rhein Main AB in the Federal Republic of Germany. The system for acquiring privately donated cargo began when an organization wanting to donate goods sent a list of its offerings to the Office of Humanitarian Assistance, which, in turn, contacted AID representatives in Islamabad to see if the Afghans needed the supplies. After the requirement for a category of goods had been validated, the private organization became responsible for transporting its donation to Andrews AFB for palletization (Leland, 1989:26).

From March through June 1986, the 459th Aerial Port Squadron, an Air Force Reserve unit at Andrews AFB, prepared the cargo for airlift, using standard 463L pallets. However, in July 1986, because the task of preparing the pallets required additional manpower, headquarters MAC transferred the responsibility for the humanitarian cargo palletization to the 93rd Aerial Port Squadron. The 93rd Aerial Port Squadron is the active duty aerial port of the 89th Military Airlift Wing at Andrews AFB, Maryland (Leland, 1989:26-27).

A member of the DOD Office of Humanitarian Assistance accompanied every flight and transferred custody of the cargo to a representative of AID. Between flights, the AID representative for Afghanistan Affairs in Islamabad, Mr. Larry Crandall, met with Pakistani officials and Alliance
representatives to determine the Afghans' requirements for humanitarian goods (Leland, 1989:33).

Upon arrival of the humanitarian cargo at Chaklala AB, Pakistani laborers unloaded the cargo using material handling equipment (such as forklifts) and trucks furnished by AID and the government of Pakistan. The trucks took the cargo from the flightline to warehouses for an inventory by Pakistani officials. Neither AID representatives nor any other American officials were permitted to watch the inventory process. The final step in the delivery of the goods occurred when Pakistani officials distributed the cargo to the Alliance representatives along the Afghanistan border. From that point the Afghans moved the goods usually by camel, horse, or mule over the mountains into Afghanistan (Leland, 1989:33).

For the returning missions to the U.S., the military aircraft was fitted with seats and litters for the patients. A few hours before the U.S. military aircraft touched down at Chaklala AB, Alliance vehicles brought the war-wounded Afghans selected for medical evacuation from Peshawar to Chaklala. Prior to the aircraft entering Pakistani airspace, the Air Defense attache at the American Embassy in Islamabad notified Pakistani officials that the MAC aircraft was enroute. Upon receipt of this notification, the Pakistanis informed Alliance headquarters in Peshawar that its buses and ambulances should start the 85 mile drive to the base (Leland, 1989:84).
When the patients arrived at Chaklala AB, they were taken to a hangar equipped with cots and chairs. Each patient wore a name tag and an identification number. Each flight was accompanied by flight nurses and an Air Force physician, who usually boarded the aircraft at the European intermediate staging base. The nurses used the name tags to match the patients with individual one page case records and the doctors made quick examinations (Leland, 1989:34).

The pattern of the McCollum Amendment missions was well established by the latter part of the summer in 1986. The Military Airlift Command maintained an Operations Center at King Abdul Aziz Air Base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia which replaced Bahrain as the Persian Gulf staging point and the second overnight rest stop on the eastbound mission to Islamabad. The missions usually departed Andrews AFB late on a Thursday afternoon and then the C-5s and C-141s proceeded to a overnight rest stop at Rhein Main AB in West Germany. The humanitarian missions were staged less frequently through Torrejon AB, Spain, Royal Air Force Mildenhall, United Kingdom, or Ramstein AB, West Germany. Usually the C-5 missions were routed through Torrejon AB rather than Rhein Main AB on the return mission to Andrews (Leland, 1989:36).

When the aircraft departed Andrews AFB there was a second crew on board who took the aircraft from the first overnight stop to Dhahran, Islamabad and then back on the outbound mission to the European overnight rest base. The
aircraft usually departed Dhahran for Islamabad on Sunday afternoon and arrived at Chaklala AB approximately five hours later because the local time in Islamabad was two hours ahead of Dhahran. On the westbound leg from Islamabad, the aircraft usually landed at Dhahran early Monday morning at about 0300 local time to refuel and continue to either Rhein Main, Ramstein, or Torrejon AB for a overnight rest stop. Arrival at the European destination base was most often late Monday morning or early Monday afternoon. The air crew who originally flew the aircraft from Andrews AFB to Europe, flew the aircraft from its European base back to the United States (Leland, 1989:36).

All of the Afghan relief missions performed through the end of 1988 were eastbound missions, with the exception of one mission flown by a C-5 of the 60th Military Airlift Wing, Travis AFB, California, from 8-10 May 1988. The aircraft picked up 135,369 net pounds of cargo at Kadena AB, Japan and delivered it to Islamabad. Kadena AB was the overnight rest stop for the westbound and eastbound missions (Leland, 1989:36).

To coordinate the flight schedules, the Office of Humanitarian Assistance worked with AID Representatives, the government of Pakistan and the Military Airlift Command several weeks in advance. During any mission the military aircraft flew in the airspace of several European and Middle East nations which required that flight clearances be obtained several weeks before the airlift missions. Because
of the complexity of obtaining clearances to fly in the airspaces of these countries, and the necessity of landing after dark within the time frame prescribed, it was difficult to change flight itineraries once approved. Depending upon the number of patients airlifted from Pakistan, the support personnel for a typical mission included one or two Afghan interpreters (Leland, 1989:42).

The C-5 aircraft could carry a maximum of 36 463L pallets and the C-141 a maximum of 13 pallets. Usually one or two pallets were left off the C-141 missions to make room for the comfort pallet, containing the galley and the restroom, and the passenger seats the aircraft loadmasters assembled for the ambulatory patients, after the humanitarian cargo had been downloaded. The largest humanitarian cargo load transported by a C-141 to Islamabad was on 25 July 1987. It weighed 52,625 net pounds. The largest C-5 humanitarian shipment arrived at Chaklala on 7 April 1987, weighing 168,840 net pounds (Leland, 1989:40).

By the latter part of 1987, the Afghan humanitarian relief missions had evolved into a pattern of two monthly flights, usually one C-5 mission and one C-141 mission, although for the entire three year period, C-141 aircraft performed 60 percent of the total missions. The C-5 type aircraft, with a full load of humanitarian cargo, often returned patients to Pakistan and departed Islamabad empty. Most often patients were returned to Pakistan by commercial air carriers with the fare paid by a sponsoring organization.
such as the Free Afghanistan Alliance of Boston, The Committee for a Free Afghanistan, or the International Rescue Committee. Twenty-five C-141 missions medically evacuated Afghans from Pakistan through the end of October 1988, and carried an average of 27 patients and escorts. The escorts, who accompanied each child under age 12 and all women, were usually family members (Leland, 1989:40).

Research Questions

**Question 1.** What was the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?

The process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during this LIC was basically established by the McCollum Amendment. This amendment became law on 8 November 1985 (Public Law 99-145). Section 1454 authorized the Secretary of Defense to make non-lethal DOD excess property available for humanitarian relief worldwide. This amendment's authority was used to send excess DOD property to aid Afghan refugees. In addition section 305 of this legislation appropriated the funds to transport this property (Leland, 1989:19; Kuntz and Shuey, 1987).

**Question 2.** Who was in charge of the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?

Section 1454 of the McCollum Amendment also stipulated that excess supplies approved for humanitarian assistance
would be transferred to the Secretary of State, whom the Amendment gave overall responsibility for this program. However, on a daily basis the operational management of the program was under the control of the DOD Director of Humanitarian Assistance, Dr. Robert K. Wolthius (Leland, 1989:20).

**Question 3.** Was there a specific plan of action for the humanitarian relief effort?

Yes, there was a specific plan of action for this humanitarian relief effort. It was based on the joint effort and cooperation of the Department of State, the DOD and the Agency for International Development (AID). The Department of State maintained overall policy guidance for the Afghan humanitarian relief program and negotiated all diplomatic arrangements with the government of Pakistan. The Agency for International Development maintained field administrators to help administer the program and the DOD managed the airlift and the logistics of identifying excess supplies and transporting them (Leland, 1989:24).

**Question 4.** Was there communication between the providers of the humanitarian relief and host country humanitarian relief administrators?

Yes. As with any foreign assistance program, the Department of State maintained overall policy guidance for the program and negotiated all diplomatic arrangements with the government of Pakistan. In addition, the AID representative for Afghanistan Affairs in Islamabad met with
Pakistani officials and Alliance representatives to determine the Afghans' requirements for humanitarian goods.
(Leland, 1989:24,33).

**Question 5.** Did the host country have a usable logistics/transportation infrastructure?

Yes. Upon arrival of the humanitarian cargo from the U.S., the Pakistani laborers unloaded the cargo using material handling equipment (such as forklifts) and trucks furnished by AID and the government of Pakistan. The next step in the delivery of the goods occurred when Pakistani officials distributed the cargo to the Alliance representatives along the Afghanistan border. From that point, the Afghans moved the goods usually by camel, horse, or mule over the mountains into Afghanistan (Leland, 1989:33).
IV. U.S. Food Aid to Chad

Introduction

Although Chad had basically been involved in LIC since its independence in 1960, unlike Afghanistan, the humanitarian relief given in 1973 and 1974 was provided as a result of a drought in the Sahel. The Sahel region of Africa is an area that is the transition between the barren expanse of the Sahara Desert to the north and the tropical climate of equatorial Africa to the south. In 1970 through the summer of 1974, the rainfall levels of the Sahel dropped 50 percent to 80 percent below normal. The land was quickly defoliated by livestock. As the livestock herds decreased, the human population began to suffer from malnutrition. Because of the impending starvation of 5 million to 17 million people, an international relief effort was organized under the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). This entire relief operation included the countries of Chad, Mali and Mauritania (Fuhrman, 1981:32). However, the focus of this study is the humanitarian aid provided to Chad.

Background

The Republic of Chad, a former French colony, has boundaries that are about as tenuous as the government is stable. It is an independent state in equatorial Africa, bounded by the Central African Republic in the south, the Sudan in the east, Libya in the north and Niger, Nigeria and...
Cameroon in the west. Most of the boundaries with these countries are established by artificially drawn lines that are not identifiable (Nelson, 1972:1). The area is 495,800 square miles and the estimated population as of 1983 is 4,740,000. The capital is N'Djamena (also called Fort Lamy). It has been independent since August 11, 1960 (Patten, 1986:Vol 5, 671).

The Land. Chad is almost coextensive with a large peneplain rising from Lake Bodele (an interior drainage basin) through encircling plateaus and lowlands. The country has numerous sand dunes, some fixed, some migrating; many isolated steep, rugged hills called kagas locally; and numerous swamps especially in the southern area. In the west is Lake Chad, which is a shallow lake that fluctuates in area from 4,000 to 10,000 square miles because of the extreme flatness of the land and the varying flow of the Chari, Logone and Komadougou rivers, which feed it. Sometimes the lake overflows into the Bahrel Ghazel, which drains into the Bodele depression (Patten, 1986:Vol 5, 671-672).

Chad has three climatic regions: the south, the Sahelian or central zone and the north. The south is predominately subtropical and is located just over the fringe of the equatorial rainbelt. The climate of the south is characterized by high relative humidity during the rainy season and relatively high temperatures throughout the year. January is the coolest month in the south and the
temperatures even during that period are usually above 80 degrees Fahrenheit. August temperatures are also moderate due to the cooling effects of the rain. March, April and May are the hottest months with an average daytime maximum temperature above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. In the area north of the Chari river and into the central zone, temperatures above 100 degrees Fahrenheit are still experienced during April and May. Further north, into the Sahara zone, even during the coolest months of the year, average daytime temperatures are above 90 degrees Fahrenheit and temperatures above 115 degrees Fahrenheit are not uncommon (Nelson, 1972:12-14).

Throughout the country there are only two seasons, wet and dry. In the subtropical south, the rainy season extends from April through October. During that period, as much as 35 inches have been measured. Although the dry season is from November through March, the southern edge of the central zone is still very wet, receiving as much as 25 inches of rain annually. In the northern area of the country the amount of rain received decreases significantly. The northern area of the country or the Sahara zone receives less than one inch of rain throughout the entire year (Africa South of the Sahara, 1986:343).

The People. Chad’s population is made up of more than 200 distinct ethnic orders and social groupings (Nelson, 1972:43). Chad has long been the meeting place for Muslim Caucasoid North Africans and Sahara and Sudanic Negroes of
the Sudanic agricultural and Eastern Nigritic cultures. Correspondingly, there is a diversity of languages, ranging from Arabic to the various tongues of the Chadic and Saharan language families. French is the official language (Fernandez, 1986: Vol 5, 672).

Ethnically, the Saras of the south constitute the largest group in Chad with approximately 24 percent of the population. The next largest group is the Arabs of the north which comprises about 14 percent of the population. Each of the remaining ethnic groups represent separately five percent or less of the total population (Central Intelligence Agency, 1986: 48).

Among the Muslims who are dispersed sparsely over the steppe and desert regions, the Bedouin (desert Arabs), Tuareg, and Fulani are nomadic herders of camels and cattle. The Hausa are traders and farmers and the Wada are farmers employing the North African techniques of irrigation and animal fertilizer. The Kanebou primarily raise livestock, while the Tubu are the nomads of the dry east and north (Fernandez, 1986: Vol 5, 672).

The non-Muslims live in the more densely populated wooded savanna area. The Sara who are the largest group, though not cohesive, fish and till. Dispensed among them live the Hakka who are exclusively farmers. The Hakka penetrated the wetter regions, during the past four centuries, with introduction of New World crops enabling
them to grow and displace the hunter-gatherers already there (Fernandez, 1986:Vol 5, 672).

The development of education has been hindered by the Muslim resistance to the spread of Christian mission schools, forerunners of the public school system (Gardinier, 1986:Vol 5, 673). The lack of education is one area in Chad that poses a serious obstacle to economic development. The illiteracy rate of the adult population is estimated to be about 85 percent, even though education is officially compulsory for the first six years. In the north, the illiteracy rate is suspected to be higher because the Muslims do not want their children to attend Koranic schools (Burch, 1987:10).

**Government.** Between the early 1960’s and the early 1980’s, a period of civil war and LIC, there were several changes in the constitution of Chad. After the abrogation in March 1979 of the fundamental charter of 1978, Chad was without a constitution. A new constitution was to be drafted in the early 1980’s. In the early 1980’s Chad had no political parties. Until that period, the main political cleavage had been between Arabized Muslims of central and northern Chad and non-Muslims of the south (Zolberg, 1986:Vol 5, 672).

Chad maintains close ties with France and other French-oriented African states. France has given Chad a significant amount of military aid. Chad was a member of the French-oriented Afro-Malagasy and Mauritius Common
Organization (OCAMM) but withdrew in 1973. Chad was an associate member of the European Economic Community from 1958 to 1975, when the Lomé Pact went into effect. Chad also belongs to the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations (Zolberg, 1986:Vol 5, 672).

**Economy.** Economic activity is mainly on a subsistence level and concentrated in the south. The commercial economy was insignificant until after World War II. The primary commercial product and chief export is cotton seeds and fiber. Livestock is also important. There are approximately 47,200 workers in industry and 72,000 in transportation and other services. In 1980 the gross national product (GNP) was estimated at 530 million dollars, or 120 dollars per person. Farming, herding and fishing account for about half the GNP, industry for seven percent, and transportation and services for approximately 20 percent. The economic growth is slower than the population growth rate of approximately 22 percent annually, and the per capita GNP is falling (Rivkin, 1986:Vol 5, 672).

Herding is predominately in the northern and central areas of Chad, and cultivation is in the south. Millet and sorghum are the main crops, supplemented by peanuts, cassava, dates, corn and rice. Cotton production is controlled by a French company in which the Chadian government has a financial interest. Ranching, slaughtering and meat-freezing enterprises are also owned by a foreign firm. There is a large trade in live cattle, most of it
illegal and unrecorded. Industry is limited to processing cotton, cattle and peanuts. A textile complex at Sarh was completed in 1967. Construction of a petroleum refinery began in 1977. Oil-powered plants produce electricity for industry. Telecommunications are limited along with transportation. Transportation is usually limited because of uncertain weather and road conditions (Rivkin, 1986:Vol 5, 672).

In the 1970's there were recurrent budget deficits because of defense spending. Approximately 30 percent of the 1976 budget went for defense and less than 10 percent for development. In the past, aid has come from France and the European Economic Community (Rivkin, 1986:Vol 5, 673).

**History.** European penetration dates from 1822, when the British explorers Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton entered the area. Heinrich Barth and Gustav Nachtigal made further explorations in 1870 to 1871. The French began to extend control in the 1890's and completed conquest by 1913, making Chad a colony in French Equatorial Africa in 1920. During the years from 1946 to 1958 Chad was represented in the French parliament and had a territorial assembly. Chad became independent on August 11, 1960. The leading nationalists were Gabriel Lisette, a West Indian who built the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT), and Francois Tombalbaye, a labor leader, Chad's first premier and its first president (Gardinier, 1986:Vol 5, 673).
Starting in 1962, uprisings occurred among the Muslims in northern Chad and in 1965 a National Liberation Front was formed. In 1968 there was a rebellion of northern militiamen. Government efforts to stop this uprising and later uprisings were aided by French troops. In 1973 Tombalbaye began an Africanization campaign, in which Chadians with Christian names were forced to take African names and to participate in ritual initiations. He even changed his first name to Ngarta. In April 1975, he was killed in army coup d'etat, and General Félix Malloum took power. However, resistance by northern guerrillas forced Malloum in 1978 to form a coalition government with rebel leader Hiséne Habré. When fighting broke out between the supporters of the two men, it led to the resignation of both Malloum and Habré in March 1979 and the formation of a transitional government of national unity led by Goukouni Oueddei. This change of government was accompanied by a truce in the civil war. However in March 1980, further fighting occurred in N'Djamena between the forces led by Habré and those loyal to Goukouni. Thousands of civilians were killed and many more fled the country (Gardinier, 1986:Vol 5, 673).

Low-Intensity Conflict Aspect

Since Chad gained its independence from France in August 1960, there has been conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian led south (Burch, 1987:4). The first fifteen years of Chadian independence, from 1960 to
1975, were under the one-man rule of Francois Tombalbaye. Tombalbaye was a protestant mission-educated teacher of the Sara tribe and represented the characteristics of the Sara tribe which gave them an early lead in the control of Chadian economic and political affairs (Thompson and Adloff, 1981:23). The Sara tribe of the south dominated the government and the army (Africa South of the Sahara, 1986:343-351).

In 1959, Tombalbaye assumed control of the government of Chad without resorting to violence. Tombalbaye used a coup d'état by telegram (Thompson and Adloff, 1981:23). A telegram was sent to the former Prime Minister, Gabriel Lisette, which forbade him to return to Chad after attending a symposium in Israel. Thus, Tombalbaye assured that his position within the newly formed Progressive Party of Chad (Parti Progressiste Tchadien, PPT) was strong. Tombalbaye and the PPT had originally gained power and influence by siding with the tobacco farmers in the southern area of Chad. Although the PPT was primarily strong in the cotton belt (southern area), it was strong in some of the Muslim areas such as Bathia, Guera, and Chari-Baguirmi (Henderson, 1984:18).

This southern domination led to a northern based insurgency in 1963. Since some of the opposition to the PPT in the National Assembly decreased after Tombalbaye assumed power, a single party system was implemented in 1962. This single party system was established despite the objections
of the politicians from the north and the conflict ensued. Five northern politicians were arrested in March 1963 because of their objections to the adoption of the Sara-dominated single party system. In September 1963, voting in N'Djamena and the Salamat Prefecture followed attempts to arrest other northern leaders who opposed Tombalbaye and the PPT (Henderson, 1984:18-19).

The sultanates and Muslim northerners had traditionally seen themselves as more socially advanced than the southerners. The northerners were now in a position exactly opposite of what had been regarded as traditional: the northerners were under the political control of the southerners. However, division between the smaller ethnic groups of the north continued. Additionally, the traditional antagonisms between the northern and southern ethnic and political groups were further aggravated by the governmental administration imposed by the southern-dominated government (Henderson, 1984:19).

The primary cause of the rebellion in 1965 was due to maladministration by the regional and local government authorities (Nelson, 1972:122). Corruption was rampant among the southern administrative officials. Anti-Sara sentiment grew strongly in the northern areas and the Muslim peasants and herders of the mountainous central region rebelled against the officials and soldiers sent there to collect taxes. This rebellion evolved not only because the collectors were Sara, pagans or Christians, but because the
taxes were unfairly high, made so by political corruption and inefficiency. "In the face of the countless abuses, humiliations and discriminatory practices attributed to Sara rule, the insurrection eventually reached a regional scale" (Lemarchand, 1981:416).

In 1966 an organized revolutionary resistance organization, the National Front for the Liberation of Chad (Front Nationale de Liberation du Tchad, FROLINAT) was formed. However, because of the fractionalization of Chadian peoples and politics up to this time, the FROLINAT was a collection of multiple armed factions united only by their opposition to Tombalbaye. This resistance organization's members' educations, religious views, regional origins, and ideologies ranged to all extremes; therefore, the ensuing rifts in FROLINAT solidarity began almost with its formation and was present throughout FROLINAT's existence (Henderson, 1984:23). FROLINAT was formed in Sudan and presided over by Ibrahim Abatcha (Burch, 1987:4).

The northern Toubou region of Chad is known as the "BET," named for the three provinces of the area: Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. The 'erde, or tribal leader, of the region instigated a rebellion known as "the BET revolt," following the advice of Libya's leader Colonel Khadafi. Inter-Touban quarrels were aggravated by the revolt; also, like FROLINAT it too was not a unified regional struggle (Thompson and Adloff, 1981:140).
During 1965, concurrently with the BET revolt, Ibrahima Abatcha was killed while fighting with government troops in eastern Chad. Abatcha's death was a stiff blow to the FROLINAT from which it never recovered; in that he was the one leader around whom various FROLINAT factions could have united due to his abilities as a field commander and politician. After Abatcha's death, there was a prolonged struggle for leadership of the FROLINAT (Thompson and Adloff, 1981:51-54).

By 1968, the armed insurrection had increased. Four of the country's fourteen prefectures (provinces) were involved, and at least six others had been effected by the rebellion. At this time, armed factions abounded throughout Chad. The rebel armies in the BET were now called the Second Liberation Army or the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN), jointly controlled by Hissein Habre and Goukkouni Queddei. The FAN emerged as a power. These armies often defeated government forces in the field; but, were most effective on the village level, organizing anti-government militia and teaching political education. The Chadian Liberation Front operated along the Sudanese border, however, not as part of FROLINAT. All those rebel armies increased the intensity of the civil war and had formed for the purpose of overthrowing Tombalbaye (Burch, 1987:4; Henderson, 1984:23).

The government's reaction to the ever-widening revolution was mixed and ineffective. By March 1965, the small Chadian armed forces were over-extended dealing with
the rebellions. Tombalbaye was forced to request French intervention to dislodge Toubou forces who had taken a government post in the Aouzon strip from Sara troops. In August 1968, French troops reentered the internal affairs of Chad. Although the French troops only remained until 1972, the French counterinsurgency effort lasted in various forms until 1979 (Burch, 1987:4; Henderson, 1984:24).

Tombalbaye's relationship with the northern ethnic groups was still deteriorating into the 1970's. This was primarily due to the incompetent administration of his government and Sara dominated armed forces. Even inter-Sara opposition to the regime had started as early as 1972 (Lemarchand, 1981:417). Tombalbaye's inept control of the government was illustrated by Tombalbaye's revision and promotion of the "Yondo" rites of the Sara. This was instituted by Tombalbaye as a result of his "Africanization" campaign. Initiation into these rites was compulsory for all Sara adolescents and all candidates seeking admission to the bureaucracy or appointment to public office. These rites involved subsistence in the wild for days and even weeks at a time, and harsh, painful psychological and physical torture. The unpopularity of this campaign was mostly among the younger and more urban population whose support Tombalbaye desperately needed (Henderson, 1984:31).

As inappropriate as Tombalbaye's policies proved to be, this was only part of the situation in Chad at the beginning
of 1975. The Institute of International Studies summarized the situation in this quote:

Among the most formidable of its internal handicaps have been its landlocked situation, frequent changes in its political frontiers; vast desert areas; a small unevenly distributed population of diverse origins, religions, and ways of life; strong and often conflicting tribal and regional loyalties; traditional chieftancies of widely varying scope and authorities; and an almost total lack of internal communication...these impediments to national unity have been compounded by an unresponsive, often repressive government, and a plethoric, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt bureaucracy. Moreover, Chad's known economic resources are so inadequate and underdeveloped as to foster chronic dependence on external aid simply to maintain the administration, the armed forces, and the public services. (Thompson and Adloff, 1981:1).

The French troops' efforts only temporarily repressed the insurgency and by 1975 General Felix Malloum, a southerner, led a successful coup d'etat. Hissein Habre of the FAN faction, a northerner, was made prime minister and at this point a temporary lull in the fighting took place (Burch, 1987:4).

U.S. Policy Goals

The agreements under which the U.S. furnished bilateral emergency food aid to Chad provided that the U.S. was responsible for supplying the grains and paying transportation costs to N'Djamena. At that point, title to this food was turned over the Chad government. The Chad government was responsible for all distribution within Chad. Additionally, the Chad government agreed to keep the U.S. fully informed on the status of commodity receipts and
distribution and to provide complete details of the relief effort upon request (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:14).

**The Humanitarian Relief Operation**

The international relief effort was organized under the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The most efficient method of delivering the international aid would have been to ship the cargo by sea, and then by rail from the seaports to the interior distribution centers, and finally by truck to the refugee concentrations. However, when the emergency aid began, there was insufficient time to truck the humanitarian cargo from the railheads to the refugee camps because the dirt roads were washed out by the rainy season. Therefore, the only means to deliver the food from railheads to the refugees was by airlift (Walker, 1974:1342).

The American part of the mission was sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. The DOD supplied the aircraft and in May 1973, three C-130 aircraft from the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing at Pope AFB, North Carolina deployed to the Sahel. Two aircraft operated form Bamako, Mali and the third operated from N'Djamena for employment as required by the FAO. The operation was under the military control of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) and was named operation "Authentic Assistance" (Fuhrman, 1981:32-37).

The humanitarian relief operation in Chad took place between 30 May 1973 and 22 June 1973. The operation at
N'Djamena utilized a single aircraft, aircrew and small maintenance contingent. Additional maintenance and servicing was purchased from ESSO Corporation, Air Afrique and the French Air Force contingent. The maintenance personnel of the ESSO Corporation, Air Afrique and the French Air Force were extremely helpful to the American maintenance personnel who were unaccustomed to the heat, sand and dust (Fuhrman, 1981:37).

The operation consisted of hand loading wheat and sorghum in 50 and 100 kilogram sacks onto the floor of the aircraft. The cargo was then airlifted to one of five locations: Abeche (the only paved runway in Chad besides N'Djamena) Biltine, Largeau, Mongo and Iriba. Major Howie Seaboldt, the mission commander in Chad, reported that all the airfields in Chad had two potential common hazards. The first hazard was uncontrolled people and livestock transiting the runway. The aircrew had to remain vigilant to combat this hazard. The second hazard was lowered visibility during a sudden dust or sand storm. The aircraft carried extra fuel to increase the loiter times to await storm passage. Once the aircraft landed, the offloading was conducted by local work teams. At Abeche, the offloading was slow and disorganized; in contrast, the work team at Mongo delivered excellent service. The average loading and unloading times for cargo were approximately one hour. The operation in Chad resulted in 670 short tons of grain delivered from the N'Djamena distribution center to the
refugee concentrations within Chad ("Authentic Assistance," 1973:12).

Authentic Assistance should have been part of an international temporary measure to help the Sahel countries buy time and to devise a cost effective method to distribute the grain because airlift was a very expensive means of delivery. The President of Niger, Humani Diori said,

> The international community spent over 40 million dollars transporting food to Niger last year and most of that money went to airlift. For that kind of money, we could have irrigated 11,000 hectares of land near the Niger River which would have produced 110,000 tons of food. That is not far from our total needs...the economy simply does not make sense. (Walker, 1974:42-43)

Bureaucratic delays at national and international levels prevented the aid development projects from being implemented. Therefore, in 1974, another airlift was necessary to deliver grain. The American contribution was labelled operation "King Grain" and again, the area of operation was the same as in 1973: Mali, Mauritania and Chad (Fuhrman, 1981:40).

On 8 September 1974, two C-130 aircraft moved with support personnel from Bamako, Mali to N'Djamena, Chad. The grain destined for use in Chad was stockpiled at Maiduguri, Nigeria, 150 miles west of N'Djamena. This operation was delayed until 14 September due to the inability of the American embassy at Lagos, Nigeria to quickly secure overflight, landing and operating clearances at Maiduguri. Once the operation began, mission aircraft would fly to
Maiduguri for onload, and then deliver the grain to the
refugee locations in Chad, just as was done in the previous
operation, Authentic Assistance. The aircraft would return
to Maiduguri for onload and fly another delivery sortie
before returning to N'Djamena to remain overnight (Fuhrman,
1981:40).

The humanitarian relief operation continued in this
manner until the New York Times published a story on 10
October 1974 entitled, "Chad's Hungriest See Little of Food
Given by World." This article charged "incompetence, apathy
and participation in or toleration of profiteering on the
part of persons close to the national leadership."

President Tombalbaye's wife was alleged to be one of the
high-ranking government people involved (Kamm, 1974:2).

On 21 October the government of Chad canceled the
American humanitarian relief operation (Fuhrman, 1981:41).

A New York Times reporter wrote on 1 November 1974,

The Government of Chad had banned further American
food relief efforts in reaction to a New York
Times article...Chad's action was confirmed today
by United States State Department officials.

In the article, President Tombalbaye reportedly denied that
his wife was engaged in profiteering because she is "an
illiterate which in a way I wish it...it's better" (Gelb,

Due to these serious allegations of mismanagement of
the U.S. food aid to Chad, a formal study was accomplished
by the Comptroller General of the U.S. in June 1975, to
investigate the problems involved in the management of U.S. emergency food aid to Chad. Because of the strained diplomatic relations (Chad refused to accept any further U.S. food aid in October 1974) the study did not include any in-country work. The study mainly consisted of reviewing the Agency for International Development (AID) records in Washington, D.C. and discussions of the Chad situation with AID officials (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:Enclosure). The findings of this study will be used to answer the research questions in the following section.

Research Questions

**Question 1.** What was the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?

The process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during this LIC evolved as a result of a drought in the Sahel region. The policy was to organize an international relief effort to decrease the impending starvation of 5 million to 17 million people.

**Question 2.** Who was in charge of the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?

The international relief effort was organized under the United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The American portion of the relief effort was sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. The DOD supplied the military
The military aircraft and resources for this humanitarian relief operation were under the control of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM).

**Question 3.** Was there a specific plan of action for the humanitarian relief effort?

According to a study by the Comptroller General of the United States, one of the weaknesses of the Chad government was the lack of a relief plan. In February 1974, the U.S. embassy reported that the Chad government's method of determining relief requirements was to estimate the percentage of crop failure, convert that to the number of months that food should have been sufficient, and then to order that food distributions be withheld until that period ended. The Embassy noted that this method assumed there would be a relatively equitable commercial distribution of locally produced grains during the first part of the year and that, during the latter part of the year, 100 percent of food needs would have to be met by donated foods. The Embassy noted the dangers and inadequacies of this type of system (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:5).

Additional reports from the Embassy in May 1974 indicated that the Chad government still had not established an operational plan for food distribution. The drought minister could not provide figures or even estimates for the amount of food on hand in each prefecture (province). In late June 1974, the Embassy pointed out to the Chad
government that to make effective plans, the Embassy still needed to know tonnage goals for each distribution center in Chad. Also, for whatever reason, sometimes the Chad government failed to order distribution to begin (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:5).

Question 4. Was there communication between the providers of the humanitarian relief and host country relief administrators?

No. On July 27, 1974, the U.S. Embassy responded that most of the information requested on relief camps and at risk populations was not available either from the Chad government or other donors. The Embassy further stated that all of its efforts to obtain information about foods on hand and rates of consumption in or out of relief camps had led nowhere and that in Chad the problem was rendered more difficult by the government's sensitivity to outside agencies making direct contact with rural officials to assemble information or to propose assistance. The Embassy noted that large areas of Chad were virtually inaccessible because of bandits, outlaws, or rebels (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:15).

On at least two separate occasions, AID officials commented on the many problems in Chad, including the attitudes and weaknesses of the government. During August 1974, AID's acting assistant administrator for Africa described the Chad government as a "weak administrative structure and extremely rudimentary infrastructure." He
said that Chad had "inadequate information systems, few trained government officials, poor transport and communications, [and] problems of internal security" (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:3). In September 1974, AID issued a special report to Congress entitled "Famine in sub-Saharan Africa" which contained the following comments about the Chad government:

...The situation in Chad continues to present serious problems, mostly related to the vastness of the country, its weak administrative structure, political fractionalization and lack of internal communication. Inadequacy of data and statistics make it difficult to determine with precision the real impact of the drought on all parts of the country. (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:4)

**Question 5.** Did the host country have a usable logistics transportation infrastructure?

No. During the relief effort in 1973, there was insufficient time to truck the aid from the railheads to the refugee centers before the dirt roads were washed out by the rainy season. Therefore, the only way to deliver the food from the railheads to refugee concentrations was by airlift (Fuhrman, 1981:32).

In addition, AID's special report to the Congress during 1974 noted that landlocked Chad depends almost entirely on Nigerian ports for grain movements and that a conflict between Chad and Nigerian trucking associations about moving grains past the Chad border had been difficult to resolve. The problems included using Nigerian trucks in Chad and increasing trucking capacity to reduce the
accumulation of food at the Nigerian border point at Maiduguri. Also, since Chad had no railroad, an agreement between the government of Chad and Nigeria specified that 85 percent of all cargo entering Chad had to be transported by trucks of the Chadian trucking cooperative (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:8).

AID records indicated that during the spring of 1974 thousands of tons of relief food from the U.S. and other donors arrived in Nigerian ports. This food was moved to Maiduguri by Nigerian trucks and rail. However, at that point the food began to build up because the cooperative's trucking capacity on the Maiduguri-N'Djamena route was insufficient to keep pace with incoming deliveries. A report on the situation in June 1974 noted that donor grain was arriving at a rate of 450 metric tons a day but that only 170 tons of total cargo a day was being transported to Chad (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:8).
V. Conclusion and Recommendations

Introduction

An analysis of each country's, land, people, government, economy and history was presented earlier to provide a background for each humanitarian relief effort. In addition, the LIC aspect, U.S. policy goals, the actual humanitarian relief operations and the military logistics support provided were studied to answer the research questions. Up to this point, the study's main interest has been the documentation of important facts describing and assessing the military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC.

This final chapter contains a cross-case comparative analysis of the humanitarian relief efforts in Afghanistan and Chad. The analysis will involve comparing the answers to the research questions of each case in order to reach a conclusion to answer the specific research problem: "What are the key elements necessary to provide successful logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC?"

This chapter also presents recommendations for further study to supplement this thesis.

Research Questions

Question 1. What was the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?
The process and/or policy for providing the military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC was very clearly noted in each relief effort, Afghanistan and Chad. Although the documented processes and/or policies were different in both cases, the host country relief administrators and the providers of the relief were aware of the documented processes and/or policies of each humanitarian relief effort.

**Question 2.** Who was in charge of the process and/or policy for providing military logistics support of humanitarian relief during LIC?

In both cases, there was a designated official and government office from the host country and relief providers in charge of the process and/or policy for providing the military logistics support of the humanitarian relief efforts. For the Afghanistan case, the host country relief administrators were Pakistani officials while in the U.S. the Secretary of State had overall responsibility for the relief effort; however, on a daily basis the operational management was under the control of the DOD Director of Humanitarian Assistance (Leland, 1989: 22). For the Chad humanitarian relief effort the host country administrator was the Chad Drought Minister, while in the U.S., again the U.S. State Department had overall responsibility; however, the daily military relief operations were under the control of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM).
Question 3. Was there a specific plan of action for the humanitarian relief effort?

The Afghanistan case had a specific plan of action; however, the Chad relief effort did not have a specific plan of action. The lack of a specific plan of action for the food distribution within Chad discredited this relief effort. In September 1974, AID issued a special report to the Congress entitled "Famine in Sub-Saharan Africa," which contained the following comments on the attitudes and weaknesses of the Chad government:

...Governmental weaknesses and attitudes have been such that the food distribution and relief effort are not yet meeting all national needs, especially the problems facing the "at risk" population. (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:3)

Question 4. Was there communication between the providers of the humanitarian relief and host country relief administrators?

There was communication between the providers of the relief effort and the host country administrators in the Afghanistan case; but not in the Chad case. This lack of communication within the Chad government and between Chad government officials and the relief provider administrators greatly limited the full potential of this relief effort (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:16).

Question 5. Did the host country have a usable logistics transportation infrastructure?

In the Afghanistan case the host country for the relief effort (Pakistan) had a usable logistics/transportation
infrastructure. The logistics/transportation infrastructure worked so well in this case that the humanitarian goods not only went to the refugee camps inside Pakistan, but, also by camel, horse or mule over the mountains into Afghanistan (Leland, 1989:33).

Within Chad, there was a poor logistics/transportation infrastructure which resulted in all of the food not being distributed to the needy in a timely manner and in some cases not at all (Comptroller General of the U.S., 1975:3).

Conclusion

In summary, the Afghanistan humanitarian relief program was created in early 1986, following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and subsequent occupation of the country. The MAC aircraft (C-5s and C-141s) flew humanitarian missions to Islamabad, Pakistan, in support of the humanitarian relief program. On the inbound missions the MAC aircraft delivered excess DOD property and other humanitarian goods donated by private voluntary organizations. On the outbound missions, Afghans with serious war-related injuries were medically evacuated for advanced medical treatment in Europe, North America, and Egypt. MAC performed these flights to provide humanitarian assistance in a timely manner and to accomplish national policy objectives (Leland, 1989:75).

For the Chad humanitarian relief effort, it appeared that the U.S. officials in Chad were not able to fully insure that the food provided was managed effectively due to
a combination of factors, including (1) the Chad
government's sensitivities to what it deemed as outside
interference, and desire to make all decisions (well-founded
or not), and to control all operations for food aid within
Chad; (2) the lack of a relief plan for in-country
distribution; (3) Chad's vastness and primitive
infrastructure; (4) problems of security due to the LIC,
which reportedly existed on a large scale; (5) the small
U.S. presence.

The evidence from these case studies and the cross-case
comparative analysis were used to provide an answer to the
specific problem, "What are the key elements necessary to
provide successful logistics support of humanitarian relief
efforts during LIC?" The key elements needed were formed on
the basis of the research questions. First of all, a
process or policy must be provided along with an official or
government office to be held responsible for the relief
operation. This provides the first essential element for
any type of operation "command." Next, there must be a
specific plan of action for the humanitarian relief effort
for "control." Another essential element to provide
successful logistics support is "communication." There must
be communication between the providers of the humanitarian
relief and the host country relief administrators. Finally,
there must be the key element of a usable
logistics/transportation infrastructure to provide
successful logistics support of a humanitarian relief effort
during LIC. In other words any type operation, humanitarian relief or otherwise must have "logistics."

While these key elements are not all of the elements that are necessary to provide successful logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC, these elements are definitely some of the more important elements. The Afghanistan Humanitarian Relief program had all of these elements and was more successful in reaching U.S. policy objectives than the Chad humanitarian aid program which, was lacking essential elements and did not meet the established U.S. policy objectives.

Recommendations

Additional research is needed on the specific topic of the military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during LIC. Although this study involved two cases, there are more which deserve research. These future findings will provide interested parties the information needed to provide more effective and efficient humanitarian relief operations.
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Vita

Captain Jangrumetta D. Shine was born on 6 March 1962 in Decatur, Alabama. She graduated from Lee High School in Huntsville, Alabama in 1980 and attended the University of Alabama, majoring in Corporate Finance and Investment Management. In May 1984, she graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration and was commissioned in the United States Air Force. She served her first tour of duty at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota as an Executive Officer for the 321st Transportation Squadron. In 1985, Capt Shine was selected to be the base Vehicle Operations Officer and in 1986 she was chosen to be the second in command of the 321st Transportation Squadron as the Chief of Plans and Programs. In September 1986, she started her second tour of duty at Rhein Main Air Base, Germany. Capt Shine was assigned to the 435th Aerial Port Squadron, initially as an Air Terminal Operations Center Duty Officer during the first 19 months. She was then selected to serve as the installation Traffic Management Officer for the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing until May 1989, when she was chosen to attend the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology.

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**THE MILITARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS DURING LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT**

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**ABSTRACT** (Maximum 200 words)

This research study was limited to two cases (Afghanistan and Chad) involving humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict. To explore the topic of military logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict, a study of the land, people, government, economy and history of each country was accomplished to provide the background for each humanitarian relief effort. These variables, along with a study of the low-intensity conflict aspect, U.S. policy goals, the actual humanitarian relief operation, and the military logistics support provided, were used to answer the specific question: "What are the key elements necessary to provide successful logistics support of humanitarian relief efforts during low-intensity conflict?"
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